1. Bruno Bauer, Die Judenfrage, Brunswick 1843.

The German Jews crave for emancipation. What emancipation do they crave? Civic, political emancipation. Bruno Bauer answers them: No ody in Germany is politically emancipated. We ourselves are unfree. !ow shall we li erate you? "ou Jews are e#oists, if you demand a special emancipation for yourselves as Jews. $s Germans you ou#ht to la our for the political emancipation of Germany, as men for human emancipation, and you ou#ht to feel the special nature of your oppression and your dis#race not as an e%ception from the rule, ut rather as its confirmation. &r do Jews demand to e put on an e'ual ()*+footin# with Christian su ,ects? Then they reco#ni-e the Christian .tate as ,ustified, then they reco#ni-e the r/#ime of #eneral su ,u#ation. Why are they displeased at their special yo0e, when the #eneral yo0e pleases them? Why should Germans interest themselves in the emancipation of the Jews, if Jews do not interest themselves in the emancipation of Germans? The Christian .tate 0nows only privile#es. 1n that .tate the Jew possesses the privile#e of ein# a Jew. $s a Jew, he has ri#hts which a Christian has not. Why does he crave the ri#hts which he has not, and which Christians en,oy? 1f the Jew wants to e emancipated from the Christian .tate, then he should demand that the Christian .tate a andon its reli#ious pre,udice. Will the Jew a andon his reli#ious pre,udice? !as he therefore the ri#ht to demand of another this a dication of reli#ion? By its very nature the Christian .tate cannot emancipate the Jews2 ut, adds Bauer, y his very nature the Jew cannot e emancipated. .o lon# as the .tate is Christian and the Jew is Jewish, oth are e'ually incapa le of #rantin# and receivin# emancipation. ()3+The Christian .tate can only ehave towards the Jew in the manner of a Christian .tate, that is in a privile#ed manner, y #rantin# the separation of the Jew from the other su ,ects, ut causin# him to feel the pressure of the other separated spheres, and all the more onerously inasmuch as the Jew is in reli#ious anta#onism to the dominant reli#ion. But the Jew also can only conduct himself towards the .tate in a Jewish fashion, that is as a stran#er, y opposin# his chimerical nationality to the real nationality, his illusory law to the real law, y ima#inin# that his separation from humanity is ,ustified, y a stainin# on principle from all participation in the historical movement, y waitin# on a future which has nothin# in common with the #eneral future of man0ind, y re#ardin# himself as a mem er of the Jewish people and the Jewish people as the chosen people. 4pon what #rounds therefore do you Jews crave emancipation? &n account of your reli#ion? 1t is the mortal enemy of the .tate reli#ion. $s citi-ens? There are no citi-ens in Germany. $s men? "ou are as little men as !e on whom you called.

$fter #ivin# a criticism of the previous ()5+positions and solutions of the 'uestion, Bauer has freshly posited the 'uestion of Jewish emancipation. !ow, he as0s, are they constituted, the Jew to e emancipated, and the Christian .tate which is to emancipate? !e replies y a criticism of the Jewish reli#ion, he analyses the reli#ious anta#onism etween Judaism and Christianity, he e%plains the nature of the Christian .tate, and all this with oldness, acuteness, spirit, and thorou#hness, in a style as precise as it is forci le and ener#etic. !ow then does Bauer solve the Jewish 'uestion? What is the result? The formulation of a 'uestion is its solution. The criticism of the Jewish 'uestion is the answer to the Jewish 'uestion. The summary is therefore as follows: We must emancipate ourselves efore we are a le to emancipate others. The most ri#id form of the anta#onism etween the Jew and the Christian is the reli#ious anta#onism. !ow is this anta#onism resolved? By ma0in# it impossi le. !ow is a reli#ious anta#onism made impossi le? By a olishin# reli#ion. $s soon as Jew and Christian reco#ni-e ())+their respective reli#ions as different sta#es in the development of the human mind, as different sna0e s0ins which history has cast off, and men as the sna0es encased therein, they stand no lon#er in a reli#ious relationship, ut in a critical, a scientific, a human one. .cience then constitutes their unity. $nta#onisms in science, however, are resolved y science itself. The German Jew is particularly affected y the lac0 of political emancipation in #eneral and the pronounced Christianity of the .tate. 1n Bauer6s sense, however, the Jewish 'uestion has a #eneral si#nificance independent of the specific German conditions. 1t is the 'uestion of the relation of reli#ion to the .tate, of the contradiction etween reli#ious entan#lement and political emancipation. 7mancipation from reli#ion is posited as a condition, oth for the Jews, who desire to e politically emancipated, and for the .tate, which shall emancipate and itself e emancipated. 8Good, you say, and the Jew says so too, the Jew also is not to e emancipated as Jew, not ecause he is a Jew, not ecause he has such an e%cellent, #eneral, human principle of ()9+morality2 the Jew will rather retire ehind the citi-en and e a citi-en, althou#h he is a Jew and wants to remain one: that is, he is and remains a Jew, in spite of the fact that he is a citi-en and lives in #eneral human relationships: his Jewish and limited nature always and eventually triumphs over his human and political o li#ations. The pre,udice remains in spite of the fact that it has een outstripped y #eneral principles. 1f, however, it remains, it rather outstrips everythin# else.8 8&nly sophistically and to outward seemin# would the Jew e a le to remain a Jew in civic life2 if he desired to remain a Jew, the mere sem lance would therefore e the essential thin# and would triumph, that is, his life

in the .tate would e only a sem lance or a passin# e%ception to the rule and the nature of thin#s8 :8The Capacity of modern Jews and Christians to ecome free,8 p. 9;<. =et us see, on the other hand, how Bauer descri es the tas0 of the .tate: 8>rance has recently :proceedin#s of the Cham er of ?eputies, 3@th ?ecem er *A)B< in connection with the Jewish 'uestionCas constantly in all other political 'uestionsC#iven us a #limpse of a life which is free, ut revo0es its freedom ()@+in law, and therefore asserts it to e a sham, and on the other hand contradicts its free law y its act.8 8The Jewish Duestion,8 p. @). 8General freedom is not yet le#al in >rance, the Jewish 'uestion is not yet solved, ecause le#al freedomCthat all citi-ens are e'ualCis limited in practice, which is still dominated y reli#ious privile#es, and this unfreedom in practice reacts on the law, compellin# the latter to sanction the division of nominally free citi-ens into oppressed and oppressor,8 p. @9. When, therefore, would the Jewish pro lem e solved for >rance? 8The Jew, for instance, must cease to e a Jew if he will not allow himself to e hindered y his law from fulfillin# his duties towards the .tate and his fellowEciti-ens, #oin#, for e%ample, to the Cham er of ?eputies on the .a ath and ta0in# part in the pu lic sittin#s. 7very reli#ious privile#e, and conse'uently the monopoly of a privile#ed Church, must e surrendered, and if few or many or even the #reat ma,ority elieve they ou#ht still to perform reli#ious duties, this performance must e left to themselves as a private matter,8 p. @9. 8When there is no lon#er a privile#ed ();+reli#ion, there will no lon#er e a reli#ion. Ta0e from reli#ion its e%communicatin# power, and it e%ists no lon#er,8 p. @@. &n the one hand, Bauer states that the Jew must a andon Judaism, and that man must a andon reli#ion, in order to e emancipated as a citi-en. &n the other hand, he feels he is lo#ical in interpretin# the political a olition of reli#ion to mean the a olition of reli#ion alto#ether. The .tate, which presupposes reli#ion, is as yet no true, no real .tate. 8$t any rate the reli#ious idea #ives the .tate #uarantees. But what .tate? What 0ind of .tate?8 p. F;. $t this point we are rou#ht up a#ainst the oneEsided conception of the Jewish 'uestion. 1t was y no means sufficient to in'uire: Who shall emancipate? Who shall e emancipated? Criticism had a third tas0 to perform. 1t had to as0: what 0ind of emancipation are we concerned with? 4pon what conditions is the desired emancipation ased? The criticism of political emancipation itself was only the eventual criticism of the Jewish 'uestion and its true solution, in the 8#eneral 'uestion of the time.8

()A+Because Bauer does not raise the 'uestion to this level he falls into contradictions. !e posits conditions which are not involved in the nature of political emancipation itself. !e su##ests 'uestions which his pro lem does not imply, and he solves pro lems which leave his 'uestions unsettled. Whereas Bauer says of the opponents of Jewish emancipation: 8Their mista0e was that they assumed the Christian .tate to e the only real .tate, and did not su ,ect it to the same criticism that they applied to Judaism,8 we find Bauer6s mista0e to consist in the fact that it is only the Christian .tate, and not the 8#eneral .tate,8 that he su ,ects to criticism, that he does not investi#ate the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation, and conse'uently lays down conditions which are only e%plica le from an uncritical confusion of political emancipation with #eneral human emancipation. When Bauer as0s Jews: !ave you the ri#ht from your standpoint to crave political emancipation? we would in'uire on the contrary: !as the standpoint of political emancipation the ri#ht to demand of Jews the a olition of Judaism, or from men #enerally the a olition of reli#ion? ()F+The comple%ion of the Jewish 'uestion chan#es accordin# to the .tate in which Jews find themselves. 1n Germany, where no political .tate, no .tate as .tate e%ists, the Jewish 'uestion is a purely theolo#ical 'uestion. The Jew finds himself in reli#ious anta#onism to the .tate, which ac0nowled#es Christianity as its asis. This .tate is theolo#ian ex professo. !ere criticism is criticism of theolo#y, is twoEed#ed criticism, criticism of Christian and criticism of Jewish theolo#y. But however critical we may e, we cannot #et out of the theolo#ical circle. 1n >rance, in the constitutional .tate, the Jewish 'uestion is the 'uestion of constitutionalism, of the incompleteness of political emancipation. $s the sem lance of a .tate reli#ion is there preserved, althou#h in a meanin#less and selfEcontradictory formula, in the formula of a reli#ion of the ma,ority, the relationship of Jews to the .tate retains the sem lance of a reli#ious and theolo#ical anta#onism. 1t is only in the North $merican >ree .tatesCat least in part of themCthat the Jewish 'uestion loses its theolo#ical si#nificance and ecomes a really secular 'uestion. (9B+&nly where the political .tate e%ists in its completeness can the relation of the Jew, of the reli#ious man #enerally, to the political .tate, and therefore the relation of reli#ion to the .tate, e studied in its special features and its purity. The criticism of this relationship ceases to e theolo#ical criticism when the .tate ceases to adopt a theolo#ical attitude towards reli#ion, when its attitude towards reli#ion ecomes purely political. The criticism then ecomes criticism of the political .tate. $t this point, where the 'uestion ceases to e theolo#ical, Bauer6s criticism ceases to e critical. 1n the 4nited .tates there is neither a .tate reli#ion nor a reli#ion declared to e that of the ma,ority, nor the predominance of one cult over another. The .tate is alien to all cults. :Marie ou l'esclavage aux Etats-Unis, etc., y G. Beaumont, Garis *A59, p. 3*).< There are even North $merican .tates where 8the constitution does not impose reli#ious eliefs or the practice of a cult as a condition of political privile#es8 :l. c. p. 339<. "et 8no ody in the 4nited .tates elieves that a man without reli#ion mi#ht e an honest man8 :l. c. p. 33)<.

"et North $merica is preEeminently the country of (9*+reli#iosity, as Beaumont, Toc'ueville and the 7n#lishman !amilton assure us with one voice. Heanwhile, the North $merican .tates only serve us as an e%ample. The 'uestion is: What is the attitude of completed political emancipation towards reli#ion? 1f even in the country of completed political emancipation we find reli#ion not only e%istin#, ut in a fresh and vital state, it proves that the e%istence of reli#ion does not contradict the completeness of the .tate. But as the e%istence of reli#ion indicates the presence of a defect, the source of this defect may only e loo0ed for in the nature of the .tate. We are no lon#er concerned with reli#ion as the asis, ut only as the phenomenon of secular shortcomin#s. Conse'uently we e%plain the reli#ious handicap of the free citi-ens from their secular handicap. We do not assert that they must remove their reli#ious handicap as soon as they cast off their secular fetters. We do not transform secular 'uestions into theolo#ical 'uestions. We transform theolo#ical 'uestions into secular 'uestions. $fter history has for so lon# een dissolved in superstition, we dissolve the superstition in history. The 'uestion of the relation of (93+political emancipation ecomes for us the 'uestion of the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation. We critici-e the reli#ious wea0ness of the political .tate y critici-in# the political .tate in its secular construction, apart from the reli#ious wea0nesses. We transmute the contradiction of the .tate with a specific reli#ion, li0e Judaism, into the contradiction of the .tate with specific secular elements, and the contradiction of the .tate with reli#ion #enerally into the contradiction of the .tate with its #eneral assumptions. The political emancipation of the Jew, of the Christian, of the reli#ious man in #eneral, means the emancipation of the .tate from Judaism, from Christianity, from reli#ion #enerally. 1n its form as .tate, in the manner peculiar to its nature, the .tate emancipates itself from reli#ion y emancipatin# itself from the .tate reli#ion, that is, y the .tate as .tate ac0nowled#in# no reli#ion. Golitical emancipation from reli#ion is not a thorou#hE#oin# and consistent emancipation from reli#ion, ecause political emancipation is not effectual and consistent human emancipation. (95+The limit of political emancipation is immediately seen to consist in the fact that the .tate can cast off a fetter without men really ecomin# free from it, that the .tate can ecome a free .tate without men ecomin# free men. Bauer tacitly assents to this in layin# down the followin# condition for political emancipation. 87very reli#ious privile#e, and therefore the monopoly of a privile#ed Church must e surrendered, and if few or many or even the #reat ma,ority elieve they ou#ht still to perform reli#ious duties, this performance must e left to themselves as a private matter.8 The .tate may therefore achieve emancipation from reli#ion, althou#h the #reat ma,ority are still reli#ious. $nd the #reat ma,ority do not cease to e reli#ious y ein# reli#ious privately. The political elevation of the individual a ove reli#ion shares all the defects and all the advanta#es of political elevation #enerally. >or e%ample, the .tate as .tate annuls private property, the individual declares in a political manner that private property is a olished as

soon as he a olishes the census for active and passive eli#i ility, which has een done in many North $merican .tates. !amilton (9)+interprets this fact 'uite correctly from the political standpoint: 8The #reat multitude has won the victory over the property owners and the monied men.8 1s not private property ideally a olished when the haveEnots ecome the le#islators of the haves? The census is the last political form to reco#ni-e private property. "et private property is not only not a olished with the political annulment of private property, ut is even implied therein. The .tate a olishes in its fashion the distinctions of irth, status, education, and occupation when it declares irth, status, education, and occupation to e unpolitical distinctions, when, without ta0in# account of these distinctions, it calls upon every mem er of the community to participate in the popular soverei#nty on an e'ual footin#, when it deals with all the elements of the real popular life from the .tate6s point of view. Nevertheless the .tate leaves private property, education, occupation operatin# in their own manner, that is, as education, as occupation, and developin# their potentialities. >rom a olishin# these actual distinctions, it rather e%ists only upon their asis, and is conscious of ein# a political .tate and (99+enforcin# its communal principle only in opposition to these its elements. Conse'uently !e#el defines the relation of the political .tate to reli#ion 'uite correctly when he says: 81f the .tate is to have reality as the ethical, selfEconscious reali-ation of spirit, it must e distin#uished from the form of authority and faith. But this distinction arises only in so far as the ecclesiastical side is in itself divided into several churches. Then only is the .tate seen to e superior to them, and wins and rin#s into e%istence the universality of thou#ht as the principle of its form.8 :8Ghilosophy of Ii#ht,8 7n#. tr. p. 3;B.< By its nature the completed political .tate is the #eneric life of man in contradistinction to his material life. $ll the assumptions of this e#oistic life remain in e%istence outside the sphere of the .tate, in our#eois society, ut as the peculiarities of our#eois society. Where the political .tate has attained its true development, the individual leads not only in thou#ht, in consciousness, ut in reality, a dou le life, a heavenly and an earthly life, a life in the political community, wherein he counts as a mem er of the community, and a life in our#eois society, wherein he is active (9@+as a private person, re#ardin# other men as a means, de#radin# himself into a means and ecomin# a playthin# of alien powers. The political .tate is related to our#eois society as spiritualistically as heaven is to earth. 1t occupies the same position of anta#onism towards our#eois society2 it su dues the latter ,ust as reli#ion overcomes the limitations of the profane world, that is, y reco#ni-in# our#eois society and allowin# the latter to dominate it. Han in his outermost reality, in our#eois society, is a profane ein#. !ere, where he is a real individual for himself and others, he is an untrue phenomenon.

1n the .tate, on the other hand, where the individual is a #eneric ein#, he is the ima#inary mem er of an ima#ined soverei#nty, he is ro ed of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality. The conflict in which the individual as the professor of a particular reli#ion is involved with his citi-enship, with other individuals as mem ers of the community, reduces itself to the secular cleava#e etween the political .tate and our#eois society. >or the individual as a our#eois, 8life in the .tate is only a sem lance, or a passin# (9;+e%ception to the rule and the nature of thin#s.8 1n any case, the our#eois, li0e the Jew, remains only sophistically in political life, ,ust as the citi-en remains a Jew or a our#eois only sophistically2 ut this sophistry is not personal. 1t is the sophistry of the political .tate itself. The difference etween the reli#ious individual and the citi-en is the difference etween the merchant and the citi-en, etween the la ourer and the citi-en, etween the landowner and the citi-en, etween the livin# individual and the citi-en. The contradiction in which the reli#ious individual is involved with the political individual is the same contradiction in which the our#eois is involved with the citi-en, in which the mem er of our#eois society is involved with his political lions0in. This secular conflict to which the Jewish 'uestion is finally reduced, the relation of the political .tate to its fundamental conditions, whether the latter e material elements, li0e private property, etc., or spiritual elements, li0e education or reli#ion, the conflict etween the #eneral interest and the private interest, the cleava#e etween the political .tate and our#eois societyCthese (9A+secular anta#onisms are left unnoticed y Bauer, while he controverts their reli#ious e%pression. 81t is precisely its foundation, the need which assures to our#eois society its e%istence and #uarantees its necessity, which e%poses its e%istence to constant dan#ers, maintains in it an uncertain element and converts the latter into a constantly chan#in# mi%ture of poverty and wealth, distress and prosperity,8 p. A. Bour#eois society in its anta#onism to the political .tate is reco#ni-ed as necessary, ecause the political .tate is reco#ni-ed as necessary. Golitical emancipation at least represents important pro#ress2 while not the last form of human emancipation #enerally, it is the last form of human emancipation within the e%istin# world order. 1t is understood that we are spea0in# here of real, of practical emancipation. The individual emancipates himself politically from reli#ion y anishin# it from pu lic ri#ht into private ri#ht. 1t is no lon#er the spirit of the .tate, where the individualC althou#h in a limited manner, under a particular form and in a special sphereC ehaves (9F+as a #eneric ein#, in con,unction with other individuals2 it has ecome the spirit of our#eois society, of the sphere of e#oism, of the bellum omnium contra omnes.(@+ 1t is no lon#er the essence of the community, ut the essence of social distinctions.

1t has ecome the e%pression of the separation of the individual from his community, from himself and from other individualsCwhat it was ori#inally. 1t is only the a stract profession of special perversity, of private whim. The infinite splittin#Eup of reli#ion in North $merica, for e%ample, #ives it outwardly the form of a purely individual concern. 1t has een added to the heap of private interests, and e%iled from the community as community. But there is no misunderstandin# a out the limits of political emancipation. The division of the individual into a pu lic and a private individual, the e%pulsion of reli#ion from the .tate into our#eois society, is not a step, it is the completion of political emancipation, which thus neither a olishes nor see0s to a olish the real reli#iosity of the individual. The splittin#Eup of the individual into Jew and citi-en, into Grotestant and citi-en, into a (@B+reli#ious person and citi-en, this decomposition does not elie citi-enship2 it is not a circumvention of political emancipation2 it is political emancipation itself, it is the political manner of ecomin# emancipated from reli#ion. Horeover, in times when the political .tate as a political .tate is forci ly orn of our#eois society, when human selfE li eration strives to reali-e itself under the form of political selfEli eration, the .tate is driven the whole len#th of a olishin#, of destroyin# reli#ion, ut it also proceeds to the a olition of private property, to the law of ma%imum, to confiscation, to pro#ressive ta%ation, ,ust as it proceeds to the a olition of life, to the #uillotine. 1n the moment of its hei#htened consciousness, the political life see0s to suppress its fundamental conditions, our#eois society and its elements, and to constitute itself as the real and uncontradictory #eneric life of the individual. 1t is, however, only ena led to do this y a fla#rant violation of its own conditions of life, y declarin# the revolution to e permanent, and the political drama therefore ends as inevita ly with the restoration of reli#ion, of private property, and all the elements of our#eois society, as war ends with peace. (@*+Why not even the soEcalled Christian .tate, which ac0nowled#es Christianity as its asis, as the .tate reli#ion, and therefore adopts a proscriptive attitude towards other reli#ions is the completed Christian .tate. The latter is rather the atheistic .tate, the democratic .tate, the .tate which consi#ns reli#ion amon# the other elements of our#eois society. The .tate which is still theolo#ical and which still officially prescri es elief in Christianity, has not yet succeeded in #ivin# secular and human e%pression to those human foundations whose e%a##erated e%pression is Christianity. The soEcalled Christian .tate is simply no .tate at all, ecause it is not Christianity as a reli#ion, ut only the human ac0#round of the Christian reli#ion which can reali-e itself in actual human creations. The soEcalled Christian .tate is the Christian denial of the .tate, althou#h it is not y any means the political reali-ation of Christianity. The .tate, which still professes Christianity in the form of reli#ion, does not yet profess it in the form of the .tate, for its attitude towards reli#ion is a reli#ious attitude. 1t is not yet the actual reali-ation of the human asis of reli#ion, ecause it still operates upon the (@3+unreality, upon the ima#inary shape of this human 0ernel. The soEcalled Christian .tate is the incomplete .tate, and the Christian reli#ion is re#arded y it as the complement and the redemption of its imperfection. Conse'uently reli#ion ecomes its instrument, and it is the .tate of

hypocrisy. The soEcalled Christian .tate needs the Christian reli#ion in order to complete itself as a .tate. The democratic .tate, the real .tate, does not need reli#ion for its political completion. 1t can rather do without reli#ion, ecause it represents the reali-ation of the human asis of reli#ion in a secular manner. The soEcalled Christian .tate, on the other hand, adopts a political attitude towards reli#ion and a reli#ious attitude towards politics. 1f it de#rades the .tate form to the level of a fiction, it e'ually de#rades reli#ion to a fiction. 1n order to elucidate these anta#onisms, let us consider Bauer6s construction of the Christian .tate, a construction which has proceeded from contemplatin# the ChristianE Germanic .tate. .ays Bauer: 81n order to demonstrate the impossi ility or the nonEe%istence of a Christian .tate, we are fre'uently referred to (@5+that pronouncement in the Gospel which it not only does not follow, ut cannot follow without dissolvin# itself completely as a .tate.8 8But the 'uestion is not settled so easily. What then does this Gospel te%t en,oin? .upernatural selfEdenial, su ,ection to the authority of revelation, the turnin# away from the .tate, the a olition of secular conditions. Now all this is en,oined and carried out y the Christian .tate. 1t has a sor ed the spirit of the Gospel, and if it does not repeat it in the same words as the Gospel e%presses it, the reason is only ecause it e%presses this spirit in the .tate form, that is, in forms which are indeed derived from the .tate of this world, ut which are de#raded to a sham in the reli#ious re irth which they have to under#o.8 Bauer #oes on to show how the people of the Christian .tate are only a sham people, who no lon#er have any will of their own, ut possess their real e%istence in the chief to whom they are su ,ect, ut from whom they were ori#inally and naturally alien, as he was #iven to them y God2 how the laws of this people are not their creation, ut positive revelations2 how their chief re'uires privile#ed mediators with his own people, with the (@)+masses2 how these masses themselves are split up into a multitude of special circles, which are formed and determined y chance, which are distin#uished y their interests, their particular passions and pre,udices, and receive as a privile#e permission to ma0e mutual compacts :p. 9@<. The separation of the 8spirit of the Gospel8 from the 8letter of the Gospel8 is an irreli#ious act. The .tate, which ma0es the Gospel spea0 in the letter of politics, in other letters than those of the !oly .pirit, commits a sacrile#e if not in human eyes, at least in its own reli#ious eyes. The .tate, which ac0nowled#es Christianity as its supreme em odiment and the Bi le as its charter, must e confronted with the words of !oly Writ, for the writin#s are sacred to the letter. The .tate lapses into a painful, and from the standpoint of the reli#ious consciousness, irresolva le contradiction, when it is pinned down to that pronouncement of the Gospel, which it 8not only does not follow, ut cannot follow without completely dissolvin# itself as a .tate.8 $nd why does it not want to completely dissolve itself? To this 'uestion it can find no answer, either for itself or for others. 1n its own (@9+consciousness the official Christian .tate is an &u#ht, which is impossi le of reali-ation. &nly y lies can it persuade itself of the reality of its e%istence,

and conse'uently it always remains for itself an o ,ect of dou t, an unrelia le and am i#uous o ,ect. The critic is therefore 'uite ,ustified in forcin# the .tate, which appeals to the Bi le, into a condition of mental deran#ement where it no lon#er 0nows whether it is a phantasm or a reality, where the infamy of its secular o ,ects, for which reli#ion serves as a mantle, falls into irresolva le conflict with the inte#rity of its reli#ious consciousness, to which reli#ion appears as the o ,ect of the world. This .tate can only redeem itself from its inner torment y ecomin# the han#man of the Catholic Church. $s a#ainst the latter, which declares the secular power to e its servin# ody, the .tate is impotent. 1mpotent is the secular power which claimed to e the rule of the reli#ious spirit. 1n the soEcalled Christian .tate it is true that alienation counts, ut not the individual. The only individual who counts, the 0in#, is a ein# specially distin#uished from other individuals, who is also reli#ious and directly (@@+connected with heaven, with God. The relations which here prevail are still relations of faith. The reli#ious spirit is therefore not yet really seculari-ed. Horeover, the reli#ious spirit cannot e really seculari-ed, for what in fact is it ut the unworldly form of a sta#e in the development of the human mind? The reli#ious spirit can only e reali-ed in so far as the sta#e of development of the human mind, whose reli#ious e%pression it is, emer#es and constitutes itself in its secular form. This is what happens in the democratic .tate. 1t is not Christianity, ut the human asis of Christianity which is the asis of this .tate. Ieli#ion remains the ideal, unworldly consciousness of its mem ers, ecause it is the ideal form of the human sta#e of development which it represents. The mem ers of the political .tate are reli#ious y virtue of the dualism etween the individual life and the #eneric life, etween the life of our#eois society and the political life2 they are reli#ious inasmuch as the individual re#ards as his true life the political life eyond his real individuality, in so far as reli#ion is here the spirit of our#eois society, (@;+the e%pression of the separation and the alienation of man from man. The political democracy is Christian to the e%tent that it re#ards every individual as the soverei#n, the supreme ein#, ut it means the individual in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, the individual in his fortuitous e%istence, the individual ,ust as he is, the individual as he is destroyed, lost, and alienated throu#h the whole or#ani-ation of our society, as he is #iven under the dominance of inhuman conditions and elements, in a word, the individual who is not yet a real #eneric ein#. The soverei#nty of the individual, as an alien ein# distin#uished from the real individual, which is the chimera, the dream, and the postulate of Christianity, is under democracy sensual reality, the present, and the secular ma%imum. The reli#ious and theolo#ical consciousness itself is hei#htened and accentuated under a completed democracy, ecause it is apparently without political si#nificance, without earthly aims, an affair of misanthropic feelin#, the e%pression of narrowEmindedness, the product of caprice, ecause it is a really otherEworldly life. !ere Christianity achieves the

practical (@A+e%pression of its universal reli#ious si#nificance, in that the most various philosophies are marshalled in the form of Christianity, and, what is more, other mem ers of society are not re'uired to su scri e to Christianity, ut to some 0ind of reli#ion. The reli#ious consciousness riots in the wealth of reli#ious anta#onism and of reli#ious variety. We have therefore shown: Golitical emancipation from reli#ion leaves reli#ion in e%istence, althou#h not as a privile#ed reli#ion. The contradiction in which the supporter of a particular reli#ion finds himself involved with his citi-enship, is only a part of the #eneral secular contradiction etween the political .tate and our#eois society. The completion of the Christian .tate is the .tate which professes to e a .tate and a stracts from the reli#ion of its mem ers. The emancipation of the .tate from reli#ion is not the emancipation of the real individual from reli#ion. We do not therefore tell the Jews with Bauer: "ou cannot e politically emancipated without radically emancipatin# yourselves from Judaism. We tell them rather: Because you could e emancipated politically without entirely rea0in# away from Judaism, political (@F+emancipation is not human emancipation. 1f you Jews desire to e politically emancipated without emancipatin# yourselves humanly, the incompleteness, the contradiction, lies not only in you, ut it also resides in the essence and the cate#ory of political emancipation. 1f you remain enmeshed in this cate#ory, you share in a #eneral disa ility. But if the individual, althou#h a Jew, can e politically emancipated and receive civic ri#hts, can he claim and receive the soEcalled ri#hts of man? Bauer denies it: 8The 'uestion is whether the Jew as such, that is the Jew who admits that y his very nature he is compelled to live in everlastin# separation from others, is capa le of receivin# and concedin# to others the #eneral ri#hts of man.8 8The idea of the ri#hts of man was first discovered in the last century so far as the Christian world is concerned. 1t is not innate in the individual, it is rather con'uered in the stru##le with the historical traditions in which the individual has hitherto een rou#ht up. Thus the ri#hts of man are not a #ift from Nature, not a le#acy from past history, ut the price of the stru##le a#ainst the accident of irth and a#ainst the privile#es which history (;B+has e'ueathed from #eneration to #eneration up to now. They are the result of education, and can only e possessed y those who have ac'uired and earned them.8 8Can they really e claimed y the Jew? .o lon# as he is a Jew, the limitin# 'uality which ma0es him a Jew must triumph over the human 'uality which inds him as a man to other men, and must separate him from #entiles. By this separation he proclaims that the special 'uality which ma0es him a Jew is his real supreme 'uality, to which the human 'uality must #ive place.8 81n the same manner the Christian as Christian cannot #rant the ri#hts of man,8 pp. *F, 3B.

$ccordin# to Bauer, the individual must sacrifice the 8privile#e of faith8 in order to e a le to receive the #eneral ri#hts of man. =et us consider for a moment the soEcalled ri#hts of man, in fact the ri#hts of man in their authentic shape, in the shape which they possess amon# their discoverers, the North $mericans and the >rench. 1n part these ri#hts of man are political ri#hts, ri#hts which are only e%ercised in the community with others. Garticipation in the affairs of the (;*+community, in fact of the political community, forms their su stance. They come within the cate#ory of political freedom, of civil ri#hts, which does not, as we have seen, y any means presuppose the une'uivocal and positive a olition of reli#ion, and therefore of Judaism. 1t remains to consider the other aspect of human ri#hts, the droits de l'homme apart from the droits du citoyen. $mon# them is to e found li erty of conscience, the ri#ht to practise any cult to one6s li0in#. The privile#e of elief is e%pressly reco#ni-ed, either as a human ri#ht or as the conse'uence of a human ri#ht, of freedom. Declaration of the rights of man and of citizenship, 1 !1, article 1":(;+ #o penalty should attach to the holding of religious opinions$ %he right of every man to practise the religious cult to &hich he is attached is guaranteed by clause 1 of the 'onstitution of 1 !1$ %he Declaration of the (ights of Man, etc$, 1 !), includes among human rights, article : %he free practice of cults$ *ith respect to the right to publish ideas and opinions and to + ,-assemble for the practice of a cult, it is even stated. %he necessity for enunciating these rights presupposes either the presence or the recent memory of a despotism$ 'onstitution of /ennsylvania, article !, paragraph ): 0ll men have received from #ature the imprescriptible right to &orship the 0lmighty according to the dictates of their conscience, and nobody may legally be constrained to follo&, to institute, or to support, against his &ill, any religious cult or ministry$ 1n no case may any human authority interfere in 2uestions of conscience and control the prerogatives of the soul$ 'onstitution of #e& 3ampshire, articles 4 and 5: 0mong the number of natural rights, some are inalienable by their nature, because nothing can ta6e their place$ 7uch are the rights of conscience$ The incompati ility of reli#ion with the ri#hts of man is thus not implied y the conception of the ri#hts of man, ecause the ri#ht to e reli#ious, to e reli#ious accordin# to one6s li0in#, to practise the cult of a particular reli#ion, is e%pressly included amon# the ri#hts of man. The privile#e of faith is a #eneral ri#ht of man. The ri#hts of man as such are distin#uished (;5+from the ri#hts of the citi-en. What is man apart from the citi-en? Nothin# else than a mem er of our#eois society. Why is the mem er of our#eois society called 8man,8 and why are his ri#hts called the ri#hts of man? !ow do we e%plain this fact? >rom the relation of the political .tate to our#eois society, from the meanin# of political emancipation.

$ ove all we must record the fact that the soEcalled ri#hts of man, as distin#uished from the ri#hts of the citi-en, are nothin# else than the ri#hts of the mem er of our#eois society, that is of the e#oistic individual, of man separated from man and the community. The most radical constitution, the Constitution of *;F5, may e cited: Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen$ 0rticle ,$ %hese rights, etc$ 8natural and imprescriptible rights9 are. e2uality, liberty, security, property$ &f what consists li erty? 0rticle 5$ :iberty is the po&er &hich belongs to man to do everything &hich does not in;ure the rights of others$ >reedom is therefore the ri#ht to do and perform that which in,ures none. The limits within which each may move without in,urin# others are fi%ed y the law, as the oundary (;)+ etween two fields is fi%ed y the fence. The freedom in 'uestion is the freedom of the individual as an isolated atom thrown ac0 upon itself. Why, accordin# to Bauer, is the Jew incapa le of receivin# the ri#hts of man? 8.o lon# as he is a Jew, the limitin# 'uality which ma0es him a Jew must triumph over the human 'uality which inds him as a man to other men, and must separate him from #entiles.8 But the ri#ht of man to freedom is not ased upon the connection of man with man, ut rather on the separation of man from man. 1t is the ri#ht to this separation, the ri#ht of the individual limited to himself. The practical application of the ri#ht of man to freedom is the ri#ht of man to private property. 1n what consists the ri#ht of man to private property? 0rticle 15 8'onst$ of 1 !)9. %he right to property is the right of every citizen to en;oy and dispose of as he li6es his goods, his income, the fruit of his toil and of his industry$ The ri#ht of man to private property is therefore the ri#ht to en,oy and dispose of his property, at his will and pleasure, without re#ard for others, and independently of society: (;9+the ri#ht of selfEinterest. 7ach particular individual freedom e%ercised in this way forms the asis of our#eois society. 1t leaves every man to find in other men not the reali-ation, ut rather the limits of his freedom. But it proclaims a ove all the ri#ht of man to en,oy and dispose of his property, his income, and the fruit of his toil and his industry accordin# to his pleasure. There still remain the other ri#hts of man, e'uality and security. 7'uality here in its nonEpolitical si#nificance is nothin# ut the e'uality of the a ove descri ed li erty, vi-.: every individual is re#arded as a uniform atom restin# on its own ottom. $rticle 9 of the 'onstitution of 1 !) states: E2uality consists in the fact that the la& is the same for all, &hether it protects or &hether it punishes$

$nd security? 0rticle < of the 'onstitution of 1 !): 7ecurity consists in the protection accorded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property$ .ecurity is the supreme social conception of our#eois society, the conception of the police, the idea that society as a whole only e%ists to (;@+#uarantee to each of its mem ers the maintenance of his person, his ri#hts, and his property. By the conception of security our#eois society does not raise itself a ove its e#oism. .ecurity is rather the confirmation of its e#oism. None of the soEcalled ri#hts of man, therefore, #oes eyond the e#oistic individual, eyond the individual as a mem er of our#eois society, withdrawn into his private interests and separated from the community. >ar from re#ardin# the individual as a #eneric ein#, the #eneric life, .ociety itself, rather appears as an e%ternal frame for the individual, as a limitation of his ori#inal independence. The sole ond which connects him with his fellows is natural necessity, material needs and private interest, the preservation of his property and his e#oistic person. 1t is stran#e that a people who were ,ust e#innin# to free themselves, to rea0 down all the arriers etween the various mem ers of the community, to esta lish a political community, that such a people should solemnly proclaim the ,ustification of the e#oistic individual, separated from his fellows and from the community, and should even repeat this (;;+declaration at a moment when the most heroic sacrifice could alone save the nation and was therefore ur#ently re'uired, at a moment when the sacrifice of all interests of our#eois society was imperative, and e#oism should have een punished as a crime. This fact is even stran#er when we ehold the political li erators de#radin# citi-enship and the political community to the level of a mere means for the maintenance of these soE called ri#hts of man, proclaimin# the citi-en to e the servant of the e#oistic man, de#radin# the sphere in which the individual ehaves as a social ein# elow the sphere in which he ehaves as a fractional ein#, and finally acceptin# as the true proper man not the individual as citi-en, ut the individual as our#eois. %he aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man$ :Declaration of the rights, etc$, of 1 !1, article ,$< %he purpose of government is to assure to man the en;oyment of his natural and imprescriptible rights$ :Declaration of 1 !), art$ 1$< Thus even at the time when its enthusiasm was still fresh and 0ept at oilin# point y the pressure of circumstances, the political life (;A+proclaimed itself to e a mere means whose end is the life of our#eois society. 1t is true that its revolutionary practice was in fla#rant contradiction to its theory. While security, for e%ample, was proclaimed to e a ri#ht of man, the violation of the secrecy of correspondence was pu licly proposed.

While the indefinite li erty of the press :*;F5 Constitution, art. *33< was #uaranteed as a conse'uence of the ri#ht of man to individual li erty, the freedom of the press was completely destroyed, for li erty of the press could not e permitted when it compromised pu lic li erty. :Io espierre ,eune, 8Garliamentary !istory of the >rench Ievolution.8 Buche- et Iou%, p. *59.< This means that the ri#ht of man to li erty ceases to e a ri#ht as soon as it comes into conflict with the political life, whereas, accordin# to theory, the political life is only the #uarantee of the ri#hts of man, and should therefore e surrendered as soon as its o ,ect contradicts these ri#hts of man. But the practice is only the e%ception and the theory is the rule. 1f, however, we re#ard the revolutionary practice as the correct position of the relation, the riddle still remains to e solved, why the relationship was (;F+inverted in the consciousness of the political li erators, the end appearin# as the means, and the means as the end. This optical illusion of their consciousness would still e the same riddle, althou#h a psycholo#ical, a theoretical riddle. The riddle admits of easy solution. The political emancipation is at the same time the dissolution of the old society, upon which was ased the civic society, or the rulership alienated from the people. The political revolution is the revolution of our#eois society. What was the character of the old society? 1t can e descri ed in one word. >eudality. The old civic society had a directly political character, that is, the elements of civic life, as for e%ample property or the family, or the mode and 0ind of la our, were raised to the level of elements of the community in the form of landlordism, status, and corporation. 1n this form they determined the relation of the individual to the community, that is his political relation, his relationship of separation and e%clusion from the other constituent parts of society. >or the latter or#ani-ation of popular life did not raise property or la our to the level of social elements, ut rather completed (AB+their separation from the political whole and constituted them as special societies within society. Thus the vital functions and vital conditions of society continued to e political, althou#h political in the sense of feudality, which means that they e%cluded the individual from the political whole, and transformed the special relation of his corporation to the political whole into his own #eneral relation to the popular life. $s a conse'uence of this or#ani-ation, the political unity necessarily appears as the consciousness, the will and the activity of the political unity, and li0ewise the #eneral .tate power as the special concern of a ruler and his servants sundered from the people. The political revolution, which overthrew this domination and raised political affairs to the ran0 of popular affairs, which constituted the political .tate as a #eneral concern, that is as a real .tate, necessarily shattered all 7states, corporations, #uilds, privile#es, which were ,ust so many e%pressions of the separation of the people from their community. The political revolution there y a olished the political character of civic society. 1t dissolved civic society into its elemental (A*+parts, on the one hand, into the individuals, on the other hand, into the material and spiritual elements, which formed the vital content, the civic situation of these individuals. 1t released the political spirit, which

was imprisoned in fra#ments in the various lind alleys of the feudal society2 it collected all these dispersed parts of it, li erated it from its entan#lement with the civic life, and constituted it as the sphere of the community, of the #eneral popular concerns in ideal independence from its particular elements of civic life. The specific life activity and the specific life situation settled into a merely #eneral si#nificance. They no lon#er formed the #eneral relation of the individual to the political whole. The pu lic usiness as such ecame rather the #eneral usiness of every individual and the political function ecame his #eneral function. But the completion of the idealism of the .tate was at the same time the completion of the materialism of civic society. The throwin# off of the political yo0e was at the same time the throwin# off of the ond which had cur ed the e#oistic spirit of civic society. The political emancipation was at (A3+the same time the emancipation of civic society from politics, from even the sem lance of a #eneral content. >eudal society was resolved into its asic elements, its individual mem ers. But into the individuals who really formed its asis, that is, the e#oistic individual. This individual, the mem er of civic society, is now the asis, the assumption of the political .tate. !e is reco#ni-ed as such in the ri#hts of man. The li erty of the e#oistic individual and the reco#nition of this li erty are, however, tantamount to the reco#nition of the un ridled movement of the intellectual and material elements which inform him. The individual was therefore not li erated from reli#ion2 he received reli#ious freedom. !e was not freed from property2 he received freedom of property. !e was not freed from the e#oism of industry2 he received industrial freedom. The constitution of the political .tate and the dissolution of civic society into independent individualsCwhose relation is ri#ht, as the relation of the mem ers of 7states and of #uilds was privile#eCis accomplished in one (A5+and the same act. But the individual as a mem er of civic society, the unpolitical individual, necessarily appears as the natural individual. The ri#hts of man appear as natural ri#hts, for the selfEconscious activity concentrates itself upon the political act. The e#oistic individual is the sediment of the dissolved society, the o ,ect of immediate certitude, and therefore a natural o ,ect. The political revolution dissolves the civic society into its constituent parts without revolutioni-in# and su ,ectin# to criticism those parts themselves. 1t re#ards our#eois society, the world of needs, of la our, of private interests, as the foundation of its e%istence, as an assumption needin# no proof, and therefore as its natural asis. =astly, the individual as a mem er of our#eois society counts as the proper individual, as the man in contradistinction to the citi-en, ecause he is man in his sensual, individual, closest e%istence, whereas political man is only the a stract, artificial individual, the individual as an alle#orical, moral person. The real man is only reco#ni-ed in the shape

of the e#oistic individual, the true man is only reco#ni-ed in the shape of the a stract citi-en. (A)+The a straction of the political man was very well descri ed y Iousseau: 3e &ho dares underta6e to give instructions to a nation ought to feel himself capable as it &ere of changing human nature= of transforming every individual &ho in himself is a complete and independent &hole into part of a greater &hole, from &hich he receives in some manner his life and his being= of altering man's constitution, in order to strengthen it= of substituting a social and moral existence for the independent and physical existence &hich &e have all received from nature$ 1n a &ord, it is necessary to deprive man of his native po&ers, in order to endo& him &ith some &hich are alien to him, and of &hich he cannot ma6e use &ithout the aid of other people$ $ll emancipation leads ac0 to the human world, to relationships, to men themselves. Golitical emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one side, to the mem er of our#eois society, to the e#oistic, independent individual, on the other side, to the citi-en, to the moral person. Not until the real, individual man is identical with the citi-en, and has ecome a #eneric ein# in his empirical life, in his individual (A9+wor0, in his individual relationships, not until man has reco#ni-ed and or#ani-ed his own capacities as social capacities, and conse'uently the social force is no lon#er divided y the political power, not until then will human emancipation e achieved.

2. The Capacity of Modern Jews and Christians to become Free , by Bruno Bauer.
4nder this form Bauer deals with the relation of the Jewish and Christian reli#ion, as well as with the relation of the same to criticism. 1ts relation to criticism is its relation 8to the capacity to e free.8 1t follows: 8The Christian has only one sta#e to surmount, vi-.: his reli#ion, in order to a olish reli#ion #enerally,8 and therefore to ecome free. 8The Jew, on the contrary, has to rea0 not only with his Jewish essence, ut also with the development of the completion of his reli#ion, with a development that has remained alien to him8 :p. ;*<. Bauer therefore transforms here the 'uestion of Jewish emancipation into a purely reli#ious 'uestion. The theolo#ical scruple as to who (A@+stood the most chance of ein# saved, Jew or Christian, is here repeated in the enli#htened form: which of the two is most capa le of emancipation? 1t is no lon#er a 'uestion of whether Judaism or Christianity ma0es free? ut rather on the contrary: which ma0es more for freedom, the ne#ation of Judaism or the ne#ation of Christianity?

81f they wish to e free, Jews should e converted, not to Christianity, ut to Christianity in dissolution, to reli#ion #enerally in dissolution, that is to enli#htenment, criticism and its results, to free humanity,8 p. ;B. 1t appears that Jews have still to e converted, ut to Christianity in dissolution, instead of to Christianity. Bauer re'uires Jews to rea0 with the essence of the Christian reli#ion, a re'uirement which, as he says himself, does not arise from the development of Jewish essentials. $s Bauer had interpreted Judaism merely as a crudeEreli#ious criticism of Christianity, and had therefore read 8only8 a reli#ious meanin# into it, it was to e foreseen that the emancipation of the Jews would e transformed into a philosophicEtheolo#ical act. Bauer conceives the ideal a stract ein# of (A;+the Jew, his reli#ion as his whole ein#. Conse'uently he correctly infers: 8The Jew #ives man0ind nothin#, when he despises his narrow law, when he a olishes his whole Judaism,8 p. @9. The relation of Jews and Christians is therefore as follows: the sole interest of Christians in the emancipation of the Jews is a #eneral human, a theoretical interest. Judaism is a detrimental fact in the reli#ious eyes of Christians. $s soon as their eyes cease to e reli#ious, this fact ceases to e detrimental. The emancipation of Jews in itself is no wor0 for Christians. But in order to emancipate himself, the Jew has to underta0e not only his own wor0, ut at the same time the wor0 of the Christian, the criticism of the synoptics, etc. We will try to #et rid of the theolo#ical conception of the 'uestion. The 'uestion of the capacity of the Jews for emancipation is from our standpoint transformed into the 'uestion, what particular social element has to e overcome in order to a olish Judaism? >or the capacity for emancipation of the modern Jew is the relation of Judaism to the emancipation of the modern world. This (AA+relation is necessarily disclosed y the special position of Judaism in the modern su ,u#ated world. =et us consider the real worldly Jews, not the .a ath Jews, as Bauer does, ut the everyE day Jews. We will not loo0 for the secret of the Jew in his reli#ion, ut we will loo0 for the secret of reli#ion in the real Jew. What is the secular asis of Judaism? Gractical needs, e#oism. What is the secular cult of the Jew? !uc0sterin#. What is his secular God? Honey. Jery well. 7mancipation from huc0sterin# and from money, and therefore from practical, real Judaism would e the selfEemancipation of our epoch.

$n or#ani-ation of society, which would a olish the fundamental conditions of huc0sterin#, and therefore the possi ility of huc0sterin#, would render the Jew impossi le. !is reli#ious consciousness would dissolve li0e a mist in the real vital air of society. &n the other hand: if the Jew reco#ni-es as valueless this his practical essence, and la ours for its a olition, he would wor0 himself free of his previous development, and la our for human (AF+emancipation #enerally, turnin# a#ainst the supreme practical e%pression of human selfEalienation. We therefore perceive in Judaism a #eneral pervadin# antiEsocial element, which has een carried to its hi#hest point y the historical development, in which Jews in this ad relation have -ealously coEoperated, a point at which it must necessarily dissolve itself. The emancipation of the Jews in its last si#nificance is the emancipation of man0ind from Judaism. The Jew has already emancipated himself in Jewish fashion. 8The Jew who in Jienna, for e%ample, is only tolerated, determines y his financial power the fate of the whole 7mpire. The Jew who may e deprived of ri#hts in the smallest German .tate, determines the fate of 7urope.8 8While the corporations and #uilds e%cluded the Jew, the enterprise of industry lau#hs at the o stinacy of the medieval institution.8 :Bauer, 8The Jewish Duestion,8 p. *).< This is no isolated fact. The Jew has emancipated himself in Jewish fashion, not only y ta0in# to himself financial power, ut y virtue of the fact that with and without (FB+his coEoperation, money has ecome a world power, and the practical Jewish spirit has ecome the practical spirit of Christian nations. The Jews have emancipated themselves in so far as Christians have ecome Jews. 8The pious and politically free inha itant of New 7n#land,8 relates Colonel !amilton, 8is a 0ind of =ao0oon, who does not ma0e even the sli#htest effort to free himself from the serpents which are throttlin# him. Hammon is his #od, he prays to him, not merely with his lips, ut with all the force of his ody and mind. 81n his eyes, the world is nothin# more than a .toc0 7%chan#e, and he is convinced that here elow he has no other destiny than to ecome richer than his nei#h ours. When he travels, he carries his shop or his counter on his ac0, so to spea0, and tal0s of nothin# ut interest and profit.8 The practical domination of Judaism over the Christian world has reached such a point in North $merica that the preachin# of the Gospel itself, the Christian ministry, has ecome an article of commerce, and the an0rupt merchant ta0es to the Gospel, while the minister #rown rich #oes into usiness. (F*+8!e whom you see at the head of a respecta le con#re#ation e#an as a merchant2 his usiness failin#, he ecame a minister. The other started his career in the ministry, ut as

soon as he had saved a sum of money, he a andoned the pulpit for the counter. 1n the eyes of a lar#e num er, the ministry is a commercial career.8 Beaumont. $ccordin# to Bauer, to withhold political ri#hts from the Jew in theory, while in practice he wields enormous power, e%ercisin# wholesale the influence he is for idden to distri ute in retail, is an anomaly. The contradiction etween the practical, political power of the Jew and his political ri#hts is the contradiction etween politics and financial power #enerally. While the former is raised ideally a ove the latter, it has in reality ecome its ond slave. Judaism has persisted alon#side of Christianity not only as reli#ious criticism of Christianity, not only as the em odiment of dou t in the reli#ious parenta#e of Christianity, ut e'ually ecause Judaism has maintained itself, and even received its supreme development, in Christian society. The Jew who e%ists as a peculiar mem er of our#eois (F3+society, is only the particular e%pression of the Judaism of our#eois society. Judaism has survived not in spite of, ut y virtue of history. &ut of its own entrails, our#eois society continually creates Jews. What was the foundation of the Jewish reli#ion? Gractical needs, e#oism. Conse'uently the monotheism of the Jew is in reality the polytheism of many needs. Gractical needs or e#oism are the principle of our#eois society, and they appear openly as such so soon as our#eois society #ives irth to the political state. The God of practical needs and e#oism is money. Honey is the ,ealous God of 1srael, y the side of which no other #od may e%ist. Honey de#rades all the #ods of man and converts them into commodities. Honey is the #eneral and selfEconstituted value of all thin#s. Conse'uently it has ro ed the whole worldCthe world of man0ind as well as NatureCof its peculiar value. Honey is the ein# of man6s wor0 and e%istence alienated from himself, and this alien ein# rules him, and he prays to it. The God of the Jews has seculari-ed himself (F5+and ecome the universal God. 7%chan#e is the Jew6s real God. The conception of Nature which prevails under the rule of private property and of money is the practical de#radation of Nature, which indeed e%ists in the Jewish reli#ion, ut only in ima#ination. 1n this sense Thomas HKn-er declared it to e intolera le 8that all creatures have een turned into property, the fishes in the water, the irds in the air, the #rowths of the soil.8

What remains as the a stract part of the Jewish reli#ion, contempt for theory, for art, for history, for man as an end in himself, is the real conscious standpoint and virtue of the monied man. The #eneric relation itselfCthe relation of man to woman, etc., ecomes an o ,ect of commerce. Woman is artered. The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the monied man #enerally. The aseless law of the Jew is only the reli#ious caricature of the aseless morality and of ri#ht #enerally, of the merely formal ceremonies which pervade the world of e#oism. (F)+!ere also the hi#hest relation of man is the le#al relationCthe relation to laws which do not #overn him ecause they are the laws of his own will and ein#, ut ecause they are imposed on him from without. $ny infraction thereof is punished. Jewish Jesuitism, the same practical Jesuitism that Bauer infers from the Talmud, is the relation of the world of e#oism to the laws which dominate it, and the cunnin# circumvention of which is the supreme art of this world. The movement of this world within its laws is necessarily a continual a ro#ation of the law. Judaism cannot develop any further as a reli#ion, that is theoretically, ecause the philosophy of practical needs is limited y its nature and is e%hausted in a few moves. Judaism could create no new world2 it could only draw the new world creations and world relations within the or it of its activity, ecause the practical need whose rationale is e#oism remains a passive state, which does not e%tend itself y spontaneous act, ut only e%pands with the development of social conditions. (F9+Judaism reaches its acme with the completion of our#eois society, ut our#eois society first completes itself in the Christian world. &nly under the rei#n of Christianity, which turns all national, natural, moral and theoretical relations into relations e%ternal to man, can our#eois society separate itself entirely from the political life, dissever all the #eneric ties of the individual, set e#oism in the place of these #eneric ties, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomi-ed, mutually hostile individuals. Christianity spran# out of Judaism. 1t has a#ain withdrawn into Judaism. The Christian from the outset was the theori-in# Jew2 the Jew is therefore the practical Christian, and the practical Christian has a#ain ecome a Jew. Christianity had only appeared to overcome Judaism. 1t was too no le, too spiritual to a olish the crudeness of practical needs e%cept y elevation into the lue s0y.

Christianity is the su lime idea of Judaism. Judaism is the common application of Christianity, ut this application could only ecome #eneral after Christianity had completed the alienation of man from himself, and (F@+theoretically from Nature. Not until then could Judaism attain to #eneral domination and turn the alienated individual and alienated Nature into aliena le and salea le o ,ects. Just as the individual while he remained in the toils of reli#ion could only o ,ectivi-e his ein# y turnin# it into a fantastic and alien ein#, so under the domination of e#oistic needs he can only manifest himself in a practical way and only create practical o ,ects y placin# oth his products and his activity under the domination of an alien ein#, and investin# them with the si#nificance of an alien ein#Cof money. The Christian selfishness of liss is necessarily transmuted in its completed practice into the material selfishness of the Jew, heavenly needs ecome earthly needs, and su ,ectivity ecomes e#oism. We do not e%plain the Jew6s tenacity from his reli#ion, ut rather from the human asis of his reli#ion, that is, practical needs, e#oism. Because the real essence of the Jew has een #enerally reali-ed and seculari-ed in our#eois society, the latter could not convince the Jew of the unreality of his reli#ious essence, which is merely the ideal refle%ion of his practical needs. (F;+Conse'uently, it is not only in the Gentateuch or the Talmud, ut also in presentEday society that we find the essence of the modern Jew2 not as an a stract, ut as an e%tremely empirical ein#, not merely in the form of the Jew6s limitations, ut in that of the Jewish limitations of society. $s soon as society succeeds in a olishin# the empirical essence of Judaism, the huc0ster, and the conditions which produce him, the Jew will ecome impossi le, ecause his consciousness will no lon#er have a correspondin# o ,ect, ecause the su ,ective asis of Judaism, vi-.: practical needs, will have een humani-ed, ecause the conflict of the individual sensual e%istence with the #eneric e%istence of the individual will have een a olished. The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism.