G.R. No. 166865 March 2, 2007 ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F. BUENAVENTURA, Petitioners, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: Petitioners filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 of the subject property. Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors have acquired vested right over the subject property by their open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any adverse claim, meaning, their possession of the subject property was in the manner and for the period required by law; and that the subject property was already characterized as alienable and disposable land. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a registrable title over the subject property HELD: It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945. The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while petitioners possession over the subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent. TINGA, J.: FACTS: Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. No decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision which orders the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration of the said lot. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. However, the OSG argues that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed; and that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. ISSUE: whether prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case HELD: Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. It can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.

[G.R. No. 129471. April 28, 2000] DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS CAJES, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: The spouses Beduya obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines as security, mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank. The spouses Beduya later failed to pay their loans, as a result of which, the mortgage on the property was foreclosed. In the resulting foreclosure sale, petitioner was the highest bidder. As the spouses Beduya failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its ownership. However, it was then discovered that private respondent Cajes was occupying a portion of said land. Petitioner maintains that the possession by private respondent and his predecessor-in-interest of the 19.4 hectares of land for more than 30 years cannot overcome the issuance of TCT NO 10101. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is the rightful owner of the subject property HELD: It is true that the indefeasibility of torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However, it should not be overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the same. It was established that private respondent, having been in possession of the land since 1950, was the owner of the property when it was registered by Jose Alvarez in 1969, his possession tacked to that of his predecessor-in-interest, Ulpiano Mumar, which dates back to 1917.[41] Clearly, more than 30 years had elapsed before a decree of registration was issued in favor of Jose Alvarez. This uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could only ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten (10) years, in case the possession is in good faith and with a just title. Such prescription is called ordinary prescription, as distinguished from extraordinary prescription which requires possession for 30 years in case possession is without just title or is not in good faith.