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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Ambassador William Milam


Type of Event: Interview
Date: December 29, 2003
Special Access Issues: Treat aJ.. ...
Prepared by: Niki Grandrimo
Reviewed by: Scott Allan
Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy)
Location: 2100 K St.
Participants: 9-11 Commission: Philip Zelikow, Mike Hurley, Niki Grandrimo, &
Scott Allan

Interviewee Background

Ambassador Milam spent a majority of the last ten years of his career as an ambassador.
From 1990-1993, he served as Ambassador to Bangladesh. He returned to Washington in
1993 and served as a Special Negotiator for the State Department's ("State") Bureau of
Oceans, Environment, and Science for two years. In 1995, he was appointed
Ambassador to Liberia and from September 1998 - July 2001, he served as Ambassador
to Pakistan. Since 2001, Ambassador Milam has been a Senior Fellow at the Wilson
Center.

US Government's ("USG") Approach to the Taliban

Ambassador Milam arrived in Pakistan immediately after the August 1998 TLAM strikes
in Afghanistan. Because of the urgency of the situation, Ambassador Milam went .
directly from Liberia to Pakistan without being briefed in Washington. He commented
that after the bombings, it seemed as if the USG was trying to determine the best way to
deal with the Taliban, especially regarding Usama bin Laden C'UBL"). [U]

Ambassador Milam said that while the relationship between VBL and the Taliban had
received some attention by the USG prior to the bombings, it was not the top priority.
Ambassador Milam was not certain what issues were the highest in priority) but he
believes they included a representative political structure and the Taliban's treatment of
women. He commented that the approach to the Taliban prior to the bombings was more
nuanced and the usa was more in "watching mode." After the bombings, UBL was the
top priority. [U]

Pakistan's Approach to the Taliban

Ambassador Milam stated that the Government of Pakistan ("GOP") characterized their
policy towards the Taliban as one of "strategic depth" - they needed a friendly, pliable
neighbor on the west because of their hostile relationship with India on the east. He said
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that the GOP would support anyone who they thought could unify Afghanistan and who
would be supportive of the GOP. Ambassador Milam stated that it is possible that
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate ("ISID") created the Taliban, but it was
certainly true that ISID was helping the Taliban. [U]

He noted that the relationship between the GOP and the Taliban did not change after the
US cruise missile attack on Afghanistan; the GOP simply took greater caution in their
dealings with the Taliban. When asked if ISID officers were killed in the bombing of
suspected al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, Ambassador Milam said that he knew
that Pakistanis were killed but assumed that they were mujahadin who had gone to fight
in Afghanistan. However, because ISID used the camps to train Kashmiri militants he
stated that it was possible that the Pakistanis killed were ISID officers.

USG's Approach to 'Pakistan

Ambassador Milam opined that he thought the USG's approach to both the GOP and the
Taliban "had too many moving parts." He stated that the USG could never determine
what issues were highest in priority. He said that every time he called upon the GOP, he
had a significant number of talking points including nuclear nonproliferation, the Taliban,
and democracy. However, after August 1998, more of his talking points were related to
the Taliban and al Qaida. He said that he thought of himself as the Ambassador to
Afghanistan because he was spending 45-500/0of his time on 'Afghanistan. He believes
that the Embassy bombings were a "wake-up call" for the USG. [U]

Ambassador Milam stated that the USG had little leverage over the GOP with regard to
the Taliban because of the GOP's deep belief that a friendly, Pashtun-dominated
Afghanistan was in their national interest. He commented that even in the months just
prior to September 11,2001, the GOP thought they could work with and influence the
Taliban. He stated that, because of the Pressler and Glenn Sanctions,' the USG was not
. willing to offer the significant economic and political considerations that might induce
the GOP to stop their support for the Taliban. [U]

Ambassador Milam believes that the GOP never thought that the USG was serious about
the Taliban and al Qaida, despite the US cruise missile attack, largely because the strikes
were ineffective; they killed people but the camps were moved. As such, the GOP never
believed the USG would use force against them for their support of the Taliban. Thus,
the GOP was more worried about sanctions than military action. Ambassador Milam
stated that the GOP consistently told the USG that sanctions and the use of force was not
the way to influence the Taliban. The GOP recommended that the USG engage Taliban

J The Pressler and Glenn Amendments provided nuclear non-proliferation conditions on assistance to
Pakistan. Pressler Sanctions were applied to Pakistan for the first time in 1990 and Glenn Sanctions were
applied to Pakistan for the first time in May 1998. These sanctions were lifted on September 22,200 I,
after the September I I, 200 I terrorist attacks. [U]

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moderates and make them believe that the USG was willing to recognize the Taliban as
the legitimate government of Afghanistan. [U]

On October 23, 1998, Ambassador Milam was instructed to demarche the GOP on
pressuring the Taliban to expel VBL. He stated that the GOP's response again was that
the USG should engage Taliban moderates. He noted that this response was consistent
even after General Pervez Musharaff became President of Pakistan, but commented that
Musharaff was more helpful on counterterrorism. ~

The USG wanted the GOP to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban because of the
GOP's leverage with them. In Ambassador Milam's opinion, the GOP never used their
influence over the Taliban. When the GOP finally tried but failed, to convince the
Taliban not to destroy the Buddhist statues in Spring 2001, they realized that they had no
influence. Ambassador Milam believes that this was the impetus for the GOP to rethink
its relationship with the Taliban. [U]

Expelling UBL from Afghanistan

On October 11, 1998, Ambassador Milam met with Taliban Foreign Minister, Wakil
Ahmed Muttawakil, to discuss al Qaida and UBL. He was instructed to tell Muttawakil
that UBL was.a criminal who needed to be expelled or brought to justice within the next
few weeks. When asked where the USG wanted UBL expelled to, Ambassador Milam'
said that he believed Saudi Arabia however he noted that he was not aware of any
discussions between the USG and Saudi Arabia regarding this issue. He stated that
Muttawakil demanded proof that UBL committed the acts for which the USG accused
him. Muttawakil said that UBL was a guest in Afghanistan and the Taliban could not
reject a guest. However, Muttawakil acknowledged, according to Ambassador Milam,
that VBL was a problem and offered to try him in Afghanistan with an Ulema council
(religious scholars). The USG rejected this offer. ~

Ambassador Milam said that Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia also twice approached Mullah
. Omar regarding rendering UBL. Ambassador Milam speculated that Turki believed that
he had a deal with Mullah Omar the first time but realized the second time that Mullah
Omar was not going to surrender VBL. Ambassador Milam believes that the Saudis
initially aided the Taliban but became frustrated with them in 1999 and cut off aide. ~

Ambassador Milam commented that the USG might have had a chance to convince the
Taliban to render VBL prior to the cruise missile attack; however he did not know if the
USG would be willing to offer the Taliban enough diplomatically to induce them to do so
or if the Taliban would fulfill its role and actually render UBL. Ambassador Milam
stated that by the time of the TLAM attack, UBL had ingratiated himself so much with
Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, through money and ideological affinity that he
could not be persuaded to abandon support for UBL. ~

Ambassador Milam commented that the Taliban was not intimidated by the USG's
military power because the Taliban did not believe the USG would do more militarily

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than cruise missile attacks. However, the Taliban did take the usa seriously on the
diplomatic front because they desperately wanted to be recognized and control
Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations. Ambassador Milam stated that the USG always
dangled recognition before the Taliban but this became increasingly unrealistic due to
opposi tion from members of Congress and those who lobbied on behalf 0 f women's
issues. [U]

Sanctions on the Taliban

In July 1999, the usa adopted Executive Order 13129, which blocked property and
transactions with the Taliban. In addition, by December 2000, the United Nations
Security Council had adopted resolutions 1267 and 1333 which applied sanctions to the
Taliban. Ambassador Milam does not believe that the sanctions worked because the
Taliban did not change its position or actions. He stated that sanctions were insignificant
in Afghanistan because everything was smuggled into the country. [U]

He also stated that the sanctions did not have a significant effect on the GOP's
relationship with the Taliban. However, he believes that the sanctions did cause the GOP
to be more cautious about their dealings with the Taliban because the GOP did not want
to willingly violate the sanctions. Nevertheless, he believes that the GOP continued to
provide aid covertly to the Taliban. [U]

Ambassador Milam commented that in general, he does not believe that sanctions work.
He noted that the USG sanctions on the GOP prohibited military assistance/relationships.
As a result, a whole generation of senior Pakistani military officers did not have a
relationship with the USG. He stated that this is counterproductive in a country that is
run by the military. [U]

Assessment of the USG's Strategy Towards the Taliban

. Ambassador Milam said that by Spring 1999, the USG's strategy of leaning on the GOP
to lean on the Taliban to expel UBL was not working. He was convinced that the Taliban
would not render UBL; Mullah Omar was a lost cause, and the moderates in the Taliban
had no influence over Mullah Omar. Ambassador Milam sent a cable to Washington
stating that sanctions were not working and that the USG should increase its diplomatic
campaign with the Taliban to include more "carrots," such as recognition and
reconstruction aide, and different "sticks,' such as threatening to assist Ahmad Shah
Masood, leader of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan ("the
Northern Alliance"), in taking over Afghanistan. ~

Ambassador Milam also stated that the Taliban was winning the public relations war
regarding VBL, noting that the Taliban's praise for UBL had resonance in Pakistan,
. because the usa was not presenting any evidence that VBL was connected to terrorist
acts. Ambassador Milam does not believe he received a response to this cable or that this
cable prompted the USG's decision to intensify its efforts with the GOP in December

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1999. Ambassador Milam commented that the Millennium threat was the likely catalyst
for the USG's increased diplomatic actions. ~

Ambassador Milam does not know why Washington did not consider his
recommendations. He does not remember any specific carrots or sticks that were
presented to the Taliban except aid to Masood and he speculated that this occurred
because Dick Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the NSC, was
pushing for it. He stated that Clarke had a counterterrorism policy but this was not
incorporated into a greater Afghanistan or Pakistan policy. Ambassador Milam believes
that the USG did token things to make it look like the USG cared about Pakistan and
Afghanistan but was not willing to "seriously put anything on the table." ~

Increased Diplomatic Efforts with the GOP in 2000

On March 25,2000, President Clinton visited Pakistan and met with President Musharaff.
The two main issues of discussion were nuclear nonproliferation and Kashmir.
Ambassador Milam stated that in all of the meetings, President Clinton discussed the
Taliban and al Qaida but advanced nothing new. Ambassador Milam does not recall
Musharaffs response but noted that he likely put forth the standard response - that is, the
USG was dealing with the Taliban in the wrong way. Ambassador Milam noted that this
meeting did not result in any new policy initiatives from Washington. fSir.

In May 2000, Thomas Pickering, State's Under Secretary for Political Affairs, traveled to
Islamabad. Again, the main focus of this trip was Kashmir and not Afghanistan. Under
Secretary Pickering did however meet with the Taliban and the GOP's Minister of
Interior, Moinuddin Haider. Ambassador Milam said that Under Secretary Pickering
presented Haider with "evidence" against UBL, and while the Ambassador believes that
Haider was impressed by it, no further developments occurred. ~.

Transition from President Clinton to President Bush

. Ambassador Milam said that the change in administration did not result in a change in the
USG's policies towards Pakistan or Afghanistan. He stated that the Clinton
Administration increased its focus in 2000 but the focus declined during the transition
which lasted until around May 2001. Ambassador Milam commented that even after
President Bush's team was in place, time was needed to develop policies. However,
Ambassador Milam noted that by the end of May 200 1, the Bush Administration was
considering the removal of sanctions on India and Pakistan. In his opinion, the new
Administration wanted to break down the diplomatic barriers which could allow for
progress on Kashmir and Afghanistan. Despite this initiative, said Ambassador Milam,
the new Administration did not make firm decisions until after September 11, 2001. ~

Engaging the Taliban in 2001

In February 2001 Ambassador Milam had series of meetings with Muttawakil's


successor, Mullah Jalil. Ambassador Milam stated that he again asked the Taliban to

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render UBL to the USO. He described UBL as "a boulder in the road" of the Taliban's
relations with theusa. Ambassador Milam said that the Taliban consistently asked what
benefits they would receive for rendering UBL. Ambassador Milam always replied
"recognition" despite the fact that he was not authorized to make such a statement.
Likewise, Ambassador Milam does not believe that Jalil had the authority to make a deal.
He stated that Taliban officials could not do anything without the consent of Mullah
Omar, which could take a significant amount of time. In his opinion, the USG used this
as one rationale for not offering an aid package. ~

On June 20, 2001, Ambassador Milam demarched the Taliban telling them that the USG
would hold them responsible for any acts committed by al Qaida that harmed US citizens
or interests. The Taliban offered no new response. Ambassador Milam had his final
meeting with Jalil on July 3, 2001 at which time he reiterated this warning. ~

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Recommendations

Ambassador Milam stated that the USG placed too much emphasis on working with the
warlords in Afghanistan and might have been able to get UBL if the usa increased its
diplomatic overtures. Regarding the current war in Afghanistan, Ambassador Milam
expressed concern that the USG will not "stay the course" and noted that the USG must
remain in Afghanistan for a long time and invest a significant amount of money into the
country. [U]

Regarding Pakistan, Ambassador Milam stated that the usa must support Musharaff.
He believes that the recent attempts on Musharaff's life may translate into increased
efforts to crack down on extremists. He stated that the USG must help to transform
Pakistan into a more modem society. Ambassador Milam believes that the USG should

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push the GOP on women's education, curriculum reform in madrassas, and a more
democratic government. In addition, the USG should encourage Musharaff to form
alliances with other secular political parties. [U]

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