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A General's Public Pressure http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20091003707271.

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Washington Post
October 3, 2009
Pg. 13

A General's Public Pressure


By Bruce Ackerman

The president, the Constitution tells us, is the commander in chief. But is it true?

In a speech in London on Thursday, Gen. Stanley McChrystal publicly intervened in the debate over
Afghanistan. Vice President Biden has suggested that we focus on fighting al-Qaeda and refrain from using
our troops to prop up the government of President Hamid Karzai. But when this strategic option was raised at
his presentation, McChrystal said it was a formula for "Chaos-istan." When asked whether he would support
it, he said, "The short answer is: No."

As commanding general in Afghanistan, McChrystal has no business making such public pronouncements.
Under law, he doesn't have the right to attend the National Security Council as it decides our strategy. To the
contrary, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 explicitly names the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the
National Security Council's exclusive military adviser. If the president wanted McChrystal's advice, he was
perfectly free to ask him to accompany Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when the council
held its first meeting on Afghanistan this week.

But Obama did not extend the invitation, even though McChrystal was leaving Kabul and could have gone to
Washington easily. Instead, Obama asked the general to report to the council via a brief teleconference.

News of McChrystal's position had been leaked to Bob Woodward and was published in The Post early last
week. But it is one thing for some nameless Washington insider to engage in a characteristic power play; quite
another for McChrystal to pressure the president in public to adopt his strategy. This is a plain violation of the
principle of civilian control.

McChrystal seemed curiously blind to this point. He emphasized that the president had "encouraged" him to
be blunt when making his grim report on Afghanistan. But future presidents won't be so encouraging if they
know that their commanders might create political problems if they think that their recommendations will be
overruled. Instead, they will insist that their commanders tell them only what they want to hear.
Confidentiality is a condition for candid communications between commanders and the commander in chief.

McChrystal was almost cavalier in dismissing this point. After praising his superiors for encouraging straight
talk, he laughingly suggested that "they may change their minds and crush me some day." This is precisely
backward: Generals shouldn't need to be told that it is wrong to lecture their presidents in public. Perhaps
McChrystal was misled by the precedent set by Gen. David Petraeus, who strongly supported President
Bush's military surge in Iraq in 2007. Though Petraeus publicly endorsed the surge, this happened only after
Bush made his decision. Petraeus was backing up his commander in chief, not trying to preempt him.

Nevertheless, precedents have the habit of adding up. Unless McChrystal publicly recognizes that he has
crossed the line, future generals will become even more aggressive in their efforts to browbeat presidents.

We have no need for a repeat of the showdown between President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas
MacArthur over Korea. Truman faced down his general the last time around, but it was a bruising experience.

Though McChrystal may feel "crushed," he should show more self-restraint. Indeed, his breach should

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A General's Public Pressure http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20091003707271.html

provoke a broader discussion of the meaning of civilian control in the 21st century. It may well make sense
for the Pentagon, or a special commission, to frame more concrete guidelines so that we may avoid future
breaches.

The writer is a professor at Yale Law School.

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