KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN Institute of Philosophy

KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF SUBLATION A Critical Interpretation

Pro oter! Professor William Desmond

"issertation presente# to fulfill the re$uire ents for the #e%ree of "octor &Ph'"'( in Philosophy )y! Ral ! Palm

Leu*en+ ,--.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my promoter Professor William Desmond for his invaluable guidance throughout the work on this dissertation; philosophical expertise is one thing, and insight another, and I have been lucky enough to study under someone gifted with both in excess. I would also like to thank Professor udovicus De !os for his thoughtful and challenging comments; this study is all the stronger due to his input. I am grateful to the many other professors of the "oger Instituut voor Wi#sbegeerte, especially Professors Paul $ruysberghs, "erman De Di#n, %artin %oors, &art 'aymaekers, and 'udi !isker. What I know about philosophy I learned from them. (hanks also go to those who helped me with the final preparation of this dissertation. %atthew )ostelecky helped proofread the text and provided valuable philosophical feedback. *o )+hler was kind enough to double,check the -erman of the text for me. (his dissertation was greatly strengthened through the contribution of 'embert De &lander, who assisted me with the statistical analysis in $hapter .. %y brother /ric Palm, who also helped with the proofreading, has forgotten more about the /nglish language than I could seem to remember. (o these four, as well as 'en0e, %ichael, *ulianne, 1ydney, "eidi, (om, 2nneke, 3rank, uc, !incent, 1arah, %ichelle, Dan, &rian, *osh, Pascale, and anyone else that I have forgotten to mention4 you should know that your friendship over the years will always be remembered. (his dissertation has involved a lot of hard work, but no small part of its successful completion has been due to blind luck. I was fortunate enough to be born to parents who have supported and encouraged me my entire life. (his work would not have been possible without them, in more ways than I can count. 2nd to Iris4 ik kan geen woorden vinden, in geen elke taal, om te zeggen hoe belangrijk je bent voor mij.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................................1 -/5/'2 '/%2')1..................................................................................................................................6 78( I5/ 73 ("/ P'7*/$(.......................................................................................................................9 PART I: STRUCTURE..........................................................................................................................................8 CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS................................................................................................................................8 2. P71I(I!/ D/3I5I(I751..............................................................................................................................: 'emark4 7n (ranslating 2ufheben ..............................................................................................................6; &. 5/-2(I!/ D/3I5I(I751.........................................................................................................................69 6. 5egation....................................................................................................................................................6< .. 1ynthesis....................................................................................................................................................6: ;. Irony...........................................................................................................................................................6 CHAPTER 2: USAGE..........................................................................................................................................24 2. 3'/=8/5$>................................................................................................................................................? (able 6. 5umber of 7ccurrences of the !arious 3orms ...............................................................................< (able .. 1ummary of the Information on the Different !olumes..................................................................< (able ;. 'esults of the 'egression 2nalysis..................................................................................................@ &. 1>5(2A.......................................................................................................................................................;9 $. $75(/A(.....................................................................................................................................................;: (ransition to Part II.......................................................................................................................................?6 PART II: FUNCTION..........................................................................................................................................42 CHAPTER 3: BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING...................................................................................42 2. &/I5- 25D 57("I5-..............................................................................................................................?9 'emark4 7n the (ransitions in "egelBs ogic...............................................................................................?: &. &/$7%I5-..................................................................................................................................................9C CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND CONTRADICTION..........................................................5 2. ID/5(I(>.....................................................................................................................................................9@ 6. 2bstract Identity........................................................................................................................................9@ .. /ssential Identity.......................................................................................................................................<6 &. DI33/'/5$/, DI!/'1I(>, 25D 7PP71I(I75.....................................................................................<9 6. 2bsolute Difference...................................................................................................................................<9 .. Diversity....................................................................................................................................................<: ;. 7pposition.................................................................................................................................................DC $. $75('2DI$(I75.......................................................................................................................................D; 6. 3irst /xplanation.......................................................................................................................................D? .. 1econd /xplanation...................................................................................................................................:? CHAPTER 5: THE SYSTEM AND ITS MOMENTS.......................................................................................!3 2. 1>1(/%.......................................................................................................................................................@; &. ID/2..............................................................................................................................................................@< $. 37'% 25D %/("7D..............................................................................................................................6CC (ransition to Part III....................................................................................................................................6C: PART III: CRITI"UE........................................................................................................................................1#! CHAPTER $: INTERNAL CRITI"UE ...........................................................................................................1#! 2. D/3I5I(I751............................................................................................................................................6C@ &. 252 >1I1..................................................................................................................................................66: CHAPTER : E%TERNAL CRITI"UE...........................................................................................................128 2. D/3I5I(I751............................................................................................................................................6.: &. 252 >1I1..................................................................................................................................................6;@

'emark4 7n (ranscendence .......................................................................................................................6?. Phenomenological /xamples.......................................................................................................................6?; 6. 2nxiety....................................................................................................................................................6?; .. (rust.........................................................................................................................................................6?? ;. "ope .......................................................................................................................................................6?< CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................................................................15$ 2. %/("7D7 7->......................................................................................................................................69< &. 7&*/$(I!/1..............................................................................................................................................6<9 $. 1I-5I3I$25$/..........................................................................................................................................6<@ PART I&: SUPPLEMENTAL...........................................................................................................................181 D2(2 (2& /14 3'/=8/5$> 252 >1I1....................................................................................................................6:6 (able .. 1ummary of the Information on the Different !olumes...............................................................6:6 (able ;. 'esults of the 'egression 2nalysis...............................................................................................6:6 2 $7%P2'I175 73 ("/ 3I'1( 25D 1/$75D /DI(I751...............................................................................................6:. 3irst /dition, Paragraph 6............................................................................................................................6:. 1econd /dition, Paragraph 6.......................................................................................................................6:. 3irst /dition, Paragraph .............................................................................................................................6:; 1econd /dition, Paragraph ........................................................................................................................6:; 3irst /dition, Paragraph ..9 ........................................................................................................................6:; 3irst /dition, Paragraph ;............................................................................................................................6:? 1econd /dition, Paragraph ;.......................................................................................................................6:? 283"/&/54 2 &'I/3 "I1(7'I$2 7!/'!I/W...........................................................................................................6:9 -eneral........................................................................................................................................................6:9 )ant.............................................................................................................................................................6:9 1chiller ........................................................................................................................................................6:< %arx............................................................................................................................................................6:: &I& I7-'2P">......................................................................................................................................................6@6 5otes 7n $itations......................................................................................................................................6@6 Works $ited.................................................................................................................................................6@6 Works $onsulted.........................................................................................................................................6@;

INTRODUCTION
GENERAL REMARKS
3or "egel, the concept of Aufheben, or sublation, is Eone of the most important concepts in philosophy, a fundamental determination, which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophyFG6 >et, for such an important concept, it has received relatively scant treatment in the secondary literature. 2mong 2nglophone "egel scholars in particular, extensive discussion of the concept is difficult to find outside of a translatorHs preface.. I would like to take a small step toward rectifying this lacuna by presenting a critical interpretation of "egelHs concept of sublation. 1ublation can most simply be explained as the mainspring in the intricate clockwork of "egelHs thinkingIthat which drives it forward.; 8nderstanding what "egel means by the term BsublationB in this technical sense is vitally important to understanding "egelHs philosophy as a whole.? (his word, in its various forms, is ubiJuitous throughout "egelHs writings. /verywhere in "egel, one can read over and over again how a given concept is sublated in the transition to another. 2nd while one can read volumes on those concepts and

EAufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt K1 6C<; "W9L66;M. (his is the 3irst /dition version of the sentence. 1ee Part I! for a comparison between the two editions. . 1ee, for example, the translatorsB introduction of -.W.3. "egel, !he "nc#clopedia $ogic% Part & of the "nc#clopedia of Philosophical 'ciences with the (us)tze, trans. and eds. (.3. -eraets, W.2. 1uchting, and ".1. "arris K"acket Publishing $ompany, 6@@6M, xxvi, xxxv,xxxvi. (his text is particularly interesting because, due a dispute among the translators, two different introductions are given. 7ne of the points of contention is the proper translation of aufheben Kbetween BsublationB for "arris and -eraets and BsuspensionB for 1uchtingM. 2s a result of this dispute, their discussion is much more informative. (his dispute in discussed in more detail in the 'emark at the end of $hapter 6, 1ection 2. ; 2ccording to the %iller translation, "egel writes, referring to his BmethodB in the science of logic, N...the dialectic which it possesses within itself, which is the mainspring of its advance.N (he term BmainspringB, however, does not occur in the original4 N...die *ialektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welche ihn fortbewegt.N K1 9?; "W9L9CM . While BmainspringB is adeJuate, a more literal translation might be Bthat which moves it forwardB. 3or more on the relationship between sublation and dialectic, see $hapter ., 1ection 2 and $hapter 9, 1ection $ of this dissertation. ? 3or a discussion of the difference between the technical sense "egel gives to Aufheben and its meaning in everyday -erman, see $hapter 6, 1ection 2.

. their interrelation, the literature contains only a few scattered remarks on what exactly the word BsublateHIthe mechanism by which these transitions are carried outIactually means. (his study will attempt to show that the Juestions surrounding the meaning of sublation in "egel are not of a merely parochial, narrowly specialiOed interest. %any of the most prevalent criticisms of "egel hinge, one way or another, on a particular interpretation of his concept of sublation. 3or example, the widely held notions that N"egelHs philosophy violates the law of non,contradictionN or that N"egelHs philosophy is totalitarianN are both contingent on a re#ection of his claims about sublation.9 (hus, for both "egelBs defenders and his critics, a firm grasp of his concept of sublation is essential. 7f course, the topic of this study is not without precedent. 2ny works on "egel, especially those works related to his logic, necessarily carry with it at least an implicit interpretation of his concept of sublation. 5o one could have even begun to grasp the peculiar meanings "egel gives to logical moments like P2bsolute IdeaH or PconceptH without already having some understanding of sublationIeven if it is one that rests only in the background. In addition, one might well ask, why would we need a work on sublation, when we already have hundreds on, say, dialecticQ (he purpose of my approach here is to examine this old problem from a new angle. I hope to demonstrate that a more elaborate and explicit treatment of "egelHs logic in terms of the concept of sublation offers certain hermeneutical advantages, which will be presented as we proceed. It is my contention that a better understanding of "egelBs concept of sublation will provide a better means to understand the rest of his thinking. (o give a preliminary example, in discussing "egelHs logic in terms of dialectic, a conscientious author is forced continually to remind his readers of the differences between the meaning of dialectic for "egel and the meaning of dialectic for other thinkers and in other traditions. (his is especially important in order to make clear the way in which "egelBs dialectic is not a formal method
9

3or a more elaborate discussion of these criticisms, see $hapter 9.

; that can be readily abstracted from its sub#ect matter.< 2 treatment of "egelHs logic in terms of sublation helps avoid these sorts of potential confusions because sublation Kin the technical sense "egel uses the termM is essentially uniJue to his thinking alone.D 7n a more personal note, it is this distinctiveness that leads me to this topic. I began my philosophical studies with an interest in issues of identity and difference in politics. 3rom there, I followed this interest into Juestions of identity and difference in intersub#ectivity, writing my %asters thesis on "usserl and evinas,: each of whom take either identity K"usserlM or difference K evinasM as somehow having priority over the other. In the end, I found neither answer satisfactory. In "egel, I discovered a thinker who seemed to treat identity and difference not as competing privileges, but as ultimately interdependent. It is this sort of interdependence that he expresses through the term BsublationB. "aving moved from politics through social ontology to logic, I returned to the issues which first sparked my interest in philosophy and found myself in a dilemma. While I found that I sympathiOed with many aspects of "egelHs logic, I could not fully endorse all of them. While I had initially hoped to apply the concept of sublation to the other philosophical Juestions that interested me, I came to realiOe through further study of his work that such an application was not prudent, since any removal of the concept of sublation from the context of its role in "egelHs system would reduce it to exactly the kind of abstract, formal method which "egel Kwith good reasonM re#ected. I was led to the conclusion that what was needed was some way to extract what I saw as the fruitful elements of "egelHs concept of sublation from his body of work as a whole in a way that at the same time addressed "egelBs concerns about formal method.
<

"egelian dialectic is not an abstract method that can simply be applied to various contents, but is rather essentially bound to the determination of the content of the "egelian system itself. 3or "egelHs re#ection of any purely external formal method, as is found in traditional logic, see the Introduction of the 'cience of $ogic, 1 ?;,?9; "W9L;9,;D. D 3or an account of this distinctiveness, see Part I! NAufheben4 2 &rief "istorical 7verviewN. : 'alph Palm, E(oward the 7ther in "usserl and evinas4 2n Introduction to the Phenomenology of 1ocialityG, )atholieke 8niversiteit euven, .CCC.

? /arlier I wrote that sublation is the mainspring of dialectic, but this analogy is not entirely apt. (he system "egel presents is not an extensively related, mechanistic unity from which parts can be easily extracted and replaced. 'ather, it is an intensively interrelated, organic unity with each element dependent on all the others. 2ccording to "egelBs own conception of this system, a more appropriate analogy would be not a clockwork, but a living organism. 'emoved from its context, an element that makes up part of a living organism ceases to functionIboth the organ and the organism die. In terms of this organic analogy, one can see that it would be imprudent to browse through "egelHs system and extract any single element in isolation because the meaning of that element is dependent upon its position in and relation to the whole. It is in this sense that these elements are much less like tools than organs. (herefore, if there were a solution to this formal method problem, it would be less of a mechanical repair than an organ transplant, and sublation less the mainspring of dialectic than its heart. -iven this problem, the purpose of my critical interpretation is to analyOe in detail what "egel says about sublation and how he uses it KPart IM, to identify what role it plays in his system KPart IIM, and then, based on these analyses, to evaluate its relative strengths and weaknesses KPart IIIM. It is only after such an analysis that any subseJuent BapplicationB of the concept of sublation could ever find a firm basis. %y ultimate goal in this study will not be to apply sublation, but rather to establish the necessary preliminary groundwork for such an applicationIone that takes "egelBs re#ection of formal method Kand his reasons for doing soM seriously. In terms of the organic analogy, I will not perform the Borgan transplantB here, but rather conduct a sort of Bclinical studyB in order to explore how such a procedure might be beneficial, and to establish whether it would even be possible at all.

OUTLINE OF THE PRO'ECT

In this study, I analyOe of "egelHs concept of sublation in three ways4 structurall#, functionall#, and criticall#. 2s we proceed, we will see how each of these analyses is ultimately intertwined with all the others. (he remainder of this section will specify more precisely what I have in mind for each of these modes of analysis in particular. (he first part, on structure, analyOes "egelHs concept of sublation in terms of how his own writings present the concept, both explicitly and implicitly. $hapter 6, on the explicit structure, first deals with "egelBs own discussions of sublation as suchIhis Bpositive definitionsB of the term, or the points where "egel states what sublation is. 5ext, this chapter discusses the terms with which he contrasts sublationIhis Bnegative definitionsB, or points where "egel states what sublation is not. $hapter ., on the implicit structure, looks at how "egel uses the term and what that usage can tell us about its meaningIfrom the general level of the context in which and the freJuency with which the term sublation occurs, down to the specific level of the syntax of the sentences in which it is used. (he benefit of approaching sublation at this level of detail is that it will be useful for isolating some of the nuances of "egelHs sense of the term that might otherwise remain obscure. (hus, Part I will help clarify the most common misconceptions about sublation and provide an overview that will guide our later analysis. $ontinuing with the organic analogy, this section on the structure of the concept could be said to present the anatom# of sublation. (he second part takes up three examples from the 'cience of $ogic in order to illustrate how the concept of sublation functions in "egelBs system. If Part I discusses what sublation is, Part II discusses how it works. In the first chapter of this part K$hapter ;M, I discuss the classic first chapter of the $ogic, in which "egel treats the transition from &eing and 5othing to &ecoming. In the second chapter of this part K$hapter ?M examines the second

< chapter of the second book of the $ogic, on the EDeterminations of 'eflectionG, in order to discuss the relationships and subtle distinctions between the various moments of identity and difference presented there. In the third chapter K$hapter 9M, I look at the final chapter of the $ogic, on the 2bsolute Idea, in order to address the relationship between "egelHs system as a whole and its moments. In each case, these sets of examples will not be analyOed for their own sake, but more specifically in terms of the role sublation plays in their development. It is also important to note that while these three topics are #ust a small selection of the many possible examples of how sublation functions in "egelHs system, they have not been chosen arbitrarily. (hese topics were chosen not only because they each represent a good example of how sublation works in "egelHs system, but also because they each illustrate important aspects of the concept of sublation itself. (hus, the purpose of the functional analysis of Part II is twofold4 6M to show concretely how sublation works in these moments and .M to show what these particular moments in turn can tell us about sublation itself. 2nalogically speaking, if looking at the structure of a concept is like examining its anatomy, then analyOing its function would be an examination of the ph#siolog# of sublation. (he third part should be both the most challenging and, I hope, the most fruitful portion of my interpretation. "ere, I offer two basic critiJues of "egelHs concept of sublation. (he first chapter of this part K$hapter <M offers an internal critiJue of the conceptIa critiJue according to "egelBs own criteria and standards for philosophy. (he second chapter K$hapter DM presents an e+ternal critiJueIa critiJue appealing to premises not found in "egelBs philosophy per se. 2t first glance, it might seem that only an internal critiJue would be a valid one. "owever, this chapter also presents an argument for the way in which an external critiJue can sometimes have its own sort of legitimacy, especially when offered in con#unction with an internal one. While I believe the reference to internal criteria to be an essential aspect of any critical analysis, I also believe that necessarily restricting oneBs

D arguments to those criteria alone is unduly limited. (o summariOe provisionally my argument4 the purpose of the history of philosophy cannot be only to understand the past; it must also address its relevance for the present. (he final chapter K$hapter :M contains a series of concluding remarks on this studyBs methodology, ob#ectives, and significance. (here I summariOe the results of the study, present the reasons underlying my approach, and explore what I see as the potential significance of sublation for philosophy today. (his last chapter will also reveal the way the content of this study is reflected in its form. It is through a critical interpretation of the relationship between the content and form of sublation that a solution to the problem of applying the concept while at the same time addressing "egelBs re#ection of formal method will ultimately be found. In terms of the organic analogy, this third part would make up the prognosis for sublation. Part I! of this study contains various supplemental materials, including the data tables used in $hapter ., a side,by,side comparison of the first and second edition versions of the passage in the 'cience of $ogic in which "egel offers his most elaborate discussion of sublation, a brief historical overview of the concept of sublation, as well as the bibliography.

PART I: STRUCTURE CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS

A. POSITI&E DEFINITIONS
"egelHs standard corpus contains four references to sublation as such. (hat is, there are four moments in "egelHs published writings where he does not simply use the term sublation, but explicitly discusses its meaning. (he earliest explicit reference to sublation is found in the Phenomenolog# of 'pirit.6 In this text, however, "egel does little more than mention the fact of the conceptBs complexity. 2nother explicit reference to sublation can be found in the first part of the "nc#clopedia.. While this passage contains some specific examples of what "egel seems to have in mind, it is contained in the (us)tze, which are additions by a later editor based on the lecture notes of "egelHs students, and thus of Juestionable reliability.; (he most elaborate and reliable of "egelHs explicit references to sublation are found in the two editions of his 'cience of $ogic. I will rely primarily on an

N1ublation exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the negative4 it is at once a negating and a preserving.N N*as Aufheben stellt seine wahrhafte gedoppelte Bedeutung dar, welche wir an dem ,egativen gesehen haben- es ist ein ,egieren und ein Aufbewahren zugleich...N KP1<:; "W;L@?,(%M 5ote that in %illerHs original translation, aufheben is rendered here as PsupersessionH here, which I have modified for the sake of consistency. . N2t this point, we should remember the double meaning of the -erman expression BaufhebenB. 7n the one hand, we understand it to mean Bclear awayB or BcancelB, and in that sense we say that a law or regulation is cancelled.. &ut the words also means Bto preserveB, and we say in this sense that something is well taken care of. (his ambiguity in linguistic usage, through which the same word has a negative and a positive meaning, cannot be regarded as an accident nor yet as a reason to reproach language as if it were a source of confusion. We ought rather to recogniOe here the speculative spirit of our language, which transcends the Beither,orB of mere understanding.NN"s ist hierbei an die gedoppelte Bedeutung unseres deutschen Ausdrucks aufheben zu erinnern. .nter aufheben verstehen wir einmal soviel als hinwegr)umen, negieren, und sagen demgem)/ z. B., ein Gesetz, eine "inrichtung usw. seien aufgehoben. 0eiter hei/t dann aber auch aufheben soviel als aufbewahren, und wir sprechen in diesem 'inn davon, da/ etwas wohl aufgehoben sei. *ieser sprachgebr)uchliche *oppelsinn, wonach dasselbe 0ort eine negative und eine positive Bedeutung hat, darf nicht als zuf)llig angesehen noch etwa gar der 'prache zum 1orwurf gemacht werden, als zu 1erwirrung 1eranlassung gebend, sondern es ist darin der 2ber das blo/ verst)ndige "ntweder34der hinausschreitende spekulative Geist unserer 'prache zu erkennen.N K/ 69?; "W:L.C?,.C9M ; 2ny mention of text from these additions here is purely for their explanatory value alone, and does not imply any philological claim as to their relative authenticity; that is, the (us)tze can be used to explain "egel, but that does not mean their authorship need be attributed to him.

@ exegesis of the more extensive second edition version in order to present "egelHs explicit definition of sublation.? (he remark on sublation from the 'cience of $ogic comes at the end of the first chapter of &ook 7ne KE(he Doctrine of &eingGM between his discussions of becoming and determinate being K*aseinM. It consists of only three paragraphs and begins with the passage Juoted at the opening of the introduction where "egel claims that sublation is Eone of the most important concepts in philosophy.G Why, for "egel, is sublation so significantQ We can begin to explain its importance by Juoting the first lines of the second paragraph4 EP(o sublateH has a twofold meaning in the language4 on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and eJually it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to.G9 5ow, a word with more than one meaning is by no means remarkable in and of itself. 2ny dictionary is full of them. "egel, however, considers both of these meanings to function simultaneousl#. "e does not mean this simultaneity as a metaphor, or a pun, or in any figurative sense whatsoever. (he Juestion is thus how one is to comprehend such a Pliteral double meaningH, and therein lies the essence of sublationBs complexity. "egel begins to suggest what he means in the next lines4 E/ven Pto preserveH includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it.G< "ere, "egel refers to the common sense of aufheben used in ordinary, everyday -erman. 2s Walter )aufmann succinctly puts it, sublation Eis what you do when something has fallen on the floor.GD 3or example, a book falls of a shelf and then I put it back. (he Nnegative elementN is my removal of the book from the floor Ki.e. its immediacyM, but this action PpreservesH the book in so far as
? 9

1ee Part I! for a comparison of this passage in both editions. EAufheben hat in der 'prache den gedoppelten 'inn, da/ es soviel als aufbewahren, erhalten bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufh5ren lassen, ein "nde machen.G K1 6CD; "W9L66?M < E*as Aufbewahren selbst schlie/t schon das ,egative in sich, da/ etwas seiner .nmittelbarkeit und damit einem den )u/erlichen "inwirkungen offenen *asein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten.G K1 6CD; "W9L66?M D Walter )aufmann, 6egel% A 7einterpretation K8niversity of 5otre Dame Press, 6@<9M, 6??. 3ew commentators before or since have so clear. )aufmannBs work on "egel, while somewhat dated, is invaluable for #ust this sort of clarity that he provides in his explanations.

6C it wonHt get stepped on Ki.e. Nan existence which is open to external influencesNM. What is important to note here is that the technical sense that "egel gives to sublation is not arbitrarily added to an ordinary -erman word, but is rather drawn out of it through a contemplation of that ordinary sense.: "egel continues4 E(hus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.G@ "ere, "egel emphasiOes the importance of the simultaneity of the two senses of sublation.6C It is also important to note that, while "egel draws out the preservative sense of sublation, this preservation does not mean that the ob#ect remains unchanged.66 "egel goes on to explain what he sees as the broader significance of this double meaning4 E(he two definitions of Pto sublateH which we have given can be Juoted as two dictionary meanings of this word. &ut it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings.G6. 5ow we can see that "egel presents sublation as having a double meaning, which is to be taken not only as literal and simultaneous, but also in which each meaning is opposed to the other. (hat is, the two meanings are not only expressed at the same time, but they also KordinarilyM mutually exclude each other. 1ince we are to take this literally, "egelHs definition of sublation would seem, at first, to violate the law of non,contradiction. Determining how one is to make sense of this Kor indeed, if it is possible to do so at allM will be discussed later in more detail.6; 3or the moment, "egelBs claim must be provisionally accepted, at least as a possibility.
:

(his distinction between "egelBs technical and nontechnical uses of aufheben is taken from 1uchtingBs portion of the translatorBs introduction to !he "nc#clopedia $ogic, / xxxv. @ E'o ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine .nmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht vernichtet ist.G K1 6CD; "W9L66?,/2M 6C I will discuss the difference between sublation and negation in more detail in the next section on "egelBs B5egative DefinitionsB of sublation. 66 "ere I mean the grammatical ob#ect of the verb Pto sublateH and not the ob#ect in its technical, philosophical sense. $oncepts can eJually be Pob#ectsH of sublation in this grammatical sense. 1ee $hapter ., 1ection & on 1yntax for more details on this important distinction. 6. E*ie angegebenen zwei Bestimmungen des Aufhebens k5nnen le+ikalisch als zwei Bedeutungen dieses 0ortes aufgef2hrt werden. Auffallend m2/te es aber dabei sein, da/ eine 'prache dazu gekommen ist, ein und dasselbe 0ort f2r zwei entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen zu gebrauchen.G K1 6CD; "W9L66?,/2M 6; 1ee $hapter ?, 1ection $.

66 In the next lines, "egel adds4 EIt is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the -erman language has a number of such.G6? "egel here identifies sublationHs double meaning as a speculative one. 7f course, the term speculation does not have a pe#orative connotation for "egel. It is the term by which he identifies his own thinking at its highest level. "egel contrasts speculation with what he refers to as PreflectionH. Where reflection separates an ob#ect of thought into parts, speculation reunites these partsIovercoming their opposition. (his contrast between the separation and the unity of opposites corresponds to the well,known distinction between understanding and reason. In this way, when "egel claims that sublationHs double meaning is speculative, he is claiming, in effect, that it is rational.69 (o summariOe what we have seen so far, "egel positively defines his technical sense of sublation as having the meanings of both negation and preservation in a way that is4 R double R literal R simultaneous R self,opposed R speculative Kor rationalM 7n top of this, "egel seems to stack a third, simultaneously active meaning onto his already crowded term. In remarking on the relationship between the -erman aufheben and the atin tollere, "egel writes that4 E(he double meaning of the atin tollere Kwhich has become famous through the $iceronian pun4 tollendum est 4ctaviumM does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only a lifting up.G6< %any commentators and translators have interpreted "egel to mean that, in addition to negation and preservation, "egel intends to add a third meaning of PelevationH. (his addition is traditional and common in scholarly treatments of the term. 3or example, %ichael Inwood, in his entry on sublation in his 6egel
6?

E82r das spekulative *enken ist es erfreulich, in der 'prache 05rter zu finden, welche eine spekulative Bedeutung an ihnen selbst haben- die deutsche 'prache hat mehrere dergleichen.G K1 6CD; "W9L66?,/2M 69 1ee the "nc#clopedia passage cited earlier in this chapter, in note .. 6< E*er *oppelsinn des lateinischen tollere 9der durch den :iceronianischen 0itz ;tollendum esse 4ctavium< ber2hmt geworden= geht nicht so weit, die affirmative Bestimmung geht nur bis zum "mporheben.G K1 6CD; "W9L66?M

6. *ictionar#, writes4
What results from the sublation of something, e.g. the whole in which both it and its opposite survive as moments, is invariably higher than, or the truth of, the itemKsM sublated. (hus despite "egelBs silence on the matter, it is reasonable to see...BelevationB as an ingredient in its "egelian meaning.N6D

InwoodBs Ket al.M inference here is incorrect. While elevation may be implied by the progressive nature of "egelHs thought and is present in the ordinary -erman sense of aufheben, it is not a feature of sublation in its technical "egelian sense. 3rom the "egel passage cited above, it is clear that, like aufheben, tollere has a double meaningIone positive KPaffirmativeNM and one negative. In this passage, however, the affirmative meaning of tollere KNto lift upNM is contrasted with the affirmative meaning of aufheben KNto preserveNM. !ollereHs affirmative meaning is said to be NonlyN elevation. "egel is therefore claiming that the opposition within aufheben is stronger than that of tollere, because in aufheben preservation operates in a stronger contrast to negation than elevation does. In effect, preservation PreplacesH elevation as the affirmative meaning in the internal opposition contained within the technical "egelian sense of the term. In other words, the connotation of elevation Kwhich aufheben carries over from its non,technical, ordinary -erman senseM is not a third denotation, but rather a weaker aspect of preservation. /ven though it contradicts "egelBs own explicit statements on the matter, the mistake of interpolating the sense of BelevationB into sublation is nevertheless an understandable one. /levation is both a part of the ordinary -erman sense of the term and implied by the overall structure of "egelBs logic. "oweverIand this is very importantIelevation is not a sense of "egelBs own strictly technical sense of the term itself. (he error here is a matter of interpolating the use that the term is put to Kin "egelBs philosophy in generalM into the meaning of the term itself, thereby conflating "egelBs philosophy with his terminology. &ut any philosophy is more than the mere sum of its vocabulary. While sublation is the operant

6D

%ichael Inwood, A 6egel *ictionar# K&lackwell, 6@@.M, .:?.

6; term6: in the overall process of "egelBs logic, it should not be conflated with that process. 7ne might say, for example, that Ball surgery involves cuttingB, but that does not mean that the denotation of the term BcuttingB itself somehow implies surgery. $onflating the meaning of a term with its use obscures both. 1ublation is an important part of "egelBs logic, but that does not mean one should mistake the part for the whole. 1uch a conflation is also the reason why K/nglishM translators have expended so much effort trying to find the Bperfect wordB to render "egelBs aufheben, using words like supersede, sublimate, suspend, and so forth. (he problem here is that no single /nglish word Kor, in fact, a single word in any languageM can convey the entirety of "egelBs intended philosophical meaning. %oreover, the same would be true for almost any philosophically interesting term. What is expected in these translations is that some perfect word choice could somehow Bbear the weightB of explaining a conceptBs complexitiesIthat translation could somehow serve as a substitute for a more elaborate interpretation. What is reJuired here, however, is not a better translation, but a better explanation. It is from the moment one confuses the two, and Kin the case of elevation and sublationM begins interpolating "egelBs philosophy into his terminology Ke.g. with a translation like supersedeM, that "egelBs aufheben first becomes, for /nglish readers, something seemingly inexplicable.

Remark: On Translating A()*+,+(his conflict between translation and explanation is also why in this study I have simply adopted the traditional /nglish translation of aufheben as sublation,6@ rather than
6:

&y Boperant termB, I mean that sublation is the Blogical operatorB of "egelBs dialectical,speculative logic, in a manner analogous to the way con#unction, dis#unction, negation, condition, and bicondition are the operators of formal KsymbolicM logic, or the way addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are the operators of mathematics. 7f course, in making this analogy, I do not mean to imply that "egelBs logic is literally formal in any respect. It is only an analogy, not an eJuivalence. 6@ (he translation of aufheben with BsublationB comes originally from *.%. 1tirling, !he 'ecret of 6egel% Being the 6egelian '#stem in 4rigin, Principle, 8orm and >atter Kreprint 7liver and &oyd, 6:@:4 original 6:<9M. (he link between the two terms is via tollere, of which sublatus is the past participle KInwood, .:;M. (he problem with this translation, in addition to the fact that BsublationB has long been obsolete, is that while aufheben has been used to translate tollere into -erman Ke.g. in Wolff and &aumgartenM, "egel himself contrasts the two terms.

6? experiment with some substitute. I am inclined to agree with 1uchting that BsuspensionB works well as a possible /nglish translation. "arris and -eraetsBs argument that suspension is Nout of place in pure logicN is a non se?uitur..C 1uchting mentions that N(he only ob#ection I have heard against the suggestion is that BsuspendB has an overtone of temporariness, which aufheben, at least in "egelBs technical use of it, does not.N.6 1ince "arris and -eraetsBs introduction provides no real #ustification for their decision, one need not wonder for long from whom 1uchting heard this ob#ection. It is, in any case, an unsound one, insofar as the temporary connotations of BsuspensionB are related to its institutional Kand academicM senses, and not, say, its physical or chemical senses; few would argue that salt is NtemporarilyN suspended in seawater Kexcept on a broad hydrological scaleM or that the &rooklyn bridge Ka suspension bridgeM is a NtemporaryN construction Kopened 6::;M. I have not adopted this substitution simply because its utility as a translation is metaphorical; suspension has a dual sense, but it conveys "egelBs particular dual sense of aufheben only figuratively. ike aufheben, suspension has a dual sense, but this does not mean anything other than that they are comparable, not that they are synonymous. 3or example, the negative aspect of suspension in its chemical senseIBdissolutionBIis comparable to negation, but is not literally negation. &y contrast, "egel is explicit in his contention that the double meaning of aufheben is to be taken literally. 2ny introduction of metaphor into the eJuation, even if it is not the sort of metaphor "egel re#ected, still risks confusion. (he problem is that there is no literal, direct translation for aufheben. 2ny /nglish term would simply be a place,holder, because there is no single verbum verbo eJuivalent... 5or is such a word,for,word substitution strictly necessary. 'ecogniOing this, some
.C

/ xxvi. 5o reason is given Kby "arris and -eraetsM wh# it would be Bout of placeB, or why it would even matter if it were. .6 / xxvi .. 3or sublationBs utility as a place,holder, see the translatorBs remark in *ean uc,5ancy, 6egel% !he 7estlessness of the ,egative, trans. *ason 1mith and 1teven %iller K8niversity of %innesota, .CC.M, 66: n.6;. 5ancy himself is not interested in the Nmultiple choices of various translatorsN arguing instead that N7ne must mediate these and try to penetrate the thing.N 5ancy, 66:.

69 translators have instead opted to translate aufheben with various terms in the same text, each tailored to the specific context of each passage..; In this case one buys precision at the cost of textual integrity. (he fact that for "egel the term expresses a single operation is completely lost and the problem of aufhebenBs complexity is simply ignored. 2nother possibility is leaving the term untranslated in /nglish..? (he problem with this approach is that as a -erman word, it cannot be con#ugated in an /nglish sentence. 2s such, it is restricted to appearing in its nominative form KAufhebungM or as a gerund KAufhebenM. In this case, the active, verbal character of the term is lost. ". &. 5isbet applies the somewhat novel solution of combining these approaches, translating aufheben with a variety of terms depending on the context, but indicating each instance with the -erman original in parenthesis..9 8nfortunately, while this solution works when translating "egelBs writings, it is of less use in discussing them. -iven these difficulties, the traditional option of BsublationB is probably the least problematic alternative. While the /nglish term is obsolete and explains virtually nothing about the original termBs meaning, it does not conceal anything about it either. 2lso, since the /nglish term is no longer in common use, there is little chance that any connotation of it will obscure the meaning of the original "egelian term. With the use of such a place,holder, however, an explanation of the originalBs meaning is absolutely essential. Providing such an explanation of the term aufheben is an important function of this study.

B. NEGATI&E DEFINITIONS
"aving now presented what "egel says sublation is, I can now examine what "egel says it is not. "egel contrasts his technical sense of sublation with three other concepts4 negation, synthesis, and irony. 2nalyOing these contrasts will help us further determine "egelHs basic comprehension of his concept of sublation.
.;

1ee, for example, $lark &utlerBs recent translation of the $ectures on $ogic% Berlin, @AB@ KIndiana 8niversity Press, .CC:M. .? "eideggerBs *asein, for example, is a similarly problematic term for the point of view of translation. .9 "egel, -.W.3., Political 0ritings, trans. ".&. 5isbet K$ambridge, 6@@@M.

6<

1. Negation
3irst and foremost, "egel contrasts sublation with simple negation. 3rom the first lines of the remark that we have been examining, "egel writes of sublation that, EIt is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especiall# distinguished from nothing.G.< (his distinction is of the most fundamental importance. When taken in its ordinary -erman sense, aufheben can be, and most commonly is, a synonym for various types of negation Ki.e. Nto cancelN, Nto abolishN, etc.M. &y contrasting negation with sublation, "egel draws a firm distinction between this ordinary sense and his technical senseIinforming his readers that sublation should not be understood in a solely conventional way. "egel continues by specifying the distinction between sublation and negation more precisely4 EWhat is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. 5othing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation;G.D When "egel refers to Pthe sublatedH Kdas AufgehobeneM he is of course referring to the thing which undergoes the KsyntacticalM operation, that which is being sublated..: It is this result which he distinguishes from nothing and it is precisely distinguished here as a result. In the lead,up to the passage cited, the concept of nothing has #ust been defined by "egel as that which is immediate and without determination, or Ecomplete emptiness, absence of all determination and contentG.@ (he sublated Kdas AufgehobeneM, by contrast, is that which has been determined, or mediated. "egel makes things a bit more complicated when he continues by referring to the sublated as Ea non,being but as a result which has its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinations from which it originates.G;C (he first problem here is that if the
.<

EFeine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt, deren 'inn bestimmt aufzufassen und besonders vom ,ichts zu unterscheiden ist.G K1 6CD; "W9L66;,/2M .D E0as sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu ,ichts. ,ichts ist das .nmittelbareG K1 6CD; "W9L66;M .: 3or more on this, see $hapter ., 1ection 6. .@ EFvollkommene $eerheit, Bestimmungs3 und &nhaltslosigkeit K1 :.; "W9L:;M ;C E es ist das ,ichtseiende, aber als 7esultat, das von einem 'ein ausgegangen ist- es hat daher die Bestimmtheit, aus der es herkommt, noch an sich. G K1 6CD; "W9L66;,66?,/2M

6D sublated is a Pnon,beingH Kdas ,ichtseiende=, then how is that to be distinguished from its being reduced to nothing K,ichtsMQ (he key to this distinction is the root 3seiende KPa beingHM. (he distinction "egel makes here between nothing K,ichtsM and a non,being K,ichtseiendeM corresponds to the distinction between being K'einM and a being K'eiendeM. 5othing is an indeterminate absence, while a non,being is some determinate thing that is Kin some senseM absent. What then is the nature of this determinate absenceQ Insofar as the nothingness of the sublated is not the general abyss of pure nothing as such, but the particular absence of a particular sort of non,being, it maintains a degree of determinationIthe aforementioned determination from which it originates. (his can be clarified by repeating a line Juoted earlier4 E(hus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has onl# lost its immediac# but is not on that account annihilated.G;6 (hus, what is negated in sublation is not the moment itself, but rather its immediacy. What is preserved is its determinateness as a moment. (he sublated is a non,being only in the sense that it is removed from its finite particularity and taken up into a broader contextIa context within which it can be more fully determined and thus more fully comprehended. "egel makes this point clearer in a revision of the remark in the second edition of the $ogic, when, in a parenthetical reference in the first sentence he eJuates the sublated with the ideal Kdas &deelleM. What is sublated is thus that which comes to be understood not as it is in its finite particularity, but in its truth, as a moment of "egelHs idealism. In this way, sublation can also be interpreted as the act of idealization.;. 2t this point, I think the relationship between the positive and negative aspects of sublation can best be clarified with an example. (hink of an archeological artifactIa piece of pottery lying discarded for thousands of years, exposed to the elements or buried in the sand. 7ne day, an archeologist discovers it, studies it, analyOes its significance for the civiliOation it
;6 ;.

$ited above; see note @. 7f course, this is not in terms of an abstract, sub#ective idealism, but rather of a concrete, absolute idealism. 3or further explanation, see $hapter 9, 1ection &.

6: comes from, publishes a paper on it, and places it on the appropriate shelf in a museum. (he piece of pottery is removed from its immediacy Kin the sandM and is taken up into the realm of scientific study Kin the museumM. Whereas before it existed only as ancient rubbish, it has now become a significant artifact. (he pottery shard acJuires its significance through being collected, studied, dated, and thereby placed in a new, more fully determined context. 1uch a process is analogous to the process of sublation. With this example, we can begin to see why, even when the proper, technical sense of sublation is taken into account, it can nevertheless be problematic. 3or instance, if in our example one exchanges the piece of pottery for a religious idol, then we see that the ob#ect Pproperly understoodH loses not #ust the external circumstances of its PabstractnessH, but it can also lose essential aspects of its own significance. 2 religious idol in a museum, functioning as a scientific ob#ect, no longer functions as an ob#ect of religious veneration. (his example suggests the possibility that whether sublation is considered problematic is dependent on the nature of the ob#ect being sublated and not necessarily the concept of sublation as such.;; (hat which is sublated is not annihilated, but it does not on that account remain unchanged. While sublation should not be confused with simple negation, it should also not be forgotten that negation makes up one half of sublationHs double meaning, and that the term is thus not in every case simply innocuous.

2. Synthesis
When "egelHs concept of sublation is confused with simple negation, its negative sense is overemphasiOed and its affirmative sense is neglected. 7n the other hand, when sublation is confused with synthesis, its positive sense is overemphasiOed and its negative sense is neglected. "egel is less direct in making this distinction, but it is nevertheless eJually important to grasp the concept of sublation in its full technical complexity.
;;

I will address these potentially problematic aspects of sublation in more detail in $hapter D.

6@ "egelHs clearest account of the difference between sublation and synthesis occurs in the second chapter of the last section of the 'cience of $ogic in his account of the EIdea of the (rueG K*ie &dee des 0ahrenM.;? "ere, "egel describes the inadeJuacy of sub#ective cognition Ki.e. the sub#ective IdeaM for theoretical cognition Ki.e. the Idea of the (rueM, for obtaining truth in its proper sense. (he specific difference between the two types of cognition is the difference between synthesis and sublation. "egel defines truth as the unity of concept and reality.;9 3or "egel, sub#ective cognition is inadeJuate because its result is a synthesis, defined as Ea unity of things that are originally separate and onl# e+ternall# so con#oined.G;< 1ub#ective cognition does not attain the level of truth because synthesis, as an external unification, does not complete the unification of concept and reality. In a clear reference to )antHs synthetic unity of apperception, "egel writes4 E2t this standpoint, the ob#ect is credited with being an unknown thing,in,itself behind cognition, and this character of the ob#ect, and with it truth too is regarded as an absolute be#ond for cognition.G;D 3or "egel, sub#ective cognition claims a truth that it does not, and cannot, possess so long as concept and reality remain only externally related. (heir unification is external because the unknowability of the thing,in,itself interposes a boundary between concept and reality. Insofar as they are kept apart in this way, both concept and reality remain abstract and thus, for "egel, incomplete. 3urthermore, according to "egel, sub#ective cognition is not merely inadeJuate but contradictory. (he contradiction is between sub#ective cognitionHs truth,claims and its lack of truth, since, according to "egelBs definition, it fails to fully unify concept and reality4 Ethe contradiction of

;? ;9

&ook ., 1ection ;, $hapter . of the 'cience of $ogic. K1 D:;,:6:; "W<L?@:,9?6M E...die "inheit des Begriffs und der 7ealit)t...G K1 D:9; "W<L?@@M 3or more on "egelBs concept of truth, see $hapter 9, 1ection &. ;< EFeiner "inheit von solchen, die urspr2nglich geschieden, nur )u/erlich so verbunden seien.G K1 D:?; "W<L?@@,/2M ;D EAuf diesem 'tandpunkte wird dem 4bjekte eine unbekannte *ingheit3an3sich hinter dem "rkennen zugeschrieben und dieselbe und damit auch die 0ahrheit als ein absolutes Censeits f2r das "rkennen betrachtet.G K1 D:9; "W<L9CC,/2M

.C a truth which is at the same time is supposed not to be truthIof a cognition of what is, which at the same time does not cogniOe the thing,in,itself.G;: 1ub#ective cognition itself, however, is not satisfied with the external unity provided by synthesis. It contains already at the beginning an Eurge to truth.G;@ (his is the urge of cognition not merely to synthesiOe itself with the otherness of its ob#ect but also the urge to sublate that otherness, to negate its separateness Ki.e. its abstractnessM and to preserve it as a moment of itself. 3or "egel, what is sublated is not the ob#ect, the reality, but the otherness of that reality which separates it from the concept. (hus, he says of the urge to truth4 E(he specific nature of this urge is therefore to sublate its own sub#ectivity, to make its first abstract reality into a concrete oneFG?C In describing sub#ective cognition as Psublating itselfH, "egel means that it is the contradiction between concept and reality that is sublated. (he cognition that operates via synthesis collapses and is replaced by a cognition which operates via sublation. What is thus sublated at this moment of the system is the very inadeJuacy of synthesis itself. %uch more could be said about the nature of this cognition. 7ur purpose here, however, is not to analyOe cognition but to distinguish sublation from synthesis. (he inadeJuacy of synthesis, as demonstrated here, should leave no doubt as to the inadeJuacy of those old accounts that attribute to "egel a Pthesis,antithesis,synthesisH formula,?6 thus bringing us one step further along in our study.

;:

E...,der 0iderspruch einer 0ahrheit, die zugleich nicht 0ahrheit sein soll, 3 eines "rkennens dessen, was ist, welches zugleich das *ing3an3sich nicht erkennt.G K1 D:9; "W<L9CCM 7f course, "egel has a very broad and complicated definition of contradiction, which will be addressed in more detail in $hapter ?, 1ection $. ;@ Eder !rieb der 0ahrheit K1 D:;; "W<L?@:M ?C E*er !rieb hat daher die Bestimmtheit, seine eigene 'ubjektivit)t aufOuheben, seine erst abstrakte 7ealit)t zur konkreten zu machenG K1 D:;; "W<L?@:M I have here maintained %illerBs translation of aufzuheben as sublation. ?6 3or a brief historical account of this misconception, see -ustav %ueller, E(he "egel egend of P(hesis, 2ntithesis,1ynthesisHN, !he 6egel >#ths and $egends, ed. *on 1tewart K5orthwestern, 6@@<M, ;C6,;C9.

.6

3. Irony
(he last of the key concepts to be distinguished from sublation is irony. While interpreting sublation as either negation or synthesis overemphasiOed one half or the other of sublationHs double meaning, the difference between sublation and irony is to be found in the nature of that double meaning itself. 2t first glance, any confusion between sublation and irony hardly seems likely. It would be a strange interpretation indeed that treated "egelHs system as one KveryM long #oke. "owever, irony is a trope that comes very close to the meaning "egel assigns to sublation; a treatment of irony will therefore be useful for refining our account. While many figurative uses of language rely on some sort of double meaning, it is in irony that those meanings are not simply compared KsimileM, eJuated KmetaphorM, or contrasted K#uxtapositionM, but opposed. 3rom our earlier list of positive characteristics, irony and sublation share three out of five.?. 2nd while irony is of course not literal by definition, it cannot be assumed that irony is without speculative significance. "ere, I have been referring to simple verbal irony. "egelHs writings explicitly refer to two other types of irony4 1ocratic irony and 'omantic irony. 1ocratic irony refers to the original -reek sense of eironeia, or feigned ignorance, where the opposition is between what one knows and what one claims to know. 3or 1ocrates, this is obviously not a form of deception, but a means by which to educateIleading away from commonly held assumptions and towards a deeper truth.?; In 'omantic irony on the other hand, the opposition is between oneHs professed attitudes, beliefs, and opinions and those one actually holds. 3riedrich 1chlegel conflates the 1ocratic and the 'omantic forms of irony4
S1ocratic ironyT involves and arouses a sense of the irreconcilable conflict between the absolute and the relative, between the necessity of complete communication and its
?. ?;

(hat is, double meaning, simultaneity, and opposition. "P6L;@:; "W6:L?9:.

..
impossibility. It is the freest of all liberties, since it allows one to rise above oneselfF It is all the better if harmonious dolts do not know what to make of this constant self, parody, if they waver endlessly between belief and disbelief until they get diOOy and take a #oke for gravity and gravity for a #oke.??

"egel, in contrast to 1chlegel, distinguishes between 1ocratic and 'omantic irony. 2ccording to "egel4 E3rom this irony of our times Si.e. 'omantic ironyT, the irony of 1ocrates is far removed.G?9 While he considers both to be merely sub#ective Kand therefore abstract and incompleteM, the two are sub#ective in different ways. 3or "egel, 1ocratic irony is above all distinct from 'omantic irony insofar as 1ocratic irony is directed against persons in conversation, or their opinions about the world, while 'omantic Irony is directed against what is actual, or the world itself.?< 3or "egel, 1ocratic irony is pedagogical, while 'omantic irony is skeptical. 1ocratic irony is limited insofar as it is merely pedagogical. It remains abstract wherever an aporia remains. 'omantic irony is skeptical insofar as the ironic attitude of the Pdivine geniusH or the Pbeautiful soulH is placed over and against everything but himself4 Ethe vanity of everything factual, moral, and of intrinsic worth, the nullity of everything ob#ective and absolutely valid.G?D 3urthermore4
(his S'omanticT irony is thus a toying with everything, and it can transform all things into semblance4 to this sub#ectivity nothing is any longer serious, for any seriousness which it has, immediately becomes dissipated in #okes, and all noble and divine truth vanishes away or becomes mere triviality.?:

In contrast to these remarks against the irony of 3riedrich 1chlegel, "egel recogniOes a more philosophically respectable form of irony4 that of ).W.3. 1olger. "egel does not discuss 1olgerHs thought at length, but he does refer to him with a great deal of respect. "egel considers 1olgerHs use of the concept of irony, while ultimately incomplete, to come from a Ngenuinely speculativeN longing. I will Juote "egelHs characteriOation of it at length4
?? ?9

3riedrich 1chlegel, $#ceum 8ragments 6C: K6D@DM, Juoted in Inwood, 6?D. E1on dieser &ronie unserer (eit ist die &ronie des 'okrates weit entfernt.G K "P6L?C6,?C.; "W6:L?<6M ?< "P6L?CC,?C6; "W6:L?<6. ?D Enun einerseits die "itelkeit alles 'achlichen, 'ittlichen und in sich Gehaltvollen, die ,ichtigkeit alles 4bjektiven und an und f2r sich Geltenden.G K 2<<; "W6;L@<M ?: E*ie &ronie ist das 'piel mit allem- dieser 'ubjektivit)t ist es mit nichts mehr "rnst, sie macht "rnst, vernichtet ihn aber wieder und kann alles in 'chein verwandeln. Alle hohe und g5ttliche 0ahrheit l5st sich in ,ichtigkeit 9Gemeinheit= auf- aller "rnst ist zugleich nur 'cherz.G K "P6L?C6; "W6:L?<C,/2M

.;
In this process he S1olgerT came to the dialectical moment of the Idea, to the point which I call Pinfinite absolute negativityH, to the activity of the Idea in so negating itself as infinite and universal as to become finitude and particularity, and in nevertheless sublating this negation in turn and so re,establishing the universal and infinite in the finite and particular. (o this negativity 1olger firmly clung, and of course it is one element in the speculative Idea, yet interpreted as this purely dialectical unrest and dissolution of both infinite and finite, onl# one element, and not, as 1olger will have it, the whole Idea.?@

With these last remarks, we can clearly see Kaside from the obvious literalLfigurative distinctionM how sublation is different from irony. (he dissolution which occurs within irony is homologous9C to the dissolution we saw with simple negation. 2nd as with negation, it is only one element of sublationHs double meaning, only half the story. 8nlike that which is treated ironically, what is sublated does not vanish and neither is it reduced to a mere semblance or triviality. 2nd while the sublated does not remain untouched or unaltered, it is nevertheless preserved, in a significant, non,trivial way. What precisely is lost and gained in the process of sublation will be further examined in the following chapter, where I will examine not what "egel says explicitly about the meaning of the term BsublationB, but rather what is implicit in his usage of it.

?@

E6ier kam er auf das dialektische >oment der &dee, auf den Punkt, den ich Dunendliche absolute ,egativit)tD nenne, auf die !)tigkeit der &dee, sich als das .nendliche und Allgemeine zu negieren zur "ndlichkeit und Besonderheit und diese ,egation ebensosehr wieder aufzuheben und somit das Allgemeine und .nendliche im "ndlichen und Besonderen wiederherzustellen. An dieser ,egativit)t hielt 'olger fest, und allerdings ist sie ein >oment in der spekulativen &dee, doch, als diese blo/e dialektische .nruhe und Aufl5sung des .nendlichen wie des "ndlichen gefa/t, auch nur ein >oment, nicht aber, wie 'olger es will, die ganze &dee.G K 2<:,<@; "W6;L@:,@@M 9C &y BhomologousB I mean something more than merely analogous. It is not a similar structure, but the same structure. (o put it another way, the two dissolutions are similar in that they both have the same structure, but the structures themselves are identical.

.?

CHAPTER 2: USAGE
In $hapter 6, we saw how "egel explicitly defines his technical conception of sublation, both positively and negatively. 5ow, we will proceed further and examine what "egelBs writings convey implicitly about sublationInot what he says about it, but how he uses it.6 I examine "egelBs usage in three ways. 3irst, I analyOe the relative fre?uenc# with which he uses various forms of aufheben. 1econd, I look at the grammatical s#nta+ of the sentences in which these uses occur. (hird, I examine what the conte+t in which he uses the term can tell us about its precise meaning. (aken in itself, this level of detail might initially seem excessive. "owever, what I hope to show in these analyses would be difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty by other, more general methods. (he basic purpose of these analyses is to reinforce some of the claims made in my textual analysis in $hapter 6. 3urthermore, it is my hope that these analyses will highlight certain aspects of "egelBs concept of sublation that might otherwise be neglected or overlooked.

A. FRE"UENCY
(he first step in the analysis of "egelBs usage of BsublationB will be to examine the freJuency with which the term occurs in "egelBs writings. &y analyOing this freJuency statistically, relative to certain other variables, we will be able to draw certain conclusions about "egelBs usage. (he basic methodology behind this freJuency analysis is derived from what is called BstylometryB, a form of Juantitative linguistics. "owever, the application here is distinct. 1tylometric analyses commonly use known features internal to a text Ke.g. distinctive features of a given writerBs particular styleM to ascertain unknown features external to the
6

(he general treatment of "egelBs usage here is distinct from the treatment of its function in Part II insofar as this chapter treats its use in abstract, general terms, while the next Part will treat its use in relation to concrete moments of "egelBs logic. (o put it another way, while general usage as an aspect of structure is an implicit feature of "egelBs writings, the particular uses that occur there are something explicit.

.9 content of the text itself Ke.g. Juestions regarding authorship or the seJuence in which texts were writtenM. &y contrast, this freJuency analysis uses known external features Ke.g. target audience, seJuenceM to help determine features internal to the structure of the text itself. I am not aware of any precedent for this approach, but I hope to demonstrate its potential utility by way of example. It is also important to emphasiOe at the outset that this statistical approach is only presented as one mode of analysis among many, and is offered as a supplement to, and not a substitute for, more traditional modes of textual analysis. (hroughout his works, "egel uses aufheben in a variety of declensions, con#ugations, and various other specialiOed forms. (he four most common forms in which the term occurs are4. aufgehoben aufheben aufhebt Aufhebung Dis sublatedD Dto sublateD DsublatesD DsublationD

(he data presented in the tables below are based on the freJuency with which each of these forms occur in "egelBs works and compared with other relevant information. (he first table K(able 6M lists the number of occurrences in "egelBs works of each of these forms of aufheben compared with the number of instances of *ialektik.; (he second table K(able .M summariOes this material, together with other Juantitative information about each volume4 the total number of pages per volume, the average date of each text, the total instances of all forms of a term, the average number of occurrences per page Kthe freJuencyM, and a comparison of the average freJuencies of aufheben and *ialektik.

isted in order of freJuency, highest to lowest. 1ee (able 6 for details. Importantly, this list does not include instances of aufheben used separably Khebt...aufM. (his problem is addressed at the end of this section. ; (his data has been collected from the electronic version of "egelBs collected works4 G.0.8. 6egel 0erke. $D, '7%. (apla,!erlag &erlin, !ersion ..C, which is itself based on -.W.3. "egel, 0erke in EF B)nden K1uhrkamp, 6@DCM. (he original files were converted to PD3 format in order to facilitate navigation, search, and data collection.

.<

T.,/+ 1. N(0,+1 2) O33(11+-3+4 2) 5*+ &.162(4 F2104 "

/arly Writings *ena Writings Phenomenology of 1pirit 5Urnberg V "eidelberg 1cience of ogic Philosophy of 'ight /ncyclopedia &erlin Writings Philosophy of "istory Philosophy of 3ine 2rt Philosophy of 'eligion "istory of Philosophy aufgehoben <9 D: 6<9 :< ;@; .< ..D 6< .C ;; 6;6 6C@ aufheben .C ?C 6CD D; ..; ;9 6?C 6< @ ;. :: <9 aufhebt 6; .C ;D 6@ DD @ 9C D : ;? ;@ ;6 Aufhebung ;9 6@ < 66 6D 66 <; < ? 6: ?; D *ialektik C . 6. ?C D. 6D << 6: 9 . 6< .69 dialektische C 6 .6 .? ?D 9 ;< D . 9 6? ;9

T.,/+ 2. S(00.17 2) 5*+ I-)210.562- 2- 5*+ D6))+1+-5 &2/(0+45

/arly Writings *ena Writings Phenomenology of 1pirit 5Urnberg V "eidelberg 1cience of ogic Philosophy of 'ight /ncyclopedia &erlin Writings Philosophy of "istory Philosophy of 3ine 2rt Philosophy of 'eligion "istory of Philosophy Pages (otal ;:: .D< .@< ?9? 9@; .DC DD; ;6D .:: ::D 9C: :?; Date 2verage 6D@:.9 6:C? 6:CD 6:6..9 6:6? 6:.C 6:.;.9 6:.?.9 6:.< 6:.? 6:.< 6:.? Aufheben (otal 2verage 6;; C.;? 69D C.9D ;69 6.C< 6:@ C.?. D6C 6..C :6 C.;C ?:C C.<. ?9 C.6? ?6 C.6? 66D C.6; ;C6 C.9@ .6. C..9 *ialektik (otal 2verage C C.CC ; C.C6 ;; C.66 <? C.6? 66@ C..C .. C.C: 6C. C.6; .9 C.C: D C.C. D C.C6 ;C C.C< .9C C.;C Difference 2verage C.;; C.9< C.@9 C..: 6.CC C... C.?@ C.C< C.6. C.6. C.9; ,C.C9

2n analysis of this data is used to make four basic claims, discussed below. 3irst of all, as one can see from (able 6, "egel uses sublation most freJuently in his more technical works, i.e. the Phenomenolog# of 'pirit and the 'cience of $ogic. (he term BtechnicalB here does not indicate a vague impression of a textBs complexity, but rather the specific nature of their intended audience. 7f the four books published by "egel in his
?

(he numbers in (able 6 indicate the total number of occurrences of each form of each term arranged by the volume of the 1uhrkamp edition. 2lso, the last column KdialektischeM includes all of the occurrences of its other declensions as well Ke.g. dialektischer, dialektischen, etc.M. 9 (he BPages (otalB lists the total pages of each volume, as converted to PD3Iimportantly, not the page counts for the print edition. (he BDate 2verageB is average year for all the texts included in a given volume, according to the 1uhrkamp edition. (he averages listed for each term are simply the number of occurrences divided into the number of pages to get the freJuency per page. (he BDifference 2verageB is the freJuency of aufheben subtracted from that of *ialektik. 2 positive number indicates that aufheben is more common than *ialektik and by how much. 2 negative number is this column indicates that *ialektik is more common.

.D lifetime Ki.e. the Phenomenolog#, the $ogic, the Philosoph# of 7ight and the "nc#clopediaM, the Phenomenolog# and the $ogic were the only two written directly for an audience of professional philosophers. While the "nc#clopedia and the Philosoph# of 7ight certainly have serious philosophical content, they were originally published as textbooks or outlines for students. (hus, for our purposes the designation BtechnicalB indicates a published work that is not a student textbook.< (he remaining works listed are collections of unpublished writings, short pieces, and compilations of lecture notes. What is interesting when one looks at the data here is how the distinction between the intended audience of each set of works Ki.e. technical versus non,technicalM seems to be related to the freJuency of the term BsublationB. (he more technical works Kthe Phenomenolog# and the $ogicM average approximately one use of the term sublation per page, while the next highest freJuencies are barely half that.D (he nature of the intended audience of the two texts, when regarded in combination with this freJuency data suggests that there is a relationship between the relative technicality of a "egelian text and the freJuency with which he used the term BsublationB. 1uch an association would support the claim that "egel makes use of sublation in a distinctively or predominantly technical sense. 1econd, according to the data, "egelBs use of the term BsublationB does not seem to show any appreciable variation over time. (hat is to say, it does not seem to be the case that, for example, "egel becomes interested in the term at some point in his career, and from then on uses it more often. 3or example, as one can see from (able ., the average freJuency in the /arly and *ena writings meets or exceeds the average freJuency of the Kmuch laterM &erlin writings or the lectures. %ore importantly, this aspect of the data would also suggest that "egelBs freJuent use of sublation does not begin with his explicit treatment of it in the 'cience of $ogic. It would seem that it is the topic of a given work, rather than the period of time in
<

(his classification of "egelBs published writings is adopted from "ans,-eorg -adamer, 6egelGs *ialectic% 8ive 6ermeneutical 'tudies, trans. P. $hristopher 1mith K>ale, 6@D<M, D<. D 1ee (able . for details. 5ote especially the three BclustersB in the average freJuencies4 the two most technical works Kthe Phenomenolog# of 'pirit and 'cience of $ogicM have freJuencies of greater than 6. (he ma#ority of the other volumes have freJuencies between roughly .; to .< and the Berlin 0ritings and $ectures Kexcept the Philosoph# of 7eligionM have freJuencies below ..9.

.: which "egel wrote that work, that is related most directly with how often he uses the term BsublationB. WWWW In order to test these first two claims, a regression analysis was conducted,: in which the difference of the average freJuencies of aufheben minus *ialektik Kthe last column of (able .M was related to the average volume date and each volumeBs BtechnicalityB.@ (he results of this regression analysis are presented in (able ; KbelowM. 2 brief explanation of the information presented in (able ; is in order.6C 'egression analysis is a statistical procedure for determining the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. KIn this case, the dependent variable is the difference in freJuency between aufheben and *ialektik and the independent variables are the average date of each volume and each volumeBs BtechnicalityB.M (he BcoefficientsB listed in the table define the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 2 coefficient value of greater than Oero Ka positive valueM indicates a relationship between the two variables, where an increase in the value of the independent variable entails a proportional increase in the dependent variable.66 In the same way, a negative coefficient value would indicate an inverse relationship, and a coefficient of or around Oero would indicate no noticeable relationship. (he Bp,valueB indicates the probability of obtaining a result eJual to or
:

Initially in the preparation of this chapter, my analysis of the data was conducted on the hypothetical basis discussed above. ater, I consulted with a statistician in order to test these hypotheses and better ground these claims. (he regression analysis itself was conducted by Dr. 'embert De &lander Kan econometric researcher at ouvain,la,5euveM and testing these claims would not have been possible were it not for his contribution. (he initial hypotheses themselves and the arguments subseJuently derived from them are my own, as are any errors in my explanation. @ B(echnicalityB was incorporated into the analysis through the use of what is called a Ndummy variableN, where BtechnicalB works were assigned a value of 6 and all others were assigned a value of C. In regression analysis, such dummy variables are used when comparing Juantitative data to other non,Juantitative factors. 6C (o avoid a lengthy digression, I will only discuss those terms most immediately relevant to the claims being made. (hese terms are underlined in (able ;. (he other information in the table was used to calculate the results we will examine more closely. 3or a more detailed introduction to the statistical terms used here, see $hapter < N(he $lassical %ultiple inear 'egression %odel4 1pecification and /stimationN of W.". -reene, "conometric Anal#sis KPrentice,"all, .CCCM, .6C,.DC. 66 (he proportion of the increase is determined by the value of the coefficient. 2 unit increase in the independent variable would entail an increase in the dependent variable eJual to the coefficient. 1o, for example, in a relationship with a coefficient of .9, every X6C increase in the independent variable would entail an estimated X9 increase in the dependent variable.

.@ more extreme than the observed result.6. (he Bp,valueB is thus a measure of the confidence one can have in each conclusion. (he lower the Bp,valueB, the less likely each result was arrived at by chance, and thus the more reliable it is. (he term B'.B is the proportion of the variability in the dependent variable that is accounted for by the statistical model under consideration. (his term is a measure of the confidence one can have not #ust in the individual coefficients but in the overall analysis, indicating how likely other possible results are to be predicted by the statistical model. In more basic terms, regression analysis provides us with the tools to test a set of hypotheses. In the case of this particular analysis, the hypotheses being tested are 6M N(here is a relationship between the freJuency "egel uses the term aufheben in a given text and the technicality of that textN and .M N(here is no relationship between the freJuency of aufheben in a given text and when the text was writtenQN6; We can now look at the results of the regression analysis, and thus verify whether these hypotheses are correct.

T.,/+ 3. R+4(/54 2) 5*+ R+81+4462- A-./7464

Dependent 'egressor A;+1.8+ ;2/(0+ <.5+ =T+3*-63./> <(007 constant R? 7bservations C2+))636+-5 :#.##82 #.$43# 69.6:;@ #. 3 6. Difference of 3reJuencies 1tandard error t,value C.CC<? ,6..: C.69D9 ?.C: 66.<?9. 6.;C 9:;./(+ #.232 #.##3 C...9

3rom (able ;, one can see that the coefficient of the first relationship K,C.CC:.M is very close to Oero and that this relationship has p,value of C..;.. (his indicates that there is no statistically significant linear relationship between the average volume date and the freJuency aufheben is used.6? (his confirms the second hypothesis that there is no appreciable variation
6.

"ere Bmore extremeB simply means that positive values would be more positive and negative values would be more negative. (he BresultsB in this case are the coefficients. 6; %ore specifically, the freJuency here is the relative freJuency between aufheben and *ialektik. (hat is, we are testing not the freJuency of aufheben alone but the degree of freJuency of aufheben relative to that of *ialektik. 6? (he coefficient value is a measure of the relationship between the two variables and the p,value is a measure of the statistical significance of that relationship. (hus, in this case, there is no appreciable relationship between freJuency and date and there is a .;..Y chance that this result Kor some more extreme resultM would be arrived at

;C over time.69 (he BtechnicalB dummy,variable, however, is highly significant Kp,value Z C.CC;M relative to the freJuency. (his confirms the first hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between a workBs technicality and its use of sublation.6< (he regression analysis was repeated using different transformations of the dependent variable Ki.e. the relative freJuencyM, and this did not alter the conclusions.6D (hus, rather than merely guessing or roughly estimating whether these hypotheses were correct, a regression analysis has allowed us to determine whether these apparent relationships were really present or not and furthermore to determine this to a measurable degree of confidence. WWWW (he third claim that can be derived from the data is that, as one can see from the first part of (able 6, "egel uses sublation primarily as a verb, rather than as a noun. (he data show three of the verbal forms Kaufgehoben, aufheben, aufhebtM to be much more common than the basic nominative form KAufhebungM. (his point may seem fairly obvious, but is nevertheless an important aspect of the next claim. 3ourth, as one can see from (able ., while "egel uses dialectic only sparingly, sublation is, by contrast, nearly ubiJuitous.6: When viewed in combination with the fact that sublation is most often used as a verb, this difference in overall freJuency supports my contention from the introduction that sublation is the heart of dialectic. It is the heart of dialectic in the specific sense that, when used as a verb, the term aufheben is the operant, active term in "egelBs overall dialectical,speculative process. (he verbal priority of aufheben
by chance. &y contrast, a typical standard for statistical significance would be a p,value of .C9 or .C6, that is, a 9Y or 6Y probability. 69 (hat is, to the specified degree of confidence. 6< 2 coefficient of C.<?;C indicates that there is a direct, positive relationship between the technicality of a work and its use of sublation. 2 p,value of .CC; indicates that there is only a .;Y chance that this value would occur by chance. 6D (hat is to say, different ways of calculating these values were used in order to verify that the analysis is in fact correct. 6: 'obert 1olomon remarks on the infreJuency of the use of the term BdialecticB in the Phenomenolog# of 'pirit, but, as we can see from the data, this infreJuency is not specific to the Phenomenolog# alone; it is characteristic of "egelBs entire body of work. 3or his interpretation of "egelian dialectic in general, see 'obert 1olomon, &n the 'pirit of 6egel K7xford, 6@:;M, .6,.D.

;6 relative to *ialektik Kwhich is, by contrast, used as a noun or ad#ectiveM in combination with their close conceptual relationship suggests that a particular instance of the term BsublationB Kin its technical sense6@M is a particular instance of dialectic in operation. In other words, these differencesIthat aufheben is more common as a verb and much more common that *ialektik Isuggest that BdialecticB is the term "egel uses when he is speaking abstractly about or describing his logic but BsublationB is the term he uses more concretely when he is actually doing logic. (his claim is further supported by the fact that the only volume where the freJuency of dialectic exceeds that of sublation is the $ectures on the 6istor# of Philosoph#I precisely where "egel is focused on describing the thinking of others, rather than on presenting his own. In this sense, taking sublation as the topic of study, rather than dialectic, means that one can better focus on "egelBs logic as it is actually carried out, rather than on how it is described or summariOed. 7f course, this does not mean that treatments of "egelBs logic in terms of dialectic are somehow incorrect. (o the contrary, if sublation is the heart of dialectic, then both concepts are present regardless of which term is used. (he four claims I have made using this freJuency analysis only signify features of "egelBs way of expressing himself. It would be a serious error to mistake the relative freJuency of a term for something like its general philosophical significance. (hat aufheben is used more often than *ialektik does not mean that aufheben is somehow more important than *ialektik. What this difference does suggest is that since sublation is the term that dominates "egelBs way of expressing his thinking, an analysis that focuses on sublation can more accurately focus on instances of that expression. (he advantage of examining the science of logic in terms of sublation is that, while dialectic
6@

2 point of clarification4 the fact that this freJuency analysis is based on the total number of instances of sublation Kregardless of whether each instance is technical or notM and the fact that there is a demonstrable direct relationship between the freJuency of "egelBs use of sublation and the technicality of a given work Kas established by the regression analysisM does not mean that I have assumed all usages of the term BsublationB are in the technical sense. (he relationship between technicality and sublation only suggests that sublation has a technical sense distinct from its ordinary one Ki.e. a certain proportionM. It does not mean that every instance would be a technical one.

;. is completely appropriate for discussions of "egelBs method generally or abstractly, sublation more closely conforms to his concrete discussions of its operation or "egelBs own usage. In other words, rather than use the abstract term to talk about something concrete, one can use the concrete term itself. 2 second advantage of this approach, as I mentioned in the introduction, is that discussions of "egelBs logic framed abstractly in terms of dialectic run the risk of misrepresenting what is at stake. (he risk is that, insofar as dialectic is a noun and not a verb,.C discussions of dialectic tend to reify "egelBs approach. 'ather than discussing his logic in the terms that "egel himself KpredominantlyM uses, one talks about "egelBs method abstractly as if it were something separable from the system as a wholeIas an extensively related BtoolB, rather than an intensively related BorganB. /ven when one fully understands this distinction and this abstraction or reification is only used as a way of speaking, "egelBs method nevertheless runs the risk of being misconstrued as something detachable or external. 2s it occurs in "egel, dialectical method is less a thing that he uses that an act he Kor more specifically the conceptM performs. Insofar as sublation is the operant term of "egelBs logic, Bto sublateB is less the heart of dialectic than the beating of this heart. In framing an interpretation of the science of logic in terms of its activity rather than its method, I think one is better able to avoid this risk of reification. /ven though the distinction is not strictly necessary to understand "egelBs logic, it is helpful as a matter of emphasis. 2ny activity, once it is taken up as an ob#ect of study, runs the risk of being talked about as if it were a thing. "ere, I have been often spoke about BsublationB Ki.e. nominativelyM, but I can also speak about how one moment might Bbe sublatedB in another Ki.e. verballyM. 2t the same time, the reverse is not possible4 one can speak about BdialecticB, but not how one

.C

I mean this in the sense of BprimarilyB, not BexclusivelyB. $learly, one can see from (able 6 that BdialecticB is also used in ad#ectival forms, and is not only used as a noun, and that BsublationB is also used in both ad#ectival and nominative forms. (he point is that BdialecticB is primarily nominative and BsublationB Kor better, Bto sublateBM is primarily verbal. (his primacy is also reflected in their relative freJuency Ki.e. the differences in the averagesM.

;; moment might be BdialecticiOedB in another. &y approaching "egelBs logic in a way that preserves this priority of the verbal over the nominative, one can better approximate "egelBs own use of language, and thus acJuire a more accurate and concrete image of his thinking. WWWW &efore going on to summariOe the conclusions of this freJuency analysis, certain limitations in the data should be noted and accounted for. 3irst of all, the edition from which the data is collected is not ideal. (he count of the number of occurrences is taken from the electronic edition of the collected works K1uhrkampM, rather than the complete works K%einerM. "owever, relying on the collected works does have the benefit that, since different versions of the same text are not included Ke.g. from 6:.6, 6:.?, 6:.D, and 6:;6M, there are no Bdouble countsB from the same text Ke.g. the $ectures on the Philosoph# of 7eligion was not counted four timesM. 1o while the data is not drawn from a complete collection of every version of every work, the lack of the inclusion of multiple versions actually means that the data from this edition offers a more accurate account "egelBs usage..6 &y examining the collected works rather than the complete works, I have in a loose sense taken the BaverageB of the content of each text so that those texts with multiple versions do not skew the results... 1econd, the tables, for reasons of clarity, do not list the myriad minor variations that "egel uses only rarely Ke.g. 'ichaufheben, hinaufhebt, etc.M. 1uch forms are extremely rare in "egel Krelative to the listed formsM and would not unduly affect the results. 3inally, and most problematically, the tables do not list instances where aufheben is used separably Ki.e. hebt....aufM. (his problem is due to the limitations of the search software that is currently commonly available Kas of .CC@M. -iven the tools at my disposal, I was able to search for individual words, but not for syntactically separated elements of the same word. It should be
.6

7ne could also say that the difference between the collected works and the complete works is comparable to the difference between a statistical sample of a population and the total population. !iewed in this sense, the fact that the sample is not identical to the population would be advantage, not a disadvantage, in terms of the reliability of our analysis. .. (he choice of edition was also a practical consideration insofar as there is no electronic version of the %einer edition yet available.

;? noted, however, even this last limitation does not fundamentally alter the conclusions drawn from the data. (he absence of separable occurrences of aufheben indicates that the use of sublation Kas a verbM is even more fre?uent than the data indicates. In other words, aufheben is undercounted, not overcounted, and thus the results that are the basis of our third and fourth claim Ke.g. that it is more commonly used as a verb and that it is more common than *ialektikM would be even more pronounced than those indicated..; 3urthermore, relative to our first and second claims Ktechnicality and the lack of variation over timeM, by assuming that the KuncountedM number of separable occurrences follows the same pattern across the different volumes as aufhebenBs other KcountedM forms,.? other regression analyses conducted for hypothetical higher total occurrences of aufheben found no appreciable change in the results..9 (herefore, while this last limitation could be resolved by a physical, page,by,page count Kor with better softwareM, such precision is not necessary in order to establish any of our four basic claims. (hus, while the freJuency analysis presented in this section has certain limitations of which I am well aware, it is not without significance or purpose. (his analysis has allowed me to demonstrate, rather than merely assert, four basic claims4 6M that "egel uses the term BsublationB in a technical philosophical sense, .M that sublation has some significance for "egel before his explicit discussion of the term, ;M that sublation is used primarily as a verb rather than a noun, and ?M that the term BsublationB is used much more freJuently than the term BdialecticB. (his relative Bverbal priorityB between sublation and dialectic established by these last two points is my reason for focusing this study on sublation rather than dialectic. Without establishing Kon some basisM this priority of sublation over dialectic, my entire decision to
.; .?

(his point also applies to the second limitation of undercount of the extremely rare forms. (his is a reasonable assumption, statistically speaking, insofar as it is an assumption about the nature of the -erman language andLor "egelBs writing style, and not the texts in the sample in particular. .9 7ther regression analyOes were conducted for hypothetical total counts of ., ;, and 6C times the given total with no change in the conclusions. (his means that even if the data collected here missed up to one half, two thirds, or @CY of the actual number of occurrences of aufheben, the statistical conclusions would still hold. Part of the purpose of including the regression analysis in the first place was to compensate for the absence of separable instances from the sample.

;9 approach "egelBs logic in terms of the concept of sublation itself might have seemed arbitrary. (herefore, while freJuency analysis alone Kor any other form of Juantitative linguistic analysisM cannot by itself explain the significance of a term, it can, when conducted in con#unction with other analyses, provide valuable supplemental information that can augment and better ground such analyses. In this case, the Juantitative analysis tells us that we are probably looking in the right placeIat an important concept. Why and how this concept is important is a Juestion for our other modes of analysis.

B. SYNTA%
(he second step in our analysis of "egelBs usage of the term BsublationB is to examine the grammar of the various forms of usage4 more specifically, the syntax. What is specifically interesting about the syntax of sublation is what one can generically refer to as its Bgrammatical ob#ectB. 3or any given sentence in which the word BsublationB occurs, examining the syntax allows us to make an initial determination of the specific nature of that sublation. Put simply, by determining the precise grammatical ob#ect of a given instance of sublation, one can glean a great deal about the relative emphasis "egel places on the two opposed meanings of sublation. (hat is to say, by determining with precision what is being sublated, one can determine how it is being sublated..< "ow exactly this will work is described in what follows. What exactly is being sublated can be determined simply by identifying the grammatical ob#ect of a given instance of sublation. When "egel uses sublation as a verb Ke.g. aufhebt, aufgehoben, hebt...auf..., etc.M that which is being sublated is the direct ob#ect. In /nglish translation, this is rendered in either the active Ki.e. B# sublates +GM or passive Ki.e. B+ is sublatedBM voice. (he grammatical ob#ect is even more obvious in -erman, insofar as the direct ob#ect is declined in the accusative case. (he grammatical ob#ect of sublation when the
.<

(hat is, to a certain extent. 1ee $hapter ., 1ection $ for a more extended discussion. %y point here is that syntactical analysis can be one helpful tool in making such determinations, but is once again not the onl# tool.

;< word is used as an ad#ective Ke.g. als aufgehobeneM is eJually easy to determineIthe ob#ect is simply the noun being modified. /ven when sublation is used as a noun, as for example when "egel uses it in the form Bthe sublation of +B Ke.g. der Aufhebung des +M, sublation still refers to some grammatical ob#ect that is being sublated. "aving first determined what is being sublated, one can then determine how it is being sublated. When the grammatical ob#ect of sublation is a moment, then the sense of negation tends to be emphasiOed. When the grammatical ob#ect is a relation between moments, then the sense of preservation tends to be emphasiOed. 2 few examples should make this clearer. (his first passage is an example where the sense of sublation as negation is emphasiOed4 N(hey Sbeing and nothingT are therefore in this unity, but as vanishing moments, only as sublated. (hey sink from their initially imagined self3subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct, but at the same time are sublated.N.D In this example, the grammatical ob#ect of the two instances of sublation is N(heyN K'ieM, referring in both instances to the moments being and nothing. 1o, in this example, the moments, rather than the relations between them, are the grammatical ob#ect of sublation. 2t the same time, both instances of the term BsublationB in the passage clearly emphasiOe the sense of sublation as negation. In the first case, sublation is eJuated with the BvanishingB of the Nvanishing momentsN K1erschwindendeM. In the second case, sublation is contrasted with what is Nstill distinctN Knoch unterschiedenenM. (hus, this passage illustrates the association between the sublation of a moment Krather than of a relation between momentsM and the sense of sublation that emphasiOes negation..: (his second passage serves as an example where the sense of sublation as preservation is emphasiOed4 N(he sub#ective logic is the logic of the concept, of essence which has sublated
.D

N'ie sind also in dieser "inheit, aber als 1erschwindende, nur als Aufgehobene. 'ie sinken von ihrer zun)chst vorgestellten 'elbst)ndigkeit zu >omenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen.N K1 6C9; "W9L66.M .: (his example is somewhat artificial since I have abstracted these two sentences from their broader context. (his abstraction is intended to isolate the syntactical element being described, not to obscure "egelBs meaning. (he full passage is Juoted below in 1ection $ of this chapter, note ;<.

;D its relationship to being or its semblance K'cheinM, and in its determination is no longer external but is sub#ectiveIfree, self,subsistent and self,determining, or rather it is the sub#ect itself.N.@ In this example, the grammatical ob#ect of sublation is NrelationshipN KBeziehungM. %ore specifically, it is the sublation, by the logic of the concept, of the relationship between essence and being. In this instance, the sense of sublation as preservation is clearly emphasiOed. What is negated is not being or essence, but the nature of the relationship between the two. 2t the level of the concept, the e+ternal determination of being and essence is replaced with a self,determination.;C (he externality is negated, but at the same time both of the moments themselves are preserved. (hus, this passage illustrates the association between the sublation of a relationship between moments Krather than the moments themselvesM and the sense of sublation as preservation.;6 "aving carefully examined the grammar of particular sentences in which the word sublation occurs, we can draw two important conclusions. 3irst and foremost, we can see that there is a pattern in "egelBs use of sublation. When used BdirectlyB Kthe sublation of momentsM, the sense of negation is emphasiOed. When used BindirectlyB Kthe sublation of the relation between momentsM, the sense of preservation is emphasiOed. 'ecognition of this pattern helps to show that "egelBs system is not simply an arbitrary aggregate of moments that can each be read independently of the other. 2t the same time, the variations in the patternIthe fact that the Bliteral double meaningsB of sublation are not always weighted eJuallyIhelp show how "egelBs system is not simply the result of the repetitious application of an abstract formal method. (here is a pattern here, but at the level of grammar, rather than dialectic.;.

.@

N*ie subjektive $ogik ist die $ogik des Begriffs, 3 des 0esens, das seine Beziehung auf ein 'ein oder seinen 'chein aufgehoben hat und in seiner Bestimmung nicht erlich mehr, sondern das freie selbstdige, sich in sich bestimmende 'ubjektive oder vielmehr das 'ubjekt selbst ist.N K1 <?; "W9L<.,/2M ;C 3or more information on this distinction, see $hapter 9. ;6 7r more precisely, the sense in which preservation is weighted as eJually as negation. ;. (his is another reason why I have chosen to examine sublation, rather than dialectic, as the topic of this dissertation. (he variations in "egelBs use of the concept of sublation will also be addressed in Part II.

;: I should note at this point that a sense of these sorts of patterns;; is helpful but not sufficient for a thorough interpretation of "egelBs concept of sublation. In my emphasis on the importance of this Bgrammar of dialecticB, I am in no way advocating a reductivel# structuralist approach to the interpretation of "egel. (o do so would be simply to repeat the old mistake of the BtextbookB reading of "egel Ke.g. the (hesis,2ntithesis,1ynthesis formulaM, which treats "egel as having the sort of merely formal method that he explicitly condemns.;? 'ather, it is my claim that structural methods can act as a useful supplement to Kbut again, not a replacement ofM a more historiographical approach. When reading "egel Kor any text, for that matterM, one can never, for specific reasons we will see in the next section, be so foolish as to neglect an eJually close attention to context.

C. CONTE%T
While structural analyses such as examinations of word freJuency and syntax can be useful tools, providing helpful glimpses into certain aspects of "egelBs concept of sublation, they cannot Kby themselvesM present a complete picture. (hus, the third step in our analysis will be to look at what the conte+t in which "egel employs the concept of sublation implies about its specific meaning. (he most important aspect of context to take note of here is "egelBs freJuent use of the term BsublationB with an emphasis on the sense of negation, but with the addition of some sort of Jualifying remark. 2long these lines, a relatively common formulation in "egelBs writings is that something is said to be sublated in the negative sense, Nbut eJuallyN Kaber ebensosehrM or Nbut at the same timeN Kaber zugleichM it is preserved. 3or an illustration of this, we can return to the first example from the section on syntax,;9 this time looking at the broader context of the paragraph as a whole.
;; ;? ;9

&y this I mean structural associations in general, including patterns of both freJuency and syntax. 1 ?;,?9; "W9L;9,;D. 2lso cited in part in previous section, in note .D.

;@
&ecoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; but as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate unity in which there is both being and nothing. &ut in so far as being and nothing, each unseparated from its other is, each is not. (hey are therefore in this unity, but as vanishing moments, only as sublated. (hey sink from their initially imagined self, subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct, but at the same time are sublated.;<

&y simply extending the scope of the Juotation, and slightly altering which words are emphasiOed, one can acJuire a very different perspective on the cited passage. While the syntax of the term BsublationB Ktaken in isolationM indicates that being and nothing are simply negated Kor taken as N1erschwindendeNM, the context indicates they are eJually preserved4 becoming is not simply some sort of destruction of being and nothing, but rather a Ndeterminate unityN in which both coexist. What is negated is not being or nothing, but their Nimagined self,subsistenceN, the notion that the relationship between the two is simple and self,contained. /laborating on the basic distinction from the earlier section on syntax, one could say that while the grammatical ob#ect of the term sublation is in this instance Bbeing and nothingB, according to the broader context, the ob#ect of the concept of sublation is Kin this instanceM the relationship between being and nothing. 'ecogniOing a distinction between the term and the concept of sublation is vitally important for an accurate interpretation of "egelBs logic. 2s we have #ust seen, even when "egel uses the term sublation in a conventional Kmerely negativeM sense, it is not necessarily the case that the technical KdoubleM meaning is entirely absent. 3or example, a critic wishing to attribute a totalitarianism to "egelBs logic could find ample evidence to support his conclusion by focusing on select Juotations where "egel uses the term in the conventional, negative sense while ignoring the broader context in which "egel discusses the concept of

;<

D*as 0erden, "ntstehen und 1ergehen, ist die .ngetrenntheit des 'eins und ,ichts- nicht die "inheit, welche vom 'ein und ,ichts abstrahiert, sondern als "inheit des 'eins und ,ichts ist es diese bestimmte "inheit oder Hdie,I in welcher sowohl 'ein als ,ichts ist. Aber indem 'ein und ,ichts jedes ungetrennt von seinem Anderen ist, ist es nicht. 'ie sind also in dieser "inheit, aber als 1erschwindende, nur als Aufgehobene. 'ie sinken von ihrer zun)chst vorgestellten 'elbst)ndigkeit zu >omenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen.N K1 6C9; "W9L666,66.,/2M

?C sublation in its technical, double sense. 7f course, a careful reader must always look beyond the syntax to the context or else risk missing the point.;D (he distinction between the term and the concept is important not #ust for avoiding a misreading of "egelBs use of sublation, but also in order to avoid missing it altogether. In some cases, the concept of sublation is present without any explicit use of the term at all. 3or example4
...there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or spirit or anywhere else which does not eJually contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity.;:

5ow, this passage makes clear Kalbeit implicitM use of both the positive and negative senses of sublation. (he opposition between immediacy and mediation is a NnullityN Ki.e. it is negatedM. 2t the same time, both immediacy and mediation are present, Ncontained eJuallyN in everything, in spite of the nullity of their opposition Ki.e. they are preservedM. (hus, the two senses of sublation are both clearly present. /ven elements of the syntactical structure are found here, insofar as it is not immediacy or mediation that are a nullity but the opposition between them. It would be absurd to claim that the concept of sublation is not at work here simply because it is not referred to explicitly, simply because it is not named. 'ecognition of this fact depends upon a distinction between the term and the concept of sublation.;@

;D

2 Blinguistically positivistB interpretation, which assumes that a concept can never be present without the corresponding term, is forced to ignore these important contextual aspects. ;: N...da/ es ,ichts gibt, nichts im 6immel oder in der ,atur oder im Geiste oder wo es sei, was nicht ebenso die .nmittelbarkeit enth)lt als die 1ermittlung, so da/ sich diese beiden Bestimmungen als ungetrennt und untrennbar und jener Gegensatz sich als ein ,ichtiges zeigt.N K1 <:; "W9L<<M ;@ (his distinction between the term and the concept is also why it is not absurd to talk about "egelBs logic in terms of dialectic. If the presence of a concept necessarily reJuired the presence of the term, then dialectic would be mysteriously absent from the vast proportion of "egelBs logic. While I have claimed that framing "egelBs logic in terms of dialectic can pose certain difficulties, it is certainly not absurd, or even incorrect, to do so.

?6

Transition to Part II
2t this point, we have reached the conclusion of Part I of this study on the structure of "egelBs concept of sublation. 1everal key aspects of this concept have been established. In $hapter 6, we saw how "egel explicitly defines the term BsublationB and how he implicitly distinguishes it from other related terms such as negation and synthesis. In $hapter ., we saw what "egelBs general usage of the term can tell us about the concept4 6M that sublation is the operant, active expression of "egelBs logic; .M that the meaning of a particular instance of sublation can be better ascertained by attending to its grammatical ob#ect; ;M that a particular instance of the concept of sublation cannot be either isolated from its context or completely identified with instances of the term alone. (aken together, these structural aspects of "egelBs concept of sublation will help us to examine, in Part II, how this concept functions in individual moments and transitions in "egelBs logic.

?.

PART II: FUNCTION CHAPTER 3: BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING

"aving analyOed "egelBs explicit discussions of sublation and some implicit aspects of his usage of the term, I will now examine some examples of how he applies the concept.6 (he functional analysis presented in Part II may seem to overlap with the treatment of usage in the previous chapter. "owever, the topics they discuss are distinct. While $hapter . dealt with "egelBs usage of sublation in general, Part II treats "egelBs specific uses of sublation in individual moments and transitions. (he earlier analyses of the structural aspects of sublation have prepared us to determine with more precision exactly how sublation operates in "egelBs logic. &y first taking a general overview of the structure of sublation in "egelBs logic, we are now be better eJuipped to perform a more precise and thorough exegesis of particular instances of the concept. (his structural overview will guide us in our subseJuent textual analysis, in the same way one might consult a map before setting off on a #ourney. If we wind up in difficult or confusing terrain, our advanced preparations will give us a better idea of how to find what we are looking for. 2t the same time, by more looking closely at specific instances of "egelBs use of sublation, we will be able to test whether the general statements made about sublation in the first section are in fact valid for specific cases. 'elative to "egelBs definitions, a functional analysis will test whether "egelBs explicit statements about sublation in fact correspond to his use of the term. 'elative to "egelBs general usage, a functional analysis will test whether the
6

(he general division between the structure and function of "egelBs logic is taken from *.5. 3indlay, who writes at one point N"aving so far dealt with what "egel sa#s about his Dialectic, we may know consider what he does with it., how it actually works in practice.N *.5. 3indlay, 6egel% A 7e3"+amination K7xford, 6@9:M, D6. While 3indlay unfortunately goes on to discuss the Ntriadic structure of "egelBs writingsN K3indlay, D6M and believes that this abstract structure is "egelBs actual Ntriadic pseudo,methodN K3indlay, ;9;M, he is nevertheless at least partially aware of the limits in this all,too,formal sort of interpretation, mentioning that Nthe triads of "egelBs system vary vastly in their make,up.N K3indlay, D.M (he variableness 3indlay notices but offers little account of is what I examine more concretely in this Part of the dissertation.

?; claims I have made about the implicit structure are in fact correct. (he first test is necessary if one does not merely want to assume, but rather to demonstrate, that "egel does not contradict himself, i.e. that his statements about sublation are in fact coherent. (he second test is necessary if one wants to make not only abstract, but also concrete claims about "egelBs philosophy. It is only by actually traveling to our destination that we can see if the map we originally consulted is accurate. With these two purposes in mind, one can see how the structural and functional analyses of "egelBs concept of sublation play complementary roles in this interpretation. /ach helps reciprocally to determine the other more fully, and helps isolate details and insights in a way that neither could accomplish alone. In this part, I take up three examples from the 'cience of $ogic in order to show how the concept of sublation functions in "egel. I examine the role of sublation in three key relationships4 being and nothing,. identity and difference,; and the system and its moments.? While these are only three of many possible examples, they are not chosen arbitrarily. /ach illustration will provide certain benefits. 3irst, choosing concepts that are more generally recogniOable beyond the scope of their particular "egelian sense Ki.e. more broadly relevant to ontology andLor systematic philosophy as suchM means that they should be more broadly elucidating than those more specialiOed examples that might be only more narrowly relevant Ke.g. %easure, $hemism, etc.M. 2s a general principle, the more widely recogniOed a concept is, the more helpful it should be for the purposes of exposition. 1econd, in practical terms, some sort of selection must be made. 2n exhaustive catalogue of every instance of sublation in the 'cience of $ogic could very well be useful for
. ;

2s discussed in &ook 6, 1ection 6, $hapter 6 of the 'cience of $ogic, also referring to becoming. 2s discussed in &ook ., 1ection 6, $hapter . of the 'cience of $ogic, also referring to similarity, diversity, opposition, and contradiction. ? 2s discussed in &ook ;, 1ection ;, $hapter ; of the 'cience of $ogic, referring to the 2bsolute Idea and its constituent moments.

?? "egel scholars treating any number of other topics, but it would be of little help for the purpose of explaining the concept of sublation itself. It would constitute a counterproductive digression away from the main thesis, like a child telling a story that goes on too long because he does not know which details are the important ones. (he topic of this dissertation is "egel concept of sublation, not "egelBs entire 'cience of $ogic.9 (hird, in addition to illustrating more specifically how sublation functions in "egelBs logic, treating these three topics will enable me to address three more general Juestions relevant to a broader understanding of the concept of sublation.
6M Is "egelBs logic simply absurdQ .M Does "egel violate the law of non,contradictionQ ;M "ow does "egel conceive of his systemQ

3rom a "egelian perspective, these Juestions may seem overly simplistic, but they are Juite common in references to "egel by non,specialists. I will look at each of these Juestions, in the chapters on being and nothing K$hapter ;M, identity and difference K$hapter ?M, and the system and its moments K$hapter 9M, respectively, through the lens of sublation. (hrough these analyses, I hope to demonstrate how the structural,functional approach I have used here can be useful as a way of elucidating a philosopher like "egel. &efore we proceed, it is important to emphasiOe that the purpose of the discussion here of moments like being, nothing, and becoming is a better understanding of "egelBs concept of sublation, not these moments in themselves. 2s such, I must set aside important issues that do not bear directly on the matter at hand. 1pecifically, I must set aside certain logical Juestions Ke.g. NIs it valid to begin the logic with beingQNM and metaphysical Juestions Ke.g. NIs "egelBs concept of being an adeJuate oneQNM which, while important, are not directly pertinent to the issue at hand.

In this study, however, I have focused specifically on the concept of sublation as it appears in "egelBs logic, insofar as the 'cience of $ogic contains its most explicit and elaborate expression.

?9 (hat being said, any discussion, regardless of its focus, needs to begin by laying some sort of groundwork. 1o, while some discussion of being and nothing in themselves will be unavoidable, the relevance to sublation should become apparent as we proceed.

A. BEING AND NOTHING

(o start with, what does "egel mean by NbeingN K'einMQ 2t the beginning of the 'cience of $ogic, he obviously does not mean it in the sense of Ba beingB Kthat is a more specific determination, clearly distinguishable in -erman as 'eiendeM, but rather being in the sense of Bbeing in generalB. "owever, "egel uses the term BbeingB in the sense of Bbeing in generalB in two ways. 7n the one hand, BbeingB refers to the entire sub#ect,matter of &ook 6 and its place in the 'cience of $ogic as a whole K*ie $ehre von 'einM4 being insofar as it is externally determined Ki.e. in contrast with essence and conceptM and insofar as it is internally determined Ki.e. in terms of Juality, Juantity, measure, etc.M. 7n the other hand, the term BbeingB also refers to the specific sub#ect,matter of the first part of $hapter 64 Npure beingN Kreine 'einM.< "ere, I will discuss being only in this latter sense. 2ny use of the term BbeingB should be understood to refer to pure being unless otherwise indicated. Pure being is being as such, being in general, being Nwithout any further determination.ND NIt has no diversity within itself nor any reference outwardsN: and NIt is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.N@ &eing is defined here as complete indeterminacy4 if it did contain or entail any determination whatsoever, it would already be a later moment, i.e. it would be something else.6C

< D

1 :.; "W9L:.. N...ohne alle weitere Bestimmung...N K1 :.; "W9L:.M : N...hat keine 1erschiedenheit innerhalb seiner noch nach au/en...N K1 :.; "W9L:.M @ N"s ist die reine .nbestimmtheit und $eere.N K1 :.; "W9L:.M 6C "egel addresses wh# he thinks that logic must begin with this pure indeterminacy in the Introduction K1 <D, D:; "W9L<9,D@M

?< "egel goes on to define pure nothing Kreine ,ichtsM as Ncomplete emptiness, absence of all determination and contentIundifferentiatedness in itselfN.66 In addition, he states in his first 'emark that this nothing K,ichtsM is not opposed to something K"twasM, because such a nothing would already be a determinate nothing Kein bestimmtes ,ichtsM. 2n eJually apt term for nothing as purely indeterminate would be Bnon,beingB K,ichtseinM.6. (he key point for "egel here is that since pure being and pure nothing both lack any determination, they are, in effect, the same. "egel makes the same basic claim at the ends of both sections 2 and & of $hapter 64 N&eing, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.N6; and N5othing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as pure being.N6? (his identification clearly follows from the way "egel defines his terms. If there were any feature with which one could distinguish them, then that feature would be a determination, and they would be something other than pure indeterminacy. 2lthough the sameness of being and nothing follows from his definitions, this does not by itself make this notion clear. "egel was well aware of this, adding to the three paragraphs of the basic text, four extensive remarks and considerable revisions between the two editions. In order to clarify what exactly "egel means by Nthe unity of being and nothingN K"inheit des 'eins und ,ichtsM, I will now discuss some of these remarks.69 (he first point that should be mentioned is that while the notion that being and nothing are the same makes sense if one accepts "egelBs definitions, it still seems paradoxical. 7n this point, "egel contrasts those determinations which occur in philosophy to those of Nordinary
66

N...vollkommene $eerheit, Bestimmungs3 und &nhaltslosigkeit- .nunterschiedenheit in ihm selbst.N K1 :.; "W9L:;M 6. 1 :;; "W9L:?. 1ee also the contrast between nothing as such K,ichtsM and a determinate nothing K,ichtseiendeM already presented in $hapter 6, 1ection &, 1ubsection 6. 6; N*as 'ein, das unbestimmte .nmittelbare ist in der !at ,ichts und nicht mehr noch weniger als ,ichts.N K1 :.; "W9L:;M 6? N,ichts ist somit dieselbe Bestimmung oder vielmehr Bestimmungslosigkeit und damit 2berhaupt dasselbe, was das reine 'ein ist.N K1 :.; "W9L:;M 69 In order to lead more directly the relevance of all this for the analysis of sublation, I will treat these remarks thematically, rather than seJuentially.

?D common senseN Kgemeinen >enschenverstandeM.6< "egel ascribes the reason that the notion that being and nothing are the same sounds strange to common sense4
7ne source among others of such perplexity is that the ordinary consciousness brings with it to such an abstract logical proposition, conceptions of something concrete, forgetting that what is in Juestion is not such concrete something but only the pure abstractions of being and nothing and that these alone are to be held firmly in mind.6D

In order to clarify this distinction between the abstract philosophical discussion at hand and the interpolation of concrete determinations by common sense, "egel points out that, from the proposition that being and nothing are the same, it does not follow that it makes no difference whether a particular thing Ke.g. a house, a 6CC dollarsM is or is not. N(his inference from, or application of, the proposition completely alters its meaning. (he proposition contains the pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application converts them into a determinate being and a determinate nothing.N6: (hus, for "egel, the reason common sense finds the notion that being and nothing are the same to be paradoxical is that it obscures the distinction between indeterminacy and determinacy.6@ It would seem, however, that "egel makes use of #ust this sort of paradox in the transition from being and nothing to becoming K0erdenM. In the first paragraph on becoming, entitled N8nity of &eing and 5othingN, he writes that NPure being and pure nothings are, therefore, the same.... &ut it is eJually true that they are not undistinguished from each other,

6<

1 :?; "W9L:<. 3or a more detailed discussion of "egelBs contrast between philosophy and Nordinary common senseN, see his essay NWho (hinks 2bstractlyQN in 6egel% 7einterpretation, !e+ts, and :ommentar#, ed. and trans. Walter )aufmann KDoubleday, 6@<9M, 66;,66:. 6D N"in Grund solcher 1erwirrungen ist unter anderen, da/ das Bewu/tsein zu solchem abstrakten logischen 'atze 1orstellungen von einem konkreten "twas mitbringt und vergi/t, da/ von einem solchen nicht die 7ede ist, sondern nur von den reinen Abstraktionen des 'eins und ,ichts, und da/ diese allein festzuhalten sind.N K1 :9; "W9L:DM 6: N*ieser 'chlu/ oder Anwendung jenes 'atzes ver)ndert dessen 'inn vollkommen. *er 'atz enth)lt die reinen Abstraktionen des 'eins und ,ichts- die Anwendung aber macht ein bestimmtes 'ein und bestimmtes ,ichts daraus.N K1 :9,:<; "W9L:DM 6@ "egel applies a similar distinction to his criticism here of )antBs re#ection of the ontological proof. K1 :<,@C; "W9L:D,@.M In brief4 "egel argues that while )ant is correct that one cannot infer the existence of finite things from their concept Ke.g. )antBs N6CC dollarsNM, one cannot extend this inference to -od. "egel points out the distinction between finite things, whose concept and existence are separable, and Kthe infinity ofM -od, whose concept and existence are inseparable. In effect, "egel argues that Kthe nature of the existence ofM -od is not Kthe nature of the existence ofM a 6CC dollars.

?: that, on the contrary, the# are not the same, that they are absolutel# distinct....N .C 1o, on the one hand, "egel dismisses the common sense notion that the unity of being and nothing is paradoxical, and, on the other hand, he identifies it as the basis of the transition from being and nothing to becoming. "ow is one to make sense of thisQ I will examine this problem in the following subsection.

Remark: On the Transitions in Hegel's Logic

&efore addressing this problem, we need to make a brief digression in order to clarify the nature of BtransitionB here, as this is an important part of understanding #ust what goes on in the concept of sublation, as well as in the organiOation of "egelBs logic in general. 3irst of all, it is important to note that there is no essential priority between being and nothing. (he treatment in these opening pages of the $ogic does not indicate any temporal se?uence where there would be something like Bfirst there was being, then there was nothingB or vice versa. Implicitly, one can see that if there were any criteria for deciding their relative priority, this would constitute an invalid introduction of a determination into their indeterminacy. 2ny temporal seJuence would be necessarily excluded for this reason. /xplicitly, one can see that "egel contrasts his position with that of Parmenides, &uddhism, and "eraclitus, who prioritiOe, respectively, being, nothing, and becoming. (he most relevant part of this passage comes from "egelBs re#ection of "eraclitus Kand similar Npopular oriental proverbsNM. While they also unify being and nothing in becoming,
...these expressions have a substratum in which the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time, are conceived as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction and conseJuently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely the same..6

.C

N*as reine 'ein und das reine ,ichts ist also dasselbe..... Aber ebensosehr ist die 0ahrheit nicht ihre .nunterschiedenheit, sondern da/ sie nicht dasselbe, da/ sie absolut unterschieden...D K1 :.,:;; "W9L:;,/2M .6 NAber diese Ausdr2cke haben ein 'ubstrat, an dem der Jbergang geschieht- 'ein und ,ichts werden in der (eit auseinandergehalten, als in ihr abwechselnd vorgestellt, nicht aber in ihrer Abstraktion gedacht, und daher auch nicht so, da/ sie an und f2r sich dasselbe sind.N K1 :?; "W9L:?,:9M

?@ "ere, "egel specifically distinguishes his presentation of being and nothing from the notion of being and nothing alternating in time. 1ignificantly, the grounds of the distinction Ki.e. that when they are thought of temporally they are not thought in their abstractionM also preclude any other sort of temporaliOation as well because any temporal priority would introduce a determination into their indeterminacy. If there is no temporal seJuence among the transitions of "egelBs logic, what about those passages where "egel seems to suggest a historical se?uenceQ (he exclusion of the former would seem to entail the exclusion of the latter. 7ne cannot have history without time. 'eferring to Parmenides and being, "egel writes that NWhat is the first in the science had of necessity to show itself historicall# as the first.N.. "ere and elsewhere, "egel repeatedly draws correspondences between logical moments and historical thinkers4 Parmenides and being, "eraclitus and becoming, and so forth. "owever, this need not contradict his position that the transitions of the logic are not temporal. It is consistent if one interprets the historical seJuence as a reflection of the logical seJuence, but not the other way around. In other words, logic shapes history, but history does not shape logicIthe necessity flows only one way..; &ut if there is no temporal or historical seJuence in the transitions of the 'cience of $ogic, then how are these transitions to be understoodQ (he best, most coherent answer is that the seJuence of the $ogic is an expository, or Kmore loosely speakingM a narrative one..? %ore precisely, the 'cience of $ogic contains both a logical and an expository seJuence, with the latter being an account of the former. 3or example, the expository seJuence of the 'cience of

.. .;

N0as das "rste in der 0issenschaft ist, hat sich m2ssen geschichtlich als das "rste zeigen.N K1 ::; "W9L@6M 3or a contrary interpretation, see $lark &utler, 6egelGs $ogic% Between *ialectic and 6istor# K5orthwestern, 6@@<M. &utler claims that the 'cience of $ogic is a Nreconstruction of historyN. K&utler, ?M I think this is not simply incorrect, but backwards. If "egelBs logic were interpreted in this way, then it would be determined b# history Krather than determinate of historyM, and thus could never be self,determinate in the way that "egel himself claims Ki.e. it would be determined by something it does not itself determineM. (he 'cience of $ogic Ki.e. the bookM is of course a product of history, but the science of logic itself Ki.e. logical thinking, an account of which "egel presents in the bookM cannot be either historical or temporal, and at the same time be self, determinate. .? 3or a more detailed account of this specific set of transitions, see below.

9C $ogic in this chapter is N&eing[5othing[&ecomingN, but the logical seJuence is N&eing V 5othing[ &ecoming.N I will use two analogies to explain further what I mean by this distinction. In one sense, the seJuence of the logic is like a story4 the main paragraphs are like the main plot, while the remarks are like the flashbacks, foreshadowing, and digressions of a Ksomewhat complicatedM story..9 ike a story, the narrative seJuence of the logic does not necessarily correspond to the temporal seJuence. 8nlike a story, the seJuence of the logic is a necessary one. In this sense, the logical seJuence of the science of logic is more like a Ksomewhat complicatedM math problem, the sort of problem where the seJuence of the operation matters, but not because it is in any way temporal. 3or example, solving the eJuation N6 X ; x 9ZN produces different results depending on the order in which the operations are carried out KN6 X K; x 9MZ6<N or NK6X;M x 9Z.CNM. &ut of course, it makes no sense to say that this seJuence of operations would be temporal, i.e. that addition happens BbeforeB multiplication or vice versa. *ust because the seJuence matters, it does not follow that the seJuence must be a temporal one. (he same is true of "egelBs logic.

B. BECOMING
Paradox is, of course, an essential aspect of the transitions within "egelBs logic..< -iven "egelBs overall approach, the specific problem for the transition from being and nothing to becoming is that there seems to be two paradoxes present4 6M the paradox of claiming being and nothing are the same, and .M the apparent contradiction between "egelBs assertion that the paradox is part of the transition and at the same time his dismissal of this paradox as one that troubles mere common sense alone.
.9

Walter )aufmann comments on this aspect of the textBs organiOation4 N(he $ogic is indeed a marvel of organiOation, and the use of B5otesB is altogether ingenious. (he device allows "egel to anticipate ob#ections, to elaborate, and to digress, while at the same time presenting an outline that is extraordinarily neat....Whatever seems worth saying is saidIif necessary, in a note.N K)aufmann, 6@;M .< (his will be discussed in more detail in $hapter ?, 1ection $.

96 (he solution to this problem is to be found in the location of the paradox..D 2t the level of being and nothing, being and nothing are the same Kdasselbe=..: (he unity K"inheitM of being and nothing, on the other hand, arrives only at the level of becoming. "ere, unity and sameness are distinct insofar as this unity is more than mere sameness; it includes both their sameness and their distinctiveness. In the transition to becoming, they are both the same and not the same,
...and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. (heir truth, therefore, is this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other4 becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has eJually immediately resolved itself..@

(here are two relevant points here. 3irst, the transition between being and nothing and becoming is, in a conceptual sense, a sublation Keven though the term is not explicitly used.M 1econd, a distinction between being and nothing only appears at the level of becoming. 2t the level of being and nothing themselves, there is no distinction and no determination Kboth are pure indeterminacyM. In becoming, there is also no difference between being and nothing Kbecause it is Nimmediately resolvedNM, but this resolution is something newIa determination.;C (hus, the mistake of common sense is not in considering the unity of being and nothing as contradictory per se, but rather in considering the paradox to exist at the level of being and nothing in themselves. (here are, in effect, two different paradoxes at play here4 the mistaken one of common sense Kwhich confuses indeterminacy with determinacyM and the operant one of the logic Kwhich underlies the logical transitionM. In order to understand how

.D .:

(hat is, its position in the logical seJuence of the transition. "egel himself uses the term sphere K'ph)reM instead. I chose to use the term BlevelB only to facilitate discussion in /nglish Ki.e. Bat the level of...B is much more idiomatic than Bin the sphere of...BM. .@ N...jedes in seinem Gegenteil verschwindet. &hre 0ahrheit ist also diese Bewegung des unmittelbaren 1erschwindens des einen in dem anderen% das 0erden- eine Bewegung, worin beide unterschieden sind, aber durch einen .nterschied, der sich ebenso unmittelbar aufgel5st hat.D K1 :;; "W9L:;,/2M ;C (his is only a sort of Bprovisional determinationB between being and nothing. It is a distinction, rather than a full determination Ki.e. a negationM. While it is minimally sufficient to remove them from the level of pure indeterminacy, being Kand nothingM will only acJuire a Bproper determinationB at the level of determinate being K*aseinM. In fact, it is the inadeJuate determinacy of this initial distinction Kin becomingM that leads to the subseJuent logical transition Kto determinate beingM.

9. exactly the operant contradiction functions, we must further clarify the specific nature of this unity. "egel writes that the term unity is an Nunfortunate wordN Kungl2ckliche 0ortM, and not an entirely adeJuate way to express the relationship between opposites that he has in mind here.
8nity...expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites. 1o far then, it would be better to say only unseparatedness and inseparabilit#, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression.;6

1o, while the term unity expresses sameness, the concept "egel is trying to express here includes both sameness and otherness.;. (he inseparability K.ntrennbarkeitM of opposites, on the other hand, is much clearer. 3or example, if one thinks of two sides of the same coin, one can immediately recogniOe how the two sides would be both opposed and inseparable. &ut "egel continues to use the word unity because he also wants to express something affirmative. (o use the coin example again, the two sides are Knegatively speakingM inseparable but also form Kpositively speakingM a unity, i.e. a whole coin. (hus, "egel uses the term BunityB in a special sense, which is not eJuivalent to sameness because it also includes a negative moment. "egel gives a few other descriptions of this unity that are helpful in defining it more precisely. In a discussion of *acobi, "egel compares the unity of being and nothing in becoming to a synthesis4 N&ecoming is the synthesis of being and nothing; but because synthesis suggests more than anything else the sense of an external bringing together of mutually externally things already there, the name synthesis, synthetic unity, has rightly been

;6

N*ie "inheit dr2ckt daher die ganz abstrakte *ieselbigkeit aus und lautet um so h)rter und auffallender, je mehr die, von denen sie ausgesprochen wird, sich schlechthin unterschieden zeigen. 82r "inheit w2rde daher insofern besser nur .ngetrenntheit und .ntrennbarkeit gesagt- aber damit ist das Affirmative der Beziehung des Ganzen nicht ausgedr2ckt.D K1 @6; "W9L@?M ;. In the case of being and nothing in becoming, it is a distinction that immediately resolves itself, but a distinction nonetheless.

9; dropped.N;; I have already discussed "egelBs criticism of the concept of synthesis relative to sublation, and it is noteworthy that the same distinction reoccurs here.;? (hus, here we have a negative definition of the unity of being and nothing in becoming; it is not, strictly speaking, a synthesis. "egel provides further negative definitions at the end of the third remark. "ere, referring specifically to the transition of being and nothing Ninto each otherN Kwhich occurs in becomingM, "egel warns against introducing later, more determinate mediations Kbestimmte 1ermittlungenM too soon. %ore specifically, he writes that Nthe transition in Juestion is not yet a relation.N;9 "aving made this distinction, "egel goes on to specify that, since this transition is not a fully developed relation, it is not the case that either being or nothing could be considered a ground or a cause of the other. (hus, for "egel, neither being nor nothing is taken to be anything like a first principle or a first cause. 2nd, by implication, "egelBs logic would seem to be neither deductive nor metaphysical in any traditional sense. 1o, while we have seen that the unity of being and nothing in becoming is not KonlyM sameness, not Kstrictly speakingM a synthesis and not KtechnicallyM even a relation, the Juestion still remains4 what is itQ 2t the level of being and nothing, the two are the same. "egel refers to this sameness as a mere Nabstract unityN Kabstrakte "inheitM. &y contrast, at the level of becoming, they are in a Ndeterminate unityN Kbestimmte "inheitM. In becoming, being and nothing are unified, but unified in a way that removes them from their initial pure indeterminacy4 N(hey are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. (hey sink from their initially imagined

;;

N0erden ist diese immanente '#nthesis des 'eins und ,ichts- aber weil der '#nthesis der 'inn von einem )u/erlichen (usammenbringen )u/erlich gegeneinander 1orhandener am n)chsten liegt, ist mit 7echt der ,ame '#nthesis, s#nthetische "inheit au/er Gebrauch gesetzt worden.N K1 @<; "W9L6CCM ;? 1ee the earlier discussion of the difference between synthesis and sublation in $hapter 6, 1ection &, 1ubsection .. ;9 N...jenes Jbergehen ist noch kein 1erh)ltnis.N K1 6C;; "W9L6C@M "ere, "egel clearly means relation K1erh)ltnisM in the more developed, technical sense he will discuss later in the $ogic. If one assumes that BrelationB is here used in a less developed sense, then "egelBs claim that a transition is not a relation would be incoherent.

9? self,subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are sublated.N;< (he determinate unity of being and nothing found in the transition to becoming is thus constituted b# sublation. (his determinate unity is a sublation in the following sense. In their unity in becoming, being and nothing are negated insofar as they lose their earlier indeterminacy. (hey are no longer BpureB being or BpureB nothing, but are rather determined as moments of becoming. 2t the same time, they are preserved in that they become distinct moments.;D With this introduction of a determination, they are no longer indistinguishable. It is in this sense that "egel states earlier that Nthe two terms Sbeing and nothingT have no separate subsistence of their own but are only in becoming.N;: (his particular instance of sublation is interesting for two reasons. 3irst, it is an implicit use of the technical sense identified in $hapter .. In both instances where the term aufgehoben is used in the passage cited above, the syntax indicates that it is used in an ordinary sense Ki.e. synonymous with simple negationM. 3rom the context of the passage, however, it is clear that both the negation and preservation which "egel explicitly identifies as the elements of sublation are present. (hus we see again, this time in more detail, that the technical sense of the concept of sublation can be present even when the term itself is not specifically used in that sense. Importantly, without this distinction between the concept and the term, the transition from being and nothing to their unity in becoming becomes indecipherable4 if there is no technical sublation operant in the transition here, then there is no means otherwise available by which the claim that they are both distinct and not distinct could be interpreted as being coherent.
;<

N'ie sind also in dieser "inheit, aber als 1erschwindende, nur als Aufgehobene. 'ie sinken von ihrer zun)chst vorgestellten 'elbst)ndigkeit zu >omenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen.N K1l6C9; "W9L66.,/2M ;D 2t the initial level, any distinctiveness they might have had was only BimaginaryB Ke.g. as they are for Bcommon senseBM. 2t the level of becoming, this distinctiveness becomes something philosophical, albeit in this somewhat unusual, sublated sense. ;: N... jene bestehen nicht f2r sich, sondern sind nur im 0erden...N K1 @;; "W9L@D,/2M

99 1econd, it is a somewhat unusual sublation. In the subseJuent transitions of the $ogic, the roles of negation and preservation are inverted. In the later transitions, it is the opposition between terms that is negated, and the moments that are preserved. "ere, in the transition from being and nothing to becoming, it is their sameness Ki.e. their indeterminacyM which is negated in order to constitute them as moments, and this constitution is in effect their preservation. (hus, while the structure is the same Ki.e. in the general relationship between negation and preservationM, in this instance there is a variation in how sublation functions Ki.e. in how negation and preservation operate relative to different individual contentsM. (he presence of this sort of variation helps illustrate why identifying a structure in "egelBs logic is not the same as attributing to "egel a merely formal method. If "egelBs method were simply an abstract, applied by roteIas if it were the operation of some sort of Blogic machineBIthere would be no such variations between the structure and the function of sublation. In other words, the presence of occasional variations in the form suggests that the content itself matters and thus that "egelBs explicit claim that his method it is not merely formal is consistent with how the system is in fact articulated.;@ (o complete this analysis of how sublation functions in this first transition of the $ogic, two more things need to be said about the determinate unity of becoming. (he determination of being and nothing in becoming is in fact a double determination4 coming,to, be K"ntstehenM and ceasing,to,be K1ergehenM. In coming,to,be, N...nothing is immediate, that is, the determination starts from nothing which relates itself to being, or in other words, changes into it....N In ceasing,to,be, N...being is immediate, that is, the determination starts from being which changes into nothing....N?C "egel identifies both coming,to,be and ceasing, to,be as types of becoming.
;@

3or more on the relation between form and content in "egelBs logic, see $hapter 9, 1ection $, 1ubsection ; of this study. ?C N...in der einen ist das ,ichts als unmittelbar, d. h. sie ist anfangend vom ,ichts, das sich auf das 'ein bezieht, d. h. in dasselbe 2bergeht, in der anderen ist das 'ein als unmittelbar, d. i. sie ist anfangend vom 'ein, das in das ,ichts 2bergeht...N K1 6C9,6C<; "W9L66.M

9< 'egarding these two determinations, "egel writes N(hey are not reciprocally sublated Ithe one does not sublate the other externallyIbut each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.N?6 (here are two things to note about this last passage. 3irst, even though these moments are in themselves suggestive of a temporal determination, once again, there is no priority between them; coming,to,be is not BbeforeB ceasing,to,be, and vice versa. 1econd, "egel draws an implicit distinction here between BreciprocalB and BreflexiveB. In coming,to,be and ceasing,to,be, it is not that being and nothing sublate each other reciprocally, because this would be an external determination. Ki.e. problematic in the same way that synthesis is problematic.M Instead, "egel prefers to express their sublation reflexively Ithey do not sublate each other; rather, they each sublate themselves. In other words, sublation is Kstrictly speakingM not an e+ternal determination of one moment operating on another, but an internal determination from within a given moment operating on itself. (o put it another way, being and nothing are not sublated b# becoming KexternallyM, but rather sublate themselves KinternallyM in becoming. While it sometimes easier, as a matter of exposition, to talk about sublation in external terms, it is important to keep in mind that sublation is, for "egel, an internal, self,determination of the content itself. (hus, a fundamental point to keep in mind about the function of sublation in "egelBs science of logic is that it is not the act of a philosopher on a concept, or of one moment on another, but an act originating from within each moment itself. "aving now completed the analysis of this first set of examples of the somewhat unusual function of "egelBs concept of sublation in the transition from being and nothing to becoming, I will now take up a second set4 identity, difference, and contradiction.

?6

N'ie heben sich nicht gegenseitig, nicht das eine )u/erlich das andere auf, sondern jedes hebt sich an sich selbst auf und ist an ihm selbst das Gegenteil seiner.N K1 6C<; "W9L66.M

9D

CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND CONTRADICTION

In this chapter, I examine the function of sublation in &ook ., 1ection 6, $hapter . of the 'cience of $ogic, which discusses those moments "egel calls the NessentialitiesN K0esenheitenM, or the Ndeterminations of reflectionN K7efle+ionsbestimmungenM. (hese essentialities include4 identity K&dentit)tM, difference K.nterschiedM, diversity K1erschiedenheitM, opposition K"ntgegensetzungM, and contradiction K0iderpruchM. %y purpose in using this set of moments as an example is twofold. 3irst, it serves as another illustration of how sublation specifically operates in "egelBs logic. 1econd, selecting this chapter also allows me to treat in more detail the relationship between sublation and contradiction Kwhich I mentioned briefly in the first chapterM. 2 proper grasp of this relationship is not only useful as an illustration, but is a key to understanding the role of sublation in "egelBs logic overall. 2t the beginning of this chapter of the $ogic, "egel remarks that4
(he determinations of reflection used to be taken up in the form of propositions, in which they were asserted to be valid for everything. (hese propositions ranked as the universal laws of thought that lie at the base of all thinking, that are absolute in themselves and incapable of proof, but are immediately and incontestably recogniOed and accepted as true by all thinking that grasps their meaning.6

"egel associates these determinations of reflections with the traditional K2ristotleanM notion of the categories, as Nwhat is predicated or asserted of the existent.N. "owever, "egel re#ects the expression of these categories in the form of propositions, as Nlaws of thoughtN4
$onseJuently, if these\ categories are put in the form of such propositions, then the opposite propositions eJually appear4 both present themselves with eJual necessity and, as immediate assertions, are at least eJually correct. (he one, therefore, would
6

N*ie 7efle+ionsbestimmungen pflegten sonst in die 8orm von ')tzen aufgenommen zu werden, worin von ihnen ausgesagt wurde, da/ sie von allem gelten. *iese ')tze galten als die allgemeinen *enkgesetze, die allem *enken zum Grunde liegen, an ihnen selbst absolut und unbeweisbar seien, aber von jedem *enken, wie es ihren 'inn fasse, unmittelbar und unwidersprochen als wahr anerkannt und angenommen werden.N K1 ?C@; "W<L;<,/2, (%M . N...was von dem 'eienden gesagt, behauptet wird.N K1 ?6C; "W<L;<M

9:
demand proof as against the other, and conseJuently these assertions could no longer be credited with the character of immediately true and incontestable propositions of thought.;

1o, rather than simply assert such laws of thought as given, here "egel attempts to prove them, or, to put it in more general terms, to examine and establish their foundations. (his is clearly Juite an audacious ambition. 3rom the outside looking in Ki.e. from a non,"egelian perspectiveM, it is very difficult at first to see how one could possibly prove the very mechanisms by which one establishes a proof in the first place. 7f course, "egel announces this ambition at the very outset of the $ogic. In other KphilosophicalM sciences, content and method are distinct, but N ogic, on the contrary, cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science.N? In the chapter considered here, "egel offers a further, concrete indication of the scope of this purpose4
...yet they are determinate against one another, as we shall find on closer examination of them, or as is immediately evident from the categories of identity, difference, and opposition; their form of reflection, therefore, does not exempt them from transition and contradiction. (he several propositions which are set up as absolute laws of thought, and, therefore, more closely considered, opposed to one another and mutually sublate themselves.9

N0enn diese Kategorien daher in solche ')tze gefa/t werden, so kommen ebensosehr die entgegengesetzten ')tze zum 1orschein- beide bieten sich mit gleicher ,otwendigkeit dar und haben als unmittelbare Behauptungen wenigstens gleiches 7echt. *er eine erforderte dadurch einen Beweis gegen den anderen, und diesen Behauptungen k5nnte daher nicht mehr der :harakter von unmittelbar wahren und unwidersprechlichen ')tzen des *enkens zukommen.N K1 ?6C; "W<L;D,/2M \(he specific categories "egel refers to here are the earlier Ndeterminations of the sphere of beingN KJuantity, Juality, etc.M, not the determinations of reflection per se. "owever, while "egel of course draws a distinction between the nature of the relationship among these two sets of determinations, the specifics of this distinction need not concern us at this point. (he significant claim Kfor the purposes of our analysisM is rather what they have in common4 that both are eJually sub#ect to dialectical,speculative transitions, and, as logical determinations, must both be established, not simply asserted or assumed. ? N*ie $ogik dagegen kann keine dieser 8ormen der 7efle+ion oder 7egeln und Gesetze des *enkens voraussetzen, denn sie machen einen !eil ihres &nhalts selbst aus und haben erst innerhalb ihrer begr2ndet zu werden.N K1 ?;; "W9L;9,/2M 9 N...aber wie sich aus ihrer n)heren Betrachtung ergeben wird 3 oder wie unmittelbar an ihnen als der &dentit)t, der 1erschiedenheit, der "ntgegensetzung erhellt 3, sind sie bestimmte gegeneinander- sie sind also durch ihre 8orm der 7efle+ion, dem Jbergehen und dem 0iderspruche nicht entnommen. *ie mehreren ')tze, die als absolute *enkgesetze aufgestellt werden, sind daher, n)her betrachtet, einander entgegengesetzt, sie widersprechen einander und heben sich gegenseitig auf.N K1 ?66; "W<L;:,/2M

9@ (hus, like the determinations of being, the determinations of reflection must be established and not simply presupposed or taken as given. (he manner in which "egel treats these determinations is not as an asserted enumeration or a sort of itemiOed list of distinct, separate propositions, but rather as an attempt to establish the way in which they are related to one another.< %ore specifically, this relationship is to be understood as a series of KlogicalM transitions, and, as we shall see, these transitions function in and through sublation.

A. IDENTITY
1. !stract I"entity
(he first of these determinations of reflection is identity. "egel immediately makes a distinction between two senses of the term4 essential identity Kwesentliche &dentit)tM and abstract identity Kabstrakte &dentit)tM. /ssential identity is identity insofar as it is a moment within "egelBs system. It is defined as Nthe immediacy of reflectionN K.nmittelbarkeit der 7efle+ionM and Nidentity,with,selfN K&dentit)t mit sichM. 2s the immediacy of reflection, identity is a moment of the sphere of essence Kinsofar as reflection as such is a moment of essenceM. In this way, identity is not immediate in the sense that being and nothing are immediate. 'ather, it is a Nsublated immediacyN Kaufgehobene .nmittelbarkeitM. (hat is, instead of being immediate in the sense that it contains no determinations, it is immediate in the sense that the determinations it contains are sublated within it. (hese earlier determinations are negated insofar essential identity is taken up as immediate, but preserved insofar as this KsublatedM immediacy is not the same as the KpureM absence of determination we saw in the discussion of being and nothing.

<

1 ?66; "W<L;:. 3or those less familiar with "egelBs way of thinking, the notion that the determinations of reflection are related to one another is an important point to keep in mind. While, from a non,"egelian point of view, the idea of Bproving proofB can readily seem absurd, the idea that these mechanisms might be related to each other is considerably less so. Presenting this weaker argument can serve as a point of access Ki.e. educationallyM into "egelBs own stronger arguments.

<C 3urthermore, this sublation is a reflexive oneIa Bself,sublationB. Identity is not some pre,existent concept or category that externally sublates Kor BconsumesBM earlier, separate moments. 'ather, identity is made up of Kor Bconstituted byBM the sublation of those earlier moments. (o put it another way, the earlier moments are not sublated b# identity, but rather in identity. 2nd since they are sublated in identity, their sublation is the self,sublation, the self, determination, of identity itselfIhence the phrase, Nidentity,with,selfN K&dentit)t mit sichM. 2bstract identity, by contrast, is not Kstrictly speakingM a moment of the system. It does not stand in relation to any KlogicallyM earlier or subseJuent moments, and thus it entails no sublation. It is, for "egel, simply an erroneous notion. Importantly, this error is not an error that is sublated and ultimately included within the overall systematic framework. 2side from a passing, negative reference in the main body of the text Kwhich serves only to define essential identityDM it is only discussed in the remarks. While these discussions are very helpful in explaining the nature of the logical transitions, it is important to note that this exposition is not part of these transitions. (he remarks are a gloss on the system, not a part of the system itself. : (hat being said, an understanding of abstract identity is necessary for a complete understanding of essential identity Kwhat one might also call Bsystematic identityBM. 2nd since most of "egelBs explanation of abstract identity is contained in the remarks, I will draw from both the main body text and the remarks for my analysis here.

N'ie ist insofern nicht abstrakte &dentit)t oder nicht durch ein relatives ,egieren entstanden, das au/erhalb ihrer vorgegangen w)re und das .nterschiedene nur von ihr abgetrennt, 2brigens aber dasselbe au/er ihr als seiend gelassen h)tte vor wie nach.N K1 ?66; "W<L;@M : (he distinction between the body of the text of the $ogic and the remarks is an instance of the distinction Kmentioned in the last chapterM between the logic and the exposition of the logic. It is important to add that this distinction should not be understood to in any way to diminish the importance of this exposition. Particularly in this chapter, "egel relies heavily on his own #argon; without the exposition, his the logical seJuence itself would be very difficult to comprehend. (hus, in my own exposition of the logic here, I will make extensive use of the explanations and examples "egel gives in the remarks. While it is of course important to understand "egelBs technical vocabulary, simply repeating it explains nothing. -iven this, it is my opinion that the best way to explain "egelBs logic is to make use of the glosses that he himself provides, as the basis for further elaboration, while at the same time keeping in mind the logicalLexpository distinction. 2n interpretation that insists on confining itself to the main,body text alone, albeit for valid logical,systematic reasons, handicaps itself from the start. (he distinction between "egelBs logical argument and his exposition is adapted from -adamer, who makes the distinction between Nthe concepts as they operate in thought and the thematiOation of themN. 1ee -adamer, 6egelGs *ialectic, :..

<6 "egel defines abstract identity most clearly in his second remark on this section4 N(he proposition in its positive expression 2Z2 is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of an empty tautology.N@ "egel further notes that since this law of identity is a tautology, it is merely formal, it has no content, and no further progress can be made from it.6C (his identity is abstract because it is only one,sided4 NIt is admitted that the law of identity expresses only a one,sided determinateness, that it contains only formal truth, a truth which is abstract, incomplete.N66 (hese notions of None,sidedN KeinseitigM and NincompleteN Kunvollst)ndigM are best understood in terms of "egelBs application of the premise that Bdetermination is negationB.6. Without some sort of negation,6; some contrast against which it could be defined, a concept cannot be adeJuately determined. (hus, when "egel claims that some notion6? is one,sided or incomplete, he means that it lacks this other determination. In this case, identity is only complete when it is understood not abstractly Knot as separate and distinctM, but in relation to another determination4 difference.

2. #ssential I"entity
Identity in its full speculative senseIessential identityIis inextricably related to difference. (his is in explicit contrast to merely abstract identity4
It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. (hey do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is
@

N*ieser 'atz in seinem positiven Ausdrucke A L A ist zun)chst nichts weiter als der Ausdruck der leeren !autologie.N K1 ?6;; "W<L?6M 6C (his last point is clearly a criticism of 3ichteBs 0issenschaftslehre. 3or "egelBs treatment of 3ichte, see "P;L?:<,?::; "W.CL;@?,;@9. (he point that Bno further progress can be made from itB is the reason "egel makes a distinction between abstract and essential identity, because otherwise the series of logical transitions would BderailB at this point, with no further progress beyond abstract identity alone being possible. 66 N"s wird zugegeben, da/ der 'atz der &dentit)t nur eine einseitige Bestimmtheit ausdr2cke, da/ er nur die formelle, eine abstrakte, unvollst)ndige 0ahrheit enthalte.N K1 ?6?; "W<L?6,?.M 6. "egel takes up this concept from 1pinoOa. 1ee, for example, "P;L.<D; "W.CL6D:. 6; (he specific type of negation reJuired will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 6? It should be noted that when I use the term BnotionB, I mean it as a generic Knon,"egelianM term that includes concepts, representations, thoughts, ideas, and so forth. I use this BgenericB term merely as a way of speaking, in order to avoid awkward stylistic constructions. 3or "egelBs technical term Begriff, I have used the word BconceptB. Please note that this is different from some older translation practices, notably %illerBs translation of the 'cience of $ogic that I have Kwith certain exceptionsM relied on in this study.

<.
different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different.69

It is in this sense that N...truth is complete only in the unity of identity and difference.N6< (he specific form that this proposed Bunity of identity and differenceB has yet to be presented. &efore arriving at that point, we need to address a few more of "egelBs problems with the interpretation of identity as merely abstract. (he proper determination of identity involves its negationIdifference. "egel re#ects the claim that the law of identity could be grounded on e+perience as only a Nmanner of speakingN Kblo/e 7edensartM.6D /ven if the law of identity were immediately obvious to the experience of every consciousness, it would not be an argument, but a presupposition. 2long the same lines, "egel also re#ects the idea that the e+pression of a tautolog# could ground the law of identity. "egel expresses this in very strong terms, in the following example4
If anyone opens his mouth and promises to state what -od is, namely -od isI-od, expectation is cheated, for what was expected was a different determination; and if this statement is absolute truth, such absolute verbiage is very lightly esteemed; nothing will be held to be more boring and tedious than conversation which merely reiterates the same thing, or than such talk which yet is supposed to be truth.6:

3or "egel, a tautology such as N-od is -odN is only formally true, what he calls elsewhere merely correct KrichtigM. "egel goes on to say that the expression of a tautologyIwhen offered as an attempt to ground the law of identityIis even self,contradictory K]M4 NS(he expression of a tautologyT sets out to say something, to bring forward a further determination. &ut since only the same thing is repeated, the opposite has happened, nothing has emerged.
69

N'o ist HesI die leere &dentit)t, an welcher diejenigen festhangen bleiben, welche sie als solche f2r etwas 0ahres nehmen und immer vorzubringen pflegen, die &dentit)t sei nicht die 1erschiedenheit, sondern die &dentit)t und die 1erschiedenheit seien verschieden. 'ie sehen nicht, da/ sie schon hierin selbst sagen, da/ die &dentit)t ein 1erschiedenes ist- denn sie sagen, die &dentit)t sei verschieden von der 1erschiedenheit- indem dies zugleich als die ,atur der &dentit)t zugegeben werden mu/, so liegt darin, da/ die &dentit)t nicht )u/erlich, sondern an ihr selbst, in ihrer ,atur dies sei, verschieden zu sein.N K1 ?6;; "W<L?6M 6< N...die 0ahrheit nur in der "inheit der &dentit)t mit der 1erschiedenheit vollst)ndig ist...N K1 ?6?; "W<L?.M 6D 1 ?6?; "W<L?.. 6: N0enn einer den >und auftut und anzugeben verspricht, was Gott sei, n)mlich Gott sei 3 Gott, so findet sich die "rwartung get)uscht, denn sie sah einer verschiedenen Bestimmung entgegen- und wenn dieser 'atz absolute 0ahrheit ist, wird solche absolute 7ednerei sehr gering geachtet- es wird nichts f2r langweiliger und l)stiger gehalten werden als eine nur dasselbe wiederk)uende .nterhaltung, als solches 7eden, das doch 0ahrheit sein soll.N K1 ?69; "W<L?;,??,/2M I should also note that this is the "egelian source for the critiJue of BrepetitionB I present in $hapter :, 1ection 2.

<; 1uch identical talk therefore contradicts itself.N6@ It is important to note a distinction here between tautolog# as such and the specific examples or e+pressions of tautolog# that "egel presents here. 7n the one hand, the opposition within tautology as such is the aforementioned point that identity cannot be different from difference without itself containing some difference. 7n the other hand, the contradiction.C in particular expressions of tautology Ke.g. N-od is -odN, N2 plant is a plantN, etc.M is the opposition between oneBs expectations about an argument and the argumentBs claim. Importantly, this latter opposition is not a dialectical, speculative one, and is not the basis on which "egel presents the logical transition between identity and difference. 1trictly speaking, it serves only an illustrative or expository function, rather than a systematic or logical one. 2t the end of his second remark, "egel addresses Nthe other expression of the law of identity4 2 cannot at the same time be 2 and not 2N;.6 that is, the law of contradiction Kor, more precisely, the law of non,contradictionM... In the law of identity expressed KnegativelyM as the law of non,contradiction, the precise relationship between identity and difference becomes more apparent. In this formulation, identity explicitly includes an element of negativity Ki.e. the not,2M.
In this proposition, therefore, identity is expressedIas the negation of negation. 2 and not 2 are distinguished, and these distinct terms are related to one and the same 2. Identity, therefore, is here represented as this distinguishedness in one relation or as simple difference in the terms themselves..;
6@

N...etwas zu sagen, eine weitere Bestimmung vorzubringen. &ndem aber nur dasselbe wiederkehrt, so ist vielmehr das Gegenteil geschehen, es ist nichts herausgekommen. 'olches identische 7eden widerspricht sich also selbst.N K1 ?69; "W<L??M .C Despite "egelBs use of the term, I have bracketed the word BcontradictionB here because the opposition of expectation discussed here is clearly not a contradiction in any formal sense. It is rather a sort of Bperformative contradictionB, the definition of which I will discuss in detail in $hapter <, 1ection 2. .6 N*er andere Ausdruck des 'atzes der &dentit)t, A kann nicht zugleich A und ,icht3A sein...N K1 ?6<; "W<L?9M .. I use the phrase Blaw of non,contradictionB here because "egel himself uses the phrase Blaw of contradictionB in two senses4 the first refers to the negative expression of the law of identity and the second Kin the third subsectionM refers to contradiction in its speculative sense. 3or the sake of clarity, I will use the phrase Blaw of contradictionB only to refer to this latter sense, discussed in the second section of this chapter below. .; N*ie &dentit)t ist also in diesem 'atze ausgedr2ckt 3 als ,egation der ,egation. A und ,icht3A sind unterschieden, diese .nterschiedenen sind auf ein und dasselbe A bezogen. *ie &dentit)t ist also als diese .nterschiedenheit in einer Beziehung oder als der einfache .nterschied an ihnen selbst hier dargestellt.N K1 ?6<; "W<L?9,(%M

<? (hus, this element of negativity shows, for "egel, that identity contains two opposed determinations4 the BpureB identity of the law of identity Kwhich contains no differenceM and the identity of the law of non,contradiction Kwhich contains, in effect, a double negationM. While the two laws are formally eJuivalent, they are not the same..? (he former contains no determination; the later contains a determination Ki.e. a negationM, which is itself negated. Importantly, this negation of negation, as distinct from the mere absence of negation, is a sublation. (he negation is itself negated Ki.e. they are formally eJuivalentM but it is at the same time preserved insofar as the negation of a negation is not the same as a mere absence of negation..9 Without interpreting the negation of negation in terms of "egelBs concept of sublation such a distinction would be unintelligible. Without the element of preservation, there would be no distinction between the negation of negation and the mere absence of negation. 2nd if one were to conceive of the transitions in "egelBs logic as merely simple negations Krather than as sublationsM, then this particular transition would be eJually unintelligible. It is only by taking into account "egelBs overall argument that one can see past its initial, prima facie absurdity. 7ver the years, more than one casual reader of the $ogic has undoubtedly re#ected out of hand the notion that tautology could ever contain even the merest glimmer of contradiction. >et if "egelBs actual argument for this point is taken into account Krather than #ust its conclusionM, then this apparent absurdity is easily dispensed with. Identity is not simply negated; it is sublated, and it is the technical, doubled sense of sublation that makes this transition ultimately intelligible. 2t this point, any reader who remains skeptical need only, at a minimum, keep in mind that for "egel, N...these laws contain more than is
.?

In case this distinction is not already clear, one could imagine having two apples and two oranges. 3ormally, they are e?uivalent K.Z.M, but, at the same time, apples are of course not the same Ki.e. the same sort of fruitM as oranges. .9 I take this interpretation of "egelBs logic in terms of the negation of negation from Dieter "enrich. 1ee his N(he ogic of 5egation and its 2pplicationN, Between Kant and 6egel% $ectures on German &dealism, ed. and trans. David 1. Pacini K"arvard, .CC;M, ;6<,;;6. (he link between the negation of negation and sublation Ki.e. that the negation of negation is the sublation of negationM is my own; "enrich does not mention the connection to aufheben in the text cited.

<9 meant by them....N.< and that, in the logical transition presented here, this BmoreB is difference itself.

B. DIFFERENCE, DI&ERSITY, AND OPPOSITION

3ollowing his initial account of the relationship between identity and difference, "egel offers three further determinations of difference itself4 absolute difference Kabsoluter .nterschiedM, diversity K1erschiedenheitM, and opposition KGegensatzM. I will now discuss each of these moments in turn. In order proceed more directly to my main thesis Ki.e. the relevance of these concepts for sublationM, I will, in this case, focus only on the logical transitions most relevant to the issue at hand, namely, the transitions between identity and difference and between difference K?ua oppositionM and contradiction. (hese are the two transitions that will tell us the most about sublation. "owever, in order to get from here to there in a concrete way, the following intermediate moments Kabsolute difference, diversity, and oppositionM must first be addressed.

1. !sol$te %i&&erence
"egel calls the first determination of difference Nabsolute differenceN. 2t a minimum, this term helps us to distinguish difference in general Kwhich would also include diversity and oppositionM from the particular character of its initial determination. "owever, "egel himself only uses this term three times in this section of the $ogic. 3or the most part, he simply uses the term NdifferenceN K.nterschied= to refer to both the general and specific senses of the term. 3or the purposes of my analysis here, I will use Nabsolute differenceN in order to draw the distinction more sharply, but the reader should bear in mind that this is not the term "egel himself predominantly employs.

.<

N...da/ diese ')tze mehr, als mit ihnen gemeint wird..HenhaltenI.N K1 ?6<; "W<L?9M

<< 2bsolute difference is difference as NdeterminateN, Nself,relatedN, and above all NsimpleN4 NIt is essential to grasp absolute difference as simple. In the absolute difference of 2 and not 2 from each other, it is the simple not which, as such, constitutes it.N.D It is this simplicity of absolute difference that suggests why "egel here uses the Jualifier BabsoluteB Ki.e. not relativeM. "egel presents this in terms of a contrast between KabsoluteM difference and otherness KAndersseinM. 7f course, there is a basic structural distinction at work here insofar as absolute difference is a moment of the sphere of essence, while otherness is a moment of the sphere of determinate being K*aseinM. In the text itself, "egel articulates the distinction as follows4 N(he other of essence Si.e. absolute differenceT...is the other in and for itself, not the other as other of an other, existing outside it but simple determinateness itself.N.: (hus, absolute difference includes otherness, but as an earlier KsublatedM moment. It is more determinate than otherness alone. "egel uses this distinction between otherness and absolute difference to illustrate the sense in which absolute difference is Nself,relatedN difference. 2bsolute difference, as self, related, is different only Nfrom itselfN. (his seemingly paradoxical expression is "egelBs way of conveying that difference understood as absolute difference contains the same internal conflict that abstract identity did4 N&ut that which is different from difference is identity.... It can eJually be said that difference, as simple, is no difference; it is this only when it is in relation with identity....N.@ In this sense, absolute difference as separate and simple and only self,related could also be called Babstract differenceB. 2bsolute difference is, also in this sense, one sided insofar as it lacks the more complete determination it would have if defined not simply as being self,related, but rather in some determinate relationship to its other, identity.
.D

N"s ist wesentlich, den absoluten .nterschied als einfachen zu fassen. &m absoluten .nterschiede des A und ,icht3A voneinander ist es das einfache ,icht, was als solches denselben ausmacht.N K1 ?6D; "W<L?<,/2M .: N*as Andere des 0esens HdagegenI ist das Andere an und f2r sich, nicht das Andere als eines anderen au/er ihm Befindlichen, die einfache Bestimmtheit an sich.N K1 ?6D; "W<L?<M .@ N*as .nterschiedene aber vom .nterschiede ist die &dentit)t.... "s kann ebenso gesagt werden, der .nterschied als einfacher ist kein .nterschied- er ist dies erst in Beziehung auf die &dentit)t...N K1 ?6D; "W<L?DM

<D While certainly not an issue for "egel himself, one can also consider this concept of absolute difference in comparison to the twentieth century theories on radical alterity.;C 3or "egel, the notion of a difference that is BbeyondB identity in this way would be incoherent insofar as such a difference would be both radically unrelated to identity and, at the same time, defined in contrast to identity. 3rom the fact that "egel would argue that such an absolute difference is self, contradictory, however, it does not follow that "egelBs system eliminates or purges all difference or difference as such. 2s we have already seen, the sublation operant in the logical transitions is not a simple negation, where all the distinctions internal to the logic, once treated, would be afterward cast aside. Difference is not simply negated, but also preserved. %oreover, this preservation is utterly essential to the coherence of the logical transitions themselves4 if the differences between the moments were not in some sense preserved K?ua determinationsM, then these moments would lack the concrete determination that is "egelBs whole reason for writing the $ogic in the first place.;6 If "egel understood himself to be simply negatingIthat is, eliminatingIall of these distinctions, making them in the first place would serve no coherent purpose. Without some preservation of difference, these determinations would not even be determinations at all. (hus, a critic might claim that "egelBs conception of difference is in some way inadeJuate, but to claim that "egel himself proposes or desires to purge all difference from his system is, to say the least, inaccurate. 3ar from wishing to eliminate all difference, "egel refers to difference Nas the specific original ground of all activity and self,movementN,;. which for "egel is high praise indeed.

;C

I have in mind here primarily /mmanuel evinas, !otalit# and &nfinit#% An "ssa# on "+teriorit#, trans. 2lphonso ingis KDuJuesne, 6@<@M, as well as those postmodern thinkers who draw from his work Ke.g. DeleuOe, yotard, et al.M 3or a convenient selection of this line of thinking and its relation to "egel, see David )ing )eenan, ed. 6egel and :ontemporar# :ontinental Philosoph# K185>, .CC?M. ;6 (he postmodern conflation Keither deliberate or accidentalM between Babsolute differenceB and BdifferenceB is the principle source of contention between "egel and this way of thinking. 1ee note ;C, above. ;. N...als bestimmter .rgrund aller !)tigkeit und 'elbstbewegung.N K1 ?6D; "W<L?DM

<:

2. %i'ersity
1o far, we have seen that identity and difference are KsomehowM related to each other insofar as each reJuires the other for its complete determination. "owever, "egel has not yet specified what KpreciselyM this complete determination entails. 2t this point,
...as each moment is thus only self3related, they are not determined against one another. 5ow because in this manner they are not different in themselves, the difference is e+ternal to them. (he diverse moments are, therefore, mutually related, not as identity and difference, but merely as simply diverse moments, that are indifferent to one another and to their determinateness.;;

(hus, the complete determination suggested in the passages on identity and KabsoluteM difference has not yet arrived. We have seen the conflict within both moments, that both are in,themselves Ki.e. in their own self,relationM inadeJuate, but that conflict has not yet been resolved. Identity and difference here remain only e+ternall# related. (hey each possess only a one,sided determination and are not yet determined in full contrast to each other, not yet internall# related. "egel refers to this relationship as an NindifferenceN;? because, without being determined in relationship to each other, their variance;9 is not a more fully determinate difference. It is merely a NdiversityN.

;;

N...indem so jedes dieser >omente nur auf sich bezogen ist, sind sie nicht bestimmt gegeneinander. 3 0eil sie nun auf diese 0eise nicht an ihnen selbst unterschiedene sind, so ist der .nterschied ihnen )u/erlich. *ie 1erschiedenen verhalten sich also nicht als &dentit)t und .nterschied zueinander, sondern nur als 1erschiedene 2berhaupt, die gleichg2ltig gegeneinander und gegen ihre Bestimmtheit sind.N K1 ?6:,?6@; "W<L?:,/2M ;? (he term NindifferenceN here is also an obvious reference to 1chelling Ke.g. "P;L96.,9?9; "W.CL?.C,?9?M, and to 1pinoOa Ke.g.1 ;:.,;:;; "W9L?9?,?99M. ;9 B!arianceB is of course, not a "egelian term. 7ne of the difficulties in talking about "egel is that, since so many terms have there own peculiar technical definitions, it is difficult to speak about them in a general way without introducing an ambiguity into oneBs interpretationIbetween "egelBs technical sense of a given term and the interpreterBs more general sense, e.g., when referring to a set of related concepts or those concepts in a more abstract sense. 1o, for instance, the term N7thernessN KAndersseinM might be more apt here, insofar as it is less determinate than difference. In fact, "egel at one point refers to diversity as Nthe otherness as such of reflectionN KNdas Anderssein als solches der 7efle+ionNMK1 ?6:; "W<L?:M, suggesting there is a systematic correspondence between otherness Kas a moment of determinate beingM and diversity Kas a moment of reflectionM. "owever, using the term BothernessB here risks confusion4 B2re we still talking about the determinations of reflectionQB, BWhy is the author referring to this earlier concept hereQB, and so forth. In such cases, precision inhibits exposition, or in other words, the most technical explanation is not always the most helpful. 7ne could write something like Bdiversity is the otherness that is not yet oppositionB, but this expression, while accurate, adds nothing. (hose who already understand the distinction being made here would not reJuire the explanation in the first place. (herefore, my purpose in introducing the occasional non,"egelian term into my interpretation of "egel is motivated by the desire to avoid this sort of Nabsolute verbiage.N

<@ Diversity itself has two moments4 identity and difference.;< "owever, identity and difference here have another sense than they have had previously. /arlier, identity and difference were self3related Ki.e. each BinsideB itselfM. 5ow, they are e+ternall# related ;DKi.e. each BalongsideB the otherM as moments of diversity. Identity as a moment of diversity, or external identity K)u/erliche &dentit)tM, is NlikenessN KGleichheitM. Difference as a moment of diversity, or external difference K)u/erliche .nterschiedM, is NunlikenessN K.ngleichheit=. "egel uses the more general term NcomparisonN Kdas 1ergleichenM to refer to both. With the introduction of this new distinction, we can now get a better sense of how the various terms might be applied in other contexts4 identical things are Bthe sameB; different things are Bnot the sameB; like things are BsimilarB; unlike things are BdissimilarB. 7ne could also express this distinction in terms of geometry4 two circles are similar insofar they are both circles, but are the same only if they have the same diameter; two triangles are similar if they contain the same angles, but the same only if they have both the same angles and are the same length on each side, and so on.;: 7n a speculative level, however, "egel finds these distinctions problematic. (he distinction between likeness and unlikeness ultimately bears within it a similar difficulty to that of the distinction between identity and difference4
&ut by this separation of one from the other they merely sublate themselves. (he very thing that was supposed to hold off contradiction and dissolution from them, namely, that something is like something else in one respect, but is unlike it in anotherIthis holding apart of likeness and unlikeness is their destruction. 3or both are
;<

%ore specifically, "egel refers to identity and difference being two moments of difference. K1 ?6@; "W<L?@M (his follows from the progression of the logical transitionsIfrom identity, to difference, and not the other way around. "owever, in this form of expression, BdifferenceB is obviously being used in two senses4 difference as one moment and difference as it contains the two moments. "owever, what is clear from the context of the discussion is that this second difference is in fact diversity. 'eferring to the second sense of difference here as diversity allows us to maintain a bit more clarity on the matter. 1o while the claim that identity and difference are moments of diversity does not strictly correspond to "egelBs usage, it does correspond, practically speaking, to his meaning. ;D (his reference to Bexternal relationB can help us to understand the distinction we made earlier between synthesis and sublation K1ee $hapter 6, 1ection &, 1ubsection .M. 1ynthesis is inadeJuate because the moments it brings together are only externally related, or merely diverse. 1ublation, on the other hand, is an internal relation, because negation and preservation are not #ust dissimilar, but opposites. ;: 7f course, this is only an illustration, and should not be understood as literally reducing identity and difference to merely Juantitative determinations.

DC
determinations of difference Si.e. diversityT; they are relations to one another, the one being what the other is not; like is not unlike and unlike is not like; and both essentially have this relation and have no meaning apart from it....;@

(hus, like identity and difference, likeness and unlikeness are understood as being separate, and yet at the same time also reJuiring one another. With the sublation of the externality of their relationship, likeness and unlikeness are brought into a Nnegative unityN Knegative "inheitM. "egel will call this negative unity NoppositionN KGegensatzM.

3. O((osition
"egel defines the third moment of differenceIoppositionIas the unity of identity and difference4 NIn opposition, the determinate reflection, difference, finds its completion. It is the unity of identity and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are opposites.N?C (his Bdifference in one identityB is "egelBs way of expressing that opposites are internall# related. (he first way to appreciate this internal relation is to understand how it contrasts to the two previously given types of relations. Identity and difference as such Ki.e. essential identity and absolute differenceM are self3related, that is, each is defined Bwithin itselfB in isolation from any other determination. (his first relation is incomplete because it lacks any contrast with an other4 without a negation, there can be no determination. Identity and difference as moments of diversity Ki.e. likeness and unlikenessM are e+ternall# related, that is, each is defined Balongside the otherB. "ere, the two moments are understood not in isolation from each other, but nevertheless separately, as Kfor exampleM items on a list. (his second relation is inadeJuate because while the determination contains a negation, it is not yet a fully articulated self,determination. In the case of moments that are internall# related, each
;@

N*urch diese ihre !rennung voneinander aber heben sie sich nur auf. Gerade was den 0iderspruch und die Aufl5sung von ihnen abhalten soll, da/ n)mlich etwas einem anderen in einer 72cksicht gleich, in einer andern aber ungleich sei, 3 dies Auseinanderhalten der Gleichheit und .ngleichheit ist ihre (erst5rung. *enn beide sind Bestimmungen des .nterschiedes- sie sind Beziehungen aufeinander, das eine, zu sein, was das andere nicht ist- gleich ist nicht ungleich, und ungleich ist nicht gleich, und beide haben wesentlich diese Beziehung und au/er ihr keine Bedeutung-N K1 ?.C; "W<L9C,96M ?C N&m Gegensatze ist die bestimmte 7efle+ion, der .nterschied vollendet. "r ist die "inheit der &dentit)t und der 1erschiedenheit- seine >omente sind in einer &dentit)t verschiedene- so sind sie entgegengesetzte.N K1 ?.?; "W<L99M

D6 moment is defined Bwithin the otherB; that is, each moment is defined not only in itself or in contrast to another moment, but in a contrast to another moment expressed in terms of that other. (his third type of relationship, where one term is understood not as not only distinct from another, but indefinable without it, is opposition. 7ne could also articulate this continuum of relations in terms of the specific case of identity and difference. 3or "egel, identity and difference cannot be adeJuately defined in isolation from one another or enumerated as a list of distinct terms Ki.e. the law of identity, the law of diversity, and so forthM. 'ather, identity and difference can only be adeJuately defined in contrast to each other. %oreover, this contrast between identity and difference remains inadeJuate as long as they remain understood as two separate terms, each subsisting BalongsideB the other, yet still each defined only Bfor itselfB. What "egel reJuires is that identity and difference each be defined in terms of the other4 identity in terms of difference, difference in terms of identity. 7nly in this way can their relationship be fully grasped. 2nd only if their relationship is fully grasped can the concepts themselves be fully determined. (his way of being Bmutually definitiveB is essential to the concept of opposition. 5ow, #ust as identity and difference were likeness and unlikeness as moments of diversity, they are further developed as moments of oppositionIas the positive KPositiveM and negative K,egativeM. (he classic example of the positive and negative is the poles of a magnet; one cannot have a magnet with a positive pole without also having a negative pole, and vice versa. In the remark on this section, "egel gives the example of positive and negative integers. 2n even more accessible example might be simply the notions of right and left; nothing can have a right side without having a left side and vice versa. 3or "egel, identity and difference are as mutually definitive as the notions of right and left. "egelBs own expression of this mutually definitiveness is somewhat complex4
(herefore each of these moments is, in its determinateness, the whole. It is the whole in so far as it also contains its other moment; thus each contains reference to its non,

D.
being, and is only reflection,into,self or the whole, as essentially connected with its non,being.?6

(his can be best explained in terms of an example like right and left. 'ight and left are wholes Ki.e. completeM only insofar as each contains its opposite4 BrightB is Bnot,leftB and BleftB is Bnot, rightB. (he two terms mutually define each other. 2t the same time, each also contains a Nreference to its KownM non,beingN; that is, the BleftB in the Bnot,leftB that defines BrightB is itself Bnot,rightB. (hus, right and left are not simply defined in contrast to one another, but also grasped as opposites, with each pole of that opposition containing what amounts to a double negation. (his complex relation applies more broadly to opposed moments in general.
In the first place, then, each is, only in so far as the other is not; it is what it is, through the other, through its own non,being; Sit is only positedness;T secondly, it is in so far as the other is not; it is what it is, through the non,being of the other; it is reflection, into,self.?.

(his Breciprocal determinationB is clearly a more elaborate determination than was present in the earlier moments. 2s self,related, the moments of identity and difference are merely posited or asserted. 2s externally related, the terms are merely contrasted or related in terms of a simple negation. 2s internally related, opposed moments are neither simply asserted nor simply contrasted to one another, but contrasted in and through their own determination.
&ut the positive or negative in itself essentially implies that to be an opposite is not merely a moment, does not stem from comparison, but is a determination belonging to the sides of the opposition themselves. (hey are therefore not positive or negative in themselves apart from the relation to the other; on the contrary, this relationIan exclusive relationIconstitutes their determination or in,itself; in it, therefore, there are at the same time explicitly and actually San und f2r sichT positive or negative.?;
?6

N...ebenso die .ngleichheit ist nur in derselben reflektierenden Beziehung, in welcher die Gleichheit ist. 3 Cedes dieser >omente ist also in seiner Bestimmtheit das Ganze. "s ist das Ganze, insofern es auch sein anderes >oment enth)lt- aber dies sein anderes ist ein gleichg2ltig seiendes- so enth)lt jedes die Beziehung auf sein ,ichtsein und ist nur die 7efle+ion3in3sich oder das Ganze als sich wesentlich auf sein ,ichtsein beziehend.N K1 ?.?; "W<L9<M ?. NCedes ist so 2berhaupt erstens, insofern das Andere ist- es ist durch das Andere, durch sein eigenes ,ichtsein das, was es ist- es ist nur Gesetztsein. (weitens% es ist, insofern das Andere nicht ist- es ist durch das ,ichtsein des Anderen das, was es ist- es ist 7efle+ion3in3sich. 3 *ieses beides ist aber die eine 1ermittlung des Gegensatzes 2berhaupt, in der sie 2berhaupt nur Gesetzte sind.N K1 ?.9; "W<L9DM ?; NAber das Positive oder ,egative nicht als Gesetztsein und damit nicht als "ntgegengesetztes, ist es jedes das .nmittelbare, 'ein und ,ichtsein. *as Positive und ,egative sind aber die >omente des Gegensatzes, das Ansichsein derselben macht nur die 8orm ihres 7eflektiertseins in sich aus. "s ist etwas an sich positiv, au/er der Beziehung auf das ,egative- und es ist etwas an sich negativ, au/er der Beziehung auf das ,egative- in

D;

(hus, for "egel, complete determination, a determination that is not merely one,sided, entails a Breciprocal determinationB. In the case at hand, the positive is not fully constituted as positive unless it contains the negation of the negative and vice versa. Identity is not full constituted as identity unless it contains the negation of difference, and so on. (his complete determination is not only relevant for the system as a whole, but also for the determination of each individual moment. *ust as any definition of BrightB would be incomplete without reference to the notion of BleftB, for "egel, any definition of a given term is incomplete without reference to its opposite. (hus for "egel, opposition is the more complete unity of identity and difference. /ach pole of an opposite both negates its other Kinsofar as the two terms are contrastedM and preserves its other Kinsofar as each term contains its other as a double negationM. 1tructurally speaking, every opposition necessarily entails a sublation. 2nd if every opposition contains a sublation in this sense, and opposition is the unity of identity and difference, then sublation could itself be described as the unity of identity and difference. %ore precisely, sublation is the logically operant mechanism through which identity and difference are unified.

C. CONTRADICTION
We now arrive at one of the most difficult passages in "egelBs logic4 his treatment of contradiction. (his difficulty is intuitively obvious4 if each moment of "egelBs logic constitutes a sort of proof of that moment, and since contradiction itself is included Kand indeed, must be includedM as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a proof of contradiction as suchQ It is difficult to express such a concept in any way that does

dieser Bestimmung wird blo/ an dem abstrakten >omente dieses 7eflektiertseins festgehalten. Allein das ansichseiende Positive oder ,egative hei/t wesentlich, da/ entgegengesetzt zu sein nicht blo/ >oment sei, noch der 1ergleichung angeh5re, sondern die eigene Bestimmung der 'eiten des Gegensatzes ist. An sich positiv oder negativ sind sie also nicht au/er der Beziehung auf Anderes, sondern Hso,I da/ diese Beziehung, und zwar als ausschlie/ende, die Bestimmung oder das Ansichsein derselben ausmacht- hierin sind sie es also zugleich an und f2r sich.N K1 ?.D; "W<L9@M

D? not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not #ust at odds with our ordinary way of thinking, but also with the overwhelming ma#ority of the Western philosophical tradition. 1uch an explanation is at least as difficult for the interpreter as for the philosopher himself, and so I will proceed cautiously. In this section of the chapter, I will conform as closely as possible to "egelBs own exposition, and offer two parallel explanations of the concept of contradiction and its relevance for our analysis of the concept of sublation. 3irst, I will summariOe the key elements of the argument "egel makes in the main body of the textI his logical argument. 1econd, I will present some of his remarks that follow that textIhis exposition of the logical argument. It is my hope that this doubled approach will better serve the purposes of my own interpretation of "egelBs science of logic and assist my efforts to render these complex passages more clearly.

1. )irst #*(lanation
2t the beginning of this section of the $ogic, "egel takes a small step backward in order to recapitulate what has led his readers up to this point4
Difference as such contains its sides as moments; in diversity they fall indifferently apart; in opposition as such, they are sides of the difference, one being determined only by the other, and therefore only moments; but they are no less determined within themselves, mutually indifferent and mutually exclusive4 the self3subsistent determinations of reflection.??

1o, at the level of opposition, the determinations of reflection become self,subsistent Kselbst)ndigM. (hey are no longer merely self,related or externally related, but internall# related4 N2s this whole, each is mediated with itself by its other and contains it. &ut further, it is mediated with itself by the non,being of its other; thus it is a unity existing on its own and it excludes the other from itself.N?9
??

N*er .nterschied 2berhaupt enth)lt seine beiden 'eiten als >omente- in der 1erschiedenheit fallen sie gleichg2ltig auseinander- im Gegensatze als solchem sind sie 'eiten des .nterschiedes, eines nur durchs andere bestimmt, somit nur >omente- aber sie sind ebensosehr bestimmt an ihnen selbst, gleichg2ltig gegeneinander und sich gegenseitig ausschlie/end% die selbst)ndigen 7efle+ionsbestimmungen.D K1 ?;6; "W<L<?M ?9 NAls dieses Ganze ist jedes vermittelt durch sein Anderes mit sich und enth)lt dasselbe. Aber es ist ferner durch das ,ichtsein seines Anderen mit sich vermittelt- so ist es f2r sich seiende "inheit und schlie/t das Andere aus sich aus.N K1 ?;6; "W<L<?,<9M

D9 (his internal relation, which up to this point "egel has insisted upon Kand which has grounded his criticisms of the inadeJuacy of earlier momentsM itself becomes problematic.
(he self,subsistent determinations of reflection that contains the opposite determination, and is self,subsistent in virtue of this inclusion, at the same time also excludes it; in its self,subsistence, therefore, it excludes from itself its own self, subsistence. 3or this consists in containing within itself its opposite determinationsI through which alone it is not a relation to something externalIbut no less immediately in the fact that it is itself, and also excludes from itself the determination that is negative to it. It is thus contradiction.?<

(his is the basic logical transition from the moment of opposition to the moment of contradiction. It is analogous to the earlier transitions between the moments of difference Ke.g. absolute difference, diversity, and oppositionM insofar as each of these transitions Ke.g. absolute difference to diversity and diversity to oppositionM involved an inadeJuate, weak articulation of their variance. (hat is, absolute difference was inadeJuate because it assumed there was no relation whatsoever to its other and diversity was inadeJuate because it assumed the relation to its other was merely external. In each of these cases, the variance is understood as inadeJuate because it is not completely articulated. /ach sort of difference is contrasted to some other, but remains for itself intact, to a certain extent, over and against its other. "egel will ultimately re#ect the very idea of such a self,subsistent difference. 2s we shall see, for "egel, difference is KultimatelyM only completely articulated in contradiction. "egel himself explains the similarity among the logical transitions of difference as follows4 NDifference as such is already implicitl# contradiction; for it is the unity of sides which are, only in so far as they are not oneIand it is the separation of sides which are, only as separated in the same relation.N?D In other words, contradiction is already implicitly present from the outset in the form of the logical transitions themselves. (hus, structurally speaking,
?<

N&ndem die selbst)ndige 7efle+ionsbestimmung in derselben 72cksicht, als sie die andere enth)lt und dadurch selbst)ndig ist, die andere ausschlie/t, so schlie/t sie in ihrer 'elbst)ndigkeit ihre eigene 'elbst)ndigkeit aus sich aus, denn diese besteht darin, die ihr andere Bestimmung in sich zu enthalten und dadurch allein nicht Beziehung auf ein Mu/erliches zu sein, 3 aber ebensosehr unmittelbar darin, sie selbst zu sein und die ihr negative Bestimmung von sich auszuschlie/en. 'ie ist so der 0iderspruch.N K1 ?;6; "W<L<9, /2M ?D N*er .nterschied 2berhaupt ist schon der 0iderspruch an sich- denn er ist die "inheit von solchen, die nur sind, insofern sie nicht eins sind, 3 und die !rennung solcher, die nur sind als in derselben Beziehung getrennte.N K1 ?;6; "W<L<9,/2M

D< there is not simply an analogy among the logical transitions here, but a homology4 that is, in their structure, they are not simply similar but identical.?: 5ot only is there a homology among these transitions, there is also a progression. In each case, the more closely related or more intertwined "egel understands the two sides of a variance to be Ki.e. BunrelatedB, external, or internalM, the stronger he understands that variance to be. 7ne could think of this in terms of two magnets being pushed together; the closer they are, the stronger the force keeping them apart. 3or "egel, as well as for ordinary thinking, contradiction is the strongest possible variance because unlike all of the earlier transitions, which each involved their own particular contradiction, the transition from opposition involves not #ust a contradiction, but the transition to contradiction as such.?@ (he implicit contradictions of the earlier transitions at this point become explicit, not #ust as an element of this or that particular logical operation but as a moment of the system as a whole. (he key difference between the previous, particular contradictions and contradiction as a moment of "egelBs logic comes to the fore in the process of its resolution. Whereas earlier contradictions were resolved as later moments, "egel claims KinitiallyM that contradiction as such, as a moment rather than simply as an element of a logical transition, must resolve itself KN*er 0iderspruch l5st sich aufDM. (his is where the principle difficulty for ordinary thinking arises. (hat an argument or concept could result in a contradiction is easily conceivable to both ordinary thinking and traditional philosophy. 2n argument that results in a contradiction is simply false. (hat a particular contradiction could be resolved is also not Kin and of itselfM problematic. In any argument, a particular contradiction is resolved either
?:

(he structuralLformal distinction is important here. It is not the case that the transitions are simply Bthe sameB, since their specific content KobviouslyM varies. 5either is it the case that their form is in every case identical Ke.g. as we saw in the transition from being and nothing to becomingM. Instead, one could say that forms of the transitions are identical in one respect Ki.e. insofar as they entail contradictionM, but not in the sense that they would be entirely and thoroughly uniform. In other words, the forms of the transitions are homologous Kthe same structureM but not isomorphic Kthe same formM. ?@ (his distinction is particularly problematic in the transition from opposition to contradiction. In this case, the two overlap. (here is the particular contradiction of the logical transition, which results in the next moment, but in the case of opposition, that particular contradiction results in contradiction as such. (his complexity is treated in more detail below.

DD insofar as at least one of its constituent terms is itself determined to be false or by reformulating its terms in such a way that they are no longer mutually exclusive. It is in this way that a claim is determined to be Kat least possiblyM true. (his latter, utterly commonplace approach is essentially similar to "egelBs own; generally speaking, each later moment resolves the contradiction of the earlier moment by reformulating its terms. "owever, "egelBs claim that contradiction as such could be resolved Kand moreover that it could resolve itselfM is, from an ordinary or traditional point of view, utterly baffling. In order to explain this, we need first to examine in detail how "egel conceives of such a resolution. "egel presents two possible resolutions for contradiction. (he first is, in effect, a traditional one4
In the self,excluding reflection we have #ust considered, positive and negative, each in its self,subsistence, sublates itself; each is simply the transition or rather the self, transposition of itself into its opposite. (his ceaseless vanishing of the opposites into themselves is the first unity resulting from contradiction; it is the null.9C

1o the Nfirst unityN of contradiction is the one ordinary thinking would expect4 nothing. "ere, the terms of opposition Kthe positive and negativeM sublate themselves, and in doing so are reduced from what they are on their own terms to what they are in the transition to their opposite terms. "ere, the result of a contradiction Bcancels outB, or is demonstrated to be false, to be nothing Ki.e. a NnullNM. &ut what exactly does "egel mean here when he says the two terms Bsublate themselvesBQ It would seem that "egel is using the term sublation here as a synonym for simple negation Ki.e. Nceaseless vanishingNM. 7nce again, it is a specific, properly contextualiOed interpretation of sublation that is the key to comprehending the logical transition.

9C

N&n der sich selbst ausschlie/enden 7efle+ion, die betrachtet wurde, hebt das Positive und das ,egative jedes in seiner 'elbst)ndigkeit sich selbst auf- jedes ist schlechthin das Jbergehen oder vielmehr das sich Jbersetzen seiner in sein Gegenteil. *ies rastlose 1erschwinden der "ntgegengesetzten in ihnen selbst ist die n)chste "inheit, welche durch den 0iderspruch zustande kommt- sie ist die ,ull.N K1 ?;;; "W<L<D,/2M

D: "egel immediately follows the first KordinaryM resolution with a second KspeculativeM one4
&ut contradiction contains not merely the negative, but also the positive; or, the self, excluding reflection is at the same time positing reflection; the result of contradiction is not merel# a nullit#. (he positive and negative constitute the positedness of the self, subsistence. (heir own negation of themselves sublates the positedness of the self, subsistence. It is this which in truth perishes Szugrunde gehtT in contradiction.96

1ince the positive and negative Kin the moment of oppositionM are also each a positedness, their sublation Kin the transition to contradictionM is more specifically a sublation of that positedness. "ere, the specification of the grammatical ob#ect of sublation Ki.e. positednessM is the key to interpreting what is going on in the distinction between the first and second resolutions. We can see here how "egel uses the two senses of the word BsublationB to distinguish two ways of thinking. When treating an issue in terms of ordinary thinking, sublation is used in a conventional, one,sided, merely negative sense. When treating an issue in speculative terms, sublation is used in a technical sense and has both its negative and positive meanings. (hus, by examining "egelBs use of the concept of sublation, one can see how ordinary thinking is not simply external to speculative thinking but is a part of it. (hey are in effect, opposites, but opposites in the speculative senseIthat is, united as much as they are divided. (his point, however, presents a problem for "egelBs concept of sublation. If sublation entails opposition and opposition is itself self,contradictory, then wouldnBt that mean that sublationBs own unity of negation and preservation is itself self,contradictoryQ In order to grasp this problem and try to resolve it, a careful examination of the specific difference between opposition and contradiction will be essential. 7therwise, the concept of sublation itself might seem to be self,contradictory.
96

N*er 0iderspruch enth)lt aber nicht blo/ das ,egative, sondern auch das Positive- oder die sich selbst ausschlie/ende 7efle+ion ist zugleich setzende 7efle+ion- das 7esultat des 0iderspruchs ist nicht nur ,ull. 3 *as Positive und ,egative machen das Gesetztsein der 'elbst)ndigkeit aus- die ,egation ihrer durch sie selbst hebt das Gesetztsein der 'elbst)ndigkeit auf. *ies ist es, was in 0ahrheit im 0iderspruche zugrunde geht.N K1 ?;;; "W<L<D,/2M

D@ (he key distinction between opposition and contradiction Kin their speculative sensesM lies with two terms4 self,subsistence K'elbst)ndigkeit= and positedness KGesetztseinM. &oth opposition and contradiction involve self,subsistence. In opposition, this self,subsistence is the result of the internal relation of the two terms.9. In the transition from opposition to contradiction, this self,subsistence is sublated and the opposition collapses. (his is the first, negative resolution of contradiction. %ore specifically, however, it is important to keep in mind that it is the positedness of the self,subsistence that is sublated. Positedness is simply the character of being put forward or asserted. 1o, if their positedness is negated but their self, subsistence is preserved, then, according to "egel, this means that these moments acJuire a new, stronger form of unity. (his unity is the second, positive resolution of contradiction. (hus4
...the sublating of this positedness is not again a positedness as the negative of an other, but is a uniting with itself, the positive unity with itself. 1elf,subsistence is thus through its own negation a unity returned into itself, since it returns into itself through the negation of its own positedness. It is the unity of essence, being identical with itself through the negation, not of an other, but of itself.9;

2s with the other logical transitions, the progression here entails the further determination of a given moment. 2nd as with the other transitions, this determination is a self,determination. 2nd since Ndetermination is negationN, self,determination is self,negation. 2s with the other transitions, this negation is not a simple negation, but a sublation.9? What is negated is the
9.

It may seem counterintuitive that self,subsistence reJuires a relationship to an other. &ut it is important to keep in mind "egelBs speculative sense of opposition, in which Kunlike other forms of differenceM each term entails an internal relation to its other. 1uch a self,subsistence is further distinct from the weaker forms of self, relation Ke.g. in identity and absolute differenceM. While the merely self3related moments are imagined in isolation from each other, self3subsistent moments incorporate their other into their own self,definition. 1o, while both self,relation and self,subsistence entail a reflexivity, self,subsistence is stronger insofar as it is more fully determined. 9; N...das Aufheben dieses Gesetztseins ist daher nicht wieder Gesetztsein als das ,egative eines Anderen, sondern ist das (usammengehen mit sich selbst, das positive "inheit mit sich ist. *ie 'elbst)ndigkeit ist so durch ihre eigene ,egation in sich zur2ckkehrende "inheit, indem sie durch die ,egation ihres Gesetztseins in sich zur2ckkehrt. 'ie ist die "inheit des 0esens, durch die ,egation nicht eines Anderen, sondern ihrer selbst identisch mit sich zu sein.N K1 ?;?; "W<L<:,/2M 9? 'ichard Dien Winfield writes that N1ince each successive category leading to the final totality of self, thinking thought undergoes this dual negation and incorporation by what follows it, logical development can thus be described as being ordered by determinate negation.N 'ichard Dien Winfield, N(he %ethod of "egelBs 'cience of $ogicN, "ssa#s in 6egelGs $ogic K185>, 6@@CM, 9C. It is in this sense that sublation is identifiable with determinate negation.

:C isolation of the prior moment and what is preserved becomes an element of the subseJuent moment, thus forming a new unity. 2t this moment, however, what is being sublated here is contradiction itself. $ontradiction, not only as an element of the logical transitions, but as such, as a moment, contradicts itself. When expressed in these KreflexiveM terms, the outlandishness of "egelBs claims Krelative to our ordinary way of thinkingM is cast in sharp relief. What could "egel possibly mean by thisQ Perhaps the best way to approach this issue is to start with what "egel wants to happen, and work backward to see how it might work. In this case, the goal is much clearer than the process. In effect, what "egel is after is a proof via negation, or a double negation.99 1o, if one thinks of contradiction as the strongest possible sort of negation, then a contradiction of a contradiction would be a type of double negation. In this sense, if a self,contradictory claim is necessarily false, then a claim where a contradiction is itself contradicted would be necessarily true. (he point here is not that non3contradictor# claims are necessarily true. 2s such, these claims are only possibly true. "egelBs point is rather that claims proven via double negation, in the form of a contradiction of a contradiction, are necessarily true. (he difference here is between non,contradiction and the contradiction of contradiction; the first is a mere absence of contradiction, while the second is a determinate negation Ki.e. a sublationM of contradiction. (his distinction is clear enough from the perspective of ordinary formal logic; "egel #ust expresses the point is his own uniJue way. 7ver the course of an argument, the contradiction of the earlier moment is made explicit, or, in "egelBs way of speaking, Bcontradicts itselfBIthus establishing the later moment on that basis.9<

99 9<

(hat is, the negation of negation. 3urthermore, there is a sense in which all contradictions can be said to be Bself,contradictionsB, insofar as an argument is only said to be contradictory if it contains, within itself, two mutually exclusive claims.

:6 5ow if a claim is posited, then it is merely asserted or presupposed to be true. 7n the other hand, if a claim is deduced via a double negation, then it is not simply asserted, but rather proven to be true. In the case of the transition at hand, the positedness of the moment is negated while the moment itself is preserved. (hus, via sublation, a claim that was initially presupposed is subseJuently proved. (his process of sublation is not peculiar to this particular transition, but occurs throughout "egelBs logic. (he moments of the $ogic are not simply presented in series, one after the next with each merely distinct from all the others. 'ather, each is also defined in opposition to those moments before and after it. 3urthermore, these moments are not only defined in opposition to one another; they are each in turn revealed to be Kaccording to "egelM self,contradictory.9D 2s the logic progresses through its series of oppositions and contradictions, these contradictions are themselves negated and a series of double negations is thereby established. (hus, from "egelBs perspective, he has not presupposed the laws of identity, difference, and so on; he has presented arguments for them via a specific form of double negation, albeit one expressed in speculative terms. It is in this sense that "egel can claim that the complete determination of a moment, both in terms of its opposition to other moments and its own self,contradiction, constitutes a sort of proof. (his point further explains why "egel considered synthesis to be an inadeJuate way to understand the transitions of the $ogic.9: 1ynthesis is also a sort of unity of identity and difference. (he two terms of a synthesis are brought together in a unity, as a third termIthe result of the synthesis. "owever, the relationship between the two terms is only an external relation; they are not opposed to one another, and therefore their relationship cannot yet entail
9D

Indeed, these contradictions are what initiates each progressionIthe BmovementB from one moment to the next. (he actual movement forward, however, occurs in the sublation of these contradictions. (o return to the earlier BwatchmakerB analogy from the introduction4 if sublation is the mainspring that drives the clockwork forward, then contradiction is the tension in the spring. 9: 1ee $hapter 6, 1ection &, 1ubsection ..

:. any double negation. Without such a double negation, a synthesis of moments could not produce a proof in the "egelian sense. "egel refers to the result of this proof as a ground KGrundM. -round as such, as a moment of essence, is the KpositiveM resolution of contradiction as such. 1omewhat frustratingly for the reader Kand the interpreterM "egel articulates this transition with a pun4
2ccording to this positive side, in which the self,subsistence in opposition, as the excluding reflection, converts itself into a positedness which it no less sublates, opposition is not only destroyed Szugrunde zur2ckgegangenT but has withdrawn into its ground Sin seinen Grund zur2ckgegangenT.9@

What "egel expresses with his pun on zugrunde gegangen Kliterally, Bto fall to the groundBM and Grund is #ust the double negation discussed above. In this second, speculative resolution of contradiction, contradiction is itself BdestroyedB Ki.e. negatedM, and through this negation, the moment of ground is established as a positive unity. "egel expresses this more directly toward the end of the section4
!he resolved contradiction is therefore ground, essence as the unit# of the positive and negative. In opposition, the determination has attained to self,subsistence; but ground is this completed self,subsistence; in it, the negative is self,subsistent essence, but as negative; as self,identical in this negativity, ground is #ust as much positive. 4pposition and its contradiction is, therefore, in ground as much abolished HaufgehobenI as preserved.<C

(hus, we arrive on the far side of this peculiar moment via a logical transition of an unusual structure. 'ather than the more linear transitions elsewhere, here we see a pair of branching transitions along the path from opposition to ground. 3irst, we have the transition from opposition to contradiction, where the particular contradiction within opposition results in the negative unit# of contradiction as such Ki.e. a NnullNM. 1econd, we have the transition from
9@

N,ach dieser positiven 'eite, da/ die 'elbst)ndigkeit im Gegensatze als ausschlie/ende 7efle+ion sich zum Gesetztsein macht und es ebensosehr aufhebt, Gesetztsein zu sein, ist der Gegensatz nicht nur zugrunde, sondern in seinen Grund zur2ckgegangen.N K1 ?;?; "W<L<:M <C N*er aufgel5ste 0iderspruch ist also der Grund, das 0esen als "inheit des Positiven und ,egativen. &m Gegensatze ist die Bestimmung zur 'elbst)ndigkeit gediehen- der Grund aber ist diese vollendete 'elbst)ndigkeit- das ,egative ist in ihm selbst)ndiges 0esen, aber als ,egatives- so ist er ebensosehr das Positive als das in dieser ,egativit)t mit sich &dentische. *er Gegensatz und sein 0iderspruch ist daher im Grunde sosehr aufgehoben als erhalten.N K1 ?;9; "W<L<@,/2M "ere of course, aufgehoben is used in a non, speculative sense, as a synonym for negation. (his is clear from its use in contrast to erhalten. It is the con#unction of these two terms in context that expresses the concept of sublation in its technical sense. K1ee $hapter ., 1ection $ for an explanation of this distinction.M

:; opposition to ground, which is the positive unit# of contradiction as such. "ere we see another complexity in the role of contradiction in "egelBs logic. (he first transition is, in effect, a non, speculative dead end, where the result is not a positive one Ki.e. another momentM but rather nothing. "owever, this dead end Ki.e. contradiction as suchM is itself also the particular contradiction that forms the basis of the positive transition to the next moment, ground. 2s one can see in the passage cited above, this is presented as a transition between opposition and ground. 8nlike other moments, there is no point at which contradiction as such is presented as a positive moment itself, as something coherent in its own terms prior to next transition. 2s we have #ust seen, the positive unity of contradiction is not contradiction itself, but ground. $ontradiction is thus a strange moment of "egelBs logic. It is as if, in working oneBs way through the 'cience of $ogic, one were going up in skyscraper by climbing flights of stairs Ki.e. each transitionM, stopping at each floor Ki.e. each momentM, but then came across one floor that was nothing but another flight of stairs Ki.e. contradictionM. (his strangeness, relative to the other moments, is partly due to the complex, twofold role that sublation plays in these particular transitions. (he first transition Kopposition to contradictionM contains a sublation, but only in an ordinary, one,sided sense KJua negationM. (he second transition Kopposition to groundM contains a sublation in the full, speculative sense. It is only once we arrive at the moment of ground that opposition has been both negated and preserved. It is this second transition that has important further implications for our interpretation of the concept of sublation as such. 7n the one hand, sublation entails an opposition. 2s we have seen, the positive and negative meanings of sublation are instances of the positive and negative poles of opposition. 7n the other hand, opposition has been shown to be self,contradictory and is sublated in ground. &ut if sublation involves an opposition, then that means that Kby transpositionM sublation might also sublate itself.

:? If one were to interpret sublation as sublating itself, this would not mean simply that sublation negates itself, because a transposition between sublation and opposition would be contingent upon the speculative, doubled sense of sublation. K1ublation is its ordinary, negative sense would not be an opposition.M (he general processes and operations we have outlined so far would suggest that sublation could be proven in a way similar to the way opposition is. It could be proven if one were to interpret the contradiction between preservation and negation as negated and the unity of the two senses as preserved. 1trangely, "egel himself makes no reference to such a Bmeta,sublationB.<6 It is clear that "egel makes no attempt to prove sublation itself, insofar as it is not a moment of his system.<. -iven the processes I have outlined, however, there is no reason in principle that one could not do so.<;

2. Secon" #*(lanation
(o offer my second explanation of "egelBs concept of contradiction and its relevance for sublation, I would now like to turn to two of the remarks, which discuss, respectively, the law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction. "egel begins by defining the law of the excluded middle as4 Nsomething is either 2 or not,2; there is no third.N<? "e follows this definition with some slight praise, stating, N(his law implies first, that everything is an opposite, is determined as either positive or negative.N<9 "egel thinks this aspect of the law is correct and follows from the fact that identity and difference pass over into opposition. 2t the same time, he is unwilling to move beyond this
<6

*ean, uc 5ancy claims that N(he concept of sublation is the concept of that which is its own upheaval and which, because it suppresses itself, itself succeeds itself, takes up where it itself leaves off.N 5ancy, 96. "owever, 5ancyBs interpretation is an interpolation into the text. 5owhere does "egel himself argue, either implicitly or explicitly, that sublation in fact sublates itself. <. (he proof of opposition itself does not Jualify as a proof of sublation because even though sublation involves opposition, it is not identical to it. (he proof of opposition as such cannot be substituted the particular opposition found in sublation any more than it could replace the proof of every other opposition in the science of logic. If such a substitution were possible, it would make the individual proofs the other moments of the logic redundant, and replace "egelBs concrete proofs with a merely abstract determination. <; 3or a further discussion of this Bsublation of sublationB and the implications of "egelBs silence on the matter, see the discussions in $hapters < and : of this study. <? N"twas ist entweder A oder ,icht3A- es gibt kein *rittes.N K1 ?;:; "W<LD;M <9 N*ieser 'atz enth)lt zuerst, da/ alles ein "ntgegengesetztes ist, ein entweder als positiv oder als negativ Bestimmtes.N K1 ?;:; "W<LD;M

:9 implication to embrace the law itself. 7n the one hand, he claims that this implication is trivial and that opposition as it is generally understood is not an opposition in the proper, speculative sense. It is not the opposition between two determinacies, but between a determination Ki.e. a particular predicateM and an indeterminacy Ki.e. the absence of a particular predicateM. 7n the other hand, "egelBs main problem with the law of the excluded middle is that, while it may seem to follow from the law of non,contradiction, it is in fact self,contradictory. (he law of non,contradiction asserts that there is nothing that is 2 and not,2 at the same time. &ut, for "egel,
It implies that there is nothing that is neither 2 nor not,2, that there is not a third that is indifferent to the opposition. &ut in fact the third that is indifferent to the opposition is given in the law itself, namely, 2 itself is present in it...(he something itself, therefore, is the third which was supposed to be excluded.<<

(his criticism, while made according to "egelBs speculative way of thinking, is eJually accessible to ordinary thinking insofar as it reJuires no speculatively formulated concepts. In other words, while it is a speculative claim, it is also easily understood from the point of view of ordinary thinking. "egel concludes this remark with one sentence explaining why he decides to treat the law of the excluded middle at this point4
1ince the opposite determinations in the something are #ust as much posited as sublated in this positing, the third which has here the form of a dead something, when taken more profoundly, is the unity of reflection into which the opposition withdraws as its ground.<D

(hus, while a discussion of the law of the excluded middle may have initially seemed like a digression, it is in fact relevant to the issue at hand. 1ince the positive unity of contradiction Ki.e. the Nunity of reflectionN in the passage cited aboveM is, in this sense, a NthirdN, the present
<<

N"r enth)lt, da/ es nicht etwas gebe, welches weder A noch ,icht3A, da/ es nicht ein *rittes gebe, das gegen den Gegensatz gleichg2ltig sei. &n der !at aber gibt es in diesem 'atze selbst das *ritte, das gleichg2ltig gegen den Gegensatz ist, n)mlich A selbst ist darin vorhanden.... *as "twas selbst ist also das *ritte, welches ausgeschlossen sein sollte.N K1 ?;:,;@; "W<LD?M <D N&ndem die entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen im "twas ebensosehr gesetzt als in diesem 'etzen aufgehobene sind, so ist das *ritte, das hier die Gestalt eines toten "twas hat, tiefer genommen die "inheit der 7efle+ion, in welche als in den Grund die "ntgegensetzung zur2ckgeht.N K1 ?;@; "W<LD?M

:< transition reJuires "egel to address and re#ect Kin terms of speculative thinkingM the law of the excluded middle. If "egel had not explicitly re#ected this law, then the very origin of ground Kand thus, his whole conception of proofM would have been vulnerable to criticism on that basis. "egelBs critiJue of the law of the excluded middle has an additional, unstated, but more general implication as well. (he result of any sublation is necessarily, by definition, such a third. (herefore, not only is the re#ection of the law of the excluded middle necessary for the logical transition from contradiction to ground, it is necessary for any logical transition whatsoever insofar as all logical transitions, Jua determination, entail sublation. "aving re#ected the law of the excluded middle and having earlier re#ected similar formulations of formal laws for identity, difference, and so forth, "egel then claims that contradiction ought to be expressed as such a law as well. -iven "egelBs earlier re#ections of these sorts of formulations, however, I would interpret this as having an expository or pedagogical Krather than a speculative or logicalM function. It would be easy to accuse "egel of being inconsistent here. "owever, it seems to me that, given the context, "egelBs purpose in formulating a law here is not to lapse back into a formal way of thinking, but rather to use the formal way of speaking, in order to help explain his Knot formal, but speculativeM position. 1uch an expository techniJue is consistent with his overall approach4 to begin with a common assumption or way thinking, demonstrate its inadeJuacies, and thereby gain a more determinate, more fully developed perspective. "egelBs Nlaw of contradictionN is not the law of identity again Ki.e. the law of non, contradictionM, but rather, literally, the law of contradiction4 Neverything is inherently contradictory.N<: "egel recogniOes how strange this sounds to his readers. 1ince his purpose here is expository, he is trying to explain the speculative content. (hat is, rather than discuss his speculative concept of contradiction in his own #argon Ki.e. Nfor itselfNM as he does in the
<:

NAlle *inge sind an sich selbst widersprechend.N K1 ?;@; "W<LD?M

:D main body text, he discusses it here in contrast to ordinary thinking Ki.e. Nin itselfN, or for anotherM. (hus, "egel begins his explanation by stating4 N&ut it is one of the fundamental pre#udices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity....N<@ "e goes on to claim that contradiction is in fact more profound than identity because4
3or as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.DC

&efore explaining in detail what he means when he says that contradiction is Nthe root of all movement and vitalityN, "egel first works through some potential ob#ections to his general claim about contradictionBs significance. (wo potential ob#ections are immediately presented4 6M N...there is nothing that is contradictory...ND6 and .M N...the contradictory cannot be imagined or thought....ND. 'egarding the first ob#ection, that contradictions do not exist, "egel offers a series of counter,examples4 ordinary phenomena that he takes to represent contradictions that exist in the world. (he first of these counter,examples is movement. 'eferring to ^enoBs paradox, "egel writes4 N(he ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself.ND; In effect, "egel here inverts ^enoBs paradox; rather than taking the contradictions in movement to mean that movement does not exist, "egel flips things around and claims that these contradictions are evidence that movement is itself contradictory.
<@

N"s ist aber eines der Grundvorurteile der bisherigen $ogik und des gew5hnlichen 1orstellens, als ob der 0iderspruch nicht eine so wesenhafte und immanente Bestimmung sei als die &dentit)t-N K1 ?;@; "W<LD9M DC N*enn die &dentit)t ihm gegen2ber ist nur die Bestimmung des einfachen .nmittelbaren, des toten 'eins- er aber ist die 0urzel aller Bewegung und $ebendigkeit- nur insofern etwas in sich selbst einen 0iderspruch hat, bewegt es sich, hat !rieb und !)tigkeit.N K1 ?;@; "W<LD9M D6 N...da/ es nichts 0idersprechendes gebe...N K1 ?;@; "W<LD9M D. N...das 0idersprechende k5nne nicht vorgestellt noch gedacht werden...N K1 ?;@,?C; "W<LD9M D; N>an mu/ den alten *ialektikern die 0iderspr2che zugeben, die sie in der Bewegung aufzeigen, aber daraus folgt nicht, da/ darum die Bewegung nicht ist, sondern vielmehr, da/ die Bewegung der daseiende 0iderspruch selbst ist.N K1 ??C; "W<LD<M

:: In addition to movement, "egel offers another perhaps more accessible counter, example4 desire K!riebM. N1imilarly, internal self,movement proper, desire in general...is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self,contained and deficient, the negative of itself.ND? 1o, according to "egel, desire, as Ninternal self,movementN, is also an existent contradiction. 2n organism that desires is both self,contained, insofar as it is an organism, and deficient, insofar as it Kby definitionM lacks what it desires. It is the Nnegative of itselfN Kin "egelBs termsM insofar as this tensionIwhich "egel identifies as a contradictionIis contained within it. Immediately following this point, "egel gives a third counter,example4 life K$ebenM. N1omething is SthereforeT alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it.ND9 /ach of "egelBs examples builds on the previous one. %ovement is an existent contradiction, desire is a form of movement, and life reJuires desire as a necessary condition.D< (hus, for "egel, contradictions do not merely exist BoutsideB of thought; they are ubiJuitous. 2nd since, of course, "egel cannot offer a full suite of concrete examples for the notion that Neverything is contradictoryN, he starts by choosing examples that are as broad as possible in their scope. (he argument itself comes later. "aving addressed the first ob#ection, that contradictions do not exist, "egel moves on to the second, that they cannot be thought. "egel, to the contrary, claims that thinking contradiction is essential to thought.
1peculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated b# it as in ordinary

D?

N"benso ist die innere, die eigentliche 'elbstbewegung, der !rieb 2berhaupt...nichts anderes, als da/ "twas in sich selbst und der >angel, das ,egative seiner selbst, in einer und derselben 72cksicht ist.N K1 ??C; "W<LD<M D9 N"twas ist also lebendig, nur insofern es den 0iderspruch in sich enth)lt, und zwar diese Kraft ist, den 0iderspruch in sich zu fassen und auszuhalten.N K1 ??C; "W<LD<M D< We need not go into detail here on "egelBs concept of life in order to understand "egelBs purpose in mentioning it in this context, i.e. as an example of the ubiJuity of contradiction.

:@
thinking, where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations or into nothing.DD

(hus, the conception and role of contradiction is a key distinction between ordinary and speculative thinking. &ut at this point, this distinction has yet to be specified. What does "egel mean when he says that ordinary thinking is NdominatedN by contradictionQ In order to explain this point, "egel gives another series of examples of Kwhat he understands to beM contradictions. $ontradictions, "egel claims, exist in any opposition4D: for example, aboveLbelow, rightLleft, fatherLchild, and so on. /ach pole of an opposition is both contrasted to its other and at the same time remains undefined without it. 3ather is not a father without a child.D@ 'ight and left, without each other, are #ust arbitrary directions Ki.e. Nthis wayN or Nthat wayNM. 2s we saw in the complex transition from opposition to ground, all oppositions are KultimatelyM also contradictions. In this way, ordinary thinking contains contradictions #ust as much as speculative thinking. (he difference is that ordinary thinking is not aware of such contradictions as contradictions.:C (hus, for "egel, ordinary thinking is inadeJuate here not because it does not contain contradictions, but because it is not aware that it does. 1uch a lack of awareness is inadeJuate for philosophy.:6 3urthermore, "egelBs logic is often criticiOed for BcontainingB contradiction, but this is typically based on a misinterpretation of "egelBs argument. 2s we saw earlier, contradiction as such is not itself a positive moment of "egelBs system. 2s such, "egel does not attempt to prove any particular contradiction, but rather to demonstrate the
DD

N*as spekulative *enken besteht nur darin, da/ das *enken den 0iderspruch und in ihm sich selbst festh)lt, nicht aber, da/ es sich, wie es dem 1orstellen geht, von ihm beherrschen und durch ihn sich seine Bestimmungen nur in andere oder in nichts aufl5sen l)/t.N K1 ??C,?6; "W<LD<,/2M D: (his point was already made, in more abstract terms, in the transition from opposition to contradiction. (he logical transition proper is the transition from opposition as such to contradiction as such. "ere, in this remark, "egel offers expository examples of particular oppositions as particular contradictions, used in order to explain and expand on the earlier logical transition; these particular examples are not presented here as logical transitions themselves. D@ "egel uses the word NsonN here instead. While "egel is of course a child of his times, I have broadened the argument for the sake of not only political, but also logical, correctness. 2 father is of course as much a father if he has daughter as when he has a son, gender biases of nineteenth century -ermany notwithstanding.... :C 1 ??6; "W<LDD. :6 (hat is, for "egelBs concept of philosophy.

@C role contradiction plays in logic as such. $ontradiction plays a similar role in formal logic as well; recogniOing a contradiction is how one can tell a set of claims is false. (hus, ordinary thinking also makes use of contradictions. "owever, this does not mean that, in terms of ordinary thinking, formal logic would itself be self,contradictory. (hus, from the mere BcontainmentB of a contradiction,:. it does not follow that an argument is necessarily false. 2 grain of sand contained within in an oyster forms a pearl, but from this it does not follow that a pearl is made of sand. "egelBs logic BcontainsB contradictions, but, #ust as it is for ordinary thinking, it is the particular use that he puts these contradictions to that matters. 2dditionally, "egel rightly points out that the only way one might be in a position to put them to use is to be aware of them first. 3or "egel, this lack of awareness of contradiction in ordinary thinking extends well beyond opposition. (he sum total of all realities here Ki.e. NeverythingN, as expressed in the law of contradictionM, when interpreted as the sum total of all determinate beings, is also the sum total of all negations Ksince, of course, determination is negationM. In this sense, BeverythingB entails Bevery differenceB, and, following from the logical progression we have outlined throughout this chapter4 N%ore precisely, when the difference of reality is taken into account, it develops from difference into opposition, and from this into contradiction, so that in the end the sum total of all realities simply becomes absolute contradiction within itself.N:; (hus, at the end of a long chain of reasoning, we can see what "egel means by his Nlaw of contradictionN. 1ince "egel thinks that Neverything is contradictoryN, what does that mean for his philosophyQ WouldnBt such a claim make him a skepticQ Indeed, a skeptic of a most radical
:.

In terms of ordinary thinking, an argument which Brefers toB or Bmakes use ofB contradiction might be a more precise way to express this idea; such arguments could be Juite different from those that are themselves contradictory. In other words, if I point out a contradiction in another personBs argument, my own argument Bmakes use ofB Kor BcontainsBM a contradiction, but this does not mean that my argument is itself KthereforeM contradictory. :; N,)her den .nterschied der 7ealit)t genommen, so wird er aus der 1erschiedenheit zum Gegensatze und damit zum 0iderspruch und der &nbegriff aller 7ealit)ten 2berhaupt zum absoluten 0iderspruch in sich selbst.N K1 ??.; "W<LD:M

@6 sortQ 2nd is the claim that everything is contradictory even coherentQ 2fter all, if every determination entailed a contradiction, wouldnBt the very determination that constitutes the law that everything is contradictory also, itself, be a contradiction, and render the whole point mootQ:? 3or an ordinary way of thinking, the notion that everything would be contradictory is of course nonsense. "egel anticipates this ob#ection4
7rdinaryIbut not speculativeIthinking, which abhors contradiction, as nature abhors a vacuum, re#ects this conclusion; for in considering contradiction, it stops short at the one,sided resolution of it into nothing, and fails to recogniOe the positive side of contradiction where it becomes absolute activity and absolute ground.:9

1ince ordinary thinking is, according to "egel, unaware of the contradictions within its own thought, it is unable to move beyond them. Its view of contradiction is one,sided, incomplete. It misses what, for "egel, is the truth of contradiction4
(his contradictory side of course resolves itself into nothing, it withdraws into its negative unity. 5ow the thing, the sub#ect, the concept is #ust this negative unity itself; it is inherently self,contradictory, but it is no less the contradiction resolved4 it is the ground that contains and supports its determinations. (he thing, sub#ect, or concept, as reflected into itself in its sphere, is its resolved contradiction, but its entire sphere is again also determinate, different; it is thus a finite sphere and this means a contradictory one. &t is not itself the resolution of this higher contradiction but has a higher sphere for its positive unit#,AN for its ground.:D

In order explain this key passage, we need to expand on three points KitaliciOed in the JuotationM. 3irst, when "egel says that Neverything is contradictoryN, he is adding the
:? :9

3or more on skepticism as a sort of Bperformative contradictionB, see $hapter :. N*er gew5hnliche horror, den das vorstellende, nicht spekulative *enken 3 wie die ,atur vor dem vacuum 3 vor dem 0iderspruche hat, verwirft diese Konse?uenz- denn es bleibt bei der einseitigen Betrachtung der Aufl5sung des 0iderspruchs in nichts stehen und erkennt die positive 'eite desselben nicht, nach welcher er absolute !)tigkeit und absoluter Grund wird.N K1 ??.; "W<LD:,/2M :< Please note that I have read Npositive unityN in place of the original textBs use of Nnegative unityN. (he reference to negative unity here seems to be some sort of textual error. 3rom the context, especially when compared to the citation above Kin the preceding footnoteM and the contrast set up in the first line of the passage, it seems "egel would have meant Bpositive unityB here. :D N*ieses 0idersprechende l5st sich allerdings in nichts auf, es geht in seine negative "inheit zur2ck. *as *ing, das 'ubjekt, der Begriff ist nun eben diese negative "inheit selbst- es ist ein an sich selbst 0idersprechendes, aber ebensosehr der aufgel5ste 0iderspruch- es ist der Grund, der seine Bestimmungen enth)lt und tr)gt. *as *ing, das 'ubjekt oder der Begriff ist als in seiner 'ph)re in sich reflektiert sein aufgel5ster 0iderspruch, aber seine ganze 'ph)re ist auch wieder eine bestimmte, verschiedene- so ist sie eine endliche, und dies hei/t eine widersprechende. 1on diesem h5heren 0iderspruche ist nicht sie selbst die Aufl5sung, sondern hat eine h5here 'ph)re zu ihrer negativen /inheit, zu ihrem Grunde.N K1 ??.,??;; "W<LD@, /2, (%M 2lthough I have corrected the /nglish translation Kas noted aboveM, I have left the -erman as it stands in the original, for the sake of comparison.

@. speculative sense of BcontradictoryB to the customary one. 2 contradictory claim is a false one, but a contradiction can also resolves itself, speculatively, into something positive, namely, a ground. 1econd, it is not everything that is contradictory per se, but more specifically everything finite. In identifying the finite with the contradictory, "egel is part of a long tradition, going back to Plato and the /leatics. 2ccording to this tradition, the finite is complex, corrupt, and full of contradictions; simplicity, perfection, and truth on the other hand are the province of the infinite. (hird, "egel claims that contradiction resolves itself, but Ivery importantlyInot at the level of the finite. 3or finite things, sub#ects, and concepts, the resolution of their internal contradictions occurs in a Nhigher sphereN. (o put this last point another way4 any finite moment of the system is grounded not by itself, but by its sublation in a later moment. (hat moment is in turn sublated and grounded in a yet later moment, and so on. 8ltimately, the only element of "egelBs system that completely grounds or proves itself is the system as whole. (his relationship between the determination of the moments relative to the completion of the system will be the topic of the following chapter.

@;

CHAPTER 5: THE SYSTEM AND ITS MOMENTS

We now arrive at our third and final example of the function of sublation in "egelBs 'cience of $ogic. Previously, I have examined examples of the role of sublation in "egelBs doctrine of being Ke.g. being, nothing, and becomingM and his doctrine of essence Ke.g. identity, difference, and contradictionM. In the final chapter of this Part, I analyOe an example from the third part of the 'cience of $ogic on "egelBs doctrine of the concept. 8nlike the previous examples, however, which looked at the particular logical transitions between moments, here I take up the relationship of those moments in general to the whole, to the system as such. ike the previous chapters in this part, this functional analysis has a twofold purpose4 6M to examine in more detail how sublation operates and .M to provide evidence and details in support of my more general, structural claims from Part I. (his chapter on the system and its moments is organiOed into two basic sections. 3irst, I provide a basic overview of "egelBs concept of system Kand certain significant, related termsM. 2s is my practice in this part of the dissertation, this analysis of "egelBs concept of system is exegetical in nature. It focuses primarily on the account found in 'cience of $ogic, !olume ., 1ection ;, $hapter ;, which is the final chapter of the $ogic on the 2bsolute Idea. 1econd, I look at the relevance of the relationship between the system and its moments to "egelBs concept of sublation.

A. SYSTEM
In order to examine the relationship between the system and its moments, we must first begin with a presentation of "egelBs concept of system. 3irst and foremost, his understanding of system is essentially bound up with )antBs. 1o, we must briefly step outside the examination of "egelBs text and over to )ant in order to ensure that our later textual analysis begins from the right starting point. )ant defines system as follows4

@?
In accordance with reasonBs legislative prescriptions, our diverse modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody, but must form a s#stem. 7nly so can they further the essential ends of reason. &y a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea.6

3or )ant, system Nis what first raises ordinar# knowledge to the rank of science....N. 3urthermore, for )ant4 N(his idea is the concept provided by reasonIof the form of the wholeIin so far as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another.N; 7ne can easily recogniOe these )antian concepts and the role they play KreiteratedM in "egelBs own writings. -iven the historical context in which "egel worked, it is to be expected that his explanations would assume familiarity with these terms and their )antian meanings. In a note at the beginning of the 'cience of $ogic, "egel writes4
I would mention that in this work I freJuently refer to the )antian philosophy Kwhich to many may seem superfluousM because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent -erman philosophy and this its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it.?

8nderstanding "egelBs exposition, both in general and in the case at hand Ki.e. of his concept of systemM thus reJuires that one keep in mind "egelBs somewhat complex relationship to his most eminent predecessor. (he complexity that I have in mind is the result of "egelBs assumptions here about the relationship between his predecessor and his audience. "egel often naturally assumes his readersB familiarity with )ant. "e does not necessarily explain every detail and its significance himself because )ant had of course already done that Ki.e. )antian philosophy understood as Nthe base and the starting point of recent -erman philosophyNM. 7n the one hand, this is a fairly obvious point to make. 7n the other hand, this
6 .

$P' 2:;.L&:<C,/2. ibid. ; ibid. ? N&ch erinnere, da/ ich auf die Kantische Philosophie in diesem 0erke darum h)ufig 72cksicht nehme 9was manchen 2berfl2ssig scheinen k5nnte=, weil sie 3 ihre n)here Bestimmtheit sowie die besonderen !eile der Ausf2hrung m5gen sonst und auch in diesem 0erke betrachtet werden, wie sie wollen 3 die Grundlage und den Ausgangspunkt der neueren deutschen Philosophie ausmacht und dies ihr 1erdienst durch das, was an ihr ausgesetzt werden m5ge, ihr ungeschm)lert bleibt.N K1 <6; "W9L9@M

@9 assumption of familiarity is so fundamental to "egelBs exposition that he often also does not bother to explain where his thinking differs from )antBs. Instead, "egel trusts his readersB assumed familiarity to alert them to any discrepancies Ki.e. Nwhatever faults may be found in itNM. 3or any contemporary interpreter, working in a milieu almost .CC years removed from "egelBs own time, it is important to note such expositional assumptions and discrepancies. "egelBs assumptions about his audience are not something we Ki.e. contemporaries writing and thinking about "egelM necessarily share. 1o, for "egel as with )ant, the concept of system is closely related to that of the concept of idea. In the introduction to his "nc#clopedia, "egel writes of philosophy in general that4
3ree and genuine thought is inwardly concrete; hence it is &dea, and in all its universality it is the &dea or the Absolute. !he science of it is essentiall# a s#stem, since what is concretely true is so only in its inward self,unfolding and in taking and holding itself together in unity, i.e. as totalit#. 7nly through the distinguishing, and determination of its distinctions, can what is concretely true be the necessity of these distinctions and the freedom of the whole.9

(hus, for both "egel and )ant, a system is what makes philosophy NscientificN. 1uch a system differs from a Nmere rhapsodyN, an aggregate KcoacervatioM, in that it has an organiOing principle Ki.e. an ideaM that unifies it. 2 scientific system is thus not merely a collection of knowledge, but an organization of knowledge KarticulatioM. 3or "egel, the relationship between system and idea is much stronger than that found in )ant. 1ystem does not merely reJuire an idea; it is an idea. In fact, it is ultimately one idea Ithe 2bsolute Idea. (his eJuivalence expresses that for "egel the idea serves a constitutive function rather a regulative one Kas it does for )antM.< In other words, the 2bsolute Idea does not simply organiOe and unify the system; it is identical with the system itself. "egel states

N*er freie und wahrhafte Gedanke ist in sich konkret, und so ist er &dee, und in seiner ganzen Allgemeinheit die &dee oder das Absolute. *ie 0issenschaft desselben ist wesentlich '#stem, weil das 0ahre als konkret nur als sich in sich entfaltend und in "inheit zusammennehmend und 3haltend, d. i. als !otalit)t ist und nur durch .nterscheidung und Bestimmung seiner .nterschiede die ,otwendigkeit derselben und die 8reiheit des Ganzen sein kann.N K/ ;:,;@; "W:L9@,/2M < $P' 26D@,6:CL&...,..;.

@< this eJuivalence explicitly4 N...the system of its peculiar elements constitutes the whole Idea....ND 3or )ant, the ideas remains beyond the capacities of human knowledge; they organiOe and guide the system, but they are not KessentiallyM a part of it. 2t the same time, the ideas are said to determine the system, to organiOe it. "egel sees this as a contradiction; )antBs ideas are said to be both determinate Ki.e. regulative or determiningM and also indeterminate Ki.e. only regulative or beyond determinationM. (hat which is beyond our ability to determine would remain abstract and indeterminate, but for "egel, Ngenuine thoughtNIsystematic thoughtImust be determinate, or concrete. 3urthermore, in order to be concrete, the system must be determined completel#4 N...only the whole of the 1cience is the presentation of the Idea....N: 2ny incompleteness would be a lack of determination; any externality would be problematic. (his, for "egel, has a practical importance as well. If freedom is understood as self, determination, then a thinking that is determined by something be#ond itself would not be free. (herefore, any incompleteness, any lack of determination within the system, would also render it unfree. 2 system, then, must not only be completely determinate, but also completely self,determinate. 2nd since for "egel the system is the idea, this idea must also be eJually self,determinate. 2 detailed analysis of this idea and the nature of its self, determination Kultimately, as it relates to sublationM will be the focus of the next section of this chapter.

B. IDEA
2ccording to "egel, N(he idea is the ade?uate concept, that which is ob#ectively true or the true as such. When anything, whatever, possesses truth, it possesses it through its Idea, or, something possesses truth only insofar as it is Idea.N@ 2 couple of points should be made
D :

N...Hda/I das '#stem ihrer eigent2mlichen "lemente die ganze &dee ausmacht...N K/ ;@; "W:L<CM N...nur das Ganze der 0issenschaft ist die *arstellung der &dee...N K/ ?.; "W:L<;M @ N*ie &dee ist der ad)?uate Begriff, das objektive 0ahre oder das 0ahre als solches. 0enn irgend etwas 0ahrheit hat, hat es sie durch seine &dee, oder etwas hat nur 0ahrheit, insofern es &dee ist.N K1 D99; "W<L?<.,

@D about this brief Juotation. 3irst of all, the term idea is obviously not a synonym for concept. 3or both )ant and "egel, an idea is a specific sort of concept, a Nconcept of reasonN.6C In other words, all ideas are concepts, but not all concepts reach the level of the ideaKsM. (his point is of course obvious to readers already familiar with )antian andLor "egelian thinking. (he point needs to be made explicit here only because "egel occasionally refers to BconceptB in the passages cited below. 3rom the context of these passages, however, it is clear he is referring to idea or 2bsolute Idea insofar as it is also a concept Kor in its conceptualityM and not conflating their distinct meanings. 1econd, while for )ant, the ideas are not knowable insofar as they cannot be brought under the transcendental schematism,66 for "egel, the idea is by definition knowable; the idea is Nthe true as suchN. "egel identifies the idea with truth insofar as he defines the idea as Nthe unity of concept and ob#ectivityN. (hus, the idea is the NadeJuateN concept because it is at this level that the concept is unified with its ob#ectivity. "egel defines this unity as truth insofar as he takes up a more traditional understanding of truth. (he correspondence of a proposition with reality becomes, for "egel, Nthe agreement of thought with its ob#ectN;6. here, the correspondence is reinterpreted on a speculative level. "egelBs concept of truth is notably not a coherence theory of truth. 3or "egel, truth is not a matter of the coherence of one set of concepts with another, but rather of the BcorrespondenceB of the concept with reality Ki.e. its ob#ectivityM. (his is obviously not a representational correspondence or a connection with an external reality Bover thereB Kas it is for the understandingM but a speculative correspondence, a unity internal to the idea itself. 3or "egel, truth is not a matter of linking concepts with other
/2M 6C 1 D99; "W<L?<.. (here, "egel explicitly attributes this definition to )ant. 66 (hat is, the synthesis of intuitions and the concepts of the understanding Ki.e. the categoriesM by either the productive imagination K2 editionM or the understanding itself K& editionM. 3or )ant, only ob#ects constituted by such a synthesis can be said to be known Ki.e. constituted as possible ob#ects of knowledgeM. 3or a summary of this process, see $P' 296,9.L&D9,D<. 3or an account of the differences between the 2 and & versions of this synthesis, see %artin "eidegger, Kant and the Problem of >etaph#sics, trans. 'ichard (aft KIndiana, 6@@DM, 66., 6.C. Interestingly, sublation in "egel plays a role analogous to that of synthesis in )ant insofar as both are the respective operations reJuired for knowledge, and therefore truth. 7n the other hand, the differences between the two are numerous, and the resulting systems Kwhile sharing a common, critical purposeM are Juite distinct. 6. N... die Jbereinstimmung des *enkens mit dem Gegenstande...N K1 ??; "W9L;DM

@: concepts, or a matter of linking concepts to external reality. 'ather, "egel sees truth as unifying the concept with ob#ectivity as its own objectivit#. In "egelBs concept of truth, concept and ob#ectivity correspond, not as a gap bridged between two distinct realms, but as the realiOation that this gap is a sort of illusion or error.6; (his distinction between what truth is for understanding and what truth is for speculation produces a twofold definition for what we might otherwise call truth4 a descriptive definition and a normative one. (ruth in the descriptive sense, referring to any correspondence between a concept and empirical reality, is referred to by "egel as being merely correct KrichtigM. "egel reserves a more normative sense for the word true KwahrM itself, which refers to only a subset of what is correct. (ruth in the higher, normative sense only exists where concept and reality correspond completely, as not merely externally linked but internally unified. 1o, for example, the statement N(he chair is in the roomN may or may not be KdescriptivelyM correct, but it would never be, according "egel, KnormativelyM true because chairs do not have the sort of existence where their concept and their ob#ectivity can ever be internally unified.6? (his is also the reason why "egel claims that his concept of truth has no empirical use.69 &y contrast, what is true, according to "egelBs normative definition, are the stages K ife, the (rue, the -ood, the 2bsoluteM, modes K5ature, 1pirit, ogic6<M, and
6; 6?

I am indebted to Professor udovicus De !os for clarifying this point for me Kpersonal conversationM. 1uch a lack of KinternalM correspondence between concept and ob#ectivity is, for "egel, characteristic of everything finite. 3inite things Bin the worldB cannot be true, precisely because their concept cannot be unified with their ob#ectivity. "egelBs more normative conception of truth means that truth only exists in and for those few moments Kor momentM where such a complete unity is possible. 3or "egel, that finite things cannot be true is not a weakness of his conception of truth, but rather a definitive aspect of finitude. (hat the concept of a chair and an existent chair are distinct is because a chair is a finite thing. 7n the other hand, for an idea Kin a general senseM its concept and its existence are not separable, and thus become for "egel the locus of the truly infinite. 69 1 D99; "W<L?<.. 6< 2s a mode of the idea, logic has a peculiar character4 N(he logical aspect of the absolute idea may also be called a mode of it; but whereas mode signifies a particular kind, a determinateness of form, the logical aspect, on the contrary, is the universal mode in which all particular modes are sublated and enfolded.N N*as $ogische der absoluten &dee kann auch eine 0eise derselben genannt werden- aber indem die 0eise eine besondere Art, eine Bestimmtheit der 8orm bezeichnet, so ist das $ogische dagegen die allgemeine 0eise, in der alle besonderen aufgehoben und eingeh2llt sind. N K1 :.9; "W<L99C,/2M (his dual nature Kinsofar as logic both appears alongside other modes and at the same time incorporates those modesM is a likely source for confusion about the precise architectonic of "egelBs concept of system, for example, in accounts of the relationship between logic and the philosophies of nature and spirit. 3or "egel, logic can be talked about as if it were one of three eJuiprimordial modes of philosophy, alongside nature and spirit, but it is ultimately Nthe universal modeN, determinative of and expressed in those other, secondary modes. In this way, for "egel, logic has a certain

@@ expressions Kin art, religion, and philosophyM of the idea itself.6D (ruth as the unity of concept and ob#ectivity reaches its apotheosis with the 2bsolute Idea; it is truth Nin and for itselfN, the ideaBs absolute knowledge of itself.6: What then is this 2bsolute IdeaQ 2ccording to "egel4
It is the sole sub#ect matter and content of philosophy. 1ince it contains all determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self, determination or particulariOation, it has various shapes KGestaltenM, and the business of philosophy is to cogniOe it in these.6@

(hus, the 2bsolute Idea is not simply one moment of the system alongside other moments, or even simply the highest moment; rather, it contains all other moments within itself. It is in this sense that the 2bsolute Idea can be said to be identical to the system itself. 7f course, it is not simply a collection of these moments, or their underlying presupposition, but the concrete determination of them. (herefore, the determination of all the moments of the system, over the entire course of the 'cience of $ogic, is at the same time the self,determination of the 2bsolute Idea. (his self,determination of the 2bsolute Idea is of a special kind, due to the specific relation within the 2bsolute Idea between form and content. N(hus the logical idea has itself as the infinite form for its content.... %ore exactly, the 2bsolute Idea itself has for its content merely this, that the form,determination is its own completed totality, the pure $oncept.N.C (hus, the 2bsolute Idea has its own form for its content. &y arriving at this point, "egel understands himself to have realiOed the ob#ective he set for himself at the beginning; not to
preeminence over other types of philosophy. 6D 1 :.?; "W<L9?@. 6: "ere is the full passage in context4 N(hirdly, spirit cogniOes the Idea as its absolute truth, as the truth that is in and for itself; the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are eJualiOed, and which is the absolute knowledge of itself.N N*rittens erkennt der Geist die &dee als seine absolute 0ahrheit, als die 0ahrheit, die an und f2r sich ist- die unendliche &dee, in welcher "rkennen und !un sich ausgeglichen hat und die das absolute 0issen ihrer selbst ist.N K1 D<C; "W<L?<@,/2M 6@ N'ie ist der einzige Gegenstand und &nhalt der Philosophie. &ndem sie alle Bestimmtheit in sich enth)lt und ihr 0esen dies ist, durch ihre 'elbstbestimmung oder Besonderung zu sich zur2ckzukehren, so hat sie verschiedene Gestaltungen, und das Gesch)ft der Philosophie ist, sie in diesen zu erkennen.N K1 :.?; "W<L9?@, /2M .C N*ie logische &dee hat somit sich als die unendliche 8orm zu ihrem &nhalte... *ie absolute &dee selbst hat n)her nur dies zu ihrem &nhalt, da/ die 8ormbestimmung ihre eigene vollendete !otalit)t, der reine Begriff ist.N K1 :.9; "W<L99C,(%M

6CC offer not a merely formal logic, where the formal aspects of logic are themselves assumed, but to present a logic where the form is taken up as the content of logic itself..6 It is with this unification or BclosureB that "egel grasps the 2bsolute Idea as not only self,determinate, but completel# self,determinate.

C. FORM AND METHOD

Immediately following the passage cited above, "egel adds this Jualification4
5ow the determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed b# this determinateness has constituted the sub#ect matter SGegenstandT of the science of logic, from which course the absolute idea itself has issued into an existence of its own; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape SGestaltT of a content, but exists wholl# as form, and that accordingly the idea is the absolutely universal idea. (herefore what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its formIthat is, the method...

(his would appear to be one of "egelBs awkwardly paradoxical expressions, but once again there is an important terminological distinction at work. While the 2bsolute Idea has the form of logic as its content, this content is of a peculiar nature; it is not a particular content KNa contentNM, but a universal one Kor, more precisely, one with a Nuniversal aspectNM. (he form, while taken up as the sub#ect matter KGegenstandM of the science of logic, nevertheless remains a form. In fact, the determination that has taken place Kover Nthe entire courseN of the science of logicM has establishedIhas provenIthis form. (o put it another way, the goal of the study of logic is not the proper application of a set of formal rules to this or that particular content, but the taking up of those rules as the sub#ect matter, the study of logic itself. (he method of proof itself is that which is to be proven. (he science of logic as a whole constitutes the demonstration of this proof4
.6 ..

1 ?;; "W9L;9. N*ie Bestimmtheit der &dee und der ganze 1erlauf dieser Bestimmtheit nun hat den Gegenstand der logischen 0issenschaft ausgemacht, aus welchem 1erlauf die absolute &dee selbst f2r sich hervorgegangen ist- f2r sich aber hat sie sich als dies gezeigt, da/ die Bestimmtheit nicht die Gestalt eines &nhalts hat, sondern schlechthin als 8orm, da/ die &dee hiernach als die schlechthin allgemeine &dee ist. 0as also hier noch zu betrachten kommt, ist somit nicht ein &nhalt als solcher, sondern das Allgemeine seiner 8orm, 3 d. i. die >ethode.N K1 :.9; "W<L99C,/2M

6C6
2gainst this however we can appeal not only to the fundamental concept of the science of logic; its entire course, in which all possible shapes KGestaltenM of a given content and of ob#ects came up for consideration, has demonstrated their transition and untruth; also that not merely was it impossible for a given ob#ect to be the foundation to which the absolute form stood in a merely external and contingent relationship but that, on the contrary, the absolute form has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and ultimate truth..;

In other words, the other moments of the system, as they transition from one to the next, demonstrate or determine their NuntruthN, their contradiction, and thus Kin partM their negation. &ut since, according to "egel, he has demonstrated the NuntruthN of Nall possible shapesN of these contents, this, in turn, demonstrates the NtruthN of their Nabsolute formN Kthe 2bsolute IdeaM. In this way, the 2bsolute Idea is proven and the system as a whole is establishedIand the individual moments preservedIvia double negation..? (he foundation or ground of "egelBs logical method is thus not a presupposition, but a conclusion; it is not merely determining, but is itself determined. In this way, "egel understands his approach to have succeeded where the early approaches had failed. "egel saw the earlier metaphysical dogmatism Ke.g. Wolff and &aumgartenM as inadeJuate because it was based on presuppositions, premises determining our knowledge but not determined by it, which remained inaccessible to knowledge and were, therefore, untrue. 3or "egel, )antBs philosophy bore within it a remainder of the same flaw Ke.g. the thing,in,itselfM. 3or "egel, any such externality to the system, any element that was determining but not itself determined, left truth vulnerable to the threat of skepticism. 7ne could argue that "egelBs entire purpose in formulating his system was to establish an ultimate defense against such skepticism..9

.;

NAber es kann hiergegen nicht nur auf den Grundbegriff vom $ogischen sich berufen werden, sondern der ganze 1erlauf desselben, worin alle Gestalten eines gegebenen &nhalts und der 4bjekte vorgekommen sind, hat ihren Jbergang und .nwahrheit gezeigt, und statt da/ ein gegebenes 4bjekt die Grundlage sein k5nnte, zu der sich die absolute 8orm nur als )u/erliche und zuf)llige Bestimmung verhielte, hat sich diese vielmehr als die absolute Grundlage und letzte 0ahrheit erwiesen.N K1 :.<; "W<L996,/2M .? 1ee $hapter ?, 1ection $, 1ubsection 6. .9 3or a detailed account of this interpretation, see %ichael 3orster, 6egel and 'kepticism K"arvard, 6@:@M, 66D, 6?D. (he defense against skepticism is of course one of the basic purposes of critical philosophy in general Kthe other being the freedom from dogmatismM.

6C. (he relationship between "egelBs method and this purpose Kthe defense against skepticismM can best be illustrated by reference to the account "egel gives toward the end of the 'cience of $ogic of dialectic. "egel begins by claiming that dialectic has often been misunderstood, in both ancient and modern philosophy. (he first misunderstanding "egel mentions is that NDialectic has often been regarded as an art, as though it rested on a sub#ective talent and did not belong to the ob#ectivity of the concept.N.< (hat which is an art KKunst, in the sense of techneM would be something external, something that works on its content from the outside, while for "egel, dialectic is internal to Nthe ob#ectivity of the conceptN and thus to truth, something that operates from out of the content itself. (he second KrelatedM misunderstanding "egel mentions is that dialectic has often been applied to this or that sub#ect matter as something contingent rather than being understood as a necessary aspect of thinking as such. "egel gives three examples of this4 the /leaticsB application of dialectic to motion, PlatoBs application of dialectic against Nthe general ideas and concepts of his time, especially those of the 1ophistsN.D and most significantly for us, skepticismBs application of dialectic to not only the Nthe immediate so,called facts of consciousness and maxims of common life, but also to all the concepts of science.N.: "egel goes on to note by way of contrast, N5ow the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the contradiction and nullit# of the assertions made.N.@ In "egelBs account in this passage, the result of dialectic understood as a NnullityN can be understood in one of two senses4 in an Nob#ective senseN where the problem lies with the sub#ect matter Ke.g. the /leatics on motionM or in a Nsub#ective senseN where the problem lies with cognition Ke.g. the sort of Ncommon senseN that regards dialectic as a mere trick or nonsenseM. 2ccording to "egel, this latter
.<

N>an hat die *ialektik oft als eine Kunst betrachtet, als ob sie auf einem subjektiven !alente beruhe und nicht der 4bjektivit)t des Begriffes angeh5re.N K1 :;6; "W<L99D,99:M .D N...die 1orstellungen und Begriffe seiner (eit, insbesondere der 'ophisten...N K1 :;6; "W<L99:M .: N...unmittelbaren sogenannten !atsachen des Bewu/tseins und >a+imen des gemeinen $ebens, sondern auch auf alle wissenschaftlichen Begriffe...N K1 :;6,:;.; "W<L99:,/2M .@ N*ie 8olgerung nun, die aus solcher *ialektik gezogen wird, ist 2berhaupt der 0iderspruch und die ,ichtigkeit der aufgestellten Behauptungen.N K1 :;.; "W<L99:,/2M

6C; sense, when extended to cognition as such, is the view of both skepticism and )antian philosophy. (herefore, "egelBs understanding of )antBs philosophy as inadeJuate is closely related to the fact that "egel believed )antBs response to skepticism to be inadeJuate.;C What both of these senses and each of the approaches mentioned above have in common is that they understand dialectic to have Nonl# a negative resultN.;6 2ccording to "egel, what they miss is the additional, positive result of dialectic.;. 3or "egel, the negative result of dialecticIcontradictionIis not something contingent, a flaw in a particular sub#ect matter or a particular way of thinking, but a necessary aspect of thinking as such. "egel credits )ant with the modern expression of this insight4 NIt must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once more recogniOed as necessar# to reason, although the result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at by )ant.N;; &ut for )ant Ket al.M a contradiction is still merely negative. 3or "egel, this KmisMunderstanding of the result is the problem with formal thinking in general4
7n this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. 3ormal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation.;?

In other words, not only is contradiction a necessary aspect of thinking as such, it is #ust as much a part of formal thinking as speculative thinking. (he difference is not that one way of

;C

3or "egel, it is what he sees as the remainder of dogmatism in )antBs philosophy Ke.g. the thing,in,itselfM that leaves it vulnerable to skepticism. (hus, "egel does not want to return to a pre,)antian dogmatism, but rather #ust the opposite. "e believes the basic problem with )antBs philosophy is that it is insufficiently critical. 3or more on the relationship between )ant and "egel relative to issues of dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism, see 3rederick &eiser, 6egel K'outledge, .CC9M, 69<,69D. ;6 N...nur ein negatives 7esultat...N K1 :;.; "W<L99@M ;. (his aspect has already been discussed at length, in $hapter 6 and $hapter ?, 1ection &. ;; N"s ist als ein unendlich wichtiger 'chritt anzusehen, da/ die *ialektik wieder als der 1ernunft notwendig anerkannt worden, obgleich das entgegengesetzte 7esultat gegen das, welches daraus hervorgegangen, gezogen werden mu/.N K1 :;6; "W<L99:,/2M ;? N"s macht sich dar2ber den bestimmten Grundsatz, da/ der 0iderspruch nicht denkbar sei- in der !at aber ist das *enken des 0iderspruchs das wesentliche >oment des Begriffes. *as formelle *enken denkt denselben auch faktisch, nur sieht es sogleich von ihm weg und geht von ihm in jenem 'agen nur zur abstrakten ,egation 2ber.N K1 :;9; "W<L9<;,/2M

6C? thinking is contradictory and one way is not, but that both ways of thinking essentially entail contradiction; it is only that formal thinking is unable, or unwilling, to recogniOe this. &ut how, one might well ask, is this any different than skepticism, which also claims that contradiction is a negativity essential to thinkingQ (he difference between "egelBs logic and skepticism is that, for "egel, contradiction has an additional positive function.
It is the simple point of the negative relation to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self,movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this sub#ectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality, and the unity that is truth.;9

/ssentially, the recognition of the positive function of this negativity in dialectic depends upon "egelBs concept of sublation. 2s we have seen from the beginning, it is sublation that expresses a negation the result of which is not merely a nullity. (hus, sublation is not only the operant concept in the logical transitions, the mainspring of dialectic, but is also essential and fundamental to "egelBs concept of truth, and moreover, to the defense of this concept of truth against skepticism. "egelBs concept of sublation is precisely what distinguishes his philosophy from a thoroughgoing skepticism. (his important point illustrates how the postmodern Btotalitarian readingB of "egel as a dogmatic arch,rationalist is not only incorrect, but almost completely backward. If "egelBs concept of sublation were only a synonym for simple negation, which reduced that which is sublated to merely nothing and eliminated all differences as such, Breducing the other to the sameB and so on, then "egelBs system would not be a rationalist, dogmatic one at all. It would be #ust the oppositeIskepticism. 2t the same time, "egelBs opposition to skepticism is an opposition in the "egelian sense; it entails that which it opposes. (his can be seen in "egelBs account of dialectic that I have been discussing. (he negativity of dialectical method, as it is employed in skepticism,
;9

N'ie ist der einfache Punkt der negativen Beziehung auf sich, der innerste Ouell aller !)tigkeit, lebendiger und geistiger 'elbstbewegung, die dialektische 'eele, die alles 0ahre an ihm selbst hat, durch die es allein 0ahres ist- denn auf dieser 'ubjektivit)t allein ruht das Aufheben des Gegensatzes zwischen Begriff und 7ealit)t und die "inheit, welche die 0ahrheit ist.N K1 :;9; "W<L9;<,/2M

6C9 not contingently or in a piecemeal way but against Nall the concepts of scienceN, is "egelBs method as well, with but one key exception. "egel extends this dialectical negativity a vital step further to include that negativit# itself. (o put it another way, rather than simply attempting to prove knowledge, "egel also wants to disprove skepticism. In this sense, "egelBs logic is an internal critiJue of skepticism itself, where "egel turns its own method and strength against it. We can see in more detail how this is indeed an internal critiJue of skepticism by KbrieflyM recapitulating "egelBs method.;< &eginning from the immediate, that immediate is first negated. In the skeptical sense, it is shown to be contradictory and as a result, it is reduced to nothing. (hen, this negation is itself revealed to be inadeJuate and a second negation is revealed. N(he second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is this sublation of contradiction....N;D (his Nnegative of the negativeN is "egelBs turning of skepticism back on itself,;: the result of which is something positive4 NIn this turning point of the method, the course of cognition at the same time returns into itself. 2s self3sublating contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality....N;@ (hus, "egel does not simply re#ect skepticism; rather, he interprets skepticism Ki.e. the result of skepticism, contradictionM to have sublated itself. (hrough this

;<

(his is an abstract account, divorced from the content, the problems with which we have already addressed. "owever, "egel himself gives #ust such an abstract account in this chapter. (he discrepancy can be resolved simply by noting KagainM the distinction between an exposition or description of the method and the logical operation of that method. "egelBs account here is also noteworthy insofar as it is an example of "egel tendency to use the term BdialecticB to describe his method in general, rather than employing it the particular logical operations themselves. 1ee also $hapter ., 1ection 2 on this point. ;D N*as zweite ,egative, das ,egative des ,egativen, zu dem wir gekommen, ist jenes Aufheben des 0iderspruches...N K1 :;9; "W<L9<;M ;: "egel of course writes as if the concepts do this themselves. (his manner of speaking is a necessary implication of his conception of the system as self,determinate. If "egel wrote as if he himself were performing these sorts of operations, then this would call into Juestion his claim that it is the system itself that is truly self, determinate and not simply determined personally by him. 2ccording to "egelBs own self,conception, this is not his system but rather the system. (he exposition of this thinking is "egelBs own, but the logical seJuence is Kaccording to "egelM that of thinking itself. ;@ N&n diesem 0endepunkt der >ethode kehrt der 1erlauf des "rkennens zugleich in sich selbst zur2ck. *iese ,egativit)t ist als der sich aufhebende 0iderspruch die 6erstellung der ersten .nmittelbarkeit, der einfachen Allgemeinheit-N K1 :;<; "W<L9<;,/2M

6C< process the immediacy of the beginning is restored. Insofar as this process is carried out over the whole of the science of logic, the result is truth.?C With this return to the beginning, the circle is complete.?6 (he idea Kas 2bsoluteM becomes the system Kas the systemBs absolute comprehension of itselfM.
In conclusion, there remains only this to be said about this idea, that in it, first, the science of logic has grasped its own concept. In the sphere of being, the beginning of its content Sob#ective logic, metaphysics, etc.T, its concept appears as knowing in a sub#ective reflection external to that content. &ut in the idea of absolute cognition, the concept has become the ideaBs own content. (he idea is itself the pure concept that has itself for sub#ect matter SGegenstandT and which, in running itself as sub#ect matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science Sof logicT, and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby sublating its standing as content and sub#ect matter and cogniOing the concept of the science.?.

(hus, the system comprehends itself through the determination of its moments. /ach constituent moment is determined by its sublation in a latter moment. (he totality of these sublations, the completion of the system, constitutes the ground of the systemIits concrete proof. 2s complete, this ground is the sublation of every constituent moment within the system itself. /ach of these moments is grounded both in its sublation in the next and as a moment of the system as a whole. In other words, there are two key roles that sublation plays

?C

(he full Juote, in context, reads4 N5ow more precisely the third is the immediate, but the immediate resulting from sublation of mediation, the simple resulting from sublation of difference, the positive resulting from sublation of the negative, the concept that has realiOed itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of this reality has become united with itself, and has restored its absolute reality, its simple relation to itself. !his result is therefore the truth.N N,)her ist nun das *ritte das .nmittelbare, aber durch Aufhebung der 1ermittlung, das "infache durch Aufheben des .nterschiedes, das Positive durch Aufheben des ,egativen, der Begriff, der sich durch das Anderssein realisiert und durch Aufheben dieser 7ealit)t mit sich zusammengegangen HistI und seine absolute 7ealit)t, seine einfache Beziehung auf sich hergestellt hat. *ies 7esultat ist daher die 0ahrheit.N K1 :;D; "W<L9<?,/2M ?6 "egel himself uses the image of a circle to characteriOe this process, e.g. / ;@; "W:L<C. "owever, from this description it does not follow that "egelBs argument is circular in the sense of being a vicious circle. (he term BcircleB never appears in "egel as part of the logical seJuence itself, but only in descriptions of it. 7ne might argue that some aspect or another of "egelBs argument is circular in a non,metaphorical sense, but given the distinction between the logic and its exposition, "egelBs use of the term BcircleB by itself is not sufficient grounds for such a claim. ?. N"s ist von dieser &dee zum 'chlusse nur noch dies zu erw)hnen, da/ in ihr erstlich die logische 0issenschaft ihren eigenen Begriff erfa/t hat. Bei dem 'ein, dem Anfange ihres &nhalts erscheint ihr Begriff als ein demselben )u/erliches 0issen in subjektiver 7efle+ion. &n der &dee des absoluten "rkennens aber ist er zu ihrem eigenen &nhalte geworden. 'ie ist selbst der reine Begriff, der sich zum Gegenstande hat und der, indem er sich als Gegenstand HhabendI die !otalit)t seiner Bestimmungen durchl)uft, sich zum Ganzen seiner 7ealit)t, zum '#steme der 0issenschaft ausbildet und damit schlie/t, dies Begreifen seiner selbst zu erfassen, somit seine 'tellung als &nhalt und Gegenstand aufzuheben und den Begriff der 0issenschaft zu erkennen.N K1 :?.,?;; "W<L9D6,(%M

6CD relative to the particular moments of the science of logic4 the sublation of each individual transition between moments and the sublation of those moments within the system as a whole. (he former is sublation as the determination of each moment; the latter is sublation as the completion of the system itself. Importantly, both of these aspects are vital to "egelBs claim to truth. Without the determination of each moment and the transitions between them, the system would remain abstractIno more than an elaborately articulated set of assumptions, a sort of Btruth without proofB.?; Without the completion of the system there would be no reconciliation of the concept with its reality, and the system would lack its groundIa sort of Bproof without truthB.?? Without determination, the system would be merely a collection of premises that might happen to be correct, but that would lack the sort of proof that would make them true. Without completion, the system would contain determinations, but not be self,determinate itself, and thus not free in "egelBs sense of the term. Without this freedom, the system could not be true because it would remain determined by something and not determinate of itself. 2s we have seen, this first reJuirement, determinateness, suggests a problem with those who would accuse "egel of being an arch,rationalist, i.e. of dogmatism. (he second reJuirementIcompletenessIsuggests a problem for those would like to follow "egel, but not all the way to the end.?9 Without completion, without a return to the beginning, such a position would be, from a "egelian point of view, nothing more than skepticism. 2ccording to his own self,conception, "egelBs position is of course neither dogmatic nor skeptical, but critical. In this way, "egel sees himself as having taken up the goal )ant proposed and having fully carried it out and, as we have seen in this chapter, the concept of sublation is essential to this understanding of "egelBs philosophy as a critical one.
?; ??

(hat is, there would be a truth,claim asserted, but no argument establishing it. (hat is, there would be a series of arguments, but no conclusion. It should be clear that both of these phrases KBtruth without proofB and Bproof without truthBM are used in a figurative sense, and that I am not literally claiming truth and proof would be separable from one another. ?9 1ee, for example, $harles (aylor, 6egel K$ambridge, 6@D9M, 9;:.

6C:

Transition to Part III

"aving arrived at the end of Part II of this study on the function of "egelBs concept of sublation, several further features of sublation have now been distinguished. In $hapter ;, we saw how sublation operates in the transition from being and nothing to becoming. %ore specifically, we saw the unusual structure of the first transition of "egelBs 'cience of $ogic. 8nlike the other transitions, the sublation here is not of the opposition between two moments but rather of their sameness. (he way sublation functions there supports the claim that "egelBs logic is not in fact the rote application of an external formal method. In $hapter ?, we examined the relationship between sublation and the determinations of reflection4 identity, difference, opposition, and contradiction. &y the end of that chapter, we had seen how an analysis of "egelBs science of logic in terms of sublation can offer a response to certain common critiJues of it; for example, "egelBs logic does not seek to abolish all difference or violate the law of non,contradiction. In $hapter 9, we looked at how sublation defines the relationship between the system and its moments. &y the end of this chapter, it had been shown how and it what sense sublation determines the science of logic as a whole. 1ublation in its speculative sense is reJuired for both the determination of each moment relative to the next as well as for the complete self,determination of those moments in the system as a whole. In the third part of this study, I will use the structural and functional analysis of the concept of sublation as the basis for a critical examination of "egelBs logic.

6C@

PART III: CRITI"UE CHAPTER $: INTERNAL CRITI"UE

(he critical part of my interpretation of "egelBs logic in terms of sublation will be carried out in three chapters. (he first K$hapter <M will be an internal critiJue of "egelBs concept of sublation. (his is a critiJue of "egel according to his own standards, i.e. the criteria that have been established in Parts I and II. (he second chapter of Part III K$hapter DM will be an external critiJue of "egelBs concept of sublation. (his will be a critiJue according not to "egelBs standards, but rather my own.6 (he final chapter K$hapter :M will be an evaluation of the significance of "egelBs concept of sublation, both in terms of this studyBs methodology and ob#ectives, as well as the implications of sublation for philosophical interpretation in general. (his chapter begins by outlining a basic definition of internal critiJue, as well as other relevant definitions for the concepts that I use here. In the second half of this chapter, I present an internal critiJue of "egelBs logical approach. (his critiJue is of course contingent upon "egelBs concept of sublation, and draws heavily on my earlier structural and functional analyses.

A. DEFINITIONS
(o begin with, what exactly is meant by the term Binternal critiJueBQ 3or our purposes, an internal critiJue can best be defined as an interpretation. that evaluates the relative merits and flaws of a given text; according to standards established by the text itself. 2ccordingly, in
6 .

(he basis for the particular legitimacy of external critiJue will be argued in $hapter D. 2 more elaborate discussion of the relationship between interpretation and critiJue will be discussed in $hapter :. ; &y BtextB here I mean individual texts, but also parts of texts, or sets of texts. 2ccording to this more generally inclusive definition, a BtextB, as the ob#ect of interpretation, could include an authorBs entire corpus. 2ccording to my understanding, this is what is meant when one talks about, for example, a criticism Bof "egelB Kor Bof )antB, etc.M (hat is, a Bcriticism of "egelB would be a criticism of his body of available written work, a Bcriticism of

66C an internal critiJue, the text and its interpretation share a set of premises in common. (hat is to say, in an internal critiJue the argument of the text and the argument of the interpretation have one or more premises in common. (hose individuals who positively evaluate a given text on this basis can be called apologists. (hose who negatively evaluate a text on this basis are simply called critics. While this distinction can have pe#orative connotations, suggesting that only those who negatively evaluate a text Bthink criticallyB, it is important to note that both apologists and critics can meet the standard of an internal critiJue as I have stipulated it here. 1trictly speaking, an internal critiJue is the only legitimate one.? Its legitimacy is based on the mutual recognition of the set of premises as shared. (his mutual recognition occurs in any debate between Kperhaps hypothetical9M apologists and critics. It is a mutual recognition in principle that the interpretation at issue is made from a common set of premises. Where apologists and critics differ is on the conclusions that ought to be derived from these premises, not on the premises themselves. 2 debate over a particular criticism can be said to be reasonable when such a mutual recognition is present between two or more interlocutors. Without some sort of recognition of the legitimacy of a given interpretation, without some premises being mutually recogniOed as being shared in common, no reasonable discourse is possible. It is important to keep in mind here that a mutual recognition of legitimacy is not the same thing as agreement. 2n apologist and a critic need not agree with each other about an# of the particular conclusions involved. Indeed, by definition, they do not
"egelBs logicB would be a critical analysis of his written work as it relates to the topic of logic, and so forth. In other words, when I use the word BtextB here, I mean it in a broad, hermeneutical sense. 2nd while I have here focused predominantly on one particular work K"egelBs 'cience of $ogicM, that focus will not be the sole purview of my critiJue. ? "egel himself insists on the exclusive legitimacy of internal critiJue. 1ee "erbert %arcuse, 7eason and 7evolution K7xford, 6@<CM, vii and &eiser, 69D. "owever, more generally speaking I believe it is possible for an external critiJue to also be legitimate. %y #ustification for this claim and an explanation of the relationship between internal and external critiJue will make up the second and third chapters of this part, respectively. 9 (his hypothetical mutual recognition is the common standard for the critiJue of most historical texts. 7ne way to test if an interpretation meets this standard is to ask something like NWould the author have agreedQN (he mutual recognition can only be non,hypothetical when either aM the author of the text is still living or bM there are interlocutors involved that position themselves as its defenders.

666 agree; each views the otherBs interpretation as incorrect. What makes a debate reasonable is not the agreement among the involved parties but that, since they share a set of premises in common, the potential that they could at some point agree. In this sense, reasonableness could also be referred to as convincibilit#. &y this I mean that, over the course of given debate, it should at least be possible for reasonable interlocutors to be convinced of some Ki.e. at least oneM of the othersB conclusions. 7f course, convincibility is not the same thing as actually being convinced. It is not necessary for two parties, ultimately, to reach any final agreement for a debate to have been reasonable according to the definitions I have outlined here. (his presents, however, an immediate difficulty4 if only potential, rather than actual, agreement is necessary for a debate to be reasonable, then how is one to tell the difference between a reasonable debate and an unreasonable oneQ (o answer this Juestion, we need to look at the reason that a reasonable debate is something desirable in the first place. (he reason reasonable debate is for which we should strive is that it is a standard that is performativel# instantiated by the act of debating itself. &efore we proceed, I should define this concept in more detail. I will define BperformativityB here as that aspect of a statement which involves its function as an act or the context in which this act is carried out. (his definition differs from *. . 2ustinBs concept of a Nperformative utteranceN in that performativity does not refer to a particular type of speech act, but to a feature of speech acts in general.< It is closer to 1earleBs concept of an Nindirect speech actN except that it is not focused on those acts that express some meaning separate from a statementBs explicit content.D Performativity here is simply a feature of the meaning of any speech actIthe sense in which it is an actIand not a feature peculiar to certain acts. In this sense, a performative standard is a criterion or expectation that
< D

1ee *. . 2ustinBs 6ow to *o !hings 0ith 0ords K7xford, 6@<.M. 1ee *ohn 1earleBs "+pression and >eaning K$ambridge, 6@D@M, ;:,9D.

66. is instantiated in the act andLor context of making a statement, rather than in the content of that statement. (aking this distinction between a statementBs content and its performativity into account also entails that it is possible for a statement to be performativel# contradictor#. (hat is, a statement might contradict itself not only through some contradiction in its content, but also through a contradiction between the content and the nature of the act of making the statement.: 3or example, the sentence N(his sentence is falseN is clearly an ordinary, formal contradiction. It is the classic NliarBs paradoxN, necessarily contradictory when written in any language or however it might be otherwise formaliOed. 7n the other hand, N(his sentence is in DutchN is a performative contradiction. (hat it is a contradiction depends, not on the specific nature of the content, but on the nature of the act or context in which it is made; in this case, it depends upon the language in which it is written. If I had expressed the same logical content in DutchIN*eze zin is in het ,ederlandsNIthen there would of course be no contradiction present. &roadening this from statements to arguments as a whole, the same distinction applies. 3or example, N*e gustibus non est disputandumN is not a formal contradiction, but it would be a performative contradiction in the context of, say, an argument about the merits of a particular work of art. (hat one is arguing that a particular work is good or bad always already assumes that there are some criteria for deciding whether the work is good or bad. (wo people may disagree about what those criteria are, but once they are engaged in a debate, they have already assumed, performatively, that such criteria exist. 7ne can coherently claim that it is not possible to argue about taste, but one cannot coherently make that claim while at the same time arguing about taste.

2ccording to 2ustin, performatives cannot be contradictory insofar as they have no truth,value. It is 1earle that introduces this possibility, with his distinction between the direct and indirect speech act.

66; 2s a second example, consider a political realistBs position that Bstates should not take morality into account in their international relations.B 2bstracted from any particular policy issue, this statement is not formally contradictory per se. "owever, once it is offered in the context of a debate on the morality of a particular policy Ke.g. whether to support a dictatorshipM, then it becomes a performative contradiction. (he political realist simultaneously claims that morality should not be taken into account in the decision and simultaneously takes a side on the moral issue at stake. 3or example, a $old War strategist claims that morality should not be taken into account when deciding whether or not to support a dictatorship because $ommunism must be opposed on moral grounds. (he theory professes to be amoral, but is in fact already based on a certain morality. 7ne can coherently claim that morality should not be taken into account in foreign policy, but one cannot coherently make that claim while at the same time arguing on a moral basis. 1o, by taking the performativity of statements into account, and by broadening it to apply to arguments, one can say that in a debate between any two given parties, the act of debating itself assumes that both parties are reasonable, i.e. convincible. (his assumption of convincibility is a sort of Bmeta,premiseB shared by any two parties in a debate. (he fact that this basic premise is shared is established in the debate insofar as the two interlocutors each provide reasons Ki.e. groundsM for their respective claims. (he act of providing grounds performatively assumes that this act has some purpose. If one did not expect those grounds to be Kat least potentiallyM acceptable to the other party, there would be no purpose in providing them in the first place. In other words, without reasonableness, the act of debating Kor

66? critiJueM@ would be an act of futility.6C In this way, the criterion of reasonableness is performatively instantiated in any act of debating. In answer to our earlier Juestion, one can distinguish a reasonable debate from an unreasonable one based on the nature of the grounds provided by either of the parties. In a reasonable debate, each party will offer as grounds for their claim one of the basic shared premises or secondary premises derived from them. 7f course, ?ua debate, the two parties will not necessarily agree. Indeed, by definition they will not, at least at first. In the process of debating, any number of these elements might be called into Juestion. /ither party may argue, for example, that essential premises were missing, or that their interlocutorsB reasoning from one premise to another was somehow flawed, and so forth. &ut what then would an unreasonable debate look likeQ 2n unreasonable debate Kor an unreasonable interlocutor, or an unreasonable critiJueM would primarily be indicated by the nature of the grounds offered in support of the claims involved, e.g. ad hominem attacks. 8nreasonableness might also be indicated by an interlocutorBs non,discursive behavior as well, such as shouting, fist pounding, leaving the room, and so on. What both these types of claims and behaviors have in common is that they are described as unreasonable because they constitute a refusal to provide grounds. It is important to point out, however, that not being convinced by reasonable grounds does not make an interlocutor unreasonable. In trying to define a reasonable tone in a debate, it is always important to keep in mind that it is KpotentialM convincibility, not KactuallyM being

(he respective natures of critiJue and debate are deeply intertwined. 7ne does not offer a critiJue without assuming an audience for that critiJue. 7ne does not offer grounds unless one anticipates some response. (he relationship between critiJue and debate is articulated here in reference to a critiJues BpublicityB. 1ee below. 6C While I do not fully elaborate an argument for it here, I would further suggest that any self,consciously futile argument would be performatively contradictory. While I do not offer an argument for this claim here, I would point out that "egel himself considers such futility to be contradictory as well, i.e. in his critiJue of Babsolute verbiageB, mentioned previously in $hapter ?, 1ection 2, 1ubsection ..

669 convinced that is the criterion. 5ot being convinced does not mean an interlocutor is being unreasonable. 5ot giving reasons does.66 3urthermore, a debate can be said to be reasonable even if the shared premises are not present from the beginning. 'ather, what is essential is the potential that shared premises could be established at some point. In this way, in a reasonable debate, even the specific nature of the set of shared premises could be called into Juestion. 3or example, two parties might have a divergent understanding of the premises they had thought they shared Ki.e. arguing at cross purposesM. In such situations, a new set of shared premises could be established, the original premises could be further clarified, or the two parties might simply mutually recogniOe the situation and conclude their debate Ki.e. agree to disagree.M In such a case, the actual reasonableness of a debate might not be established until the very end. Where the only shared premise is the ultimate, mutual recognition that the two parties do not share any other relevant premises in common, the debate can still be said to be reasonable, insofar as the two parties share at least this last recognition in common. 7f course, since reasonableness is, as a criterion, performatively instantiated in the act of debating itself, it is far preferable for a debate to be reasonable from the outset. In fact, as I have argued here, reasonable debate is the only coherent form of debate. 7therwise, too much time can be wasted in confusion and one runs the risk of futility. (he best way to minimiOe the risk of such confusion and futility is to begin by establishing and clarifying oneBs basic premises. (his is why it is important, before engaging in such a critiJue, to lay some sort of
66

2ccording the definitions of these terms as I have presented them here, the criterion of reasonableness by no means reJuire any ascertainment of intent or other kind of psychological insight. It is only the linguistic, textual character, accessible to both parties Ki.e. as Baccessible to allBM, that can be categoriOed as reasonable or unreasonable. 1o this means, importantly, that an interpreterBs motives are irrelevant. 3or example, a lawyer makes his case in court. "e might make his case because he is being paid, as a favor to a loved one, or out of devotion to a political cause. 5one of those motivesIonly the argument that makes up the lawyerBs caseIcould be characteriOed as being either reasonable or unreasonable, according to the definitions I have stipulated here. In making this distinction, I have in mind the particular issue of religiously,motivated public policy arguments made in a secular, liberal society. I do not believe that faith disJualifies anyone from engaging in such debate, and that such a claim made in response to a religiously motivated argument would be ad hominem. 'eligious grounds Ke.g. B...because the &ible says soBM are what would be excluded from a reasonable public debate in a secular society, but not religious motivations Ke.g. B...because I am a $hristianBM.

66< groundwork, to establish, as clearly as possible, #ust what one takes to be the relevant set of shared basic premises. (his has, in fact, been a key purpose in both my earlier structural and functional analyses, as well as this KapparentM digression into the nature of criticism and debate. (he former was needed in order to make explicit the premises I take to be shared in the critiJue of "egel I present below. (he latter was necessary in order to make explicit the specific relationship between the earlier parts and this one. (he importance of this Bmaking explicitB brings me to one last performative criterion for any act of criticism, what I will call, for lack of a better word, its publicit#. 2ny criticism is essentially public in the sense that it is necessarily intended for some audience. (he act of formulating any critiJue always assumes at least one interlocutor, even if, at the moment the critiJue is offered, such an interlocutor is only hypothetical. In a written work, for example, the interlocutor might be the intended audience. 1uch an interlocutor remains hypothetical unless or until a reader responds to that work. Without such an Kat least hypotheticalM interlocutor, there is no purpose in providing grounds for oneBs claims in the first place. Without someone to convince, why would one bother to make an argumentQ If no one is listening, why speakQ If no one will read a work, why write itQ It is in this sense that critiJue and debate are inseparable. (his is why in defining the former, I have taken so much time discussing the latter. (o summariOe, an act of criticism has two Kmutually intertwinedM performative criteria4 reasonableness and publicity. 7easonableness reJuires that one offer grounds for oneBs claims. Publicit# reJuires that those grounds be accessible to oneBs Kactual or potentialM interlocutors. Internal criticism further reJuires that the grounds offered belong to Kor be

66D derived fromM a shared set of premises. 3or the sake of publicity, it is important to make what one takes to be those shared premises as explicit and as clear as possible.6. In the context of the present study, the following criticism will be internal insofar as it is based on my account of "egelBs concept of sublation. (he shared set of premises is "egelBs text, and one of the purposes of my prior analysis has been to make what I take to be key premises explicit Ki.e. those aspects of the text most relevant to my critiJueM. (his is also why I have occasionally taken the time to explain elements of "egelBs thinking that may seem obvious to one already familiar with "egelBs writings, why I have often written as if to a general audience, rather than to my real audience of a defense committee made up of specialists. If one were to assume oneBs audience holds a common interpretation of "egelBs work, to assume a set of Bthings everyone knowsB about "egel, then the shared set of premises necessary for an internal critiJue would remain merely implicit. eaving the set of shared premises implicit runs the risk of arguing at cross purposes, misunderstandings, and so forth. "ere, I have taken the additional step of elaborating on my understanding of the nature of criticism in general. It has not been my intent to offer any kind of normative, prescriptive methodology here, but rather a descriptive account of what I take to be the nature of text, interpretation, criticism, and debate, and moreover, how each of these concepts is closely intertwined with the others. (his analysis of the nature of criticism has served the same purpose as my earlier analysis of "egel4 to make explicit my premises and, most importantly in this case, my understanding of the criteria of an internal critiJue. Without stating such criteria explicitly, one runs the risk that oneBs critiJue may not be recogniOable as internal at all. "aving now laid out this preliminary groundwork, we can now move on to the critical analysis proper.

6.

(he excessive use of #argon or too many assumptions about the knowledge,base of oneBs audience are other commonly encountered problems of relating to the publicity of a critiJue.

66:

B. ANALYSIS
2t the end of the previous chapter, I indicated two of "egelBs criteria for his system4 determination and completeness. (he criterion of determination reJuires that any particular determining element of logic must also itself be determined. 7therwise, the resultant system would remain abstract, unfree, and unproven; what I summariOed with the phrase Ntruth without proofN. (he criterion of completion reJuires that every logicall# determining element must also itself be determined. 7therwise, the resultant system would not reconcile its concept with its ob#ectivity, and thus would not be, according to "egel, true; what I summariOed with the phrase Nproof without truthN. Without both determination and completeness, "egelBs system would not be self,determinate. In addition, we have seen the key role sublation plays in both of these criteria. (he determination of any particular moment is its sublation relative to the next, i.e. in the transition to the next moment. (he completion of the system is the sublation of these moments relative to the whole. (hese two reJuirementsIthat the system be both determinate and completeIpose a serious problem for "egel as well. 2s we have seen, "egel adamantly insists on both, and both are absolutely necessary according to his own standard of truth. (o take one explicit example, in response to some ob#ections on the nature of the beginning of the 'cience of $ogic, "egel writes4
Whatever ob#ections to it might be raisedIsay, the limitations of human knowledge, the need to examine critically the instrument of cognition before starting to deal with the sub#ect matterIare themselves presuppositions, which as concrete determinations involve the demand for their mediation and proof. 1ince therefore they possess no formal advantage over the beginning with the sub#ect matter against which they protest, but on the contrary themselves re?uire deduction on account of their more concrete content, their claim to prior consideration must be treated as an empty presumption.6;
6;

N0as man gegen ihn vorbringen m5chte 3 etwa von den 'chranken der menschlichen "rkenntnis, von dem "rfordernis, ehe man an die 'ache gehe, das &nstrument des "rkennens kritisch zu untersuchen 3, sind selbst 1oraussetzungen, die als konkrete Bestimmungen die 8orderung ihrer 1ermittlung und Begr2ndung mit sich f2hren. *a sie hiermit formell nichts vor dem Anfange mit der 'ache, gegen den sie protestieren, voraushaben und vielmehr wegen des konkreteren &nhalts einer Ableitung bed2rftig sind, so sind sie nur f2r eitle Anma/ungen

66@

In other words, any concrete content reJuires determination, reJuires proof. (hat which determines our cognition must itself be determined. 7therwise, such a determining would remain merely an indeterminate presupposition. (his, as we have seen, is "egelBs whole purposeIthe articulation of the totality of determinations, through every moment and every transition, over the entire course of the science of logic. (his is, of course, not a reJuirement that everything that could be determined b# the logic be determined, but that every determination be determined that would determine the logic itself. $ompleteness is not some artificial reJuirement that "egel enumerate every possible element determinable by logic Ke.g. every possible determination of every philosophical scienceM, but that "egel determine every element that determines the logic itself. (he criterion of completeness means that the science of logic must be self,determinate, not that it must somehow Bdetermine everythingB. (o put it yet another way4 in order to take up its form as its own content, the science of logic must determine itself. 2s the science of logic, it also determines the form of thinking in the other philosophical sciences. 3rom this, however, it does not follow that the content of these other sciences would also be reducible to logic and thereby also be reJuired to be completely determined. What is reJuired for completeness is only the determination of those elements that determine the logic itself. >et there remains at least one determining element of "egelBs logic that is not itself determined in this wayI"egelBs concept of sublation. 1ublation is not itself a moment of the system. 5o logical transition is ever presented for it and it is never established as a result.6? While there are any number of Bself,sublationsB, there is never a moment where sublation sublates, and thus determines, itself. 2t the same time, "egel refers to sublation from the very

zu nehmen, da/ auf sie viel mehr als HaufI etwas anderes zu achten sei.N K1 :?6; "W<L9<@,/2M 6? 1ee $hapter ?, 1ection &, 1ubsection . for a more detailed discussion of this. 7ne could also note that "egelBs explicit description of sublation Kthat I discussed in $hapter 6M occurs in a remark, not in the main,body text. "egelBs definition of sublation is therefore part of his exposition of the logic, not itself part of the logical seJuence per se.

6.C outset as a Nfundamental determination.N (hus, it would seem that the operant element of "egelBs method of proof is not itself proven. If this is indeed the case, that sublation is a logically determining element that is not itself determined, then "egelBs system would be, by his own standards, incomplete, and thus not, in "egelBs sense of the term, true. 2gain, such a lacuna would be a failure according to "egelBs own criteria. 3urthermore, "egel himself was well aware of this problem, as it is one that he explicitly mentions. In the context of a discussion of dialectic, "egel writes4
(o hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this reJuirement and so far as e+amples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole logic consists of such.69

1o, while "egel explicitly addresses the problem, one can see that the defense offered here is wholly insufficient. N(o hold fast to the positive in its negativeN is said to be both Nthe most important feature in rational cognitionN and yet, at the same time, reJuires Nonly the simplest reflectionN. 7f course, simplicity is, for "egel, no grounds at all and he manages to avoid appealing to it directly.6< Instead, the Nexamples of the proofN are said to be found throughout Nthe whole logic.N6D In other words, "egel claims here that the proofs for the concept of sublation are found in the logical transitions themselves, where it is operant as the Bholding fast to the positive in its negativeB, i.e. as negation and preservation. 7f course, in these transitions, sublation is not that which is being proven. In these transitions, sublation is what is determining the transitions but is not itself that which is being determined by them. In more "egelian terms, sublation is Kan aspect ofM the form of these transitions, but not their content.
69

N*as Positive in seinem ,egativen, dem &nhalt der 1oraussetzung, im 7esultate festzuhalten, dies ist das 0ichtigste im vern2nftigen "rkennen- es geh5rt zugleich nur die einfachste 7efle+ion dazu, um sich von der absoluten 0ahrheit und ,otwendigkeit dieses "rfordernisses zu 2berzeugen, und was die Beispiele von Beweisen hierzu betrifft, so besteht die ganze $ogik darin.N K1 :;?; "W<L9<C,/2M 6< What is BsimpleB in this sense is not a ground because it is immediate, not mediated or determined. In other words, something BsimpleB is an assumption, not an argument. 1ee, for example, "egelBs re#ection of immediate knowledge in thinkers like *acobi, e.g. "P;L?6D,?6:; "W.CL;.;. 6D 2n example, however, is not itself a proof. Instances of the use of sublation does not mean that sublation itself is taken up as the content that is being determined in that proof. 1ublation is part of the form of these proofs, not their content or that which is being proven.

6.6 In order, though, for the science of logic to be completely self,determinate, its form must be taken up as its content. (he absence of a logical determination of sublation means that the ground of the system Ki.e. the system as a wholeM contains Kat leastM one element that is not itself grounded. "egelBs own demand for the complete determination of every logically determining element means that Kregarding the concept of sublationM "egelBs system is not complete. "egel seems to recogniOe the problem here, but, given the clear inadeJuacy of his defense, at once seems to turn away from it. (he problem of "egelBs basic taskIto take up the form of logic as its own contentIis in this way deferred but not resolved. In anticipation of possible ob#ections to this criticism, I will continue by analyOing elements of this critiJue in more detail. 3irst of all, the word BsublationB does not occur in this passage explicitly. 7ne might therefore ob#ect that sublation must not be the concept to which "egel refers here. While it is correct that "egel does not use the term BsublationB here explicitly, the presence of the concept is clear from the context.6: Immediately preceding the cited passage, "egel writes4
(he immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken as the usual result of dialectic; rather it is the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediatedIcontains in general the determination of the first within itself. $onseJuently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other.6@

3rom the context of this passage and its relation to the passage cited above, we can see that the element in Juestion 6M is described as Nthe most important feature in rational cognitionN,.C .M includes both negation and preservation,.6 ;M results in a negation that is distinct from nothing,.. ?M is described in contrast to Nthe usual result of dialecticN, and 9M occurs
6: 6@

1ee $hapter ., 1ection $ for my #ustification of this distinction. N*as .nmittelbare ist nach dieser negativen 'eite in dem Anderen untergegangen, aber das Andere ist wesentlich nicht das leere ,egative, das ,ichts, das als das gew5hnliche 7esultat der *ialektik genommen wird, sondern es ist das Andere des "rsten, das ,egative des .nmittelbaren- also ist es bestimmt als das 1ermittelte, 3 enth)lt 2berhaupt die Bestimmung des "rsten in sich. *as "rste ist somit wesentlich auch im Anderen aufbewahrt und erhalten.N K1 :;?; "W<L9<6,/2M .C $ompare to "egelBs description of sublation as None of the most important concepts in philosophyN K2lready cited in the Introduction, note 6.M .6 $ompare to "egelBs explicit definition of sublation, treated in $hapter 6, 1ection 2. .. $ompare to "egelBs implicit definition of sublation, treated in $hapter 6, 1ection &, 1ubsection 6.

6.. throughout the whole logic..; -iven these five points of commonality between sublation and the concept being referred to in this passage, to argue that the concept referred to here is not sublation because the term is absent would be a bit like seeing a certain black,and,white striped mammalian Juadruped running across a plain in 2frica and refusing to call it a Oebra. /ven if one were to persist with such a linguistically positivist interpretation and assume that a concept cannot be present without its term, then that would necessarily raise the Juestion4 what then is presentQ What is this element that is both Nthe most important feature in rational cognitionN and at the same time so simple that it reJuires no proofQ Whatever this hypothetical element would be, it would still pose the same, unresolved problem. Persisting, one could continue to claim that the concept being addressed here is not sublation. /ven if we, for the sake of argument, grant that possibility, what other possible elements could fit this descriptionQ $ould "egel be referring to opposition, or contradiction, or dialectic, or something elseQ Without listing every possible proposed alternative, one can categoriOe these possibilities into two basic groups4 those concepts that are moments of the system Ke.g. oppositionM and those that are not Ke.g. dialecticM. (he former are excluded as possibilities because, if "egel were here referring to some Klogically determinedM moment of his system, then he would not need to argue that no proof is reJuired. (he proof would be present in the transition to the given moment. 7n the other hand, if one were to argue that one of the latter, Bnon,momentsB was a legitimate alternative, then the problem would once again be simply deferred, not resolved. If "egel is referring here to some other determining element that is not itself proven, then that element would be #ust as problematic, for exactly the same reasons. 2nother possible ob#ection is related to "egelBs concept of the completeness of the system. 7f course, that the system must be complete does not mean that it must somehow
.;

$ompare to "egelBs description of sublation as N...a fundamental determination, which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophyFG K2lready cited in the Introduction, note 6.M

6.; contain everything. N(he truth is the wholeN does not mean that every single word of the system has to be proven in order for it to be true. (his would be an enumerationIa list of every possible determination that could be made in logic. (his is, of course, not what "egel himself reJuires. 'ather, what "egel reJuires is completion. $ompletion does not reJuire the determination of everything that could be determined by the logic, but everything that determines the logic itself. In this sense, completion does not mean total determination but rather self,determination. 3or "egel, the science of logic must be self,determinate if it is to be true, but it does not on that account need to Bprove everythingB. K2 recognition of the distinction between enumeration and completeness is very important, at the very least in order to avoid the appearance of pressing unrealistic and incoherent demands onto "egel.M 7ne might argue that what this entails is that every moment of the s#stem has to be proven. (hus, since sublation is not itself a moment of the system, it might not seem necessary that it be determined in this way. (his ob#ection, while somewhat more substantive, is still flawed. (hat sublation is not a moment of the system is exactly the problem. If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that "egel fully determines every moment of the system, that as a moment each is logically determinate, relative to both its subseJuent moment and the whole, and that these determinations are what make up the self,determination of the system Kas the self, determination of the 2bsolute IdeaM, one must nevertheless acknowledge there remains a potential difficulty. If there were a logically determining element of the system that was not itself logically determined as a moment, then the system would not be self,determinate. 2nd, as we have seen here, sublation is #ust such an element. 7ne could also try to preclude such a possibility in advance, via reference to "egelBs concept of limit KGrenzeM. 7ne might argue that any such determining,but,not,determined element could easily be incorporated into the system, because the very act of determining

6.? such a boundary Ki.e. Boutside the systemBM would render the element in Juestion determined Ki.e. Binside the systemBM. (his is only a potential solution and not an actual one. While it is possible to argue this, my point is that "egel himself does not. In reading a text, one cannot pro#ect solutions to a textBs problems into that text and, at the same time, assume that they must be a part of it simply because otherwise it would be incoherent. 1uch assumptions are Juestion,begging because they assume that a coherence must be present when it is that very coherence that is at issue. 3urthermore, my criticism here is not directed at the possibility of systematic philosophy as such. I make no claim against the possibility of some other person, a later philosopher or commentator, formulating a complete system, only that, in this case, "egel himself does not offer one..? 2long similar lines, one could argue that "egel did not intend to establish every possible logical determination, but to establish the framework within which later thinkers could do so, thus Bfilling in the gapsB, so to speak. 1uch gaps, it could be argued, would not be a problem for the system because they are still contained within the overall framework of the system. (o put this argument in terms of an analogy4 if one man builds a house and another man later adds furniture or some paint, it does not mean that the first man did not actually finish the house. In more general terms, later additions or modifications do not necessarily indicate an earlier incompleteness. (he problem with this Bframework argumentB is similar to the problem with the Blimit argumentB mentioned above. 2ccording to "egelBs reJuirement of completeness, it is possible for later philosophical determinations to be made. In insisting on the importance of completeness for "egel, I am not somehow claiming that "egel reJuires anything like Bthe end of philosophyB. >et, in order for the system to be self,determinate and thus free and true,
.?

In addition, this KhypotheticalM argument illustrates a problem with "egelBs Blimit,argumentB in general. K1ee 1 6;.; "W9L6?;.M "egel is correct to say, in a certain sense, that in defining any limit, we always already define what is beyond it. "owever, such a determination entails only that there is something beyond the limit, not what that something is. (his problem will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter K$hapter DM, in terms of the determination of indeterminacy.

6.9 what cannot be left for later is anything essential to the systemIanything without which it would not be a system. 2s such, this means that what cannot be left for later is anything that determines the system itself. %ore specifically, this means that later philosophers might make further determinations through the system or within the system, but never of the system. If "egel had deliberately left room for other philosophers to determine something essential to the self,determination of the system itself, then he could not have legitimately claimed to have completed it. eaving room for infinite later progress of this type would involve a Nbad infiniteN, which would, of course, be unacceptable to "egel. (o return to the earlier construction analogy, one might be said to have finished a house even if it lacked furniture or paint, but not if it was put together without any nails. 7ne could also compare a systematic philosopher to a watchmaker. 2 watchmaker could be said to have finished a watch even if it lacked something like a chain or a wristband or if it was later repaired. 2 watchmaker, however, could not be said to have completed making a watch if he left out the mainspring. 1uch a watch would not tell time; it would not KessentiallyM be a watch at all. It is my position in this internal critiJue that "egelBs system lacks such a mainspring, and that this is a fundamental flaw in its very design. 7ne could still ask BIs sublation really so importantQ Is sublation really what you call a Ndetermining elementNQ IsnBt sublation #ust an ordinary -erman word that "egel happens to useQB 1etting aside, for the sake of argument, that "egel himself insists upon sublationBs importance and its determining character, this ob#ection does make the helpful point that it is of course not necessary for "egel to define logically every term he uses. It would not make any sense, for example, to reJuire "egel to define every word, down to each und, aber, oder, and so forth. (hat such terms are not determined as moments is not problematic because they are not logically determinative; ordinary language alone is not essential to proof. 2gain, it is the determination of all logicall# determinative elements that is reJuired for completenessI

6.< those elements without which no proof could be made. 1o, for "egel, every moment of the system is logically determinative relative to the moment after it; each momentBs contradiction is resolved within it and this resolution simultaneously constitutes that subseJuent moment. In other words, each transition entails a logical determination. (he point of my critiJue is that while the determination of each moment determines the content of each transition, in failing to determine sublation, "egel fails to take into account the full form of those transitions. (he reconciliation of form and content in the science of logic occurs only at the macro,level of the 2bsolute Idea. 2t the micro,level, the operant level of the very mechanism that makes each individual transition possible, no such reconciliation ever occurs and the form of the particular transitions Ki.e. sublationM is never itself a content. Indeed, it could even be argued that such a micro,level resolution would be impossible for "egel. If such a resolution occurred, if sublation were ever itself determined as a moment, then one of two things would result. /ither sublation would function #ust as any other moment and would collapse under its own internal contradictionsIthus establishing "egelBs transitions to be, in a certain sense, false. 7r, sublation would be resolved as true, as the reconciliation of the concept with its ob#ectivity, in which case sublation would be #ust as true as the 2bsolute Idea. &ut in that case, sublation would either actually be the 2bsolute Idea.9 or there would be a truth prior to the 2bsolute Idea, in which case the 2bsolute Idea would itself be unnecessary. In other words, either the 2bsolute Idea is true or sublation is true. &ut if either is false, concept and ob#ectivity are not reconciled and the system is false. (hus, "egelBs

.9

It may seem odd to eJuate sublation with the 2bsolute Idea, but it is necessary to refute the possibility. 1ublation and the 2bsolute Idea are of course distinct. "egel claims that the Nexamples of proofN of sublation occur throughout the logic. (he proof of the 2bsolute Idea, on the other hand, reJuires the complete system as a whole, and is not a proof repeated in every transition. In other words, unlike "egelBs problematic characteriOation of sublation here, the proof of the 2bsolute Idea is not pluralIthere is only one.

6.D ultimately univocal conception of truth precludes his system, by his own definition, from actually being true. (his is a contradiction in the system that is not resolved by it..< (here is one last possible ob#ection. 7ne could argue that B(his is only a few sentences in a massive work. 2renBt you making too much of this one passageQ Is one minor misstatement really sufficient reason to re#ect an entire systemQB %y response to this would be that the passage cited as the basis of this critiJue is only the occasion for a much deeper ob#ection. (his passage only indicates that "egel himself was aware of the problem. (he problem itself runs throughout the entire 'cience of $ogic. It would still have been present even if "egel had been unaware of it, even if he had never mentioned it. 2 problem with sublation is a problem with every logical transition, every determination. (he absence of a determination of sublation means that "egelBs system is not complete, not wholly self, determinate, and not true, according to his own criteria. It is a fundamental flaw at the very heart of the system itself.

.<

2s was explained in $hapter ?, 1ection $, for "egel the system can contain contradictions but it cannot itself be contradictory. 2ll of the contradictions it contains must be resolved at some point in order for the system itself to be true.

6.:

CHAPTER : E%TERNAL CRITI"UE

"aving presented my internal critiJue of "egelBs logic in terms of sublation, I will now offer an external critiJue of it. 'elative to this second critiJue, I take my internal critiJue to have served a propaedeutic function. (hat is, having criticiOed "egelBs logic on internal grounds, I understand this to have laid the groundwork for a broader critiJue. 2n internal critiJue can function in this way insofar as, having re#ected one set of premises on their own terms, a critic might offer an alternative set of premises in their place. In this way, an external critiJue can serve a positive function, where an internal critiJue alone cannot.6 2ccordingly, I begin by first defining what I mean by the term Bexternal critiJueB. In doing so, I hope to suggest the way in which such a critiJue can also be a legitimate one. (his legitimacy differs from the legitimacy of an internal critiJue, but that difference should not in itself preclude the possibility. 5ext, I present my external critiJue of "egelBs logic, again in light of his concept of sublation. 8ltimately, I will show how certain moments cannot be determined by means of a logic of sublation as "egel understands it. (hus, this external critiJue will call into Juestion the foundations of "egelBs logic, albeit in a different and somewhat more controversial way.

A. DEFINITIONS
In contrast to our earlier definition of internal critiJue, we can define an external critiJue as an interpretation that evaluates the relative merits and flaws of a text based on a set of standards not found in the text itself. (raditionally, such a critiJue is seldom, if ever, understood as being worthy of the name. )ant, for example, asserts the superiority of his KinternalM critiJue of pure reason over those approaches which lack this sort of critical

(hat is, on the basis of a prior andLor concomitant internal critiJue. I explain my reasoning on this point below.

6.@ structure, arguing Nthere can, properly speaking, be no polemic of pure reason.N. 3urthermore, )ant argues4
(he critiJue of pure reason can be regarded as the true tribunal for all disputes of pure reason; for it is not involved in these disputes\Idisputes which are immediately concerned with ob#ectsIbut is directed to the determining and estimating of the rights of reason in general, in accordance with the principles of their first institution. In the absence of this critiJue reason is, as it were, in the state of nature, and can establish and secure its assertions and claims only through war. (he critiJue, on the other hand, arriving at all its decisions in the light of fundamental principles of its own institution, the authority of which no one can Juestion, secures to us the peace of a legal order, in which our disputes have to be conducted solely by the recogniOed methods of legal action.;

2ccording to this passage, there are two forms of dispute4 critiJue and polemic, where critiJue is to law as polemic is to war.? $riticism is comparable to law in the sense that the interlocutors share a common set of premises in the same way that opposing litigants would K?ua litigantsM share a recognition of the legitimacy of their own legal system. Polemic is comparable to war because, without a set of premises shared between interlocutors, there is no means to resolve a dispute in a way that is recogniOably legitimate for both parties. 8nder such circumstances, reasonable debate gives way to a struggle of blind assertion, a conflict of mere power or dogmatic authority. In )antBs terms, without the Nlegal orderN of critiJue, disputes occur in a Nstate of natureN. )ant thus sees the structure of an internal critiJue as analogous to that of an institutionaliOed political order Ki.e. of a stateM; polemic is by contrast mere anarchy. I would like to argue, however, that there are circumstances under which such a polemic can have its own legitimacy. In effect, I would like to offer a sort of B#ust war theoryB for polemic.9 In order to avoid confusion, however, I will use the term Bexternal critiJueB to
. ;

$P' 2D9CL&DD: $P' 2D96L&DD@,/2. (he sort of dispute )ant refers to here K\M are speculative disputes about the transcendent, Na dispute about a thing the reality of whichN neither interlocutor can Npresent in actual or even possible experience.N K2D9CL&DD:M I am indebted to "oward $aygill, in his Kant *ictionar# article on Ncritical philosophyN K$aygill, 6;:M for pointing me toward this legal metaphor and the contrast )ant makes to war. ? )ant is obviously playing off the etymology of the term BpolemicB, referring to its -reek root polemos, meaning BwarB. 9 (his B#ust war theoryB will be a necessarily a brief sketch, more of a B#ust war hypothesisB than a proper theory. (he purpose here is of course to establish the grounds of my later remarks on "egel, not to establish a second,

6;C refer to those external critiJues that are Kor can beM legitimate and reserve the term BpolemicB for those critiJues that are external and not legitimate. (he legitimacy of an argument, as we have seen, can be defined by a mutual recognition of a shared set of premises. I would argue that this definition of legitimacy holds regardless of whether one is referring to an internal or external critiJue. "owever, if this definition of legitimacy is maintained, how could an external critiJue ever acJuire such a shared set of premisesQ (he key distinction here is the locus of legitimac#. In an internal critiJue, the common set of premises is shared with the text itself KandLor with apologists for that textM. (he locus of legitimacy is thus found in relation to the text itself. In an external critiJue, on the other hand, the common set of premises is shared with a third party. -iven the earlier claim that all critiJues are essentially public, this third party can be referred to as the audience. (he locus of legitimacy of an external critiJue is thus found not in the criticBs relation to the text, but in relation to the intended audience of his critiJue. (his distinction can be further explained by shifting focus from critiJue to debate. 2s corollaries to these two types of critiJue, one can define two types of debate4 direct debate and indirect debate. In a direct debate, one attempts to convince oneBs interlocutor. In an indirect debate, one still argues with oneBs interlocutors, but the purpose of this argument is instead to convince oneBs audience.< (hus, by combining this distinction with our earlier definition of reasonableness as convincibility,D it is clear how an external critiJue can potentially be a reasonable one. If the mutual recognition of a shared set of premises is necessary for legitimacy, and if such a legitimacy is necessary for reasonableness, then it is not strictly necessary that one share a set of premises with the text per se. (he key reJuirement for legitimacy is that there is a
separate thesis. < Direct and indirect debate are very often two aspects of a single conversation or written exchange. D $hapter <, 1ection 2.

6;6 recognition of a common set of premises, not where that commonality is found. (hus, a critiJue may be recogniOed as legitimate even if it only shares premises with its audience. Whether a critiJue is recogniOed as legitimate depends more on whom the critiJue is directed toward than the nature of the critiJue itself. 7ne possible exception to this could be a certain sort of dogmatic fundamentalist who would only ever accept his or her own interpretation of a single text as the shared set of premises.: 1uch a fundamentalist could only ever recogniOe an internal critiJue of that text as legitimate if it were based on their own interpretation. "owever, this sort of fanatic is more of a logical possibility than a real problem. In order for such fanatics to pose a coherent problem here, not only would they have to derive all their premises Kfor all of their argumentsM from a single text, they would also have to derive their exclusivism from that text as well. 3or example, there are legal theorists in the 8nited 1tatesIso,called Bstrict constructionistsBIthat claim that the only legal principles they will acknowledge as legitimate are those found in the text of the 8.1. $onstitution itself. (he problem, however, is that this strict constructionism is, in the 8.1. $onstitution itself, nowhere to be found.@ In this way, this sort of fundamentalist hermeneutic is Kvery oftenM a sort of performative contradiction. (hus, while there are real people who make such arguments, they are KtypicallyM not internally coherent and thus do not pose a substantial problem. 1o, while it is possible for a certain sort of person to view only one interpretation of one text as the only possible locus of legitimacy, most people have the capacity to recogniOe some sorts of external critiJue as legitimate. (hat is not to say these people would necessarily be willing to recogniOe any critiJue as legitimate, only that there is nearly always some sort of possible common ground available for making one. 2t the very least, one should be able to
:

"ere, the term BfundamentalistB is understood here in a hermeneutical sense, not referring to any particular movement, denomination, or ideology. @ In fact, the 5inth 2mendment specifically precludes such a narrow, exclusivist interpretation, reading4 N(he enumeration in the $onstitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.N (he strict,constructionist claim that the only legal rights citiOens have are enumerated in the text of the $onstitution is contradicted by that very text.

6;. abstract from one their internal premises in order to find a common ground. 3or example, one might argue with a fanatical %arxist that the institutionaliOation of %arxist principles is not the best way to help the poor. While, as a fanatic, such a person is unlikely to agree, there remains in such an appeal the logical possibility of agreement Ki.e. the common ground of wanting to help the poorM, which is the standard that we have stipulated as the minimum criteria for reasonableness.6C Instead of a myopic adherence to a single interpretation of a single text, one might instead insist on the exclusive legitimacy of internal critiJues in general. 8pon reaching this point, however, the dispute becomes merely one of semantics. If such a person were to concede the definitions and reJuirements for internal critiJue stipulated earlier, then he or she would agree with our criteria for legitimacy Ki.e. a shared set of premisesM. If, however, such a person has no particular attachment to a single text, if he or she really is only committed to internal critiJue in general, then the locus of this legitimacy would, by definition, be flexible; that is, multiple common grounds would be available. It would thus be possible for this person to recogniOe an external critiJue as I have defined it here as legitimate. (o put it another way4 I would understand a person who claimed that only internal critiJues Kin generalM were exclusively legitimate to be insisting that critiJues are only legitimate when based on a shared set of premises. In this case, the dispute would no longer be about whether or not commonality is reJuired, but how one defines that commonality. It is in this sense that the difference would be only semantic. If one prefers, the definition of external critiJue could be articulated as a t#pe of internal criti?ue insofar as both are based on a shared set of premises. In other words, an external critiJue is e+ternal to a text, but, if legitimate, still internal to its audience. It is only

6C

(he actual reasonableness of oneBs interlocutor is independently related to oneBs own reasonableness. 3or example, one might offer a set of premises, have the interlocutor accept those premises, then offer a valid argument, and nevertheless be confronted with an interlocutor who refuses to agree. (his interlocutorBs ultimate refusal would not alter the fact that oneBs argument was itself offered on a reasonable basis.

6;; the locus of legitimacy that differs. 2s long as one had no fixed or pre,determined notions of which loci are permissible and impermissible Ke.g. a fixation on a single textM, then there would be no reason one could not Kat least, in principleM acknowledge certain forms of external critiJue as reasonable. $onsider the admittedly hyperbolic example of condemnations of the "olocaust. It would be perverseIin the extremeIto consider such criticisms illegitimate because they did not appeal to a shared set of premises with 5ational 1ocialism. "ere, the premises of the critiJue are shared with the audience, not the opponent. We recogniOe such criticisms as legitimate because we share the Bcommon premiseB of the horror over what occurred. 7n this basis, whether or not the critic finds some sort of internal contradiction within 5aOism itself is completely irrelevant to our recognition of the legitimacy of his or her critiJue. (his is, granted, an extreme case, but it clearly establishes the possibility of a legitimate external critiJue. (o put it another way, if one can recogniOe that a criticism of the horrors of 5aOism need not share principles with 5aOism, then one can recogniOe the possibility that internal critiJue alone is not the only legitimate form of argument.66 'eturning to )antBs political analogy where polemic is considered to be something like war, one could argue that the possibility of a legitimate external critiJue suggests the possibility of something like a #ust war, something akin to the possibility of a right to resistance. If a set of premises is like the legal system of a state, it could be the case that a BstateB is corrupt, non,functional, or otherwise fundamentally flawed. In such cases, it could be that a BstateB needs to be overthrown; that is, that we must begin again from some new set of premises. 8nder these circumstances, it is not the case that one necessarily insists on the abolition of the BstateB as such Ki.e. the abandonment of any principles of reasonableness whatsoeverM, but rather the establishment of a new BstateB. *ust as all revolutionaries are not
66

(he point of this 5aOism example is that it is possible to recogniOe external critiJues as legitimate, not that all cases where an external critiJue might be legitimate necessarily involve such extremity.

6;? necessarily anarchists, the re#ection of the exclusive legitimacy of internal critiJue is not necessarily a re#ection of reasonableness as such. (he purpose of my argument here is not to re#ect reasonableness, but to Juestion the notion that it exists in only one form.6. If one is still uncomfortable with the idea of an external critiJue being called reasonable, one could instead use a term like B#ustifiable polemicB. 2gain, however, this distinction would only be semantic. 2ccording to the definitions that have been stipulated, such a critiJue, if it shares a common ground with its audience, could #ust as well be called reasonable. 3urthermore, I make no attempt here to establish any general principles by which one might distinguish in advance between KillegitimateM polemic and KlegitimateM external critiJue. %y purpose is not to specify some set of criteria upon which one could make the distinction, but only to suggest that such a distinction is possible. (here are at least two problems with this conception of external critiJue that must be addressed before we proceed. 3irst of all, in an external critiJue, shared premises cannot, as shared, be made fully explicit beforehand. 8nlike the case of internal critiJue, this would be impossible by definition. 2n interlocutor might make his own premises explicit, but an audience K?ua audienceM cannot. If a member of the audience were to do so, he or she would step forward and become an interlocutor. 2ccordingly, the shared premises in an external critiJue always begin as something implicit. In this sense, an interlocutor can never be fully certain that his premises are shared by a given audience. (his can sometimes lead to confusion, arguing at cross purposes, the appearance of unreasonableness, and so forth. (his possibility leads us to a second, closely related problem. In an external critiJue, since the commonality of its premises can only ever be implicit, its reasonableness is, at the outset, only ever hypothetical. (hat is, while an interlocutor might state his or her premises explicitly and in great detail, whether or not these premises are shared cannot be determined
6.

I should also point out that, like )antBs comparison between polemic and war, the analogy between external critiJue and revolution is also a hyperbole. 2n external critiJue need not be BrevolutionaryB in order to be legitimate.

6;9 with any certainty beforehand. 2s we saw in our discussion of internal critiJue, reasonableness reJuires only potential agreement.6; "owever, the possibility of agreement in an external critiJue is different. 7ffering an internal critiJue, an interlocutor, having based his or her argument on the premises of the text itself, knows that the possibility of agreement exists Ki.e. the possibility itself is known.M With an internal critiJue, an interlocutor may not know whether or not his audience agrees with him, but he can know whether such agreement is possible. When offering an external critiJue, however, the interlocutor cannot be certain that even the possibility of agreement exists Ki.e. the possibility itself is unknown.M With an external critiJue, not only would an interlocutor not know if his audience would accept his premises, he would not even know, initially, if they could. (o put the point more succinctly4 the distinction here between the legitimacy of an internal critiJue versus an external critiJue is between a known possibility and an unknown possibility. (hese two points present a serious difficulty for the possibility of a legitimate external critiJue. If the reasonableness of oneBs argument is only ever implicit or hypothetical, then how can one distinguish between a legitimate external critiJue and a mere polemicQ 2nalogically speaking, making an external critiJue could easily be like arguing with silence, shouting into an abyss, or tossing a message in a bottle into the sea, addressed to no one. 2n external critiJue could easily become a performative contradiction, an incoherent, purposeless argument.6? (he desire to avoid this risk might seem like a very good motive to insist upon internal critiJue exclusively. In his argument for a critical philosophy, )ant himself makes much the same point.69 (here is, however, a solution to this basic problemIa way to conceive of external critiJues as being something more than a hollow gesture. What if the hypothetical common
6; 6?

1ee $hapter <, 1ection 2. It should be noted that performative contradiction is a problem for the coherence of arguments, not the meaning of statements. Irony, for example, entails a performative contradiction Kbetween the literal and intended meaningM, but from this it does not follow that ironic statements are therefore meaningless. 69 1ee the context surrounding the passage cited in note ; at the beginning of this chapter.

6;< ground of oneBs external critiJue was something like a scientific hypothesisQ ooking at in this way, one could test the hypothesis in the act of offering the critiJue itself. While it would not be possible to establish the common ground in advance, it would be possible to verify the commonality of the ground after the fact, through the nature of the response the argument receives. If one offers an external critiJue and it elicits internal critiJues of itself in response, then the original critiJue was probably reasonable; that is, the audience probably found some sort of common ground with the critiJue, something they recogniOed as being worthy of a response. If the critiJue elicits no response Ke.g. blank staresM, or no arguments in response Ke.g. N(hatBs absurd]N, N>ouBre an idiot.NM, then it probably did not find any common ground with its audience. *ust because the reasonableness of an external critiJue cannot be known in advance does not necessarily mean it cannot be known at all. 1o why go to all this troubleQ If external critiJues are only legitimate if they develop into internal critiJues Ki.e. direct debatesM, then they are merely potential internal critiJues. If this is the case, why should one not insist on actual internal critiJues aloneQ While external critiJues may seem like a less reliable means of making oneBs case, they do offer at least one advantage. 2n internal critiJue, in and of itself, cannot offer anything fundamentally new. If the premises of a given text are the only ones available for any reflection on that text, then no progress beyond that text is ultimately possible. Instead, one remains forever born back into the past. In this sense, an exclusive insistence upon internal critiJue alone has an essentially conservative bias.6< It is, in effect, an un#ustified presupposition, the assumption that the only thing of importance is the text at hand and that no new beginning could not possibly offer anything of value. (o explain better what I mean here, I can offer a simple example. "annah 2rendtBs $ectures on KantGs Political Philosoph#@P has often been accused of misunderstanding )antBs
6<

I mean BconservativeB here in a historical, rather than an ideological sense. 2n exclusive insistence on internal critiJue alone is not, to my knowledge, the sole provenance of any one political faction. 6D "annah 2rendt, $ectures on KantGs Political Philosoph# K8niversity of $hicago, 6@@.M.

6;D concept of #udgment.6: 1uch criticism assumes that the only possible purpose in thinking about )ant would be )ant scholarship, i.e., the historical study of )ant as an end in itself. &ut what if the end were not the study of )ant, but the study of #udgmentQ If one focused exclusively only on what )ant said about #udgment, one could never say anything new about it. In relying on internal critiJue alone, regardless of the content of oneBs claims, these claims would always remain fundamentally )antian. 5o matter how much these claims differed from )antBs own position, they would remain expressed in )antian terms. 2rendt opts instead to speak not in )antBs voice but in her own. I must confess it makes little sense to me to interpret the act of finding oneBs own voice as if it were something unreasonable. 3urthermore, I should add that this argument for the potential legitimacy of an external critiJue is not a call for something like a new methodology, or worse, an BetiJuette guideB for polite debating. 'ather, it is a description of what happens, performatively, when one debates Ia structure already embedded in philosophy and its history, not a new structure to be imposed upon it. Well,received external critiJues Ki.e. legitimate ones, those that eventually find some common ground and do not remain mere polemicsM are an essential aspect of progress in philosophy. (hey are necessary for the transition from one paradigm to another.6@ (o refer to the 2rendt example4 it is by virtue of a sort of BmisreadingB.C that we recogniOe a thinker like 2rendt as not simply a )antian or a "eideggerian, but a thinker in her own right. Progress, in whatever discipline or period, reJuires #ust this sort of externality..6
6:

3or a discussion of such interpretations, see, for example, 2nnelies Degryse, N'ensus :ommunis as the Inner 2wareness of Plurality4 2 Different Interpretation of "annah 2rendtHs $ectures on Kant<s Political Philosoph#N, Philosoph# and 'ocial :riticism ;9 K.C6C, forthcomingM. 6@ (he notion of a Bparadigm shiftB in philosophy is problematic here. (he two main difficulties are 6M philosophy by its very nature does not en#oy the same sort of consensus as exists in, say, physics and .M I offer nothing like )uhnBs historical argument on which properly to base such a claim. 1uffice it to say, this reference to Bparadigm shiftsB in philosophy is only a loose analogy, not a specific historical claim. 3or a detailed account of the concept of paradigm shift, see (homas )uhn, !he 'tructure of 'cientific 7evolutions K8niversity of $hicago, 6@<.M. .C (his argument is an adaptation of that found in "arold &loomBs An+iet# of &nfluence K7xford, 6@D.M. &loom argues there that each new BstrongB poet achieve his own voice by, in effect, BmisreadingB his predecessor. (his BmisreadingB is not simply a mistake, but rather serves a positive function. It opens the space for the emergence of a new voice. "ere, I have simply generaliOed &loomBs argument from poets to philosophers. .6 I offer no Juantitative evaluation here. &y BprogressB I simply mean Bforward in timeB, not necessarily better or worse.

6;: 'elative to this progress, internal and external critiJue serve a sort of complementary function. 2n internal critiJue is a necessary first step in order to understand any aspect of the history of ideas or any past vocabulary. 2t the same time, an internal critiJue can serve as a propaedeutic to an external one insofar as a successful internal critiJue can suggest that a new vocabulary might be helpful or even reJuired. It is in this sense that an internal critiJue can open the space for an external one... (his is also why I have gone to such lengths, in the context of a work on "egel, to make my more general methodological reasoning clear and explain in detail my understanding of internal and external critiJue. In addition to the need to make my premises as explicit as possible, and thus minimiOe the risk posed by potential sources of misunderstanding, I also needed to clarify the premises underlying my understanding of the nature of argument as such. &y offering not only my arguments about "egel but also my reasons for making them in this way, it is my hope that they will be received in the spirit that they are intended. In particular, my purpose in this section has been to make as clear as possible that in offering an external critiJue, it is not my goal simply to assert my own views alone, but to offer something constructive within the context of and in combination with my earlier internal critiJue. (o that end, I will now offer my external critiJue of "egelBs concept of sublation. %y hope is that my appeal to a certain set of experiences and an understanding of those experiences will at least be recogniOable to my readers. 2nd though this critiJue is not itself offered on wholly internal "egelian grounds, I hope that there is at least the possibility that they might be recogniOed as legitimate ones nevertheless.

..

While I have tried in this study to offer both, an internal critiJue can #ust as easily open the space for an external critiJue when these arguments are made by different individuals. (heir complementary structure need not hinge on there being made by the same person. In fact, historically speaking, it seems Juite clear that it does not.

6;@

B. ANALYSIS
I will now present what one might call a BphenomenologicalB critiJue of "egelBs logic in terms of sublation. (o begin with, we can define phenomenology here as the analysis of experience, as something distinct from knowledge. (hat is to say, in this conception of phenomenology, experiences are taken to have their own validity, irreducible to anything like their correspondence with reality or their determination as knowledge. (ake pain, for example. 7ne cannot only imagine that one is in pain. (he experience of pain may or may not correspond to any in#ury, but the experience itself exists regardless of whether or not there is any known underlying physical cause. 2s an experience, a headache is still a headache, whether it is psychosomatic or the result of physical trauma. (he subseJuent determination of whether a headache is psychosomatic or the result of a physical trauma would be a matter of knowledge. Phenomenology in this sense addresses experience not epistemologically, as a source for knowledge, but in its own terms. (his is clearly not "egelBs own use of the term BphenomenologyB. "ere, we are not concerned with the appearances of spirit or of consciousness in general, but with consciousness more narrowly considered in terms of ordinary sub#ective experience. (his narrowed focus has more in common with the "usserlian conception of phenomenology. ike "usserl, we are not concerned with the empirical study of contingently sub#ective experience, but with the essence of such experiences. 8nlike "usserl, we are not concerned with these experiences for their own sake, but with the use of them as examples or illustrations in order to understand better the broader implications of "egelBs logic. (he purpose here is not to understand experience per se, but to use experience as a means to understand logic. Importantly, this conception of phenomenology is utterly distinct from an appeal to something like an abstract common sense. (he purpose is not to invoke what Beveryone knowsB about this or that particular experience in vague terms, but to analyOe such experiences

6?C in order to determine something concrete and essential about their structure. In "egelian terms, the appeal to experience in phenomenology here is not the appeal to something immediate, but to something mediated. In this sense, phenomenology as it is defined here can also be understood as Bthe logic of experienceB. %ore specifically, I want to analyOe this logic of experience in terms of "egelBs concept of sublation. 3or "egel, knowledge reJuires determination and determination reJuires sublation. (herefore, according to "egel, all possible ob#ects of knowledge must be determinable in some way by sublation. It will be my contention, however, that there are certain forms of experience that can at the same time be known and yet cannot be properly determined via sublation in this way. (he key distinction here is between knowledge, defined as the consciousness of a determinate ob#ect, and experience, defined as a form of consciousness indifferent to the determination of its ob#ect. Importantly, that experience Kas it is defined hereM is indifferent to the determination of its ob#ect does not necessarily mean that it is completely indeterminable. In order to explain this layered conception of determination, consider the following example. Pretend that I donBt know the capital of 8Obekistan. (he capital of 8Obekistan would be Kcontingently, for meM indeterminate. In this case, such indeterminacy would indicate a lack of knowledge. 2t the same time, I would still have an experience of this indeterminacy Ki.e. the experience of ignoranceM. (his ignorance would notIas a form of e+perienceInecessarily be wholly indeterminate, since the experience itself would be a possible ob#ect of knowledge. It would still be possible for me to know the fact that I donBt know. 2s such, experiences themselves Kwhether or not their ob#ects are determinateM can still be KdeterminateM ob#ects of knowledge. (o render this more formally4 NI donBt know K+=N is an indeterminate statement; NI know KI donBt know +MN is a determinate one. In other words, a first,order indeterminacy does not necessarily entail a second,order indeterminacy.

6?6 3ollowing on this example, if I were asked NWhat is the capital of 8ObekistanQN I could offer three possible types of responses..;
6M N(ashkent.N Ki.e. a correct, certain responseM .M NDushanbeQN Ki.e. an incorrect, uncertain responseM ;M NI donBt know.N Ki.e. an indeterminate but certain responseM

In the first case, there is a first,order determination of the ob#ect and thus knowledge of the ob#ect. (here is also a second,order determination of the experience, the experience of knowing the correct answer. (he first answer is a complete determination and thus indicates knowledge. In the second case, there is no first,order determination and thus no knowledge, because the answer is incorrect. 3urthermore, there is no second,order determination of the experience, because I donBt know whether my answer is correct. (his second answer is a complete indetermination and thus entails no knowledge whatsoever. In the third case, however, while there is no first,order determination Kbecause I donBt know the answer to the JuestionM, there is a second,order determination. (he third answer is thus an incomplete determination. "ere, there is no knowledge of the ob#ect but there is knowledge of the experience Ki.e. knowledge of oneBs own ignoranceM. It is the structure of this third answer that we are most interested in here. 7f course, this 8Obekistan example only concerns something contingent. ogic, on the other hand, concerns what is necessary. If we are to examine the logic of experience properly, we must consider this same structure on the level of necessity. (hat is, we must now examine those experiences whose ob#ects are not merely contingently indeterminate, but necessarily indeterminate. Without even the possibility of determination, the ob#ects of such experiences would not be merely contingently unknown but necessarily unknowable. (his unknowability can also be referred to as transcendence..?
.;

(here are of course other possible responses Ke.g. N(ashkentQN, an uncertain but correct response, or NDushanbe.N, a certain but incorrect responseM, but an exhaustive exploration of the alternative logical possibilities is not necessary to illustrate the basic claim being made here. .? (his definition stems from the modern, )antian definition of the transcendent, as that which passes beyond the limits of possible KdeterminateM experience. 1ee $P' 2.@<L&;9;.

6?.

Remark: On Transcen"ence
7ne important point needs to be made before we can proceed. I cannot emphasiOe enough that the concept of transcendence presented here is a logical concept, not a metaphysical one. 3or the purposes of my argument, I have no interest in the Juestion of the existence of any transcendent contentKsM. 'ather, the issue at hand is the structure or the form of transcendence in general. 2 logic of transcendence would apply regardless of the existence or non,existence of any possible content. %oreover, I should stress that my personal religious beliefs are irrelevant to my argument here. In fact, I have deliberately framed the issue here BagnosticallyB, specifically in order to exclude possible religious andLor denominational conflicts and misunderstandings. If transcendence is defined as unknowability, then neither believers nor atheists would have any logical grounds Kon this basisM for metaphysical knowledge claims about the existence or non, existence of the divine. (hus, whether one does or does not recogniOe my claims about transcendence as legitimate is in no way dependent upon whether one shares my beliefs. (his is an external critiJue of "egelBs logic, but not a denominational one, and is thus still in principle accessible to everyone, i.e. reasonable. WWWW (he fundamental basis for my analysis of the logic of Kthe experience ofM transcendence is the distinction made earlier between first, and second,order determination..9 2ccording to the stipulated definition, a first,order determination of transcendence is impossible; it is by definition unknowable. 3urthermore, it is not simply contingently but necessarily precluded. 2s we saw earlier, however, a first,order indeterminacy does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a second,order determination. While one cannot have knowledge of a transcendent content, it would nevertheless be possible to have an e+perience

.9

(hat is, in the B8Obekistan exampleB presented above.

6?; of transcendence. 3urthermore, one could have knowledge of the form of that experience..< I could know that I experienced something without knowing what it was. (hus, while I may not be able to determine the ob#ect of such an experience, I could determine the nature of the experience itself.

Phenomenological #*am(les
In order to illustrate what I mean here, I will now present a few phenomenological examples of experiences of transcendence. I should note at the outset that none of these examples refer to anything supernatural. 'ather, they represent mundane examples of transcendence from within ordinary, everyday human experience. (his may, at first, seem paradoxical, but the meaning and import should become clear as we proceed.

1. n*iety
7ne example of an experience of transcendence is anxiety. In anxiety, one feels uneasy, without knowing the specific ob#ect of oneBs unease. (his definition of anxiety is distinct from fear, where one does know the ob#ect of oneBs unease..D 2nxiety is an experience of transcendence, according to my terms, because the ob#ect is not simply indeterminate, but indeterminable; it is not simply unknown, but unknowable. It is necessarily unknowable in the sense that if the ob#ect of unease were known, it would not be anxiety but fear..: In order to clarify this distinction, we can consider the following example. Imagine that a doctor gives a patient a drug that induces anxiety. (his anxiety would have a cause Ki.e. the drugM but not an ob#ect; that is, there would not necessarily be anything toward which the patient directs his unease. Indeed, since the cause of such anxiety would be physiological
.< .D

(hat is, a knowledge of Kthe experience of transcendenceM. (hese definitions are of course adapted from "eidegger. 1ee %artin "eidegger, NWhat is %etaphysicsQN >artin 6eidegger% Basic 0ritings, trans. David 3arrell )rell K'outledge, 6@D:M, 6CC. .: (hat is to say, it is necessarily unknowable in terms of the essence of the experience itself. /mpirically speaking, one might come to know the source of oneBs anxiety Ke.g. through psychotherapyM, but in that case, the anxiety Jua anxiety would cease to be present. In fact, this elimination of anxiety would be the entire purpose of such therapy. (hus, when I say here that anxiety is necessarily unknowable, I mean this in a phenomenological and not empirical sense.

6?? rather than psychological or environmental, any fixation on a particular ob#ect would be a post facto rationaliOation or cathexis. It is in this sense that anxiety, in its essence, has no determinate ob#ect. If it is possible to feel anxious without feeling anxious about something, then it follows that a determinate ob#ect is not a necessary, essential aspect the experience itself. In other words, this lack of an ob#ect in anxiety is not something merely contingent. It is not that anxiety might not have a determinate ob#ect, but that, as anxiety, it cannot. (o reinforce the point further, we can also distinguish between the experience of anxiety and the fear of the unknown. In the fear of the unknown, the ob#ect of oneBs unease happens to be unknown, but is not therefore unknowable. If I hear a noise downstairs at night, I might be frightened but I can get out of bed and check. If I found a burglar, the ob#ect of my fear would become the burglar. If I found nothing, my fear would dissipate. In either case, what had been indeterminate would become determined. In anxiety, on the other hand, there is in effect nothing to check, nothing to determine. If there were, the experience would not be, or would cease to be, one of anxiety. (o ascribe or determine an ob#ect to anxiety is to falsify the experience itself, to misunderstand or misrepresent what anxiety is..@ (herefore, phenomenologically speaking, anxiety is essentially an experience of transcendenceIan experience not of the unknown, but the unknowable.

2. Tr$st
2 second example of an experience of transcendence is trust. (rust can be defined as a belief in the truthfulness or responsibility of another person. If I trust someone, I believe that they are telling the truth or will do what they promise. Importantly, trust is a belief essentially

.@

7nce again, this is what anxiety is phenomenologically speaking, Jua experience. (his is not a claim about the psychology of anxiety Ke.g. its causesM, or its physiology Ke.g. its physical effects, at the biological levelM, but rather a claim about the nature of the experience itself. *ust as we saw with the example of pain from the beginning of this section, one cannot Bonly imagineB one is anxious. =ua experience, the causes are irrelevant to determining the essence of anxiety Kor, in fact, of any other experience as experienceM.

6?9 without certainty. If I were to attempt to determine with certainty whether someone was telling the truth or had fulfilled a promise, then I would by definition not trust him or her. Insofar as trust lacks determination in this way, trust and Kfirst,orderM knowledge can be said to be mutually exclusive. It is, of course, not the case that the truthfulness or responsibility of a person are, in themselves, indeterminable. 'ather, they are indeterminable as trust. 7ne cannot both trust another person and, at the same time, be completely certain of their statements or actions. If I trust someone, an attempt to determine their trustworthiness would undermine that trust. In more formal terms, any determination of the ob#ect Ki.e. the trustworthiness of the person in JuestionM undermines the experience Ki.e. the experience of trusting that personM. 2s with anxiety, trust is an experience that is abolished by a complete determination of its ob#ect. (his is even easier to see in the example of trust, because its negation does not simply transform it into another experience KfearM, but into its opposite KdistrustM. In addition, empirically speaking, it is not the case that trust is essentially something na_ve. (o the contrary, trust is an essential aspect of many social relationships. Without it, such relationships can break down or disappear altogether. 3or example, if I visit my friendsB house and they offer to take my coat and hang it up, I let them take it because there is a basic level of trust between us. If, on the other hand, I keep my coat and other possessions with me at all times and assume that they would rob me if given the opportunity, they probably arenBt my friends; in this case, the relationship of friendship would not exist. 5or is social trust exclusive to interpersonal relationships. 7ther social relationships, relationships between persons and groups, relationships with institutions and so on, are eJually dependent on trust. 3or example, if I put my money in a bank, I trust that the bank in Juestion will be able to return my money later. If enough people cease to believe this, there is a run on the bank; people withdraw their money and the bank collapses. (he very existence of such an institution

6?< is dependent upon the trust of its customers.;C In this sense, trust is essential to any number of social phenomena. 7n an interpersonal level, the complete absence of trust in others would not be a personality trait of cunning or intelligence. It would not be a matter of thoroughgoing and complete knowledge; rather, it would manifest itself as a dysfunctional paranoia. In the case of trust, one can see that there is such a thing as too much certainty or too much determination. In effect, sometimes the unknowable is itself something necessary. %oreover, trust understood as an experience of transcendence demonstrates the manner in which such experiences are not necessarily ephemeral, incidental, or merely mystical but something essential to our everyday life. (his also suggests that a logic that is incapable of evaluating such experiences in their own terms may be, in some cases, too limited or even undesirable in a broadly philosophical sense.

3. Ho(e
7ur last example of an experience of transcendence will be hope. "ope can be defined as the desire for some future outcome.;6 5ow, the future as such is by definition unknowable. 2t the moment it can be determined with any certainty, it has already become the present. (herefore, the future can be understood as something transcendent; and in the same sense, an experience of the future like hope can be understood as an experience of transcendence.;. *ust because we cannot know the future, however, does not mean that we have no experience of it. 7ur hopes Kor despairM about the future shape our actions in the present. I go
;C

3rancis 3ukuyama, in his book !rust, discusses the importance of trust in these sorts of social relationships, specifically as they pertain to economics. 3rancis 3ukuyama, !rust% the 'ocial 1irtues and the :reation of Prosperit# K3ree Press, 6@@9M. ;6 7r, alternatively, the belief that some positive outcome will occur. 3or the purposes of this example, however, and having already addressed belief under BtrustB, I will here focus on hope in this more narrow sense of this desire. ;. In relation to the future, the experience of despair Kas hopelessnessM would have a similar fundamental structure. (his is worth noting that if transcendence is defined as unknowability, and experiences like anxiety and despair are experiences of transcendence, then such experiences are not necessarily something fundamentally good or positive. &y keeping this in mind, one can better conceptualiOe the logic of transcendence as something Baccessible to allB, and distinct from any particular denomination or ideology.

6?D to work because I hope to get paid; I buy food because I plan to eat it. 2 person who followed the slogan Blive in the momentB too literally would barely be able to function. &eing unable to plan or delay gratification in any way, he would resemble an animal more than a man. Insofar as they shape our actions in the present, our feelings about the future are an experience of a content of which we can have no knowledge. In other words, the future determines us without itself being determinable. Insofar as the future continually becomes the present, there is a tension between a hope about the future and its eventual realiOation Kor non,realiOationM in the present. 7ne cannot have some hope for the future and at the same time have that hope realiOed. 7nce it is realiOed, it is no longer a hope; the two are, in their essence, mutually exclusive. 5ow, one might well argue that given the choice between hope and its realiOation, one ought to prefer the latter. Indeed, "egel makes much the same point.;; "owever, the notion that it is somehow better to have realiOation than hope is, I think, only half,correct. It is not simply this or that realiOation that matters, but also the very experience of hope itself. Without hope for the future we could take no action and make no plans. Whether or not a particular hope is realiOed is inessential to whether we act or plan, precisely because we do not know when we take the action or make the plan whether it will actually work. In this sense, in its effect on our present actions, the experience of hope has its own significance, irrespective of its eventual realiOation Kor non,realiOationM. (he significance of hope in this sense can be explained in more detail by looking at the psychological phenomena of learned helplessness.;? In learned helplessness, one becomes less likely to take action because of repeated experiences of failure Kof that action, or of action in generalM. 2 common example is that of an elephant in the circus. When the elephant first

;; ;?

P'6<9; "WDL?6<,?6D. (his concept was first introduced through the research of 2merican psychologists %artin 1eligman and 1teve %aier in the late 6@<Cs and early 6@DCs. 3or a detailed survey of the concept, see $hristopher Peterson and %artin 1eligman, $earned 6elplessness% A !heor# for the Age of Personal :ontrol K7xford, 6@@9M.

6?: comes to the circus, he is bound with a thick metal chain. (he elephant struggles against the chain, but cannot break free. /ventually, after repeated failures to escape, the elephant stops trying. (he metal chain is eventually replaced with a simple rope. (he elephant still does not try to escape, because from its repeated failures it has learned that its struggles are useless. In this example, we see how hope itself has its own significance irrespective of its realiOation. It is the lack of hope, not a lack of strength, that keeps the elephant bound. 2 lack of hope inhibits any realiOation of escape, of freedom.;9 "ope has its own significance irrespective of its realiOation because hope itself is very often a precondition for any possible realiOation. "egelBs preference for realiOation over hope is based on sound motives. "egel rightly points out that to offer only hope, in lieu of its realiOation, and always promising but never delivering would be oppressive. "egel presents an alternative between a religion that offers only hope for the future Knever realiOedM and Khis own conception ofM religious hope as reconciled with, or realiOed in, the present. "egel offers his reconciliation as a means to defend religion against criticisms based on the first conception. "owever, what "egelBs defense leaves out is a third alternative, wherein religious hope is not merely a de facto facilitator of oppression but a source for positive change. 3or example, the movement to abolish slavery in the 8nited 1tates in the nineteenth century was primarily motivated by religious concerns; the abolitionists had the hope that they could eliminate slavery. Without such hope, no efforts to actually get rid of slavery could have taken place. $onceiving of the issue as being limited to a choice between hope or realiOation ignores the role that hope itself, as an experience, plays in realiOation. If one is to realiOe oneBs hopes, then hope is itself a necessary first condition. In this sense, the relationship between hope and its realiOation is con#unctive KbothLandM not dis#unctive KeitherLorM.

;9

In human beings, learned helplessness is associated with clinical depression, characteriOed, among other things, by this very same inability to act.

6?@ 2t the same time, as hope, its realiOation is never determinable4 always potential, never actual. (he experience of hope, the experience that shapes our actions, that makes the realiOation of our hopes possible, is itself the experience of something indeterminable. (he realiOation of a hoped for outcome determines and at the same time abolishes the experience of hope. In its realiOation, hope is negated but not preserved. In this sense, hope could not be sublated and at the same time properly determined as an experience in its own right. WWWW "aving examined these three experiences of transcendence Kanxiety, trust, and hope;<M, we can now address their broader significance for "egelBs concept of sublation. (he purpose of presenting these examples is to test the concept of sublation, in order to see how a logic of sublation might function within a certain logic of experience Knamely, this conception of phenomenologyM. 2s we have seen, determinations within "egelBs logic necessarily entail sublation. &ut what if one applied this sort of determination to the sort of moments that have #ust been discussedQ What would the results beQ;D 2t first glance, sublation and transcendence would seem to be mutually exclusive concepts; that is, one could not have both transcendence and sublation. Insofar as transcendence is unknowable it is indeterminable; it could not be determined in itself by sublation. 7n the other hand, for "egel, it is not any transcendent content that must be sublated, but the contradiction between its determinacy and indeterminacy. 3or "egel, of course, such a contradiction could indeed be sublated, resolved as a later moment; in this case,

;<

(hese are by no means the only possible examples of experiences of transcendence, experiences which determine us by are not themselves determinable. 7ther examples might include wonder, mystery, surprise, desire, laughter, and so forth. 3or a discussion of such topics, especially in their relation to "egel, see, for example Kon laughterM, William Desmond, Be#ond 6egel and *ialectic K185>, 6@@.M, .D;,.:6. ;D It is important to note here that this test does not represent the conversion of "egelBs logic into some sort of formal method, that could be applied to this or that content irrespective of the whole. 'ather, the purpose of these phenomenological examples is #ust their utility as e+amples. (his is means their utility for analyOing the topic of logic, not a discussion of a separate topic Kin this case, phenomenologyM in itself. (his is also the reason I have referred to my usage of phenomenology here as Bthe logic of experienceBIto make this relationship clearer.

69C any given transcendent moment would be negated Kin its unknowabilityM and preserved Kas a moment that is now in a certain sense knownM. If, in the face of such an argument, one were to insist nevertheless on the coherence of a logic of transcendence, one might anticipate the counterargument that B(his is not philosophy.B 3or "egel, philosophy is defined as being strictly concerned with knowledge Ki.e. that which is determinableM. (herefore, according to "egel, transcendence could not be a sub#ect matter of philosophy, strictly speaking, except as an error to be overcome. 2ssuming for the sake of argument that this definition of philosophy does not constitute an instance of petitio principii, that defining in advance what is and is not philosophy does not constitute an assumption about the conclusion regarding what is and is not philosophy, one could nevertheless press the Juestion4 wh# would transcendence not be a proper sub#ect matter for philosophyQ In order to address this Juestion, we must go back to "egelBs own conception of what we have called here BtranscendenceB. When "egel refers to this concept, he often uses the term Censeits. 2s a preposition, the term means BbeyondB or BacrossB. 2s a noun, it means Bthe &eyondB, in the sense of Bthe "ereafterB or B)ingdom $omeB.;: "egel further eJuates this concept with the infinite in the sense of the Nbad infiniteN Kschlechte .nendlichkeitM. (he bad infinite is an infinite that is conceived to be beyond the finite or beyond determination. 3or "egel such a beyond is self,contradictory, because BbeyondB is itself a determination.;@ (hus, transcendence, taken as a BbeyondB Ki.e. as a transcendent contentM, is eJually self, contradictory.?C
;:

(hus, Censeits does not simply have a prepositional or logical sense; it also has strong religious andLor metaphysical connotations. ;@ 2n BindeterminateB infinite defined simply as the opposite of the BdeterminateB finite is itself determined by this opposition. ?C "egelBs use of the term B6inausgehenB can also be taken to refer to transcendence Ke.g. as in %illerBs translationM, but this is in a different sense than I have used the term here. 6inausgehen is used in reference to transcendence conceived of not as a content, but an act4 Bto transcendB, or more literally Bto go out beyondB. In /nglish, the term by itself can be used to mean Bto surpassB, Bto exitB or Bto departB. (he term can be used in reference to the act of transcending a limit Ke.g. 1 6?.; "W9L699M or the logical BsurpassingB of one moment by the next. In this sense, it is roughly similar to sublation, insofar as sublation is the particular form through which this BsurpassingB is carried out. K"owever, while this BelevationB is achieved through sublation but is not itself a

696 (he bad infinite is contrasted by "egel with the Ntrue infiniteN Kwahrhafte .nendlichkeitM.?6 (he true infinite is that infinite wherein the infinite is not conceived as simply other than or distinct from the finite, but the negation of the finite. (hus, given the nature of negation for "egel Ki.e. negation as determinationM, the true infinite is in effect the sublation of the finite, or more precisely, the sublation of the opposition between the finite and the infinite. (he determination of the finite by the infinite is no less a determination of the infinite by the finite. (his determination is thus not the determination of any Binfinite contentB, but of infinity as such, the form of infinity. In the sublation of the contradiction between the finite and the infinite, the contradiction of their separation is resolved as a later moment. "egelBs resolution of this particular contradiction is strikingly similar to the first,orderL second,order distinction we discussed earlier. In fact, the underlying structure is identical for any such resolution. 2 given moment Kmoment AM is shown to contain a contradiction. (he contradiction is then negated and the elements of it are preserved, via sublation, in the transition to the later moment Kmoment BM. In terms of the distinction we have introduced, A is a first,order statement and B is a second,order statement. (he indeterminacy of the first, order Kthe contradiction within AM is subordinate to the determinacy of the second,order Kits resolutionLdetermination as BM. In this way, a determination is made, but never from within the moment itself. (he determination is only present for a BlaterB Ksecond,orderM moment. 3ormulated in this way, "egel would KhypotheticallyM be able to recogniOe such a first, orderLsecond,order distinction in knowledge, since it is #ust such a distinction that makes his own resolutions of contradictions possible. If "egelBs logic would be able to admit such a distinction, then why would an e+perience of transcendence be excluded as a possible sub#ect matter for philosophyQ (he
part of sublation, as we have seen in $hapter 6, 1ection 2M. Despite the risk of potential confusion, I have used the term BtranscendenceB here as an umbrella term, referring to the general characteristics of the various types of Bbad infiniteB, Binfinite progressB, Bthe beyondB, and so on Ki.e. their indeterminacy as BbeyondB determinationM. 1uch a BgenericB concept was necessary in order to make my later arguments more clear and succinct. "owever, since this is a generic use of the term BtranscendenceB, it should not be taken in any strictly "egelian sense. ?6 1 6?:; "W9L6<;.

69. relationship between an experience of transcendence and a transcendent content is homologous Ki.e. identical in structureM to the relationship between the true infinite and the bad infinite. (he experience of transcendence and the true infinite are both second,order determinations of an indeterminable content Ka transcendent content or a bad infinite, respectivelyM. 1o, if the second,order determination of the true infinite functions as a resolution of the contradiction of the bad infinite, then it would seem as if an analysis of the experience of transcendence could fulfill the same function for transcendenceIthat it would not be determinable in itself as a content, but that it would be determinable as an experience in its form. It does not seem to be the case that "egel himself would admit such a parallel. (he coexistence of indeterminacy and determinacy in the bad infinite is cited as the contradiction that must be resolved within it; what makes it BbadB is that it is taken to be both indeterminate, in itself, and determinate, as something standing over and against the finite. 2t the same time, the sublation of the opposition between the bad infinite and the finite is what constitutes the true infinite. In this sublation, however, the BbadB infinite is not really preserved but destroyed; the content is not taken to have something like its own limited validity within a certain sphere, but is instead dismissed as an error. (he transcendence of the bad infinite is thus eliminated. 7n the other hand, given our analysis of the logic of the experience of transcendence, we can see how the first,orderLsecond,order distinction suggests that such a dismissal is not strictly necessary. (he form of an experience of indeterminacy is itself determinable, irrespective of the determination Kor even determinabilityM of its content. $ontrary to "egelBs own position, however, it is logically possible to sublate the opposition between the transcendent and the non,transcendent in such a way that it preserves Kthat it sublates and thus does not simply eliminateM transcendence itself. (ranscendence can be negated as an ob#ect of knowledge, but preserved as an ob#ect of experience. &y taking the experience as the ob#ect of

69; a second,order knowledge, transcendence itself can be sublatedInegated as a possible ob#ect of knowledge but nevertheless preserved as an ob#ect of experience.?. "egelBs own formulation cannot account for such a sublation. 3or "egel, all possible ob#ects of experience Ki.e. of consciousness, of thoughtM must be determinable, as either error or truth. Without such determinability, truth itself, as the ultimate reconciliation of form with content, would be impossible. 8nder these conditions, the possibility of knowledge would, according to "egel, collapse into skepticism. 3or "egel, any persistence of transcendence as anything other than an error to be completely negated would leave open the possibility of such a collapse. 2n experience of transcendence, as an experience of unknowability, would have Kto put it in another vocabularyM no truth,value. 2s unknowable, transcendence would not be determinable as either true or false. If, however, such an indeterminacy were sublated in the manner described, then one could have knowledge of an experience that is not itself reducible to knowledge; a gap would remain between form and content and their ultimate reconciliation as a system would be impossible. (he system would not be complete. 2t the same time, the sublation of transcendence as the experience of transcendence is possible, given "egelBs own conception of determination. (he same first,orderLsecond,order distinction that allows "egel to resolve contradictions in his system also leaves open the possibility of the impossibility of such a system. (herefore, "egelBs logic simultaneously cannot and yet must accept such a first,orderLsecond,order distinction. If "egel was to re#ect the possibility of the sublation of transcendence Kas the experience of transcendenceM, then he would be forced to re#ect the very form of determination KsublationM that makes the ultimate reconciliation of his system possible in the first place. In other words, the nature of determination within "egelBs system precludes its completion.
?.

In other words, one need not negate the BbadB and preserve the infinite Kas the true infiniteM. 7ne could instead negate and preserve the BbadB itself Ki.e. the beyondM; negated as a possible ob#ect of first,order knowledge, but preserved as an ob#ect of second,order knowledge.

69? 7nce again, we can see an unresolved contradiction between "egelBs concepts of determination and completeness. "owever, the contradiction presented in this chapter is external to "egelBs own premises. (he desirability of preserving the experience of transcendence as more than a mere errorIas a possible topic of philosophyIis not a desire that "egel, according to his own premises, need share. 5evertheless, as I have tried to show with my BphenomenologicalB examples, such a preservation may in fact be something philosophically desirable. It is my position that a concept of philosophy that can only be coherent insofar as it excludes such topics from consideration by philosophy may be too limited. 1uch a philosophyBs limitation is that it can only account for these sorts of moments as errors to be overcome, rather than as Kat least potentiallyM essential aspects of the range of human experience. In fact, such a philosophy of completion cannot really determine whether such moments would be essential or not, since the reJuirement that they be excluded as mere errors is essential to such a philosophy. 2ccording to "egelBs own conception of the system, these topics are not excluded a priori but through the process of the systemBs own self,development. 2t the same time, the goal of completeness that "egel sets reJuires the exclusion of such topics. (he problem for "egel here is less in his method or in how he attempts to articulate a completely self,determinate logic than his goal or that he attempts to do so in the first place.?; -iven the goal of completeness, such a philosophy cannot determine whether such phenomena should be excluded because they already must be excluded from the very beginning. 2t best, a philosophy of completeness can only ever determine how they are to be excluded. In effect, the inclination to formulate a complete philosophy always already precludes the possibility of its actual completion. 3or this reason, while the exclusion of

?;

(he conseJuences of this problem, both for "egel and philosophy in general, will be discussed in the following chapter K$hapter :, 1ection $M.

699 experiences of transcendence as possible topics of philosophy is not a "egelian concern, I nevertheless believe it to be a legitimate one.

69<

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
I will now end this dissertation with three sets of concluding remarks. 3irst of all, I begin by evaluating this studyBs methodolog#, both in terms of its specific approach and in relation to more general methodological considerations. I then address some of the objectives of the interpretation I have presented, especially focusing on the particular manner of its presentation. astly, I offer some general comments on the significance of "egelBs concept of sublation and its relevance not only for the study of "egel, but also for philosophy in general.

A. METHODOLOGY
I will begin my consideration of this studyBs methodology by considering its organiOation. (he first two parts of this study treat the structure and function of "egelBs concept of sublation, respectively. 2s I mentioned in the introduction, if the structure of sublation can be called its BanatomyB, its function could be referred to as its BphysiologyB. In my analysis of its structure, I have tried to define "egelBs concept of sublation in its relation to and in its distinction from other, related concepts. In my analysis of its function, I selected a few key examples in order to illustrate how sublation operates within the transitions of "egelBs logic. It might seem as though structure and function overlap to a certain degree, and this would be, in a certain sense, correct4 one cannot really understand one of these aspects without reference to the other. 3or the purposes of my analysis, however, I have presented them as if they were separate for the sake of clarity. I could have presented the structure in terms of function or vice versa Kas a single sectionM, but this would have run the risk of confusing topics with examples. 7ne might say that, together, the structural and functional sections serve as the Binterpretative halfB of my critical interpretation of "egelBs concept of sublation.

69D 2long these lines, the second Bcritical halfB of my interpretation is what I have treated in this third part. In the previous two chapters, I discussed two types of critiJue4 internal and external. In addition to these methodological reflections, I presented two corresponding critiJues of "egelBs concept of sublation. %y internal critiJue claimed that "egelBs system is ultimately incomplete6 insofar as sublation is a determinative element of the system that is not itself determined. 2s an internal critiJue, I articulated this problem according to "egelBs own standards and criteria. %y second, external critiJue claimed that "egelBs goal of a complete self,determination is KpotentiallyM undesirable insofar as it necessarily excludes certain important topics from philosophical consideration. (his critiJue obviously appeals to criteria that are not found within "egel himself, but as I have attempted to show, I am fully aware of this and it does not necessarily mean the critiJue is without value. What has not yet been addressed, however, is the specific relationship between these two types of critiJue. It is my position that these two critiJues are not merely additions to the interpretation I have presented in the Binterpretative halfB, but are rather essentially related to it. (he remainder of this section will be devoted to exploring this relationship in more detail. (o start with, I need to show how internal and external critiJue are themselves related. 2s we have seen, an internal critiJue is one whose locus of legitimacy is found within the text while an external critiJue is one whose locus of legitimacy is found outside of the text. In addition to these two forms of legitimacy, these critiJues also have two types of relevance. $ontinuing along our earlier line of reasoning, we can say that a relevant critiJue is one that shares at least one premise in common with its audience andLor interlocutors. I call this relevance because it is this sort of commonality that allows an audience to recogniOe a critiJue as a position that might matter to them. 2 person holding no premise in common with

(o repeat myself, in order to ensure that I am clear on this point4 my claim that "egelBs system is incomplete is not a complaint that he does not treat individually all possible topics of philosophy Ki.e. that it is not an enumerationM but rather that it does not treat a topic Ke.g. sublationM that he must, according to the criteria that he himself has insisted upon, i.e. the complete self,determination of the form of the logic as its own content.

69: a particular critiJue would have no means to access that critiJue; it would be of no importance to him or her. 5ow, an external critiJue is relevant as long as it shares at least one premise with its audience. (hus, any external critiJue that meets the standard of legitimacy we addressed in the previous chapter would also be a relevant one. 2 legitimate internal critiJue, however, is not necessarily a relevant one, insofar as it is possible to offer an interpretation of a text that shares premises with the text itself but not the audience. 2s I have defined it here, relevance is effectively the converse of KinternalM legitimacy. 2nd #ust as the legitimacy of external critiJue can be expressed in terms of internal critiJue,. the relevance of internal critiJue can be expressed in terms of external critiJue. 2n internal critiJue can be said to be also external Kand thus relevantM insofar as its premises are typically not limited to the text alone. 2 hostile or negative critiJue obviously has premises beyond the text itself; that is, those points upon which the text and the critiJue disagree Kthis is true of both internal and external negative critiJuesM. ess obviously, a positive critiJue Ki.e. a defense or apologyM also contains additional premises beyond those found in the text itself. Insofar as an apology explains or #ustifies an argument found in a text, it has already taken a step beyond it, given that it understands such an addition to be reJuired in the first place. In this way, every relevant critiJue contains some element of externality, #ust as every legitimate critiJue contains some element of internality. In this conception of the relationship between legitimacy and relevance, these two types of critiJues constitute two complementary and mutually co,determinate aspects of interpretation as such. If both legitimacy and relevance are understood as necessary in order to have a valid interpretation,; then there would be no BpurelyB external or BpurelyB internal
. ;

$hapter <, 1ection 2. &y valid interpretation, I merely mean an interpretation that is recogniOed as such, as an interpretation, and not something else Ke.g. a polemic or a repetitionM. 2nother way to express the same point would be to say that legitimacy and relevance are essential aspects of interpretation, aspects without which no interpretation is present. In addition, this reference to hermeneutical validity is made in analogy to logical validity, but it should be considered a more or less figurative use of the term. *ust because I refer to interpretations as BvalidB does not mean that this is the same sort of validity present in formal logic.

69@ interpretation that would also be valid. 2 purely external interpretation would have no premises in common with either the text or its audience and thus be neither legitimate nor relevant. 1uch an interpreter would essentially be formulating arguments in what amounts to a sort of private languageItalking only to him, or herself. 7n the other hand, a purely internal interpretation would have no premises in common with its audience and no premises beyond the text itself. 1uch an interpretation would contain no additional information, explanation or #ustification at all, but would essentially be a repetition of claims from the text itself.? 1trictly speaking, such an interpretation would be legitimate but it would also be completely irrelevant to any audience9 insofar as it would be completely redundant relative to the text itself. 1uch a repetition would constitute a performative contradiction insofar as its content Kproviding no additional informationM would contradict its purpose Kto provide such informationM. 3or an audience, there would be no coherent reason to read such an interpretation when one could #ust as easily read the original text instead. 5ow, it is difficult to imagine an example of a concrete argument that would Jualify as such an extremely BpureB interpretation one way or the other. 2nd that is precisely my point. (he reason it is difficult to imagine such a pure interpretation is that any interpretations we would recogniOe as such Ki.e. as validM essentially lacks such purity. 2ll valid interpretations contain both internal and external aspects. 7ne can imagine the contrast between internality and externality along a continuum with the BpureB types placed at the two extremes. $onceptualiOed in this way, internal and external critiJue cease to be two mutually exclusive forms and become instead two different aspects of interpretation as such. In other words, the difference between the two is not one of kind but of relative degree. %oreover, internality and

2 practical example of such a BrepetitionB would be a book report done by a primary or secondary school student. 2 book report repeats certain content from the text to prove that the student has read it, but would rarely be recogniOed as an interpretation in the usual sense. 3or the "egelian source of this concept, see $hapter ?, 1ection 2, in reference to "egelBs comments on Nabsolute verbiageN. 9 It would not even be relevant to a living author of an interpreted text, who would likely respond with something to the effect of B>es, thatBs what I said.B

6<C externality are mutually determinative aspects of interpretation in general4< an internal critiJue cannot be relevant without at least some externality and an external critiJue cannot be legitimate without at least some internality. 2ccording to this conception, what we commonly recogniOe as internal critiJues are simply Bmore internalB than external ones and vice versa. 3or lack of a better term, I have called the understanding of interpretation presented here Bcritical interpretationB.D (hree additional features of critical interpretation should be noted. 3irst of all, this account should explain why I have used the terms BcritiJueB and BinterpretationB almost interchangeably.: (hat all critiJues are also interpretations is clear insofar as all critiJues Kno matter what their degree of validityM at least attempt to understand or explain a text Ki.e. they contain some element of internalityM. 2s such, even in circumstances where the degree of internality is deemed to be insufficient, an element of internality is still present. What the concept of critical interpretation adds is that all KvalidM interpretations are also essentially critical insofar as they necessarily reach beyond the text itself. (hat is to say, these interpretations contain some element of externality insofar as they purport to offer something that the text itself does not. 1econd, I am extremely reticent about assigning the concept of critical interpretation any label at all, even if only provisionally. While such a label is helpful for the purpose of explanation, the use of any such term also runs the risk of being mistaken for something like a
<

Precisely the same point was made by the literary critic 5orthrop 3rye. 5orthrop 3rye, Anatom# of :riticism% 8our "ssa#s KPrinceton 8niversity Press, 6@9DM. 3rye refers to what I have termed BinternalityB as the BcentripetalB movement of criticism; my term BexternalityB is eJuivalent to 3ryeBs BcentrifugalB movement. While internality and externality are also of course BmovementsB, in the sense that interpretation is less a KstaticM thing than a KdynamicM act, I have avoided 3ryeBs terminology simply because I will use the metaphor of movement to apply to different concepts KBinternaliOationB and BexternaliOationB; see belowM, and I do not want to confuse the exposition by mixing my metaphors. D (his name is imperfect for two reasons. 3irst, the term is rather vague, having little explanatory value. 1econd, it runs the risk of being confused with similar terms Ke.g. Bcritical hermeneuticsBM from thinkers such as *Urgen "abermas Ksee his Knowledge and 6uman &nterests, trans. *eremy *. 1hapiro K&eacon, 6@D.MM. 1pecifically defining the similarities and differences between my use of the term and "abermasBs Ket al.M would go well beyond the scope of this study. "ere, it would perhaps be best to treat Bcritical interpretationB as merely a label, rather than as a kind of definition. : I have made use of this synonymity previously, but have not yet defined it. I should also mention that this identity is a commonplace of literary criticism, which I have merely adapted to philosophy.

6<6 recommended method or techniJue. (his is uneJuivocally not my intent. I understand the term critical interpretation to refer to a description of interpretation, not a prescription for it. (he mutual determination of internality and externality is not something that I claim should be present in an interpretation, but something, I argue, that is present in any interpretations we recogniOe as such; we recogniOe interpretations as valid Kthat is, legitimate and relevantM and even as interpretations only insofar as they contain this sort of mutual determination. astly, I should rephrase how I understand the relationship between internality and externality more precisely. Initially, I presented internal and external critiJue as if they were two Jualitatively distinct types of critiJue because this is how they are generally understood. I then argued, in this chapter, that they are better understood as two Juantitatively@ distinct but mutually determinative aspects of one type of critiJue or interpretation as such. "owever, this is still not precise enough. Insofar as the Jualitative distinction between the two breaks down when one considers the relationship between legitimacy and relevance, it is the fixed, rigid opposition between them that collapses.6C Insofar as internality and externality are understood in this way, one can also say that, in critical interpretation, the opposition between internality and externality is sublated.66 2nother way to express the same point is to say that KcriticalM interpretation is the sublation of a te+t.6. In any given interpretation, the text is both preserved and negated. It is
@

I use the term BJuantitativelyB here in a somewhat loose sense. While I have claimed that internality and externality are differences of degree not kind, I do not think that these differences are something that could be Juantified in any empirical or mathematical sense. It is a matter of Bmore or lessB, but not precisely Bhow muchB. In other words, in response to the Juestion B"ow internal is this critiJueQB, an answer like BDB would be absurd; a coherent answer would be something more along the lines of Binternal Kor not internalM enoughB. 6C In other words, it is not that internality and externality are mutually determinative as two separate and distinct forms, but rather that they are determined as two aspects of one and the same form, i.e. that of interpretation as such. In "egelian terms, one would say this mutual determination is not a synthesis. 66 2nother possible label that could be used instead of critical interpretation is Binterpretation as sublationB. While this is more specific and less likely to be confused with other approaches, it is considerably more awkward and of little explanatory value to those not already familiar with "egel. I will refer to it occasionally in what follows, but only in order to emphasiOe the sublative nature of what I have otherwise called critical interpretation. 6. It is important to note here that the thinking underlying my conception of critical interpretation is not taken from "abermas, but is rather essentially an adaptation of -adamerBs concept of interpretation as a Nfusion of horiOonsN K6orizontverschmelzungM. 1ee "ans,-eorg -adamer, !ruth and >ethod, trans. *oel Weinsheimer and Donald -. %arshall K$ontinuum, .CC.M, ;C<. (he primary difference between my position and -adamerBs is one of emphasis. 2rticulating the point in terms of sublation Krather than as a fusionM only accentuates the fact that

6<. preserved insofar as the content of the text is taken up into the interpretation as its sub#ect, matter; it is negated insofar as an interpretation necessarily goes beyond the text itself by adding its own comments, #ustifications, evaluations, and so forth. (o express this in the terms we have been using here, the text is preserved in the internality of its interpretation and negated by the externality of it. (he primary implication of understanding interpretation as sublation is that, from this point of view, there would be no Btext,in,itselfB.6; In other words, if an interpretation of a text is a sublation of that text, then there is KessentiallyM no text that is separable and distinct from Kor Bprior toBM an interpretation of that text. 7bviously, I do not mean this in any empirical sense, where books do not exist until we pick them up and read them. 'ather, I claim that there is no text,in,itself in a hermeneutical sense. We have no access to texts prior to our understanding of Kor attempts to understandM them.6? (his is because, outside of the realm of interpretation, texts have no meaning. (hese last two points reJuire further explanation. If one understands meaning necessarily to entail some form of expression, then there would be no meaning present without something being conveyed from the text to a reader. In this sense, a reader is reJuired for meaning to be present; there is no meaningful text without one. 3urthermore, such a reader cannot be said to have understood the meaning of text unless he or she has, to a certain extent, internaliOed it; that is, without some reception of what it is that the text conveys, there is also no meaning. %eaning as such reJuires both expression and reception in order to be, in fact, meaning. 2 basic criterion for such internaliOation is that meaning that has been both expressed and received can be re,expressed, or externaliOed, or made public. 7ne could say that internaliOation is the capacity for externaliOation. (his point
the unification of the horiOon of the text with that of its interpretation is not a mutual synthesis of two horiOons, or an indeterminate amalgamation or blending, but the determinate incorporation the former into the latter. 6; *ust as for "egel there is ultimately no thing,in,itself. 1ee 1 ?@?,?@<; "W<L6?.,6?? on the NDissolution of the (hingN K*ie Aufl5sung des *ingsM. 6? "ere, I mean understanding in its hermeneutical K1erstehenM, rather than its discursive K1erstandM sense. In this sense, it is not a way of thinking opposed to reason, but is rather a BreasoningB about texts. (he reason I have not simply used the term BreasonB instead is that it would be awkward to do so in /nglish, given the context Ke.g. sentences like NI BreasonedB the textN would make little senseM.

6<; can best be illustrated with reference to an example of a lack of reception. 2 child forced to memoriOe a poem in school is not said to have understood the meaning of that poem if he or she can only repeat the words but not explain what the poem means in his or her own terms. 1imilarly, a parrot or an audio recorder can repeat words but cannot, of course, understand their meaning. If one accepts that the evidence of internaliOation is such a capacity for externaliOation, then all understandings of the meaning of a text would also be interpretations of that text. (his idea can be rephrased in terms of sublation. When I read and understand the meaning of a text, I preserve or grasp the content of the text only insofar as I also Kat least implicitlyM negate the content, or insofar as I am able to re,express the content of the text in my own terms. Inversely, if I am unable to do so, if I lack this capacity for re,expression, I am not recogniOed as having grasped the content. In a hermeneutical sense, there is no text,in, itself, no text BbeyondB interpretation, because such a text would have no meaning. (ake, for example, a very simple text4 I leave my wife a note reading NI went to the store.N 5ow, as a text,in,itself, this text would be almost meaningless KNWhat store did he go toQN, NWhen did he goQN, and so on.M 3or my wife, however, this note would mean that I went to the grocery store near our house, that I will probably be back within the hour, and so on. (he note is only fully meaningful insofar as my wife is familiar with our neighborhood, her husbandBs habits, and so forth. %oreover, if asked, she can re,express the content of the note to a third,party as something more generally meaningful KN"e went to the grocery store three blocks from here and will be back in about an hourNM because she would understand the full meaning of the note. In this sense, understanding a text and the ability to KreMinterpret it are identical. If this is true of simple texts, it is even more so when dealing with complex texts like those found in, say, the history of philosophy. In terms of critical interpretation, one cannot really grasp a text from one historical period within another historical period while, at the

6<? same time, grasping it solely and exclusively as it originally appeared. While understanding factors such as an authorBs intent, the historical context, and so forth provide invaluable and necessary information for understanding a text, it is important to note that these aspects cannot be the final or sole criteria for interpretation. 1uch data are necessary but not sufficient for the hermeneutical understanding of a historical text because, in and of themselves, they remain purely internal criteria Kof the textM; the reJuisite externality Kof the interpreterM may still be lacking. *ust as I can have no access to any text,in,itself, I can also have no access to anything like a Bhistory,in,itselfB for analogous reasons. (he only way for me to understand any given historical period69 is to be able to re,express its ways of understanding in my own KcontemporaryM terms.6< (his idea is hardly new; indeed, it was well known to "egel himself4
Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his times; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is #ust as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, #ump over the 'hodes.6D

(his is no less true for the study of "egel than it was for "egel. 2 presentation of "egelBs concept of sublation, one that truly understands that concept, reJuires some sort of critical distance from it. -iven the nearly .CC years between the time when "egel wrote and the time when I read him, I could not have understood "egelBs concept of sublation without some sort of critical re,appraisal of what it means for me, for us, now. If one accepts Keven if only provisionallyM critical interpretation as I have outlined it here, then one can see how a proper understanding of the history of philosophy is inseparable from a critical approach to that history. It is in this sense that I understand the idea that, N7ne must be a philosopher to understand as philosoph# the history of philosophy.N6: It is this understanding
69 6<

7r any historical author, movement, shift, issue, etc. (his re#ection of BoriginalismB should not be construed as some sort of historical relativism. I will address my reasoning for why this is the case in the next section of this chapter. 6D N0as das &ndividuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein 'ohn seiner (eit- so ist auch die Philosophie ihre (eit in Gedanken erfa/t. "s ist ebenso t5richt zu w)hnen, irgendeine Philosophie gehe 2ber ihre gegenw)rtige 0elt hinaus, als, ein &ndividuum 2berspringe seine (eit, springe 2ber 7hodus hinaus.N KP'66; "WDL.<M 6: William Desmond, Being and the Between K185>, 6@@9M, xvi.

6<9 of philosophical method in general that has led me to organiOe my study in the way that I have. In this dissertation, I have presented both an interpretation and a criticism of "egelBs concept of sublation because the two are, in the end, inseparable.

B. OB'ECTI&ES
I have spent a great deal of time in this chapter discussing the nature of criticism, interpretation, and method in very general terms rather than focusing more closely on sublation itself. (o some, these passages may have seemed like unnecessary digressions from my main thesis. 5evertheless, I believe that they have been a necessary component of my exposition. In order to explain why this is the case, I need to make my ob#ectives for this study of "egelBs concept of sublation more explicit. %y purpose in discussing critical interpretation has not been to provide a general theory of hermeneutics. (o articulate properly such a theory would have taken several dissertations4 on meaning, understanding, critiJue, and so forth. I am well aware that my treatment of these topics has been very brief and overly simplified. (he brevity of my treatment of these topics has, unfortunately, meant that I have often made too many assertions and offered too few #ustifications. "owever, it has not been my purpose to offer a fully grounded and properly #ustified general hermeneutics. 'ather, my intent has only been to explain #ust enough to show why I have presented this study of "egelBs concept of sublation in the form that I have. It is less a theory of hermeneutics than the outline for one. 3or a study of a specific historical concept like "egelBs concept of sublation, I think such an outline suffices. (he outline I have presented here should be helpful in several respects. 3irst, an explanation of my general approach to interpretation makes the organiOation of this study clearer. 2s previously discussed, the first two parts treat sublation internally, in "egelBs own terms; the third part treats sublation externally, or in my own Kthe interpreterBsM terms, with the internal critiJue of $hapter < serving as a vital link between the two. (hese various parts

6<< might have seemed separate or even arbitrarily connected, but, given the explanation of my general approach, one can now see how they are interrelated. 2 critical perspective is as essential to understanding "egelBs concept of sublation Kor any other textM as a thoroughly grounded knowledge of the concept itself Kor any other textM would be to making a proper critiJue of it. 2ny treatment of "egelBs concept of sublation that lacked one or the other would have been incomplete. (here is, of course, nothing uniJue in this approach. (hat is why I have taken pains to mention, repeatedly, how critical interpretation is a description of interpretation and not a prescription for it. 7n a broader scale, I see this structure of interpretation reflected in the practice of academic philosophy in general. 2necdotally speaking, some philosophers tend to focus more on the internal aspects of philosophical texts, while others focus on the more external aspects. &ut as with the internality and externality of any individual interpretation, I see this as a difference of degree, not of kind. In addition, as is the case with individual critical interpretations, the interaction of these differences among interpreters serves a positive, complementary function. 3rom my point of view, it is this interaction that, on a social, interpersonal level constitutes the Bcommunity of lettersB. %y account of critical interpretation could eJually be understood as an attempt to both internaliOe this dynamic as well as a means of making the complementary nature of this interaction explicit. While I have presented each of these aspects as parts of a single study, there is no reason, in principle, that they would not function in the same complementary way on a social level, with different interpreters focusing on different ends of the interpretative spectrum, while at the same time recogniOing that they are working together toward a common purpose. (he second reason for presenting this outline is that it explains why, in this study, I did not take a more historiographical approach. 2 reader might very well consider this studyBs dearth of broader historical context a serious, perhaps even fatal, lacuna. "owever, before it

6<D would have been possible to explain the nature of the historical transformations of the concept of sublation leading up to and following from "egel, it was first necessary to present the concept itself. Without first addressing the specific structure and function of "egelBs concept of sublation, one cannot explain what it is about the concept that changes over time between, say, )ant and "egel, or between "egel and %arx, and so on. 7ne could not simply assume the peculiarity of "egelBs concept of sublation as something generally understood, and then explain its historical progression, because without first making its peculiarities explicit, one would not be able to recogniOe what has in fact changed over time. /ssentially, I see a structural, functional, and critical interpretation of the concept of sublation as serving a propaedeutic function for any subseJuent historiographical analysis. In "egelian terms, I think of this as analogous to the relationship between logic and history; one cannot grasp the latter without first making explicit the former. 3or this reason, my critical interpretation of "egelBs concept of sublation is essentially an interpretation of the logic of sublation rather than its history.6@ 3inally, it has been important for me to explain my general approach in order to make explicit the relationship between the sub#ect,matter of this study and its organiOation. %y conception of a critically interpretative approach was not arrived at arbitrarily; rather it has followed from my study of "egelBs concept of sublation itself. Insofar as critical interpretation entails sublationIof the opposition between interpretation and critiJue and of the opposition between internal and external critiJueIthe content of this study Ki.e. sublationM is reflected in its form Ki.e. critical interpretationM. (his coincidence of content and form.C is nothing like a system in the "egelian sense. 2s I have mentioned, the presentation here is an explanation, not a #ustification; there is no ground. 2s presented, there is merely a sort of parallelism
6@

1uch a history is of course not precluded. 3or a brief historical overview of "egelBs concept of sublation, see Part I!. 3or a somewhat more detailed account of its development, see, for example, 3uldaBs entry on NAufhebenN in *oachim 'itterBs 6istorisches 05rterbuch der Philosophie K1chwabe, 6@D6M, <6:,<.C. .C (hat is, an interpretation of "egelBs concept of sublation Ki.e. the contentM that is based on an understanding of interpretation as sublation Ki.e. the formM.

6<: between the content of this study and its form, although I do consider this parallel to be highly suggestive. (he parallel is suggestive for two reasons. 3irst of all, it indicates an internal coherence in this treatment of "egelBs concept of sublation. (here is an analogy between my explanation of my approach and "egelBs #ustification for his system. ike "egelBs system Kalbeit on a much smaller scaleM, the form of this study is defined by its content and not the other way around. I have also done my best to explain interpretation as sublation in a way that is analogous to the manner in which "egel #ustifies his own system. 7f course, this is only an analogy; the explanation is still not a self,determination of form and content. In this study, form and content remain only two Bparallel linesB and not a single complete BcircleB. 1econd, if, in some later pro#ect, something like a BcircleB could be circumscribed around this relationship between the form and content of sublation Ki.e. if a general hermeneutics were thoroughly #ustified on this Juasi,"egelian basisM, then it would be possible to demonstrate how the application of the concept of sublation in philosophy does not necessarily fall afoul of the problem of an externally formal method. 2 properly grounded theory of interpretation as sublation would be neither an externally formal hermeneutic, nor a philosophical or ontological hermeneutic, but an internal and self,determinate logical hermeneutic..6 2 BtransplantB of the concept of sublation from "egelBs logic to such a hermeneutic would enable one to apply the concept of sublation to a broader set of philosophical issues while at the same time avoiding the problems that "egel identified with formal method, thus resolving the problem I presented in the introduction. 7f course, for now, such a full #ustification of such a pro#ect remains well beyond my current task. %y ultimate

.6

(hat is, BlogicalB in the "egelian rather than formal sense. (o put it another way, I mean to suggest the possibility of applying "egelBs concept of sublation to contemporary issues in hermeneutics Ke.g. the possibility of criticism, the relation to tradition, etc.M

6<@ ob#ective in this study has been only to lay the groundwork for this pro#ect, in order to suggest that and how it might be possible...

C. SIGNIFICANCE
"egel would likely consider such a theory of critical interpretation to be, at best, superfluous. 2fter all, the reconciliation of form and content for philosophy is his own pro#ect. "owever, "egelBs solution, insofar as it reJuires both determination and completeness, has been shown to be both inadeJuate Kaccording to my internal critiJueM and potentially undesirable Kaccording to my external critiJueM. In this final remark, I will address some of the implications and conseJuences of these critiJues in order to address the significance of "egelBs concept of sublation for philosophy in general. 3or "egel, the reconciliation of form and content reJuires a complete and KselfM determinate system, i.e. the 2bsolute Idea..;
&ut in the idea of absolute cognition the concept has become the ideaBs own content. (he idea is itself the pure concept that has itself for sub#ect matter and which, in running itself as sub#ect matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science, and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding KaufzuhebenM its standing as content and sub#ect matter and cogniOing the concept of the science..?

In this way, the 2bsolute Idea is Nthe sole sub#ect matter and content of philosophyN.9 and, furthermore, Nthe 2bsolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self,knowing truth and is all truth.N.< (he 2bsolute Idea is thus for "egel the sole locus of truth, the only place where

..

3or an alternative interpretation of "egel in terms of hermeneutics, see Paul 'edding, 6egelGs 6ermeneutics K$ornell 8niversity Press, 6@@<M. In his book, 'edding interprets "egelBs logic as if it were already hermeneutical. .; 'egarding "egel, it should be clear by this point that this reconciliation is not a s#nthesis of two separate moments BformB and BcontentB, but rather the sublation of the content of philosophy determined as its own form. .? N&n der &dee des absoluten "rkennens aber ist er zu ihrem eigenen &nhalte geworden. 'ie ist selbst der reine Begriff, der sich zum Gegenstande hat und der, indem er sich als Gegenstand HhabendI die !otalit)t seiner Bestimmungen durchl)uft, sich zum Ganzen seiner 7ealit)t, zum '#steme der 0issenschaft ausbildet und damit schlie/t, dies Begreifen seiner selbst zu erfassen, somit seine 'tellung als &nhalt und Gegenstand aufzuheben und den Begriff der 0issenschaft zu erkennen.N K1 :?;; "W<L9D.M .9 N'ie ist der einzige Gegenstand und &nhalt der Philosophie.N K1 :.?; "W<L9?@M .< N...die absolute &dee allein ist 'ein, unverg)ngliches $eben, sich wissende 0ahrheit, und ist alle 0ahrheit.N K1 :.?; "W<L9?@M

6DC concept and ob#ectivity are adeJuately and completely unified..D (his means that, for "egel, truth is ultimately univocal; there is only one truth. "egel would therefore re#ect the sort of Bhermeneutical shiftB I have #ust suggested..: If truth is univocal, then it cannot be open to interpretation. If truth were a matter of interpretation, then it would be possible for there to be multiple truths. (hat is, if meaning is a matter of both expression and reception, then variations in reception Ke.g. in different historical contextsM could produce different valid interpretations, different BtruthsB in relation to the same text. 2nd if there were such a thing as multiple truths, then it would also be possible for these two truths to contradict each other..@ (herefore, in admitting the possibility of this sort of pluralism, critical interpretation would seem to be vulnerable to skepticism. Indeed, such a hermeneutical approach would ultimately seem to be a form of skepticism.;C I am not certain, however, that such a pluralism would necessarily be vulnerable to skepticism in this way. In order to illustrate my doubts on this point, I must first make a distinction. Pluralism can be considered to be skeptical in two different senses; it seems vulnerable to both relativism and eJuipollence. &riefly, we can define relativism as the problem that if there are many truths, then there is no truth at all, and e?uipollence as the problem that if there are many truths, then there is no way to decide between them. I will now address each of these problems in turn. 3irst of all, the claim that pluralism would necessaril# be relativism is simply incorrect. (o use a mathematical metaphor, Bgreater than oneB does not necessarily eJual infinity, and it certainly does not eJual Oero. (his can be better illustrated with reference to interpretation as sublation. *ust as there is no text,in,itself, there is also no text merely and
.D .:

1ee $hapter 9, 1ection $ for details. (hat is, a shift from a logic of concepts to an interpretation of texts. .@ "egel would claim that the notion of multiple truths would be necessaril# contradictory, insofar as neither truth could be the wholly self,determinate reconciliation of concept and ob#ectivity as long as remained set apart over and against its other. ;C 3or "egelBs re#ection of skepticism, see %ichael 3orster, 6egel and 'kepticism K"arvard, 6@:@M, cited previously and discussed in $hapter <, 1ection &.

6D6 solely Bfor usB. *ust as there is no purely internal text KBbeyondB interpretationM, there is also no purely external one, where interpretation would be reduced to a merely personal response alone KBbeyondB the textM. If interpretation were a matter of reception alone, then there would be a potentially infinite number of possible interpretations and no possibility of determination whatsoever. "owever, to claim that interpretation is the sublation of the text is, of course, not the same as claiming that it is simply the negation of the text. If a sublation is present Kin a transplanted, Juasi,"egelian senseM, then the text must not be simply negated, but also preserved. (here may be multiple valid interpretations but, from this, it does not follow that one interpretation is necessarily as valid as any other. (ake, for example, the play 6amlet. In that text, one can find valid grounds for claiming that "amlet is fundamentally motivated by melancholy. 2lternatively, one can also find eJually valid grounds for claiming that he is fundamentally motivated by anger.;6 &ut while there are grounds for claiming 1hakespeareBs Prince of Denmark is melancholy or angry, there are no such grounds for claiming that "amlet is happy or 1wedish. *ust because there is more than one possible interpretation does not mean an interpretation cannot be wrong. (he fact that there is more than one potentially valid interpretation does not necessarily entail that there are an infinite number of valid interpretations. (herefore, since there remains the possibility of some determination among them, pluralism does not necessarily entail relativism. (he second problem with pluralismIeJuipollenceIis a far more serious one. In hermeneutical terms, if multiple valid interpretations of a text are possible, then there would be, by definition, no grounds for deciding between them. While pluralism can contain
;6

(here are obviously grounds for claiming "amlet is both melancholy and angry, but the point is the Juestion of his fundamental motivation, i.e. whether he is depressed because he is angry at being usurped Ketc.M or angry because he is depressed and grieving over his dead father. (his Juestion, I would argue, is undecidable based on the text of the play alone. (he various possible answers to this Juestion determine to a great extent how the character is played. 3or examples of how these different interpretations of the play affect its staging, one can compare and contrast the different films versions, for example, the anger of 3ranco ^effirelliBs 6amlet K6@@CM as opposed to the melancholy of aurence 7liverBs K6@?:M or )enneth &ranaghBs K6@@<M.

6D. determination, an indeterminacy always remains between two Kor moreM BtruthsB. 3or "egel, such an indeterminacy would constitute a contradiction, where the Btwo truthsB would remain separate and set over and against one another; the lack of the possibility of complete self, determination would be the lack of the possibility of truth. (herefore, pluralism Kas eJuipollentM would seem to be a skepticism. In order to respond to this difficulty, we must take a step backward and ask why skepticism is itself a problem. 3irst of all, it must be clear that when referring to skepticism here I mean what "egel calls ancient skepticism4 not a skepticism about a particular kind of knowledge Kas in modern skepticismM, but a skepticism about the possibility of knowledge as such Kwhat one might also call Babsolute skepticismBM.;. "ere, we can immediately see why skepticism is a problem for "egelBs concept of philosophy. If philosophy is concerned with possible ob#ects of knowledge, then knowledge itself must be established Knot simply assumedM as a possibility. 7ne can, however, easily see how such an absolute skepticism is not really a problem at all. If a skepticism were to re#ect the possibility of knowledge as such, then it would also re#ect its own claim to know that this is the case; it would entail a re#ection of its own knowledge,claim. (his point can also be phrased in terms of the distinction between first, and second,order knowledge. (he claim NI know KI donBt know +MN is coherent; the claim NI know KI canBt know any +MN is not, since as the second clause contradicts the first. (o articulate such an absolute skepticism would therefore be a performative contradiction. In this sense, skepticism is not a threat; it is a fallacy.;;
;.

I will use the ahistorical term Babsolute skepticismB below, rather than the more "egelian term Bancient skepticismB, because it permits the inclusion of relatively more recent forms of skepticism that fit the definition, e.g. romantic irony, deconstruction, and so on. ;; 3ollowing on my inclusion of deconstruction as an instance of absolute skepticism, I should make an important distinction. It is not any particular deconstruction of a text that is necessarily problematic; individually, these deconstructions would be simply instances of internal critiJue. "owever, once generaliOed to a theory like BdeconstructionismB, as a principle that would apply to all possible texts, deconstruction would fall victim to this fallacy. (he same performative contradiction is also present in yotardBs Nincredulity towards meta,narrativesN K*ean,3ran`ois yotard, !he Postmodern :ondition, trans. -eoff &ennington and &rian %assumi K8niversity of %innesota, 6@:?M, xxivM, insofar as this statement is itself such a meta,narrative.

6D; 7f course, "egel himself makes use of the same type of argument. In the Phenomenolog# of 'pirit, one can read how skepticism contradicts itself.;? In the 'cience of $ogic, one can read how even contradiction contradicts itself and is sublated as ground.;9 &ut if skepticism contradicts itself, then why is an absolute cognition itself necessary as a defense against skepticismQ Why is an ultimate, univocal, single ground reJuired for philosophyQ It would seem that, if skepticism is already found to be incoherent, then a subseJuent absolute cognition would be unnecessary. "egel sees it as necessary because as long as there are unsublated moments of the system, contradictions remain within and among those moments. If one were to sublate contradiction as such, without sublating the individual contradictions among the various moments, then such a logic would remain abstract. 2n abstract logic would be a merely formal one, and the reconciliation of form and content Kas the truth of the 2bsolute IdeaM would not be accomplished. (his is why, for "egel, the defense against skepticism reJuires a complete system. It is my contention, however, that such completeness, in addition to being 6M inadeJuately presented in "egel and .M potentially undesirable, is also ;M unnecessar#.;< It is not necessary to sublate all possible contradictions because it is not the presence of individual contradictions that is a threat to the possibility of knowledge as such; rather, the threat to philosophy is found in absolute skepticism alone. (hat NI canBt know +N does not mean NI canBt know #N 2n individual indeterminacy does not make determinacy as such Kand thus knowledgeM impossible. 3urthermore, as we have seen, an individual indeterminacy does not mean that one cannot have a determination of that indeterminacy, i.e. NI know KI donBt know

;? ;9

P16.<; "W;L6<;. 2s discussed in $hapter ?, 1ection $. ;< I have not argued here that absolute cognition is impossible, because I think to do so risks falling afoul the same performative contradiction that undermined absolute skepticism. If there were a position from which one could claim NI know I canBt know absolutelyN, it would be difficult make the case that this argument is not itself made from some sort of absolute standpoint.

6D? +M.N 2gain, this possibility is implicitly entailed by "egelBs own logic.;D 2nd if completeness is unnecessary to establish the conditions of possibility of knowledge, then pluralism would be a possibility. (his possibility of pluralism reJuires further explanation. I have not claimed that pluralism is necessary. If I were to make a claim like Nall truths are pluralN, then such a pluralism would indeed be relativism. Instead, I make only the more limited claim that pluralism is possible, that Nsome truths are pluralN. 3urthermore, while there would be an eJuipollence between such truths, this does not mean that they are completely indeterminable. 7n a second,order level, their eJuipollence could be determined, as eJuipollent4 NI know Kx and y are both trueM.N;: In other words, on this second,order level, the presence of eJuipollence does not entail an absence of knowledge. (herefore, admitting the possibility of pluralism would not result in an absolute skepticism, since it preserves the possibility of knowledge. What this means is that, insofar as critical interpretation is KpotentiallyM pluralistic, it also admits the possibility of knowledge in the determinate but not absolute sense of the term. (he fact that multiple valid interpretations are possible does not mean that determinate knowledge of a text is impossible. In cases where two interpretations are both eJually valid, what is reJuired is a recognition K?ua determinationM of that eJual validity. 1o, returning to our 6amlet example, if I recogniOe that both claims Kthat he is fundamentally melancholy and fundamentally angryM have eJual validity, such a recognition functions as a second,order interpretation, which sublates and thus determines the indeterminacy Kthe eJuipollenceM of the first,order. I cannot decide between N"amlet is angryN and N"amlet is melancholyN, but I can

;D ;:

2s we saw in $hapter D, 1ection &. (his is of course still possible even if Nx and yN are not simply different, but also contradictory, insofar as a first,order contradiction does not necessarily entail a second,order one.

6D9 know that I cannot decide. Interpretation is, in this way, a form of knowledge. What this means is that interpretation is not restricted to meaning, but can also involve truth.;@ (he truth of interpretation here is obviously not truth in the "egelian sense of the term. 2s I have presented it here, however, this hermeneutical truth is analogous to "egelBs concept of truth. *ust as "egelian truth Ki.e. the 2bsolute IdeaM is the reconciliation of the concept with its ob#ectivity, a true interpretation is one that reconciles a text with its interpreterKsM. *ust as, for "egel, there can be no truth that is purely ob#ective or purely sub#ective, for critical interpretation there can be no true interpretation that is either purely internal or purely external. 2n interpretation reconciles the internality of a text with the externality of an interpreter and in this way is recogniOed as an interpretation or an understanding of the meaning of a text Kand not merely as a polemic or repetitionM. -rasped in this way, critical interpretation would not be an abstract formal method because there is no pre,determination of the content. (here is, for example, no reJuirement that all texts must be interpreted in light of a single topic, such as economics, sexuality, language, and so on.?C (here are also no external formal criteria, no pre,determined forms, that a valid interpretation must take external to interpretation as such. (he criteria for a valid interpretation are internal to the relationship between the text and the interpreter itself; the criteria are not defined in advance or separably, but are performatively instantiated by the act of interpretation itself. 1uch internal criteria would mean that a plurality of valid interpretations is possible insofar as critical interpretation does not assume a particular type of text or a particular type of interpretation in advance of or separate from the act of interpretation itself. 2t the same time, these criteria do not mean that all interpretations are eJually valid because the range of possible valid interpretations is still limited, both by the content of the text and the context of
;@

If a legitimate and relevant interpretation can be described figuratively as BvalidB, then an interpretation that is also true could be described, in the same analogical sense relative to logic, as BsoundB. ?C 1uch interpretations fall victim to what 3rye calls the Ndeterministic fallacyN, which he KamusinglyM defines as N...the rhetorical device of putting his Sthe criticBsT favorite study into a causal relationship with whatever interests him less.N 3rye, <.

6D< the interpreter. (o put this in more concrete terms, consider the example of historical interpretation. 2 valid historical interpretation reconciles a historical text with the interpreterBs own time. (hat different interpretations may be recogniOed as valid at different times or in different contexts does not mean that interpretation is simply either a matter of the interpreterBs own whims where the past would be merely a playground for oneBs own musings, or some imaginary Bpure ob#ectivismB that claims to resurrect the past in the present. &oth of these extremes are excluded not by some dogmatically assumed criteria, but in the very act of interpretation itself.?6 Interpretation, grasped in this way, would be self,determinate. 2nother way to express this point would be to say that interpretation as sublation would be performativel# Krather than systematicallyM self,determinate. (hat is, any given act of interpretation performatively assumes that it is a valid interpretation insofar as the interpretation is advanced in the first place. (he purpose of a general hermeneutics fully and explicitly articulated along these lines would be to ground what would otherwise remain only an implicit assumption of every act of interpretation. It would be grounded, not according to some external criteria, but on criteria wholly internal to interpretation itself. In this way, critical interpretation Kas a general theoryM would serve a role relative to particular philosophical interpretations analogous to the role of "egelBs logic relative to the other philosophical sciences and their moments. It would provide a self,determinate ground for interpretation while, at the same time, having the advantage of being able to remain open to the possibilities of transcendence and pluralism. 3rom a "egelian point of view, what would be absent from such a self,determinate theory of critical interpretation is completeness. 3rom his perspective, a self,determination that is not also complete would be incoherent. "owever, as I have argued, a lack of completeness does not entail an absence of determination of knowledge. (herefore, a hermeneutic shift from Kself,determinateM logic to Kself,determinateM interpretation would not
?6

(hat is, when understood as interpretation as sublation.

6DD mean that philosophy would thereby abandon all claims to knowledge. Interpretation would not be something other than knowledge Krestricted only to edification?.M or a special kind of knowledge Kreserved for the humanitiesM but the performatively instantiated ground underlying the conditions of the possibility of knowledge.?; $ritical interpretation would not be one approach among many, with hermeneutical fields like literary criticism and edifying philosophy set over and against fields like natural science or systematic philosophy. (he difference between, say, literary criticism and statistics would be in their modes of interpretation4 language and mathematics, respectively. Within the framework outlined, different fields would each be defined by their respective shared set of premises. What they would have in common is that they are all fundamentally grounded as interpretation,?? analogous to the way "egelBs logic grounds the other philosophical sciences. (hrough such a general hermeneutical theory, knowledge would be establishable on a non,dogmatic, critical basis that would be eJually both self,determinate Kinsofar as it is performatively instantiated and not merely presupposedM and, at the same time, capable of remaining open to transcendence and pluralism. 1elf,determination in this non,"egelian sense Kwithout completenessM thus retains the virtue of the "egelian approach in that it avoids any dogmatic dependence on unreflected, implicit assumptions while, at the same time, avoiding what I have articulated as "egelBs limitationsIthat his solution is inadeJuate, undesirable, and unnecessary.
?.

I take this term and the subseJuent distinction between BsystematicB and BedifyingB philosophy from 'ichard 'orty, Philosoph# and the >irror of ,ature KPrinceton, 6@D@M, ;<C, ;<D,;<:. ?; In this sense, another label that might be used for what I have called critical interpretation is Btranscendental hermeneuticsB Ka phrase taken from )arl,7tto 2pelM. (he problem with this label is that it reJuires sufficient familiarity with )ant to recogniOe the distinction between BtranscendentalB Kconcerned with the conditions of possibility of knowledgeM and BtranscendentB Kthat which is said to be beyond knowledgeM. Without this distinction, Btranscendental hermeneuticsB might appear to be concerned with interpreting what I referred to earlier as the experiences of transcendence, rather than the conditions of possibility of all knowledge as such. ?? It is important to note here that this concept of interpretation Kas a performatively instantiated groundM should be distinguished from interpretation as one mode set over and against others, for example, as the method of the humanities as opposed to that of the natural sciences. If interpretation is capable of knowledge, then distinctions like these, or 'ortyBs distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy Kand any hierarchy between themM would collapse. (his would effectively entail a sublation of the traditional dichotomy Kfrom Wilhelm Dilthey and %ax WeberM between understanding K1erstehenM and explanation K"rkl)rungM.

6D: It is important to note that such a shift is not without its own negative conseJuences as well. While critical interpretation can involve determination and thus knowledge, on this basis no complete self,determination or complete self,knowledge would be possible. (herefore, this sort of hermeneutical shift would mean that there would always be answers that escape us; there would always be dilemmas that cannot be resolved. We would always remain to a certain degree determined by factors we cannot ourselves KcompletelyM overcome. In "egelian terms, this would mean that, for critical interpretation, there is ultimately no freedom. 3or "egel, N(he pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the concept is itself raised into concept, is an absolute liberation for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not eJually posited and itself concept....N?9 In critical interpretation, insofar as there would remain the possibility of a determination that is not itself determined, no such Nabsolute liberationN could take place. I would agree Kto a certain extentM with "egel that this would be tragic. 3or example, when confronted with an ethical dilemma, such a pluralism would mean that it would be possible for there to be two eJually valid positions on an issue, and that there would be no way to #ustify deciding between them.?< 5evertheless, the negative impact and implications of those sorts of conseJuences are not sufficient grounds to re#ect the line of reasoning that leads to them. In the case of an ethical dilemma of the sort mentioned, we cannot resolve such a tragic conflict by transforming it into a comedy, by simply assuming there must be a happy ending because we do not like the alternative. Without falsifying the phenomena, the best we could do in the face of such a dilemma is to recogniOe it as a tragedy. (hus, insofar as critical interpretation includes the possibility of pluralism, there would remain the possibility of a Ntragedy of
?9

N*ie reine &dee, in welcher die Bestimmtheit oder 7ealit)t des Begriffes selbst zum Begriffe erhoben ist, ist vielmehr absolute Befreiung, f2r welche keine unmittelbare Bestimmung mehr ist, die nicht ebensosehr gesetzt und der Begriff ist-N K1 :?;; "W<L9D;,/2M 1ee also the discussion of freedom in $hapter 9, 1ection $. ?< 7ne can see a specific example of such a dilemma in 1ophoclesB Antigone, the conflict of which "egel himself takes as paradigmatic for -reek tragedy. 1ee 26.C:,6.6;L"W69L9;:,9??. 3or a nice summary of "egelBs concept of tragedy as Btragic conflictB, see Walter )aufmann, !raged# and Philosoph# KPrinceton, 6@D.M, .C.,.6..

6D@ truthNIthat there might be problems that we can recogniOe but not solve. 1uch a conception of philosophy would not necessarily be concerned with overcoming every problem; rather, it would have the capacity to admit the possibility that sometimes the only solution might be acceptance. While "egel would understand this last possibility as a weakness, I see it as a strength. In order to reach the point where we would be able to acknowledge the possibility of the validity of such BmereB acceptance, we must be able to move beyond "egel; his weakness would have to become our strength. (his Bmoving beyondB is not nearly as easy as it might seem to some. 7n the one hand, moving beyond "egel cannot simply be a matter of ignoring him. In that case, his broad influence, both positive and negative, would remain merely implicit and undetermined. 7n other hand, the more familiar one is with "egel, the more difficult finding a way out seems to become. %ichel 3oucault expresses this problem well4
&ut to truly escape "egel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which "egel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against "egel, of that which remains "egelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti,"egelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us.?D

In other words, the very logic that constitutes "egelian thinking would seem to preclude the possibility of transcending it. 2ny anti,"egelian, insofar as he or she is opposed to "egel, would, according "egelBs own concept of opposition, remain defined by him and thus, in this sense, remain "egelian. 2t the same time, the very logic that poses this problem also already contains the solution4 "egelBs concept of sublation. 3or the most part, I think "egel was right; sublation is indeed N...one of the most important concepts in philosophy, a fundamental determination,

?D

%ichel 3oucault, !he Archeolog# of Knowledge, trans. 2.%. 1heridan 1mith K(avistock, 6@D.M, .;9. 3oucault expresses this point with a bit more hostility than would be reJuired to support my own position. "owever, in spite his personal attitude, I think he nevertheless captures the essence of problem. I would only add that this problem for anti,"egelianism need not be characteriOed as an Binsidious trickB to be recogniOed as a problem.

6:C which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophyF.G?: 3or "egel, the concept of sublation is essential to the very fabric of thinking itself. (his too, I think, is correct, albeit in a slightly different sense than "egelBs own. I have tried to suggest that sublation might be inherent in every act of interpretation #ust as, for "egel, it is inherent in philosophical thinking as such. &ut if this is correct, then it would mean that it would be possible for "egelBs own thought to itself be not simply opposed but sublated.?@ I make no claim here to have actually accomplished such a sublation of "egel. (his would reJuire a far more elaborate study than a treatment of "egelBs concept of sublation alone. %y own point is more limited and claims only that such a sublation is possible. (hus, the ultimate task of this study has not been to overcome "egel, but rather to demonstrate, on B"egelogicalB9C grounds, this possibility. 'egardless of whether one thinks such an overcoming is necessary or not, I hope that it is clear that "egelBs concept of sublation, as the golden thread running through his logic, is the key to unraveling it.

?:

EAufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt K1 6C<; "W9L66;M 2lready cited in the Introduction, note 6. ?@ (his same distinction has already been expressed in the distinction made between the rubrics Banti,"egelianB and Bpost,"egelianB. 1ee, for example, William Desmond, Art and the Absolute% a 'tud# of 6egelGs Aesthetics K185> Press, 6@:<M, D@. 1uch a Bpost,"egelianB inclination is hardly original to this study; here, I have only rephrased it as a Bsublation of "egelB, essentially restating the grounds for such approaches in other terms. 9C (hat is, of or relating to "egelBs logic. I have used this rather odd,sounding term only because the term B"egelianB might risk confusion with "egelBs own thought and the term Bpost,"egelianB can include reference to philosophies whose underlying logic is vastly different from "egelBs. Instead, I mean of or relating to "egelBs logic as I have applied it here, in analogy to but not necessarily identical with "egelBs own.

6:6

PART I&: SUPPLEMENTAL

%ata Ta!les: )re+$ency nalysis
(he 3reJuency 2nalysis tables from $hapter . are included here for ease of reference.

T.,/+ 1. N(0,+1 2) O33(11+-3+4 2) 5*+ &.162(4 F2104

/arly Writings *ena Writings Phenomenology of 1pirit 5Urnberg V "eidelberg 1cience of ogic Philosophy of 'ight /ncyclopedia &erlin Writings Philosophy of "istory Philosophy of 3ine 2rt Philosophy of 'eligion "istory of Philosophy aufgehoben <9 D: 6<9 :< ;@; .< ..D 6< .C ;; 6;6 6C@ aufheben .C ?C 6CD D; ..; ;9 6?C 6< @ ;. :: <9 aufhebt 6; .C ;D 6@ DD @ 9C D : ;? ;@ ;6 Aufhebung ;9 6@ < 66 6D 66 <; < ? 6: ?; D *ialektik C . 6. ?C D. 6D << 6: 9 . 6< .69 dialektische C 6 .6 .? ?D 9 ;< D . 9 6? ;9

T.,/+ 2. S(00.17 2) 5*+ I-)210.562- 2- 5*+ D6))+1+-5 &2/(0+4

Pages (otal ;:: .D< .@< ?9? 9@; .DC DD; ;6D .:: ::D 9C: :?; Date 2verage 6D@:.9 6:C? 6:CD 6:6..9 6:6? 6:.C 6:.;.9 6:.?.9 6:.< 6:.? 6:.< 6:.? Aufheben (otal 2verage 6;; C.;? 69D C.9D ;69 6.C< 6:@ C.?. D6C 6..C :6 C.;C ?:C C.<. ?9 C.6? ?6 C.6? 66D C.6; ;C6 C.9@ .6. C..9 *ialektik (otal 2verage C C.CC ; C.C6 ;; C.66 <? C.6? 66@ C..C .. C.C: 6C. C.6; .9 C.C: D C.C. D C.C6 ;C C.C< .9C C.;C Difference 2verage C.;; C.9< C.@9 C..: 6.CC C... C.?@ C.C< C.6. C.6. C.9; ,C.C9

/arly Writings *ena Writings Phenomenology of 1pirit 5Urnberg V "eidelberg 1cience of ogic Philosophy of 'ight /ncyclopedia &erlin Writings Philosophy of "istory Philosophy of 3ine 2rt Philosophy of 'eligion "istory of Philosophy

T.,/+ 3. R+4(/54 2) 5*+ R+81+4462- A-./7464

Dependent 'egressor A;+1.8+ ;2/(0+ <.5+ =T+3*-63./> <(007 constant 'a 7bservations C2+))636+-5 :#.##82 #.$43# 69.6:;@ C.D; 6. Difference of 3reJuencies 1tandard error t,value C.CC<? ,6..: C.69D9 ?.C: 66.<?9. 6.;C 9:;./(+ #.232 #.##3 C...9

6:.

,om(arison o& the )irst an" Secon" #"itions

(he following excerpt compares the first K6:6.M and second editions K6:;6M of "egel 0issenschaft der $ogik. It includes the entire text of "egelBs remark KAnmerkungM from the end of $hapter 6, following the section on the N1ublation of &ecomingN KAufheben des 0erdensM. (hese three paragraphs represent "egelBs most elaborate and detailed treatment of his concept of sublation. It is Juoted freJuently and discussed at length in $hapter 6 of this study. I have Juoted the entire remark here so that readers might compare the two versions, and more easily view the whole context of the passages cited earlier only in part. (he 3irst /dition text is Juoted from the %einer edition K-W66L9D,9:M. (he 1econd /dition text is Juoted from the 1uhrkamp edition K"W9L66.,66?M. 2n /nglish version of the 1econd /dition can be found in the %iller translation K1 6C<,6C:M I have divided the text into three basic paragraphs, which correspond across both editions. 8nderlined text appears in first edition but is absent from the second. (ext in ,2/< indicates text added in the second edition. (ext that is both (-<+1/6-+< .-< 6- ,2/< indicates text altered between the two editions Ke.g. verschwunden KvanishedM to vernichtet KdestroyedMM. (he notable changes in the 1econd /dition are the characteriOation of aufheben as N&deelleN in paragraph 6 and the extended explanation added to paragraph .. (he paragraph labeled B..9B appears in the 3irst /dition but not the 1econd.

F6145 E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 1

Aufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt, deren 'inn bestimmt aufzufassen und besonders vom ,ichts zu unterscheiden ist. 3 0as sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu ,ichts. ,ichts ist das .nmittelbare- ein Aufgehobenes dagegen ist ein 1ermitteltes, es ist das ,ichtseiende, aber als 7esultat, das von einem 'ein ausgegangen ist- es hat daher die Bestimmtheit, aus der es herkommt, noch an sich.

S+32-< E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 1

Aufheben und das Aufgehobene 9"as I"eelle= ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt, deren 'inn bestimmt aufzufassen und besonders vom ,ichts zu unterscheiden ist. 3 0as sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu ,ichts. ,ichts ist das .nmittelbare- ein Aufgehobenes dagegen ist ein 1ermitteltes, es ist das ,ichtseiende, aber als 7esultat, das von einem 'ein ausgegangen istes hat daher die Bestimmtheit, aus der es herkommt, noch an sich.

6:;

F6145 E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 2

Aufheben hat in der 'prache den gedoppelten 'inn, da/ es soviel als aufbewahren, erhalten bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufh5ren lassen, ein "nde machen. *as Aufbewahren selbst schlie/t schon das ,egative in sich, da/ etwas seiner .nmittelbarkeit und damit einem den )u/erlichen "inwirkungen offenen *asein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten. 3 'o ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine .nmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht 'ersch-$n"en ist.

S+32-< E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 2

Aufheben hat in der 'prache den gedoppelten 'inn, da/ es soviel als aufbewahren, erhalten bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufh5ren lassen, ein "nde machen. *as Aufbewahren selbst schlie/t schon das ,egative in sich, da/ etwas seiner .nmittelbarkeit und damit einem den )u/erlichen "inwirkungen offenen *asein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten. 3 'o ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine .nmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht 'ernichtet ist. %ie angege!enen .-ei /estimm$ngen "es $&he!ens k0nnen le*ikalisch als .-ei /e"e$t$ngen "ieses 1ortes a$&ge&2hrt -er"en. $&&allen" m23te es a!er "a!ei sein4 "a3 eine S(rache "a.$ gekommen ist4 ein $n" "assel!e 1ort &2r .-ei entgegengeset.te /estimm$ngen .$ ge!ra$chen. )2r "as s(ek$lati'e %enken ist es er&re$lich4 in "er S(rache 10rter .$ &in"en4 -elche eine s(ek$lati'e /e"e$t$ng an ihnen sel!st ha!en5 "ie "e$tsche S(rache hat mehrere "ergleichen. %er %o((elsinn "es lateinischen tollere 6"er "$rch "en ,iceronianischen 1it. 7tollen"$m esse Octa'i$m7 !er2hmt ge-or"en8 geht nicht so -eit4 "ie a&&irmati'e /estimm$ng geht n$r !is .$m #m(orhe!en. #t-as ist n$r inso&ern a$&geho!en4 als es in "ie #inheit mit seinem #ntgegengeset.ten getreten ist5 in "ieser n9heren /estimm$ng als ein Re&lektiertes kann es (assen" :oment genannt -er"en. ;e-icht $n" #nt&ern$ng 'on einem P$nkt hei3en !eim He!el "essen mechanische :omente4 $m "er %iesel!igkeit ihrer 1irk$ng -illen !ei aller sonstigen <erschie"enheit eines Reellen4 -ie "as ein ;e-icht ist4 $n" eines I"eellen4 "er !lo3en r9$mlichen /estimm$ng4 "er Linie5 s. #n.yklo(9"ie "er (hiloso(hischen 1issenscha&ten4 3. $sga!e =1>3?@4 A 2B1 nm. C Noch 0&ter -ir" "ie /emerk$ng sich a$&"r9ngen4 "a3 "ie (hiloso(hische D$nsts(rache &2r re&lektierte /estimm$ngen lateinische $s"r2cke ge!ra$cht4 ent-e"er -eil "ie :$tters(rache keine $s"r2cke "a&2r hat o"er4 -enn sie "eren hat -ie hier4 -eil ihr $s"r$ck mehr an "as Enmittel!are4 "ie &rem"e S(rache a!er mehr an "as Re&lektierte erinnert.

F6145 E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 2.5

*as Aufgehobene genauer bestimmt, so ist hier etwas nur insofern aufgehoben, als es in die "inheit mit seinem "ntgegengesetzten getreten ist- es ist in dieser n)hern Bestimmung ein reflectirtes, und kann passend >oment genannt werden. Q0ie noch 5fter die Bemerkung sich aufdringen wird, da/ die philosophische Kuntsprache, f2r reflectirte Bestimmungen lateinische Ausdr2cke gebraucht.

6:?

F6145 E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 3

*er n)here 'inn und Ausdruck, den 'ein und ,ichts, indem sie nunmehr >omente sind, erhalten, hat sich bei der Betrachtung des *aseins als der "inheit, in der sie aufbewahrt sind, n)her zu ergeben. 'ein ist 'ein, und ,ichts ist ,ichts, nur in ihrer .nterschiedenheit von einander- in ihrer 0ahrheit aber, in ihrer "inheit sind sie als diese Bestimmungen verschwunden, und sind nun etwas anderes. 'ein und ,ichts sind dasselbe- darum weil sie dasselbe sind, sind sie nicht mehr 'ein und ,ichts, und haben eine verschiedene Bestimmungim 0erden waren sie "ntstehen und 1ergehen- im *asein als einer anders bestimmten "inheit sind sie wieder anders bestimmte >omente.

S+32-< E<6562-, P.1.81.9* 3

*er n)here 'inn und Ausdruck, den 'ein und ,ichts, indem sie nunmehr >omente sind, erhalten, hat sich bei der Betrachtung des *aseins als der "inheit, in der sie aufbewahrt sind, zu ergeben. 'ein ist 'ein und ,ichts ist ,ichts nur in ihrer .nterschiedenheit voneinander- in ihrer 0ahrheit aber, in ihrer "inheit sind sie als diese Bestimmungen verschwunden und sind nun etwas anderes. 'ein und ,ichts sind dasselbe- darum weil sie dasselbe sind, sind sie nicht mehr 'ein und ,ichts und haben eine verschiedene Bestimmung- im 0erden waren sie "ntstehen und 1ergehen- im *asein als einer anders bestimmten "inheit sind sie wieder anders bestimmte >omente. *iese "inheit bleibt nun ihre Grundlage, aus der sie nicht mehr zur abstrakten Bedeutung von 'ein und ,ichts heraustreten.

6:9

$&he!en:
G+-+1./

/rie& Historical O'er'ie-

(he purpose of this overview is to illustrate how "egelBs concept of sublation, as I have interpreted it in this study, is uniJue to "egel alone. In order to do so, I look at #ust a small handful of historical examples and mention how "egelBs technical sense of the term aufheben differs from each. (he purpose of these examples is not to present a complete history of the concept, but to show the ways "egelBs concept differs from certain key thinkers with which it is commonly identified. (herefore, this overview is more of a suggestion of uniJueness than a complete demonstration. &y carefully targeting certain common alternate conceptions of aufheben and how "egel differs from them, however, I believe this suggestion should suffice. 2t the beginning of modern -erman philosophy, the word aufheben is simply used to render the atin tollere. (his identification is found, for example, in the writings of $hristian Wolff. (he difference between aufheben and tollere for "egel was already discussed in $hapter 6, 1ection 2 of this study. (o recapitulate the point here4 while "egel notes that aufheben means both to negate and to preserve, he claims that tollereBs positive meaning is not as strong. 2ccording to "egel, aufhebenBs sense of preservation is to be contrasted with tollereBs sense of elevation. In this way, "egel distinguishes his technical conception of aufheben not only from tollere, but also from those uses of aufheben that are eJuated with tollere Ke.g. WolffBs sense of aufhebenM.

K.-5
(he term aufheben achieves a certain prominence in subseJuent -erman philosophy thanks to )ant. In the preface to the second K&M edition of the :riti?ue of Pure 7eason K6D:DM, )ant makes his well,known remark NI have therefore found it necessary to den# knowledge, in order to make room for faith....N6 In this common /nglish version of the famous phrase,
6

N &ch mu/te also das 0issen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen...N K$P' &xxx,/2M

6:< translator 5orman )emp 1mith uses the /nglish word Bto denyB to render the -erman aufheben.. I would hypothesiOe that it is possible that it is this sentence that brings aufheben to the attention of later thinkers as a significant philosophical concept. "owever, for our purposes, this need only remain a hypothesis. What is important for our purposes is )antBs usage relative to "egelBs. It would seem that )ant uses aufheben in both a negative and positive sense here, insofar as knowledgeIas the grammatical ob#ect being sublatedIis clearly both negated and, at the same time, not completely abolished. In the :riti?ue of Pure 7eason, knowledge is limited Ki.e. negatedM so that it can be defended against both dogmatism and skepticism Ki.e. preservedM. Interpreted in this way, )antBs usage of the term would seem similar to "egelBs. (here is, however, at least one important distinction between the twoIthe difference in the choice of grammatical ob#ect. 3or )ant, knowledge is that which is being sublated, rather than the opposition between concepts like knowledge and faith. Instead of sublating the difference between knowledge and faith in order to establish a unity, )ant uses the term aufheben to articulate a difference. )nowledge is sublated in order Nto make roomN KPlatz zu bekommen, literally Bto make a placeBM for faith. Aufheben is thus used here in the sense of a negation; not a complete negation or annihilation by any means, but a negation nonetheless; more specifically, the term is used in the sense of limitation. In )ant, the term aufheben determines a division between opposites rather than a unity. 1o while )antBs critical philosophy could be interpreted as a sublation of knowledge Kin the "egelian sense of aufhebenM, that is not how )ant uses the term here. "egelBs and )antBs uses aufheben would is in this sense distinct.

S3*6//+1
2 few years later K6D@?M 1chiller, in his 4n the Aesthetic "ducation of >an, uses the term aufheben a number of times as a philosophical concept. 3or example, in the eighteenth
.

I am indebted to "oward $aygill KA Kant *ictionar# K&lackwell, 6@@9M, 6@;M for calling my attention to this Juote in relation to aufheben.

6:D etter, he writes, N&eauty unites these two opposed states and thus sublates Shebt...aufT the opposition. &ut because both states remain eternally opposed to each other, they cannot be united in any other way than by being sublated SaufgehobenT.N; "ere, unlike )ant, 1chiller uses the term aufheben in relation to a unity of opposites, in a manner that seems Juite "egelian. 2s in "egel, it is the opposition between concepts, rather than the concepts themselves, that is here the grammatical ob#ect of sublation. (his unity of opposites, however, is not ultimately a "egelian one. ater in the same etter, 1chiller writes4
7ur second task, therefore, is to make this union complete; and to do it with such unmitigated thoroughness that both these conditions totally disappear Sg)nzlich verschwindenT in a third without leaving any trace of division behind in the new whole that has been made; otherwise we shall succeed in distinguishing but never in uniting them.?

In the broader context of 1chillerBs remarks, we can thus see how his conception of the unity of opposites through aufheben is in this case distinct from "egelBs. 3or 1chiller, this unification reJuires that the two opposites Ntotally disappearN Kg)nzlich verschwindenM, leaving no trace. 3or "egel, on the other hand, N(hus what is sublated is at the same preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.N9 (he -erman term for the result "egel re#ects hereIvernichtet Kannihilated, destroyedMIis from the 1econd /dition of the 'cience of $ogic. In the 3irst /dition, the term "egel uses for this re#ected result is verschwunden KdisappearedM.< (he term that "egel re#ects as a result is the same term 1chiller uses KemphasiOed in the passage Juoted aboveM to describe his own result. (hus, while both 1chiller and "egel use aufheben in relation to the unity of opposites, they
;

1chiller, 3rederich, 4n the Aesthetic "ducation of >an, trans. /.%. Wilkinson and .2. Willoughby K7xford, 6@<DM, 6.;. (he Wilkinson and Willboughy edition includes the -erman original on the facing pages. "owever, I have used a modified version of Walter )aufmannBs translation of this phrase instead, in order to highlight the use of aufheben. 1ee Walter )aufmann, 6egel% A 7einterpretation K8niversity of 5otre Dame, 6@<9M, .9. ? N.nser zweites Gesch)ft ist also, diese 1erbindung vollkommen zu machen, sie so rein und vollst)ndig durchzuf2hren, dass beide (ust)nde in einem *irtten g)nzlich verschwinden und keine 'pur der !eilung in dem Ganzen zur2ckbleibt sonst vereinzeln wir, aber vereinigen nicht.N K1chiller, 6.9M 9 N 'o ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine .nmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht vernichtet ist.N K1 6CD; "W9L66?,/2M < 1ee N2 $omparison of the 3irst and 1econd /ditionsN, above.

6:: each use the term in exactly the opposite sense of the other. 3urthermore, the fact that in the first edition of the $ogic "egel uses the e+act word that 1chiller does to describe what he re#ects seems, at least, to be Juite a remarkable coincidence. "egel himself was well aware of 1chillerBs essay. Writing to 1chelling a year later K6D@9M, "egel calls 1chillerBs essay Na masterpieceN.D -iven "egelBs esteem of this work and the remarkable coincidence of terminology, one could readily suppose Kagain hypotheticallyM that "egel was inspired by 1chiller when formulating his own concept of aufheben. "owever, I think 1chillerBs /nglish editors KWilkinson and WilloughbyM go too far when they claim that NIn this double sense aufheben was to become a key,term of "egelBs dialectical method.N: 2s I have #ust shown, while 1chiller uses the term in relation to the unity of opposites, the resulting unity is precisely the opposite of that found in "egelBs own concept of aufheben. 1chiller uses aufheben as a synonym for what I have called simple negation.@ 2s I have previously noted, the interpretation of sublation as simple negation completely obscures "egelBs own conception of the term and its purpose in the science of logic4 "egelBs essentially critical philosophy is thereby warped into a destructive, skeptical one. -iven its conseJuences and the fundamental misunderstandings that result from it, this interpretation of aufheben as simple negation is amaOingly common, for reasons we will see momentarily.

M.1@
"egelBs concept of sublation as both negation and preservation broke down Juite rapidly after his death. In very general, schematic terms, the 7ld "egelians, who used "egelBs philosophy as a means to defend tradition, emphasiOed the sense of preservation over negation and the >oung "egelians, who used "egelBs philosophy to attack those traditions, emphasiOed the sense of negation over preservation. 7n a conceptual level, neither faction maintained the

D : @

"egel, -.W.3., 6egel% !he $etters, (rans. $lark &utler KIndiana, 6@:?M, ;<. 1chiller, ;C9. 1ee $hapter 6, 1ection 2, 1ubsection 6.

6:@ concept of aufheben in "egelBs own, doubled sense. I will not explore the particular stages of decay here, but we can take up one prominent example. %arx uses the term Aufhebung in a famous line from the :ommunist >anifesto4 NIn this sense, the theory of the $ommunist Party may be summed up in a single sentence4 abolition of private propert#.N6C (he $ommunist aufheben of private property is Juite obviously a simple negation. 2ll property is completely subsumed in the stateIit is purely totalitarian, and any preservation of private property would be considered merely bourgeois. (he %arxist sense of aufheben clearly does not possess the preservative element of "egelBs concept.66 3rom this example, it would seem that by the time we arrive at %arx, the concept of aufheben has lost much if not all of the technical, double sense in which "egel used it. In effect, one could say that, by the time we reach %arx, the concept of aufheben had reverted to a pre,"egelian form, much closer to 1chillerBs than "egelBs. It is as if "egelBs fusion of negation and preservation in his concept of aufheben was somehow unstable, like something radioactive with a short half,life, rapidly decaying into its component parts or simpler states. )arl +with aptly summariOes this phenomena with the line N"egelBs pupils and successors put asunder what he had so painfully #oined together, and demanded decisions in the place of his mediations.N6. I suspect that this decay serves as a sort of crossroads for subseJuent misinterpretations of "egelBs concept of sublation Ke.g. the postmodern BtotalitarianB readingM. 7f course, actually demonstrating the progression of this Bputting asunderB would reJuire more than this brief set of examples. I have offered this overview not as a substitute for a proper historical analysis of the pre, and post,"egelian development of the concept of aufheben, but only in order to suggest a sense of the uniJueness of "egelBs technical sense of
6C

)arl %arx and 3riedrich /ngels, !he :ommunist >anifesto, ed. 3rederic . &ender K5orton, 6@DDM, <:. In -erman, the sentence reads N&n diesem 'inn k5nnen die Kommunisten ihre !heorie in dem einen Ausdruck% 2ufhebung des Privateigentums, zusammenfassen.N KKarl >ar+ 8rederich "ngels 0erke KDietO, 6@DDM, ?L?D9M 66 7n this distinction between the "egelian and %arxist concepts of aufheben Krather than simply a focus on dialecticM see, for example, $harles (aylor, 6egel K$ambridge, 6@D9M, 99?. 6. )arl +with, 8rom 6egel to ,ietzsche, trans. David /. -reen K$olumbia, 6@<?M, .??.

6@C aufheben and to illustrate concretely some of the ways my structural,functional approach might augment further analysis.

6@6

/i!liogra(hy
N25+4 O- C65.562-4
3reJuently cited works are abbreviated in the footnotes as follows4 6egel 0erke K1uhrkampM Gesammelte 0erke K%einerM 'cience of $ogic "nc#clopedia Phenomenolog# of 'pirit $ectures on 8ine Art $ectures on the 6istor# of Philosoph# :riti?ue of Pure 7eason "W -W 1 / P1 2 "P $P'

(hese abbreviations are repeated in the entry for each of the texts in the bibliography, for ease of reference. In addition, changes that I have made in the cited passages are indicated as follows4 /mphasis 2dded /2 (ranslation %odified (% $hanges in emphasis have been made to facilitate exposition, in order to highlight the particular words or phrases under discussions. %odifications to the published /nglish translations have usually been made for the sake of terminological consistency.

W21A4 C65+<
2rendt, "annah. $ectures on KantGs Political Philosoph#. 8niversity of $hicago Press, 6@@.. 2ustin, *. . 6ow to *o !hings 0ith 0ords% !he 0illiam Cames $ectures delivered at 6arvard .niversit# in @RSS. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@<.. &eiser, 3rederick. 6egel. 'outledge, .CC9 &loom, "arold. !he An+iet# of &nfluence% A !heor# of Poetr#. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@D.. &utler, $lark. 6egelGs $ogic% *ialectic and 6istor#. 5orthwestern 8niversity Press, 6@@<. $aygill, "oward. A Kant *ictionar#. &lackwell Publishers, 6@@9. Degryse, 2nnelies. N1ensus $ommunis as the Inner 2wareness of Plurality4 2 Different Interpretation of "annah 2rendtHs ectures on )antHs Political Philosophy.N Philosoph# and 'ocial :riticism, !olume ;9 K.C6CM KforthcomingM. Desmond, William. Art and the Absolute% a 'tud# of 6egelGs Aesthetics. 185> Press, 6@:<. III. Being and the Between. 185> Press, 6@@9. III. Be#ond 6egel and *ialectic% 'peculation, :ult, and :omed#. 185> Press, 6@@.. 3indlay, *.5. 6egel% A 7e3"+amination. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@9:. 3orster, %ichael. 6egel and 'kepticism. "arvard 8niversity Press, 6@:@. 3oucault, %ichel. !he Archeolog# of Knowledge. (rans. 2.%. 1heridan 1mith. (avistock Publications imited, 6@D.. 3rye, 5orthrop. !he Anatom# of :riticism% 8our "ssa#s. Princeton 8niversity Press, 6@9D. 3ukuyama, 3rancis. !rust% !he 'ocial 1irtues and the :reation of Prosperit#. 3ree Press, 6@@9. 3ulda, 3. NAufheben.N 6istorisches 05rterbuch der Philosophie. /d. *oachim 'itter. 1chwabe, 6@D64 <6:,<.C.

6@. -adamer, "ans,-eorg. 6egelGs *ialectic% 8ive 6ermeneutical 'tudies. (rans. P. $hristopher 1mith. >ale 8niversity Press, 6@D<. III. !ruth and >ethod, End 7evised "dition. (rans. *oel Weinsheimer and Donald -. %arshall. $ontinuum Publishing $ompany, .CC.. W.". -reene. "conometric Anal#sis, 8ourth "dition. Prentice,"all, .CCC. "abermas, *Urgen. Knowledge and 6uman &nterests. (rans. *eremy *. 1hapiro. &eacon Press, 6@D.. "egel, -.W.3. Aesthetics% $ectures on 8ine Art. (rans. (.%. )nox. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@@:. K2bbreviated LAM III. !he "nc#clopedia $ogic% Part & of the "nc#clopedia of Philosophical 'ciences with the (us)tze. (rans. and eds. (.3. -eraets, W.2. 1uchting, and ".1. "arris. "acket Publishing $ompany, 6@@6. K2bbreviated ELM III. "nc#clopedia of the Philosophical 'ciences in 4utline and :ritical 0ritings. /d. /rnst &ehler. $ontinuum, 6@@C. III. Gesammelte 0erke. 3elix %einer !erlag, 6@D:. K2bbreviated GWM III. 6egel% !he $etters. (rans. $lark &utler and $hristiane 1eiler. Indiana 8niversity Press, 6@:?. III. 6egelGs Phenomenolog# of 'pirit. (rans. 2.!. %iller. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@DD. K2bbreviated PSM III. 6egelGs 'cience of $ogic. (rans. 2.!. %iller. "umanity &ooks, 6@@@. K2bbreviated SLM III. -.W.3. 6egel 0erke. $D,'7%. (apla,!erlag &erlin, !ersion ..C. Windows. K2 collection of -.W.3. "egel. 0erke in EF B)nden. 1uhrkamp !erlag, 6@DC.M K2bbreviated HWM III. $ectures on $ogic% Berlin,@AB@. (rans. $lark &utler. Indiana 8niversity Press, .CC6. III. $ectures on the 6istor# of Philosoph# &% Greek Philosoph# to Plato. (rans. .1. "aldane. 8niversity of 5ebraska Press, 6@@9. K2bbreviated LHP1M III. $ectures on the 6istor# of Philosoph# &&&% >edieval and >odern Philosoph#. (rans. .1. "aldane. 8niversity of 5ebraska Press, 6@@9. K2bbreviated LHP3M. III. Political 0ritings. /d. ". &. 5isbet and aurence Dickey. (rans. ".&. 5isbet. $ambridge 8niversity Press, 6@@@. III. NWho (hinks 2bstractlyQN 6egel% 7einterpretation, !e+ts, and :ommentar#. (rans. and ed. Walter )aufmann. Doubleday, 6@<9. "eidegger, %artin. Being and !ime. (rans. *ohn %acJuarrie and /dward 'obinson. "arper and 'ow, 6@<.. III. Kant and the Problem of >etaph#sics. (rans. 'ichard (aft. Indiana 8niversity Press, 6@@D. III. >artin 6eidegger% Basic 0ritings. (rans. David 3arrell )rell. 'outledge, 6@D:. "enrich, Dieter. Between Kant and 6egel% $ectures on German &dealism. (rans. and ed. David 1. Pacini. "arvard 8niversity Press, .CC;. Inwood, %ichael. A 6egel *ictionar#. &lackwell, 6@@.. )aufmann, Walter. 6egel% A 7einterpretation. 8niversity of 5otre Dame Press, 6@D:. III. (ragedy and Philosophy. Princeton 8niversity Press, 6@<:. )ant, Immanuel. &mmanuel KantGs :riti?ue of Pure 7eason. (rans. 5orman )emp 1mith. %acmillan Press, 6@.@. K2bbreviated CPRM. III. Kritik der reinen 1ernunft. Insel !erlag, 6@9<. )eenan, Dennis )ing, ed. 6egel and :ontemporar# :ontinental Philosoph#. 185> Press, .CC?. )uhn, (homas. !he 'tructure of 'cientific 7evolutions. 8niversity of $hicago Press, 6@<..

6@; evinas, /mmanuel. !otalit# and &nfinit#% An "ssa# on "+teriorit#. (rans. 2lphonso ingis. DuJuesne 8niversity Press, 6@<@. +with, )arl. 8rom 6egel to ,ietzsche% !he 7evolution in ,ineteenth3:entur# !hought. (rans. David /. -reen. $olumbia 8niversity Press, 6@<?. yotard, *ean,3ran`ois. !he Postmodern :ondition% A 7eport on Knowledge. (rans. -eoff &ennington and &rian %assumi. 8niversity of %innesota Press, 6@:?. %arcuse, "erbert. 7eason and 7evolution% 6egel and the 7ise of 'ocial !heor#. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@?6. 'eprint4 &eacon Press, 6@<C. %arx, )arl and 3riedrich /ngels. !he :ommunist >anifesto. /d. 3rederic . &ender. W.W. 5orton and $ompany, 6@DD. III. N%anifest der kommunistischen Partei.N Karl >ar+ 8rederich "ngels 0erke. DietO !erlag, 6@DD. %ueller, -ustav. E(he "egel egend of P(hesis,2ntithesis,1ynthesisH.N !he 6egel >#ths and $egends. /d. *on 1tewart. 5orthwestern 8niversity Press, 6@@<4 ;C6,;C9. Palm, 'alph. N(oward the 7ther in "usserl and evinas4 2n Introduction to the Phenomenology of 1ociality.N )atholieke 8niversiteit euven K(hesisM, .CCC. Peterson, $hristopher and %artin 1eligman. $earned 6elplessness% A !heor# for the Age of Personal :ontrol. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@@9. 'edding, Paul. 6egelGs 6ermeneutics. $ornell 8niversity Press, 6@@<. 'orty, 'ichard. Philosoph# and the >irror of ,ature. Princeton 8niversity Press, 6@D@. 1chiller, 3riedrich von. 4n the Aesthetic "ducation of >an in a 'eries of $etters. (rans. and eds. /.%. Wilkinson and .2. Willoughby. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@<D. 1earle, *ohn. "+pression and >eaning% 'tudies in the !heor# of 'peech Acts. $ambridge 8niversity Press, 6@D@. 1olomon, 'obert. &n the 'pirit of 6egel% A 'tud# of G.0.8 6egelGs Phenomenolog# of 'pirit. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@:;. 1tirling, *.%. !he 'ecret of 6egel% Being the 6egelian '#stem in 4rigin, Principle, 8orm and >atter. 7liver and &oyd, 6:@:. (aylor, $harles. 6egel. $ambridge 8niversity Press, 6@D9. Winfield, 'ichard Dien. N(he %ethod of "egelBs 1cience of ogic.N "ssa#s in 6egelGs $ogic. 185> Press, 6@@C.

W21A4 C2-4(/5+<
2pel, )arl,7tto. .nderstanding and "+planation% A !ranscendental3Pragmatic Perspective. (rans. -eorgia Warnke. %I( Press, 6@:?. &eiser, 3rederick. !he 8ate of 7eason% German Philosoph# from Kant to 8ichte. "arvard 8niversity Press, 6@@;. III. German &dealism% !he 'truggle Against 'ubjectivism, @PA@3@AF@. "arvard 8niversity Press, .CC.. de &oer, )arin. !hinking in the $ight of !ime% 6eideggerGs "ncounter with 6egel. 185> Press, .CCC. &reunig, $harles. !he Age of 7evolution and 7eaction, @PAR3@ASF, 'econd "dition. W.W. 5orton and $ompany, 6@DD. $arlson, David -ray. A :ommentar# to 6egelGs 'cience of $ogic. Palgrave %ac%illan, .CCD. Derrida, *acJues. 0riting and *ifference. (rans. 2lan &ass. 8niversity of $hicago Press, 6@D:. Desmond, William. "thics and the Between. 185> Press, .CC6. III. 6egelGs God% A :ounterfeit *oubleT 2shgate Publishing, .CC;.

6@? III. Philosoph# and &ts 4thers% 0a#s of Being and >ind. 185> Press, 6@@C. /agleton, (erry. After !heor#. Penguin &ooks, .CC?. III. $iterar# !heor#% An &ntroduction, 'econd "dition. 8niversity of %innesota Press, 6@@<. 3ichte, *.-. 'cience of Knowledge% 0ith the 8irst and 'econd &ntroductions. (rans. and eds. Peter "eath and *ohn aches. $ambridge 8niversity Press, 6@:.. "egel, -.W.3. "arl# !heological 0ritings. (rans. (. %. )nox. 8niversity of $hicago, 6@?:. III. $ectures on the Philosoph# of 7eligion% 4ne31olume "dition, the $ectures of @AEP. /d. Peter $. "odgson. 8niversity of $alifornia Press, 6@::. III. >iscellaneous 0ritings. /d. *on 1tewart. 5orthwestern 8niversity Press, .CCC. III. !he Philosoph# of 6istor#. (rans. *. 1ibree. Dover Publications, 6@9<. "ippolyte, *ean. $ogic and "+istence. (rans. eonard awlor and 2mit 1en. 185> Press, 6@@D. "oulgate, 1tephen. !he 4pening of 6egelGs $ogic. Purdue 8niversity Press, .CC<. *aeschke, Walter. 6egel 6andbuch. !erlag *.&. %etOler, .CC;. )aufmann, Walter. N(he "egel %yth and Its %ethod.N 6egelGs Political Philosoph#. /d. Walter )aufmann. 2therton Press, 6@DC. )o#bve, 2lexandre. &ntroduction to the 7eading of 6egel% $ectures on the Phenomenolog# of 'pirit. (rans. *ames ". 5ichols, *r. &asic &ooks, 6@<@. %c$ort, Dennis. Going Be#ond the Pairs% !he :oincidence of 4pposites in German 7omanticism, (en, and *econstruction. 185> Press, .CC6. %c$umber, *ohn. !he :ompan# of 0ords% 6egel, $anguage, and '#stematic Philosoph#. 5orthwestern 8niversity Press, 6@@;. 5ancy, *ean, uc. 6egel% !he 7estlessness of the ,egative. (rans. *ason 1mith and 1teven %iller. 8niversity of %innesota Press, .CC.. 7B$onnor, &rian. AdornoGs ,egative *ialectic% Philosoph# and the Possibilit# of :ritical 7ationalit#. %I( Press, .CC?. Pinkard, (erry. 6egel% A Biograph#. $ambridge 8niversity Press, .CCC. Pippin, 'obert. 6egelGs &dealism% !he 'atisfactions of 'elf3:onsciousness. $ambridge 8niversity Press, 6@:@. III. N"egelBs %etaphysics and the Problem of $ontradiction.N !he 6egel >#ths and $egends. /d. *on 1tewart. 5orthwestern 8niversity Press, 6@@<4 .;@,.9.. 'ichter, David "., ed. 8alling into !heor#% :onflicting 1iews on 7eading $iterature. &edford &ooks, 6@@?. 1heehan, *ames *. German 6istor#% @PPF3@ANN. 7xford 8niversity Press, 6@:@. 1tromberg, 'oland 5. "uropean &ntellectual 6istor# 'ince @PAR, 8ourth "dition. Prentice "all, 6@:<. (aylor, 'onald. !he 7omantic !radition in German#% An Antholog#, with :ritical "ssa#s and :ommentar#. %ethuen and $o., 6@DC. Wolff, $hristian. Gesammelte 0erke. -eorg 7las !erlag, 6@@9.