When Reagan Cut and Run

The forgotten history of when America boldly abandoned ship in the Middle East.

BY MICAH ZENKO FEBRUARY 7, 2014 Thirty years ago this week, President Ronald Reagan made perhaps the most purposeful and consequential foreign-policy decision of his presidency. Though he never said so e plicitly, he ended !merica"s military commitment to a strategic mistake that was peripheral to !merica"s interests. Three-and-a-half months after the #om#ing of the $arine #arracks in %eirut that killed &'( ).*. military personnel + and after repeatedly pledging not to do so + Reagan ordered the withdrawal of all ).*. troops from ,e#anon. !s -en. Colin Powell later aptlysummari.ed this military misadventure/ 0%eirut wasn"t sensi#le and it never did serve a purpose. 1t was goofy

from the #eginning.2 What was particularly remarka#le a#out Reagan"s #old decision was its rarity. Presidents often authori.e using force or deploying troops to achieve some discrete set of political and military o#3ectives. When they prove incapa#le of doing so with the initial resources and political support, the mission can #e scaled #ack in its scope, enlarged to achieve additional missions, or, the atypical choice, terminated. The latter option requires having the a#ility to recogni.e failure, and political courage to end a ).*. military commitment. 1n large part, it is a com#ined lack of strategic awareness and political courage that e plains many ).*. military disasters. To understand how Ronald Reagan successfully pulled this off, it is worth reviewing and remem#ering the strategic mistake that was the ).*. military deployment to ,e#anon in the midst of that country"s wrenching civil war. )pon the request of the government of ,e#anon, the )nited 4ations authori.ed the $ultinational 5orce in ,e#anon 6$457 in (89& to help the government regain control over the country. There was strong disagreement within the Reagan administration a#out potential ).*. involvement, with the :oint Chiefs of *taff unanimously opposed to the deployment, and the 4ational *ecurity Council and *tate ;epartment deeply enthusiastic. *u#sequently, the :oint Chiefs developed a range of options for !merica"s participation in the $45, including sending up to <=,>>> ).*. troops to ,e#anon to disarm the militias, and enforce the peace in territory under the control of *yria and 1srael. )ltimately, without congressional approval, Reagan authori.ed the deployment of what was seen as a limited mission of some (,9>> $arines, who 3oined 5rench, 1talian, and later %ritish troops. Reagan claimed/ 0Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations,2 #ut 0in carrying out this mission, the !merican force will not engage in com#at.2 !fter the Palestine ,i#eration ?rgani.ation 6P,?7 pulled out of %eirut in !ugust (89&, $45 troops withdrew to their ships offshore. %ut the assassination of ,e#anese President %achir -emayel, massacre of Palestinian refugees + who were living in camps under 1sraeli military control + #y militias linked to the $aronite Christian Phalange Party, and the su#sequent chaos led almost immediately to international support for a second $45 deployment. 1t was during this second $45 deployment that the intention and scope of ).*. forces was never quite clear. 1t was during this second $45 deployment that the intention and scope of ).*. forces was never quite clear.*hortly after the ).*. troops returned to ,e#anese territory, on !ug. &>, (89&, Reagan contended that they would now 0assist the ,e#anese !rmed

5orces in carrying out their responsi#ility for ensuring the departure of P,? leaders, officers, and com#atants in %eirut from ,e#anese territory,2 and 0facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the ,e#anese -overnment over the %eirut area.2 @e added/ 01n no case will our troops stay longer than => days.2 ?n ?ct. &9, *ecretary of ;efense Caspar Wein#erger offered his astonishingly contradictory statement/ 0What we need is a multinational force until certain conditions have #een achieved. 4o#ody knows when those conditions can #e achieved. 1t is not an open-ended commitment.2 6Wein#erger later wrote in his memoir, 01 o#3ected Ato the deploymentB, of course, very strongly, #ecause this $45 would not have any mission that could #e defined.27 *tate ;epartment official ,awrence Cagle#urger, using 1raq surge-like language, later claimed during a congressional hearing that the $arines" mission was 2to provide the -overnment of ,e#anon a #reathing spell to #egin to sort out the country"s political pro#lems.2 %y *ept. &8, (89=, Reagan stated/ 0Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and there#y provide the multinational presence as requested #y the ,e#anese -overnment to assist it and the ,e#anese !rmed 5orces.2 1n ?cto#er (89=, after five $arines were killed in three separate incidents, 4ational *ecurity !dvisor Ro#ert $c5arlane convinced the president to authori.e the )** 4ew :ersey to launch attacks against the ;ru.e militia and *yrian forces on land. !ccording to Powell, once the naval attack commenced, the *hiites 0assumed the !merican Dreferee" had taken sides against them. !nd since they could not reach the #attleship, they found a more vulnera#le target/ the e posed $arines at the airport.2 Within one week, @e.#ollah-linked militants drove two truck #om#s containing a half a kiloton of e plosives into the $arine #arracks at the %eirut 1nternational !irport, killing &&> $arines and &( other ).*. service mem#ers. Reagan neverretaliatedagainst @e.#ollah or their 1ranian and *yrian sponsors responsi#le for the #om#ings, a position widely endorsed #y senior military officials 1n the months that followed, the Reagan administration discussed a range of options including striking #ack and fully withdrawing the $arines. The Reagan administration also considered the pluses and minuses of withdrawing from the $45. ?n the day after the #arracks #om#ing, however, the presidentreaffirmed his commitment/ 0The reason they must stay there until the situation is under control is quite clear. We have vital interests in ,e#anon. !nd our actions in ,e#anon are in the cause of world peace.2 ?ver a month later, on ;ec. (, Reagan stated that the $arines were in %eirut to 0demonstrate the strength of our commitment to peace in the $iddle CastE. Their presence is making it possi#le for reason to triumph over the forces of violence, hatred, and intimidation.2 4ine days

later, he told the nation/ 0?nce internal sta#ility is esta#lished and withdrawal of all foreign forces is assured, the $arines will leave.2 5inally, on 5e#. ', (89', Reagan stated something frequently heard in de#ates over !fghanistan and other theaters of conflict today + if the )nited *tates withdraws, 0we"ll #e sending one signal to terrorists everywhere/ They can gain #y waging war against innocent peopleE. 1f we"re to #e secure in our homes and in the world, we must stand together against those who threaten us.2Reagan never retaliated against @e.#ollah or their 1ranian and *yrian sponsors responsi#le for the #om#ings, a position widely endorsed #y senior military officials. !s then-Chairman of the :oint Chiefs -en. :ohn Fessey declared/ 01t is #eneath our dignity to retaliate against the terrorists who #lew up the $arine #arracks.2 Get, 3ust three days later, on 5e#. H, Reagan ordered the $arines to 0redeploy2 to their ships offshore + which was actually a full withdrawal achieved in three weeks. !lthough the $arine"s mission in ,e#anon was not clearly defined and, su#sequently, not achieved, Reagan"s tacit admission of failure and withdrawal of the $arines from ,e#anon limited !merica"s further involvement in foreign-policy disaster + saving money, lives, and time. $any pundits later claimed wrongly that Reagan was erroneous, #ecause ?sama #in ,aden contended that the withdrawal was a sign of ).*. weaknessI as if !merica"s strategic choices should #e held hostage to how terrorists choose to descri#e them. ).*. officials and policymakers often share a long tradition of refusing to acknowledge strategic errors, or to place specific #lame on individuals responsi#le for their authori.ation and e ecution. Rather, the causes of defeat are assigned to anonymous sources like 0the #ureaucracy,2 0lack of pu#lic will,2 or may#e 0Congress.2 When serving or retired officials are asked whether a war or military intervention was a mistake, they often reply/ 0That"s for historians to decide.2 Cven then-*ecretary of ;efense Ro#ert -ates said this when asked if 1raq was 0worth it2 3ust #efore he retired/ 0A1Bt really requires a historian"s perspective in terms of what happens here in the long term.2 %ut historians do not make future policy decisionsI they study and assess previous ones. *ending $arines to ,e#anon for such an imprecise and unachieva#le end-state was a tremendous mistake. Reagan"s decision to tacitly admit that it was a ).*. foreign-policy failure, and to then undertake corrective actions, was an admira#le trait rarely seen in poilcymakers or presidents. $1JC *!R-C4TK!5PK-etty 1mages Posted #y Thavam