The Battle of Eylau

(February 7-8, 1807)

From Denis Davidov's Memoirs Translated and introduced by Greg Troubetzkoy

Introdu t!on
Napoleon's successful campaign against Prussia in 1806 ama ed everyone! "e appeared unstoppable in #is plans to #ammer out ne$ foundations for %urope and bend it to #is $ill! &#ile #e succeeded in destroying t#e Prussian military mac#ine in t#e battles of 'ena and (uerstadt) #is diplomatic efforts met $it# little success! *ussia continued to refuse to +oin #is crusade against %ngland and to accept t#e ne$ status,-uo imposed in central %urope! T#e economic bloc.ade promulgated from /erlin in November 1806 did not bring t#e #oped,for result and force %ngland to #er .nees! 0nstead) it $ould gradually bring economic ruin to Napoleon's empire! "is efforts to pin t#e *ussians do$n and to destroy t#em $ere also proving elusive! ( long $inter $ar $as looming a#ead) and t#e *ussians and Frenc# armies prepared to meet! T#e original *ussian plan $as to surprise and over$#elm t#e Frenc# troops under /ernadotte and Ney) before Napoleon and t#e ot#er corps of #is army) about 80)000 strong) could come to t#eir rescue) and defeat t#em separately! 0n #is $inter -uarters) /ernadotte #ad 11)000 troops) almost outside t#e military operations) in %lbingen! Ney #ad 22)000 infantry soldiers and t#e cavalry of /essieres in #is corps) also far flung out! "o$ever) Ney $as not in #is $inter -uarters) but $as actually pursuing 3estoc.'s corps in t#e direction of Friedland) and t#ereby $as almost on t#e route $#ic# $as being follo$ed by t#e *ussian army4 T#e plan $as to cut off and destroy Ney's corps $#ile on t#e marc#) but due to slo$ movement and incorrect orientation of t#e *ussians) Ney $as able to marc# t#roug# %ylau) follo$ t#e Passarge river) and +oin t#e main body of t#e Frenc# army! /ernadotte) learning of t#e *ussian movement to intercept Ney and /essieres) reali ed t#e danger of remaining near t#e sea s#ore ne5t to t#e fortified to$ns of Dan ig and 6rauden ) $#ic# $ere still occupied by t#e Prussians! T#erefore) /ernadotte left %lbing) and marc#ed to Mo#rungen) $#ere #e $as able to ma.e a stand and avoid encirclement up nort#!

(fter s.irmis#ing for almost eig#t #ours $it# 7oult and Murat around %ylau's cemetery on 1 February) /enningsen $it# about 80)000 men under #is command s#ould #ave attac.ed t#e Frenc# at t#e crac. of da$n on 8 February) before Davout and Ney arrived! T#ey $ere still t$enty and t$enty,five miles off respectively $#en t#ey $ere summoned urgently by Napoleon to come +oin #is forces! Davout $as #urrying from /artenstein $it# about 18)000 men!

Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte

0nstead) t#e *ussians opened a cannonade early in t#e morning $it# 800 artillery pieces of $#ic# one,t#ird $as of #eavy caliber! (t about 1900 P!M!) #aving arrived $it# fres# troops) Davout attac.ed t#e *ussian left and t#reatened t#eir rear! /enningsen turned most of #is troops against #im! To prevent t#is) Napoleon ordered (ugereau to attac. but bot# of #is divisions $ere c#opped up by *ussian artillery and #e lost 12)000 out of #is 18)000 men! Ney failed to intercept t#e Prussian army numbering 18)000 men and t#ey c#ec.ed Davout's advance! Finally Murat's cavalry :10)100 men; c#arged t#e *ussian center and forced t#em to $it#dra$) albeit in good order! (lt#oug# /enningsen lost a good c#un. of #is army) %ylau $as no better t#an a dra$4 T#e Frenc# lost bet$een 20)000 and 28)000 .illed and $ounded and 1)200 $ere ta.en prisoners! T#e *ussians left 11)000 dead on t#e battlefield and about 2)800 $ere ta.en prisoners) mainly $ounded! (ll told t#ere $as almost <0)000 casualties at %ylau $#ere about 10)000 men confronted one anot#er on eac# side! /enningsen #ad a c#ance to destroy /ernadotte and Ney $#ile t#ey $ere so far removed from Napoleon's main body of Frenc# troops! Ney in particular $as in a precarious position) as #e $as strung out in pursuit of 3estoc. and t#e Prussians! /enningsen failed to ma.e good on #is c#ance) $#ic# $as a ma+or missed opportunity t#at $ould #ave #ad a dramatic effect on t#e outcome of t#e overall action! 0ncidentally) Davidov's memoirs contain ten pages of te5t regarding t#e marc#es and counter,marc#es prior t#e battle of %ylau) $#ic# are not included in t#is translation of #is $riting on t#e battle itself!

The Battle "f Eylau

Fro# $E%I& $'(I$"()& *e#o!r+

T#e disposition of our army comprising from 10)000 to 80)000 $as as follo$s9 0ts rig#t flan. $as anc#ored to t#e main =oenigsberg #ig#$ay near t#e village of 7c#loditen and $as stretc#ing at an angle to$ards t#e to$n but s#ort of about one,#alf mile of its $alls made an angle and rested its left flan. on =lein , 7ausgarten! T#e village of 7erpalten +ust a#ead of 7ausgarten $as occupied by a $ea. detac#ment under Ma+or,6eneral /aggovut! Five infantry divisions9 t#e 2nd) >rd) 8t#) 1t# and 8t# $ere arranged in t$o lines? 2 battalions of eac# regiment $ere deployed frontally and t#e >rd be#ind t#em in a column? $it# t#em $ere arrayed over 200 canons!

Denis Davidov in 1814 Engraving by M. Dubourg from a painting by Orlovsky. !is print is t!e frontpie"e of !is memoirs.

T#e reserve consisting of t$o divisions) t#e <t# and t#e 1<t# $ere disposed in t$o t#ic. columns and #ad 80 pieces of #orse,dra$n artillery! (t sunrise it $as moved closer to t#e center of t#e army! (ll t#e cavalry $as divided in t#ree portions and placed on t#e flan.s and in t#e center of t#e army $#ere t#ere $as no more t#an 28 s-uadrons? as for t#e cossac. regiments t#ey $ere positioned on t#e approac#es of bot# flan.s! 0ndependently of t#e artillery $#ic# $as deployed along t#e line and .ept $it# t#e reserve) t#e 1st battery of <0 #eavy pieces and 20 lig#t pieces $as at first on t#e rig#t flan. of t#e army) ne5t to t#e =oenigsberg #ig#$ay) but $#en t#e to$n $as occupied by t#e enemy it $as moved 100 steps furt#er a$ay from it? t#e 2nd battery of 10 #eavy pieces $as arrayed almost in t#e center of t#e army) about a mile from t#e city and finally t#e >rd battery of <0 #eavy pieces stood bet$een t#e center and 7ausgarten! To all t#ree batteries $ere ad+oining t#e troops of our first line as if t#ey $ere bastions protruding from fortifications! T#e Prussian corps under 3estoc.) strengt#ened by t#e @iborg infantry regiment and counting up to 8)000 men $as still -uite far) but moving to$ards (ltdorf) t#at is to$ards our rig#t flan.! Ane of its brigades under 6eneral Plot $as to entice Ney to$ards =reit burg and a$ay from t#e area of decisive events and from ta.ing part in t#e coming battle!

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Aur rig#t flan. $as under t#e command of 3t! 6eneral Tuc#.ov 1st) t#e center under 3t! 6eneral 7a.en) t#e left flan. under 3t! 6eneral Asterman,Tolstoy? t#e reserve under 3t! 6eneral Do.#turov) all t#e cavalry under 3t! 6eneral 6olit yne) t#e artillery under 3t! 6eneral *e voy!

Mi"!el #ey

/agration $#o $as t#e youngest of t#e generals #ad no independent command and $as assigned to Do.#turov's reserve!

T#e Frenc# army on t#e eve of t#e battle $as disposed as follo$s9 (t t#e approac#es to t#e to$n and inside ,, t#e infantry division of gal! 3egrand on t#e rig#t side of t#e to$n ,, t#e infantry brigade under @ivienne) on t#e left t#e infantry brigade under Fere :t#ey bot# $ere part of 0nfantry Division under 3e$al;!

$eter Bagration

To t#e rig#t flan. of @ivienne's brigade ad+oined t#e infantry division of 7t! "ilaire all t#ese t#ree divisions $ere part of t#e corps under Mal! 7oult! To t#e rig#t of 7t! "ilaire's division t#e dragoon division under Mil#aud! /e#ind t#e to$n) on eit#er side of t#e 3andsberg road $ere to be found t#e dragoon divisions of =lein and 6rouc#y) to t#eir left) be#ind t#e infantry brigade of Fere $as t#e cavalry division of t#e 6uard! Affside) also
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to t#e left) t#e lig#t cavalry brigades of Bolbert) 6uyot and /ruyere and t#e Buirassier division under "aupoult! T#e lig#t cavalry brigade of Durosnel $as at t#e very end of t#e left flan. of t#e $#ole army and ne5t to t#e village of (ltdorf! /e#ind t#e Buirassiers of "aupoult) on t#e road leading from %ylau to t#e village of 7troben ,, t#e infantry corps of (ugereau! T#e infantry guard of Napoleon and its o$n bivouac) on t#e #ill bet$een %ylau and 6ring#ofs#en! T#e infantry corps of Davout) about 20 miles a$ay from t#e main body of t#e army on t#e road to /artens#tein! T#e infantry corps of Ney) about 28 miles from t#e army on t#e road to T inten! T#e infantry corps of /ernadotte $as several days marc# be#ind t#e Frenc# army! T#e surrounding area $#ic# $as occupied by our positions $as a slig#tly #illy plain $#ic# ad+oined on t#e left side several elevations overloo.ing our left flan. and t#eir location $as very dangerous from t#e strategic point of vie$! 7no$ covered t#e ground and t#is made it difficult to move t#e artillery and t#e fro en small la.es) also sno$ covered) spread around t#e field of battle $ere very treac#erous as t#ey offered flat surfaces $#ic# appeared ideal but in fact $ere -uite dangerous $#en moving artillery pieces! 7$amps $ere even more impossible even for infantry4 ( forest of brambles stretc#ed bet$een t#e villages of 7ausgarten) =utsc#itten and (u.lappen! T#e $eat#er $as clear on t#e $#ole) alt#oug# marred by passing sno$ flurries! 3ig#t frost) no more t#an > or < degrees!

%ouis #i"olas Davout

&it# morning's early #alf,lig#t t#e army got up and got t#eir rifles ready! T#e camp fires $ere still smoldering $#ere t#e men #ad slept bet$een t#e dar. lines of t#e formations crisscrossing t#e pristine sno$,covered fields of t#e coming battle? no$#ere among t#em #ad a s#ot been fired yet? you could only see a certain commotion in t#e lines and columns $#ic# $ere coming to a final battle order! T#e <t# infantry division and t#e (rc#angel to$n regiment returned to t#eir place) $#ic# $as part of t#e general army reserve! Daylig#t suddenly appeared and $it# it t#e 60 piece battery of our rig#t flan. opened up $it# a roar! Part of t#e enemy artillery $#ic# $as at rest be#ind t#e first buildings of t#e to$n came out from be#ind t#em and ans$ered t#e c#allenge ,, and Napoleon sa$ $it# #is o$n eyes t#at it $as no longer a -uestion of a fig#t $it# t#e rear,guard) as #e #ad first t#oug#t) but $it# our $#ole army! 0t is not possible t#at at t#at moment t#e great army commander did not reproac# #imself for allo$ing t#e corps of Ney and Davout to be removed for suc# a distance from t#e army as t#ey $ere and did not become annoyed t#at fate #ad left #im $it#out /ernadotte's corps on suc# a decisive day! 7taff officers $ere immediately rus#ed to Davout and Ney $it# orders to #urry to %ylau! 0n t#e meantime a severe cannonade roared around t#e city) and t#e main Frenc# forces began to redeploy! T#e lig#t cavalry brigades of Durosnel) /ruyere) 6uyot and Bolbert remained to t#e left of %ylau! T#e infantry division of 3e$al pooling toget#er all t#ree brigades presented t#eir left flan. to t#ese lig#t cavalry brigades and t#eir rig#t to$ards t#e city! T#e 3egrand infantry division moved for$ard from t#ere and connected to t#e rig#t flan. of 3e$al! (ugereau's corps formed t$o lines9 Des+ardin division $as t#e first and "udelet division made up t#e second!
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/ot# of t#em anc#ored t#eir left to t#e c#urc# $#ic# $as at t#e end of to$n $#ere Napoleon remained for t#e duration of t#e battle! /e#ind (ugereau $as deployed t#e Buirassier division of "aupoult $#ic# $as ne5t to t#e guard infantry standing be#ind t#e c#urc# on an elevation! /e#ind "aupoult $as t#e mounted guard and to t#e rig#t) lined up $it# t#em $as 6rouc#y's division of Dragoons! 7t! "ilaire :from 7oult's corps; ad+oined t#e rig#t flan. of (ugereau's first line and screened $it# its men t#e =lein Dragoon division! T#e cannonade from bot# sides increased $it# t#e deployment of t#e Frenc# army parallel to ours! 0t became generali ed but still appeared stronger near t#e city t#an else$#ere! T#is $as due to t#e fact t#at $e $ere trying t#ere to stop 3egrand and 3e$al from attac.ing our rig#t flan. and t#e Frenc# $ere attempting to dra$ our attention a$ay from our left and facilitate Davout's effort at t#at point) $#ose arrival $as meant to decide t#e outcome of t#e battle! T#e fire from several #undred guns #ad already lasted about t#ree #ours straig#t but not#ing remar.able #ad #appened neit#er on t#e enemy's nor our side! "aving received t#e ne$s of t#e impending arrival of Davout's corps $#o $as under orders to move from t#e "eilsberg road to t#e /artens#tein road) Napoleon ordered t#e main center of #is army to move to t#e rig#t and combine t#eir operations $it# t#ose of Davout! T#e armies moved for$ard but at t#at instant a #eavy sno$ storm #it and you couldn't see anyt#ing t$o steps a$ay! (ugereau's corps lost its bearing) lost contact $it# 7t! "ilaire's division and all t#e cavalry) and suddenly appeared) muc# to t#eir and our surprise in front of our central battery +ust as t#e $eat#er cleared! 7eventy cannons belc#ed total #ell and a #ail of grapes#ot started to ring against t#eir rifle barrels and #ammer at t#e live mass of fles# and bone! 0n an instant t#e Mosco$ grenadier and t#e 7#lusselbourg infantry toget#er $it# gal! 7omov infantry $it# lo$ered bayonets rus#ed #ungrily at t#em! T#e Frenc# $avered) but recovering met bayonet $it# bayonet and stood t#eir ground! T#ere too. place an engagement t#e li.es of $#ic# #ad never been seen before! Aver 20)000 men from bot# sides $ere plunging a t#ree,faceted blade into eac# ot#er! Bro$ds fell! 0 $as a personal $itness of t#is "omeric slaug#ter and 0 must say truly t#at over t#e course of t#e 16 campaigns in my service record and t#roug# t#e epoc# of all Napoleonic campaigns) +ustly referred to as t#e legend of our century) 0 #ave never seen t#e li.es of it4 For about #alf an #our you didn't #ear a cannon or a rifle s#ot neit#er in t#e midst nor around t#is spot9 you could only #ear some ine5pressible roar of t#ousands of brave soldiers in #and to #and struggle) mi5ing and cutting eac# ot#er up! Mounds of dead bodies $ere piled over $it# ne$ mounds? people $ere falling on top of eac# ot#er by t#e #undreds) so t#at t#is $#ole segment of t#e battle resembled a #ig# parapet of a suddenly erected fortification! Finally) our side got t#e upper #and4

(ugereau's corps $as toppled and #otly pursued by our infantry and Prince 6olitsyn $#o #ad galloped $it# t#e central cavalry to support t#e foot soldiers! T#e pitc# of t#eir fervor reac#ed improbable #eig#ts9 one of our battalions in t#e #eat of pursuit $ent $ay over t#e enemy position and appeared at t#e c#urc# a #undred steps a$ay from Napoleon #imself) $#ic# is mentioned by all Frenc#men in t#eir $ar diaries of t#at time! 0t $as a critical moment! Napoleon $#ose resolve gre$ incrementally $it# multiplying dangers ordered Murat and /essiCres toget#er $it# t#e t#ree "aupoult divisions) =lein) 6rouc#y and t#e #orse,guard to stri.e at our troops rus#ing in $it# s#outs of "D**("! T#is movement $as necessary to save even part of (ugereau's corps and to forestall our general onslaug#t! More t#an 60 s-uadrons galloped around to t#e rig#t of t#e fleeing corps and rus#ed against us) $aving t#eir s$ords! T#e field $as engulfed in a roar and t#e sno$) ploug#ed over by 12)000 united riders lifted and s$irled from under t#em li.e a storm! /rilliant Murat $it# #is carousel,li.e costume follo$ed by a large suite) $as abla e a#ead of t#e onslaug#t $it# a na.ed saber and fle$ directly into t#e t#ic. of t#e fig#t! Joa"!im Murat *ifle and canon fire and leveled bayonets $ere unable to stem t#e deadly tide! T#e Frenc# cavalry crumpled and stomped on everyt#ing) bro.e t#roug# t#e first line of t#e army and its impetuous rus# #ad reac#ed t#e second line and our reserve) but #ere it bro.e against t#e cliff of a stronger $ill! T#e second line and t#e reserve stood t#eir ground) did not $aver and turned bac. t#e a$esome tidal $ave $it# t#ic. battery and rifle fire!

T#en t#is cavalry pursued in turn by our #orsemen rig#t t#roug# t#e ran.s of t#e first line :$#ic# at first #ad been crumpled and stomped but $#ic# again got up on its feet and $as firing bac.; $as no$ flo$ing bac. even beyond t#e line $#ic# #ad occupied in t#e beginning of t#e day! T#e pursuit of t#e cavalry $as breat#ta.ingly successful and follo$ed t#roug# to t#e #ilt!

'ean /aptiste /essiCres by 'ob T#e enemy batteries left on t#at line $ere sei ed by our several s-uadrons and t#e gun cre$s toget#er $it# t#e carriage $#eels $ere #ac.ed to pieces $#ile t#e draug#t #orses and t#eir drivers #ad galloped a$ay in a panic!

0n t#is #and,to,#and engagement and t#e flo$ing bac. and fort# of t#e cavalry) t#e follo$ing generals , "aupoult of t#e cavalry) Daleman of t#e guard) Des+ardin of t#e infantry and Borbineau all fell on t#e field of battle! Mars#al (ugereau #imself) along $it# Division 6eneral "udelet and /rigade 6eneral 3oc#et $ere $ounded? several ot#er brigade generals and staff officers suc# as 3acuyet) Marois) /ouvier and ot#ers s#ared t#e same fate! T$o s-uadrons of #orse guard grenadiers composing t#e tail of t#e retreating enemy cavalry $ere intercepted by ours and laid do$n t#eir lives bet$een t#e c#urc# and t#e second line! T#e 1<t# regiment of t#e line lost all its officers and t#e 2<t# of t#e line #ad only five left alive! T#e $#ole corps of (ugereau) t#ree cavalry divisions and t#e mounted guard represented only fragments of t#eir former selves! 7i5 eagles $ere captured by us! &#at a minute of opportunity for a forceful and combined t#rust of all our forces at t#e division of 7t! "ilaire) left $it#out support and any #ope of #elp4 (ll around t#is division #ad been destroyed or toppled and $#at's more important left $it#out t#e spirit to come to its aid or t#e $ill to fig#t bac.! Moreover) it $asn't -uite eleven o'cloc. in t#e morning) t#erefore t#ere $as still t$o #ours left before Davout's arrival on t#e battlefield! /ut to put suc# moments to good use) it is not enoug# to #ave a t#oroug# .no$ledge of one's craft) and to #ave a determined spirit or a s#arp mind9 all t#is is dead $it#out t#e inspiration) $it#out t#is incompre#ensive) ine5pressible impulse $#ic# is instantaneous li.e an electric spar. $#ic# is +ust as necessary to t#e poet as it is to a military commander? it $as innate to Napoleon and to 7uvorov ,, it belonged to poets and men t#at made t#ings #appen suc# as Pindar and Mirabeau ,, $#o #ad a command over $ords! T#e propitious moment $#ic# promised suc# advantage to our arms disappeared! Aur troops) pursuing t#e enemy $ere forced to return bac. to t#e main body of t#e army from $#ic# not a single battalion $as sent for$ard to #elp us and t#e enemy $#o #ad been in disarray came toget#er) ta.ing advantage of t#is lull got bac. in order and too. #eart! T#en t#e opposing armies resumed t#e same position in $#ic# t#ey $ere before t#e onslaug#t and bloods#ed $#ic# #ad devoured uselessly suc# numbers) and all t#ese miracles of pro$ess) all t#e selflessness and #eroism of t#ese soldiers $#o #ad #eaped t#eir bodies in piles over t#e disputed ground) turned to naug#t as if it never #appened4 T#e action limited itself to a severe cannonade $#ic# again engulfed t#e entire lengt# of bot# armies and t#e slaug#ter of ne$ t#ousands) +ust li.e t#at) to $#ile t#e time a$ay) until t#e arrival of t#e Davout corps to t#e Frenc# and t#e Prussian corps of 3estoc. to our side! No$ came t#e second p#ase of t#e battle! (round one o'cloc. in t#e afternoon) on t#e crest of t#e #ills $#ic# rose to t#e left of us and $#ere our left flan. $as anc#ored) t#ere appeared a fe$ isolated men on #orsebac.! /e#ind t#em appeared masses of cavalry and t#en came masses of infantry and artillery as $ell! T#e #ori on gre$ dar. and rippled $it# motion! T#e #ills of 7ausgarten) silent until t#en) flas#ed) belc#ed smo.e and roared! Davout ans$ered t#em $it# <0 field pieces and flo$ed in mass over t#e battlefield at about t#e same time as t#e division of 7t! "ilaire) reinforced by t#e cavalry division Mil#aud moved to meet #im! To t#e left of 7t! "ilaire came t#e cavalry divisions of =lein) 6rouc#y and "aupoult $#ic# #ad already been mauled in battle and $ere no$ arrayed in t#ree lines! Furt#er to t#e left of t#is cavalry came fort# t#e remains of (ugereau's corps in formation composed of t$o lines! /e#ind t#em marc#ed t#e guard infantry and bringing up t#e rear of "aupoult) no less mauled t#an t#e ot#er cavalry) came t#e guard cavalry! "o$ever) t#e divisions of 3egrand and 3e$al as $ell as four lig#t cavalry brigades remained $#ere t#ey $ere! (ll attention on bot# sides $as no$ riveted to Davout and our left $ing! (d+utants $ere galloping on t#e (ltdorf road $it# orders for 3estoc. to #urry up #is arrival not to our rig#t flan. anymore) but t#roug# 7c#moditten to our t#reatened left $ing! ( portion of t#e cavalry and artillery situated
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on our rig#t and in t#e center moved to t#e left as $ell) $#ic# t#e enemy forces $ere forcing to fall bac. to$ards t#e center) already suffering from t#e fire of batteries deployed be#ind t#e stone $alls of t#e city! T#ese batteries $ere firing all t#e lengt# of our army from %ylau to (u.lappen and t#e $oods bet$een 7ausgarten) (u.lappen and =utsc#itten! T#e situation did not appear very rosy! Davout #aving pus#ed bac. our left flan. be#ind t#e $oods no$ occupied t#e area dividing =utsc#itten and 7ausgarten) deployed on t#e #eig#ts of 7ausgarten an enormous battery and $as s#elling t#e $#ole lengt# of our army $it# t#e same s$eeping enfilade fire $#ic# $e $ere getting from %ylau! T#e village of =utsc#itten filled $it# Davout's infantry as $ell as t#e infantry of 7t! "ilaire $#ic# #ad captured (u.lappen :$#ere /enningsen #ad #is #ead-uarters t#e nig#t before;! Bount Asterman $it# fearlessness) Bount Palen $it# e-uanimity of #eroes $ere attempting to fend off t#e assault gro$ing stronger $it# success) but to no avail4 disorder $as beginning to #amper our troops! T#e $#ole field of battle from =utsc#itten to 7c#moditten $as covered $it# scattered soldiers9 t#ey $ere stretc#ed to$ards t#e =oenigsberg #ig#$ay under t#e protection of t#ose comrades in arms $#o #ad not lost spirit or order and $ere s#edding t#eir blood on every step of ground t#ey foug#t for! T#e cross,fire of t#e ever,increasing enemy batteries plo$ed and ble$ up everyt#ing t#at $as to be seen on t#e battlefield! Pieces of rifles) c#un.s of gun, carriages) #eadgear) #elmets $ere flying all over) everyt#ing $as crac.ing and falling apart! (midst t#e storm of screaming s#ells and e5ploding grenades) among t#e fallen and t#e falling men and #orses) surrounded by t#e #ustle and bustle of t#e fig#t and clouds of smo.e) t#ere to$ered t#e #uge figure of /enningsen li.e a flag of #onor! To #im and from #im streamed ad+utants) messages and orders $ere follo$ed by ne$s and furt#er orders) t#e race $as $it#out stop and t#e activity unflagging! /ut t#e situation of t#e army did not improve because all t#oug#ts) intentions) dispositions of our leader $ere impregnated $it# carefulness) calculation) t#e product of an e5act and sound mind) e-ual to t#e tas. of grappling $it# minds of t#e same type) but not up to dealing $it# flas#es of genius) sudden events $#ic# escape foresig#t and clever guesses grounded in classic rules! (ll t#at /enningsen ordered and all t#at $as carried out as a result tended only to oppose systematically t#e attac.s of Davout and 7t! "ilaire) opposing bayonet to bayonet and firearm to firearm but did not address any une5pected move $#ic# came out of t#e ordinary) and did not forestall a blo$ out of t#e blue on some point $#ic# $as deemed out of danger from t#e enemy! (nd actually) #o$ $ere t#ings goingE Davout continued to press on) capturing more and more of our left flan.) $#ile t#e center and rig#t) not moving at all) $ere s#edding small portions of infantry) cavalry and artillery to #elp out t#e retreating left $ing) not underta.ing anyt#ing t#at mig#t suddenly surprise t#e enemy! /ut even t#e fact t#at $e $ere opposing t#e enemy rig#t flan. $as bringing us no small advantage9 by postponing a decisive defeat) because it gave time to 3estoc.'s corps to arrive on t#e battlefield! /ut to do t#is rig#t $e s#ould #ave been propping up t#is flan. $it# large masses and not +ust small units! /agration $#o in moments of danger found #is proper place t#roug# $ill po$er and inborn talents) moved t#e reserve to$ards (u.lappen and #ad it facing Davout and 7t! "ilaire! %rmolov galloped to t#e same spot $it# >6 #orse,dra$n guns dra$n from t#e reserve) peppered (u.lappen $it# incendiary s#ells) set it immediately on fire and forced t#e enemy infantry to leave it? Ma+or gal! BT! =utaisoff also arrived t#ere $it# 12 guns but some$#at later! T#en) not loosing a moment) #e rus#ed to t#e stream crossing t#e $oods and attac.ed t#e batteries $#ic# #ad been stationed t#ere and preventing t#e infantry columns from eit#er moving into t#e $oods or (u.lappen or =utsc#itten and reinforcing t#e troops pouring into t#is last village! /ut t#ese successes) or rat#er t#e postponement of t#e t#reatened disaster could not last! To snatc# decisive victory from t#e enemy it $as vital not only to stop but to defeat Davout by bearing do$n on #is
F

rig#t flan. and simultaneously to t#reaten #is rear by a general offensive against t#e corps of (ugereau and t#e cavalry $#ic# $ere contiguous to #is forces! Finally t#e ad+utants galloped over $it# t#e ne$s of 3estoc.'s approac# $#om $e #ad a$aited so long and so patiently! "aving occupied t#e greater part of Ney's corps $it# battling t#e brigade of gal! Plot and pursuing #im to =rei burg) 3estoc. turned to 3eisen) 6raventen and (ltdorf $it# #is main forces) consisting of F battalions and 2F s-uadrons! 0t $as already around <900 p!m!? t#e road to (ltdorf $as dar.ened $it# troops and /enningsen galloped to meet t#em ,, to speed t#em up and so t#at #e could direct t#em according to #is o$n vie$s! 0t $as noticeable t#at $it# t#e arrival of t#e commander,in,c#ief t#e entire corps began to move faster! 3estoc. $as directed to$ards 7c#moditten? #e moved past t#is village and +ust s#ort of =utsc#itten arranged #is troops in battle order! T#e rig#t column $as composed by t#e @iborg infantry regiment) t#e left $as *uc#el's regiment and t#e reserve be#ind t#em) t#e grenadier battalion of Fobets.y deployed in one line! T#e infantry regiment of 7#oning) marc#ing in a column) by,passed t#e village on t#e left and slammed into t#e enemy infantry facing t#em) toppled it and c#ased it into t#e $oods! 6eneral =al) $it# cavalry and one cossac. regiment $#ic# +oined #im from t#e main body of t#e army) leaving =utsc#itten to t#e rig#t) fell on t#e enemy cavalry ad+oining t#is village) bringing disorder into t#eir ran.s and turned on t#e infantry running out in disarray from t#e village) trampled t#em and destroyed t#e greater part of it) preventing t#eir escape into t#e $oods $#ere t#e first elements #ad found refuge! 0n t#is engagement t#e @iborg regiment $on bac. t#ree cannons t#at t#e Frenc# #ad captured on our left flan. during its retreat! "aving ta.en possession of =utsc#itten) 3estoc. turned #is troops to t#e rig#t and arranged t#em facing t#e $oods! T#e regiment of 7#oning composed #is rig#t flan.) t#e grenadier battalion of Fobets.y and t#e @iborg infantry t#e center) and t#e *uc#el regiment $as t#e left! ( second line of defense $as made up of t#e &agenfeld Buirassier regiment and t#e dragoon regiments of (uer and /atc#.o! ( lig#t cavalry regiment composed of various elements $as arranged to t#e left of t#e infantry! Aur left flan. $#ic# #ad been retreating came to a #alt and came to order) and its reserve under t#e command of Ma+or gal! BT! =amens.oy and t#e reserve cavalry under Ma+or gal! B#aplit came to reinforce t#e Prussian corps! T#e attac. of t#e $oods $as carried out $it# great courage and in impeccable order! T#e $oods $ere cleared partly by fire,arms) partly by cold steel! T#e moment $as ripe for a combined effort by t#e center and t#e reserve of our army against t#e $atered,do$n remains of (ugereau's corps :mauled t#at morning; t#e #orse guard and t#e t#ree cavalry divisions of =lein) 6rouc#y and "aupoult $#ic# #ad broug#t t#e left flan. $it# t#e rig#t of t#e Frenc# army! 7uc# a combination #ad given victory to Napoleon at (usterlit ! /ut our army remained on t#e spot limiting its action to a cannonade! To 3estoc.'s pressure $as adding #is o$n artillery #ammering t#e troops of Davout and 7t! "ilaire) and also %rmolov's artillery lining t#eir fire along t#e $#ole e5tension from t#e left to t#e rig#t of t#e enemy! Despite t#is general inactivity on our side $#ic# relied solely on t#e efforts of 3estoc. and %rmolov's artillery) t#e enemy $as not able to stand up to t#em! T#eir retreat $#ic# at first began $it# some semblance of order turned into ine5cusable disorder) so muc# in fact t#at 28 cannons) some damaged and some not) $ere abandoned by t#em on t#e battlefield! T#e coming dar.ness and poor intelligence did not allo$ t#e Prussian general to cro$n t#is day $it# t#ese important trop#ies! "aving left t#e field of battle Davout and 7t! "ilaire arranged t#eir troops on eit#er side of 7ausgarten? t#e front line and sentries $ere placed a fe$ yards a#ead! T#e $#ole enemy line segmented t#e battlefield from 7ausgarten to %ylau! (t %ylau remained at t#eir previous stations t#e divisions of 3e$al and 3egrand? but < lig#t cavalry brigades moved for$ard to t#e (ltdorf stream to .eep lines of communication opened $it# Ney $#o $as approac#ing (ltdorf!
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An our side) t#e troops $ere disposed as follo$s9 T#e for$ard line resting its left flan. against t#e road) going from =utsc#itten to Domnau follo$ed t#e stream $#ic# flo$ed from (u.lappen and cut t#e $oods in t$o! From t#ere t#e line continued in front of (u.lappen and rested against our central battery) $#ic# #ad played suc# an important role in t#e first p#ase of t#e battle! To t#is battery ad+oined t#e troops of t#e rig#t flan.) as t#ey did in t#eir original formation prior to t#e battle! T#is defensive battle order of t#e opposing forces at t#e end of t#e battle proves t#e absence of decisive arms superiority of one side over t#e ot#er! T#e Frenc# and our army as $ell remained in t#e positions t#ey originally occupied $it# essentially small c#anges on our left flan.) giving $ay a fe$ yards to Davout's corps and 7t! "ilaire's division because t#e coming dar.ness made fig#ting more difficult! 0f $e #ad #ad one more #our of daylig#t) 3estoc. $ould #ave inevitably ta.en possession of t#e artillery abandoned by t#e Frenc# and $ould #ave compelled Davout and 7t! "ilaire to retreat be#ind 7ausgarten and beyond! 3ate nig#t dar.ened furt#er and furt#er over %ylau's field) saturated $it# blood! (ll t#e surrounding villages $ere no$ t#e prey of flames and t#e reflection of t#e fires s#one over t#e e5#austed troops) still standing under arms and a$aiting furt#er orders! "ere and t#ere you could see camp fires being lit) around $#ic# gat#ered or bec.oned to t#ousands of cra$ling $ounded soldiers! T#e torn bodies of men and #orses) bro.en $agons) po$der cases and gun carriages) outfit and arms ,, all t#is scattered #ere) piled up t#ere gave t#e plain a loo. of terror and destruction $ort#y of t#e brus# of t#e inspired creator of T"% 3(7T D(G7 AF PAMP%00! T#e engagement #ad ended but t#e uncertainty9 H7#ould $e rene$ t#e battle or retreat to =oenigsbergEH and for t#e Frenc#) H7#ould $e pull bac. to t#e @istulaEH gripped t#e minds of t#e leaders of bot# armies! T#e most obstinate of t#e t$o finally triump#ed not because #e rene$ed t#e offensive but because #e remained on t#e battlefield until da$n! /enningsen left t#e field around midnig#t) posting several s-uadrons to .eep surveillance on t#e enemy and to provide a screen for t#e army #eading for =oenigsberg! 3estoc. retired t#roug# (llenburg to /yelo! T#ere $as no pursuit! T#e Frenc# li.e a disabled man,of,$ar $it# torn sails and bro.en masts $ere bobbing about menacingly) but unable to ma.e any #ead$ay to fig#t or to pursue! 7uddenly $e #eard rifle,fire in 7c#moditten! &e $ere astonis#ed! Aur first t#oug#t it $as Ney t#at $e #ad forgotten about! (nd sure enoug#) Ney arrived $it# part of #is corps at (ltdorf around F o'cloc. in t#e evening) found t#ere t#e Prussian battalion of Baptain =uro$s.y) $#o reali ing t#e disproportion in t#e opposing forces) left t#e village and +oined t#e rest of t#e army! 6eneral 3iger,/elair $it# t#e 6t# and >Ft# regiments follo$ed #im and entered 7c#moditten village) $#ic# $as filled $it# $ounded and covering escorts t#at #ad got t#ere to protect t#em! T#ey opened fire on t#e Frenc# and a fusillade ensued! To assist t#em $e sent t#e @orone # infantry regiment and a fe$ cannons? but t#e enemy did not c#oose to a$ait t#eir arrival and retreated into (ltdorf) and t#us t#e alarm $as over! An t#e Ft# our army #aving rested in Mu#l#ausen continued its marc# to =oenigsberg around $#ic# it stopped) #aving left in t#e rear guard Prince /agration in 3ud$igs$ald! T#e Frenc# army fearing a ne$ battle up a#ead c#ose to remain near %ylau! Anly 2< s-uadrons moved for$ard to .eep under observation t#e s#ores of Fries#ing) to$ards Mansfeld and 3ud$igs$ald) and t#at only t$o days later $#en Napoleon $as assured t#at our army #ad arrived at Pregel! T#e 11t# of February Napoleon decided to retreat be#ind t#e Passarge *iver to ta.e up #is $inter,-uarters and left %ylau) pursued by our advance guard and all t#e cossac. regiments under t#e command of t#eir leader Platoff $#o from t#at day for$ard ac-uired #is %uropean reputation! T#e retrograde marc# of t#e enemy $as no less costly in many respects t#an t#e retreat suffered five years later from Mosco$ to t#e Niemen river) in spite of t#e moderate cold! T#e later losses $ere ascribed to t#e cold $eat#er by t#e Frenc# but today) #o$ever) fe$ people give it credence!
11

/eing in t#e advance guard myself) 0 $as $itness to t#e bloody trail from %ylau to 6utstadt! T#e $#ole road $as littered $it# debris $it#out cease! &e met every$#ere #undreds of #orses dying or obstructing t#e $ay $#ic# $e follo$ed) and ambulance filled $it# dying or dead soldiers and men of ran. mutilated in t#e %ylau battle! T#e rus# to evacuate #ad become suc# t#at besides t#e sufferers left in t#e carriages $e found many t#at #ad been simply dumped on t#e sno$ $it#out cover or clot#es) bleeding to deat#! (t eac# mile of road t#ere $eren't t$o) but tens and #undreds! Moreover) all t#e villages along t#e $ay $ere filled $it# sic. and $ounded) $it#out doctors or food or t#e least care! 0n t#is pursuit t#e cossac.s captured many e5#austed men) marauders and 8 artillery pieces) stuc. in t#e sno$ $it#out #arnesses! Aur losses in t#is battle reac#ed almost #alf of t#e number of t#e fig#ting men) t#at is to say >1)000 men .illed or $ounded! (ccording to t#e army registers it appears t#at our army $as composed of <6)800 men :regular army; and 2)800 cossac.s! T#ere $as no e-ual to suc# losses in military annals since t#e invention of gun po$der! T#e reader can imagine $#at t#e losses of t#e Frenc# army $ere) since t#ey possessed a less numerous artillery t#an ours and $#ic# $as beaten bac. from t$o #ot assaults in t#e center and t#e left flan. of our army! Aur trop#ies consisted of nine eagles torn out from t#e ran.s of t#e enemy and 2)000 prisoners! T#e Prussian .ing too. t$o eagles! 0 $as involved in a touc#ing episode after t#e battle! ( year and t$o mont#s before) our army #ad been defeated at (usterlit ! T#e #orse guard regiment s#ared t#e defeat along $it# t#e ot#ers! My o$n brot#er) t#en a 20,year old yout# $#o served in t#is regiment $as grievously $ounded9 #e received five saber cuts) one bullet $ound and a bayonet t#rust and #ad been left for dead in a mound of corpses on t#e battlefield! T#ere #e lay until late at nig#t! "e regained consciousness in t#e dar.) got up and some#o$ #obbled to$ards a fire $#ic# could be seen coming from a nearby village $#ic# #e found overflo$ing $it# *ussian $ounded) among $#om #e found a spot! (fter t#ree days t$o men from #is regiment $#o #ad sustained muc# lig#ter $ounds , (rapov and /ar.ovs.y , persuaded #im to $al. in t#e direction of our retreating army) and #e) not really .no$ing $#at direction it #ad ta.en) made #is $ay $it# t#em) $andering about t#e $ay people e5#austed by suffering and #unger are apt to do! T#eir +ourney did not last very long! ( s-uadron of mounted grenadiers of t#e guard) detac#ed from t#e Frenc# army to gat#er t#e $ounded from bot# sides caug#t up $it# t#em and informed t#em of t#eir fate! T#ere $as not#ing to be done ,, t#ey #ad to obey! T#e s-uadron continued on) but t#eir commanding officer entrusted my brot#er and #is t$o comrades to one of t#e officers of t#e s-uadron $it# orders to convey t#em to /rInn $#ere Napoleon's #ead-uarters $ere located! /ut as our proverb says t#e poor fol. get lost but 6od loo.s after t#em! T#is particular officer $as second,lieutenant 7erugues) a nep#e$ of Minister Maret :Du.e of /assano; to #is mercy $as left t#e life and deat# of my brot#er! 0 say life and deat# because t#e #atred of t#e Frenc# to$ards t#e *ussians and vice,versa #ad originated from about t#at time! 0n bot# armies t#ey got into t#e #abit of stripping prisoners of t#eir last clot#es) t#eir boots and left t#em to die) overcome by #unger and e5#austion) cold or $ounds T#is $as not part of a system ordered from above) but suc# acts $ere never -uestioned by superiors! ( #umane and compassionate man) 7erugues #ad not been yet infected by t#ese loat#some e5amples! Ta.ing a #eartfelt interest in t#e misfortune of #is prisoner) #e e5tended #is indulgence and even forbade #im to $al. on foot) put #im on a #orse and seeing #o$ $ea. #e $as from #unger s#ared $it# #im #is last morsel of bread! T#us #e conveyed #im to t#e pastor of t#e nearest village) sa$ to it t#at #e $as fed until full) got a cart ready for #im and sent #im on to /rInn) c#eering #im on $it# a friendly) almost brot#erly concern! Moreover) #e gave #is $ord to my brot#er t#at #e $ould loo. for #im and find #im again in /rInn $#ere #e #oped to return soon) but failing t#at got #im to promise #e $ould apply for assistance from #is uncle) Minister Maret) and insist t#at every necessary #elp be given #im! (ll t#is 0 #eard from my brot#er upon #is return from captivity and a fe$ $ee.s before 0 myself left to +oin t#e army! "aving arrived
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$it# t#e rear,guard into 3ud$igs$ald t#e 2Ft# of 'anuary) 0 begged permission from /agration to visit =oenigsberg on personal affairs) and #aving gotten t#ere -uartered myself $it# 6eneral B#aplit $#o $as assigned t#e duty of commander of t#e city! B#aplit told me t#at t#ere $as some .ind of Frenc# officer) $ounded in t#e last engagement $#o $as ma.ing in-uiries about me and as.ing $#et#er t#ere $as a lieutenant of t#e guard DavidovE 0 $as t#e only guard officer by t#at name in t#e $#ole army and in my curiosity to find out t#e name of t#is Frenc# officer 0 as.ed to see t#e list of prisoners of ran.! Gou can imagine my surprise $#en t#e name of second, lieutenant of t#e #orse guard regiment 7erugues +umped out at me t#e moment 0 opened t#e enormous folio4 To spot t#is name) to run and find #im $as all one motion! 0 $as still running) not #aving seen #is face yet) but 0 $as already #is brot#er) a friend for life and t#e most devoted relative! 0t must be mentioned #ere t#at t#e in#abitants of =oenigsberg #aving learned of t#e arrival of our army under t#eir $alls $ere fearing its furt#er retreat and t#e eventual occupation of t#e city by t#e Frenc#! T#erefore to earn t#e good graces of Napoleon before#and) t#ey made every effort to beg /enningsen for t#e permission to split among t#emselves t#e $ounded Frenc# officers in order to -uarter t#em and .eep t#em in t#eir #omes at t#eir e5pense! 0t goes $it#out saying t#at fortune $as even more favorable to t#e nep#e$ of t#e Minister t#an to ot#ers! 7erugues en+oyed t#e #ospitality of one of t#e $ealt#iest citi ens of =oenigsberg! 0 found #im in a tall) lu5uriously appointed #ouse) $#ose entire first floor #ad been put at #is disposal! ( bed $it# a large canopy) c#oice linens) screens) small tables and sofas) comfortable armc#airs near t#e bed) semi,dar.ness and fragrant incense) a doctor and medicines) surely not#ing $as lac.ing! /ut #e lay t#ere pale) $orn out and in great pain! 7everal s$ord slas#es on #is #ead and arms did not incommode #im as muc# as a deep and eventually mortal $ound to t#e groin! 0 approac#ed -uietly and carefully to$ards t#e bed of t#e $retc#ed sufferer and told #im my name! &e embraced as true blood,brot#ers! "e as.ed about mine $it# genuine concern? 0 t#an.ed #im for #aving preserved #im and offered my services $it# deep emotion! "e ans$ered me9 HGou see 0 am in t#e care of a good person and don't lac. for anyt#ing! "o$ever) you can do me a great service! Dndoubtedly among t#e prisoners t#ere are some $ounded from my outfit? could you possibly appeal to t#e aut#orities and arrange for t$o or per#aps even one of my #orse grenadiers to remain by my side! 3et me die) still .eeping to t#e end my eyes on t#e uniform of my regiment and t#e guard of a great man!H 0t goes $it#out saying t#at 0 rus#ed to see /enningsen and B#aplit and obtained t#eir permission to c#oose from t#e cro$d of prisoners t$o #orse grenadiers from 7erugues o$n s-uad and in t$o #ours time 0 returned to #im) accompanied by t$o mustac#ioed fello$s) cro$ned $it# bear, s.in #ats and in full uniform! 0t is impossible to e5press t#e +oy Davidov in 18&' of my ill,fated friend at t#e sig#t of #is comrades,in,arms! %5pressions of gratitude $ould #ave been endless $it#out my begging #im to restrain t#ese outbursts of t#e #eart) so e5#austing in #is state! For t$o days 0 did not leave 7erugues' side) day or nig#t? on t#e t#ird everyt#ing came to an end9 #e died in my arms and $as buried in t#e =oenigsberg cemetery! /e#ind t#e cas.et $al.ed t#e t$o aforementioned Frenc# #orse,grenadiers and 0) a second lieutenant of t#e *ussian guard! ( strange +u5taposition of uniforms4 ( deep sorro$ $as clearly evident on t#e faces of t#e old veterans) my companions in t#e procession ,, 0 $as young ,, 0 $as crying!
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