The Simmering Cauldrons of Madhya Bharat

an account of left wing terrorism

Genesis It is commonly accepted that domestic terrorism based on a political ideology is defined by the genesis of the Naxalbari incidents of 1967. Charu Mazumdar leading a brea!"a#ay faction of the Communist $arty of India %Marxist& 'C$I %M&( #ith )anu *anyal as his acti+ist collaborator extremist Naxalites. ,he term itself comes from the +illage of Naxalbari in the -ar.eeling district of north /engal #here hired ruffians beat up a tribal peasant #ho had been granted land o#ning rights by the local court. ,he court had merely upheld the land tenancy 0cts. In retaliation the tribals arose and attac!ed the landlord1s hired men and the incident the 1Naxalbari Incident1 as reported by the press coined the term Naxalites. It #ould be pertinent to note that the earliest e+idence of some form of grass roots re+olt against established authority can be traced to the then ne# state of Madras in 2ul 1934 for the establishment of a separate ,elugu spea!ing state. In 1967 C $ulla 5eddy re+i+ed the agitation this time for the ,elengana region to split from 0ndhra $radesh to form a separate state. 0 peasant re+olution #ith se+eral6 incidents of +iolence erupted in the *ri!a!ulam district of the ,elengana region of 0ndhra $radesh. *ri!a!ulam has since been synonymous #ith +iolent rural unrest 7 tenuously lin!ed Naxalbari. ,he original inspiration for +iolent protest against established authority is Marxian thought morphed by the social re+olutions in by the simultaneity of the rural uprisings #ith is deemed the originator of the +iolent

5ussia and China. ,he undi+ided Communist $arty of India %C$I& #as the source for the basic ideology though not directly responsible for the resultant actions. In fact Charu Mazumdar split from the C$I %Marxist&'C$I%M&( and created the C$I%Marxist"8eninist&&'C$I%M"8&( because he ob.ected to the C$I%M& in 9est /engal agreeing to participate in a coalition go+ernment and ta!ing part in the electoral process. In the late 196:s and through the 197:s the Naxalites had an aura #hich attracted the bright and brilliant from all #al!s of life particularly young idealistic students of uni+ersities
Aisee a recent art film from Bollywood). (see Hazaroan Khwaishen

,he professed morality itself #as magnetic to idealists 7 a d;.< +u of the 1434 =rench 5e+olution 7 #ith e>uality fraternity and liberty echoing the aspirations of the landless under"pri+ileged and condemning the +ested interests of the rich oppressors. $opular for a couple of decades the image of the Naxalites became tarnished #ith the dimming of the +ision of the original principles. ?o#e+er left #ing terrorism still has a constant stream of recruits #hose beliefs are fresh and +igorous. @stablished authority in the Indian political system the elected go+ernment has al#ays opposed Naxalites or more generically named no#adays left #ing extremists %89@&. ,his opposition has no exceptions through the #hole range of political parties rightist and conser+ati+e to leftist and re+olutionary. In the case of 9est /engal itself the C$I %M& #as the harshest in its actions to suppress the mo+ement in acti+e collaboration #ith the Congress party itself in po#er in -elhi. 0n unintended conse>uence of the armed protests by the underpri+ileged has been the birth of many local %+igilante& gangs nurtured and armed by the rich and pri+ileged. ,hese span the entire

social spectrum and are political in nature. ,ypical examples are found in /ihar and 2har!hand #ith the li!es of the 15an+ir *ena1. Growth and Development Aiolent armed action by peasantry starting #ith the incident at Naxalbari sought to highlight t#o aspects of rural India. Bne #as the complete lac! of de+elopment acti+ities by the elected go+ernment and the established administration. ,he second #as the ine>uality in land holdings and the absence of any mo+e to#ards effecti+e land reform. ,hese t#o factors ine+itably led to exploitation of the lo#er social classes and the perpetuation of the feudal lord 7 peasant serf relationship. ,he +ery identification of the stratification of society itself #as one of the factors of the gro#th of the unrest. ,o add more heat to the simmering discontent the early %1967& broadcast from 5adio $e!ing seemed to support the cause of the do#ntrodden by hailing 1the commencement of the re+olutionary struggle by the people of north /engal1. 1 0t the outset there Mazumdar )anu *anyal #ere in charismatic leaders and C $ulla li!e Charu 5eddy ) /engal

*eetharamaiah in 0ndhra $radesh.

9ith their leadership and the ?o#e+er soon

factors enumerated cadres strengths continued to rise #ith the surge of popular support during the years 1967 7 1971. thereafter the entire left #ing extremist mo+ement suffered a decline. ,he first and foremost reason for this decline #as the strong action ta!en by the police #ith the full support of the state and union go+ernments. Many of the leaders of the mo+ement #ere pursued and !illed in encounters. ,he decimation of the leadership se+erely affected the coordinated gro#th of the 89@.

*econdly ideological differences splintered the mo+ement and further dissipated the effect of mass unrest against elected go+ernment and established administration. initial +erbal support ,hirdly apart from the

material support from the t#o bul#ar!s of

Communism 7 the $eoples 5epublic of China %$5C& and the Cnion of *o+iet *ocialist republics %C**5&. ,he C$I party cadres in India had lin!ages and exchanges #ith the *o+iets and the Chinese factions but this did not result in any tangible ad+antage to 89@. ,here #as also significant land reform effected in 9est /engal by its go+ernment under M5 ** 5ay the Chief Minister. Resurgence In spite of the decline of the mo+ement and the resulting uncoordinated splintering of the armed groups there #as a slo# but steady resurgence in the years that follo#ed especially in the 194:s and the 199:s. *ome of the factors responsible for the continuing existence of 89@ and its gro#th in the last fe# years are touched upon in subse>uent paragraphs. Land Rights and Ownership 8and reform #as hardly made ,he effecti+e by legislation and follo# up action in enforcement.

holdings of big lando#ners #ere curtailed but the distribution of the holding did not benefit the ma.ority of the landless. ,he burgeoning rural landless population combined #ith the inheritance la#s made doubly sure that subse>uent generations held e+er decreasing portions of land. Social Stratification ,he ideal of e>ual opportunity as en+isaged by the Constituent 0ssembly #as gi+en form by the *chedules appended to the Indian Constitution itself. ,he schedules

in effect

codified and modernized the traditional caste system in

perpetuity. 5ecent e+ents starting from the Mandal Commission and culminating perhaps in the 0r.un *ingh policy ha+e only accentuated this stratification and gi+en license to protest and agitation against ine>uality. !dministrative Defaults ,he 1steel frame1 erected by the ,his strong Indian Ci+il *er+iceD upon #hich the strong administrati+e net#or! of /ritish Indian rested had a deep and robust foundation. foundation #as the effecti+e and impartial deli+ery to the go+erned masses of de+elopment and .ustice. In the last three decades of the t#entieth century both de+elopment and .ustice ha+e been #ithheld from those #ho need it the most and the foundation of go+ernance has eroded. -e+elopment is no# entirely dependent on patronage and therefore directed to#ards fa+oured constituencies particularly urban. ,he district administration and its de+elopment plans and funds are dismal thereby fueling rural discontent and resentment. Terrain Draw"ac#s ,he t#in factors of stratification of by the society and the lac! of de+elopment ma!es many areas of rural India inaccessible %though many times inaccessibility is cited administration as the cause of poor progress&. Moreo+er much of the interior areas of 2har!hand Brissa Chattisgarh Madhya $radesh and 0ndhra $radesh are rugged hilly and forested offering ideal refuge to the militant groups of 89@%alsoEleft #ing extremism&. Cadres and Groups ,hese factors ha+e aided the proliferation of a multitude of armed groups and cadres #hich constitute 89@ in India. ,here are around thirty such militant groups each professing allegiance to some

local leader and also to one of the splintered offshoots of the communist parties. It #ill suffice to detail the ma.or ones and outline the #ay ahead en+isaged by them. Maoist Communist Centre $MCC% ,he split in the C$I %M& Bne leading to the formation of the C$I %M"8& under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar united se+eral dissident groups at that time. such group the -a!shin -esh did not merge but determined to

continue its independent existence. ,his -a!shin -esh renamed itself in 197F as the MCC. Names associated #ith MCC are 0mulya *en *hi+en.i 5amadhan *ingh $ramod )anhai Chatter.ee %died 1947&

Mishra and *an.ay -usadhG. ,hough initially acti+e in fi+e districts of southern 9est /engal the MCC is no# present and acti+e in eight to ten districts of /ihar fourteen districts of 2har!hand and three districts of Cttar $radesh. ,he declared ob.ecti+e of the MCC is to establish a go+ernment of the people through armed struggle 7 a 1peoples1 #ar1. &eoples 'ar Group $&'G% )ondapalli *eetharamaiah a leading light of the C$I %M"8& and #ell !no#n in the state of 0ndhra $radesh formed the $9H in 0pr 194: 3. of 0ndhra $radesh but soon spread ,he group commenced its its influence throughout initial acti+ity in the )arimnagar district of the north ,elengana region ,elengana. ,he $9? #ants to emulate Mao ,se ,ung1s peasant

re+olution and aims at obtaining political po#er through protracted guerilla #arfare. It calls this process the Ne# -emocratic 5e+olution. 0 central committee heads the $9H as the policy ma!ing nucleus. It consists of D1 permanent members plus an additional it is understood six co"opted from localities #hich are more acti+e. ,he $9H demarcates clearly the di+ision bet#een its ,he general secretary is one M 8a!shmana 5ao also !no#n as Hanapathi. political zonal organization 7 the hierarchy of central committee regional

district and s>uad committees 7 and the military #ing. #ing is led by Hanapathi commission being its general secretary.

,he military

as the head of the central military ,he parallels #ith the

Chinese model are clearly intended. ,he political hierarchy is mirrored by the military organisation at each le+el 7 #ith the lo#est being the +illage defence s>uad mirroring the +illage go+erning committee. ,he fighting component of the military #ing is organized as the $eoples Huerilla 0rmy %$H0& formed in -ec D:::. &eoples Guerilla !rmy $&G!% It appears from uncorroborated reports that the formation of the $H0 #as a coordinated reaction to the decision of the Cnion and state go+ernments to launch .oint operations by +arious police forces in the states in #hich 89@ #ere present. ,his impression is reinforced by the fact that the formation of the $H0 in -ec D::: #as timed to coincide #ith the first centenary of the death of the top $9H members %one or t#o also featuring in the central committee& at the hands of the 0ndhra $radesh police. purported organisation is appended 0 belo#I

Central Military Commission

5egional Military Commission

JonalK*tate Military Commission

Main =orce

*econdary =orce

$eoples Militia

Military platoons

*pecial guerrilla s>uads

8ocal guerrilla s>uads

Central Military Commission

5egional Military Commission

JonalK*tate Military Commission

Main =orce

*econdary =orce

$eoples Militia

Military platoons

*pecial guerrilla s>uads

8ocal guerrilla s>uads

(ig )

,he modus operandi encompasses !illings abductions and destruction of property. 0n inter+ie# #as published on the #ebsite of rediff.com on 1 =eb D::: no# a+ailable in their archi+es F. *ome notable >uotes #hich one always summarize the $9H aims and acti+ities areI ".. Their murders in an encounter shall be aven ed re!ays ones blood debts." " they s!ent the most !art of their revolutionary lives in areas of class stru le" amidst uerilla s#uads and o!!ressed masses .. firmly adherin to $ar%ism&'eninism $ao Tse Tun thou ht.(sic)" "The revolutionary movement constantly re!lenishes itself from the masses new blood is !roduced every moment. (o lon continuously." as we stic) to the correct line and adhere to the masses" new leaders are made

"*ur movement develo!s throu h many u!s and downs" many defeats" until we achieve final victory. !rotracted war" Communist &arty of *ndia $Maoist% +C&*$Maoist%, ,he MCC and the $9H merged on D1 *ep D::3 although the merger #as announced by the 1state secretary1 of the 0ndhra $radesh $9H on 13 Bct the e+e of the tal!s of the 89@ #ith the go+ernment of 0ndhra $radesh in ?yderabad. C$I%Maoist&. ,hough the merger culminated in D::3 the e+ents leading to the union and the creation of this amalgam started in the 194:s. *ince the beginning the $9H had a +ision of a coordinated and comprehensi+e politico"military organisation comprising all the existing factions %fractions really numbering around 3:& of the 89@. ,he initial thrust of the $9H #as to attract the MCC and amalgamate. 0s #ith all organisations turf battles and the percei+ed precedence of the leaders came in the #ay of progress to#ards unity. Internecine >uarrels and a struggle for dominance preoccupied much of the time of the leaders of both groups and at times the ran! and file too. In undi+ided%at that time& /ihar the ri+al groups fought each other murderously and suffered numerous casualties. 5ealisation slo#ly da#ned on the antagonists that the real gainers of this internal conflict #ere the state security forces. ,he t#o factions gradually reduced the physical conflicts and increase cooperation recognizing the unity of purpose. Initially in 1941 ,he united groups named themsel+es the (uch is the nature of our

though )anhai Chatter.ee of the MCC had met #ith ) *eetharamaiah of the $9H stressing the unity of purpose the death of Chatter.ee in 194D and the arrest of *eetharamaiah at about the same time made

the t#el+e day meeting fruitless.

In the late 194:s #ith increasing

confidence in each other and seeing the need for coordination amongst all the factions the $9H MCC and the /ihar C$I%M"8& decided to step up re+olutionary acti+ity%namely +iolence& in the Madhya /harat states. /y 199G this #a+e of +iolence had reached a crest. ,hese groups also constituted the 0ll India $eoples1 resistance =orum to intensify the struggle of the proletariat. #as at an end. In the years bet#een 1994 and D::G +iolence and mutual belligerence the cycle of distrust feelers for compromise and tal!s ,he union /ut once again internal ri+alries frittered a#ay the initiati+es ta!en and by 1996 cooperation

#as repeated se+eral times. =inally in =eb D::G +arious definite steps #ere ta!en to#ards union of cadres and unity in action. #as hastened by the creation of 2har!hand and the increased effort by the administration of this ne# state against 89@. 0 truce bet#een the $9H and the MCC #as announced in D::D"G. Many meetings #ere held and a series of #ritten documents emerged of #hich fi+e are !no#nI Marxism 7 8eninism 7 Maoism Ideology6 $arty $rograms6 *trategy and ,actics6 $olitical resolution of the International and -omestic *ituation6 and the $arty Constitution. =urther tal!s and meetings at high le+els including the central committees of both groups continued till agreement #as reached and the announcement of the merger in Bct D::3 and the formation of one central committee. Communist /anasha#ti place &arty of *ndia $Mar-ist%+C&*$M%, . 89@ in India has had se+eral splinter groups through the ,he

last fifty years. In 199D a merger of se+en such splinter groups too! resulting in the emergence of the C$I %M& 2anasha!ti. se+en merging groups #ereI the C$I%M"8& resistance6 one faction of

the Cnity Centre of the Communist 5e+olutionaries of India %Marxist" 8eninist&6 C$I%M"8& 0gami Lug6 $aila Aasude+ 5ao1s C$I%M"8&6 ,he )ho!an Mazumdar of faction of the C$I%M"8&6 the and Coordination Communist Committee Communist 5e+olutionaries6

5e+olutionary Hroup for Cnity6. ,he merger #as follo#ed as #ith most of the 89@ factions by splits caused by internal ri+alries. ,he first split in 1996 #as follo#ed by se+en more. Bf these the ) 5a.anna faction #as dominant and inherited the mantle of the C$I %M"8& 2anasha!ti. ,his dominant 5a.anna faction too suffered a split #ith se+en senior leaders falling out accusing 5a.anna of the misuse of funds. *uffice it to say that in since D::3"F the C$I %M"8& 2anasha!ti 5a.anna faction is the most acti+e 89@ group after the C$I %Maoist& and is predominant in the ,elengana region of 0ndhra $radesh. It is also acti+e in t#o more ,here are ongoing tal!s states +iz. Maharashtra and Chattisgarh. thirteen to fifteen states in #hich it is acti+e. *deology ,he left #ing ideology across all the factions is similar though the rhetoric expounding it +aries in tone timbre and context. 0ll share their belief in the Mannihilation of class enemiesM and in the use of +iolence in achie+ing organizational goals. ,he main difference #as al#ays bet#een 8eninist ethos %*o+iet style& and Maoist action %Chinese example& 0ndhra $radesh but Maoism has no# pre+ailed. In the #ords of the self styled state secretary of the $9H in it is the M.. the higher stage of Marxist"8eninist philosophy. Marxist"8eninist"Maoism #ill be guiding our thin!ing in all

bet#een the C$I %Maoist& and the go+ernments of se+eral of the

spheres of acti+ity.M ,he goal therefore is ultimate state po#er in full. Not the local control of land districts or areas. In this plan participation in the electoral process of the pre+ailing as they put it Mbourgeois democracyM is re.ected unanimously. ,he concentration is on re+olutionary acti+ities to undermine the state and seize po#er by force. O"0ectives and !ims Ideology defines the aims and ob.ecti+es of 89@ and that being so the ultimate dri+ing ob.ecti+e is to further the cause of re+olution in India. ,he thoughts and pronouncements of the main factions ,he .argon is stereotyped and is full of #ords and 1democratic re+olution1 1imperialism1 1feudalism1 documented published and publicized by our media are too numerous to >uote here. phrases li!e

1bureaucratic capitalism1 1ruling classes1 1aspirations of the masses1 1proletarian re+olution1 etc. etc. ,he patterned ad+ance of their plans is to seize control of remote parts on India through terror induced by +iolence6 raise armed groups6 increase guerilla actions and gradually control larger and larger areas by arousing and organizing the people6 finally morphing into the go+erning entity. ,he documents published by the C$I%Maoist& define in their .argon the purpose and plan of actions. ,he increase in fire po#er areas of acti+ity of 89@ and the gro#ing sophistication of e>uipment only ser+es to highlight the fact that the threat to the existing democratic polity is enormous. Magnitude of the Threat

0 glance at the daily ne#s 7 in print or in the electronic media 7 is sufficient to illustrate the omnipresence of the 89@. It is estimated and this is a matter in the public domain that 89@ is an acti+e threat in 1F6 districts of 1G states of the Indian Cnion. 0ndhra $radesh Madhya $radesh Hu.erat /ihar Chattisgarh 2har!hand Maharashtra ?aryana Brissa ,hese states areI )arnata!a )erala Cttar $radesh

,amil Nadu

Cttaranchal and 9est /engal. 5a.asthan

*ome other contiguous states li!e $un.ab and ?imachal $radesh are

targeted by the 89@ for extension of their influence and acti+ities. Commonality in planning and coordination of action is still in the formati+e stages and therefore a pan"Indian plan of re+olutionary acti+ities in a pre"determined schedule is still not a reality. ?o#e+er the formation of the C$I %Maoist& as a result of the merger has made it a pan"Indian re+olutionary organisation and its central committee is closer to the declared ob.ecti+e of control o+er a re+olutionary zone. Let in spite of the merger the MCC and $9H cadres retain dominance o+er certain districts and states. ,he MCC is based and oriented to#ards the northern and eastern parts of India #hereas the $9H dominates in the southern states. ,he map belo# gi+es a +i+id +isual impact of the spread of the influence of 89@.

Conflict Map (ig 1 $reproduced with permission from www satp org%

,he areas highlighted by colour also gi+e a +i+id reality to the term mentioned in one of the C$I %Maoist& manifestos 7 the Compact 5e+olutionary Jone %C5J&. ,he media has also coined a phrase 7 the 5ed Corridor 7 and the core area in the conflict map in /ihar 2har!hand Chattisgarh north 0ndhra $radesh and the land connecti+ity to the Maoist groups in Nepal amply illustrates the phrase. ,he magnitude of the problem faced by the organisations responsible for la# and order the police forces as #ell as the district administration can also be >uantified in the tabulated datasheets compiled by the Institute of Conflict *tudies and put on the same #ebsite. *ome of these datasheets are reproduced belo# to elucidate. 2006

States Andhra Pradesh Bihar Jharkhand Chhattisgarh Maharashtra Orissa West Bengal Uttar Pradesh Total*

Civilian

SF

Naxal 52

Total 60 32 40 187 31 11

6 11 6
112 13 1

2 2 18
45 2

19 16 30
16

3 3 0
75

7
2

5 0 154

10 1
372

1
143

!ata till Ma" 28# 2006 $%&te' C&()iled *r&( ne+s re)&rts and are )r&,isi&nal-

Table 1 (with permission from www.satp.org)

2005
States Andhra Pradesh Bihar Jharkhand Chhattisgarh Orissa Maharashtra /arnataka Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Total* Civilian 132 25 4. 52 13 2 2 1 5 281 SF 21 2. 27 48 1 17 6 0 1 150 Naxal 167 52 20 26 3 8 4 6 0 286 Total 320 106 .6 126 17 27 12 7 6 717

C&()iled *r&( ne+s re)&rts and are )r&,isi&nal

Table 2 (with permission from www.satp.org)

2005 Ministry of Home Affairs !o"ernment of #n$ia %ata

States

Deaths

Incidents

Andhra Pradesh Bihar Chhattisgarh Jharkhand Madh"a Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Other 0tates Total*

206 .4 165 118 3 53 14 1 7 8 669

532 183 380 308 20 .5 42 10 14 10 1594

!eaths in1l2de se12rit" *&r1e $03- )ers&nnel and 1i,ilian *atalities &nl" 516 1i,ilians# 153 03 )ers&nnel and 223 %a4alites +ere killed# taking the t&tal *&r the "ear t& 8.25

Table & (with permission from www.satp.org) 5e+olutionary acti+ity of 89@ can broadly be di+ided into four categories namely abductions %leading to ransom in cash or !ind& damage or destruction to %public or pri+ate& property setting off of impro+ised explosi+e de+ices % as intimidation as #ell as inducement& and armed confrontations #ith policing forces %a sho# of strength as #ell as intimidation&. 0ll four categories of +iolence contribute ,he substantially to the collected re+enue of all left #ing groups.

ransoms yield bul! sums on occurrence #hilst the act of abduction itself ensures a steady flo# of funds from the local population as #ell as businesses in the area as tax and protection money %also the sub.ect of a serious /olly#ood mo+ie named A!haran&. 0n illustrati+e example of the trend of these for broad categories is depicted in the graphs belo#.

(ig 2

(ig 3

(ig 4

(ig 5

!nalysis and an !ction Ta#en Review ,he Institute of Conflict *tudies hosts a +ariety of papers on their #ebsite #hich is aptly designated at the *outh 0sia ,errorism $ortal. Many of these pertain to India amongst the many nations of *outh 0sia being addressed and the text contained is detailed and coordinated. In addition other centres of study also ha+e published material accessible by those interested. ,he Ministry of ?ome 0ffairs of the Ho+ernment of India is the core agency for internal security and their analyses are numerous and a+ailable for researchers after a fashion. 9hile it #ould be repetiti+e to analyse the causes of 89@ in India it #ould be #orth#hile to !eep in focus some of the conclusions #hich are common in these analyses. ,#o of the common ones are

lac! of good go+ernance and the ineffecti+e .udicial system. interesting to see the conse>uences of such conclusions. !cts and Ordinances

It is

Much before 89@ #as recognized as

such there existed on the statutes t#o 0cts dealing #ith acti+ities sub+ersi+e to the *tate. ,he $re+ention of *editious Meetings 0ct of 1911 #as one of them and it still is on the statutes. ,he second one dates to 1967 #hen the Cnla#ful 0cti+ities %$re+ention& 0ct #as 9ith 89@ gaining ground a barrage of la#s passed by parliament. *ome of them areI 1976 194: 194D ,he -isturbed 0reas *pecial Courts 0ct ,he National *ecurity 0ct ,he *uppression of Cnla#ful 0cti+ities against *afety of Ci+il 0+iation 0ct ,he 0nti"?i.ac!ing 0ct 1943 1947 1944 199G 199F 1999 D::1 D::3 ,errorist 0ffected 0reas %*pecial Courts& 0ct ,errorist and -isrupti+e 0cti+ities %pre+ention& 0ct ,he 5eligious Institutions %$re+ention of Misuse& Brdinance ,he $rotection of ?uman 5ights 0ct ,he *005C Con+ention %*uppression of ,errorism& 0ct ,he Criminal 8a# 0mendment /ill %later passed& Maharashtra Control of Brganised Crime 0ct ,he $re+ention of ,errorism Brdinance ,he Cnla#ful 0cti+ities %$re+ention& 0mendment Brdinance ,he $re+ention of ,errorism %5epeal& Brdinance

%0cts and Brdinances& #ere instituted in the late 197:s and later.

0s

is

e+ident

one

of

the

ma.or

reactions

of

the

go+ernment regardless of the party in po#er has been to add to the statutes seemingly in an effort to strengthen the means of enforcement. 0 fair assessment of this measure #ould be to term it a double"edged #eapon prone to inflict more damage to the system than to those it #as meant to control. ,he ?ome Ministry of the Cnion Ho+ernment has also made considerable effort to coordinate the approach to the 89@ problem at the le+el of the states. ,his has resulted in progress or expression of intent at least in many areas such as the one listed belo#. Modernisation of state police forces by #ay of e>uipment +ehicles and communication. Coordination of intelligence collection efforts bet#een states and bet#een the Cnion Ho+ernment and the states. /etter sharing of intelligence bet#een states. ,raining of police forces in counter insurgency operations. Notable the establishment of a specialized school for such training in Chattisgarh under the leadership of an experienced 0rmy brigadier. Maintenance of data ban!s. Creation of +illage defence organisations %often counter producti+e fatally so in the recent case of Chattisgarh& It must be recognized that these efforts ha+e induced a sense of urgency in state organisations dealing #ith 89@. ,he urgency is gi+en additional impetus by the desire of ruling parties to stay in po#er. *adly the demand from the top seems to re>uire intelligence analysts to tell the go+ernment that on Monday next /ori+li rail#ay station #ill

be bombedN Br some such exact prediction. trends can be forecast

,he understanding that

but hard intelligence is hard to come by

#ithout years and years of dedicated infiltration and de+elopment of sources is slo# to da#n on successi+e executi+es. 8ocal reaction and resistance to 89@ has been confined mainly to /ihar #here se+eral organisations ha+e sprung up. *ome are financed by land o#ners some form by caste orientation and some are sponsored by political parties. ,he fairly #ell !no#n ones areI 5an+ir *ena 8ori! *ena /humi *ena )un#ar *ena )isan *angram $arishad *unlight *ena *uccess has been limited to the area of influence of the sponsor and since action has bee directed at protection of the sponsor the ordinary peasant is the +ictim of both the sides. 0 similar go+ernment sponsored organisation in Chattisgarh is the *al#a 2udum. 0n unintended conse>uence of the acts and ordinances has been the creation of legal front organisations by the 89@ themsel+es. ,hese are too many to list in full many being +ery short"li+ed and many confined to +ery small geographical area. *ome names areI 8o! *angram Morcha 9or!ers $easant 8iberation front $eoples 8iberation Council Indian Louth 0ssociation 9or!ers $easant Cnity front 9or!ers $easant *truggle 0ssociation $eoples 8iberation *truggle =ront

Nau.a#an $ratirodh *angharsh Manch )ranti!ari /udhi.i+i *angh )ranti!ari *ans!riti! *angh )ranti!ari Chhatra 8eague Communist Lu+a 8eague Naari Mu!ti *angh Mazdoor Mu!ti *angh

!n !ssessment ,he +ery nature of the police 7 administration 7 politician relationship militates against a coordinated and #ell planned approach to counter 89@. =re>uent change of !ey personnel frustrates the +ery organisation set up to monitor plan and coordinate action. 0 loo! at the profiles of many of the legislators in the states affected by 89@ re+eals that elected go+ernment often has a clash of interest #ith its o#n appointed officials. ,his bodes ill for anti"89@ actions and this sho#s in the results achie+ed. ,he interest and in+ol+ement of professionals in the field is beyond doubt. ?o#e+er as mentioned earlier their efforts are most often nullified by either inaction at the appropriate le+el or a >uic! transfer of the official to a lea troublesome appointment. 0ll anti"89@ efforts depend upon ade>uate financing +ery reluctant to allocate the necessary fiscal resources. talent concentrated against it. and thereafter .udicious expenditure. *tates are all strapped for cash and 0part from funding the anti"terrorist game is entirely dependent on the human It is also directly proportional to the ,alented indi+iduals #ith time in+ested in planning and preparation.

long tenures in their specializations as #ell as the time in+ested are both #oefully inade>uate. 0ll the official and other analyses of the causes of the gro#th of 89@ list the lac! of de+elopment as one of the primary reasons. 0 co" relation of the conflict map %fig D& to the bac!#ard areas of India highlights the fact that no de+elopmental acti+ity 7 either agricultural or industrial 7 has touched these areas for the past fifty years. ,he poor landless dispossessed and depri+ed population of these areas supports 89@ in the hope that the 1re+olution1 #ill impro+e their prospects. ,his hope is augmented by the actions of the 1lo! adalats1 or the local instant .ustice system practiced by the left #ing groups. ,he do#n trodden feel empo#ered by .oining the guerilla groups. It is interesting to note that 89@ are secular 7 there is no distinction made by caste creed or religion. /ut it #ould also be pertinent to note that the +ast ma.ority of the population of these bac!#ard areas of India figures in one of the schedules of the Indian Constitution. Lin#ages It is reported in the media as #ell as on the portal cited that an umbrella organisation called the Coordination Committees of the Maoist $arties and Brganisations #as constituted in D::1 comprisingI 1. $9H D. MCC O O since merged into C$I %Maoist&

G. 5e+olutionary Communist Centre of India %M"8"M& 3. 5e+olutionary Communist Centre %Maoist& F. $urba /angla *arbahara $arty %Maoist $unargathan )endra& 6. $urba /angla *arbahara $arty

7. /angladesh *amay#adi party %M"8& 4. Communist party of Nepal %Maoist& 9. Communist party of Ceylon %Maoist& ,he impetus in forming this organisation #as pro+ided by the $9H and the MCC #ith the aim of unifying and coordinating the acti+ities of the constituent parties. Ideological themes are deri+ed from Marxism 8eninism and the Maoist interpretation of Communism. ?o#e+er considerable lateral shifts ha+e ta!en place and it is generally accepted that the mother countries %the erst#hile C**5 and the $5C& ha+e no direct ideological lin!ages #ith these groups. Bn the contrary a glance at the economic policies of 5ussia and China today re+eals that these countries are no# follo#ing the path of #hat can only be termed as 1authoritarian capitalism1. Material and monetary support are also in short supply 7 though #eaponry and e>uipment are a+ailable for payment in hard currency. 0nd the source is not limited to communist regimes. Let for the record the +oice of the 1re+olutionary proletariat1 is heard and occasionally gi+en some energetic rhetoric. It is belie+ed also that the $9H has fraternal relations #ith the 8iberation 0rmy of $eru and the )urdistan 9or!ers $arty. 9or!ers $arty of /elgium in May 199F ,he $9H sent some in an attempt to representati+es to attend an international seminar organised by the internationalize their cause. ,he $9H is also belie+ed to ha+e a #or!ing relationship #ith the 8iberation ,igers of ,amil @elam %8,,@& and some arms training for its cadres in *ri 8an!a is reported. It is also belie+ed that some #ireless intercepts in /ihar re+ealed ,amil being spo!en indicating the

presence of some ,amil spea!ing indi+iduals 7 though not necessarily from *ri 8an!a. ,hese lin!ages and the merger of the $9H and the MCC do ha+e #ider implications. ,he C5J mentioned in one of the manifestos of the C$I %Maoist& does no# de facto" extend from Nepal through /ihar 7 2har!hand 7 Chattisgarh 7 0ndhra $radesh 7 Madhya $radesh 7 Maharashtra 7 ,amil Nadu to )erala. In the east it reaches out to /angladesh and creates possibilities of cooperation #ith the militant groups of 0ssam and the other north eastern states of India. In the peninsula the coast is per+ious and to the south is the most resourceful and persistent insurgent group 7 the 8,,@ 7 ready for mutual support and help. Role &lay "y Government and its !gencies ,he +arious facets of go+ernment #hich address one or more aspects of 89@ are enumerated in a broad classificationI ,he Cnion Ho+ernment ,he +arious *tate Ho+ernments ,he *tate police forces ,he Central 5eser+e $olice =orce ,he intelligence #ings of the central go+ernment of the states ,he 0rmed =orces 0 mention has been made earlier of the clash of interests bet#een indi+idual legislators #ho form the go+ernment %in the states& and the go+ernment itself. ,his results in a di+orce of policy from

action to the detriment of the ground forces actually deployed against 89@. In addition there is also the larger interest of some political parties particularly #hen in po#er. *#inging bet#een inaction against 89@ is the policy at its best and support albeit co+ert at its #orst the go+ernment in such cases sho#s up in the public1s and media1s +ie# in a +ery poor light. *uch political interests at the state le+els force coalition go+ernments at the centre to appro+e often tacitly the policy of conciliation adopted by the states in >uestion. 0n example is the #illing ness of 0ndhra $radesh to sit do#n and negotiate #ith the Naxalites suspending police action. ,he 89@ groups #elcome this opportunity to regroup and re+italize their ran!s by fresh recruitment attracted by the percei+ed legitimacy and clout of the 89@. ,he go+ernments of /ihar 2har!hand and Cttar $radesh also exhibit some inclination to#ards negotiation #arnings at the same time li!e the though issuing +erbal Cttar $radesh media

announcement M,he challenge posed by armed acti+ities of Naxalites shall be met firmlyM. In riposte upon tal!s #ith the 0ndhra $radesh go+ernment seeming imminent a Naxalite leader said as reported by media M/y going to the tal!s #e are not declaring any cease fire P P. tal!s are a part of our tactical line. Naxalism is not a problem it is a solution.M ,he 89@ leaders attended the tal!s #ith their #eapons and left to return to their hideouts unhindered. !ctions coordinating dissemination. action. ,he Cnion ?ome Ministry has no# established regular meetings for intelligence gathering analysis and ,hese meetings also coordinate police policy and but the attendance is by no

,he meetings are con+ened

means complete. =ar less in >uantum is the con+ersion of policy into concrete action #ith relentless follo# up. 0 policy of control of the Indo"Nepal border is in place but mainly left to the states to implement. ,rans"border mo+ement as #ell as trans"migration of segments of the population from interior regions to the proximity of the border continues unabated. Bf late se+eral of the states ha+e once again started #ooing the extremists to the negotiating table. Chattisgarh is the latest the Indian @xpress of 13 2ul :6 reporting that the Chief Minister Mr. 5aman *ingh has as!ed the Naxalites to come to his capital 5aipur for tal!s. ?e is also reported to ha+e said that a determined political party in po#er cannot be o+erthro#n by arson abduction and anarchy. ,he fact of the matter is that none of the affected states ha+e the #ill to follo# through #ith the re>uired action. !no#ledge of the insurgents prompt arrest and s#ift .udicial action is essential. communities. and ,horough acti+e monitoring of their acti+ities ,his must be

matched #ith corresponding de+otion to the rural bac!#ard areas and *upport for agriculture establishment of employment a+enues and the construction of ade>uate ,he first re>uires #ill determination education

infrastructure must ta!e place.

and unity of purpose the second e>ual amounts of the same #edded to ade>uate financing and probity in execution. The !rmed (orces It is far too often that recourse is ta!en by the Indian Ho+ernment to the last resort. 0nd that last resort is of course the military. ,he 0rmed =orces are used both for policing as #ell as for succour often at the slightest pretext. ,he nation has seen the

in+ol+ement of the 0rmed =orces in the maintenance of la# and order in the north eastern states for close to fifty years and in 2ammu and )ashmir for the last t#enty fi+e. 9ell documented statistics sho# that Naxalite acti+ities spread o+er thirteen states. ,he badly affected ones are fi+e or six all of them falling #ithin the region of central India %Madhya /harat&. In t#o of these states the elected officials are relati+ely ne# in their offices and perhaps inexperienced in dealing #ith a situation #hich is out of their control. /ut in all the states there is a gradual realisation that their o#n police forces augmented by the Cnion Ho+ernment1s reser+e police forces and para"military units are not in a position to restore peace and tran>uility. ,hey are also a#are that the central resources are stretched already and are not easily made a+ailable for Madhya /harat areas. It is but natural that these states #ill loo! to#ards the 0rmed =orces as a bac!up. It #ould be a disaster if the military #ere to be committed to an anti"Naxalite role in central India. ,he arguments of #hy and #herefore are not pertinent to this paper. ?o#e+er as the management ethos of the armed forces are based on the 1.ust in case1 philosophy there is a lot for them to do in their altogether brief transient peace time tenures in the +arious cantonments and locations scattered o+er these thirteen states. 0ll the three *er+ices particularly the 0rmy need to prepare ade>uately. =irst of all their commanders at +arious le+els must fully understand the local dynamics. ,hey must be familiar #ith the faces and appointments in the go+ernment dealing #ith this matter. coordinated information gathering and dissemination ,he higher commanders must also see the larger picture and establish systems. 5egular and in+ol+ed interaction #ith state go+ernment 7 the

bureaucracy the police and regional executi+es must be set into an established routine. 0t the same time by spreading an a#areness of the implications of in+ol+ing the armed forces ma!e decision ma!ers in go+ernment hesitate from calling upon this last resort. ! Summary and a &rognosis ,here is an enemy #ithin. ,he existence of o+er G: groups

#hich are re+olutionary in ideology and +iolent to a greater or lesser degree in their actions is a gra+e threat to the democratic fabric of India. ,he term 89@ encompasses all these di+erse groups. 0mongst them unity of purpose is gaining ground and the old adage of strength in unity is being pro+ed once again. ,his strength exhibited by the exercise of administrati+e control o+er many remote districts the imposition of a parallel tax structure the establishment of common courts for the dispensation of >uic! .ustice is augmented by their readiness to commit their armed cadres #here+er the need is felt. ,he display of resol+e by the 89@ is not matched by the elected go+ernment in any of its actions. ,he C5J is a reality and there is a nexus bet#een our indigenous extremists and those of our neighbours. ,he #orld arms trade is more than #illing to supply anyone able to meet their bills. 0ll of the affected states ha+e at one time or another ac!no#ledged that there is a serious threat to peace and security. ,he Ho+ernment of India admits that there is an internal security problem. ,he blasts in Mumbai on 11 2ul :6 only highlight the probability that such security problems are not confined to interior Madhya /harat.

It is not sufficient to classify the 89@ as a 1la# and order1 problem. ,he existence of extremism dedicated to +iolence as a means of bringing about change is a symptom of bad go+ernance. It is a great challenge to the democratic polity and the rule of la# that India pro.ects to the de+eloped #orld. *ome of the #ays and means of finding solutions ha+e been touched upon in passing but the details ha+e to be executed by the existing elected and official bodies. ,he root problems are not being addressed by a coherent holistic approach encompassing both the ,he coalition at the centre and Central and the *tate Ho+ernments.

the regional biases of the parties in po#er in the states do not generate any confidence that democratic go+ernment #ill be able to suppress 89@. Mr. *he!har Hupta recounts a meeting of his #ith the head of the $un.ab 0rmed $olice at that time Mr. )$* Hill immediately after the 5a.i+"8ongo#al accord.7 2ournalists li!e Hupta co+ering the $un.ab scene #ere .ubilant and eager to report the return of peace to $un.ab. Mr. Hill1s +ie# #as >uite the opposite. 0ccording to him one ma!es peace only #hen #ielding a big stic! #hen the other side !no#s there is no option. ,he article goes on to dra# a parallel #ith the chaos in $un.ab follo#ing 8ongo#al1s assassination and the militancy today. ?e theorizes that terrorism #ill match state suppression till a point is reached #hen the terrorists realize that the superior resources of the state combined #ith the determination to fight to the finish #ill pre+ail. ,hen a compromise #as sought and normalcy restored. Mr. Hupta reminds the C$0 go+ernment of this and as!s #hether it has allo#ed its politics to confuse the security agencies so much that they ha+e lost all sense of direction. ?e decries the fact that Naxalites #ere

allo#ed to carry their arms to tal!s

resulting in loss of face and

morale for the go+ernment1s forces and a boost for the Naxalites. Mr. Hupta ends his editorial on an optimistic note stating that the C$0 go+ernment has been #o!en up by the Mumbai blasts and its public rhetoric is indicati+e to strong action to come. Let he hedges his bets by his last sentence M,hose on the frontlines of these operations the heads of his %the +rime $inister,s) security forces and intelligence agencies #ould need more con+incing from the subse>uent actions and commitment le+els that he and his colleagues demonstrateM. ?is +ie# only reiterates that the determination of go+ernment to sol+e the problem needs to be demonstrated effecti+ely. ,here is indeed urgent need to exhibit this resol+e both from the Ho+ernment of India and the *tate Ho+ernments. Bnce again the Indian @xpress reports4 that Naxalites ha+e chal!ed out plans for ma!ing their presence felt in urban areas by setting up zonal committees in four ne# states. ,his #as re+ealed after the seizure of literature from hideouts in Chattisgarh. industrial areas. Hu.erat and 0ssam are targeted along #ith the /hilai " )ol!ata and 0hmedadabad " Aadodara

1 D

httpIKKen.#i!ipedia.orgK#i!iKNaxalite Mason $hilipI The -ounders AintageK@bury %0 -i+ision of 5andom ?ouse Hroup& %-ecember G1 19FG& G ###.satp.org 3 ###.satp.org F httpIKK###.rediff.comKne#sKD:::KfebK:1p#.htm 6 ###.satp.org 7 ,he Indian @xpress *at 1F 2ul D::6 4 ,he Indian @xpress Ne# -elhi ,ue 19 2ul D::6