tribal structures in Pakistan v. Afghanistan v.

Iraq assessments on the tribal politics in each of these countries journal search on lexis in addition to a general search INTERNET ARTICLES: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned (PD ! http:""###.#ashingtoninstitute.org"print.php$template%&'()&ID%*'+* The Triumph Of Tribal Politics ,anuar- *./ 0''+: 1A23/ Afghan and 4.5. commanders in Afghanistan agree on one thing/ the ke- to victor- is tribal politics. It is the tribes that control most of the territorin Afghanistan/ and the areas of Pakistan that border Afghanistan. 2he major problem #ith tribal politics is that sometimes the tribes decide that illegal activities (like drug production and smuggling! are acceptable. Disputes over stuff like this can unite tribes against the government. 2he 2aliban movement (#hich seeks to make the religious and social customs of a fe# southern tribes mandator- for all the Afghan tribes!/ on the other hand/ is ver- divisive/ but still hostile to the central government. 6All politics is local.6 In Afghanistan/ local politics is heav- on inter7tribal issues. or the last fe# -ears/ some tribes have been resisting 2aliban influence not because thenecessaril- oppose the group8s ultra7conservative version of Islam/ but because the local 2aliban leadership comes from rival tribes. 2he government has been exploiting this. Indeed/ this is one area #here the 9ar:ai government has had lots of success/ bnegotiating deals #ith pro72aliban tribal chiefs. 2he problem is that these arrangements/ #hile the- often end up #ith tribes less hostile to the government/ also leave the tribes as independent as ever from government control. 2his #as a problem the 2aliban had #hen the- #ere running the countr-. 2he 2aliban fell in late 0''* largel- because the 4nited 5tates and its Afghan allies made it clear that smart bombs no# prevented the 2aliban from retaliating against defiant tribes. 2he 2aliban has al#a-s ruled b- fear/ and has not changed its methods. 2he tribes remember the 2aliban8s brutal reprisals/ #hich #ere at a peak in the 5ummer of 0''*. A lot of the fighting in Afghanistan isn8t about religion or 6expelling the foreigners.6 1o/ it8s usuall- about mone-/ po#er and tribal politics. 2he current Afghan government is having the same problems 6running the countr-6 that the 2aliban did. 2hese #ere the same problems the loose coalition/ that defeated the communist government in the earl*++'s/ had. 2hese #ere the same problems that the monarch- had for over a centur-/ even though the kings #ere usuall- #ell a#are of #hat the- #ere dealing #ith (a loose coalition of tribes and ethnic groups that don8t reall- get along/ but reall- can8t afford to be at #ar for a long time.!

Afghanistan has al#a-s been a poor countr-. ;anditr- can be sustained indefinitel-/ especiall- no# that the foreign troops and 1<3s are here/ #ith all manner of things to steal. Afghans don8t consider it theft if -ou take something -ou need (or/ let8s face it/ just #ant! from someone outside -our tribe. 2hat8s just taking care of -our o#n. And therein lies the problem. 2here is no Afghanistan/ just a patch#ork of tribes and tribal alliances. =ithin the larger tribes there are often nast- rivalries bet#een large clans. 2hen there are the ne#l- rich drug gangs/ #hich are tribe based/ and have changed the po#er relationships among some of the tribes. 2he 62aliban6 (religiousl- conservative/ and violent/ factions! are on a mission from <od to impose strict lifest-le rules/ and turn the countr- into a religious dictatorship. 2he 2aliban #ere unable to do that b- the end of 0''*/ and are less likel- to do it in the future. ;ut fueled b- a share of the drug profits and the proceeds of other criminal enterprises (especiall- extortion and kidnapping! the- can still entice poor/ but adventurous/ countr- bo-s to come along and raise some hell. And usuall- get killed bsmart bombs the star struck kids cannot comprehend. >ean#hile/ more and more of the tribes are getting a clue and making peace #ith the central government. =hile the national rulers tend to be thieves/ the- are also #illing to share the loot. 2hat8s another ancient Afghan custom/ and 4.5. and 1A23 commanders are #illing to pla- along in order to prevent the countr- from slipping back into anarch(real anarch-/ not the 2aliban terrorism that passes for it these da-s! and once more becomes a terrorist haven. 2he 4.5. Arm- 5pecial orces have been dealing #ith Afghan tribal politics for over t#ent- -ears. During the *+?'s #ar #ith @ussia in Afghanistan/ it #as 5pecial orces operators/ #ho often spoke the local languages/ #ho ran up against the tribal politics/ and learned ho# to deal #ith it. It #as this 5pecial orces expertise that made possible the rapid defeat of the 2aliban in late 0''*. 5ince then/ it8s been the 5pecial orces operators that often got called in #hen there #as an opportunit- to exploit situations #here tribal politics #as a major issue. 2his 6tribal politics6 approach proved vital in #inning over the 5unni Arab tribes (the base of 5addam8s support! to #ork against the terrorists (#ho are mostl- 5unni Arabs/ both Iraqi and foreign.! ;ut the Iraqi tribes have al#a-s had to deal #ith a stronger central government. In Afghanistan/ the tribes see the central government as another 6tribe6/ and #ill onl- deal if the government brings enough goodies to the table to make negotiating #orth#hile. 2he =estern peacekeepers have the goodies (cash/ expertise and securit-!/ and bringing in another A'/''' 4.5. troops in the next *? months is expected to make the tribal politics approach #eaken the 2aliban to the point #here these terrorists are a nuisance/ not a major threat. http:""###.strateg-page.com"htm#"htterr"articles"0''+'**..aspx Tribal politics e! to building bridges in Afghanistan

>on Dec */ 0''? +:0'pm B52 ;- <olnar >otevalli

;ACA >3@<DA;/ Afghanistan (@euters! 7 ;uilding bridges in Afghanistan requires more than bricks7and7mortar. It requires deft diplomac- and an appreciation of tribal politics/ especiall- if the bridge in question is to survive sabotage attempts b- the 2aliban. 2hat is #h- the commander of 1A237led forces/ Afghan militar- leaders and government officials traipsed up to this isolated to#n in northern Afghanistan at the #eekend to meet men #hose cooperation the- soughtE eleven bearded elders from ;ala >orghab. 62hat bridge is just one small bridge but it8s a s-mbol to the people #ho live here that if securit- improves #e can bring improvements to the people here/6 <eneral David >c9iernan/ commander of F'/''' 1A237led troops in Afghanistan/ told @euters. 6Gou sit around and speak to scholars/ village elders and leaders and that8s the #a- business is done/6 he said. 6=e8re going to sit do#n at a shura. It8s certainl- more effective than tr-ing to impose a foreign #a-.6 Afghanistan8s tribal heartlands are administered b- a traditional s-stem #here elders/ respected senior male figures #ithin communities/ resolve disputes and make decisions bforming a 6shura6 77 a consultation. It is a s-stem #hich the coalition #ants to #ork #ith to gain the trust of influential decision makers in remote areas #here insurgents can find a foothold. =hile pleasantries #ere exchanged bet#een the turban7clad/ elders and the 9abul7based officials dressed in militar- fatigues/ the fate of *H Afghan soldiers captured b- 2aliban militants nearb- on 2hursda-/ hung in the balance. 2hirteen more soldiers and police #ere killed in the ambush. 62he village leaders/ the- kno# #hat8s happening in their communities/ so hopefull- the-8ll have a voice to those 2aliban that have these soldiers and hopefull- secure their release/6 >c9iernan said. A ;@ID<B 233 A@$ =hile most of northern Afghanistan is relativel- peaceful compared to the volatile south and east/ ;ala >orghab and the neighboring district of <hormach have seen a rise in violence this -ear #ith 2aliban militants finding fertile ground for their insurgenc- among minoritPashtuns/ excluded from po#er locall-. ighting in the area has held up completion of the northern section of a ring road that #ould provide an alternative route for goods coming from Iran to the capital/ 9abul/ #ithout passing through the areas #ith the most fighting on the southern loop.

62hree times #e have asked construction companies to help build the road here/ but no companies #ant to come here for the lack of securit-. If -ou #ant to -ou can do it/ -ou can stop the enem-/6 Afghanistan8s >inister of Public =orks/ 5ourab Ali 5afari/ told the elders at the shura. ;etter roads are essential not onl- for the econom- 77 so that farmers and merchants can get produce to markets more easil- and importers can bring vital foodstuffs into the landlocked countr- 77 but also for securit-/ since police and the arm- can get more quickl- to remote unstable areas. Paved roads also make it much harder for the 2aliban to plant improvised explosive devices (IBDs! 77 nearl- HF' of #hich detonated across Afghanista in 0''H/ causing hundreds of deaths. 3f the .0/''' km (0(/''' miles! of roads in Afghanistan/ onl- *0/''' km of roads are paved/ according to the &IA =orld actbook. 6It (the bridge! #ill help #ith medical care/ export and import of goods if the bridge #as not there people8s lives #ould be a lot more difficult especiall- in the =inter months/6 5afari said. 2he .F7meter bridge #as built b- Afghan companies #ith support from 1A238s Italian and 5panish contingent. 3n the surface at least/ the elders of ;adghis #elcomed the help. 5abri Abdul 9hani/ the deput- governor of the province/ ;adghis/ and spokesman for the elders assured the government officials and militar- top brass 6the people of ;adghis are al#a-s read- to cooperate in the name of peace and prosperit- for this province. 3ur people kno# #e need the help of the international communit-.6 =ith insecurit- on the rise and forces thinl- stretched over the large and mountainous countr-/ 1A23 commanders kno# the- need local communities to bu- into such projects if the- are to last bombing campaigns b- the 2aliban. 62hat bridge toda-/ #hich #e #ill open/ I #ill leave it here for as long as -ou need it/ as long as -ou help protect it/6 <eneral >c9iernan told the elders.

http:""###.reuters.com"article"#orld1e#s"id452@B.;*'340''?*0'0$ feed2-pe%@55)feed1ame%#orld1e#s)sp%true NE"IS ARTICLES: The Pashtun Tribe in Afg#Pa ;;& >onitoring 5outh Asia 7 Political 5upplied b- ;;& =orld#ide >onitoring August ?/ 0''H =ednesda-

2aleban Association 2aleban I mostl- dra#n from Pashtun tribes on their joint border vast majorit- of 2alebs are Pashtuns *++. I 2al got support from Pashtun tribes in Pak and Afg secular"democratic7minded Pashtuns reject idea that their A'''7-ear7old culture"language is being J2alebani:edK I but hard to shrug off

=ho are Pashtuns$ Pashtun ethnic group is majorit- of AfgLs diverse population also inhabit 1= P and A2A in Pak ;aluchistan province and 9arachi cit- in 5indh province also have significant population of Pashtuns characteri:ed b- Pashtun language"adherence to Pashtun#ali (pre7Islamic indigenous code of honor"culture! and Islam approximatel- (' tribes (but over .'' if all sub7clans included! o each tribe divided into different clans"sub7clans"patriarchal families o each has kinsmen #ho trade descent through male bloodline from common tribal ancestor largest"most influential tribes: o Afridi/ Achak:ais/ ;angash/ Durrani/ 9hattak/ >ehsuds/ >ohammad:ai/ >ohmand/ 3rak:ai/ 5hin#ari/ Gusuf:ai and =a:iri one of the best7kno#n Pashtuns I Aghan president/ Damed 9ar:ai

2he Durand line believed to be main contention bet#een Afg and Pak *(*' mile7long border I divided Pashtun tribes bet#een ;ritish India and Afg in *?+A I after division of India and creation of Pak in *+.H/ tension point bet#een Afg and Pak Pak #ants Afg to recogni:e the line I Afghans sa- robbed of Pashtun territor-

2he jerga

forum to settle disputes

Local Realities Clash $ith %&S& Polic! in Tribal 'elt Defense 1e#s April 0A/ 0''H Cittle &ontrol on border/ difficult to monitor b"c communities that have lived there for centuries free of government control I live b- conservative Islamic traditions and uncompromising tribal code since *+.H have been under control of civil administration and not subject to nationLs la#s (in Pak! 62he Pakistani Arm- #as defeated in clashes #ith tribesmen in =a:iristan and lost H'' troops/ #ith t#ice the number #ounded/ and have subsequentl- been demorali:ed for fighting its o#n people and other >uslimsK 62he Pakistan7Afghani borders have al#a-s been notional borders and #ere never ph-sical bordersK 6=e cannot control the movement of people along the border line/ #here tens of thousands of people cross in both directions ever- da-/ and of course militants sneak amongst them6 61ot even in our best da-s #ere #e able to have full control of the borders6 Pakistani tribes and 2aliban fighters are #idel- regarded to be on a jihad to liberate their land from foreign occupiers 62he Pakistani government underestimated the level of militanc- amongst the tribes and the ethnic factors that link Afghani Pashtuns #ith the Pakistani Pashtun tribes in =a:iristan6 62he largel- religious arm- of Pakistan resented the idea of fighting Pakistani tribesmen and other >uslims there6 6=e cannot deal #ith terrorism alone #ithout addressing the issue of extremism6 >usharraf said 6Bxtremism is a state of mind that must be defeated through a long7 term strateg- that tackles its causes6 extremists like the border tribesmen 6#ould use violence #hen threatened/ and if pushed into a corner #ould become a terrorist6

8Divide and @ule8 Pakistani government8s softer approach is largel- based on getting tribal leaders to rid their o#n areas of foreign fighters and Afghan militants

6Pakistan is no# tr-ing to sign pacts #ith tribal leaders to appl- MaN divide7and7rule strateg-/ and use the tribes against one another6 JPakistan8s t#o7track polic- of limited militar- strikes #ith extensive political and economic efforts to pacif- the tribal belt is the onl- choice applicable and possible no#K Prominent leaders of major =a:ir tribes signed a pact on April *F (0''H! proclaiming that an-one #ho grants sanctuar- to foreign fighters #ill have his house demolished/ #ill be fined and exiled from the region 4.5. and Afghan officials complain that similar pacts have failed in the past to stop 2aliban and al7Oaida activities in the tribal belt 6If Pakistan presses militaril- an- harder/ that #ould prompt tribal leaders to unleash suicide7bomb attacks across the countr-/K 6If #e tr- to crack do#n on the tribes militaril-/6 he said/ 6#e #ill end up #ith a heav- collateral damage and #ith an open #ar #ith the tribes throughout the countr-6 Pak believes that in Afgh need to engage 2al and integrate them into ne# political process canLt beat 2al in south"southeast Agh so engage 2al and get deal bet#een them and other Afg groups 2al"aO are separate entities #" separate objectives

Re(enge of the Tribes 1ational @evie# August *H/ 0''H rida beaten badl- in the past I no# huge problem in J=32K goal no# to create decent indigenous governing authorities #here other#ise chaos #ould reign I tribes"clans canLt beat back conquering =estern arm- but can frustrate attempts to govern them #estern Pak"southern and eastern Afg"#estern Iraq I ungoverned spaces #" environments in #hich terrorists can thrive tribes difficult to govern b"c donLt see themselves as citi:ens #" equal rights #" one homogeneous nation I instead as collection of nations in a nation but not of it

even Dussein had problem #" tribes in Iraq I progress there b"c getting tribes on 45 side I benefited from savage aO most >uslims in >B donLt live in individualist societies and creating them #ould require a radical social revolution #hich #ould threaten tribal leaders

Reluctant )arriors* +ighting insurgencies 2he Bconomist >arch *./ 0''+ 4.5. Bdition SECTION, ;3395 ) A@2 LEN-T., +H* #ords A>B@I&A85 disastrous #ar in Iraq #as salvaged b- an unlikel- collection of dissident generals/ think7tank scholars and foreign experts. 2he 6surge6 of troops launched in 0''H/ along #ith the adoption of ne# counter7insurgenc- tactics and a favourable realignment of political forces/ all combined to pull Iraq back from a full7blo#n civil #arPand made a celebrit- of <eneral David Petraeus. 2homas @icks/ a militar- correspondent for the =ashington Post/ and David 9ilcullen/ a former Australian arm- officer #ho served as an adviser to the general/ further burnish his reputation #ith t#o ne# accounts of the surge. >r @icks8s acclaimed previous book/ 6 iasco6/ chronicled America8s march to#ards perdition in Iraq. 62he <amble6 tells the stor- of its (partial! redemption/ led b- <eneral Petraeus and the other prophets of counter7insurgenc- such as >r 9ilcullen. 2he book recounts the manoeuvres that led to the **th7hour change of course in ,anuar0''H to tr- to avoid a humiliating defeat. <eneral @a- 3dierno/ then the second7most7 senior commander in Iraq/ #ent behind the backs of his superiors to seek extra troops at a time #hen the top brass #as set on reducing forces. De #as greatl- helped in =ashington b- a retired general/ ,ack 9eane/ #hose advocac- #as so successful that there #ere some #ho regarded him as the real chairman of the joint chiefs of staff/ America8s overall militar- commander. <eneral Petraeus/ #ho had just #ritten a mould7breaking ne# manual on counter7 insurgenc-/ #as put in charge. Instead of tr-ing to capture and kill insurgentsPstandard procedures required soldiers to kick do#n doors and fire t#o bullets into the chest of ansuspected insurgentPthe general told his soldiers their main task #as henceforth to 6protect the population6. In a further move/ he had soldiers set up small outposts to live

among the people and reclaim areas lost to insurgents instead of commuting from their bases along predictable routes to different hotspots. 4ntil then American commanders had been operating under the assumption that their presence among Iraqis #as feeding resentment. Get the more the- #ithdre# from to#ns/ the more the insurgenc- intensified. >r @icks quotes one ke- commander as recounting ho# American forces #ould tell Iraqis: 6Don8t #orr-/ #e8re leaving.6 =ith the ne# tactics/ the- #ould tell them: 6=e8re sta-ing until #e #in this fight.6 <eneral Petraeus benefited from some good luck too. 5unni tribes #ere alread- rising up against al7Oaeda8s murderous follo#ers before the surge/ and the 5hia militia led b- the hardline cleric/ >uqtada al75adr/ declared a ceasefire. ;ut fortune smiles on a militarcommander #ho kno#s ho# to exploit a good opportunit-. Perhaps the best assessment of <eneral Petraeus (intelligent/ fiercel- competitive/ fanatical about fitness and/ probabl- inevitabl-/ also arrogant! comes from an unnamed American officer #ho sa-s: 6David Petraeus is the best general in the 45 Arm-/ bar none. De also isn8t half as good as he thinks he is.6 Do#ever/ despite material that is rich in both vignettes and intervie#s/ >r @icks8s book comes as something of a disappointment. It has the feel of a manuscript #ritten in a hurr-. 2he structure is mess- and the author makes use of too man- long quotes/ tediousl- parsing speeches at the expense of providing rigorous anal-sis. De treats counter7insurgenc- doctrine as a fixed revelation/ divorced from histor- or culture/ #ithout much discussion of its limits or contradictions. or a #ider perspective on the lessons dra#n over the past seven -ears of the 6#ar on terror6/ the reader can do no better than turn to >r 9ilcullen8s excellent book. 62he Accidental <uerrilla6 has an anthropologist8s sense of social d-namics and a reporter8s e-e for telling detail. If 2.B. Ca#rence evoked the means of #aging irregular #arfare in his *+0( classic/ 65even Pillars of =isdom6/ >r 9ilcullen describes the practitioner8s art of combating insurgents. or instance/ his account of ho# the Americans use soft and hard po#er to pacif- parts of eastern AfghanistanPcombining road7building #ith focused operationsPshould be compulsor- reading in militar- academies on both sides of the Atlantic. >r 9ilcullen dra#s on experiences from man- placesPnot just Iraq/ but also Afghanistan/ Pakistan/ Indonesia and even BuropePto tr- to understand the nature of global jihadist militanc-. De offers four overlapping/ if imperfect/ #a-s of anal-sing the phenomenon: as part of a reaction against globalisationE part of a global >uslim insurgenc-E the result of a civil #ar #ithin Islam itselfE and a rebellion of the #eak against America8s might. All this makes the Iraq #ar fiendishl- complexE it is 6an insurgenc- plus a terrorist campaign plus a sectarian civil #ar/ sitting on top of a fragile state #ithin a divided/ unstable region/6 sa-s >r 9ilcullen. &lassical notions of counter7insurgenc-/ #hich emphasise building up indigenous forces/ ma- be counter7productive if that ends up

strengthening one side of a sectarian #ar. &onversel-/ creating 5unni tribal militias/ successful against al7Oaeda in the short term/ ma- ultimatel- #eaken the central government. >r 9ilcullen quotes one Iraqi officer as #arning him: 6Gou have taken a crocodile as a pet.6 >r 9ilcullen is a reluctant #arrior. >an- of those fighting the =est/ he argues/ are 6accidental guerrillas6/ driven to making common cause #ith violent extremists b- the perceived need to defend themselves against American intervention. 2he invasion of Iraq/ he sa-s/ #as a grievous self7inflicted #ound. Daving learnt/ impressivel- but painfull-/ ho# to do a better job of fighting insurgencies/ America should not rush into more such #ars. 2he #atch#ord/ he sa-s/ should be 6never again6. ;ut nor should it give up its hard7#on expertise. It ma- need it in future. -LO'AL SEC%RIT/ S%00ARIES: 2ribal 5tructures (Iraq! at least Q of Iraqi people are members of one of *F' tribes o societ- is feudalistic I most of the population identifies #" a tribe o tribes increasingl- important in societ- b"c people look to leaders for representation"assistance 3ttoman period I nomadic tribes most of IraqLs population o direct 3ttoman control #eak there I had loose tribal confederations I each tribe acting as mini7state o tribal net#ork fulfilled function of conflict"resource management o most important tribal confederations in Iraq included: the >untafiq/ Ana:a/ Dulaim/ 5hammar/ Ruba-d/ 4ba-d/ ;ani Cam and Al7bu >uhammed o blurred origins"religious divisions I often fusion I shared religion and feeling of Arabness but tribes didnLt have sense of common identit during 3ttoman period/ people earned livelihood from herding animals/ trade/ raiding/ and collecting tribute o hierarchical s-stem based on mode of subsistence developed I camel7breeding tribes at top/ then sheep7breeders/ peasants/ and marsh7d#ellers o #here sedentar- agriculture/ rice7gro#ers on top/ then vegetable gro#ers/ manual #orkers

o tribesmen regularl- visited to#ns to trade and visit hol- shrines beginning the mid7*+th centur-/ 3ttoman Bmpire increased control over Iraqi tribes through settlement policies and land reform measures o result I erosion of sheiksL traditional source of po#er and disintegration of the traditional tribal s-stem o follo#ing ==I and collapse of 3ttoman Bmpire/ ;ritish decided to unite the three 3ttoman provinces of ;aghdad/ >osul/ and ;asra into one nation7state called Iraq despite significant religious"linguistic"ethnic"tribal divisions o ;ritish policies restored po#er to the tribal sheiks/ helping to preserve"reinforce IraqLs tribal structure o ;ritish colonial state also appropriated formal tribal functions like control of land/ #ater distribution/ and la# enforcement o nomadic tribes continued to settle in village communities based on extended families or sub7clans I often retained their tribal names but linked to the agricultural market rather than the subsistence economo tribes continued to lose po#er under monarch- and republican regime #hich enacted agrarian reform I ne# #ave of emigration from countr-side to cit#eakened the remaining tribal units"ties *+(? ;aathist coup I close famil-"clan"famil- ties bound ruling 5unni elite o most notable I 2ikritis from 1= of ;aghdad I related to President al ;akr o 5addam I leader behind the scenes I 2ikriti and relative of al ;akr o since mid7*+H's ;aathist regime tried to overcome Iraqi divisions and bring ethnic"religious communities under central control b- militar- campaigns against 5hia"9urds/ social"economic incentives/ and attempted creation of unif-ing national ideolog 5unni75hia tensions peaked follo#ing *+H+ Islamic @evolution in Iran and during Iran7Iraq =ar (*+?'7++! o regime increased control then b- rel-ing on tribal lo-alties among 5unni"5hia Arabs o ruling elite came from 5addamLs Al7bu 1asir tribe and its allies in the 2ikrit region I other 5unni tribes supported the regime I Dula-m/ ,ubbur/ 4ka-dat/

>ulla/ 5a8idat/ and 5hammar I 5hia tribe/ al7Ahbab/ from the 2ikrit region also supports the regime o rationale for rel-ing on tribes I tribal Arabs considered ;edouin and most genuinel- Arab and most trust#orth- in #ar against the Persians I also believed to have retained tribal values of communal spirit"honor"valor for poor tribes/ militar-"govt service respectable"profitable I #a- for up#ard mobilito 5addam re#arded villages of lo-al tribesmen #" roads"electricit-"#ater s-stems I govt provided jobs"perks o but punishment for uncooperative sheiks ranged from no jobs"perks to death o in 9urdish region replaced uncooperative chiefs and split tribes in order to interact during *+?'s o appointed tribal chiefs mediated bet#een govt and communities and fought 9urdish nationalists represented b- 9DP and P49 ;ecause of a #eakened econom- and the severel- reduced abilit- of the state to provide social services/ man- Iraqis increasingl- turned to their tribes for support. 2he rene#ed alliance bet#een state and tribe created a ne# s-mbiosis: the state advances the favored tribes and the favored tribes protect the state. In the late *+?'s/ this state7tribe alliance became official. 2he regime has continued to portra- tribes as a s-mbol of patriotism/ broadcasting popular forms of tribal #ar poetr- and stressing tribal values. It has facilitated the re7establishment of tribal councils to supervise economic activities/ resolve conflicts/ and police the region. It also has armed the more lo-al tribes throughout the countr-. 2he success of the regime8s tribal polic- #as demonstrated #hen several 5hia tribes remained on the sidelines or supported the regime during the *++* uprising. An-one #ho is 2ikriti is easil- understood to be affiliated #ith the ;aath regime and the state. An-one #ho had a problem #ith a 2ikriti #ould not receive proper protection from the state as he #ould in an- other countr-. Individuals in disagreement #ith a 2ikriti in Iraq certainl- face severe retributions/ and even death. Alternativel-/ if one is having a problem #ith the ;ar:ani famil- in 1orthern Iraq or the Dalabchei famil- heading the Islamic >ovement/ one #ill be persecuted/ regardless of one8s identit- or political perspective. 2he Iraq government #as a famil- enterprise. It8s run b- famil- members/ tribal members/ second cousins/ their sons/ their nephe#s. It is a tribal s-stem that runs the countr- and famil- relations is the most sure to lo-alt-/ in the s-stem and a guarantor of having no coups/ no assassinations from #ith. Bmphasi:ing the tribal structures as a ruling aspect is quite important as the Iraqi securits-stem is under the umbrella of the 1ational 5ecurit- &ouncil. 2he &ouncil #as headed

b- the President and conveneed in the presidential palace. =hen 5addam Dussein #as not there/ his son7in7la# Ali Dassan >ajid took over this function. Catel- the ruling famil- leaders/ i.e. 5addam Dussein and his brothers and half7brothers/ met and decided that his son Ousa- should replace him in all meetings or ceremonies #here he is not present due to illness or other reasons. 2his provision is another indication that the tribal life #as firml- incorporated in the dail- decision7making process in Iraq. 2he same applies to the 9DP #here it has alread- been decided #ho is going to replace >assud ;ar:ani/ should an-thing happen to him. 2he- are #orking on this individual to promote him like a prince. In a passport one #ill usuall- find three names: the name of the person/ the name of their father/ the name of the grandfather. Do#ever/ the actual surname/ #hich is the indication of the tribe or region one belongs to/ #as not #ritten in the passport. 2he Iraqi government came up #ith this deliberate polic- in order to not identif- the area or tribe a person comes from for securit- reasons. 2his practice #as partl- a protection for the individual. If somebod- is e.g. called a 2ikriti/ it is eas- to kno# that the- are part of the ruling famil- #hich ma- expose them to particular securit- risks. 2he tribal societ- brings along some other consequences: individuals are protected/ -et at the same time limited b- the tribe. 2his fact is ver- visible for #omen and children. =omen belong to the famil- and do not have much right to choose about their o#n future. Deciding #hether to #ork or not/ choosing a profession/ choosing their spouses is not in their hands. =hat is decisive is the famil-8s approval. If one defects from the existing social structure/ it means that one is immoral. 5ince immoralit- #ould ruin the honour of the famil-/ the respective famil- member should be punished. In 5ula-mani-ah one #oman8s nose #as cut in order to set an example. 5he #as accused of having an immoral relationship #hich/ ho#ever/ #as not proven. After *++' there #ere quite a high number of honour crimes in Iraq/ #hich according to Iraqi la# #ere not punishable. If a #oman transgressed a social norm/ e.g. b- being #ith a man #ithout marriage or eloping from her husband #ithout permission of the famil-/ the tribal la# prescribes capital punishment for this behaviour. 2his punishment is tolerable according to the Iraqi criminal code. It should give the families the right to instruct their children ethicall- #ith the methods the- choose/ be it punishment at home/ be it not letting their children attend a specific school. 2he result is a circle of social relations at home/ #ith the brothers having superiorit- to the sisters and the father having superiorit- to the rest of the famil-. 2his pattern is reflected at district as #ell as government level. After the ;aath Partcame to po#er in *+(? the- #ere opposed to this tribal societ- and #anted not onl- to abolish the tribal names/ reflecting the 3ttoman st-le of naming people/ but also to do a#a- #ith these tribal structures altogether. Do#ever/ the developments in the >iddle Bast #ere not allo#ing them to reach their aim. According to ,udith Gaphe/ 6;aghdad through the *++'s encouraged the reconstruction of clans and tribal extended families #here the- existed. In other areas/ the government al lo#ed the manufacture of ne# 6tribal6 groups based on economic ties or greed. =here the initiative #as #eak/ ;aghdad apparentl- encouraged prominent citi:ens to take the initiative or permitted non7leading families to manufacture an entit- in order to gain

po#er and #ealth.... 2his has created a ne# s-mbiosis: the state advances the favored tribes and the favored tribes protect the state. 2he state benefits from its absorption of the tribes and the tribes use the state to enrich themselves. 6 In 1orthern Iraq the tribal societ- helps the parties to maintain their po#er b- assigning their o#n people to specific positions in the government and b- using the benefits of this mechanism for themselves or their families. =hen the 9DP took over the rule of Arbil/ first the- just kept ever-thing in the same order in #hich the- had received it. In time/ ho#ever/ the- started to promote ;ahdinani people (from the northern regions of 9urdistan! to be assigned to positions in Arbil &it-/ the supposed capital of 9urdistan. 2his caused some reaction from Arbili people/ still the- support the 9DP position in the government and in Arbil &it- for reasons of securit- and further settlement in the administration and societ-. 2his phenomenon does not onl- occur #ith the 9DP. 2he P49 is also including some tribes/ assigning tribe members to specific apparatuses. 2he situation in the south is not different. 2he head of the 5upreme Assembl- of Islamic @evolution in Iraq/ #hich is the umbrella organi:ation for 5hia opposition groups/ is >ohammed ;akr al7Dakim. De comes from the al7Dakim famil- #ho for centuries have been scholars. Dis predecessor >ohammed 5adiq al75adr/ his name deriving from his tribe/ #as a #ell7kno#n scholar of 5hia Islam/ too. De #as #as assassinated in 1ajaf in ebruar- *+++. 2hese people are kno#n because of the reputation of their tribe. 2he rise of an individual is quite rare in this kind of societ-. 2he routine chain of feudalistic relations continues to exist/ making it difficult to ensure life/ bread and securit- under these conditions. http:""###.globalsecurit-.org"militar-"#orld"iraq"tribes.htm 2ribal 5tructures (Afghanistan! @eligion population fragmented into ethnic"linguistic"religious"kin7based"regional groupings o one commonalit- I Islam o but sectarian divides and divide Ouranic"legal interpretations o minorit- Dindus"5ikhs (from India! and ,e#s there for generations late *+?F I those #anting pan Afghan constituenc- appealed to people on basis of common >uslim identito resistance fighters I mujahidin I Jthose #aging jihadK Afghan societ- I composed of #arring factions o common themes (honor"famil-! but tend to divide

Bthnicit- and 2ribe different religious"ethnic"linguistic"tribal groups o rivalr-"armed hostilit- historicalldifferences in ph-sical appearance rugged ph-sical environment I isolates residential communities and creates microenvironments

Distribution largest"most po#erful ethnic group I Pashtun o Pashtu speaking (but those in 9abul often speak Dari! both belong to Iranian branch of Indo7Buropean language familo generall- 5unni but 2#elver 5hia Pashtuns too o traditionall- have resided in large semicircular areas along border 2ajiks I numerous o generall- live in the #est around Derat/ in 1= interior/ and (primaril-! in the 1B of the countr- (but not in =akhan &orridor! o speak Dari and 2ajik dialects of Dari o some are 5unni #hile others (particularl- those in the north! are Ismaili arsi#ans (Persians! are also Dari speaking o live in #estern Afg near Iranian border o 2#elver 5hia Oi:ilbash I remnants of old Iranian presence o 2#elver 5hia (some use taqf--a to pass as 5unni! o small group found in Afg urban centers o Dari speakers o

Da:aras speak a dialect of Dari and live primaril- in central Afghanistan. Among Da:aras are members of ever- >uslim religious sect in the countr- Ismaili/ 2#elver 5hia/ and 5unni. Dupree put their number at ?H'/''' in *+?'. Altaic languages are also represented in the countr- b- speakers of 2urkic languages. 2he 4:beks are 5unni #ho speak 4:bek/ a 2urkic dialect. 2urkic languages are not in the same famil- as Indo Buropean languages (such as Dari and Pashtu!. 4:beks live in a large semicircular area roughl- follo#ing Afghanistan8s northern borders/ from ar-ab Province almost to e-:abad. Dupree8s *+?' estimate #as about * million people resident in the countr-. 2urkmen are another 5unni 2urkicspeaking group found scattered throughout the northernmost portion of Afghanistan along the 5oviet border. 2he 9irghi: are also 2urkic speaking and/ until recentl-/ lived in the Pamir mountains of the =akhan &orridor. In *+?F there #ere unconfirmed reports that this area #as inhabited solel- b- 5oviet and Afghan arm- soldiers and that the indigenous population had fled or been exiled. 2he 9irghi: lived it the high mountain valle-s of this region/ #hile another ethnic group/ the =akhi/ occupied lo#land areas. 2he 9irghi: are 5unnis. 2he neighboring =akhi/ or >ountain 2ajik/ are speakers of Iranian dialects. 2he- are often Ismaili but/ according to Dupree/ some =akhi 2#elver 5hia and 5unni exist. 2hegenerall- live in the same regions as the 9irghi: but at lo#er altitudes. 1uristanis are 5unni #ho speak dialects of Dari and often also Pashtu. 2he- live in the 9onarha/ 1angarhar/ Caghman/ and Parvan areas of eastern Afghanistan. 2he area #here the 1uristanis live/ 1uristan/ #as the scene of the first armed opposition to the 9halq government. Arabs are a 5unni group living in northeastern Afghanistan/ primaril- 6in an arc extending from >aimana to 9undu:.6 Dere the- speak a dialect of arsi that is mixed #ith 4:bek vocabular-. 5ome scholars report that Arabic speaking Arab communities exist in the area of ;alkh. 2he selection of major ethnic groups in Afghanistan is some#hat arbitrar-/ as is a classification b- language and location. Bthnicit- is extremel- complicated in the countr-/ and an- simple classification is bound to have man- exceptions. urthermore/ there are man- more ethnic groups than those listed here. Bthnicit- has been extensivelexplored b- scholars stud-ing Afghanistan/ and the- often disagree/ further complicating an alread- lab-rinthine phenomenon. Anderson points out the futilit- of attempting to locate Afghan ethnic groups on a map because 6boundaries are not all of a piece . . . the- var- according to the situation.6 5cholars disagree about #hat constitutes an ethnic group. @ichard . 5trand/ an ethnologist/ and Anderson describe ethnicit- as a process emerging 6in situations r-here people of different traditions and organi:ations come together or are brought together in contexts set b- terms external to themselves.6 Anthropologist Dugh ;eattie defines ethnic groups as 6loose collectivities of people #ho classif- themselves and others for the

purposes of social interaction on the basis of var-ing criteria such as language/ ideologof patrilineal descent/ origin and histor- and custom in general.6 2hese t#o definitions need not conflict if the processual nature of social interaction is kept in mind. Patrilineal descent is also notoriousl- malleable and to some extent ma- be defined and redefined situationall-. &anfield introduces a further complication. Dis experience in ;amian leads him to assert/ unlike man- other scholars/ the importance of religious sectarian differences #hich/ he contends/ take precedence over ethnicit-. Bthnicit-/ then/ is based on shared kinship traced through the father/ shared customs/ tradition/ and language. It is most obvious and is to a large extent formed #hen different groups come into contact in alien situations. 2he importance of ethnicit- as a behavioral and cognitive categor- is generall- extremel- important in Afghanistan but/ in some areas/ at least/ ma- take a backseat to religious sectarianism. inall-/ ethnicit-/ religious sect/ tribe/ famil-/ and mode of subsistence intermesh and are to some extent indistinguishable. 2he largest and most politicall- po#erful ethnic group/ the Pashtuns (or Pakhtuns/ in northern Pakhtu dialects!/ is ver- diverse. It is composed of at least seven tribal groups: the Durrani/ <hil:ai/ ,aji/ >angal/ 5afi/ >amund/ and >ohmand. 2he Pashtuns have been the subject of several scholars8 research. Anderson reports that because Pashtuns have historicall- dominated government/ other ethnic groups have had to learn to deal #ith them on the Pashtuns8 o#n terms. De refers to the 6Pashtuni:ation6 of the countr-8s public behavior. ;eing a Pashtun/ at least a male Pashtun/ centers around Pashtun#ali/ or 6doing Pashto.6 6Doing Pashto6 connotes adherence to a code of behavior stressing honor (namos! and its defense/ autonom-/ braver-/ self respect/ and respect for others. It is probable that Pashtun#ali is shared ball male Pashtuns. A man8s namos is expressed through his abilit- to dominate and defend his propert-/ including his household and his #ife and female relatives. A Pashtun #ho has suffered a blo# to his honor is expected to seek revenge in the form of ph-sical retaliation or compensation in propert- or mone-. 5uch a code of behavior is often in opposition to strict interpretation of sharia. =hen a conflict occurs/ Pashtuns tend to 6do Pashto6 instead of follo#ing 5unna/ believing as the- do that >uslim and Pashtun are equivalent. In matters other than Pashtun#ali/ there ma- be regional differences. @ichard 2apper reports that to be classified as Pashtun in the 5aripul district/ a man must speak Pashto/ be a 5unni/ trace his ancestr- to Oa-s/ and marr- his sisters and daughters to other Pashtuns. >ost Pashtuns in the countr- tend to follo# this marriage pattern. It is a form of h-pergam- and is also practiced b- other ethnic groups/ i.e./ a #oman ma- marr- #ithin her ethnic status group or above it/ but she ma- not marr- belo# it. >ales ma- marr#ithin or belo# their group. ;ecause ethnic groups in Afghanistan are ranked in terms of their status and all Pashtuns consider themselves the top7ranked ethnic group/ Pashtun #omen marr- onl- other Pashtuns.

Interethnic Relations
5cholars stud-ing Afghanistan quip that if Afghans #ere not fighting the soldiers of another countr-/ the- #ould be fighting each other. @elations among Afghan ethnic groups have tended to bear this out. <roups that live in close proximit- often have complex and hostile relations/ a situation that is exacerbated b- the fact that a multiplicit- of ethnic groups ma- reside in the same region. urthermore/ #hen Pashtuns have trespassed on the propert- of other ethnic groups/ these groups have been able to do little. 2he Pashtun dominated government generall- sided #ith Pashtuns/ regardless of the merits of the case. Bxamples of interethnic conflict abound. 2#o examples #ill suggest the complexit- of interethnic relations.

In 1uristan the 9om 1uristanis have been subject to the encroachments of the <ujars (another ethnic group!. 2he 9om let some of their pastures to the <ujars in return for pa-ment in livestock. In the late *+.'s the <ujars began to renege on this agreement. 5trand reports that 6since then hostilities have become perennial #ith occasional shootings and rustlings on both sides.6 <overnment officials attempting to mediate have almost al#a-s been biased against the 9om. 2he 9om leaders feel that this reflected the desire of the government to promote disunit- among 1uristani tribes so that it could manage them more easil-. 2his kind of raiding #as #idespread among man- ethnic groups in the countr-. 3ccasionall- it has erupted into open #arfare. Distoricall-/ stronger groups have attempted to dominate #eaker ones. 2he #eaker groups have had the choice of moving to a harsher/ more marginal environment or pa-ing tribute to the more po#erful groups. 5uch has been the case in the =akhan &orridor. ;oth =akhi and 9irghi: occup- this region. 2he Ismaili =akhi farm and herd in the lo#er valle-s. In addition/ there are Pashtuns and 2ajiks in the area #ho are traders suppl-ing market goods. 2he traders choose their #ares carefull- and consciousl- or unconsciousl- foster a dependence on tea/ opium/ and other luxur- goods. 2heir customers/ particularl- the 9irghi:/ are often indebted to them. 5hahrani observes that relations bet#een 5unni 9irghi:/ #ho inhabit the high/ frigid mountain valle-s/ and relativel- lo#land =akhi are tense. 62he 9irghi: refer to =akhi as sart (a derogatorterm! and regard them as 6nonbelievers.6 eelings of contempt are mutual/ -et both groups have developed increased economic dependence on each other.6 2he 9irghi: cannot gro# grain in their inhospitable environment and consequentl- must purchase this from the =akhi. 2he =akhi resort to the 9irghi: for animals and animal products/ #hich the- emplo- for their o#n use or use to pa- traders. 5hahrani #rites that these t#o groups 6have achieved a successful economic exchange s-stem in a situation filled #ith social tensions.6 Bthnic groups are perceived to be ranked in terms of status/ although members of the groups in question ma- not al#a-s agree #ith members of other groups about their o#n status ranking. Sirtuall- ever-#here/ Pashtuns are the most prestigious ethnic group/ both in their o#n e-es and usuall- also in the e-es of others. 2he subsequent rankings var- bregion/ but Da:aras are almost al#a-s ranked as one of the lo#est ethnic groups. 2heare often placed directl- above the despised g-psies. 2apper reports that other groups in

north central Afghanistan regard the g-psies (fats and ,uggis! 6as blots on the ethnic landscape.6 http:""###.globalsecurit-.org"militar-"#orld"afghanistan"cs7societ-.htm