Dian Yang John (Trip) Adler

Thursday, 5:00 1/11/06

Foreign Cultures 63

The Internet in China: Just How Big of a Threat Is It to Chinese Communist Party Rule?

The Internet is a new form of communication that some people believe might lead

to the doom of the Chinese Communist Party. For more than half a century, the leaders of

China have made a dedicated effort to both censor the information that reaches the minds

of Chinese citizens and control any communication between citizens that can lead to an

undermining of the Party. Suddenly, in a matter of a few years, a new form of

communication has arrived that promotes the free flow of information and facilitates

communication between large groups of people on a scale that has never been seen

before. While this clearly is threatening to the Party, how dangerous is it for Chinese

leaders? Is this new form of technology going to cause problems on a scale that the

national government has never encountered before? Or instead, is the Internet not so

much more dangerous for the CCP than the forms of communication that existed

throughout the twentieth century? This paper analyzes two aspects of the Internet — its

ability to disseminate information and its ability to help people communicate with each

other — and the ways in which these features may or may not undermine the Party. After

providing some background on the Internet in China and different perspectives on it, the

paper explains that the Web is less of a threat than it may seem, due to both the

technological nature of the Internet and market forces that control it. Lastly, the Internet

is compared to past communication technologies that have been threatening to

nondemocatic rule, and demonstrates that the Internet is not entirely different. While the

1
Web does pose new problems for the CCP and can never be controlled completely,

effective Internet control by the national government is certainly not impossible.

It is necessary to provide some background information on the Internet in China

and its censorship by the Chinese Communist Party. As in most countries of the

developed world, Internet use began in China in the early 1990s and has grown at a

tremendous pace. By 2005, there were more than 100 million Internet users and

hundreds of thousands of Chinese websites. While there are large Internet content

providers (ICPs) that are based in China, such as Sina, Sohu, Netease, and Baidu, there is

also a major presence of American Internet companies, such as Yahoo!, Google, and

Microsoft. Foreign Internet companies are definitely major influences in Chinese

cyberspace; the national government has promised to allow foreigners to own 50% of

web companies that have a presence in China (Kalathil 75).

Long before the arrival of the Internet, the ruling Party has made a large-scale

effort to censor the media and control communications between citizens — and this did

not at all stop with the Internet. To handle this new and potentially threatening form of

communication, the Chinese national government created an entire set of regulations, that

involve the censoring of media and the control of communication between individuals.

At least part of this government project is known to many as Golden Shield. Gudrun

Wacker divides the Internet regulations that were introduced in the year 2000 into seven

main categories. The first is a list of forbidden contents, such as human rights,

pornographic content, or information about Falun Gong. The regulations also call for

restrictions on the distributions of news, and the requirement of gaining a license to be an

Internet service provider (ISP). This is true for Internet cafés, which are forced to

2
monitor the use of the Internet by their customers. ISPs are also required to store user

data, and both ISPs and ICPs must maintain surveillance of users, including screening of

emails and chat rooms. Lastly, the regulations call for judicial liability and serious

penalty for not following laws (Wacker 62–65). To name a few of the specific measures

taken to censor Internet content and monitor communications, the most effective method

of blocking Internet content involves censoring content providers within mainland China;

occasionally the government will physically seize websites and their operators. They also

block foreign websites, such as CNN and the New York Times, and disallow certain

terms from being used in search engines. In the case of monitoring chat rooms and e-

mail, the government does not have the physical resources to monitor all chat rooms and

forums, so the Party threatens to shut down Internet content providers who do not employ

internal staff, often known as “big mammas,” to do this for the national government

(Wikipedia).

It probably seems at first glance that the effort to regulate the flow of information

over the Internet is a lost cause; it simply changes and grows so quickly and could not be

more decentralized. This is the conclusion of many individuals who have studied the

efforts of the CCP, such as Geoffry Taubman and Jason Lacharite. Taubman comes to the

conclusion: “Given the rapid pace of diffusion of the Internet and related tools, along

with the growth in content providers and the decentralized and increasingly inexpensive

nature of the technology, governments will have difficulty preventing Internet-driven

information pluralism without incurring significant economic and political problems in

the process” (Taubman 268). Meanwhile, Lacharite focuses more on the technical

difficulties with regulating the Internet and concludes: “Digital censorship is

3
unworkable. Not only are China’s surveillance and bureaucratic arrangements

inadequate, counter-filtering technologies have been implemented both in and out of

China to ensure a relatively free flow of information” (Lacharite 333). Although both of

these scholars come to similar conclusions, Gudrun Wacker points out that “a number of

observers have begun to develop theories that cast doubt on the assertion that there is

something inherent in the nature of the Internet that puts it beyond the control of the

state.” Lawrence Lessig, James Boyle, Eric Harwit, and Duncan Clark are a few if such

scholars whose arguments will be considered later in this paper (Wacker 59). Clearly, the

political potential of the Internet in China is a highly disputed issue, but this paper tries to

illustrate the perspective of those who believe that effective control of the Internet is still

possible.

The technological nature of the Internet is one of the main factors that explains

why efforts to control the Web are not hopeless for the Chinese national government, and

this is particularly true when it comes to censoring online content. At first glance it might

seem that the Internet is an advanced form of technology, and this feature will make it

more difficult to censor. This is exactly what Jason Lacharite tries to prove, giving

detailed technological reasons why the Internet cannot be censored easily. In particular,

he mentions anti-blocking software, mirror sites, remailers, secret Usenet groups, and

anonymous e-mail services (Lacharite 333). But at the same time, more advanced

technology also means there are more advanced ways to censor the information

distributed by this technology. The difference between the Internet and some past forms

of communication is that while it is more complicated to control, it can at least be

controlled to some extent. This was not true for some other technologies, such as radio

4
broadcasts, which have always been a form of media that could never be blocked from

the air in China. While it was a more primitive technology, it was also impossible to

censor and the national government simply had no ability to stop broadcasts; all it could

do was tell people not to listen. With the Internet, on the other hand, the government at

least has the ability to block certain words from search engines, block particular websites,

and alter the content of webpages. Lawrence Lessig is a writer who believes in the

possibility of shaping behavior in cyberspace and thereby regulating it. One of his best

arguments involves the idea that behavior on the Internet is shaped by the code writers.

For example, code writers determine whether a user needs a password to gain access or

whether the transactions that a user completes can be linked back to the user. Lessig

explains that “code is a kind of regulation, in just the same way that the architectures of

real-space codes are a kind of regulation.” Therefore, “governments are able to indirectly

regulate the Internet by directly regulating intermediary actors,” such as Internet service

providers and Internet content providers (Wacker 59–60). Therefore, the technological

nature of the Internet makes it relatively easy for the CCP to control some of the flow of

information.

The other threatening aspect of the Internet is the way it can link people together

as a convenient medium for communication. While this does provide new

communication opportunities, due to the technological architecture of the Web, it is still

easier to control than a network of telephones. For example, it is impossible to monitor

every telephone call and edit the content of what is spoken, but it is possible to monitor

many large chat rooms and mass emails at the same time, and to change any content if

necessary. James Boyle, another scholar who believes that the Internet is not completely

5
opposed to nondemocratic rule, uses an argument that draws an analogy with a prison in

which every cell has a window facing a central tower. An unseen warden in the tower

might be watching what any individual prisoner does at any time. The prisoners act as if

they are under constant surveillance all the time, even though such surveillance is not

physically possible for a single warden. This same argument can be applied to the

Internet to show how it can indeed be controlled; Internet users always know that they

could be monitored, but they never know when. Therefore, they are cautious with what

they do or write online (Wacker 60). Of course complete control of Internet

communication will never be possible, but this does not rule out effective control.

A final point is related not just to Internet architecture but also to the philosophy

associated with that architecture. In the minds of most people, the Web is unlike other

forms of media, because it represents the whole world in an electronic format. This is

why it is often called “Cyberspace.” While the censorship might not cover every website,

an Internet that has hundreds of thousands of websites praising Party leaders but only has

a few websites about democracy will make democracy seem like it is not a very powerful

force in the world. Even if an individual knows that the CCP censors what he is reading,

an unbalanced cyberspace will create the impression that reality is somewhat similar.

This is especially true considering that the CCP censors “not only by promoting ‘positive’

ideas and images through the media, but by censoring cultural products too” (Lull 133).

The net effect of censorship is an online world that presents a seriously skewed view of

the real world. The problem with this is described well by Bill Xia, the chief executive of

Dynamic Internet Technology, who comments on the censored version of Google that is

currently present in China: “Users expect Google to return anything on the Internet.

6
That’s what a search engine does.” Meanwhile, people do not know that “there are

alternative opinions from the Chinese government and there are many things being

covered up by the government” (Wired News). Another example of how the government

can create a skewed view of the world is how it generally blocks The New York Times,

but it was unblocked when Jiang Zemin was privately interviewed; when specifically

asked about the block, he replied that he would look into the matter (Wikipedia). Due to

the philosophical nature of Internet technology, censorship of the Web by the Chinese

government does not just create an incomplete store of information, but it actually

distorts people’s understanding of the world. Therefore, incomplete censorship is enough

for the CCP to accomplish its goal.

In addition to the nature of Internet technology, there are significant market forces

that contribute to the Party’s taming of the Internet. Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark

emphasize that this is a major flaw in the arguments of Taubman (Clark, Harwit 380).

While American software companies, such as Sun Microsystems and Cisco Systems,

provide the software that the Chinese government uses to censor and monitor the Web,

what is more important is that many companies have major business incentives for

complying with Party regulations (Wacker 69). While this is true for Chinese Internet

companies, such as Sina, Sohu, Netease, and Baidu, the effect can be understood most

clearly by looking at American companies competing for market share in China. Google

for example was providing search in China until 2002 when the Chinese government

completely shut down the site. Because Google is competing fiercely with other major

Internet content providers, it agreed to comply with Chinese regulations in order to keep

the site running. Not only does it allow censors in China to block particular sites that

7
Google finds, but Google itself censors out various sites from its news service in China

(Wired News). Microsoft also has agreed to block certain words, and Yahoo! signed a

pledge of “self-discipline” in 2002, vowing to refrain from posting “pernicious

information that may jeopardize state security” (USA Today). While these companies

generally support the free flow of information, they are making exceptions in China to

increase profits. Wacker explains: “China’s Internet industry has become characterized

by the rapid formation of an authoritarian-capitalist coalition that has seized the central

spot that used to belong to small to medium-sized enterprises” (Wacker 68). This is in

agreement with the way that American Internet companies have bowed to Chinese

national laws.

The fact that business incentives are supporting censorship by American

companies is actually unique to the Internet. For instance, many American magazines

and newspapers, such as Time, USA Today, The New York Times, and The Wall Street

Journal, have refused to bow to censorship. Time Asia was banned for three years in

China after running some inappropriate material, and the magazine company placed

freedom of speech above increasing profits (USA Today). The contrast between Google

and other forms of media is interesting in light of Google’s pledge to “do no evil.” While

Google could easily post a disclaimer on the Chinese news site informing visitors that the

results might be censored, it chooses not to do this, thereby creating the impression that

what it finds is the truth. As a final example of how Internet companies collaborate with

the CCP to further their business ambitions, Yahoo! in 2005 helped Chinese officials link

journalist’s Shi Tao’s email account and computer to a message that “divulged state

secrets.” This ultimately led to a ten-year prison sentence for Shi Tao (BBC News). In

8
this case, Yahoo! went beyond monitoring its email, and actually got involved with the

law in China. This illustrates the kinds of measures that American Internet companies

will make to stay on good terms with the Chinese government.

Perhaps it is useful to evaluate the ability of the Party to censor the Internet by a

comparison with past efforts to censor various forms of media. James Lull explains that

“especially since 1978, China has found it difficult to censor foreign materials

effectively.” A good example of this is the steamy romantic novel Lovers and Gamblers

that was considered pornographic. Although it was banned, confusion in the censors’

office prevented it from being taken off the shelves until more than 300,000 copies had

been sold. In addition, a black market for pornographic magazines and videos has

developed in China, despite laws that can punish the sellers of porn with death or life in

prison. Another example is foreign radio broadcasting, such as the Voice of America and

the British Broadcasting Corporation, which are easily received in most of China. While

listening was subject to reprimand, it was physically impossible to block such signals

from the air. In finding programs to put on China’s national television, the censors have

more problems, because the standard of what is acceptable cultural and political

information is never completely clear and changes frequently. An example of this was

when television was just starting to show programs that depict romantic entanglements

around 1985, the government suddenly insisted on a new standard for love relations.

Clearly the Chinese Communist Party has had difficulties with censorship for decades

(Lull 134–135). Just because the Internet is a new form of communication that has not

been dealt with before does not necessarily mean that the CCP is going to have a more

difficult time dealing with it. Even if the Internet is very difficult to censor, this is not

9
very different from what has happened with other forms of media in the past. At the

same time, the general trend has been an increased relaxation and liberalization of the

media throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Clark, Harwit 379). The Internet is coming at a

time when compulsive censorship has already failed many times and less regulated media

is becoming more acceptable.

There are various reasons why censorship has failed in the past, and it can be

shown that many of these are less likely to be true for the Internet. Four significant

reasons, which are all mentioned above, are the incompetence of the censors, the

ineffectiveness of laws, the lack of technology to censor various forms of media, and the

inconsistency of policy. It has already been demonstrated that the Internet is in some

ways easier to censor than other forms of media for technological reasons. Also, laws

that regulate the Internet are likely to be more effective because of the numerous business

incentives associated with following laws. The incompetence of the censors and the

inconsistency of policy are two reasons that are unlikely to be any different with the

censoring of the Internet, although it probably can be argued that these might be

diminished due to the huge amount of effort and resources being devoted to censoring the

Internet. For example, just to enforce censorship laws, the national government uses the

Ministry of Information Industry, along with licensed Internet Service Providers, local

police forces, the Data Communications Bureau, and the Ministry of State Security

(Lacharite 334). With all these resources devoted to censorship, it is likely that less

incompetence and more careful policy-making will result.

The Internet as e a new form of communication between Chinese citizens can be

compared to the telephone, which was the most recent breakthrough in

10
telecommunications prior to the Web. It is probably easiest to study the effect of the

telephone in the Soviet Union, because the entry of this form of communication into

society was around the time that Stalin was dictator, prior to China’s social revolution in

1949. Although this is a different country, it was a nondemocratic and communist

country, just like China, so it can be assumed that a new form of communication would

affect the two societies in similar ways. A famous quote by Stalin was when he said, “I

can imagine no greater instrument of counter-revolution than the telephone” (Taubman

255). This shows that the phone was a threat to nondemocratic society in the first half of

the twentieth century, just as the Internet is today. The danger has always been the

possibility of informal social networks, or in other words, a technology-constructed

“public space,” forming outside of the control of the rulers. However, communism

survived in both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, despite the rise of

the telephone. It is certainly likely that computer networks will be another obstacle to

Chinese leaders just as telephones once were. As in the case of media, telephones

became less regulated over time as worries subsided.

This paper does not try to say that the Party will be able to maintain complete

control of the Internet; it merely suggests that there are many reasons why the situation is

not hopeless for the Chinese Communist Party and the possibility of maintaining an

influential position in Cyberspace is perfectly feasible. There are both technological and

business reasons for why the Internet is less threatening than other forms of media and

communication. At the same time, nondemocratic countries have been accepting new

technologies that undermine authoritarian rule for the last century, and there are few

reasons why the Internet will be completely different. In fact, the Internet may even be

11
less worrisome for several reasons. But the Web is clearly a new challenge for the

Chinese Communist Party, and only time will tell how it influences politics in China over

the next few decades.

12
 Works Cited

Clark, Duncan. Harwit, Eric. “Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political

Control over Network Infrastructure and Content.” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3.

377–408.

“Google Bows to Chinese Censorship.” Wired News. Online:

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65089,00.html?tw=newsletter_topsto

ries.html

“Internet Censorship in Mainland China.” Wikipedia. Online:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/internet_censorship_in_China

Kalathil, Shanthi. “Between the Lines: China’s Dot-Communism.” Foreign Policy, No.

122, 74–75.

Lacharite, Jason. “Electronic Decentralisation in China: A Critical Analysis of Internet

Filtering Policies in the People’s Republic of China.” Australian Journal of

Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 2. 333–346.

Lull, James. “The Freedom to Have Fun: Popular Culture and Censorship in China.”

China Turned On: Television, Reform, and Resistance. 127–153.

Taubman, Geoffry. “A Not-So World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the

Challenges to Nondemocratic Rule.” Political Communication. 255–272.

“U.S. Firms Help China Censor Fr**dom, D*mocr*cy.” USA Today. Online:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-06-19-our-view_x.htm

Wacker, Gudrun. “The Internet and Censorship in China.” China and the Internet:

Politics of the Digital Leap Forward. 58–82.

13
“Yahoo ‘Helped Jail China Writer’.” BBC News. Online:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4221538.stm

14