ATREATISEONGOVERNMENT TRANSLATEDFROMTHEGREEKOF ARISTOTLE BYWILLIAMELLIS,A.M. LONDON&.TORONTOPUBLISHEDBYJMDENT&SONSLTD. &.INNEWYORKBYE.P.DUTTON&.CO FIRSTISSUEOFTHISEDITION1912REPRINTED1919,1923,1928 INTRODUCTION ThePoliticsofAristotleisthesecondpartofatreatiseofwhich theEthicsisthefirstpart.ItlooksbacktotheEthicsasthe EthicslooksforwardtotheePolitics.ForAristotledidnotseparate, asweareinclinedtodo,thespheresofthestatesmanandthe moralist.

e moralist.IntheEthicshehasdescribedthecharacternecessaryfor thegoodlife,butthatlifeisforhimessentiallytobelivedin society,andwheninthelastchaptersoftheEthicshecomestothe practicalapplicationofhisinquiries,thatfindsexpressionnotin moralexhortationsaddressedtotheindividualbutinadescriptionof thelegislativeopportunitiesofthestatesman.Itisthelegislator's tasktoframeasocietywhichshallmakethegoodlifepossible. PoliticsforAristotleisnotastrugglebetweenindividualsor classesforpower,noradeviceforgettingdonesuchelementarytasks asthemaintenanceoforderandsecuritywithouttoogreat encroachmentsonindividualliberty.Thestateis"acommunityof wellbeinginfamiliesandaggregationsoffamiliesforthesakeofa perfectandselfsufficinglife."Thelegislatorisacraftsmanwhose materialissocietyandwhoseaimisthegoodlife. InanearlydialogueofPlato's,theProtagoras,Socratesasks Protagoraswhyitisnotaseasytofindteachersofvirtueasitis tofindteachersofswordsmanship,riding,oranyotherart. Protagoras'answeristhattherearenospecialteachersofvirtue, becausevirtueistaughtbythewholecommunity.PlatoandAristotle bothaccepttheviewofmoraleducationimpliedinthisanswer.Ina passageoftheRepublic(492b)Platorepudiatesthenotionthatthe sophistshaveacorruptingmoralinfluenceuponyoungmen.Thepublic themselves,hesays,aretherealsophistsandthemostcompleteand thorougheducators.Noprivateeducationcanholdoutagainstthe

irresistibleforceofpublicopinionandtheordinarymoralstandards ofsociety.Butthatmakesitallthemoreessentialthatpublic opinionandsocialenvironmentshouldnotbelefttogrowupat haphazardastheyordinarilydo,butshouldbemadebythewise legislatortheexpressionofthegoodandbeinformedinalltheir detailsbyhisknowledge.Thelegislatoristheonlypossibleteacher ofvirtue. Suchaprogrammeforatreatiseongovernmentmightleadustoexpect inthePoliticsmainlyadescriptionofaUtopiaoridealstatewhich mightinspirepoetsorphilosophersbuthavelittledirecteffectupon politicalinstitutions.Plato'sRepublicisobviouslyimpracticable, foritsauthorhadturnedawayindespairfromexistingpolitics.He hasnoproposals,inthatdialogueatleast,formakingthebestof thingsastheyare.Thefirstlessonhisphilosopherhastolearnis toturnawayfromthisworldofbecominganddecay,andtolookupon theunchangingeternalworldofideas.Thushisidealcityis,ashe says,apatternlaidupinheavenbywhichthejustmanmayrulehis life,apatternthereforeinthemeantimefortheindividualandnot forthestatesman.Itisacity,headmitsintheLaws,forgodsor thechildrenofgods,notformenastheyare. Aristotlehasnoneofthehighenthusiasmorpoeticimaginationof Plato.HeisevenundulyimpatientofPlato'sidealism,asisshownby thecriticismsinthesecondbook.Buthehasapowertoseethe possibilitiesofgoodinthingsthatareimperfect,andthepatience ofthetruepoliticianwhohaslearnedthatifhewouldmakemenwhat theyoughttobe,hemusttakethemashefindsthem.Hisidealis constructednotofpurereasonorpoetry,butfromcarefuland sympatheticstudyofawiderangeoffacts.HiscriticismofPlatoin thelightofhistory,inBookII.chap,v.,thoughasacriticismit iscuriouslyinept,revealshisownattitudeadmirably:"Letus rememberthatweshouldnotdisregardtheexperienceofages;inthe multitudeofyears,thesethings,iftheyweregood,wouldcertainly nothavebeenunknown;foralmosteverythinghasbeenfoundout, althoughsometimestheyarenotputtogether;inothercasesmendo notusetheknowledgewhichtheyhave."AristotleinhisConstitutions hadmadeastudyofonehundredandfiftyeightconstitutionsofthe statesofhisday,andthefruitsofthatstudyareseeninthe continualreferencetoconcretepoliticalexperience,whichmakesthe Politicsinsomerespectsacriticalhistoryoftheworkingsofthe institutionsoftheGreekcitystate.InBooksIV.,V.,andVI.the idealstateseemsfaraway,andwefindadispassionatesurveyof imperfectstates,thebestwaysofpreservingthem,andananalysisof thecausesoftheirinstability.ItisasthoughAristotlewere saying:"Ihaveshownyoutheproperandnormaltypeofconstitution, butifyouwillnothaveitandinsistonlivingunderaperverted form,youmayaswellknowhowtomakethebestofit."Inthisway

thePolitics,thoughitdefinesthestateinthelightofitsideal, discussesstatesandinstitutionsastheyare.Ostensiblyitismerely acontinuationoftheEthics,butitcomestotreatpolitical questionsfromapurelypoliticalstandpoint. Thiscombinationofidealismandrespectfortheteachingsof experienceconstitutesinsomewaysthestrengthandvalueofthe Politics,butitalsomakesithardertofollow.Thelargenation statestowhichweareaccustomedmakeitdifficultforustothink thatthestatecouldbeconstructedandmodelledtoexpressthegood life.WecanappreciateAristotle'scriticalanalysisof constitutions,butfindithardtotakeseriouslyhisadvicetothe legislator.Moreover,theidealismandtheempiricismofthePolitics areneverreallyreconciledbyAristotlehimself. ItmayhelptoanunderstandingofthePoliticsifsomethingissaid onthosetwopoints. Weareaccustomedsincethegrowthofthehistoricalmethodtothe beliefthatstatesare"notmadebutgrow,"andareapttobe impatientwiththebeliefwhichAristotleandPlatoshowinthepowers ofthelawgiver.Buthowevertruethemaximmaybeofthemodern nationstate,itwasnottrueofthemuchsmallerandmore selfconsciousGreekcity.WhenAristotletalksofthelegislator,he isnottalkingintheair.StudentsoftheAcademyhadbeenactually calledontogivenewconstitutionstoGreekstates.FortheGreeks theconstitutionwasnotmerelyasitissooftenwithus,amatterof politicalmachinery.Itwasregardedasawayoflife.Further,the constitutionwithintheframeworkofwhichtheordinaryprocessof administrationandpassingofdecreeswenton,wasalwaysregardedas theworkofaspecialmanorbodyofmen,thelawgivers.Ifwestudy Greekhistory,wefindthatthepositionofthelegislatorcorresponds tothatassignedtohimbyPlatoandAristotle.AllGreekstates, exceptthoseperversionswhichAristotlecriticisesasbeing"above law,"workedunderrigidconstitutions,andtheconstitutionwasonly changedwhenthewholepeoplegaveacommissiontoalawgivertodraw upanewone.SuchwasthepositionoftheAEsumnetes,whomAristotle describesinBookIII.chap,xiv.,inearliertimes,andofthepupils oftheAcademyinthefourthcentury.Thelawgiverwasnotanordinary politician.Hewasastatedoctor,calledintoprescribeforan ailingconstitution.SoHerodotusrecountsthatwhenthepeopleof CyreneaskedtheoracleofDelphitohelpthemintheirdissensions, theoracletoldthemtogotoMantinea,andtheMantineanslentthem Demonax,whoactedasa"setterstraight"anddrewupanew constitutionforCyrene.SoagaintheMilesians,Herodotustellsus, werelongtroubledbycivildiscord,tilltheyaskedhelpfromParos, andtheParianssenttencommissionerswhogaveMiletusanew constitution.SotheAthenians,whentheywerefoundingtheirmodel

newcolonyatThurii,employedHippodamusofMiletus,whomAristotle mentionsinBookII,asthebestexpertintownplanning,toplanthe streetsofthecity,andProtagorasasthebestexpertinlawmaking, togivethecityitslaws.IntheLawsPlatorepresentsoneofthe personsofthedialogueashavingbeenaskedbythepeopleofGortyna todrawuplawsforacolonywhichtheywerefounding.Thesituation describedmusthaveoccurredfrequentlyinactuallife.TheGreeks thoughtadministrationshouldbedemocraticandlawmakingtheworkof experts.Wethinkmorenaturallyoflawmakingasthespecialrightof thepeopleandadministrationasnecessarilyconfinedtoexperts. Aristotle'sPolitics,then,isahandbookforthelegislator,the expertwhoistobecalledinwhenastatewantshelp.Wehavecalled himastatedoctor.Itisoneofthemostmarkedcharacteristicsof GreekpoliticaltheorythatPlatoandAristotlethinkofthestatesman asonewhohasknowledgeofwhatoughttobedone,andcanhelpthose whocallhimintoprescribeforthem,ratherthanonewhohaspower tocontroltheforcesofsociety.Thedesireofsocietyforthe statesman'sadviceistakenforgranted,PlatointheRepublicsays thatagoodconstitutionisonlypossiblewhentherulerdoesnotwant torule;wheremencontendforpower,wheretheyhavenotlearntto distinguishbetweentheartofgettingholdofthehelmofstateand theartofsteering,whichaloneisstatesmanship,truepoliticsis impossible. WiththispositionmuchthatAristotlehastosayaboutgovernmentis inagreement.HeassumesthecharacteristicPlatonicviewthatallmen seekthegood,andgowrongthroughignorance,notthroughevilwill, andsohenaturallyregardsthestateasacommunitywhichexistsfor thesakeofthegoodlife.Itisinthestatethatthatcommonseeking afterthegoodwhichistheprofoundesttruthaboutmenandnature becomesexplicitandknowsitself.ThestateisforAristotlepriorto thefamilyandthevillage,althoughitsucceedsthemintime,for onlywhenthestatewithitsconsciousorganisationisreachedcanman understandthesecretofhispaststrugglesaftersomethingheknew notwhat.Ifprimitivesocietyisunderstoodinthelightofthe state,thestateisunderstoodinthelightofitsmostperfectform, whenthegoodafterwhichallsocietiesareseekingisrealisedinits perfection.HenceforAristotleasforPlato,thenaturalstateorthe stateassuchistheidealstate,andtheidealstateisthe startingpointofpoliticalinquiry. Inaccordancewiththesamelineofthought,imperfectstates, althoughcalledperversions,areregardedbyAristotleastheresult ratherofmisconceptionandignorancethanofperversewill.Theyall represent,hesays,somekindofjustice.Oligarchsanddemocratsgo wrongintheirconceptionofthegood.Theyhavecomeshortofthe perfectstatethroughmisunderstandingoftheendorthroughignorance

ofthepropermeanstotheend.Butiftheyarestatesatall,they embodysomecommonconceptionofthegood,somecommonaspirationsof alltheirmembers. TheGreekdoctrinethattheessenceofthestateconsistsincommunity ofpurposeisthecounterpartofthenotionoftenheldinmoderntimes thattheessenceofthestateisforce.Theexistenceofforceisfor PlatoandAristotleasignnotofthestatebutofthestate's failure.Itcomesfromthestrugglebetweenconflictingmisconceptions ofthegood.Insofarasmenconceivethegoodrightlytheyare united.Thestaterepresentstheircommonagreement,forcetheir failuretomakethatagreementcomplete.Thecure,therefore,of politicalillsisknowledgeofthegoodlife,andthestatesmanishe whohassuchknowledge,forthatalonecangivemenwhattheyare alwaysseeking. Ifthestateistheorganisationofmenseekingacommongood,power andpoliticalpositionmustbegiventothosewhocanforwardthis end.ThisistheprincipleexpressedinAristotle'saccountof politicaljustice,theprincipleof"toolstothosewhocanusethem." Astheaimofthestateisdifferentlyconceived,thequalifications forgovernmentwillvary.Intheidealstatepowerwillbegivento themanwithmostknowledgeofthegood;inotherstatestothemen whoaremosttrulycapableofachievingthatendwhichthecitizens havesetthemselvestopursue.Thejustestdistributionofpolitical poweristhatinwhichthereisleastwasteofpoliticalability. Further,thebeliefthattheconstitutionofastateisonlythe outwardexpressionofthecommonaspirationsandbeliefsofits members,explainstheparamountpoliticalimportancewhichAristotle assignstoeducation.Itisthegreatinstrumentbywhichthe legislatorcanensurethatthefuturecitizensofhisstatewillshare thosecommonbeliefswhichmakethestatepossible.TheGreekswith theirsmallstateshadafarclearerapprehensionthanwecanhaveof thedependenceofaconstitutionuponthepeoplewhohavetoworkit. SuchisinbrieftheattitudeinwhichAristotleapproachespolitical problems,butinworkingoutitsapplicationtomenandinstitutions astheyare,Aristotleadmitscertaincompromiseswhicharenotreally consistentwithit. 1.Aristotlethinksofmembershipofastateascommunityinpursuit ofthegood.Hewishestoconfinemembershipinittothosewhoare capableofthatpursuitinthehighestandmostexplicitmanner.His citizens,therefore,mustbemenofleisure,capableofrational thoughtupontheendoflife.Hedoesnotrecognisethesignificance ofthatlessconsciousbutdeepseatedmembershipofthestatewhich findsitsexpressioninloyaltyandpatriotism.Hisdefinitionof

citizenincludesonlyasmallpartofthepopulationofanyGreek city.Heisforcedtoadmitthatthestateisnotpossiblewithoutthe cooperationofmenwhomhewillnotadmittomembershipinit,either becausetheyarenotcapableofsufficientrationalappreciationof politicalends,likethebarbarianswhomhethoughtwerenatural slaves,orbecausetheleisurenecessaryforcitizenshipcanonlybe gainedbytheworkoftheartisanswhobythatveryworkmake themselvesincapableofthelifewhichtheymakepossibleforothers. "Theartisanonlyattainsexcellenceinproportionashebecomesa slave,"andtheslaveisonlyalivinginstrumentofthegoodlife.He existsforthestate,butthestatedoesnotexistforhim. 2.Aristotleinhisaccountoftheidealstateseemstowaverbetween twoideals.Thereistheidealofanaristocracyandtheidealofwhat hecallsconstitutionalgovernment,amixedconstitution.The principleof"toolstothosewhocanusethem"oughttoleadhim,as itdoesPlato,toanaristocracy.Thosewhohavecompleteknowledgeof thegoodmustbefew,andthereforePlatogaveentirepowerinhis stateintothehandsofthesmallminorityofphilosopherguardians. ItisinaccordancewiththisprinciplethatAristotleholdsthat kingshipistheproperformofgovernmentwhenthereisinthestate onemanoftranscendentvirtue.Atthesametime,Aristotlealways holdsthatabsolutegovernmentisnotproperlypolitical,that governmentisnotliketheruleofashepherdoverhissheep,butthe ruleofequalsoverequals.Headmitsthatthedemocratsarerightin insistingthatequalityisanecessaryelementinthestate,thoughhe thinkstheydonotadmittheimportanceofotherequallynecessary elements.Hencehecomestosaythatrulingandbeingruledoverby turnsisanessentialfeatureofconstitutionalgovernment,whichhe admitsasanalternativetoaristocracy.Theendofthestate,which istobethestandardofthedistributionofpoliticalpower,is conceivedsometimesasagoodfortheapprehensionandattainmentof which"virtue"isnecessaryandsufficient(thisistheprincipleof aristocracy),andsometimesasamorecomplexgood,whichneedsfor itsattainmentnotonly"virtue"butwealthandequality.Thislatter conceptionistheprincipleonwhichthemixedconstitutionisbased. Thisinitsdistributionofpoliticalpowergivessomeweightto "virtue,"sometowealth,andsometomerenumber.Buttheprinciple of"rulingandbeingruledbyturns"isnotreallycompatiblewithan unmodifiedprincipleof"toolstothosewhocanusethem."Aristotle isrightinseeingthatpoliticalgovernmentdemandsequality,notin thesensethatallmembersofthestateshouldbeequalinabilityor shouldhaveequalpower,butinthesensethatnoneofthemcan properlyberegardedsimplyastoolswithwhichthelegislatorworks, thateachhasarighttosaywhatwillbemadeofhisownlife.The analogybetweenthelegislatorandthecraftsmanonwhichPlato insists,breaksdownbecausethelegislatorisdealingwithmenlike himself,menwhocantosomeextentconceivetheirownendinlifeand

cannotbetreatedmerelyasmeanstotheendofthelegislator.The senseofthevalueof"rulingandbeingruledinturn"isderived fromtheexperiencethattherulermayusehispowertosubordinate thelivesofthecitizensofthestatenottothecommongoodbutto hisownprivatepurposes.Inmodernterms,itisasimple, roughandreadyattempttosolvethatconstantproblemofpolitics, howefficientgovernmentistobecombinedwithpopularcontrol.This problemarisesfromtheimperfectionofhumannature,apparentin rulersaswellasinruled,andiftheprinciplewhichattemptsto solveitbeadmittedasaprincipleofimportanceintheformationof thebestconstitution,thenthestartingpointofpoliticswillbe man'sactualimperfection,nothisidealnature.Instead,then,of beginningwithastatewhichwouldexpressman'sidealnature,and adaptingitaswellasmaybetoman'sactualshortcomingsfromthat ideal,wemustrecognisethatthestateandallpoliticalmachinery areasmuchtheexpressionofman'sweaknessasofhisideal possibilities.Thestateispossibleonlybecausemenhavecommon aspirations,butgovernment,andpoliticalpower,theexistenceof officialswhoaregivenauthoritytoactinthenameofthewhole state,arenecessarybecausemen'scommunityisimperfect,because man'ssocialnatureexpressesitselfinconflictingways,intheclash ofinterests,therivalryofparties,andthestruggleofclasses, insteadofintheunitedseekingafteracommongood.Platoand Aristotlewerefamiliarwiththelegislatorwhowascalledinbythe wholepeople,andtheytendedthereforetotakethegeneralwillor commonconsentofthepeopleforgranted.Mostpoliticalquestionsare concernedwiththeconstructionandexpressionofthegeneralwill, andwithattemptstoensurethatthepoliticalmachinerymadeto expressthegeneralwillshallnotbeexploitedforprivateor sectionalends. Aristotle'smixedconstitutionspringsfromarecognitionofsectional interestsinthestate.Fortheproperrelationbetweentheclaimsof "virtue,"wealth,andnumbersistobebasednotupontheirrelative importanceinthegoodlife,butuponthestrengthoftheparties whichtheyrepresent.Themixedconstitutionispracticableinastate wherethemiddleclassisstrong,asonlythemiddleclasscanmediate betweentherichandthepoor.Themixedconstitutionwillbestable ifitrepresentstheactualbalanceofpowerbetweendifferentclasses inthestate.WhenwecometoAristotle'sanalysisofexisting constitutions,wefindthatwhileheregardsthemasimperfect approximationstotheideal,healsothinksofthemastheresultof thestrugglebetweenclasses.Democracy,heexplains,isthe governmentnotofthemanybutofthepoor;oligarchyagovernmentnot ofthefewbutoftherich.Andeachclassisthoughtof,notas tryingtoexpressanideal,butasstrugglingtoacquirepoweror maintainitsposition.Ifevertheclassexistedinunredeemed nakedness,itwasintheGreekcitiesofthefourthcentury,andits

existenceisabundantlyrecognisedbyAristotle.Hisaccountofthe causesofrevolutionsinBookV.showshowfarweretheexisting statesofGreecefromtheidealwithwhichhestarts.Hisanalysisof thefactsforceshimtolookuponthemasthesceneofstruggling factions.Thecausesofrevolutionsarenotdescribedasprimarily changesintheconceptionofthecommongood,butchangesinthe militaryoreconomicpoweroftheseveralclassesinthestate.The aimwhichhesetsbeforeoligarchsordemocraciesisnotthegood life,butsimplestabilityorpermanenceoftheexistingconstitution. WiththisspiritofrealismwhichpervadesBooksIV.,V.,andVI.the idealismofBooksI.,II.,VII.,andVIII.isneverreconciled. Aristotleiscontenttocallexistingconstitutionsperversionsofthe trueform.ButwecannotreadthePoliticswithoutrecognisingand profitingfromtheinsightintothenatureofthestatewhichis revealedthroughout.Aristotle'sfailuredoesnotlieinthis,thathe isbothidealistandrealist,butthathekeepsthesetwotendencies toofarapart.Hethinkstoomuchofhisidealstate,assomethingto bereachedonceforallbyknowledge,asafixedtypetowhichactual statesapproximateorfromwhichtheyareperversions.Butifweare tothinkofactualpoliticsasintelligibleinthelightoftheideal, wemustthinkofthatidealasprogressivelyrevealedinhistory,not assomethingtobediscoveredbyturningourbackonexperienceand havingrecoursetoabstractreasoning.Ifwestretchforwardfromwhat existstoanideal,itistoabetterwhichmaybeinitsturn transcended,nottoasingleimmutablebest.Aristotlefoundinthe societyofhistimemenwhowerenotcapableofpoliticalreflection, andwho,ashethought,didtheirbestworkundersuperintendence.He thereforecalledthemnaturalslaves.For,accordingtoAristotle, thatisaman'snaturalconditioninwhichhedoeshisbestwork.But Aristotlealsothinksofnatureassomethingfixedandimmutable;and thereforesanctionstheinstitutionofslavery,whichassumesthat whatmenarethattheywillalwaysbe,andsetsupanartificial barriertotheireverbecominganythingelse.WeseeinAristotle's defenceofslaveryhowtheconceptionofnatureastheidealcanhave adebasinginfluenceuponviewsofpracticalpolitics.Hishighideal ofcitizenshipofferstothosewhocansatisfyitsclaimstheprospect ofafairlife;thosewhofallshortaredeemedtobedifferentin natureandshutoutentirelyfromapproachtotheideal. A.D. LINDSAY. BIBLIOGRAPHY Firsteditionofworks(withomissionofRhetorica,Poetica,and secondbookofOEconomica),5vols.byAldusManutius,Venice,14958; reimpressionsupervisedbyErasmusandwithcertaincorrectionsby

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byE.Pargiter,1745;withPolitica,byJ.Gillies,1797,1804,1813; withRhetoricaandPoetica,byT.Taylor,1818,andlatereditions. NicomacheanEthics,1819;mainlyfromtextofBekker,byD.P.Chase, 1847;revised1861,andlatereditions/withanintroductoryessayby G.H.Lewes(CamelotClassics),1890;reeditedbyJ.M.Mitchell(New UniversalLibrary),1906,1910;withanintroductoryessaybyProf. J.H.Smith(Everyman'sLibrary),1911;byR.W.Browne(Bohn'sClassical Library),1848,etc.;byR.Williams,1869,1876;byW.M.Hatchand others(withtranslationofparaphraseattributedtoAndronicusof Rhodes),editedbyE.Hatch,1879;byF,H.Peters,1881;J.E.C. Welldon,1892;J.Gillies(Lubbock'sHundredBooks),1893.Historia Animalium,byR.Creswell(Bohn'sClassicalLibrary),1848;with TreatiseonPhysiognomy,byT.Taylor,1809.Metaphysica,byT. Taylor,1801;byJ.H.M'Mahon(Bohn'sClassicalLibrary),1848. Organon,withPorphyry'sIntroduction,byO.F.Owen(Bohn'sClassical Library),1848.PosteriorAnalytics,E.Poste,1850;E.S.Bourchier, 1901;OnFallacies,E.Poste,1866.ParvaNaturalia(Greekand English),byG.R.T.Ross,1906;withDeAnima,byW.A.Hammond, 1902.YouthandOldAge,LifeandDeathandRespiration,W.Ogle, 1897.Poetica,withNotesfromtheFrenchofD'Acier,1705;byH.J. Pye,1788,1792;T.Twining,1789,1812,withPrefaceandNotesbyH. Hamilton,1851;TreatiseonRhetoricaandPoetica,byT.Hobbes (Bohn'sClassicalLibrary),1850;byWharton,1883(seeGreek version),S.H.Butcher,1895,1898,3rdedition,1902;E.S. Bourchier,1907;byIngramBywater,1909.DePartibusAnimalium,W. Ogle,1882.DeRepublicaAthenientium,byE.Poste,1891;F.G. Kenyon,1891;T.J.Dymes,1891.DeVirtutibusetVitiis,byW. Bridgman,1804.Politica,fromtheFrenchofRegius,1598;byW. Ellis,1776,1778,1888(Morley'sUniversalLibrary),1893(Lubbock's HundredBooks);byE.Walford(withAEconomics,andLifebyDr. Gillies)(Bohn'sClassicalLibrary),1848;J.E.C.Welldon,1883;B. Jowett,1885;withIntroductionandIndexbyH.W.C.Davis,1905; Booksi.iii.iv.(vii.)fromBekker'stextbyW.E.Bolland,with IntroductionbyA.Lang,1877.Problemata(withwritingsofother philosophers),1597,1607,1680,1684,etc.Rhetorica:AsummarybyT. Hobbes,1655(?),newedition,1759;bythetranslatorsoftheArtof Thinking,1686,1816;byD.M.Crimmin,1812;J.Gillies,1823;Anon. 1847;J.E.C.Welldon,1886;R.C.Jebb,withIntroductionand SupplementaryNotesbyJ.E.Sandys,1909(seeunderPoeticaand Ethica).SecretaSecretorum(supposititiouswork),Anon.1702;from theHebrewversionbyM.Gaster,1907,1908.VersionbyLydgateand Burgh,editedbyR.Steele(E.E.T.S.),1894,1898. LIFE,ETC.:J.W.Blakesley,1839;ACrichton(Jardine'sNaturalist's Library),1843;J.S.Blackie,FourPhasesofMorals,Socrates, Aristotle,etc.,1871;G.Grote,Aristotle,editedbyA.BainandG. C.Robertson,1872,1880;E.Wallace,OutlinesofthePhilosophyof Aristotle,1875,1880;A.Grant(AncientClassicsforEnglish

readers),1877;T.Davidson,AristotleandAncientEducationalIdeals (GreatEducators),1892. ATREATISEONGOVERNMENT BOOKI CHAPTERI Asweseethateverycityisasociety,andeverysocietyEd.is establishedforsomegoodpurpose;foranapparent[Bekker1252a]good isthespringofallhumanactions;itisevidentthatthisisthe principleuponwhichtheyareeveryonefounded,andthisismore especiallytrueofthatwhichhasforitsobjectthebestpossible, andisitselfthemostexcellent,andcomprehendsalltherest.Now thisiscalledacity,andthesocietythereofapoliticalsociety; forthosewhothinkthattheprinciplesofapolitical,aregal,a family,andaherilegovernmentarethesamearemistaken,whilethey supposethateachofthesedifferinthenumberstowhomtheirpower extends,butnotintheirconstitution:sothatwiththemaherile governmentisonecomposedofaveryfew,adomesticofmore,acivil andaregalofstillmore,asiftherewasnodifferencebetweena largefamilyandasmallcity,orthataregalgovernmentanda politicalonearethesame,onlythatintheoneasinglepersonis continuallyattheheadofpublicaffairs;intheother,thateach memberofthestatehasinhisturnashareinthegovernment,andis atonetimeamagistrate,atanotheraprivateperson,accordingto therulesofpoliticalscience.Butnowthisisnottrue,aswillbe evidenttoanyonewhowillconsiderthisquestioninthemost approvedmethod.As,inaninquiryintoeveryothersubject,itis necessarytoseparatethedifferentpartsofwhichitiscompounded, tillwearriveattheirfirstelements,whicharethemostminute partsthereof;sobythesameproceedingweshallacquireaknowledge oftheprimarypartsofacityandseewhereintheydifferfromeach other,andwhethertherulesofartwillgiveusanyassistancein examiningintoeachofthesethingswhicharementioned.

 CHAPTERII Nowifinthisparticularscienceanyonewouldattendtoitsoriginal seeds,andtheirfirstshoot,hewouldthenasinothershavethe subjectperfectlybeforehim;andperceive,inthefirstplace,that itisrequisitethatthoseshouldbejoinedtogetherwhosespecies cannotexistwithouteachother,asthemaleandthefemale,forthe businessofpropagation;andthisnotthroughchoice,butbythat naturalimpulsewhichactsbothuponplantsandanimalsalso,forthe purposeoftheirleavingbehindthemotherslikethemselves.Itis alsofromnaturalcausesthatsomebeingscommandandothersobey, thateachmayobtaintheirmutualsafety;forabeingwhoisendowed withamindcapableofreflectionandforethoughtisbynaturethe superiorandgovernor,whereashewhoseexcellenceismerelycorporeal isformecttobeaslave;whenceitfollowsthatthedifferentstate ofmaster[1252b]andslaveisequallyadvantageoustoboth.Butthere isanaturaldifferencebetweenafemaleandaslave:fornatureis notliketheartistswhomaketheDelphicswordsfortheuseofthe poor,butforeveryparticularpurposeshehasherseparate instruments,andthusherendsaremostcomplete,forwhatsoeveris employedononesubjectonly,bringsthatonetomuchgreater perfectionthanwhenemployedonmany;andyetamongthebarbarians,a femaleandaslaveareuponalevelinthecommunity,thereasonfor whichis,thatamongstthemtherearenonequalifiedbynatureto govern,thereforetheirsocietycanbenothingbutbetweenslavesof differentsexes.Forwhichreasonthepoetssay,itisproperforthe Greekstogovernthebarbarians,asifabarbarianandaslavewereby natureone.Nowofthesetwosocietiesthedomesticisthefirst,and Hesiodisrightwhenhesays,"Firstahouse,thenawife,thenanox fortheplough,"forthepoormanhasalwaysanoxbeforeahousehold slave.Thatsocietythenwhichnaturehasestablishedfordaily supportisthedomestic,andthosewhocomposeitarecalledby Charondas_homosipuoi_,andbyEpimenidestheCretan_homokapnoi_;but thesocietyofmanyfamilies,whichwasfirstinstitutedfortheir lasting,mutualadvantage,iscalledavillage,andavillageismost naturallycomposedofthedescendantsofonefamily,whomsomepersons callhomogalaktes,thechildrenandthechildren'schildrenthereof: forwhichreasoncitieswereoriginallygovernedbykings,asthe barbarianstatesnoware,whicharecomposedofthosewhohadbefore submittedtokinglygovernment;foreveryfamilyisgovernedbythe elder,asarethebranchesthereof,onaccountoftheirrelationship thereunto,whichiswhatHomersays,"Eachoneruledhiswifeand child;"andinthisscatteredmannertheyformerlylived.Andthe opinionwhichuniversallyprevails,thatthegodsthemselvesare

subjecttokinglygovernment,arisesfromhence,thatallmenformerly were,andmanyaresonow;andastheyimaginedthemselvestobemade inthelikenessofthegods,sotheysupposedtheirmanneroflife mustneedsbethesame.Andwhenmanyvillagessoentirelyjoin themselvestogetherasineveryrespecttoformbutonesociety,that societyisacity,andcontainsinitself,ifImaysospeak,theend andperfectionofgovernment:firstfoundedthatwemightlive,but continuedthatwemaylivehappily.Forwhichreasoneverycitymust beallowedtobetheworkofnature,ifweadmitthattheoriginal societybetweenmaleandfemaleis;fortothisastheirendall subordinatesocietiestend,andtheendofeverythingisthenatureof it.Forwhateverybeingisinitsmostperfectstate,thatcertainly isthenatureofthatbeing,whetheritbeaman,ahorse,orahouse: besides,whatsoeverproducesthefinalcauseandtheendwhichwe [1253a]desire,mustbebest;butagovernmentcompleteinitselfis thatfinalcauseandwhatisbest.Henceitisevidentthatacityis anaturalproduction,andthatmanisnaturallyapoliticalanimal, andthatwhosoeverisnaturallyandnotaccidentallyunfitfor society,mustbeeitherinferiororsuperiortoman:thusthemanin Homer,whoisreviledforbeing"withoutsociety,withoutlaw,without family."Suchaonemustnaturallybeofaquarrelsomedisposition, andassolitaryasthebirds.Thegiftofspeechalsoevidentlyproves thatmanisamoresocialanimalthanthebees,oranyoftheherding cattle:fornature,aswesay,doesnothinginvain,andmanisthe onlyanimalwhoenjoysit.Voiceindeed,asbeingthetokenof pleasureandpain,isimpartedtoothersalso,andthusmuchtheir natureiscapableof,toperceivepleasureandpain,andtoimpart thesesensationstoothers;butitisbyspeechthatweareenabledto expresswhatisusefulforus,andwhatishurtful,andofcoursewhat isjustandwhatisunjust:forinthisparticularmandiffersfrom otheranimals,thathealonehasaperceptionofgoodandevil,of justandunjust,anditisaparticipationofthesecommonsentiments whichformsafamilyandacity.Besides,thenotionofacity naturallyprecedesthatofafamilyoranindividual,forthewhole mustnecessarilybepriortotheparts,forifyoutakeawaythewhole man,youcannotsayafootorahandremains,unlessbyequivocation, assupposingahandofstonetobemade,butthatwouldonlybeadead one;buteverythingisunderstoodtobethisorthatbyitsenergic qualitiesandpowers,sothatwhenthesenolongerremain,neithercan thatbesaidtobethesame,butsomethingofthesamename.Thata citythenprecedesanindividualisplain,forifanindividualisnot inhimselfsufficienttocomposeaperfectgovernment,heistoacity asotherpartsaretoawhole;buthethatisincapableofsociety,or socompleteinhimselfasnottowantit,makesnopartofacity,as abeastoragod.Thereistheninallpersonsanaturalimpetusto associatewitheachotherinthismanner,andhewhofirstfounded civilsocietywasthecauseofthegreatestgood;forasbythe completionofitmanisthemostexcellentofalllivingbeings,so

withoutlawandjusticehewouldbetheworstofall,fornothingis sodifficulttosubdueasinjusticeinarms:butthesearmsmanis bornwith,namely,prudenceandvalour,whichhemayapplytothemost oppositepurposes,forhewhoabusesthemwillbethemostwicked,the mostcruel,themostlustful,andmostgluttonousbeingimaginable; forjusticeisapoliticalvirtue,bytherulesofitthestateis regulated,andtheserulesarethecriterionofwhatisright. CHAPTERIII SINCEitisnowevidentofwhatpartsacityiscomposed,itwillbe necessarytotreatfirstoffamilygovernment,foreverycityismade upoffamilies,andeveryfamily[1253b]hasagainitsseparateparts ofwhichitiscomposed.Whenafamilyiscomplete,itconsistsof freemenandslaves;butasineverysubjectweshouldbeginwith examiningintothesmallestpartsofwhichitconsists,andasthe firstandsmallestpartsofafamilyarethemasterandslave,the husbandandwife,thefatherandchild,letusfirstinquireinto thesethree,whateachofthemmaybe,andwhattheyoughttobe;that istosay,theherile,thenuptial,andthepaternal.Letthesethen beconsideredasthethreedistinctpartsofafamily:somethinkthat theprovidingwhatisnecessaryforthefamilyissomethingdifferent fromthegovernmentofit,othersthatthisisthegreatestpartof it;itshallbeconsideredseparately;butwewillfirstspeakofa masterandaslave,thatwemaybothunderstandthenatureofthose thingswhichareabsolutelynecessary,andalsotryifwecanlearn anythingbetteronthissubjectthanwhatisalreadyknown.Some personshavethoughtthatthepowerofthemasteroverhisslave originatesfromhissuperiorknowledge,andthatthisknowledgeisthe sameinthemaster,themagistrate,andtheking,aswehavealready said;butothersthinkthatherilegovernmentiscontrarytonature, andthatitisthelawwhichmakesonemanaslaveandanotherfree, butthatinnaturethereisnodifference;forwhichreasonthatpower cannotbefoundedinjustice,butinforce. CHAPTERIV Sincethenasubsistenceisnecessaryineveryfamily,themeansof procuringitcertainlymakesuppartofthemanagementofafamily,

forwithoutnecessariesitisimpossibletolive,andtolivewell.As inallartswhicharebroughttoperfectionitisnecessarythatthey shouldhavetheirproperinstrumentsiftheywouldcompletetheir works,soisitintheartofmanagingafamily:nowofinstruments someofthemarealive,othersinanimate;thuswithrespecttothe pilotoftheship,thetilleriswithoutlife,thesailorisalive; foraservantisasaninstrumentinmanyarts.Thuspropertyisasan instrumenttoliving;anestateisamultitudeofinstruments;soa slaveisananimatedinstrument,buteveryonethatcanministerof himselfismorevaluablethananyotherinstrument;forifevery instrument,atcommand,orfromapreconceptionofitsmaster'swill, couldaccomplishitswork(asthestorygoesofthestatuesof Daedalus;orwhatthepoettellsusofthetripodsofVulcan,"that theymovedoftheirownaccordintotheassemblyofthegods"),the shuttlewouldthenweave,andthelyreplayofitself;norwouldthe architectwantservants,orthe[1254a]masterslaves.Nowwhatare generallycalledinstrumentsaretheefficientsofsomethingelse,but possessionsarewhatwesimplyuse:thuswithashuttlewemake somethingelseforouruse;butweonlyuseacoat,orabed:since thenmakingandusingdifferfromeachotherinspecies,andtheyboth requiretheirinstruments,itisnecessarythattheseshouldbe differentfromeachother.Nowlifeisitselfwhatweuse,andnot whatweemployastheefficientofsomethingelse;forwhichreason theservicesofaslaveareforuse.Apossessionmaybeconsideredin thesamenatureasapartofanything;nowapartisnotonlyapart ofsomething,butalsoisnothingelse;soisapossession;therefore amasterisonlythemasteroftheslave,butnopartofhim;butthe slaveisnotonlytheslaveofthemaster,butnothingelsebutthat. Thisfullyexplainswhatisthenatureofaslave,andwhatarehis capacities;forthatbeingwhobynatureisnothingofhimself,but totallyanother's,andisaman,isaslavebynature;andthatman whoisthepropertyofanother,ishismerechattel,thoughhe continuesaman;butachattelisaninstrumentforuse,separatefrom thebody. CHAPTERV Butwhetheranypersonissuchbynature,andwhetheritis advantageousandjustforanyonetobeaslaveorno,orwhetherall slaveryiscontrarytonature,shallbeconsideredhereafter;notthat itisdifficulttodetermineitupongeneralprinciples,orto understanditfrommattersoffact;forthatsomeshouldgovern,and othersbegoverned,isnotonlynecessarybutuseful,andfromthe houroftheirbirthsomearemarkedoutforthosepurposes,andothers

fortheother,andtherearemanyspeciesofbothsorts.Andthe betterthosearewhoaregovernedthebetteralsoisthegovernment, asforinstanceofman,ratherthanthebrutecreation:forthemore excellentthematerialsarewithwhichtheworkisfinished,themore excellentcertainlyisthework;andwhereverthereisagovernorand agoverned,therecertainlyissomeworkproduced;forwhatsoeveris composedofmanyparts,whichjointlybecomeone,whetherconjunctor separate,evidentlyshowthemarksofgoverningandgoverned;andthis istrueofeverylivingthinginallnature;nay,eveninsomethings whichpartakenotoflife,asinmusic;butthisprobablywouldbea disquisitiontooforeigntoourpresentpurpose.Everylivingthingin thefirstplaceiscomposedofsoulandbody,ofthesetheoneisby naturethegovernor,theotherthegoverned;nowifwewouldknowwhat isnatural,weoughttosearchforitinthosesubjectsinwhich natureappearsmostperfect,andnotinthosewhicharecorrupted;we shouldthereforeexamineintoamanwhoismostperfectlyformedboth insoulandbody,inwhomthisisevident,forinthedepravedand viciousthebodyseems[1254b]toruleratherthanthesoul,on accountoftheirbeingcorruptandcontrarytonature.Wemaythen,as weaffirm,perceiveinananimalthefirstprinciplesofherileand politicalgovernment;forthesoulgovernsthebodyasthemaster governshisslave;themindgovernstheappetitewithapoliticalora kinglypower,whichshowsthatitisbothnaturalandadvantageous thatthebodyshouldbegovernedbythesoul,andthepatheticpartby themind,andthatpartwhichispossessedofreason;buttohaveno rulingpower,oranimproperone,ishurtfultoall;andthisholds truenotonlyofman,butofotheranimalsalso,fortameanimalsare naturallybetterthanwildones,anditisadvantageousthatboth shouldbeundersubjectiontoman;forthisisproductiveoftheir commonsafety:soisitnaturallywiththemaleandthefemale;the oneissuperior,theotherinferior;theonegoverns,theotheris governed;andthesamerulemustnecessarilyholdgoodwithrespectto allmankind.Thosementhereforewhoareasmuchinferiortoothersas thebodyistothesoul,aretobethusdisposedof,astheproperuse ofthemistheirbodies,inwhichtheirexcellenceconsists;andif whatIhavesaidbetrue,theyareslavesbynature,anditis advantageoustothemtobealwaysundergovernment.Hethenisby natureformedaslavewhoisqualifiedtobecomethechattelof anotherperson,andonthataccountisso,andwhohasjustreason enoughtoknowthatthereissuchafaculty,withoutbeinginduedwith theuseofit;forotheranimalshavenoperceptionofreason,butare entirelyguidedbyappetite,andindeedtheyvaryverylittleintheir usefromeachother;fortheadvantagewhichwereceive,bothfrom slavesandtameanimals,arisesfromtheirbodilystrength administeringtoournecessities;foritistheintentionofnatureto makethebodiesofslavesandfreemendifferentfromeachother,that theoneshouldberobustfortheirnecessarypurposes,theothers erect,uselessindeedforwhatslavesareemployedin,butfitfor

civillife,whichisdividedintothedutiesofwarandpeace;though theserulesdonotalwaystakeplace,forslaveshavesometimesthe bodiesoffreemen,sometimesthesouls;ifthenitisevidentthatif somebodiesareasmuchmoreexcellentthanothersasthestatuesof thegodsexcelthehumanform,everyonewillallowthattheinferior oughttobeslavestothesuperior;andifthisistruewithrespect tothebody,itisstilljustertodetermineinthesamemanner,when weconsiderthesoul;thoughitisnotsoeasytoperceivethebeauty of[1255a]thesoulasitisofthebody.Sincethensomemenare slavesbynature,andothersarefreemen,itisclearthatwhere slaveryisadvantageoustoanyone,thenitisjusttomakehima slave. CHAPTERVI Butitisnotdifficulttoperceivethatthosewhomaintainthe contraryopinionhavesomereasonontheirside;foramanmaybecome aslavetwodifferentways;forhemaybesobylawalso,andthislaw isacertaincompact,bywhichwhatsoeveristakeninbattleis adjudgedtobethepropertyoftheconquerors:butmanypersonswho areconversantinlawcallinquestionthispretendedright,andsay thatitwouldbehardthatamanshouldbecompelledbyviolencetobe theslaveandsubjectofanotherwhohadthepowertocompelhim,and washissuperiorinstrength;anduponthissubject,evenofthosewho arewise,somethinkonewayandsomeanother;butthecauseofthis doubtandvarietyofopinionsarisesfromhence,thatgreatabilities, whenaccompaniedwithpropermeans,aregenerallyabletosucceedby force:forvictoryisalwaysowingtoasuperiorityinsome advantageouscircumstances;sothatitseemsthatforceneverprevails butinconsequenceofgreatabilities.Butstillthedispute concerningthejusticeofitremains;forsomepersonsthink,that justiceconsistsinbenevolence,othersthinkitjustthatthe powerfulshouldgovern:inthemidstofthesecontraryopinions,there arenoreasonssufficienttoconvinceus,thattherightofbeing masterandgovernoroughtnottobeplacedwiththosewhohavethe greatestabilities.Somepersons,entirelyrestingupontheright whichthelawgives(forthatwhichislegalisinsomerespects just),insistuponitthatslaveryoccasionedbywarisjust,notthat theysayitiswhollyso,foritmayhappenthattheprincipleupon whichthewarswerecommencedisunjust;moreovernoonewillsaythat amanwhoisunworthilyinslaveryisthereforeaslave;forifso, menofthenoblestfamiliesmighthappentobeslaves,andthe descendantsofslaves,iftheyshouldchancetobetakenprisonersin warandsold:toavoidthisdifficultytheysaythatsuchpersons

shouldnotbecalledslaves,butbarbariansonlyshould;butwhenthey saythis,theydonothingmorethaninquirewhoisaslavebynature, whichwaswhatweatfirstsaid;forwemustacknowledgethatthere aresomepersonswho,wherevertheyare,mustnecessarilybeslaves, butothersinnosituation;thusalsoitiswiththoseofnoble descent:itisnotonlyintheirowncountrythattheyareEsteemedas such,buteverywhere,butthebarbariansarerespectedonthisaccount athomeonly;asifnobilityandfreedomwereoftwosorts,theone universal,theothernotso.ThussaystheHelenofTheodectes: "Whodaresreproachmewiththenameofslave?Whenfromthe immortalgods,oneitherside,Idrawmylineage." Thosewhoexpresssentimentslikethese,shewonlythatthey distinguishtheslaveandthefreeman,thenobleandtheignoblefrom eachotherbytheirvirtuesandtheir[1255b]vices;fortheythinkit reasonable,thatasamanbegetsaman,andabeastabeast,sofroma goodman,agoodmanshouldbedescended;andthisiswhatnature desirestodo,butfrequentlycannotaccomplishit.Itisevidentthen thatthisdoubthassomereasoninit,andthatthesepersonsarenot slaves,andthosefreemen,bytheappointmentofnature;andalsothat insomeinstancesitissufficientlyclear,thatitisadvantageousto bothpartiesforthismantobeaslave,andthattobeamaster,and thatitisrightandjust,thatsomeshouldbegoverned,andothers govern,inthemannerthatnatureintended;ofwhichsortof governmentisthatwhichamasterexercisesoveraslave.Butto governillisdisadvantageoustoboth;forthesamethingisusefulto thepartandtothewhole,tothebodyandtothesoul;buttheslave isasitwereapartofthemaster,asifhewereananimatedpartof hisbody,thoughseparate.Forwhichreasonamutualutilityand friendshipmaysubsistbetweenthemasterandtheslave,Imeanwhen theyareplacedbynatureinthatrelationtoeachother,forthe contrarytakesplaceamongstthosewhoarereducedtoslaverybythe law,orbyconquest. CHAPTERVII Itisevidentfromwhathasbeensaid,thataherileandapolitical governmentarenotthesame,orthatallgovernmentsarealiketoeach other,assomeaffirm;foroneisadaptedtothenatureoffreemen, theothertothatofslaves.Domesticgovernmentisamonarchy,for thatiswhatprevailsineveryhouse;butapoliticalstateisthe governmentoffreemenandequals.Themasterisnotsocalledfrom hisknowinghowtomanagehisslave,butbecauseheisso;forthe

samereasonaslaveandafreemanhavetheirrespectiveappellations. Thereisalsoonesortofknowledgeproperforamaster,anotherfora slave;theslave'sisofthenatureofthatwhichwastaughtbya slaveatSyracuse;forheforastipulatedsuminstructedtheboysin allthebusinessofahouseholdslave,ofwhichtherearevarious sortstobelearnt,astheartofcookery,andothersuchlike services,ofwhichsomeareallottedtosome,andotherstoothers; someemploymentsbeingmorehonourable,othersmorenecessary; accordingtotheproverb,"Oneslaveexcelsanother,onemasterexcels another:"insuchlikethingstheknowledgeofaslaveconsists.The knowledgeofthemasteristobeableproperlytoemployhisslaves, forthemastershipofslavesistheemployment,notthemere possessionofthem;notthatthisknowledgecontainsanythinggreator respectable;forwhataslaveoughttoknowhowtodo,thatamaster oughttoknowhowtoorder;forwhichreason,thosewhohaveitin theirpowertobefreefromtheselowattentions,employastewardfor thisbusiness,andapplythemselveseithertopublicaffairsor philosophy:theknowledgeofprocuringwhatisnecessaryforafamily isdifferentfromthatwhichbelongseithertothemasterorthe slave:andtodothisjustlymustbeeitherbywarorhunting.And thusmuchofthedifferencebetweenamasterandaslave. CHAPTERVIII [1256a]Asaslaveisaparticularspeciesofproperty,letusbyall meansinquireintothenatureofpropertyingeneral,andthe acquisitionofmoney,accordingtothemannerwehaveproposed.Inthe firstplacethen,someonemaydoubtwhetherthegettingofmoneyis thesamethingaseconomy,orwhetheritisapartofit,orsomething subservienttoit;andifso,whetheritisastheartofmaking shuttlesistotheartofweaving,ortheartofmakingbrasstothat ofstatuefounding,fortheyarenotofthesameservice;fortheone suppliesthetools,theotherthematter:bythematterImeanthe subjectoutofwhichtheworkisfinished,aswoolfortheclothand brassforthestatue.Itisevidentthenthatthegettingofmoneyis notthesamethingaseconomy,forthebusinessoftheoneisto furnishthemeansoftheothertousethem;andwhatartisthere employedinthemanagementofafamilybuteconomy,butwhetherthis isapartofit,orsomethingofadifferentspecies,isadoubt;for ifitisthebusinessofhimwhoistogetmoneytofindouthow richesandpossessionsmaybeprocured,andboththesearisefrom variouscauses,wemustfirstinquirewhethertheartofhusbandryis partofmoneygettingorsomethingdifferent,andingeneral,whether thesameisnottrueofeveryacquisitionandeveryattentionwhich

relatestoprovision.Butastherearemanysortsofprovision,soare themethodsoflivingbothofmanandthebrutecreationveryvarious; andasitisimpossibletolivewithoutfood,thedifferenceinthat particularmakesthelivesofanimalssodifferentfromeachother.Of beasts,someliveinherds,othersseparate,asismostconvenientfor procuringthemselvesfood;assomeofthemliveuponflesh,otherson fruit,andothersonwhatsoevertheylighton,naturehavingso distinguishedtheircourseoflife,thattheycanveryeasilyprocure themselvessubsistence;andasthesamethingsarenotagreeableto all,butoneanimallikesonethingandanotheranother,itfollows thatthelivesofthosebeastswholiveuponfleshmustbedifferent fromthelivesofthosewholiveonfruits;soisitwithmen,their livesdiffergreatlyfromeachother;andofallthesetheshepherd's istheidlest,fortheyliveuponthefleshoftameanimals,without anytrouble,whiletheyareobligedtochangetheirhabitationson accountoftheirflocks,whichtheyarecompelledtofollow, cultivating,asitwere,alivingfarm.Othersliveexercising violenceoverlivingcreatures,onepursuingthisthing,anotherthat, thesepreyinguponmen;thosewholivenearlakesandmarshesand rivers,ortheseaitself,onfishing,whileothersarefowlers,or huntersofwildbeasts;butthegreaterpartofmankindliveuponthe produceoftheearthanditscultivatedfruits;andthemannerin whichallthoselivewhofollowthedirectionofnature,andlabour fortheirownsubsistence,isnearlythesame,withouteverthinking toprocureanyprovisionbywayofexchangeormerchandise,suchare shepherds,husbandmen,[1256b]robbers,fishermen,andhunters:some joindifferentemploymentstogether,andthusliveveryagreeably; supplyingthosedeficiencieswhichwerewantingtomaketheir subsistencedependuponthemselvesonly:thus,forinstance,thesame personshallbeashepherdandarobber,orahusbandmanandahunter; andsowithrespecttotherest,theypursuethatmodeoflifewhich necessitypointsout.Thisprovisionthennatureherselfseemstohave furnishedallanimalswith,aswellimmediatelyupontheirfirst originasalsowhentheyarearrivedatastateofmaturity;forat thefirstoftheseperiodssomeofthemareprovidedinthewombwith propernourishment,whichcontinuestillthatwhichisborncanget foodforitself,asisthecasewithwormsandbirds;andastothose whichbringforththeiryoungalive,theyhavethemeansfortheir subsistenceforacertaintimewithinthemselves,namelymilk.Itis evidentthenthatwemayconcludeofthosethingsthatare,that plantsarecreatedforthesakeofanimals,andanimalsforthesake ofmen;thetameforouruseandprovision;thewild,atleastthe greaterpart,forourprovisionalso,orforsomeotheradvantageous purpose,asfurnishinguswithclothes,andthelike.Asnature thereforemakesnothingeitherimperfectorinvain,itnecessarily followsthatshehasmadeallthesethingsformen:forwhichreason whatwegaininwarisinacertaindegreeanaturalacquisition;for huntingisapartofit,whichitisnecessaryforustoemploy

againstwildbeasts;andthosemenwhobeingintendedbynaturefor slaveryareunwillingtosubmittoit,onwhichoccasionsucha.war isbynaturejust:thatspeciesofacquisitionthenonlywhichis accordingtonatureispartofeconomy;andthisoughttobeathand, orifnot,immediatelyprocured,namely,whatisnecessarytobekept instoretoliveupon,andwhichareusefulaswellforthestateas thefamily.Andtruerichesseemtoconsistinthese;andthe acquisitionofthosepossessionswhicharenecessaryforahappylife isnotinfinite;thoughSolonsaysotherwiseinthisverse: "Noboundstorichescanbefixedforman;" fortheymaybefixedasinotherarts;fortheinstrumentsofnoart whatsoeverareinfinite,eitherintheirnumberortheirmagnitude; butrichesareanumberofinstrumentsindomesticandcivileconomy; itisthereforeevidentthattheacquisitionofcertainthings accordingtonatureisapartbothofdomesticandcivileconomy,and forwhatreason. CHAPTERIX Thereisalsoanotherspeciesofacquisitionwhichthey[1257a] particularlycallpecuniary,andwithgreatpropriety;andbythis indeeditseemsthattherearenoboundstorichesandwealth.Now manypersonssuppose,fromtheirnearrelationtoeachother,that thisisoneandthesamewiththatwehavejustmentioned,butitis notthesameasthat,thoughnotverydifferent;oneoftheseis natural,theotherisnot,butratherowingtosomeartandskill;we willenterintoaparticularexaminationofthissubject.Theusesof everypossessionaretwo,bothdependentuponthethingitself,but notinthesamemanner,theonesupposinganinseparableconnection withit,theothernot;asashoe,forinstance,whichmaybeeither worn,orexchangedforsomethingelse,boththesearetheusesofthe shoe;forhewhoexchangesashoewithsomemanwhowantsone,for moneyorprovisions,usestheshoeasashoe,butnotaccordingtothe originalintention,forshoeswerenotatfirstmadetobeexchanged. Thesamethingholdstrueofallotherpossessions;forbarter,in general,haditsoriginalbeginninginnature,somemenhavinga surplus,otherstoolittleofwhatwasnecessaryforthem:henceit isevident,thatthesellingprovisionsformoneyisnotaccordingto thenaturaluseofthings;fortheywereobligedtousebarterfor thosethingswhichtheywanted;butitisplainthatbartercouldhave noplaceinthefirst,thatistosay,infamilysociety;butmust havebegunwhenthenumberofthosewhocomposedthecommunitywas

enlarged:forthefirstofthesehadallthingsincommon;butwhen theycametobeseparatedtheywereobligedtoexchangewitheach othermanydifferentthingswhichbothpartieswanted.Whichcustomof barterisstillpreservedamongstmanybarbarousnations,whoprocure onenecessarywithanother,butneversellanything;asgivingand receivingwineforcornandthelike.Thissortofbarterisnot contradictorytonature,norisitanyspeciesofmoneygetting;but isnecessaryinprocuringthatsubsistencewhichissoconsonant thereunto.Butthisbarterintroducedtheuseofmoney,asmightbe expected;foraconvenientplacefromwhencetoimportwhatyou wanted,ortoexportwhatyouhadasurplusof,beingoftenatagreat distance,moneynecessarilymadeitswayintocommerce;foritisnot everythingwhichisnaturallymostusefulthatiseasiestofcarriage; forwhichreasontheyinventedsomethingtoexchangewitheachother whichtheyshouldmutuallygiveandtake,thatbeingreallyvaluable itself,shouldhavetheadditionaladvantageofbeingofeasy conveyance,forthepurposesoflife,asironandsilver,oranything elseofthesamenature:andthisatfirstpassedinvaluesimply accordingtoitsweightorsize;butinprocessoftimeithada certainstamp,tosavethetroubleofweighing,whichstampexpressed itsvalue.[1257b] Moneythenbeingestablishedasthenecessarymediumofexchange, anotherspeciesofmoneygettingspontookplace,namely,bybuying andselling,atprobablyfirstinasimplemanner,afterwardswith moreskillandexperience,whereandhowthegreatestprofitsmightbe made.Forwhichreasontheartofmoneygettingseemstobechiefly conversantabouttrade,andthebusinessofittobeabletotell wherethegreatestprofitscanbemade,beingthemeansofprocuring abundanceofwealthandpossessions:andthuswealthisveryoften supposedtoconsistinthequantityofmoneywhichanyonepossesses, asthisisthemediumbywhichalltradeisconductedandafortune made,othersagainregarditasofnovalue,asbeingofnoneby nature,butarbitrarilymadesobycompact;sothatifthosewhouse itshouldaltertheirsentiments,itwouldbeworthnothing,asbeing ofnoserviceforanynecessarypurpose.Besides,hewhoaboundsin moneyoftenwantsnecessaryfood;anditisimpossibletosaythatany personisingoodcircumstanceswhenwithallhispossessionshemay perishwithhunger. LikeMidasinthefable,whofromhisinsatiablewishhadeverything hetouchedturnedintogold.Forwhichreasonothersendeavourto procureotherrichesandotherproperty,andrightly,forthereare otherrichesandpropertyinnature;andthesearetheproperobjects ofeconomy:whiletradeonlyprocuresmoney,notbyallmeans,butby theexchangeofit,andforthatpurposeitisthiswhichitis chieflyemployedabout,formoneyisthefirstprincipleandtheend oftrade;norarethereanyboundstobesettowhatisthereby

acquired.Thusalsotherearenolimitstotheartofmedicine,with respecttothehealthwhichitattemptstoprocure;thesamealsois trueofallotherarts;nolinecanbedrawntoterminatetheir bounds,theseveralprofessorsofthembeingdesiroustoextendthem asfaraspossible.(Butstillthemeanstobeemployedforthat purposearelimited;andthesearethelimitsbeyondwhichtheart cannotproceed.)Thusintheartofacquiringrichesthereareno limits,fortheobjectofthatismoneyandpossessions;buteconomy hasaboundary,thoughthishasnot:foracquiringrichesisnotthe businessofthat,forwhichreasonitshouldseemthatsomeboundary shouldbesettoriches,thoughweseethecontrarytothisiswhatis practised;forallthosewhogetrichesaddtotheirmoneywithout end;thecauseofwhichisthenearconnectionofthesetwoartswith eachother,whichsometimesoccasionstheonetochangeemployments withtheother,asgettingofmoneyistheircommonobject:for economyrequiresthepossessionofwealth,butnotonitsownaccount butwithanotherview,topurchasethingsnecessarytherewith;butthe otherprocuresitmerelytoincreaseit:sothatsomepersonsare confirmedintheirbelief,thatthisistheproperobjectofeconomy, andthinkthatforthispurposemoneyshouldbesavedandhoardedup withoutend;thereasonforwhichdispositionis,thattheyareintent uponliving,butnotuponlivingwell;andthisdesirebeingboundless initsextent,themeanswhichtheyaimatforthatpurposeare boundlessalso;andthosewhoproposetolivewell,oftenconfinethat totheenjoymentofthepleasuresofsense;sothatasthisalsoseems todependuponwhatamanhas,alltheircareistogetmoney,and hencearisestheothercauseforthisart;forasthisenjoymentis excessiveinitsdegree,theyendeavourtoprocuremeansproportionate tosupplyit;andiftheycannotdothismerelybytheartofdealing inmoney,theywillendeavourtodoitbyotherways,andapplyall theirpowerstoapurposetheywerenotbynatureintendedfor.Thus, forinstance,couragewasintendedtoinspirefortitude,nottoget moneyby;neitheristhistheendofthesoldier'sorthephysician's art,butvictoryandhealth.Butsuchpersonsmakeeverything subservienttomoneygetting,asifthiswastheonlyend;andtothe endeverythingoughttorefer. Wehavenowconsideredthatartofmoneygettingwhichisnot necessary,andhaveseeninwhatmannerwebecameinwantofit;and alsothatwhichisnecessary,whichisdifferentfromit;forthat economywhichisnatural,andwhoseobjectistoprovidefood,isnot likethisunlimitedinitsextent,buthasitsbounds. CHAPTERX

 Wehavenowdeterminedwhatwasbeforedoubtful,whetherornotheart ofgettingmoneyishisbusinesswhoisattheheadofafamilyora state,andthoughnotstrictlyso,itishoweververynecessary;for asapoliticiandoesnotmakemen,butreceivingthemfromthehandof natureemploysthemtoproperpurposes;thustheearth,orthesea,or somethingelseoughttosupplythemwithprovisions,andthisitis thebusinessofthemasterofthefamilytomanageproperly;foritis nottheweaver'sbusinesstomakeyarn,buttouseit,andto distinguishwhatisgoodandusefulfromwhatisbadandofno service;andindeedsomeonemayinquirewhygettingmoneyshouldbea partofeconomywhentheartofhealingisnot,asitisasrequisite thatthefamilyshouldbeinhealthasthattheyshouldeat,orhave anythingelsewhichisnecessary;andasitisindeedinsome particularsthebusinessbothofthemasterofthefamily,andheto whomthegovernmentofthestateisentrusted,toseeafterthehealth ofthoseundertheircare,butinothersnot,butthephysician's;so alsoastomoney;insomerespectsitisthebusinessofthemasterof thefamily,inothersnot,butoftheservant;butaswehavealready said,itischieflynature's,foritisherparttosupplyher offspringwithfood;foreverythingfindsnourishmentleftforitin whatproducedit;forwhichreasonthenaturalrichesofallmenarise fromfruitsandanimals.Nowmoneymaking,aswesay,beingtwofold, itmaybeappliedtotwopurposes,theserviceofthehouseorretail trade;ofwhichthefirstisnecessaryandcommendable,theother justlycensurable;forithasnotitsoriginin[1258b]nature,butby itmengainfromeachother;forusuryismostreasonablydetested,as itisincreasingourfortunebymoneyitself,andnotemployingitfor thepurposeitwasoriginallyintended,namelyexchange. Andthisistheexplanationofthename(TOKOS),whichmeansthe breedingofmoney.Forasoffspringresembletheirparents,sousury ismoneybredofmoney.Whenceofallformsofmoneymakingitismost againstnature. CHAPTERXI Havingalreadysufficientlyconsideredthegeneralprinciplesofthis subject,letusnowgointothepracticalpartthereof;theoneisa liberalemploymentforthemind,theothernecessary.Thesethings areusefulinthemanagementofone'saffairs;tobeskilfulinthe natureofcattle,whicharemostprofitable,andwhere,andhow;as forinstance,whatadvantagewillarisefromkeepinghorses,oroxen, orsheep,oranyotherlivestock;itisalsonecessarytobe

acquaintedwiththecomparativevalueofthesethings,andwhichof theminparticularplacesareworthmost;forsomedobetterinone place,someinanother.Agriculturealsoshouldbeunderstood,andthe managementofarablegroundsandorchards;andalsothecareofbees, andfish,andbirds,fromwhenceanyprofitmayarise;thesearethe firstandmostproperpartsofdomesticmanagement. Withrespecttogainingmoneybyexchange,theprincipalmethodof doingthisisbymerchandise,whichiscarriedoninthreedifferent ways,eitherbysendingthecommodityforsalebyseaorbyland,or elsesellingitontheplacewhereitgrows;andthesedifferfrom eachotherinthis,thattheoneismoreprofitable,theothersafer. Thesecondmethodisbyusury.Thethirdbyreceivingwagesforwork done,andthiseitherbybeingemployedinsomemeanart,orelsein merebodilylabour.Thereisalsoathirdspeciesofimprovinga fortune,thatissomethingbetweenthisandthefirst;foritpartly dependsuponnature,partlyuponexchange;thesubjectofwhichis, thingsthatareimmediatelyfromtheearth,ortheirproduce,which, thoughtheybearnofruit,areyetuseful,suchassellingoftimber andthewholeartofmetallurgy,whichincludesmanydifferent species,fortherearevarioussortsofthingsdugoutoftheearth. Thesewehavenowmentionedingeneral,buttoenterintoparticulars concerningeachofthem,thoughitmightbeusefultotheartist, wouldbetiresometodwellon.Nowofalltheworksofart,thoseare themostexcellentwhereinchancehastheleasttodo,andthoseare themeanestwhichdepravethebody,thosethemostservileinwhich bodilystrengthaloneischieflywanted,thosemostilliberalwhich requireleastskill;butastherearebookswrittenonthesesubjects bysomepersons,asbyCharesthePanian,andApollodorustheLemnian, uponhusbandryandplanting;andbyothersonothermatters,[1259b] letthosewhohaveoccasionconsultthemthereon;besides,every personshouldcollecttogetherwhatsoeverhehearsoccasionally mentioned,bymeansofwhichmanyofthosewhoaimedatmakinga fortunehavesucceededintheirintentions;foralltheseareuseful tothosewhomakeapointofgettingmoney,asinthecontrivanceof ThalestheMilesian(whichwascertainlyagainfulone,butasitwas hisitwasattributedtohiswisdom,thoughthemethodheusedwasa generalone,andwoulduniversallysucceed),whentheyreviledhimfor hispoverty,asifthestudyofphilosophywasuseless:fortheysay thathe,perceivingbyhisskillinastrologythattherewouldbe greatplentyofolivesthatyear,whileitwasyetwinter,havinggot alittlemoney,hegaveearnestforalltheoilworksthatwerein MiletusandChios,whichhehiredatalowprice,therebeingnoone tobidagainsthim;butwhentheseasoncameformakingoil,many personswantingthem,heallatonceletthemuponwhattermshe pleased;andraisingalargesumofmoneybythatmeans,convinced themthatitwaseasyforphilosopherstoberichiftheychoseit,

butthatthatwasnotwhattheyaimedat;inthismannerisThales saidtohaveshownhiswisdom.Itindeedis,aswehavesaid, generallygainfulforapersontocontrivetomakeamonopolyof anything;forwhichreasonsomecitiesalsotakethismethodwhenthey wantmoney,andmonopolisetheircommodities.Therewasacertain personinSicilywholaidoutasumofmoneywhichwasdepositedin hishandinbuyingupalltheironfromtheironmerchants;sothat whenthedealerscamefromthemarketstopurchase,therewasnoone hadanytosellbuthimself;andthoughheputnogreatadvanceupon it,yetbylayingoutfiftytalentshemadeanhundred.WhenDionysius heardthishepermittedhimtotakehismoneywithhim,butforbidhim tocontinueanylongerinSicily,asbeingonewhocontrivedmeansfor gettingmoneyinconsistentwithhisaffairs.Thisman'sviewand Thales'swasexactlythesame;bothofthemcontrivedtoprocurea monopolyforthemselves:itisusefulalsoforpoliticiansto understandthesethings,formanystateswanttoraisemoneyandby suchmeans,aswellasprivatefamilies,naymoreso;forwhichreason somepersonswhoareemployedinthemanagementofpublicaffairs confinethemselvestothisprovinceonly. CHAPTERXII Therearethenthreepartsofdomesticgovernment,themasters,of whichwehavealreadytreated,thefathers,andthehusbands;nowthe governmentofthewifeandchildrenshouldbothbethatoffree persons,butnotthe[I259b]same;forthewifeshouldbetreatedasa citizenofafreestate,thechildrenshouldbeunderkinglypower; forthemaleisbynaturesuperiortothefemale,exceptwhen somethinghappenscontrarytotheusualcourseofnature,asisthe elderandperfecttotheyoungerandimperfect.Nowinthegenerality offreestates,thegovernorsandthegovernedalternatelychange place;foranequalitywithoutanypreferenceiswhatnaturechooses; however,whenonegovernsandanotherisgoverned,sheendeavoursthat thereshouldbeadistinctionbetweentheminforms,expressions,and honours;accordingtowhatAmasissaidofhislaver.Thisthenshould betheestablishedrulebetweenthe,manandthewoman.Thegovernment ofchildrenshouldbekingly;forthepowerofthefatheroverthe childisfoundedinaffectionandseniority,whichisaspeciesof kinglygovernment;forwhichreasonHomerveryproperlycallsJupiter "thefatherofgodsandmen,"whowaskingofboththese;fornature requiresthatakingshouldbeofthesamespecieswiththosewhomhe governs,thoughsuperiorinsomeparticulars,asisthecasebetween theelderandtheyounger,thefatherandtheson.

 CHAPTERXIII Itisevidentthenthatintheduegovernmentofafamily,greater attentionshouldbepaidtotheseveralmembersofitandtheir virtuesthantothepossessionsorrichesofit;andgreatertothe freementhantheslaves:butheresomeonemaydoubtwhetherthereis anyothervirtueinaslavethanhisorganicservices,andofhigher estimationthanthese,astemperance,fortitude,justice,and suchlikehabits,orwhethertheypossessonlybodilyqualities:each sideofthequestionhasitsdifficulties;foriftheypossessthese virtues,whereindotheydifferfromfreemen?andthattheydonot, sincetheyaremen,andpartakersofreason,isabsurd.Nearlythe sameinquirymaybemadeconcerningawomanandachild,whetherthese alsohavetheirpropervirtues;whetherawomanoughttobetemperate, brave,andjust,andwhetherachildistemperateorno;andindeed thisinquiryoughttobegeneral,whetherthevirtuesofthosewho,by nature,eithergovernoraregoverned,arethesameordifferent;for ifitisnecessarythatbothofthemshouldpartakeofthefairand good,whyisitalsonecessarythat,withoutexception,theoneshould govern,theotheralwaysbegoverned?forthiscannotarisefromtheir possessingthesequalitiesindifferentdegrees;fortogovern,andto begoverned,arethingsdifferentinspecies,butmoreorlessare not.Andyetitiswonderfulthatonepartyoughttohavethem,and theothernot;forifhewhoistogovernshouldnotbetemperateand just,howcanhegovernwell?orifheistobegoverned,howcanhe begovernedwell?forhewhoisintemperate[1260a]andacowardwill neverdowhatheought:itisevidentthenthatbothpartiesoughtto bevirtuous;butthereisadifferencebetweenthem,asthereis betweenthosewhobynaturecommandandwhobynatureobey,andthis originatesinthesoul;forinthisnaturehasplantedthegoverning andsubmittingprinciple,thevirtuesofwhichwesayaredifferent, asarethoseofarationalandanirrationalbeing.Itisplainthen thatthesameprinciplemaybeextendedfarther,andthattherearein natureavarietyofthingswhichgovernandaregoverned;fora freemanisgovernedinadifferentmannerfromaslave,amalefroma female,andamanfromachild:andallthesehavepartsofmind withinthem,butinadifferentmanner.Thusaslavecanhavenopower ofdetermination,awomanbutaweakone,achildanimperfectone. Thusalsomustitnecessarilybewithrespecttomoralvirtues;all mustbesupposedtopossessthem,butnotinthesamemanner,butas isbestsuitedtoeveryone'semployment;onwhichaccounthewhois togovernoughttobeperfectinmoralvirtue,forhisbusinessis entirelythatofanarchitect,andreasonisthearchitect;while otherswantonlythatportionofitwhichmaybesufficientfortheir

station;fromwhenceitisevident,thatalthoughmoralvirtueis commontoallthosewehavespokenof,yetthetemperanceofamanand awomanarenotthesame,northeircourage,northeirjustice,though Socratesthoughtotherwise;forthecourageofthemanconsistsin commanding,thewoman'sinobeying;andthesameistrueinother particulars:andthiswillbeevidenttothosewhowillexamine differentvirtuesseparately;forthosewhousegeneraltermsdeceive themselveswhentheysay,thatvirtueconsistsinagooddisposition ofmind,ordoingwhatisright,orsomethingofthissort.Theydo muchbetterwhoenumeratethedifferentvirtuesasGeorgiasdid,than thosewhothusdefinethem;andasSophoclesspeaksofawoman,we thinkofallpersons,thattheir'virtuesshouldbeapplicableto theircharacters,forsayshe, "Silenceisawoman'sornament," butitisnotaman's;andasachildisincomplete,itisevident thathisvirtueisnottobereferredtohimselfinhispresent situation,buttothatinwhichhewillbecomplete,andhis preceptor.Inlikemannerthevirtueofaslaveistobereferredto hismaster;forwelaiditdownasamaxim,thattheuseofaslave wastoemployhiminwhatyouwanted;sothatitisclearenoughthat fewvirtuesarewantedinhisstation,onlythathemaynotneglect hisworkthroughidlenessorfear:somepersonmayquestionifwhatI havesaidistrue,whethervirtueisnotnecessaryforartificersin theircalling,fortheyoftenthroughidlenessneglecttheirwork,but thedifferencebetweenthemisverygreat;foraslaveisconnected withyouforlife,buttheartificernotsonearly:asneartherefore astheartificerapproachestothesituationofaslave,justsomuch oughthetohaveofthevirtuesofone;forameanartificeristoa certainpointaslave;butthenaslaveisoneofthosethingswhich arebynaturewhattheyare,butthisisnottrue[1260b]ofa shoemaker,oranyotherartist.Itisevidentthenthataslaveought tobetrainedtothosevirtueswhichareproperforhissituationby hismaster;andnotbyhimwhohasthepowerofamaster,toteachhim anyparticularart.Thosethereforeareinthewrongwhowoulddeprive slavesofreason,andsaythattheyhaveonlytofollowtheirorders; forslaveswantmoreinstructionthanchildren,andthuswedetermine thismatter.Itisnecessary,Iamsensible,foreveryonewhotreats upongovernment,toenterparticularlyintotherelationsofhusband andwife,andofparentandchild,andtoshowwhatarethevirtuesof eachandtheirrespectiveconnectionswitheachother;whatisright andwhatiswrong;andhowtheoneoughttobefollowed,andtheother avoided.Sincetheneveryfamilyispartofacity,andeachofthose individualsispartofafamily,andthevirtueofthepartsoughtto correspondtothevirtueofthewhole;itisnecessary,thatboththe wivesandchildrenofthecommunityshouldbeinstructedcorrespondent tothenaturethereof,ifitisofconsequencetothevirtueofthe

state,thatthewivesandchildrenthereinshouldbevirtuous,andof consequenceitcertainlyis,forthewivesareonehalfofthefree persons;andofthechildrenthesucceedingcitizensaretobeformed. Asthenwehavedeterminedthesepoints,wewillleavetheresttobe spokentoinanotherplace,asifthesubjectwasnowfinished;and beginningagainanew,firstconsiderthesentimentsofthosewhohave treatedofthemostperfectformsofgovernment. BOOKII CHAPTERI Sincethenweproposetoinquirewhatcivilsocietyisofallothers bestforthosewhohaveitintheirpowertoliveentirelyasthey wish,itisnecessarytoexamineintothepolityofthosestateswhich areallowedtobewellgoverned;andifthereshouldbeanyothers whichsomepersonshavedescribed,andwhichappearproperly regulated,tonotewhatisrightandusefulinthem;andwhenwepoint outwhereintheyhavefailed,letnotthisbeimputedtoan affectationofwisdom,foritisbecausetherearegreatdefectsin allthosewhicharealready'established,thatIhavebeeninducedto undertakethiswork.Wewillbeginwiththatpartofthesubjectwhich naturallypresentsitselffirsttoourconsideration.Themembersof everystatemustofnecessityhaveallthingsincommon,orsome thingscommon,andnotothers,ornothingatallcommon.Tohave nothingincommonisevidentlyimpossible,forsocietyitselfisone speciesof[1261a]community;andthefirstthingnecessarythereunto isacommonplaceofhabitation,namelythecity,whichmustbeone, andthiseverycitizenmusthaveasharein.Butinagovernmentwhich istobewellfounded,willitbebesttoadmitofacommunityin everythingwhichiscapablethereof,oronlyinsomeparticulars,but inothersnot?foritispossiblethatthecitizensmayhavetheir wives,andchildren,andgoodsincommon,asinPlato'sCommonwealth; forinthatSocratesaffirmsthatalltheseparticularsoughttobe so.Whichthenshallweprefer?thecustomwhichisalready established,orthelawswhichareproposedinthattreatise? CHAPTERII

 Nowasacommunityofwivesisattendedwithmanyotherdifficulties, soneitherdoesthecauseforwhichhewouldframehisgovernmentin thismannerseemagreeabletoreason,norisitcapableofproducing thatendwhichhehasproposed,andforwhichhesaysitoughttotake place;norhashegivenanyparticulardirectionsforputtingitin practice.NowIalsoamwillingtoagreewithSocratesinthe principlewhichheproceedsupon,andadmitthatthecityoughttobe oneasmuchaspossible;andyetitisevidentthatifitis contractedtoomuch,itwillbenolongeracity,forthatnecessarily supposesamultitude;sothatifweproceedinthismanner,weshall reduceacitytoafamily,andafamilytoasingleperson:forwe admitthatafamilyisoneinagreaterdegreethanacity,anda singlepersonthanafamily;sothatifthisendcouldbeobtained,it shouldneverbeputinpractice,asitwouldannihilatethecity;for acitydoesnotonlyconsistofalargenumberofinhabitants,but theremustalsobedifferentsorts;forweretheyallalike,there couldbenocity;foraconfederacyandacityaretwodifferent things;foraconfederacyisvaluablefromitsnumbers,althoughall thosewhocomposeitaremenofthesamecalling;forthisisentered intoforthesakeofmutualdefence,asweaddanadditionalweightto makethescalegodown.Thesamedistinctionprevailsbetweenacity andanationwhenthepeoplearenotcollectedintoseparatevillages, butliveastheArcadians.Nowthosethingsinwhichacityshouldbe oneareofdifferentsorts,andinpreservinganalternate reciprocationofpowerbetweenthese,thesafetythereofconsists(as IhavealreadymentionedinmytreatiseonMorals),foramongst freemenandequalsthisisabsolutelynecessary;forallcannotgovern atthesametime,buteitherbytheyear,oraccordingtosomeother regulationortime,bywhichmeanseveryoneinhisturnwillbein office;asiftheshoemakersandcarpentersshouldexchange occupations,andnotalwaysbeemployedinthesamecalling.Butasit isevidentlybetter,thattheseshouldcontinuetoexercisetheir respectivetrades;soalsoincivilsociety,whereitispossible,it wouldbebetterthatthegovernmentshouldcontinueinthesamehands; butwhereit[1261b]isnot(asnaturehasmadeallmenequal,and thereforeitisjust,betheadministrationgoodorbad,thatall shouldpartakeofit),thereitisbesttoobservearotation,andlet thosewhoaretheirequalsbyturnssubmittothosewhoareatthat timemagistrates,astheywill,intheirturns,alternatelybe governorsandgoverned,asiftheyweredifferentmen:bythesame methoddifferentpersonswillexecutedifferentoffices.Fromhenceit isevident,thatacitycannotbeoneinthemannerthatsomepersons propose;andthatwhathasbeensaidtobethegreatestgoodwhichit couldenjoy,isabsolutelyitsdestruction,whichcannotbe:forthe goodofanythingisthatwhichpreservesit.Foranotherreatonalso itisclear,thatitisnotforthebesttoendeavourtomakeacity

toomuchone,becauseafamilyismoresufficientinitselfthana singleperson,acitythanafamily;andindeedPlatosupposesthata cityowesitsexistencetothatsufficiencyinthemselveswhichthe membersofitenjoy.Ifthenthissufficiencyissodesirable,the lessthecityisonethebetter. CHAPTERIII Butadmittingthatitismostadvantageousforacitytobeoneas muchaspossible,itdoesnotseemtofollowthatthiswilltakeplace bypermittingallatoncetosaythisismine,andthisisnotmine (thoughthisiswhatSocratesregardsasaproofthatacityis entirelyone),forthewordAllisusedintwosenses;ifitmeans eachindividual,whatSocratesproposeswillnearlytakeplace;for eachpersonwillsay,thisishisownson,andhisownwife,andhis ownproperty,andofeverythingelsethatmayhappentobelongtohim, thatitishisown.Butthosewhohavetheirwivesandchildrenin commonwillnotsayso,butallwillsayso,thoughnotas individuals;therefore,tousethewordallisevidentlyafallacious modeofspeech;forthiswordissometimesuseddistributively,and sometimescollectively,onaccountofitsdoublemeaning,andisthe causeofinconclusivesyllogismsinreasoning.Thereforeforall personstosaythesamethingwastheirown,usingthewordallinits distributivesense,wouldbewell,butisimpossible:inits collectivesenseitwouldbynomeanscontributetotheconcordofthe state.Besides,therewouldbeanotherinconvenienceattendingthis proposal,forwhatiscommontomanyistakenleastcareof;forall menregardmorewhatistheirownthanwhatotherssharewiththemin, towhichtheypaylessattentionthanisincumbentoneveryone:let meaddalso,thateveryoneismorenegligentofwhatanotheristo seeto,aswellashimself,thanofhisownprivatebusiness;asina familyoneisoftenworseservedbymanyservantsthanbyafew.Let eachcitizentheninthestatehaveathousandchildren,butletnone ofthembeconsideredasthechildrenofthatindividual,butletthe relationoffatherandchildbecommontothemall,andtheywillall beneglected.Besides,inconsequenceofthis,[1262a]wheneverany citizenbehavedwellorill,everyperson,bethenumberwhatit would,mightsay,thisismyson,orthisman'sorthat;andinthis mannerwouldtheyspeak,andthuswouldtheydoubtofthewhole thousand,orofwhatevernumberthecityconsisted;anditwouldbe uncertaintowhomeachchildbelonged,andwhenitwasborn,whowas totakecareofit:andwhichdoyouthinkisbetter,foreveryoneto saythisismine,whiletheymayapplyitequallytotwothousandor tenthousand;oraswesay,thisismineinourpresentformsof

government,whereonemancallsanotherhisson,anothercallsthat samepersonhisbrother,anothernephew,orsomeotherrelation, eitherbybloodormarriage,andfirstextendshiscaretohimand his,whileanotherregardshimasoneofthesameparishandthesame tribe;anditisbetterforanyonetobeanephewinhisprivate capacitythanasonafterthatmanner.Besides,itwillbeimpossible topreventsomepersonsfromsuspectingthattheyarebrothersand sisters,fathersandmotherstoeachother;for,fromthemutual likenessthereisbetweenthesireandtheoffspring,theywill necessarilyconcludeinwhatrelationtheystandtoeachother,which circumstance,weareinformedbythosewriterswhodescribedifferent partsoftheworld,doessometimeshappen;forinUpperAfricathere arewivesincommonwhoyetdelivertheirchildrentotheirrespective fathers,beingguidedbytheirlikenesstothem.Therearealsosome maresandcowswhichnaturallybringforththeiryoungsolikethe male,thatwecaneasilydistinguishbywhichofthemtheywere impregnated:suchwasthemarecalledJust,inPharsalia. CHAPTERIV Besides,thosewhocontrivethisplanofcommunitycannoteasilyavoid thefollowingevils;namely,blows,murdersinvoluntaryorvoluntary, quarrels,andreproaches,allwhichitwouldbeimpiousindeedtobe guiltyoftowardsourfathersandmothers,orthosewhoarenearly relatedtous;thoughnottothosewhoarenotconnectedtousbyany tieofaffinity:andcertainlythesemischiefsmustnecessarilyhappen ofteneramongstthosewhodonotknowhowtheyareconnectedtoeach otherthanthosewhodo;andwhentheydohappen,ifitisamongthe firstofthese,theyadmitofalegalexpiation,butamongstthe latterthatcannotbedone.Itisalsoabsurdforthosewhopromotea communityofchildrentoforbidthosewholoveeachotherfrom indulgingthemselvesinthelastexcessesofthatpassion,whilethey donotrestrainthemfromthepassionitself,orthoseintercourses whichareofallthingsmostimproper,betweenaFatherandason,a brotherandabrother,andindeedthethingitselfismostabsurd.It isalsoridiculoustopreventthisintercoursebetweenthenearest relations,fornootherreasonthantheviolenceofthepleasure, whiletheythinkthattherelationoffatheranddaughter,thebrother andsister,isofnoconsequenceatall.Itseemsalsomore advantageousforthestate,thatthehusbandmenshouldhavetheir wivesandchildrenincommonthanthemilitary,fortherewillbeless affection[1262b]amongtheminthatcasethanwhenotherwise;for suchpersonsoughttobeundersubjection,thattheymayobeythe laws,andnotseekafterinnovations.Uponthewhole,theconsequences

ofsuchalawasthiswouldbedirectlycontrarytothosethingswhich goodlawsoughttoestablish,andwhichSocratesendeavouredto establishbyhisregulationsconcerningwomenandchildren:forwe thinkthatfriendshipisthegreatestgoodwhichcanhappentoany city,asnothingsomuchpreventsseditions:andamityinacityis whatSocratescommendsaboveallthings,whichappearstobe,as indeedhesays,theeffectoffriendship;aswelearnfrom AristophanesintheErotics,whosays,thatthosewholoveoneanother fromtheexcessofthatpassion,desiretobreathethesamesoul,and frombeingtwotobeblendedintoone:fromwhenceitwould necessarilyfollow,thatbothoroneofthemmustbedestroyed.But nowinacitywhichadmitsofthiscommunity,thetieoffriendship must,fromthatverycause,beextremelyweak,whennofathercansay, thisismyson;orson,thisismyfather;forasaverylittleof whatissweet,beingmixedwithagreatdealofwaterisimperceptible afterthemixture,somustallfamilyconnections,andthenamesthey goby,benecessarilydisregardedinsuchacommunity,itbeingthen bynomeansnecessarythatthefathershouldhaveanyregardforhim hecalledason,orthebrothersforthosetheycallbrothers.There aretwothingswhichprincipallyinspiremankindwithcareandloveof theiroffspring,knowingitistheirown,andwhatoughttobethe objectoftheiraffection,neitherofwhichcantakeplaceinthis sortofcommunity.Asforexchangingthechildrenoftheartificers andhusbandmenwiththoseofthemilitary,andtheirsreciprocally withthese,itwilloccasiongreatconfusioninwhatevermannerit shallbedone;forofnecessity,thosewhocarrythechildrenmust knowfromwhomtheytookandtowhomtheygavethem;andbythismeans thoseevilswhichIhavealreadymentionedwillnecessarilybethe morelikelytohappen,asblows,incestuouslove,murders,andthe like;forthosewhoaregivenfromtheirownparentstoother citizens,themilitary,forinstance,willnotcallthembrothers, sons,fathers,ormothers.Thesamethingwouldhappentothoseofthe militarywhowereplacedamongtheothercitizens;sothatbythis meanseveryonewouldbeinfearhowtoactinconsequenceof consanguinity.Andthusletusdetermineconcerningacommunityof wivesandchildren. CHAPTERV Weproceednexttoconsiderinwhatmannerpropertyshouldbe regulatedinastatewhichisformedafterthemostperfectmodeof government,whetheritshouldbecommonornot;forthismaybe consideredasaseparatequestionfromwhathadbeendetermined concerning[1263a]wivesandchildren;Imean,whetheritisbetter

thattheseshouldbeheldseparate,astheynoweverywhereare,or thatnotonlypossessionsbutalsotheusufructofthemshouldbein common;orthatthesoilshouldhaveaparticularowner,butthatthe produceshouldbebroughttogetherandusedasonecommonstock,as somenationsatpresentdo;oronthecontrary,shouldthesoilbe common,andshoulditalsobecultivatedincommon,whiletheproduce isdividedamongsttheindividualsfortheirparticularuse,whichis saidtobepractisedbysomebarbarians;orshallboththesoiland thefruitbecommon?Whenthebusinessofthehusbandmandevolvesnot onthecitizen,thematterismucheasiersettled;butwhenthose labourtogetherwhohaveacommonrightofpossession,thismay occasionseveraldifficulties;fortheremaynotbeanequal proportionbetweentheirlabourandwhattheyconsume;andthosewho labourhardandhavebutasmallproportionoftheproduce,will certainlycomplainofthosewhotakealargeshareofitanddobut littleforthat.Uponthewhole,asacommunitybetweenmanandmanso entireastoincludeeverythingpossible,andthustohaveallthings thatmancanpossessincommon,isverydifficult,soisit particularlysowithrespecttoproperty;andthisisevidentfrom thatcommunitywhichtakesplacebetweenthosewhogoouttosettlea colony;fortheyfrequentlyhavedisputeswitheachotheruponthe mostcommonoccasions,andcometoblowsupontrifles:wefind,too, thatweoftenestcorrectthoseslaveswhoaregenerallyemployedin thecommonofficesofthefamily:acommunityofpropertythenhas theseandotherinconveniencesattendingit. Butthemanneroflifewhichisnowestablished,moreparticularly whenembellishedwithgoodmoralsandasystemofequallaws,isfar superiortoit,foritwillhavetheadvantageofboth;bybothImean propertiesbeingcommon,anddividedalso;forinsomerespectsit oughttobeinamannercommon,butuponthewholeprivate:forevery man'sattentionbeingemployedonhisownparticularconcerns,will preventmutualcomplaintsagainsteachother;nay,bythismeans industrywillbeincreased,aseachpersonwilllabourtoimprovehis ownprivateproperty;anditwillthenbe,thatfromaprincipleof virtuetheywillmutuallyperformgoodofficestoeachother, accordingtotheproverb,"Allthingsarecommonamongstfriends;"and insomecitiestherearetracesofthiscustomtobeseen,sothatit isnotimpracticable,andparticularlyinthosewhicharebest governed;somethingsarebythismeansinamannercommon,andothers mightbeso;forthere,everypersonenjoyinghisownprivate property,somethingsheassistshisfriendwith,othersare consideredasincommon;asinLacedaemon,wheretheyuseeachother's slaves,asiftheywere,sotospeak,theirown,astheydotheir horsesanddogs,orevenanyprovisiontheymaywantinajourney. Itisevidentthenthatitisbesttohavepropertyprivate,butto maketheuseofitcommon;buthowthecitizensaretobebroughtto

itistheparticular[1263b]businessofthelegislator.Andalso withrespecttopleasure,itisunspeakablehowadvantageousitis, thatamanshouldthinkhehassomethingwhichhemaycallhisown; foritisbynomeanstonopurpose,thateachpersonshouldhavean affectionforhimself,forthatisnatural,andyettobeaselflover isjustlycensured;forwemeanbythat,notonethatsimplyloves himself,butonethatloveshimselfmorethanheought;inlikemanner weblameamoneylover,andyetbothmoneyandselfiswhatallmen love.Besides,itisverypleasingtoustoobligeandassistour friendsandcompanions,aswellasthosewhomweareconnectedwithby therightsofhospitality;andthiscannotbedonewithoutthe establishmentofprivateproperty,whichcannottakeplacewiththose whomakeacitytoomuchone;besides,theypreventeveryopportunity ofexercisingtwoprincipalvirtues,modestyandliberality.Modesty withrespecttothefemalesex,forthisvirtuerequiresyouto abstainfromherwhoisanother's;liberality,whichdependsupon privateproperty,forwithoutthatnoonecanappearliberal,ordo anygenerousaction;forliberalityconsistsinimpartingtoothers whatisourown. Thissystemofpolitydoesindeedrecommenditselfbyitsgood appearanceandspeciouspretencestohumanity;andwhenfirstproposed toanyone,mustgivehimgreatpleasure,ashewillconcludeittobe awonderfulbondoffriendship,connectingalltoall;particularly whenanyonecensurestheevilswhicharenowtobefoundinsociety, asarisingfrompropertiesnotbeingcommon,Imeanthedisputeswhich happenbetweenmanandman,upontheirdifferentcontractswitheach other;thosejudgmentswhicharepassedincourtinconsequenceof fraud,andperjury,andflatteringtherich,noneofwhicharisefrom propertiesbeingprivate,butfromthevicesofmankind.Besides, thosewholiveinonegeneralcommunity,andhaveallthingsin common,oftenerdisputewitheachotherthanthosewhohavetheir propertyseparate;fromtheverysmallnumberindeedofthosewhohave theirpropertyincommon,comparedwiththosewhereitis appropriated,theinstancesoftheirquarrelsarebutfew.Itisalso butrighttomention,notonlytheinconveniencestheyarepreserved fromwholiveinacommunionofgoods,butalsotheadvantagesthey aredeprivedof;forwhenthewholecomestobeconsidered,this manneroflifewillbefoundimpracticable. Wemustsuppose,then,thatSocrates'smistakearosefromthe principlehesetoutwithbeingfalse;weadmit,indeed,thatbotha familyandacityoughttobeoneinsomeparticulars,butnot entirely;forthereisapointbeyondwhichifacityproceedsin reducingitselftoone,itwillbenolongeracity. Thereisalsoanotherpointatwhichitwillstillcontinuetobea city,butitwillapproachsoneartonotbeingone,thatitwillbe

worsethannone;asifanyoneshouldreducethevoicesofthosewho singinconcerttoone,oraversetoafoot.Butthepeopleoughtto bemadeone,andacommunity,asIhavealreadysaid,byeducation;as propertyatLacedsemon,andtheirpublictablesatCrete,weremade commonbytheirlegislators.Butyet,whosoevershallintroduceany education,andthinktherebytomakehiscityexcellentand respectable,willbeabsurd,whileheexpectstoformitbysuch regulations,andnotbymanners,philosophy,andlaws.Andwhoever [1264a]wouldestablishagovernmentuponacommunityofgoods, oughttoknowthatheshouldconsulttheexperienceofmanyyears, whichwouldplainlyenoughinformhimwhethersuchaschemeisuseful; foralmostallthingshavealreadybeenfoundout,butsomehavebeen neglected,andotherswhichhavebeenknownhavenotbeenputin practice.Butthiswouldbemostevident,ifanyonecouldseesucha governmentreallyestablished:foritwouldbeimpossibletoframe suchacitywithoutdividingandseparatingitintoitsdistinct parts,aspublictables,wards,andtribes;sothatherethelawswill donothingmorethanforbidthemilitarytoengageinagriculture, whichiswhattheLacedaemoniansareatpresentendeavouringtodo. NorhasSocratestoldus(norisiteasytosay)whatplanof governmentshouldbepursuedwithrespecttotheindividualsinthe statewherethereisacommunityofgoodsestablished;forthoughthe majorityofhiscitizenswillingeneralconsistofamultitudeof personsofdifferentoccupations,ofthosehehasdeterminednothing; whetherthepropertyofthehusbandmanoughttobeincommon,or whethereachpersonshouldhavehissharetohimself;andalso, whethertheirwivesandchildrenoughttobeincommon:forifall thingsaretobealikecommontoall,wherewillbethedifference betweenthemandthemilitary,orwhatwouldtheygetbysubmittingto theirgovernment?anduponwhatprincipleswouldtheydoit,unless theyshouldestablishthewisepracticeoftheCretans?forthey, allowingeverythingelsetotheirslaves,forbidthemonlygymnastic exercisesandtheuseofarms.Andiftheyarenot,buttheseshould beinthesamesituationwithrespecttotheirpropertywhichtheyare inothercities,whatsortofacommunitywilltherebe?inonecity theremustofnecessitybetwo,andthosecontrarytoeachother;for hemakesthemilitarytheguardiansofthestate,andthehusbandman, artisans,andothers,citizens;andallthosequarrels,accusations, andthingsofthelikesort,whichhesaysarethebaneofother cities,willbefoundinhisalso:notwithstandingSocratessaysthey willnotwantmanylawsinconsequenceoftheireducation,butsuch onlyasmaybenecessaryforregulatingthestreets,themarkets,and thelike,whileatthesametimeitistheeducationofthemilitary onlythathehastakenanycareof.Besides,hemakesthehusbandmen mastersofpropertyuponpayingatribute;butthiswouldbelikelyto makethemfarmoretroublesomeandhighspiritedthantheHelots,the Penestise,ortheslaveswhichothersemploy;norhasheever

determinedwhetheritisnecessarytogiveanyattentiontothemin theseparticulars,northoughtofwhatisconnectedtherewith,their polity,theireducation,theirlaws;besides,itisofnolittle consequence,norisiteasytodetermine,howtheseshouldbeframed soastopreservethecommunityofthemilitary. Besides,ifhemakesthewivescommon,whiletheproperty[1264b] continuesseparate,whoshallmanagethedomesticconcernswiththe samecarewhichthemanbestowsuponhisfields?norwillthe inconvenienceberemediedbymakingpropertyaswellaswivescommon; anditisabsurdtodrawacomparisonfromthebrutecreation,and say,thatthesameprincipleshouldregulatetheconnectionofaman andawomanwhichregulatestheirsamongstwhomthereisnofamily association. ItisalsoveryhazardoustosettlethemagistracyasSocrateshas done;forhewouldhavepersonsofthesamerankalwaysinoffice, whichbecomesthecauseofseditionevenamongstthosewhoareofno account,butmoreparticularlyamongstthosewhoareofacourageous andwarlikedisposition;itisindeedevidentlynecessarythathe shouldframehiscommunityinthismanner;forthatgoldenparticle whichGodhasmixedupinthesoulofmanfliesnotfromonetothe other,butalwayscontinueswiththesame;forhesays,thatsomeof ourspecieshavegold,andotherssilver,blendedintheircomposition fromthemomentoftheirbirth:butthosewhoaretobehusbandmenand artists,brassandiron;besides,thoughhedeprivesthemilitaryof happiness,hesays,thatthelegislatoroughttomakeallthecitizens happy;butitisimpossiblethatthewholecitycanbehappy,without all,orthegreater,orsomepartofitbehappy.Forhappinessisnot likethatnumericalequalitywhicharisesfromcertainnumberswhen addedtogether,althoughneitherofthemmayseparatelycontainit; forhappinesscannotbethusaddedtogether,butmustexistinevery individual,assomepropertiesbelongtoeveryintegral;andifthe militaryarenothappy,whoelseareso?fortheartisansarenot,nor themultitudeofthosewhoareemployedininferioroffices.Thestate whichSocrateshasdescribedhasallthesedefects,andotherswhich arenotoflessconsequence. CHAPTERVI ItisalsonearlythesameinthetreatiseuponLawswhichwaswrit afterwards,forwhichreasonitwillbeproperinthisplaceto considerbrieflywhathehastheresaidupongovernment,forSocrates hasthoroughlysettledbutveryfewpartsofit;asforinstance,in

whatmannerthecommunityofwivesandchildrenoughttoberegulated, howpropertyshouldbeestablished,andgovernmentconducted. Nowhedividestheinhabitantsintotwoparts,husbandmenand soldiers,andfromtheseheselectathirdpartwhoaretobesenators andgovernthecity;buthehasnotsaidwhetherornothehusbandman andartificershallhaveanyorwhatshareinthegovernment,or whethertheyshallhavearms,andjoinwiththeothersinwar,ornot. Hethinksalsothatthewomenoughttogotowar,andhavethesame educationasthesoldiers;astootherparticulars,hehasfilledhis treatisewithmatterforeigntothepurpose;andwithrespectto education,hehasonlysaidwhatthatoftheguardsoughttobe. [1265a]AstohisbookofLaws,lawsaretheprincipalthingwhich thatcontains,forhehastheresaidbutlittleconcerninggovernment; andthisgovernment,whichhewassodesirousofframinginsucha mannerastoimparttoitsmembersamoreentirecommunityofgoods thanistobefoundinothercities,healmostbringsroundagainto bethesameasthatothergovernmentwhichhehadfirstproposed;for exceptthecommunityofwivesandgoods,hehasframedbothhis governmentsalike,fortheeducationofthecitizensistobethesame inboth;theyareinbothtolivewithoutanyservileemploy,and theircommontablesaretobethesame,exceptingthatinthathesays thewomenshouldhavecommontables,andthatthereshouldbea thousandmenatarms,inthis,thatthereshouldbefivethousand. AllthediscoursesofSocratesaremasterly,noble,new,and inquisitive;butthattheyarealltrueitmayprobablybetoomuchto say.Fornowwithrespecttothenumberjustspokenof,itmustbe acknowledgedthathewouldwantthecountryofBabyloniaforthem,or someonelikeit,ofanimmeasurableextent,tosupportfivethousand idlepersons,besidesamuchgreaternumberofwomenandservants. Everyone,itistrue,mayframeanhypothesisashepleases,butyet itoughttobepossible.Ithasbeensaid,thatalegislatorshould havetwothingsinviewwhenheframeshislaws,thecountryandthe people.Hewillalsodowell,ifhehassomeregardtothe neighbouringstates,ifheintendsthathiscommunityshouldmaintain anypoliticalintercoursewiththem,foritisnotonlynecessarythat theyshouldunderstandthatpracticeofwarwhichisadaptedtotheir owncountry,buttoothersalso;foradmittingthatanyonechooses notthislifeeitherinpublicorprivate,yetthereisnottheless occasionfortheirbeingformidabletotheirenemies,notonlywhen theyinvadetheircountry,butalsowhentheyretireoutofit. Itmayalsobeconsideredwhetherthequantityofeachperson's propertymaynotbesettledinadifferentmannerfromwhathehas doneitin,bymakingitmoredeterminate;forhesays,thateveryone oughttohaveenoughwhereontolivemoderately,asifanyonehad

saidtolivewell,whichisthemostcomprehensiveexpression. Besides,amanmaylivemoderatelyandmiserablyatthesametime;he hadthereforebetterhaveproposed,thattheyshouldliveboth moderatelyandliberally;forunlessthesetwoconspire,luxurywill comeinontheonehand,orwretchednessontheother,sincethesetwo modesoflivingaretheonlyonesapplicabletotheemploymentofour substance;forwecannotsaywithrespecttoaman'sfortune,thathe ismildorcourageous,butwemaysaythatheisprudentandliberal, whicharetheonlyqualitiesconnectedtherewith. Itisalsoabsurdtorenderpropertyequal,andnottoprovideforthe increasingnumberofthecitizens;buttoleavethatcircumstance uncertain,asifitwouldregulateitselfaccordingtothenumberof womenwho[1265b]shouldhappentobechildless,letthatbewhatit wouldbecausethisseemstotakeplaceinothercities;butthecase wouldnotbethesameinsuchastatewhichheproposesandthose whichnowactuallyunite;forinthesenooneactuallywants,asthe propertyisdividedamongstthewholecommunity,betheirnumberswhat theywill;butasitcouldnotthenbedivided,thesupernumeraries, whethertheyweremanyorfew,wouldhavenothingatall.Butitis morenecessarythaneventoregulateproperty,totakecarethatthe increaseofthepeopleshouldnotexceedacertainnumber;andin determiningthat,totakeintoconsiderationthosechildrenwhowill die,andalsothosewomenwhowillbebarren;andtoneglectthis,as isdoneinseveralcities,istobringcertainpovertyonthe citizens;andpovertyisthecauseofseditionandevil.NowPhidon theCorinthian,oneoftheoldestlegislators,thoughtthefamilies andthenumberofthecitizensshouldcontinuethesame;althoughit shouldhappenthatallshouldhaveallotmentsatthefirst, disproportionatetotheirnumbers. InPlato'sLawsitishoweverdifferent;weshallmentionhereafter whatwethinkwouldbebestintheseparticulars.Hehasalso neglectedinthattreatisetopointouthowthegovernorsaretobe distinguishedfromthegoverned;forhesays,thatasofonesortof woolthewarpoughttobemade,andofanotherthewoof,sooughtsome togovern,andotherstobegoverned.Butsinceheadmits,thatall theirpropertymaybeincreasedfivefold,whyshouldhenotallowthe sameincreasetothecountry?heoughtalsotoconsiderwhetherhis allotmentofthehouseswillbeusefultothecommunity,forhe appointstwohousestoeachperson,separatefromeachother;butit isinconvenientforapersontoinhabittwohouses.Nowheisdesirous tohavehiswholeplanofgovernmentneitherademocracynoran oligarchy,butsomethingbetweenboth,whichhecallsapolity,forit istobecomposedofmenatarms.IfPlatointendedtoframeastate inwhichmorethaninanyothereverythingshouldbecommon,hehas certainlygivenitarightname;butifheintendedittobethenext inperfectiontothatwhichhehadalreadyframed,itisnotso;for

perhapssomepersonswillgivethepreferencetotheLacedaemonian formofgovernment,orsomeotherwhichmaymorecompletelyhave attainedtothearistocraticform. Somepersonssay,thatthemostperfectgovernmentshouldbecomposed ofallothersblendedtogether,forwhichreasontheycommendthatof Lacedsemon;fortheysay,thatthisiscomposedofanoligarchy,a monarchy,andademocracy,theirkingsrepresentingthemonarchical part,thesenatetheoligarchical;and,thatintheephorimaybe foundthedemocratical,asthesearetakenfromthepeople.Butsome say,thatintheephoriisabsolutepower,andthatitistheircommon mealanddailycourseoflife,inwhichthedemocraticalformis represented.Itisalsosaidinthistreatiseof[1266a]Laws,that thebestformofgovernmentmust,beonecomposedofademocracyanda tyranny;thoughsuchamixturenooneelsewouldeverallowtobeany governmentatall,orifitis,theworstpossible;thoseproposewhat ismuchbetterwhoblendmanygovernmentstogether;forthemost perfectisthatwhichisformedofmanyparts.Butnowinthis governmentofPlato'stherearenotracesofamonarchy,onlyofan oligarchyanddemocracy;thoughheseemstochoosethatitshould ratherinclinetoanoligarchy,asisevidentfromtheappointmentof themagistrates;fortochoosethembylotiscommontoboth;butthat amanoffortunemustnecessarilybeamemberoftheassembly,orto electthemagistrates,ortakepartinthemanagementofpublic affairs,whileothersarepassedover,makesthestateinclinetoan oligarchy;asdoestheendeavouringthatthegreaterpartoftherich maybeinoffice,andthattherankoftheirappointmentsmay correspondwiththeirfortunes. Thesameprincipleprevailsalsointhechoiceoftheirsenate;the mannerofelectingwhichisfavourablealsotoanoligarchy;forall areobligedtovoteforthosewhoaresenatorsofthefirstclass, afterwardstheyvoteforthesamenumberoutofthesecond,andthen outofthethird;butthiscompulsiontovoteattheelectionof senatorsdoesnotextendtothethirdandfourthclassesandthefirst andsecondclassonlyareobligedtovoteforthefourth.Bythis meanshesaysheshallnecessarilyhaveanequalnumberofeachrank, butheismistakenforthemajoritywillalwaysconsistofthoseof thefirstrank,andthemostconsiderablepeople;andforthisreason, thatmanyofthecommonaltynotbeingobligedtoit,willnotattend theelections.Fromhenceitisevident,thatsuchastatewillnot consistofademocracyandamonarchy,andthiswillbefurtherproved bywhatweshallsaywhenwecomeparticularlytoconsiderthisform ofgovernment. Therewillalsogreatdangerarisefromthemannerofelectingthe senate,whenthosewhoareelectedthemselvesareafterwardstoelect others;forbythismeans,ifacertainnumberchoosetocombine

together,thoughnotveryconsiderable,theelectionwillalwaysfall accordingtotheirpleasure.SucharethethingswhichPlatoproposes concerninggovernmentinhisbookofLaws. CHAPTERVII Therearealsosomeotherformsofgovernment,whichhavebeen proposedeitherbyprivatepersons,orphilosophers,orpoliticians, allofwhichcomemuchnearertothosewhichhavebeenreally established,ornowexist,thanthesetwoofPlato's;forneitherhave theyintroducedtheinnovationofacommunityofwivesandchildren, andpublictablesforthewomen,buthavebeencontentedtosetout withestablishingsuchrulesasareabsolutelynecessary. Therearesomepersonswhothink,thatthefirstobjectofgovernment shouldbetoregulatewelleverythingrelatingtoprivateproperty; fortheysay,thataneglecthereinisthesourceofallseditions whatsoever.Forthisreason,PhaleastheChalcedonianfirstproposed, thatthefortunesofthecitizensshouldbeequal,whichhethought wasnotdifficulttoaccomplishwhenacommunitywasfirstsettled, butthatitwasaworkofgreaterdifficultyinonethathadbeenlong established;butyetthatitmightbeeffected,andanequalityof circumstancesintroducedbythesemeans,thattherichshouldgive marriageportions,butneverreceiveany,whilethepoorshouldalways receive,butnevergive. ButPlato,inhistreatiseofLaws,thinksthatadifferencein circumstancesshouldbepermittedtoacertaindegree;butthatno citizenshouldbeallowedtopossessmorethanfivetimesasmuchas thelowestcensus,aswehavealreadymentioned.Butlegislatorswho wouldestablishthisprincipleareapttooverlookwhattheyoughtto consider;thatwhiletheyregulatethequantityofprovisionswhich eachindividualshallpossess,theyoughtalsotoregulatethenumber ofhischildren;foriftheseexceedtheallottedquantityof provision,thelawmustnecessarilyberepealed;andyet,inspiteof therepeal,itwillhavethebadeffectofreducingmanyfromwealth topoverty,sodifficultisitforinnovatorsnottofallintosuch mistakes.Thatanequalityofgoodswasinsomedegreeserviceableto strengthenthebandsofsociety,seemstohavebeenknowntosomeof theancients;forSolonmadealaw,asdidsomeothersalso,to restrainpersonsfrompossessingasmuchlandastheypleased.And uponthesameprincipletherearelawswhichforbidmentoselltheir property,asamongtheLocrians,unlesstheycanprovethatsome notoriousmisfortuuehasbefallenthem.Theywerealsotopreserve

theirancientpatrimony,whichcustombeingbrokenthroughbythe Leucadians,madetheirgovernmenttoodemocratic;forbythatmeansit wasnolongernecessarytobepossessedofacertainfortunetobe qualifiedtobeamagistrate.Butifanequalityofgoodsis established,thismaybeeithertoomuch,whenitenablesthepeople toliveluxuriously,ortoolittle,whenitobligesthemtolivehard. Henceitisevident,thatitisnotproperforthelegislatorto establishanequalityofcircumstances,buttofixapropermedium. Besides,ifanyoneshouldregulatethedivisionofpropertyinsucha mannerthatthereshouldbeamoderatesufficiencyforall,itwould beofnouse;foritisofmoreconsequencethatthecitizenshould entertainasimilarityofsentimentsthananequalityof circumstances;butthiscanneverbeattainedunlesstheyareproperly educatedunderthedirectionofthelaw.ButprobablyPhaleasmaysay, thatthisinwhathehimselfmentions;forhebothproposesaequality ofpropertyandoneplanofeducationinhiscity.Butheshouldhave saidparticularlywhateducationheintended,norisitofany servicetohavethistomuchone;forthiseducationmaybeone,and yetsuchaswillmakethecitizensovergreedy,tograspafter honours,orriches,orboth.Besides,notonlyaninequalityof possessions,butalsoofhonours,willoccasion[1267a]seditions,but thisuponcontrarygrounds;forthevulgarwillbeseditiousifthere beaninequalityofgoods,bythoseofmoreelevatedsentiments,if thereisanequalityofhonours. "Whengoodandbaddoequalhonoursshare." Formenarenotguiltyofcrimesfornecessariesonly(forwhichhe thinksanequalityofgoodswouldbeasufficientremedy,asthey wouldthenhavenooccasiontostealcoldorhunger),butthatthey mayenjoywhatthedesire,andnotwishforitinvain;foriftheir desireextendbeyondthecommonnecessariesoflife,theywerebe wickedtogratifythem;andnotonlyso,butiftheirwishespoint thatway,theywilldothesametoenjoythosepleasureswhichare freefromthealloyofpain.Whatremedythenshallwefindforthese threedisorder;andfirst,topreventstealingfromnecessity,let everyonebesuppliedwithamoderatesubsistence,whichmaymakethe additionofhisownindustrynecessary;secondtopreventstealingto procuretheluxuriesoflife,temperancebeenjoined;andthirdly, letthosewhowishforpleasureinitselfseekforitonlyin philosophy,allotherswanttheassistanceofmen. Sincethenmenareguiltyofthegreatestcrimesfromambition,and notfromnecessity,noone,forinstanceaimsatbeingatyrantto keephimfromthecold,hencegreathonourisduetohimwhokillsnot athief,buttyrant;sothatpolitywhichPhaleasestablisheswould onlybesalutarytopreventlittlecrimes.Hehasalsobeenvery desiroustoestablishsuchrulesaswillconducetoperfectthe

internalpolicyofhisstate,andheoughtalsotohavedonethesame withrespecttoitsneighboursandallforeignnations;forthe considerationsofthemilitaryestablishmentshouldtakeplacein planningeverygovernment,thatitmaynotbeunprovidedincaseofa war,ofwhichhehassaidnothing;soalsowithrespecttoproperty, itoughtnotonlytobeadaptedtotheexigenciesofthestate,but alsotosuchdangersasmayarisefromwithout. Thusitshouldnotbesomuchastotemptthosewhoarenear,andmore powerfultoinvadeit,whilethosewhopossessitarenotableto driveouttheinvaders,norsolittleasthatthestateshouldnotbe abletogotowarwiththosewhoarequiteequaltoitself,andof thishehasdeterminednothing;itmustindeedbeallowedthatitis advantageoustoacommunitytoberatherrichthanpoor;probablythe properboundaryisthis,nottopossessenoughtomakeitworthwhile foramorepowerfulneighbourtoattackyou,anymorethanhewould thosewhohadnotsomuchasyourself;thuswhenAutophradatus proposedtobesiegeAtarneus,Eubulusadvisedhimtoconsiderwhat timeitwouldrequiretotakethecity,andthenwouldhavehim determinewhetheritwouldanswer,forthatheshouldchoose,ifit wouldeventakelessthanheproposed,toquittheplace;hissaying thismadeAutophradatusreflectuponthebusinessandgiveoverthe siege.Thereis,indeed,someadvantageinanequalityofgoods amongstthecitizenstopreventseditions;andyet,tosaytruth,no verygreatone;formenofgreatabilitieswillstomachtheirbeing putuponalevelwiththerestofthecommunity.Forwhichreason theywillveryoftenappearreadyforeverycommationandsedition; forthewickednessofmankindisinsatiable.Forthoughatfirst twoobolimightbesufficient,yetwhenonceitisbecomecustomary, theycontinuallywantsomethingmore,untiltheysetnolimitsto theirexpectations;foritisthenatureofourdesirestobe boundless,andmanyliveonlytogratifythem.Butforthispurpose thefirstobjectis,notsomuchtoestablishanequalityoffortune, astopreventthosewhoareofagooddispositionfromdesiringmore thantheirown,andthosewhoareofabadonefrombeingableto acquireit;andthismaybedoneiftheyarekeptinaninferior station,andnotexposedtoinjustice.Norhashetreatedwellthe equalityofgoods,forhehasextendedhisregulationonlytoland; whereasaman'ssubstanceconsistsnotonlyinthis,butalsoin slaves,cattle,money,andallthatvarietyofthingswhichfallunder thenameofchattels;nowtheremustbeeitheranequalityestablished inallthese,orsomecertainrule,ortheymustbeleftentirelyat large.Itappearstoobyhislaws,thatheintendstoestablishonlya smallstate,asalltheartificersaretobelongtothepublic,and addnothingtothecomplementofcitizens;butifallthosewhoareto beemployedinpublicworksaretobetheslavesofthepublic,it shouldbedoneinthesamemannerasitisatEpidamnum,andas DiophantusformerlyregulateditatAthens.Fromtheseparticularsany

onemaynearlyjudgewhetherPhaleas'scommunityiswellorill established. CHAPTERVIII Hippodamus,thesonofEuruphonaMilesian,contrivedtheartof layingouttowns,andseparatedthePireus.Thismanwasinother respectstooeagerafternotice,andseemedtomanytoliveinavery affectedmanner,withhisflowinglocksandhisexpensiveornaments, andacoarsewarmvestwhichhewore,notonlyinthewinter,butalso inthehotweather.Ashewasverydesirousofthecharacterofa universalscholar,hewasthefirstwho,notbeingactuallyengagedin themanagementofpublicaffairs,sathimselftoinquirewhatsortof governmentwasbest;andheplannedastate,consistingoften thousandpersons,dividedintothreeparts,oneconsistingof artisans,anotherofhusbandmen,andthethirdofsoldiers;healso dividedthelandsintothreeparts,andallottedonetosacred purposes,anothertothepublic,andthethirdtoindividuals.The firstofthesewastosupplywhatwasnecessaryfortheestablished worshipofthegods;thesecondwastobeallottedtothesupportof thesoldiery;andthethirdwastobethepropertyofthehusbandman. Hethoughtalsothatthereneedonlybethreesortsoflaws, correspondingtothethreesortsofactionswhichcanbebrought, namely,forassault,trespasses,ordeath.Heorderedalsothatthere shouldbeaparticularcourtofappeal,intowhichallcausesmightbe removedwhichweresupposedtohavebeenunjustlydetermined elsewhere;whichcourtshouldbecomposedofoldmenchosenforthat purpose.Hethoughtalso[1268a]thattheyshouldnotpasssentenceby votes;butthateveryoneshouldbringwithhimatablet,onwhichhe shouldwrite,thathefoundthepartyguilty,ifitwasso,butif not,heshouldbringaplaintablet;butifheacquittedhimofone partoftheindictmentbutnotoftheother,heshouldexpressthat alsoonthetablet;forhedisapprovedofthatgeneralcustomalready established,asitobligesthejudgestobeguiltyofperjuryifthey determinedpositivelyeitherontheonesideortheother.Healso madealaw,thatthoseshouldberewardedwhofoundoutanythingfor thegoodofthecity,andthatthechildrenofthosewhofellin battleshouldbeeducatedatthepublicexpense;whichlawhadnever beenproposedbyanyotherlegislator,thoughitisatpresentinuse atAthensaswellasinothercities,hewouldhavethemagistrates chosenoutofthepeopleingeneral,bywhomhemeantthethreeparts beforespokenof;andthatthosewhoweresoelectedshouldbethe particularguardiansofwhatbelongedtothepublic,tostrangers,and toorphans.

 Thesearetheprincipalpartsandmostworthyofnoticein Hippodamus'splan.Butsomepersonsmightdoubttheproprietyofhis divisionofthecitizensintothreeparts;fortheartisans,the husbandmen,andthesoldiersaretocomposeonecommunity,wherethe husbandmenaretohavenoarms,andtheartisansneitherarmsnor land,whichwouldinamannerrenderthemslavestothesoldiery.It isalsoimpossiblethatthewholecommunityshouldpartakeofallthe honourableemploymentsinitforthegeneralsandtheguardiansof thestatemustnecessarilybeappointedoutofthesoldiery,and indeedthemosthonourablemagistrates;butasthetwootherparts willnothavetheirshareinthegovernment,howcantheybeexpected tohaveanyaffectionforit?Butitisnecessarythatthesoldiery shouldbesuperiortotheothertwoparts,andthissuperioritywill notbeeasilygainedwithouttheyareverynumerous;andiftheyare so,whyshouldthecommunityconsistofanyothermembers?whyshould anyothershavearighttoelectthemagistrates?Besides,ofwhatuse arethehusbandmentothiscommunity?Artisans,'tistrue,are necessary,fortheseeverycitywants,andtheycanliveupontheir business.Ifthehusbandmenindeedfurnishedthesoldierswith provisions,theywouldbeproperlypartofthecommunity;butthese aresupposedtohavetheirprivateproperty,andtocultivateitfor theirownuse.Moreover,ifthesoldiersthemselvesaretocultivate thatcommonlandwhichisappropriatedfortheirsupport,therewill benodistinctionbetweenthesoldierandthehusbandman,whichthe legislatorintendedthereshouldbe;andifthereshouldbeanyothers whoaretocultivatetheprivatepropertyofthehusbandmanandthe commonlandsofthemilitary,therewillbeafourthorderinthe statewhichwillhavenoshareinit,andalwaysentertainhostile sentimentstowardsit.Ifanyoneshouldproposethatthesamepersons shouldcultivatetheirownlandsandthepubliconesalso,thenthere wouldbeadeficiency[1268b]ofprovisionstosupplytwofamilies,as thelandswouldnotimmediatelyyieldenoughforthemselvesandthe soldiersalso;andallthesethingswouldoccasiongreatconfusion. NordoIapproveofhismethodofdeterminingcauses,whenhewould havethejudgesplitthecasewhichcomessimplybeforehim;andthus, insteadofbeingajudge,becomeanarbitrator.Nowwhenanymatteris broughttoarbitration,itiscustomaryformanypersonstoconfer togetheruponthebusinessthatisbeforethem;butwhenacauseis broughtbeforejudgesitisnotso;andmanylegislatorstakecare thatthejudgesshallnothaveitintheirpowertocommunicatetheir sentimentstoeachother.Besides,whatcanpreventconfusiononthe benchwhenonejudgethinksafineshouldbedifferentfromwhat anotherhassetitat;oneproposingtwentyminae,anotherten,orbe itmoreorless,anotherfour,andanotherfive;anditisevident, thatinthismannertheywilldifferfromeachother,whilesomewill givethewholedamagessuedfor,andothersnothing;inthis

situation,howshalltheirdeterminationsbesettled?Besides,ajudge cannotbeobligedtoperjurehimselfwhosimplyacquitsorcondemns, iftheactionisfairlyandjustlybrought;forhewhoacquitsthe partydoesnotsaythatheoughtnottopayanyfineatall,butthat heoughtnottopayafineoftwentyminae.Buthethatcondemnshim isguiltyofperjuryifhesentenceshimtopaytwentyminaewhilehe believesthedamagesoughtnottobesomuch. Nowwithrespecttothesehonourswhichheproposestobestowonthose whocangiveanyinformationusefultothecommunity,this,though verypleasinginspeculation,iswhatthelegislatorshouldnot settle,foritwouldencourageinformers,andprobablyoccasion commotionsinthestate.Andthisproposalofhisgivesrisealsoto furtherconjecturesandinquiries;forsomepersonshavedoubted whetheritisusefulorhurtfultoaltertheestablishedlawofany country,ifevenforthebetter;forwhichreasononecannot immediatelydetermineuponwhatheheresays,whetheritis advantageoustoalterthelawornot.Weknow,indeed,thatitis possibletoproposetonewmodelboththelawsandgovernmentasa commongood;andsincewehavementionedthissubject,itmaybevery propertoenterintoafewparticularsconcerningit,foritcontains somedifficulties,asIhavealreadysaid,anditmayappearbetterto alterthem,sinceithasbeenfoundusefulinothersciences. Thusthescienceofphysicisextendedbeyonditsancientbounds;so isthegymnastic,andindeedallotherartsandpowers;sothatone maylayitdownforcertainthatthesamethingwillnecessarilyhold goodintheartofgovernment.Anditmayalsobeaffirmed,that experienceitselfgivesaproofofthis;fortheancientlawsaretoo simpleandbarbarous;whichallowedtheGreekstowearswordsinthe city,andtobuytheirwivesofeach[1269a].other.Andindeedall theremainsofoldlawswhichwehaveareverysimple;forinstance,a lawinCumarelativetomurder.Ifanypersonwhoprosecutesanother formurdercanproduceacertainnumberofwitnessestoitofhisown relations,theaccusedpersonshallbeheldguilty.Uponthewhole, allpersonsoughttoendeavourtofollowwhatisright,andnotwhat isestablished;anditisprobablethatthefirstmen,whetherthey sprungoutoftheearth,orweresavedfromsomegeneralcalamity,had verylittleunderstandingorknowledge,asisaffirmedofthese aborigines;sothatitwouldbeabsurdtocontinueinthepracticeof theirrules.Norisit,moreover,righttopermitwrittenlawsalways toremainwithoutalteration;forasinallothersciences,soin politics,itisimpossibletoexpresseverythinginwritingwith perfectexactness;forwhenwecommitanythingtowritingwemustuse generalterms,butineveryactionthereissomethingparticularto itself,whichthesemaynotcomprehend;fromwhenceitisevident, thatcertainlawswillatcertaintimesadmitofalterations.Butif weconsiderthismatterinanotherpointofview,itwillappearto

requiregreatcaution;forwhentheadvantageproposedistrifling,as theaccustomingthepeopleeasilytoabolishtheirlawsisofbad consequence,itisevidentlybettertopassoversomefaultswhich eitherthelegislatororthemagistratesmayhavecommitted;forthe alterationswillnotbeofsomuchserviceasahabitofdisobeying themagistrateswillbeofdisservice.Besides,theinstancebrought fromtheartsisfallacious;foritisnotthesamethingtoalterthe oneastheother.Foralawderivesallitsstrengthfromcustom,and thisrequireslongtimetoestablish;sothat,tomakeitaneasy mattertopassfromtheestablishedlawstoothernewones,isto weakenthepoweroflaws.Besides,hereisanotherquestion;ifthe lawsaretobealtered,aretheyalltobealtered,andinevery govermentornot,andwhetheratthepleasureofonepersonormany? allwhichparticularswillmakeagreatdifference;for whichreasonwewillatpresentdroptheinquiry,topursueitatsome othertime. CHAPTERIX Therearetwoconsiderationswhichofferthemselveswithrespectto thegovernmentestablishedatLacedsemonandCrete,andindeedin almostallotherstateswhatsoever;oneiswhethertheirlawsdoordo notpromotethebestestablishmentpossible?theotheriswhether thereisanything,ifweconsidereithertheprinciplesuponwhichit isfoundedortheexecutivepartofit,whichpreventstheformof governmentthattheyhadproposedtofollowfrombeingobserved;now itisallowedthatineverywellregulatedstatethemembersofit shouldbefreefromservilelabour;butinwhatmannerthisshallbe effectedisnotsoeasytodetermine;forthePenestsehaveveryoften attackedtheThessalians,andtheHelotstheLacedaemonians,forthey inamannercontinuallywatchanopportunityforsomemisfortune befallingthem.ButnosuchthinghaseverhappenedtotheCretans; the[1269b]reasonforwhichprobablyis,thatalthoughtheyare engagedinfrequentwarswiththeneighbouringcities,yetnoneof thesewouldenterintoanalliancewiththerevolters,asitwouldbe disadvantageousforthem,whothemselvesalsohavetheirvillains.But nowthereisperpetualenmitybetweentheLacedaemoniansandalltheir neighbours,theArgives,theMessenians,andtheArcadians.Their slavesalsofirstrevoltedfromtheThessalianswhiletheywere engagedinwarswiththeirneighbourstheAcheans,thePerrabeans,and theMagnesians.Itseemstomeindeed,ifnothingelse,yetsomething verytroublesometokeepuponpropertermswiththem;forifyouare remissinyourdisciplinetheygrowinsolent,andthinkthemselves uponanequalitywiththeirmasters;andiftheyarehardlyusedthey

arecontinuallyplottingagainstyouandhateyou.Itisevident, then,thatthosewhoemployslaveshavenotasyethitupontheright wayofmanagingthem. Astotheindulgingofwomeninanyparticularliberties,itis hurtfultotheendofgovernmentandtheprosperityofthecity;for asamanandhiswifearethetwopartsofafamily,ifwesupposea citytobedividedintotwoparts,wemustallowthatthenumberof menandwomenwillbeequal. Inwhatevercitythenthewomenarenotundergoodregulations,we mustlookupononehalfofitasnotundertherestraintoflaw,asit therehappened;forthelegislator,desiringtomakehiswholecitya collectionofwarriorswithrespecttothemen,hemostevidently accomplishedhisdesign;butinthemeantimethewomenwerequite neglected,fortheylivewithoutrestraintineveryimproper indulgenceandluxury.Sothatinsuchastatericheswillnecessarily beingeneralesteem,particularlyifthemenaregovernedbytheir wives,whichhasbeenthecasewithmanyabraveandwarlikepeople excepttheCelts,andthoseothernations,ifthereareanysuch,who openlypractisepederasty.Andthefirstmythologistsseemnot improperlytohavejoinedMarsandVenustogether;forallnationsof thischaracteraregreatlyaddictedeithertotheloveofwomenorof boys,forwhichreasonitwasthusatLacedaemon;andmanythingsin theirstateweredonebytheauthorityofthewomen.Forwhatisthe difference,ifthepowerisinthehandsofthewomen,orinthehands ofthosewhomtheythemselvesgovern?itmustturntothesame account.Asthisboldnessofthewomencanbeofnouseinanycommon occurrences,ifitwaseverso,itmustbeinwar;butevenherewe findthattheLacedaemonianwomenwereofthegreatestdisservice,as wasprovedatthetimeoftheThebaninvasion,whentheywereofno useatall,astheyareinothercities,butmademoredisturbance thaneventheenemy. TheoriginofthisindulgencewhichtheLacedaemonianwomenenjoyis easilyaccountedfor,fromthelongtimethemenwereabsentfromhome uponforeignexpeditions[1270a]againsttheArgives,andafterwards theArcadiansandMessenians,sothat,whenthesewarswereatanend, theirmilitarylife,inwhichthereisnolittlevirtue,preparedthem toobeythepreceptsoftheirlawgiver;butwearetold,thatwhen Lycurgusendeavouredalsotoreducethewomentoanobediencetohis laws,upontheirrefusalhedeclinedit.Itmayindeedbesaidthat thewomenwerethecausesofthesethings,andofcourseallthefault wastheirs.Butwearenotnowconsideringwherethefaultlies,or whereitdoesnotlie,butwhatisrightandwhatiswrong;andwhen themannersofthewomenarenotwellregulated,asIhavealready said,itmustnotonlyoccasionfaultswhicharedisgracefultothe state,butalsoincreasetheloveofmoney.Inthenextplace,fault

maybefoundwithhisunequaldivisionofproperty,forsomewillhave fartoomuch,otherstoolittle;bywhichmeansthelandwillcome intofewhands,whichbusinessisbadlyregulatedbyhislaws.Forhe madeitinfamousforanyoneeithertobuyorselltheirpossessions, inwhichhedidright;buthepermittedanyonethatchoseittogive themaway,orbequeaththem,althoughnearlythesameconsequences willarisefromonepracticeasfromtheother.Itissupposedthat neartwopartsinfiveofthewholecountryisthepropertyofwomen, owingtotheirbeingsooftensoleheirs,andhavingsuchlarge fortunesinmarriage;thoughitwouldbebettertoallowthemnone,or alittle,oracertainregulatedproportion.Noweveryoneis permittedtomakeawomanhisheirifhepleases;andifhedies intestate,hewhosucceedsasheiratlawgivesittowhomhepleases. Fromwhenceithappensthatalthoughthecountryisabletosupport fifteenhundredhorseandthirtythousandfoot,thenumberdoesnot amounttoonethousand. Andfromthesefactsitisevident,thatthisparticularisbadly regulated;forthecitycouldnotsupportoneshock,butwasruined forwantofmen.Theysay,thatduringthereignsoftheirancient kingstheyusedtopresentforeignerswiththefreedomoftheircity, topreventtherebeingawantofmenwhiletheycarriedonlongwars; itisalsoaffirmedthatthenumberofSpartanswasformerlyten thousand;butbethatasitwill,anequalityofpropertyconduces muchtoincreasethenumberofthepeople.Thelaw,too,whichhemade toencouragepopulationwasbynomeanscalculatedtocorrectthis inequality;forbeingwillingthattheSpartansshouldbeasnumerous as[1270b]possible,tomakethemdesirousofhavinglargefamilieshe orderedthathewhohadthreechildrenshouldbeexcusedthe nightwatch,andthathewhohadfourshouldpaynotaxes:thoughit isveryevident,thatwhilethelandwasdividedinthismanner,that ifthepeopleincreasedtheremustmanyofthembeverypoor. Norwashelessblamableforthemannerinwhichheconstitutedthe ephori;forthesemagistratestakecognisanceofthingsofthelast importance,andyettheyarechosenoutofthepeopleingeneral;so thatitoftenhappensthataverypoorpersoniselectedtothat office,who,fromthatcircumstance,iseasilybought.Therehavebeen manyinstancesofthisformerly,aswellasinthelateaffairat Andros.Andthesemen,beingcorruptedwithmoney,wentasfarasthey couldtoruinthecity:and,becausetheirpowerwastoogreatand nearlytyrannical,theirkingswereobligedtonatterthem,which contributedgreatlytohurtthestate;sothatitalteredfroman aristocracytoademocracy.Thismagistracyisindeedthegreat supportofthestate;forthepeopleareeasy,knowingthattheyare eligibletothefirstofficeinit;sothat,whetherittookplaceby theintentionofthelegislator,orwhetherithappenedbychance, thisisofgreatservicetotheiraffairs;foritisnecessarythat

everymemberofthestateshouldendeavourthateachpartofthe governmentshouldbepreserved,andcontinuethesame.Anduponthis principletheirkingshavealwaysacted,outofregardtotheir honour;thewiseandgoodfromtheirattachmenttothesenate,aseat whereintheyconsiderastherewardofvirtue;andthecommonpeople, thattheymaysupporttheephori,ofwhomtheyconsist.Anditis properthatthesemagistratesshouldbechosenoutofthewhole community,notasthecustomisatpresent,whichisveryridiculous. Theephoriarethesupremejudgesincausesofthelastconsequence; butasitisquiteaccidentalwhatsortofpersonstheymaybe,itis notrightthattheyshoulddetermineaccordingtotheirownopinion, butbyawrittenlaworestablishedcustom.Theirwayoflifealsois notconsistentwiththemannersofthecity,foritistooindulgent; whereasthatofothersistoosevere;sothattheycannotsupportit, butareobligedprivatelytoactcontrarytolaw,thattheymayenjoy someofthepleasuresofsense.Therearealsogreatdefectsinthe institutionoftheirsenators.Ifindeedtheywerefitlytrainedto thepracticeofeveryhumanvirtue,everyonewouldreadilyadmitthat theywouldbeusefultothegovernment;butstillitmightbedebated whethertheyshouldbecontinuedjudgesforlife,todeterminepoints ofthegreatestmoment,sincethemindhasitsoldageaswellasthe body;butastheyaresobroughtup,[1271a]thateventhelegislator couldnotdependuponthemasgoodmen,theirpowermustbe inconsistentwiththesafetyofthestate:foritisknownthatthe membersofthatbodyhavebeenguiltybothofbriberyandpartiality inmanypublicaffairs;forwhichreasonithadbeenmuchbetterif theyhadbeenmadeanswerablefortheirconduct,whichtheyarenot. Butitmaybesaidtheephoriseemtohaveacheckuponallthe magistrates.Theyhaveindeedinthisparticularverygreatpower;but Iaffirmthattheyshouldnotbeentrustedwiththiscontrolinthe mannertheyare.Moreover,themodeofchoicewhichtheymakeuseof attheelectionoftheirsenatorsisverychildish.Norisitright foranyonetosolicitforaplaceheisdesirousof;forevery person,whetherhechoosesitornot,oughttoexecuteanyofficehe isfitfor.Buthisintentionwasevidentlythesameinthisasinthe otherpartsofhisgovernment.Formakinghiscitizensambitiousafter honours,withmenofthatdispositionhehasfilledhissenate,since nootherswillsolicitforthatoffice;andyettheprincipalpartof thosecrimeswhichmenaredeliberatelyguiltyofarisefromambition andavarice. Wewillinquireatanothertimewhethertheofficeofakingisuseful tothestate:thusmuchiscertain,thattheyshouldbechosenfroma considerationoftheirconductandnotastheyarenow.Butthatthe legislatorhimselfdidnotexpecttomakeallhiscitizenshonourable andcompletelyvirtuousisevidentfromthis,thathedistruststhem asnotbeinggoodmen;forhesentthoseuponthesameembassythat wereatvariancewitheachother;andthought,thatinthedisputeof

thekingsthesafetyofthestateconsisted.Neitherweretheircommon mealsatfirstwellestablished:fortheseshouldratherhavebeen providedatthepublicexpense,asatCrete,where,asatLacedaemon, everyonewasobligedtobuyhisportion,althoughhemightbevery poor,andcouldbynomeansbeartheexpense,bywhichmeansthe contraryhappenedtowhatthelegislatordesired:forheintendedthat thosepublicmealsshouldstrengthenthedemocraticpartofhis government:butthisregulationhadquitethecontraryeffect,for thosewhowereverypoorcouldnottakepartinthem;anditwasan observationoftheirforefathers,thatthenotallowingthosewho couldnotcontributetheirproportiontothecommontablestopartake ofthem,wouldbetheruinofthestate.Otherpersonshavecensured hislawsconcerningnavalaffairs,andnotwithoutreason,asitgave risetodisputes.Forthecommanderofthefleetisinamannersetup inoppositiontothekings,whoaregeneralsofthearmyforlife. [1271b]Thereisalsoanotherdefectinhislawsworthyofcensure, whichPlatohasgiveninhisbookofLaws;thatthewholeconstitution wascalculatedonlyforthebusinessofwar:itisindeedexcellentto makethemconquerors;forwhichreasonthepreservationofthestate dependedthereon.Thedestructionofitcommencedwiththeir victories:fortheyknewnothowtobeidle,orengageinanyother employmentthanwar.Inthisparticularalsotheyweremistaken,that thoughtheyrightlythought,thatthosethingswhicharetheobjects ofcontentionamongstmankindarebetterprocuredbyvirtuethanvice, yettheywrongfullypreferredthethingsthemselvestovirtue.Norwas thepublicrevenuewellmanagedatSparta,forthestatewasworth nothingwhiletheywereobligedtocarryonthemostextensivewars, andthesubsidieswereverybadlyraised;forastheSpartans possessedalargeextentofcountry,theywerenotexactuponeach otherastowhattheypaidin.Andthusaneventcontrarytothe legislator'sintentiontookplace;forthestatewaspoor,the individualsavaricious.EnoughoftheLacedaemoniangovernment;for theseseemthechiefdefectsinit. CHAPTERX ThegovernmentofCretebearsanearresemblancetothis,insomefew particularsitisnotworse,butingeneralitisfarinferiorinits contrivance.Foritappearsandisallowedinmanyparticularsthe constitutionofLacedaemonwasformedinimitationofthatofCrete; andingeneralmostnewthingsareanimprovementupontheold.For theysay,thatwhenLycurgusceasedtobeguardiantoKingCharilles hewentabroadandspentalongtimewithhisrelationsinCrete,for

theLyciansareacolonyoftheLacedaemonians;andthosewhofirst settledthereadoptedthatbodyoflawswhichtheyfoundalready establishedbytheinhabitants;inlikemanneralsothosewhonowlive nearthemhavetheverylawswhichMinosfirstdrewup. ThisislandseemsformedbynaturetobethemistressofGreece,for itisentirelysurroundedbyanavigableoceanwhichwashesalmostall themaritimepartsofthatcountry,andisnotfardistantontheone sidefromPeloponnesus,ontheother,whichlookstowardsAsia,from TriopiumandRhodes.BymeansofthissituationMinosacquiredthe empireoftheseaandtheislands;someofwhichhesubdued,inothers plantedcolonies:atlasthediedatCamicuswhilehewasattacking Sicily.Thereisthisanalogybetweenthecustomsofthe LacedaemoniansandtheCretans,theHelotscultivatethegrounds [1272a]fortheone,thedomesticslavesfortheother.Bothstates havetheircommonmeals,andtheLacedaemonianscalledtheseformerly not_psiditia_but_andpia_,astheCretansdo;whichprovesfrom whencethecustomarose.Inthisparticulartheirgovernmentsarealso alike:theephorihavethesamepowerwiththoseofCrete,whoare called_kosmoi_;withthisdifferenceonly,thatthenumberoftheone isfive,oftheotherten.Thesenatorsarethesameasthosewhomthe Cretanscallthecouncil.Therewasformerlyalsoakinglypowerin Crete;butitwasafterwardsdissolved,andthecommandoftheir armieswasgiventothe_kosmoi_.Everyonealsohasavoteintheir publicassembly;butthishasonlythepowerofconfirmingwhathas alreadypassedthecouncilandthe_kosmoi_. TheCretansconductedtheirpublicmealsbetterthanthe Lacedaemonians,foratLacedsemoneachindividualwasobligedto furnishwhatwasassesseduponhim;whichifhecouldnotdo,there wasalawwhichdeprivedhimoftherightsofacitizen,ashasbeen alreadymentioned:butinCretetheywerefurnishedbythecommunity; forallthecornandcattle,taxesandcontributions,whichthe domesticslaveswereobligedtofurnish,weredividedintopartsand allottedtothegods,theexigenciesofthestate,andthesepublic meals;sothatallthemen,women,andchildrenweremaintainedfroma commonstock.Thelegislatorgavegreatattentiontoencourageahabit ofeatingsparingly,asveryusefultothecitizens.Healso endeavoured,thathiscommunitymightnotbetoopopulous,tolessen theconnectionwithwomen,byintroducingtheloveofboys:whetherin thishedidwellorillweshallhavesomeotheropportunityof considering.ButthatthepublicmealswerebetterorderedatCrete thanatLacedaemonisveryevident. Theinstitutionofthe_kosmoi_,wasstillworsethanthatofthe ephori:foritcontainedallthefaultsincidenttothatmagistracy andsomepeculiartoitself;forinbothcasesitisuncertainwho willbeelected:buttheLacedaemonianshavethisadvantagewhichthe

othershavenot,thatasallareeligible,thewholecommunityhavea shareinthehighesthonours,andthereforealldesiretopreservethe state:whereasamongtheCretansthe_kosmoi_arenotchosenoutof thepeopleingeneral,butoutofsomecertainfamilies,andthe senateoutofthe_kosmoi_.Andthesameobservationswhichmaybe madeonthesenateatLacedaemonmaybeappliedtothese;fortheir beingundernocontrol,andtheircontinuingforlife,isanhonour greaterthantheymerit;andtohavetheirproceedingsnotregulated byawrittenlaw,butlefttotheirowndiscretion,isdangerous.(As totherebeingnoinsurrections,althoughthepeoplesharenotinthe managementofpublicaffairs,thisisnoproofofawellconstituted government,asthe_kosmoi_havenoopportunityofbeingbribedlike theephori,astheyliveinan[1272b]islandfarfromthosewhowould corruptthem.)Butthemethodtheytaketocorrectthatfaultis absurd,impolitic,andtyrannical:forveryofteneithertheir fellowmagistratesorsomeprivatepersonsconspiretogetherandturn outthe_kosmoi_.Theyarealsopermittedtoresigntheiroffice beforetheirtimeiselapsed,andifallthiswasdonebylawitwould bewell,andnotatthepleasureoftheindividuals,whichisabad ruletofollow.Butwhatisworstofallis,thatgeneralconfusion whichthosewhoareinpowerintroducetoimpedetheordinarycourse ofjustice;whichsufficientlyshowswhatisthenatureofthe government,orratherlawlessforce:foritisusualwiththe principalpersonsamongstthemtocollecttogethersomeofthecommon peopleandtheirfriends,andthenrevoltandsetupforthemselves, andcometoblowswitheachother.Andwhatisthedifference,ifa stateisdissolvedatoncebysuchviolentmeans,orifitgradually soaltersinprocessoftimeastobenolongerthesameconstitution? Astatelikethiswouldeverbeexposedtotheinvasionsofthosewho werepowerfulandinclinedtoattackit;but,ashasbeenalready mentioned,itssituationpreservesit,asitisfreefromtheinroads offoreigners;andforthisreasonthefamilyslavesstillremain quietatCrete,whiletheHelotsareperpetuallyrevolting:forthe Cretanstakenopartinforeignaffairs,anditisbutlatelythatany foreigntroopshavemadeanattackupontheisland;andtheirravages soonprovedtheineffectualnessoftheirlaws.Andthusmuchforthe governmentofCrete. CHAPTERXI ThegovernmentofCarthageseemswellestablished,andinmany respectssuperiortoothers;insomeparticularsitbearsanear resemblancetotheLacedaemonians;andindeedthesethreestates,the Cretans,theLacedaemoniansandtheCarthaginiansareinsomethings

verylikeeachother,inotherstheydiffergreatly.Amongstmany excellentconstitutionsthismayshowhowwelltheirgovernmentis framed,thatalthoughthepeopleareadmittedtoashareinthe administration,theformofitremainsunaltered,withoutanypopular insurrections,worthnotice,ontheonehand,ordegeneratingintoa tyrannyontheother.NowtheCarthaginianshavethesethingsin commonwiththeLacedaemonians:publictablesforthosewhoare connectedtogetherbythetieofmutualfriendship,afterthemanner oftheirPhiditia;theyhavealsoamagistracy,consistingofan hundredandfourpersons,similartotheephori,orratherselected withmorejudgment;foramongsttheLacedaemonians,allthecitizens areeligible,butamongsttheCarthaginians,theyarechosenoutof thoseofthebettersort:thereisalsosomeanalogybetweentheking andthesenateinboththesegovernments,thoughtheCarthaginian methodofappointingtheirkingsisbest,fortheydonotconfine themselvestoonefamily;nordotheypermittheelectiontobeat large,norhavetheyanyregardtoseniority;forifamongstthe candidatesthereareanyofgreatermeritthantherest,thesethey prefertothosewhomaybeolder;forastheirpowerisvery extensive,iftheyare[1273a]personsofnoaccount,theymaybevery hurtfultothestate,astheyhavealwaysbeentotheLacedaemonians; alsothegreaterpartofthosethingswhichbecomereprehensibleby theirexcessarecommontoallthosegovernmentswhichwehave described. NowofthoseprinciplesonwhichtheCarthaginianshaveestablished theirmixedformofgovernment,composedofanaristocracyand democracy,someinclinetoproduceademocracy,othersanoligarchy: forinstance,ifthekingsandthesenateareunanimousuponanypoint indebate,theycanchoosewhethertheywillbringitbeforethe peopleorno;butiftheydisagree,itistothesetheymustappeal, whoarenotonlytohearwhathasbeenapprovedofbythesenate,but arefinallytodetermineuponit;andwhosoeverchoosesit,hasa righttospeakagainstanymatterwhatsoeverthatmaybeproposed, whichisnotpermittedinothercases.Thefive,whoelecteachother, haveverygreatandextensivepowers;andthesechoosethehundred, whoaremagistratesofthehighestrank:theirpoweralsocontinues longerthananyothermagistrates,foritcommencesbeforetheycome intooffice,andisprolongedaftertheyareoutofit;andinthis particularthestateinclinestoanoligarchy:butastheyarenot electedbylot,butbysuffrage,andarenotpermittedtotakemoney, theyarethegreatestsupportersimaginableofanaristocracy. Thedeterminingallcausesbythesamemagistrates,andnotoraein onecourtandanotherinanother,asatLacedaemon,hasthesame influence.TheconstitutionofCarthageisnowshiftingfroman aristocracytoanoligarchy,inconsequenceofanopinionwhichis favourablyentertainedbymany,whothinkthatthemagistratesinthe

communityoughtnottobepersonsoffamilyonly,butoffortunealso; asitisimpossibleforthosewhoareinbadcircumstancestosupport thedignityoftheiroffice,ortobeatleisuretoapplytopublic business.Aschoosingmenoffortunetobemagistratesmakeastate inclinetoanoligarchy,andmenofabilitiestoanaristocracy,sois thereathirdmethodofproceedingwhichtookplaceinthepolityof Carthage;fortheyhaveaneyetothesetwoparticularswhenthey electtheirofficers,particularlythoseofthehighestrank,their kingsandtheirgenerals.Itmustbeadmitted,thatitwasagreat faultintheirlegislatornottoguardagainsttheconstitution's degeneratingfromanaristocracy;forthisisamostnecessarything toprovideforatfirst,thatthosecitizenswhohavethebest abilitiesshouldneverbeobligedtodoanythingunworthytheir character,butbealwaysatleisuretoservethepublic,notonlywhen inoffice,butalsowhenprivatepersons;forifonceyouareobliged tolookamongthewealthy,thatyoumayhavemenatleisuretoserve you,yourgreatestoffices,ofkingandgeneral,willsoonbecome venal;inconsequenceofwhich,richeswillbemorehonourablethan virtueandaloveofmoneybetherulingprincipleinthecityfor whatthosewhohavethechiefpowerregardashonourablewill necessarilybetheobjectwhichthe[1273b]citizensingeneralwill aimat;andwherethefirsthonoursarenotpaidtovirtue,therethe aristocraticformofgovernmentcannotflourish:foritisreasonable toconclude,thatthosewhoboughttheirplacesshouldgenerallymake anadvantageofwhattheylaidouttheirmoneyfor;asitisabsurdto suppose,thatifamanofprobitywhoispoorshouldbedesirousof gainingsomething,abadmanshouldnotendeavourtodothesame, especiallytoreimbursehimself;forwhichreasonthemagistracy shouldbeformedofthosewhoaremostabletosupportanaristocracy. Itwouldhavebeenbetterforthelegislaturetohavepassedoverthe povertyofmenofmerit,andonlytohavetakencaretohaveensured themsufficientleisure,wheninoffice,toattendtopublicaffairs. Itseemsalsoimproper,thatonepersonshouldexecuteseveral offices,whichwasapprovedofatCarthage;foronebusinessisbest donebyoneperson;anditisthedutyofthelegislatortolookto this,andnotmakethesamepersonamusicianandashoemaker:sothat wherethestateisnotsmallitismorepoliticandmorepopularto admitmanypersonstohaveashareinthegovernment;for,asIjust nowsaid,itisnotonlymoreusual,buteverythingisbetterand soonerdone,whenonethingonlyisallottedtooneperson:andthis isevidentbothinthearmyandnavy,wherealmosteveryone,inhis turn,bothcommandsandisundercommand.Butastheirgovernment inclinestoanoligarchy,theyavoidtheilleffectsofitbyalways appointingsomeofthepopularpartytothegovernmentofcitiesto maketheirfortunes.Thustheyconsultthisfaultintheir constitutionandrenderitstable;butthisisdependingonchance; whereasthelegislatoroughttoframehisgovernment,thattherethe

noroomforinsurrections.Butnow,ifthereshouldbeanygeneral calamity,andthepeopleshouldrevoltfromtheirrulers,thereisno remedyforreducingthemtoobediencebythelaws.Andthesearethe particularsoftheLacedaemonian,theCretan,andtheCarthaginian governmentswhichseemworthyofcommendation. CHAPTERXII Someofthosepersonswhohavewrittenupongovernmenthadneverany shareinpublicaffairs,butalwaysledaprivatelife.Everything worthyofnoticeintheirworkswehavealreadyspoketo.Otherswere legislators,someintheirowncities,otherswereemployedin regulatingthegovernmentsofforeignstates.Someofthemonly composedabodyoflaws;othersformedtheconstitutionalso,as Lycurgus;andSolon,whodidboth.TheLacedaemonianshavebeen alreadymentioned.SomepersonsthinkthatSolonwasanexcellent legislator,whocoulddissolveapureoligarchy,andsavethepeople fromthatslaverywhichhungoverthem,andestablishtheancient democraticformofgovernmentinhiscountry;whereineverypartofit wassoframedastobewelladaptedtothewhole.Inthesenateof Areopagusanoligarchywaspreserved;bythemannerofelectingtheir [1274a]magistrates,anaristocracy;andintheircourtsofjustice,a democracy. Solonseemsnottohavealteredtheestablishedformofgovernment, eitherwithrespecttothesenateorthemodeofelectingtheir magistrates;buttohaveraisedthepeopletogreatconsiderationin thestatebyallottingthesupremejudicialdepartmenttothem;and forthissomepersonsblamehim,ashavingdonewhatwouldsoon overturnthatbalanceofpowerheintendedtoestablish;forbytrying allcauseswhatsoeverbeforethepeople,whowerechosenbylotto determinethem,itwasnecessarytoflatteratyrannicalpopulacewho hadgotthispower;whichcontributedtobringthegovernmenttothat puredemocracyitnowis. BothEphialtesandPericlesabridgedthepoweroftheAreopagites,the latterofwhomintroducedthemethodofpayingthosewhoattendedthe courtsofjustice:andthuseveryonewhoaimedatbeingpopular proceededincreasingthepowerofthepeopletowhatwenowseeit. ButitisevidentthatthiswasnotSolon'sintention,butthatit arosefromaccident;forthepeoplebeingthecauseofthenaval victoryovertheMedes,assumedgreatlyuponit,andenlisted themselvesunderfactiousdemagogues,althoughopposedbythebetter partofthecitizens.Hethoughtitindeedmostnecessarytoentrust

thepeoplewiththechoiceoftheirmagistratesandthepowerof callingthemtoaccount;forwithoutthattheymusthavebeenslaves andenemiestotheothercitizens:butheorderedthemtoelectthose onlywhowerepersonsofgoodaccountandproperty,eitheroutof thosewhowereworthfivehundredmedimns,orthosewhowerecalled xeugitai,orthoseofthethirdcensus,whowerecalledhorsemen. Asforthoseofthefourth,whichconsistedofmechanics,theywere incapableofanyoffice.ZaleucuswasthelegislatoroftheWestern Locrians,aswasCharondas,theCatanean,ofhisowncities,andthose alsoinItalyandSicilywhichbelongedtotheCalcidians.Some personsendeavourtoprovethatOnomacritus,theLocrian,wasthe firstpersonofnotewhodrewuplaws;andthatheemployedhimselfin thatbusinesswhilehewasatCrete,wherehecontinuedsometimeto learnthepropheticart:andtheysay,thatThaleswashiscompanion; andthatLycurgusandZaleucuswerethescholarsofThales,and CharondasofZaleucus;butthosewhoadvancethis,advancewhatis repugnanttochronology.Philolausalso,ofthefamilyofthe Bacchiades,wasaThebanlegislator.Thismanwasveryfondof Diocles,avictorintheOlympicgames,andwhenhelefthiscountry fromadisgustatanimproperpassionwhichhismotherAlithoehad entertainedforhim,andsettledatThebes,Philolausfollowedhim, wheretheybothdied,andwheretheystillshowtheirtombsplacedin viewofeachother,butsodisposed,thatoneofthemlookstowards Corinth,theotherdoesnot;thereasontheygiveforthisis,that Diodes,fromhisdetestationofhismother'spassion,wouldhavehis tombsoplacedthatnoonecouldseeCorinthfromit;butPhilolaus chosethatitmightbeseenfromhis:andthiswasthecauseoftheir livingatThebes.[1274b] AsPhilolausgavethemlawsconcerningmanyotherthings,sodidhe uponadoption,whichtheycalladoptivelaws;andthishein particulardidtopreservethenumberoffamilies.Charondasdid nothingnew,exceptinactionsforperjury,whichhewasthefirst personwhotookintoparticularconsideration.Healsodrewuphis lawswithgreatereleganceandaccuracythanevenanyofourpresent legislators.Philolausintroducedthelawfortheequaldistribution ofgoods;Platothatforthecommunityofwomen,children,andgoods, andalsoforpublictablesforthewomen;andoneconcerning drunkenness,thattheymightobservesobrietyintheirsymposiums.He alsomadealawconcerningtheirwarlikeexercises;thattheyshould acquireahabitofusingbothhandsalike,asitwasnecessarythat onehandshouldbeasusefulastheother. AsforDraco'slaws,theywerepublishedwhenthegovernmentwas alreadyestablished,andtheyhavenothingparticularinthemworth mentioning,excepttheirseverityonaccountoftheenormityoftheir punishments.Pittacuswastheauthorofsomelaws,butneverdrewup

anyformofgovernment;oneofwhichwasthis,thatifadrunkenman beatanypersonheshouldbepunishedmorethanifhediditwhen sober;foraspeoplearemoreapttobeabusivewhendrunkthansober, hepaidnoconsiderationtotheexcusewhichdrunkennessmightclaim, butregardedonlythecommonbenefit.AndromadasRegmuswasalsoa lawgivertotheThraciantalcidians.Therearesomelawsofhis concerningmurdersandheiressesextant,butthesecontainnothing thatanyonecansayisnewandhisown.Andthusmuchfordifferent sortsofgovernments,aswellthosewhichreallyexistasthosewhich differentpersonshaveproposed. BOOKIII CHAPTERI Everyonewhoinquiresintothenatureofgovernment,andwhatareits differentforms,shouldmakethisalmosthisfirstquestion,Whatisa city?Foruponthisthereisadispute:forsomepersonssaythecity didthisorthat,whileotherssay,notthecity,buttheoligarchy, orthetyranny.Weseethatthecityistheonlyobjectwhichboththe politicianandlegislatorhaveinviewinalltheydo:butgovernment isacertainorderingofthosewhoinhabitacity.Asacityisa collectivebody,and,likeotherwholes,composedofmanyparts,itis evidentourfirstinquirymustbe,whatacitizenis:foracityisa certainnumberofcitizens.Sothatwemustconsiderwhomweoughtto callcitizen,andwhoisone;forthisisoftendoubtful:forevery onewillnotallowthatthischaracterisapplicabletothesame person;forthatmanwhowouldbeacitizeninarepublicwouldvery oftennotbeoneinanoligarchy.Wedonotincludeinthisinquiry manyofthosewhoacquirethisappellationoutoftheordinaryway,as honorarypersons,forinstance,butthoseonlywhohaveanatural righttoit. Nowitisnotresidencewhichconstitutesamanacitizen;forinthis sojournersandslavesareuponanequalitywithhim;norwillitbe sufficientforthispurpose,thatyouhavetheprivilegeofthelaws, andmaypleadorbeimpleaded,forthisallthoseofdifferent nations,betweenwhomthereisamutualagreementforthatpurpose, areallowed;althoughitveryoftenhappens,thatsojournershavenot aperfectrightthereinwithouttheprotectionofapatron,towhom theyareobligedtoapply,whichshowsthattheirshareinthe

communityisincomplete.Inlikemanner,withrespecttoboyswhoare notyetenrolled,oroldmenwhoarepastwar,weadmitthattheyare insomerespectscitizens,butnotcompletelyso,butwithsome exceptions,forthesearenotyetarrivedtoyearsofmaturity,and thosearepastservice;noristhereanydifferencebetweenthem.But whatwemeanissufficientlyintelligibleandclear,wewanta completecitizen,oneinwhomthereisnodeficiencytobecorrected tomakehimso.Astothosewhoarebanished,orinfamous,theremay bethesameobjectionsmadeandthesameanswergiven.Thereis nothingthatmorecharacterisesacompletecitizenthanhavingashare inthejudicialandexecutivepartofthegovernment. Withrespecttooffices,somearefixedtoaparticulartime,sothat nopersonis,onanyaccount,permittedtofillthemtwice;orelse nottillsomecertainperiodhasintervened;othersarenotfixed,as ajuryman's,andamemberofthegeneralassembly:butprobablysome onemaysaythesearenotoffices,norhavethecitizensinthese capacitiesanyshareinthegovernment;thoughsurelyitisridiculous tosaythatthosewhohavetheprincipalpowerinthestatebearno officeinit.Butthisobjectionisofnoweight,foritisonlya disputeaboutwords;asthereisnogeneraltermwhichcanbeapplied bothtotheofficeofajurymanandamemberoftheassembly.Forthe sakeofdistinction,supposewecallitanindeterminateoffice:butI layitdownasamaxim,thatthosearecitizenswhocouldexerciseit. Suchthenisthedescriptionofacitizenwhocomesnearesttowhat allthosewhoarecalledcitizensare.Everyonealsoshouldknow, thatofthecomponentpartsofthosethingswhichdifferfromeach otherinspecies,afterthefirstorsecondremove,thosewhichfollow haveeithernothingatallorverylittlecommontoeach. Nowweseethatgovernmentsdifferfromeachotherintheirform,and thatsomeofthemaredefective,others[1275b]asexcellentas possible:foritisevident,thatthosewhichhavemanydeficiencies anddegeneraciesinthemmustbefarinferiortothosewhichare withoutsuchfaults.WhatImeanbydegeneracieswillbehereafter explained.Henceitisclearthattheofficeofacitizenmustdiffer asgovernmentsdofromeachother:forwhichreasonhewhoiscalleda citizenhas,inademocracy,everyprivilegewhichthatstation supposes.Inotherformsofgovernmenthemayenjoythem;butnot necessarily:forinsomestatesthepeoplehavenopower;norhave theyanygeneralassembly,butafewselectmen. Thetrialalsoofdifferentcausesisallottedtodifferentpersons; asatLacedaemonalldisputesconcerningcontractsarebroughtbefore someoftheephori:thesenatearethejudgesincasesofmurder,and soon;somebeingtobeheardbyonemagistrate,othersbyanother: andthusatCarthagecertainmagistratesdetermineallcauses.Butour formerdescriptionofacitizenwilladmitofcorrection;forinsome

governmentstheofficeofajurymanandamemberofthegeneral assemblyisnotanindeterminateone;butthereareparticularpersons appointedforthesepurposes,someorallofthecitizensbeing appointedjurymenormembersofthegeneralassembly,andthiseither forallcausesandallpublicbusinesswhatsoever,orelseforsome particularone:andthismaybesufficienttoshowwhatacitizenis; forhewhohasarighttoashareinthejudicialandexecutivepart ofgovernmentinanycity,himwecallacitizenofthatplace;anda city,inoneword,isacollectivebodyofsuchpersonssufficientin themselvestoallthepurposesoflife. CHAPTERII Incommonusetheydefineacitizentobeonewhoissprungfrom citizensonbothsides,notonthefather'sorthemother'sonly. Otherscarrythematterstillfurther,andinquirehowmanyofhis ancestorshavebeencitizens,ashisgrandfather,greatgrandfather, etc.,butsomepersonshavequestionedhowthefirstofthefamily couldprovethemselvescitizens,accordingtothispopularand carelessdefinition.GorgiasofLeontium,partlyentertainingthesame doubt,andpartlyinjest,says,thatasamortarismadebya mortarmaker,soacitizenismadebyacitizenmaker,anda LarissseanbyaLarissseanmaker.Thisisindeedaverysimpleaccount ofthematter;forifcitizensareso,accordingtothisdefinition, itwillbeimpossibletoapplyittothefirstfoundersorfirst inhabitantsofstates,whocannotpossiblyclaiminrighteitherof theirfatherormother.Itisprobablyamatterofstillmore difficultytodeterminetheirrightsascitizenswhoareadmittedto theirfreedomafteranyrevolutioninthestate.As,forinstance,at Athens,aftertheexpulsionofthetyrants,whenClisthenesenrolled manyforeignersandcityslavesamongstthetribes;andthedoubtwith respecttothemwas,notwhethertheywerecitizensorno,butwhether theywerelegallysoornot.Thoughindeedsomepersonsmayhavethis further[1276a]doubt,whetheracitizencanbeacitizenwhenheis illegallymade;asifanillegalcitizen,andonewhoisnocitizenat all,wereinthesamepredicament:butsinceweseesomepersons governunjustly,whomyetweadmittogovern,thoughnotjustly,and thedefinitionofacitizenisonewhoexercisescertainoffices,for suchaonewehavedefinedacitizentobe,itisevident,thata citizenillegallycreatedyetcontinuestobeacitizen,butwhether justlyorunjustlysobelongstotheformerinquiry.

 CHAPTERIII Ithasalsobeendoubtedwhatwasandwhatwasnottheactofthe city;as,forinstance,whenademocracyarisesoutofanaristocracy oratyranny;forsomepersonsthenrefusetofulfiltheircontracts; asiftherighttoreceivethemoneywasinthetyrantandnotinthe state,andmanyotherthingsofthesamenature;asifanycovenant wasfoundedforviolenceandnotforthecommongood.Soinlike manner,ifanythingisdonebythosewhohavethemanagementofpublic affairswhereademocracyisestablished,theiractionsaretobe consideredastheactionsofthestate,aswellasintheoligarchyor tyranny. Andhereitseemsverypropertoconsiderthisquestion,Whenshallwe saythatacityisthesame,andwhenshallwesaythatitis different? Itisbutasuperficialmodeofexaminingintothisquestiontobegin withtheplaceandthepeople;foritmayhappenthatthesemaybe dividedfromthat,orthatsomeoneofthemmayliveinoneplace,and someinanother(butthisquestionmayberegardedasnoveryknotty one;for,asacitymayacquirethatappellationonmanyaccounts,it maybesolvedmanyways);andinlikemanner,whenmeninhabitone commonplace,whenshallwesaythattheyinhabitthesamecity,or thatthecityisthesame?foritdoesnotdependuponthewalls;for IcansupposePeloponnesusitselfsurroundedwithawall,asBabylon was,andeveryotherplace,whichratherencirclesmanynationsthan onecity,andthattheysaywastakenthreedayswhensomeofthe inhabitantsknewnothingofit:butweshallfindapropertimeto determinethisquestion;fortheextentofacity,howlargeitshould be,andwhetheritshouldconsistofmorethanonepeople,theseare particularsthatthepoliticianshouldbynomeansbeunacquainted with.This,too,isamatterofinquiry,whetherweshallsaythata cityisthesamewhileitisinhabitedbythesameraceofmen,though someofthemareperpetuallydying,otherscomingintotheworld,as wesaythatariverorafountainisthesame,thoughthewatersare continuallychanging;orwhenarevolutiontakesplaceshallwe [1276b]saythemenarethesame,butthecityisdifferent:forifa cityisacommunity,itisacommunityofcitizens;butifthemodeof governmentshouldalter,andbecomeofanothersort,itwouldseema necessaryconsequencethatthecityisnotthesame;asweregardthe tragicchorusasdifferentfromthecomic,thoughitmayprobably consistofthesameperformers:thuseveryothercommunityor compositionissaidtobedifferentifthespeciesofcompositionis different;asinmusicthesamehandsproducedifferentharmony,as theDoricandPhrygian.Ifthisistrue,itisevident,thatwhenwe

speakofacityasbeingthesamewerefertothegovernmentthere established;andthis,whetheritiscalledbythesamenameorany other,orinhabitedbythesamemenordifferent.Butwhetherornoit isrighttodissolvethecommunitywhentheconstitutionisalteredis anotherquestion. CHAPTERIV Whathasbeensaid,itfollowsthatweshouldconsiderwhetherthe samevirtueswhichconstituteagoodmanmakeavaluablecitizen,or different;andifaparticularinquiryisnecessaryforthismatterwe mustfirstgiveageneraldescriptionofthevirtuesofagood citizen;forasasailorisoneofthosewhomakeupacommunity,so isacitizen,althoughtheprovinceofonesailormaybedifferent fromanother's(foroneisarower,anotherasteersman,athirda boatswain,andsoon,eachhavingtheirseveralappointments),itis evidentthatthemostaccuratedescriptionofanyonegoodsailormust refertohispeculiarabilities,yettherearesomethingsinwhich thesamedescriptionmaybeappliedtothewholecrew,asthesafety oftheshipisthecommonbusinessofallofthem,forthisisthe generalcentreofalltheircares:soalsowithrespecttocitizens, althoughtheymayinafewparticularsbeverydifferent,yetthereis onecarecommontothemall,thesafetyofthecommunity,forthe communityofthecitizenscomposesthestate;forwhichreasonthe virtueofacitizenhasnecessarilyareferencetothestate.Butif therearedifferentsortsofgovernments,itisevidentthatthose actionswhichconstitutethevirtueofanexcellentcitizeninone communitywillnotconstituteitinanother;whereforethevirtueof suchaonecannotbeperfect:butwesay,amanisgoodwhenhis virtuesareperfect;fromwhenceitfollows,thatanexcellentcitizen doesnotpossessthatvirtuewhichconstitutesagoodman.Thosewho areanywaysdoubtfulconcerningthisquestionmaybeconvincedofthe truthofitbyexaminingintothebestformedstates:for,ifitis impossiblethatacityshouldconsistentirelyofexcellentcitizens (whileitisnecessarythateveryoneshoulddowellinhiscalling, inwhichconsistshisexcellence,asitisimpossiblethatallthe citizensshouldhavethesame[1277a]qualifications)itisimpossible thatthevirtueofacitizenandagoodmanshouldbethesame;for allshouldpossessthevirtueofanexcellentcitizen:forfromhence necessarilyarisetheperfectionofthecity:butthateveryone shouldpossessthevirtueofagoodmanisimpossiblewithoutallthe citizensinawellregulatedstatewerenecessarilyvirtuous.Besides, asacityiscomposedofdissimilarparts,asananimalisoflifeand body;thesoulofreasonandappetite;afamilyofamanandhis

wifepropertyofamasterandaslave;inthesamemanner,asacity iscomposedofalltheseandmanyotherverydifferentparts,it necessarilyfollowsthatthevirtueofallthecitizenscannotbethe same;asthebusinessofhimwholeadsthebandisdifferentfromthe otherdancers.Fromallwhichproofsitisevidentthatthevirtuesof acitizencannotbeoneandthesame.Butdoweneverfindthose virtuesunitedwhichconstituteagoodmanandexcellentcitizen?for wesay,suchaoneisanexcellentmagistrateandaprudentandgood man;butprudenceisanecessaryqualificationforallthosewho engageinpublicaffairs.Nay,somepersonsaffirmthattheeducation ofthosewhoareintendedtocommandshould,fromthebeginning,be differentfromothercitizens,asthechildrenofkingsaregenerally instructedinridingandwarlikeexercises;andthusEuripidessays: "...NoshowyartsBemine,butteachmewhatthestaterequires." Asifthosewhoaretoruleweretohaveaneducationpeculiarto themselves.Butifweallow,thatthevirtuesofagoodmanandagood magistratemaybethesame,andacitizenisonewhoobeysthe magistrate,itfollowsthatthevirtueoftheonecannotingeneralbe thesameasthevirtueoftheother,althoughitmaybetrueofsome particularcitizen;forthevirtueofthemagistratemustbedifferent fromthevirtueofthecitizen.ForwhichreasonJasondeclaredthat washedeprivedofhiskingdomheshouldpineawaywithregret,asnot knowinghowtoliveaprivateman.Butitisagreatrecommendationto knowhowtocommandaswellastoobey;andtodoboththesethings wellisthevirtueofanaccomplishedcitizen.Ifthenthevirtueofa goodmanconsistsonlyinbeingabletocommand,butthevirtueofa goodcitizenrendershimequallyfitfortheoneaswellastheother, thecommendationofbothofthemisnotthesame.Itappears,then, thatbothhewhocommandsandhewhoobeysshouldeachofthemlearn theirseparatebusiness:butthatthecitizenshouldbemasterofand takepartinboththese,asanyonemayeasilyperceive;inafamily governmentthereisnooccasionforthemastertoknowhowtoperform thenecessaryoffices,butrathertoenjoythelabourofothers;for todotheotherisaservilepart.Imeanbytheother,thecommon familybusinessoftheslave. Therearemanysortsofslaves;fortheiremploymentsarevarious:of thesethehandicraftsmenareone,who,astheirnameimports,get theirlivingbythelabouroftheirhands,andamongsttheseall mechanicsareincluded;[1277b]forwhichreasonssuchworkmen,in somestates,werenotformerlyadmittedintoanyshareinthe government;tillatlengthdemocracieswereestablished:itisnot thereforeproperforanymanofhonour,oranycitizen,oranyonewho engagesinpublicaffairs,tolearntheseservileemploymentswithout theyhaveoccasionforthemfortheirownuse;forwithoutthiswas observedthedistinctionbetweenamasterandaslavewouldbelost.

Butthereisagovernmentofanothersort,inwhichmengovernthose whoaretheirequalsinrank,andfreemen,whichwecallapolitical government,inwhichmenlearntocommandbyfirstsubmittingtoobey, asagoodgeneralofhorse,oracommanderinchief,mustacquirea knowledgeoftheirdutybyhavingbeenlongunderthecommandof another,andthelikeineveryappointmentinthearmy:forwellisit said,nooneknowshowtocommandwhohasnothimselfbeenunder commandofanother.Thevirtuesofthoseareindeeddifferent,buta goodcitizenmustnecessarilybeendowedwiththem;heoughtalsoto knowinwhatmannerfreemenoughttogovern,aswellasbegoverned: andthis,too,isthedutyofagoodman.Andifthetemperanceand justiceofhimwhocommandsisdifferentfromhiswho,thougha freeman,isundercommand,itisevidentthatthevirtuesofagood citizencannotbethesameasjustice,forinstancebutmustbeofa differentspeciesinthesetwodifferentsituations,asthetemperance andcourageofamanandawomanaredifferentfromeachother;fora manwouldappearacowardwhohadonlythatcouragewhichwouldbe gracefulinawoman,andawomanwouldbethoughtatalkerwhoshould takeaslargeapartintheconversationaswouldbecomeamanof consequence. Thedomesticemploymentsofeachofthemarealsodifferent;itisthe man'sbusinesstoacquiresubsistence,thewoman'stotakecareofit. Butdirectionandknowledgeofpublicaffairsisavirtuepeculiarto thosewhogovern,whileallothersseemtobeequallyrequisitefor bothparties;butwiththisthegovernedhavenoconcern,itistheirs toentertainjustnotions:theyindeedarelikeflutemakers,while thosewhogovernarethemusicianswhoplayonthem.Andthusmuchto showwhetherthevirtueofagoodmanandanexcellentcitizenisthe same,orifitisdifferent,andalsohowfaritisthesame,andhow fardifferent. CHAPTERV Butwithrespecttocitizensthereisadoubtremaining,whetherthose onlyaretrulysowhoareallowedtoshareinthegovernment,or whetherthemechanicsalsoaretobeconsideredassuch?forifthose whoarenotpermittedtorulearetobereckonedamongthem,itis impossiblethatthevirtueofallthecitizensshouldbethesame,for thesealsoarecitizens;andifnoneofthemareadmittedtobe citizens,whereshalltheyberanked?fortheyareneither[1278a] sojournersnorforeigners?orshallwesaythattherewillno inconveniencearisefromtheirnotbeingcitizens,astheyareneither slavesnorfreedmen:forthisiscertainlytrue,thatallthoseare

notcitizenswhoarenecessarytotheexistenceofacity,asboysare notcitizensinthesamemannerthatmenare,forthoseareperfectly so,theothersundersomeconditions;fortheyarecitizens,though imperfectones:forinformertimesamongsomepeoplethemechanics wereeitherslavesorforeigners,forwhichreasonmanyofthemareso now:andindeedthebestregulatedstateswillnotpermitamechanic tobeacitizen;butifitbeallowedthem,wecannotthenattribute thevirtuewehavedescribedtoeverycitizenorfreeman,buttothose onlywhoaredisengagedfromservileoffices.Nowthosewhoare employedbyonepersoninthemareslaves;thosewhodothemformoney aremechanicsandhiredservants:henceitisevidentontheleast reflectionwhatistheirsituation,forwhatIhavesaidisfully explainedbyappearances.Sincethenumberofcommunitiesisvery great,itfollowsnecessarilythattherewillbemanydifferentsorts ofcitizens,particularlyofthosewhoaregovernedbyothers,sothat inonestateitmaybenecessarytoadmitmechanicsandhiredservants tobecitizens,butinothersitmaybeimpossible;asparticularlyin anaristocracy,wherehonoursarebestowedonvirtueanddignity:for itisimpossibleforonewholivesthelifeofamechanicorhired servanttoacquirethepracticeofvirtue.Inanoligarchyalsohired servantsarenotadmittedtobecitizens;becausethereaman'sright tobearanyofficeisregulatedbyhisfortune;butmechanicsare,for manycitizensareveryrich. TherewasalawatThebesthatnoonecouldhaveashareinthe governmenttillhehadbeentenyearsoutoftrade.Inmanystatesthe lawinvitesstrangerstoacceptthefreedomofthecity;andinsome democraciesthesonofafreewomanishimselffree.Thesameisalso observedinmanyotherswithrespecttonaturalchildren;butitis throughwantofcitizensregularlybornthattheyadmitsuch:for theselawsarealwaysmadeinconsequenceofascarcityof inhabitants;so,astheirnumbersincrease,theyfirstdeprivethe childrenofamaleorfemaleslaveofthisprivilege,nextthechild ofafreewoman,andlastofalltheywilladmitnonebutthosewhose fathersandmotherswerebothfree. Thattherearemanysortsofcitizens,andthathemaybesaidtobe ascompletelywhosharesthehonoursofthestate,isevidentfrom whathasbeenalreadysaid.ThusAchilles,inHomer,complainsof Agamemnon'streatinghimlikeanunhonouredstranger;forastranger orsojournerisonewhodoesnotpartakeofthehonoursofthestate: andwhenevertherighttothefreedomofthecityiskeptobscure,it isforthesakeoftheinhabitants.[1278b]Fromwhathasbeensaidit isplainwhetherthevirtueofagoodmanandanexcellentcitizenis thesameordifferent:andwefindthatinsomestatesitisthe same,inothersnot;andalsothatthisisnottrueofeachcitizen, butofthoseonlywhotakethelead,orarecapableoftakingthe lead,inpublicaffairs,eitheraloneorinconjunctionwithothers.

 CHAPTERVI Havingestablishedthesepoints,weproceednexttoconsiderwhether oneformofgovernmentonlyshouldbeestablished,ormorethanone; andifmore,howmany,andofwhatsort,andwhatarethedifferences betweenthem.Theformofgovernmentistheorderingandregulatingof thecity,andalltheofficesinit,particularlythosewhereinthe supremepowerislodged;andthispowerisalwayspossessedbythe administration;buttheadministrationitselfisthatparticularform ofgovernmentwhichisestablishedinanystate:thusinademocracy thesupremepowerislodgedinthewholepeople;onthecontrary,in anoligarchyitisinthehandsofafew.Wesaythen,thattheform ofgovernmentinthesestatesisdifferent,andweshallfindthesame thingholdgoodinothers.Letusfirstdetermineforwhosesakea cityisestablished;andpointoutthedifferentspeciesofrulewhich manmaysubmittoinsociallife. Ihavealreadymentionedinmytreatiseonthemanagementofafamily, andthepowerofthemaster,thatmanisananimalnaturallyformed forsociety,andthattherefore,whenhedoesnotwantanyforeign assistance,hewillofhisownaccorddesiretolivewithothers;not butthatmutualadvantageinducesthemtoit,asfarasitenables eachpersontolivemoreagreeably;andthisisindeedthegreat objectnotonlytoallingeneral,butalsotoeachindividual:butit isnotmerelymatterofchoice,buttheyjoininsocietyalso,even thattheymaybeabletolive,whichprobablyisnotwithoutsome shareofmerit,andtheyalsosupportcivilsociety,evenforthesake ofpreservinglife,withouttheyaregrievouslyoverwhelmedwiththe miseriesofit:foritisveryevidentthatmenwillenduremany calamitiesforthesakeofliving,asbeingsomethingnaturallysweet anddesirable.Itiseasytopointoutthedifferentmodesof government,andwehavealreadysettledtheminourexoteric discourses.Thepowerofthemaster,thoughbynatureequally serviceable,bothtothemasterandtotheslave,yetneverthelesshas foritsobjectthebenefitofthemaster,whilethebenefitofthe slavearisesaccidentally;foriftheslaveisdestroyed,thepowerof themasterisatanend:buttheauthoritywhichamanhasoverhis wife,andchildren,andhisfamily,whichwecalldomesticgovernment, iseitherforthebenefitofthosewhoareundersubjection,orelse forthecommonbenefitofthewhole:butitsparticularobjectisthe benefitofthegoverned,asweseeinotherarts;inphysic,for instance,andthegymnasticexercises,wherein,ifanybenefit[1279a] arisetothemaster,itisaccidental;fornothingforbidsthemaster

oftheexercisesfromsometimesbeinghimselfoneofthosewho exercises,asthesteersmanisalwaysoneofthesailors;butboththe masteroftheexercisesandthesteersmanconsiderthegoodofthose whoareundertheirgovernment.Whatevergoodmayhappentothe steersmanwhenheisasailor,ortothemasteroftheexerciseswhen hehimselfmakesoneatthegames,isnotintentional,ortheobject oftheirpower;thusinallpoliticalgovernmentswhichare establishedtopreserveanddefendtheequalityofthecitizensitis heldrighttorulebyturns.Formerly,aswasnatural,everyone expectedthateachofhisfellowcitizensshouldinhisturnservethe public,andthusadministertohisprivategood,ashehimselfwhenin officehaddoneforothers;butnoweveryoneisdesirousofbeing continuallyinpower,thathemayenjoytheadvantagewhichhemakes ofpublicbusinessandbeinginoffice;asifplaceswerea neverfailingremedyforeverycomplaint,andwereonthataccountso eagerlysoughtafter. Itisevident,then,thatallthosegovernmentswhichhaveacommon goodinviewarerightlyestablishedandstrictlyjust,butthosewho haveinviewonlythegoodoftherulersareallfoundedonwrong principles,andarewidelydifferentfromwhatagovernmentoughtto be,fortheyaretyrannyoverslaves,whereasacityisacommunityof freemen. CHAPTERVII Havingestablishedtheseparticulars,wecometoconsidernextthe differentnumberofgovernmentswhichthereare,andwhattheyare; andfirst,whataretheirexcellencies:forwhenwehavedetermined this,theirdefectswillbeevidentenough. Itisevidentthateveryformofgovernmentoradministration,forthe wordsareofthesameimport,mustcontainasupremepoweroverthe wholestate,andthissupremepowermustnecessarilybeinthehands ofoneperson,orafew,ormany;andwheneitheroftheseapplytheir powerforthecommongood,suchstatesarewellgoverned;butwhenthe interestoftheone,thefew,orthemanywhoenjoythispoweris aloneconsulted,thenill;foryoumusteitheraffirmthatthosewho makeupthecommunityarenotcitizens,orelselettheseshareinthe advantagesofgovernment.Weusuallycallastatewhichisgovernedby onepersonforthecommongood,akingdom;onethatisgovernedby morethanone,butbyafewonly,anaristocracy;eitherbecausethe governmentisinthehandsofthemostworthycitizens,orbecauseit isthebestformforthecityanditsinhabitants.Whenthecitizens

atlargegovernforthepublicgood,itiscalledastate;whichis alsoacommonnameforallothergovernments,andthesedistinctions areconsonanttoreason;foritwillnotbedifficulttofindone person,oraveryfew,ofverydistinguishedabilities,butalmost impossibletomeetwiththemajority[1279b]ofapeopleeminentfor everyvirtue;butifthereisonecommontoawholenationitis valour;forthisiscreatedandsupportedbynumbers:forwhichreason insuchastatetheprofessionofarmswillalwayshavethegreatest shareinthegovernment. Nowthecorruptionsattendingeachofthesegovernmentsarethese;a kingdommaydegenerateintoatyranny,anaristocracyintoan oligarchy,andastateintoademocracy.Nowatyrannyisamonarchy wherethegoodofonemanonlyistheobjectofgovernment,an oligarchyconsidersonlytherich,andademocracyonlythepoor;but neitherofthemhaveacommongoodinview. CHAPTERVIII Itwillbenecessarytoenlargealittlemoreuponthenatureofeach ofthesestates,whichisnotwithoutsomedifficulty,forhewho wouldenterintoaphilosophicalinquiryintotheprinciplesofthem, andnotcontenthimselfwithasuperficialviewoftheiroutward conduct,mustpassoverandomitnothing,butexplainthetruespirit ofeachofthem.Atyrannythenis,ashasbeensaid,amonarchy, whereonepersonhasanabsoluteanddespoticpoweroverthewhole communityandeverymembertherein:anoligarchy,wherethesupreme powerofthestateislodgedwiththerich:ademocracy,onthe contrary,iswherethosehaveitwhoareworthlittleornothing.But thefirstdifficultythatarisesfromthedistinctionswhichwehave laiddownisthis,shouldithappenthatthemajorityofthe inhabitantswhopossessthepowerofthestate(forthisisa democracy)shouldberich,thequestionis,howdoesthisagreewith whatwehavesaid?Thesamedifficultyoccurs,shoulditeverhappen thatthepoorcomposeasmallerpartofthepeoplethantherich,but fromtheirsuperiorabilitiesacquirethesupremepower;forthisis whattheycallanoligarchy;itshouldseemthenthatourdefinition ofthedifferentstateswasnotcorrect:nay,moreover,couldanyone supposethatthemajorityofthepeoplewerepoor,andtheminority rich,andthendescribethestateinthismanner,thatanoligarchy wasagovernmentinwhichtherich,beingfewinnumber,possessedthe supremepower,andthatademocracywasastateinwhichthepoor, beingmanyinnumber,possessedit,stilltherewillbeanother difficulty;forwhatnameshallwegivetothosestateswehavebeen

describing?Imean,thatbwhichthegreaternumberarerich,andthat inwhichthelessernumberarepoor(whereeachofthesepossessthe supremepower),iftherearenootherstatesthanthosewehave described.Itseemsthereforeevidenttoreason,thatwhetherthe supremepowerisvestedinthehandsofmanyorfewmaybeamatterof accident;butthatitisclearenough,thatwhenitisinthehandsof thefew,itwillbeagovernmentoftherich;wheninthehandsofthe many,itwillbeagovernmentofthepoor;sinceinallcountries therearemanypoorandfewrich:itisnotthereforethecausethat hasbeenalreadyassigned(namely,thenumberofpeopleinpower)that makesthedifferencebetweenthetwogovernments;butanoligarchyand democracydifferinthisfromeachother,inthepovertyofthosewho governintheone,andtherichesI28oaofthosewhogoverninthe other;forwhenthegovernmentisinthehandsoftherich,bethey feworbetheymore,itisanoligarchy;whenitisinthehandsof thepoor,itisademocracy:but,aswehavealreadysaid,theone willbealwaysfew,theothernumerous,butbothwillenjoyliberty; andfromtheclaimsofwealthandlibertywillarisecontinual disputeswitheachotherfortheleadinpublicaffairs. CHAPTERIX Letusfirstdeterminewhataretheproperlimitsofanoligarchyand ademocracy,andwhatisjustineachofthesestates;forallmen havesomenaturalinclinationtojustice;buttheyproceedtherein onlytoacertaindegree;norcantheyuniversallypointoutwhatis absolutelyjust;as,forinstance,whatisequalappearsjust,andis so;butnottoall;onlyamongthosewhoareequals:andwhatis unequalappearsjust,andisso;butnottoall,onlyamongstthose whoareunequals;whichcircumstancesomepeopleneglect,and thereforejudgeill;thereasonforwhichis,theyjudgefor themselves,andeveryonealmostistheworstjudgeinhisowncause. Sincethenjusticehasreferencetopersons,thesamedistinctions mustbemadewithrespecttopersonswhicharemadewithrespectto things,inthemannerthatIhavealreadydescribedinmyEthics. Astotheequalityofthethings,thesetheyagreein;buttheir disputeisconcerningtheequalityofthepersons,andchieflyforthe reasonaboveassigned;becausetheyjudgeillintheirowncause;and alsobecauseeachpartythinks,thatiftheyadmitwhatisrightin someparticulars,theyhavedonejusticeonthewhole:thus,for instance,ifsomepersonsareunequalinriches,theysupposethem unequalinthewhole;or,onthecontrary,iftheyareequalin liberty,theysupposethemequalinthewhole:butwhatisabsolutely

justtheyomit;forifcivilsocietywasfoundedforthesakeof preservingandincreasingproperty,everyone'srightinthecity wouldbeequaltohisfortune;andthenthereasoningofthosewho insistuponanoligarchywouldbevalid;foritwouldnotberight thathewhocontributedoneminashouldhaveanequalshareinthe hundredalongwithhimwhobroughtinalltherest,eitherofthe originalmoneyorwhatwasafterwardsacquired. Norwascivilsocietyfoundedmerelytopreservethelivesofits members;butthattheymightlivewell:forotherwiseastatemight becomposedofslaves,ortheanimalcreation:butthisisnotso;for thesehavenoshareinthehappinessofit;nordotheyliveafter theirownchoice;norisitanalliancemutuallytodefendeachother frominjuries,orforacommercialintercourse:forthenthe TyrrheniansandCarthaginians,andallothernationsbetweenwhom treatiesofcommercesubsist,wouldbecitizensofonecity;forthey havearticlestoregulatetheirexportsandimports,andengagements formutualprotection,andalliancesformutualdefence;but[1280b] yettheyhavenotallthesamemagistratesestablishedamongthem,but theyaredifferentamongthedifferentpeople;nordoestheonetake anycare,thatthemoralsoftheothershouldbeastheyought,or thatnoneofthosewhohaveenteredintothecommonagreementsshould beunjust,orinanydegreevicious,onlythattheydonotinjureany memberoftheconfederacy.Butwhosoeverendeavourstoestablish wholesomelawsinastate,attendstothevirtuesandthevicesof eachindividualwhocomposesit;fromwhenceitisevident,thatthe firstcareofhimwhowouldfoundacity,trulydeservingthatname, andnotnominallyso,mustbetohavehiscitizensvirtuous;for otherwiseitismerelyanallianceforselfdefence;differingfrom thoseofthesamecastwhicharemadebetweendifferentpeopleonlyin place:forlawisanagreementandapledge,asthesophistLycophron says,betweenthecitizensoftheirintendingtodojusticetoeach other,thoughnotsufficienttomakeallthecitizensjustandgood: andthatthisisfiactisevident,forcouldanyonebringdifferent placestogether,as,forinstance,encloseMegaraandCorinthina wall,yettheywouldnotbeonecity,noteveniftheinhabitants intermarriedwitheachother,thoughthisintercommunitycontributes muchtomakeaplaceonecity.Besides,couldwesupposeasetof peopletoliveseparatefromeachother,butwithinsuchadistanceas wouldadmitofanintercourse,andthattherewerelawssubsisting betweeneachparty,topreventtheirinjuringoneanotherintheir mutualdealings,supposingoneacarpenter,anotherahusbandman, shoemaker,andthelike,andthattheirnumbersweretenthousand, stillallthattheywouldhavetogetherincommonwouldbeatariff fortrade,oranallianceformutualdefence,butnotthesamecity. Andwhy?notbecausetheirmutualintercourseisnotnearenough,for evenifpersonssosituatedshouldcometooneplace,andeveryone shouldliveinhisownhouseasinhisnativecity,andthereshould

bealliancessubsistingbetweeneachpartytomutuallyassistand preventanyinjurybeingdonetotheother,stilltheywouldnotbe admittedtobeacitybythosewhothinkcorrectly,iftheypreserved thesamecustomswhentheyweretogetheraswhentheywereseparate. Itisevident,then,thatacityisnotacommunityofplace;nor establishedforthesakeofmutualsafetyortrafficwitheachother; butthatthesethingsarethenecessaryconsequencesofacity, althoughtheymayallexistwherethereisnocity:butacityisa societyofpeoplejoiningtogetherwiththeirfamiliesandtheir childrentoliveagreeablyforthesakeofhavingtheirlivesashappy andasindependentaspossible:andforthispurposeitisnecessary thattheyshouldliveinoneplaceandintermarrywitheachother: henceinailcitiestherearefamilymeetings,clubs,sacrifices,and publicentertainmentstopromotefriendship;foraloveofsociability isfriendshipitself;sothattheendthenforwhichacityis establishedis,thattheinhabitantsofitmaylivehappy,andthese thingsareconducivetothatend:foritisacommunityoffamilies andvillagesforthesakeofaperfectindependentlife;thatis,as wehavealreadysaid,forthesakeoflivingwellandhappily.Itis notthereforefoundedforthepurposeofmen'smerely[1281a]living together,butfortheirlivingasmenought;forwhichreasonthose whocontributemosttothisenddeservetohavegreaterpowerinthe citythanthosewhoaretheirequalsinfamilyandfreedom,buttheir inferiorsincivilvirtue,orthosewhoexceltheminwealthbutare belowtheminworth.Itisevidentfromwhathasbeensaid,thatin alldisputesupongovernmenteachpartysayssomethingthatisjust. CHAPTERX Itmayalsobeadoubtwherethesupremepoweroughttobelodged. Shallitbewiththemajority,orthewealthy,withanumberofproper persons,oronebetterthantherest,orwithatyrant?Butwhichever oftheseweprefersomedifficultywillarise.Forwhat?shallthe poorhaveitbecausetheyarethemajority?theymaythendivideamong themselves,whatbelongstotherich:noristhisunjust;because trulyithasbeensojudgedbythesupremepower.Butwhatavailsit topointoutwhatistheheightofinjusticeifthisisnot?Again,if themanyseizeintotheirownhandseverythingwhichbelongstothe few,itisevidentthatthecitywillbeatanend.Butvirtuewill neverdestroywhatisvirtuous;norcanwhatisrightbetheruinof thestate:thereforesuchalawcanneverberight,norcantheacts ofatyranteverbewrong,forofnecessitytheymustallbejust;for he,fromhisunlimitedpower,compelseveryonetoobeyhiscommand,

asthemultitudeoppresstherich.Isitrightthenthattherich,the few,shouldhavethesupremepower?andwhatiftheybeguiltyofthe samerapineandplunderthepossessionsofthemajority,thatwillbe asrightastheother:butthatallthingsofthissortarewrongand unjustisevident.Wellthen,theseofthebettersortshallhaveit: butmustnotthenalltheothercitizensliveunhonoured,without sharingtheofficesofthecity;fortheofficesofacityareits honours,andifonesetofmenarealwaysinpower,itisevidentthat therestmustbewithouthonour.Wellthen,letitbewithoneperson ofallothersthefittestforit:butbythismeansthepowerwillbe stillmorecontracted,andagreaternumberthanbeforecontinue unhonoured.Butsomeonemaysay,thatitiswrongtoletmanhavethe supremepowerandnotthelaw,ashissoulissubjecttosomany passions.Butifthislawappointsanaristocracy,orademocracy,how willithelpusinourpresentdoubts?forthosethingswillhappen whichwehavealreadymentioned. CHAPTERXI Otherparticularswewillconsiderseparately;butitseemsproperto prove,thatthesupremepoweroughttobelodgedwiththemany,rather thanwiththoseofthebettersort,whoarefew;andalsotoexplain whatdoubts(andprobablyjustones)mayarise:now,thoughnotone individualofthemanymayhimselfbefitforthesupremepower,yet whenthesemanyarejoinedtogether,itdoesnotfollowbuttheymay bebetterqualifiedforitthanthose;andthisnotseparately,butas acollectivebody;asthepublicsuppersexceedthosewhicharegiven atoneperson'sprivateexpense:for,astheyaremany,eachperson bringsinhisshareofvirtueandwisdom;andthus,comingtogether, theyarelikeonemanmadeupofamultitude,withmanyfeet,many hands,andmanyintelligences:thusisitwithrespecttothemanners andunderstandingsofthemultitudetakentogether;forwhichreason thepublicarethebestjudgesofmusicandpoetry;forsome understandonepart,someanother,andallcollectivelythewhole;and inthisparticularmenofconsequencedifferfromeachofthemany;as theysaythosewhoarebeautifuldofromthosewhoarenotso,andas finepicturesexcelanynaturalobjects,bycollectingtheseveral beautifulpartswhichweredispersedamongdifferentoriginalsinto one,althoughtheseparateparts,astheeyeoranyother,mightbe handsomerthaninthepicture. Butifthisdistinctionistobemadebetweeneverypeopleandevery generalassembly,andsomefewmenofconsequence,itmaybedoubtful whetheritistrue;nay,itisclearenoughthat,withrespecttoa

few,itisnot;sincethesameconclusionmightbeappliedevento brutes:andindeedwhereindosomemendifferfrombrutes?Notbut thatnothingpreventswhatIhavesaidbeingtrueofthepeoplein somestates.Thedoubtthenwhichwehavelatelyproposed,withall itsconsequences,maybesettledinthismanner;itisnecessary thatthefreemenwhocomposethebulkofthepeopleshouldhave absolutepowerinsomethings;butastheyareneithermenof property,noractuniformlyuponprinciplesofvirtue,itisnotsafe totrustthemwiththefirstofficesinthestate,bothonaccountof theiriniquityandtheirignorance;fromtheoneofwhichtheywilldo whatiswrong,fromtheothertheywillmistake:andyetitis dangeroustoallowthemnopowerorshareinthegovernment;forwhen therearemanypoorpeoplewhoareincapableofacquiringthehonours oftheircountry,thestatemustnecessarilyhavemanyenemiesinit; letthemthenbepermittedtovoteinthepublicassembliesandto determinecauses;forwhichreasonSocrates,andsomeother legislators,gavethemthepowerofelectingtheofficersofthe state,andalsoofinquiringintotheirconductwhentheycameoutof office,andonlypreventedtheirbeingmagistratesbythemselves;for themultitudewhentheyarecollectedtogetherhaveallofthem sufficientunderstandingforthesepurposes,and,mixingamongthose ofhigherrank,areserviceabletothecity,assomethings,which aloneareimproperforfood,whenmixedwithothersmakethewhole morewholesomethanafewofthemwouldbe. Butthereisadifficultyattendingthisformofgovernment,forit seems,thatthepersonwhohimselfwascapableofcuringanyonewho wasthensick,mustbethebestjudgewhomtoemployasaphysician; butsuchaonemustbehimselfaphysician;andthesameholdstruein everyotherpracticeandart:andasaphysicianought[1282a]togive anaccountofhispracticetoaphysician,sooughtittobeinother arts:thosewhosebusinessisphysicmaybedividedintothreesorts, thefirstoftheseishewhomakesupthemedicines;thesecond prescribes,andistotheotherasthearchitectistothemason;the thirdishewhounderstandsthescience,butneverpractisesit:now thesethreedistinctionsmaybefoundinthosewhounderstandall otherarts;norhavewelessopinionoftheirjudgmentwhoareonly instructedintheprinciplesoftheartthanofthosewhopractiseit: andwithrespecttoelectionsthesamemethodofproceedingseems right;fortoelectaproperpersoninanyscienceisthebusinessof thosewhoareskilfultherein;asingeometry,ofgeometricians;in steering,ofsteersmen:butifsomeindividualsshouldknowsomething ofparticularartsandworks,theydonotknowmorethanthe professorsofthem:sothatevenuponthisprincipleneitherthe electionofmagistrates,northecensureoftheirconduct,shouldbe entrustedtothemany. Butprobablyallthathasbeenheresaidmaynotberight;for,to

resumetheargumentIlatelyused,ifthepeoplearenotverybrutal indeed,althoughweallowthateachindividualknowslessofthese affairsthanthosewhohavegivenparticularattentiontothem,yet whentheycometogethertheywillknowthembetter,oratleastnot worse;besides,insomeparticularartsitisnottheworkmanonlywho isthebestjudge;namely,inthosetheworksofwhichareunderstood bythosewhodonotprofessthem:thushewhobuildsahouseisnot theonlyjudgeofit,forthemasterofthefamilywhoinhabitsitis abetter;thusalsoasteersmanisabetterjudgeofatillerthanhe whomadeit;andhewhogivesanentertainmentthanthecook.Whathas beensaidseemsasufficientsolutionofthisdifficulty;butthereis anotherthatfollows:foritseemsabsurdthatthepowerofthestate shouldbelodgedwiththosewhoarebutofindifferentmorals,instead ofthosewhoareofexcellentcharacters.Nowthepowerofelection andcensureareoftheutmostconsequence,andthis,ashasbeensaid, insomestatestheyentrusttothepeople;forthegeneralassemblyis thesupremecourtofall,andtheyhaveavoiceinthis,and deliberateinallpublicaffairs,andtryallcauses,withoutany objectiontothemeannessoftheircircumstances,andatanyage:but theirtreasurers,generals,andothergreatofficersofstateare takenfrommenofgreatfortuneandworth.Thisdifficultyalsomaybe solveduponthesameprinciple;andheretootheymayberight,for thepowerisnotinthemanwhoismemberoftheassembly,orcouncil, buttheassemblyitself,andthecouncil,andthepeople,ofwhich eachindividualofthewholecommunityaretheparts,Imeanas senator,adviser,orjudge;forwhichreasonitisveryright,that themanyshouldhavethegreatestpowersintheirownhands;forthe people,thecouncil,andthejudgesarecomposedofthem,andthe propertyofallthesecollectivelyismorethanthepropertyofany personorafewwhofillthegreatofficesofthestate:andthusI determinethesepoints. Thefirstquestionthatwestatedshowsplainly,thatthesupreme powershouldbelodgedinlawsdulymadeandthatthemagistrateor magistrates,eitheroneormore,shouldbeauthorisedtodetermine thosecaseswhichthelawscannotparticularlyspeakto,asitis impossibleforthem,ingenerallanguage,toexplainthemselvesupon everythingthatmayarise:butwhattheselawsarewhichare establisheduponthebestfoundationshasnotbeenyetexplained,but stillremainsamatterofsomequestion:butthelawsofeverystate willnecessarilybelikeeverystate,eithertriflingorexcellent, justorunjust;foritisevident,thatthelawsmustbeframed correspondenttotheconstitutionofthegovernment;and,ifso,itis plain,thatawellformedgovernmentwillhavegoodlaws,abadone, badones.

 CHAPTERXII Sinceineveryartandsciencetheendaimedatisalwaysgood,so particularlyinthis,whichisthemostexcellentofall,thefounding ofcivilsociety,thegoodwhereinaimedatisjustice;foritisthis whichisforthebenefitofall.Now,itisthecommonopinion,that justiceisacertainequality;andinthispointallthephilosophers areagreedwhentheytreatofmorals:fortheysaywhatisjust,and towhom;andthatequalsoughttoreceiveequal:butweshouldknow howwearetodeterminewhatthingsareequalandwhatunequal;andin thisthereissomedifficulty,whichcallsforthephilosophyofthe politician.Somepersonswillprobablysay,thattheemploymentsof thestateoughttobegivenaccordingtoeveryparticularexcellence ofeachcitizen,ifthereisnootherdifferencebetweenthemandthe restofthecommunity,buttheyareineveryrespectelsealike:for justiceattributesdifferentthingstopersonsdifferingfromeach otherintheircharacter,accordingtotheirrespectivemerits.Butif thisisadmittedtobetrue,complexion,orheight,oranysuch advantagewillbeaclaimforagreatershareofthepublicrights. Butthatthisisevidentlyabsurdisclearfromotherartsand sciences;forwithrespecttomusicianswhoplayontheflute together,thebestfluteisnotgiventohimwhoisofthebest family,forhewillplayneverthebetterforthat,butthebest instrumentoughttobegiventohimwhoisthebestartist. Ifwhatisnowsaiddoesnotmakethisclear,wewillexplainitstill further:ifthereshouldbeanyone,averyexcellentplayeronthe flute,butverydeficientinfamilyandbeauty,thougheachofthem aremorevaluableendowmentsthanaskillinmusic,andexcelthisart inahigherdegreethanthatplayerexcelsothers,yetthebestflutes oughttobegiventohim;forthesuperiority[1283a]inbeautyand fortuneshouldhaveareferencetothebusinessinhand;butthese havenone.Moreover,accordingtothisreasoning,everypossible excellencemightcomeincomparisonwitheveryother;forifbodily strengthmightdisputethepointwithrichesorliberty,evenany bodilystrengthmightdoit;sothatifonepersonexcelledinsize morethananotherdidinvirtue,andhissizewastoqualifyhimto takeplaceoftheother'svirtue,everythingmustthenadmitofa comparisonwitheachother;forifsuchasizeisgreaterthanvirtue bysomuch,itisevidentanothermustbeequaltoit:but,sincethis isimpossible,itisplainthatitwouldbecontrarytocommonsense todisputearighttoanyofficeinthestatefromeverysuperiority whatsoever:forifonepersonisslowandtheotherswift,neitheris theonebetterqualifiednortheotherworseonthataccount,though inthegymnasticracesadifferenceintheseparticularswouldgain theprize;butapretensiontotheofficesofthestateshouldbe

foundedonasuperiorityinthosequalificationswhichareusefulto it:forwhichreasonthoseoffamily,independency,andfortune,with greatpropriety,contendwitheachotherforthem;forthesearethe fitpersonstofillthem:foracitycannomoreconsistofallpoor menthanitcanofallslavesButifsuchpersonsarerequisite,itis evidentthatthosealsowhoarejustandvaliantareequallyso;for withoutjusticeandvalournostatecanbesupported,theformerbeing necessaryforitsexistence,thelatterforitshappiness. CHAPTERXIII Itseems,then,requisitefortheestablishmentofastate,thatall, oratleastmanyoftheseparticularsshouldbewellcanvassedand inquiredinto;andthatvirtueandeducationmaymostjustlyclaimthe rightofbeingconsideredasthenecessarymeansofmakingthe citizenshappy,aswehavealreadysaid.Asthosewhoareequalinone particulararenotthereforeequalinall,andthosewhoareunequal inoneparticulararenotthereforeunequalinall,itfollowsthat allthosegovernmentswhichareestablisheduponaprinciplewhich supposestheyare,areerroneous. Wehavealreadysaid,thatallthemembersofthecommunitywill disputewitheachotherfortheofficesofthestate;andinsome particularsjustly,butnotsoingeneral;therich,forinstance, becausetheyhavethegreatestlandedproperty,andtheultimateright tothesoilisvestedinthecommunity;andalsobecausetheir fidelityisingeneralmosttobedependedon.Thefreemenandmenof familywilldisputethepointwitheachother,asnearlyonan equality;fortheselatterhavearighttoahigherregardascitizens thanobscurepersons,forhonourabledescentiseverywhereofgreat esteem:norisitanimproperconclusion,thatthedescendantsofmen ofworthwillbemenofworththemselves;fornoblebirthisthe fountainofvirtuetomenoffamily:forthesamereasonalsowe justlysay,thatvirtuehasarighttoputinherpretensions. Justice,forinstance,isavirtue,andsonecessarytosociety,that allothersmustyieldhertheprecedence. Letusnowseewhatthemanyhavetourgeontheirsideagainstthe few;andtheymaysay,thatif,whencollectivelytaken,theyare comparedwiththem,theyarestronger,richer,andbetterthanthey are.Butshoulditeverhappenthatalltheseshouldinhabitthe [1283b]samecity,Imeanthegood,therich,thenoble,aswellas themany,suchasusuallymakeupthecommunity,Iask,willthere thenbeanyreasontodisputeconcerningwhoshallgovern,orwill

therenot?forineverycommunitywhichwehavementionedthereisno disputewherethesupremepowershouldbeplaced;forasthesediffer fromeachother,sodothoseinwhomthatisplaced;forinonestate therichenjoyit,inothersthemeritorious,andthuseachaccording totheirseparatemanners.Letushoweverconsiderwhatistobedone whenallthesehappenatthesametimetoinhabitthesamecity.If thevirtuousshouldbeveryfewinnumber,howthenshallweact? shallwepreferthevirtuousonaccountoftheirabilities,ifthey arecapableofgoverningthecity?orshouldtheybesomanyasalmost entirelytocomposethestate? Thereisalsoadoubtconcerningthepretensionsofallthosewho claimthehonoursofgovernment:forthosewhofoundthemeitheron fortuneorfamilyhavenothingwhichtheycanjustlysayintheir defence;sinceitisevidentupontheirprinciple,thatifanyone personcanbefoundricherthanalltherest,therightofgoverning allthesewillbejustlyvestedinthisoneperson.Inthesame manner,onemanwhoisofthebestfamilywillclaimitfromthosewho disputethepointuponfamilymerit:andprobablyinanaristocracy thesamedisputemightariseonthescoreofvirtue,ifthereisone manbetterthanalltheothermenofworthwhoareinthesame community;itseemsjust,bythesamereasoning,thatheshouldenjoy thesupremepower.Anduponthisprinciplealso,whilethemany supposetheyoughttohavethesupremecommand,asbeingmorepowerful thanthefew,ifoneormorethanone,thoughasmallnumbershouldbe foundstrongerthanthemselves,theseoughtrathertohaveitthan they. Allthesethingsseemtomakeitplain,thatnoneoftheseprinciples arejustlyfoundedonwhichthesepersonswouldestablishtheirright tothesupremepower;andthatallmenwhatsoeveroughttoobeythem: forwithrespecttothosewhoclaimitasduetotheirvirtueortheir fortune,theymighthavejustlysomeobjectiontomake;fornothing hindersbutthatitmaysometimeshappen,thatthemanymaybebetter orricherthanthefew,notasindividuals,butintheircollective capacity. Astothedoubtwhichsomepersonshaveproposedandobjected,wemay answeritinthismanner;itisthis,whetheralegislator,whowould establishthemostperfectsystemoflaws,shouldcalculatethemfor theuseofthebetterpartofthecitizens,orthemany,inthe circumstanceswehavealreadymentioned?Therectitudeofanything consistsinitsequality;thatthereforewhichisequallyrightwill beadvantageoustothewholestate,andtoeverymemberofitin common. Now,ingeneral,acitizenisonewhobothsharesinthegovernment andalsoinhisturnsubmitstobegoverned;[1284a]theircondition,

itistrue,isdifferentindifferentstates:thebestisthatin whichamanisenabledtochooseandtopersevereinacourseof virtueduringhiswholelife,bothinhispublicandprivatestate. Butshouldtherebeoneperson,oraveryfew,eminentforanuncommon degreeofvirtue,thoughnotenoughtomakeupacivilstate,sothat thevirtueofthemany,ortheirpoliticalabilities,shouldbetoo inferiortocomeincomparisonwiththeirs,ifmorethanone;orif butone,withhisonly;sucharenottobeconsideredaspartofthe city;foritwouldbedoingtheminjusticetoratethemonalevel withthosewhoaresofartheirinferiorsinvirtueandpolitical abilities,thattheyappeartothemlikeagodamongstmen.From whenceitisevident,thatasystemoflawsmustbecalculatedfor thosewhoareequaltoeachotherinnatureandpower.Suchmen, therefore,arenottheobjectoflaw;fortheyarethemselvesalaw: anditwouldberidiculousinanyonetoendeavourtoincludethemin thepenaltiesofalaw:forprobablytheymightsaywhatAntisthenes tellsusthelionsdidtothehareswhentheydemandedtobeadmitted toanequalsharewiththeminthegovernment.Anditisonthis accountthatdemocraticstateshaveestablishedtheostracism;foran equalityseemstheprincipalobjectoftheirgovernment.Forwhich reasontheycompelallthosewhoareveryeminentfortheirpower, theirfortune,theirfriendships,oranyothercausewhichmaygive themtoogreatweightinthegovernment,tosubmittotheostracism, andleavethecityforastatedtime;asthefabuloushistoriesrelate theArgonautsservedHercules,fortheyrefusedtotakehimwiththem intheshipArgoonaccountofhissuperiorvalour.Forwhichreason thosewhohateatyrannyandfindfaultwiththeadvicewhich PeriandergavetoThrasybulus,mustnotthinktherewasnothingtobe saidinitsdefence;forthestorygoes,thatPeriandersaidnothing tothemessengerinanswertothebusinesshewasconsultedabout,but strikingoffthoseearsofcornwhichwerehigherthantherest, reducedthewholecroptoalevel;sothatthemessenger,without knowingthecauseofwhatwasdone,relatedthefacttoThrasybulus, whounderstoodbyitthathemusttakeoffalltheprincipalmenin thecity.Noristhisserviceabletotyrantsonly;norisittyrants onlywhodoit;forthesamethingispractisedbothinoligarchies anddemocracies:fortheostracismhasinamannernearlythesame power,byrestrainingandbanishingthosewhoaretoogreat;andwhat isdoneinonecityisdonealsobythosewhohavethesupremepower inseparatestates;astheAthenianswithrespecttotheSamians,the Chians,andtheLesbians;forwhentheysuddenlyacquiredthe superiorityoverallGreece,theybroughttheotherstatesinto subjection,contrarytothetreatieswhichsubsistedbetweenthem.The KingofPersiaalsoveryoftenreducestheMedesandBabylonianswhen theyassumeupontheirformerpower:[1284b]andthisisaprinciple whichallgovernmentswhatsoeverkeepintheireye;eventhosewhich arebestadministered,aswellasthosewhicharenot,doit;these forthesakeofprivateutility,theothersforthepublicgood.

 Thesamethingistobeperceivedintheotherartsandsciences;for apainterwouldnotrepresentananimalwithafootdisproportionally large,thoughhehaddrawnitremarkablybeautiful;norwouldthe shipwrightmaketheproworanyotherpartofthevessellargerthan itoughttobe;norwillthemasterofthebandpermitanywhosings louderandbetterthantheresttosinginconcertwiththem.Thereis thereforenoreasonthatamonarchshouldnotactinagreementwith freestates,tosupporthisownpower,iftheydothesamethingfor thebenefitoftheirrespectivecommunities;uponwhichaccountwhen thereisanyacknowledgeddifferenceinthepowerofthecitizens,the reasonuponwhichtheostracismisfoundedwillbepoliticallyjust; butitisbetterforthelegislatorsotoestablishhisstateatthe beginningasnottowantthisremedy:butifincourseoftimesuchan inconvenienceshouldarise,toendeavourtoamenditbysomesuch correction.Notthatthiswastheuseitwasputto:formanydidnot regardthebenefitoftheirrespectivecommunities,butmadethe ostracismaweaponinthehandofsedition. Itisevident,then,thatincorruptgovernmentsitispartlyjustand usefultotheindividual,thoughprobablyitisasclearthatitis notentirelyjust:forinawellgovernedstatetheremaybegreat doubtsabouttheuseofit,notonaccountofthepreeminencewhich onemayhaveinstrength,riches,orconnection:butwhenthe preeminenceisvirtue,whatthenistobedone?foritseemsnot righttoturnoutandbanishsuchaone;neitherdoesitseemrightto governhim,forthatwouldbelikedesiringtosharethepowerwith Jupiterandtogovernhim:nothingthenremainsbutwhatindeedseems natural,andthatisforallpersonsquietlytosubmittothe governmentofthosewhoarethuseminentlyvirtuous,andletthembe perpetuallykingsintheseparatestates. CHAPTERXIV Whathasbeennowsaid,itseemspropertochangeoursubjectandto inquireintothenatureofmonarchies;forwehavealreadyadmitted themtobeoneofthosespeciesofgovernmentwhichareproperly founded.Andhereletusconsiderwhetherakinglygovernmentis properforacityoracountrywhoseprincipalobjectisthehappiness oftheinhabitants,orrathersomeother.Butletusfirstdetermine whetherthisisofonekindonly,ormore;[1285a]anditiseasyto knowthatitconsistsofmanydifferentspecies,andthattheformsof governmentarenotthesameinall:foratSpartathekinglypower seemschieflyregulatedbythelaws;foritisnotsupremeinall

circumstances;butwhenthekingquitstheterritoriesofthestatehe istheirgeneralinwar;andallreligiousaffairsareentrustedto him:indeedthekinglypowerwiththemischieflythatofageneral whocannotbecalledtoanaccountforhisconduct,andwhosecommand isforlife:forhehasnotthepoweroflifeanddeath,exceptasa general;astheyfrequentlyhadintheirexpeditionsbymartiallaw, whichwelearnfromHomer;forwhenAgamemnonisaffrontedincouncil, herestrainshisresentment,butwhenheisinthefieldandarmed withthispower,hetellstheGreeks: "Whoe'erIknowshallshunth'impendingfight,Todogsand vulturessoonshallbeaprey;Fordeathismine...." This,then,isonespeciesofmonarchicalgovernmentinwhichthe kinglypowerisinageneralforlife;andissometimeshereditary, sometimeselective:besides,thereisalsoanother,whichistobemet withamongsomeofthebarbarians,inwhichthekingsareinvested withpowersnearlyequaltoatyranny,yetare,insomerespects, boundbythelawsandthecustomsoftheircountry;forasthe barbariansarebynaturemorepronetoslaverythantheGreeks,and thoseinAsiamorethanthoseinEurope,theyendurewithoutmurmuring adespoticgovernment;forthisreasontheirgovernmentsare tyrannies;butyetnotliabletobeoverthrown,asbeingcustomaryand accordingtolaw.Theirguardsalsoaresuchasareusedinakingly government,notadespoticone;fortheguardsoftheirkingsarehis citizens,butatyrant'sareforeigners.Theonecommands,inthe mannerthelawdirects,thosewhowillinglyobey;theother, arbitrarily,thosewhoconsentnot.Theone,therefore,isguardedby thecitizens,theotheragainstthem. These,then,arethetwodifferentsortsofthesemonarchies,and anotheristhatwhichinancientGreecetheycalled_aesumnetes_; whichisnothingmorethananelectivetyranny;anditsdifference fromthatwhichistobefoundamongstthebarbariansconsistsnotin its'notbeingaccordingtolaw,butonlyinitsnotbeingaccording totheancientcustomsofthecountry.Somepersonspossessedthis powerforlife,othersonlyforaparticulartimeorparticular purpose,asthepeopleofMityleneelectedPittacustoopposethe exiles,whowereheadedbyAntimenidesandAlcaeusthepoet,aswe learnfromapoemofhis;forheupbraidstheMityleniansforhaving chosenPittacusfortheirtyrant,andwithone[1285b]voiceextolling himtotheskieswhowastheruinofarashanddevotedpeople.These sortsofgovernmentthenare,andeverwere,despotic,onaccountof theirbeingtyrannies;butinasmuchastheyareelective,andovera freepeople,theyarealsokingly. Afourthspeciesofkinglygovernmentisthatwhichwasinuseinthe heroictimes,whenafreepeoplesubmittedtoakinglygovernment,

accordingtothelawsandcustomsoftheircountry.Forthosewhowere atfirstofbenefittomankind,eitherinartsorarms,orby collectingthemintocivilsociety,orprocuringtheman establishment,becamethekingsofawillingpeople,andestablished anhereditarymonarchy.Theywereparticularlytheirgeneralsinwar, andpresidedovertheirsacrifices,exceptingsuchonlyasbelongedto thepriests:theywerealsothesupremejudgesoverthepeople;andin thiscasesomeofthemtookanoath,othersdidnot;theydid,the formofswearingwasbytheirsceptreheldout. Inancienttimesthepowerofthekingsextendedtoeverything whatsoever,bothcivil,domestic,andforeign;butinaftertimesthey relinquishedsomeoftheirprivileges,andothersthepeopleassumed, sothat,insomestates,theylefttheirkingsonlytherightof presidingoverthesacrifices;andeventhosewhomitwereworthwhile tocallbythatnamehadonlytherightofbeingcommanderinchiefin theirforeignwars. These,then,arethefoursortsofkingdoms:thefirstisthatofthe heroictimes;whichwasagovernmentoverafreepeople,withits rightsinsomeparticularsmarkedout;forthekingwastheirgeneral, theirjudge,andtheirhighpriest.Thesecond,thatofthe barbarians;whichisanhereditarydespoticgovernmentregulatedby laws:thethirdisthatwhichtheycallaesumnetic,whichisan electivetyranny.ThefourthistheLacedaemonian;andthis,infew words,isnothingmorethananhereditarygeneralship:andinthese particularstheydifferfromeachother.Thereisafifthspeciesof kinglygovernment,whichiswhenonepersonhasasupremepowerover allthingswhatsoever,inthemannerthateverystateandeverycity hasoverthosethingswhichbelongtothepublic:forasthemasterof afamilyiskinginhisownhouse,sosuchakingismasterofa familyinhisowncityorstate. CHAPTERXV Butthedifferentsortsofkinglygovernmentsmay,ifImaysosay,be reducedtotwo;whichwewillconsidermoreparticularly.Thelast spokenof,andtheLacedaemonian,forthechiefoftheothersare placedbetweenthese,whichareasitwereattheextremities,they havinglesspowerthananabsolutegovernment,andyetmorethanthe Lacedaemonians;sothatthewholematterinquestionmaybereducedto thesetwopoints;theoneis,whetheritisadvantageoustothe citizenstohavetheofficeofgeneralcontinueinonepersonfor life,andwhetheritshouldbeconfinedtoanyparticularfamiliesor

whethereveryoneshouldbeeligible:theother,whether[1286a]itis advantageousforonepersontohavethesupremepowerovereverything ornot.Buttoenterintotheparticularsconcerningtheofficeofa Lacedaemoniangeneralwouldberathertoframelawsforastatethan toconsiderthenatureandutilityofitsconstitution,sinceweknow thattheappointingofageneraliswhatisdoneineverystate. Passingoverthisquestionthen,wewillproceedtoconsidertheother partoftheirgovernment,whichisthepolityofthestate;andthis itwillbenecessarytoexamineparticularlyinto,andtogothrough suchquestionsasmayarise. Nowthefirstthingwhichpresentsitselftoourconsiderationis this,whetheritisbesttobegovernedbyagoodman,orbygood laws?Thosewhopreferakinglygovernmentthinkthatlawscanonly speakagenerallanguage,butcannotadaptthemselvestoparticular circumstances;forwhichreasonitisabsurdinanysciencetofollow writtenrule;andeveninEgyptthephysicianwasallowedtoalterthe modeofcurewhichthelawprescribedtohim,afterthefourthday; butifhediditsooneritwasathisownperil:fromwhenceitis evident,ontheverysameaccount,thatagovernmentofwrittenlaws isnotthebest;andyetgeneralreasoningisnecessarytoallthose whoaretogovern,anditwillbemuchmoreperfectinthosewhoare entirelyfreefrompassionsthaninthosetowhomtheyarenatural. Butnowthisisaqualitywhichlawspossess;whiletheotheris naturaltothehumansoul.Butsomeonewillsayinanswertothis, thatmanwillbeabetterjudgeofparticulars.Itwillbenecessary, then,forakingtobealawgiver,andthathislawsshouldbe published,butthatthoseshouldhavenoauthoritywhichareabsurd, asthosewhicharenot,should.Butwhetherisitbetterforthe communitythatthosethingswhichcannotpossiblycomeunderthe cognisanceofthelaweitheratallorproperlyshouldbeunderthe governmentofeveryworthycitizen,asthepresentmethodis,whenthe publiccommunity,intheirgeneralassemblies,actasjudgesand counsellors,wherealltheirdeterminationsareuponparticularcases, foroneindividual,behewhohewill,willbefound,uponcomparison, inferiortoawholepeopletakencollectively:butthisiswhatacity is,asapublicentertainmentisbetterthanoneman'sportion:for thisreasonthemultitudejudgeofmanythingsbetterthananyone singleperson.Theyarealsolessliabletocorruptionfromtheir numbers,aswaterisfromitsquantity:besides,thejudgmentofan individualmustnecessarilybepervertedifheisovercomebyangeror anyotherpassion;butitwouldbehardindeedifthewholecommunity shouldbemisledbyanger.Moreover,letthepeoplebefree,andthey willdonothingbutinconformitytothelaw,exceptonlyinthose caseswhichthelawcannotspeakto.ButthoughwhatIamgoingto proposemaynoteasilybemetwith,yetifthemajorityofthestate shouldhappentobegoodmen,shouldtheypreferoneuncorrupt governorormanyequallygood,isitnotevidentthattheyshould

choosethemany?Buttheremaybedivisionsamong[1286b]thesewhich cannothappenwhenthereisbutone.Inanswertothisitmaybe repliedthatalltheirsoulswillbeasmuchanimatedwithvirtueas thisoneman's. Ifthenagovernmentofmany,andallofthemgoodmen,composean aristocracy,andthegovernmentofoneakinglypower,itisevident thatthepeopleshouldratherchoosethefirstthanthelast;andthis whetherthestateispowerfulornot,ifmanysuchpersonssoalike canbemetwith:andforthisreasonprobableitwas,thatthefirst governmentsweregenerallymonarchies;becauseitwasdifficultto findanumberofpersonseminentlyvirtuous,moreparticularlyasthe worldwasthendividedintosmallcommunities;besides,kingswere appointedinreturnforthebenefitstheyhadconferredonmankind; butsuchactionsarepeculiartogoodmen:butwhenmanypersonsequal invirtueappearedatthetime,theybrookednotasuperiority,but soughtafteranequalityandestablishedafreestate;butafterthis, whentheydegenerated,theymadeapropertyofthepublic;which probablygaverisetooligarchies;fortheymadewealthmeritorious, andthehonoursofgovernmentwerereservedfortherich:andthese afterwardsturnedtotyranniesandtheseintheirturngaveriseto democracies;forthepowerofthetyrantscontinuallydecreasing,on accountoftheirrapaciousavarice,thepeoplegrewpowerfulenoughto frameandestablishdemocracies:andascitiesafterthathappenedto increase,probablyitwasnoteasyforthemtobeunderanyother governmentthanademocracy.Butifanypersonprefersakingly governmentinastate,whatistobedonewiththeking'schildren?Is thefamilyalsotoreign?Butshouldtheyhavesuchchildrenassome personsusuallyhave,itwillbeverydetrimental.Itmaybesaid, thatthenthekingwhohasitinhispowerwillneverpermitsuch childrentosucceedtohiskingdom.Butitisnoteasytotrustto that;foritisveryhardandrequiresgreatervirtuethanistobe metwithinhumannature.Thereisalsoadoubtconcerningthepower withwhichakingshouldbeentrusted:whetherheshouldbeallowed forcesufficienttocompelthosewhodonotchoosetobeobedientto thelaws,andhowheistosupporthisgovernment?forifheisto governaccordingtolawanddonothingofhisownwillwhichis contrarythereunto,atthesametimeitwillbenecessarytoprotect thatpowerwithwhichheguardsthelaw,Thismatterhowevermaynot beverydifficulttodetermine;forheoughttohaveaproperpower, andsuchaoneisthatwhichwillbesufficienttomaketheking superiortoanyonepersonorevenalargepartofthecommunity,but inferiortothewhole,astheancientsalwaysappointedguardsfor thatpersonwhomtheycreatedaesumnetesortyrant;andsomeone advisedtheSyracusians,whenDionysiusaskedforguards,toallowhim such.

 CHAPTERXVI [1287a]Wewillnextconsidertheabsolutemonarchthatwehavejust mentioned,whodoeseverythingaccordingtohisownwill:foraking governingunderthedirectionoflawswhichheisobligedtofollow doesnotofhimselfcreateanyparticularspeciesofgovernment,aswe havealreadysaid:forineverystatewhatsoever,eitheraristocracy ordemocracy,itiseasytoappointageneralforlife;andthereare manywhoentrusttheadministrationofaffairstoonepersononly; suchisthegovernmentatDyrrachium,andnearlythesameatOpus.As foranabsolutemonarchyasitiscalled,thatistosay,whenthe wholestateiswhollysubjecttothewillofoneperson,namelythe king,itseemstomanythatitisunnaturalthatonemanshouldhave theentireruleoverhisfellowcitizenswhenthestateconsistsof equals:fornaturerequiresthatthesamerightandthesamerank shouldnecessarilytakeplaceamongstallthosewhoareequalby nature:forasitwouldbehurtfultothebodyforthosewhoareof differentconstitutionstoobservethesameregimen,eitherofdietor clothing,soisitwithrespecttothehonoursofthestateas hurtful,thatthosewhoareequalinmeritshouldbeunequalinrank; forwhichreasonitisasmuchaman'sdutytosubmittocommandasto assumeit,andthisalsobyrotation;forthisislaw,fororderis law;anditismoreproperthatlawshouldgovernthananyoneofthe citizens:uponthesameprinciple,ifitisadvantageoustoplacethe supremepowerinsomeparticularpersons,theyshouldbeappointedto beonlyguardians,andtheservantsofthelaws,forthesupremepower mustbeplacedsomewhere;buttheysay,thatitisunjustthatwhere allareequalonepersonshouldcontinuallyenjoyit.Butitseems unlikelythatmanshouldbeabletoadjustthatwhichthelawcannot determine;itmaybereplied,thatthelawhavinglaiddownthebest rulespossible,leavestheadjustmentandapplicationofparticulars tothediscretionofthemagistrate;besides,itallowsanythingtobe alteredwhichexperienceprovesmaybebetterestablished.Moreover, hewhowouldplacethesupremepowerinmind,wouldplaceitinGod andthelaws;buthewhoentrustsmanwithit,givesittoawild beast,forsuchhisappetitessometimesmakehim;forpassion influencesthosewhoareinpower,eventheverybestofmen:for whichreasonlawisreasonwithoutdesire. Theinstancetakenfromtheartsseemsfallacious:whereinitissaid tobewrongforasickpersontoapplyforaremedytobooks,butthat itwouldbefarmoreeligibletoemploythosewhoareskilfulin physic;forthesedonothingcontrarytoreasonfrommotivesof friendshipbutearntheirmoneybycuringthesick,whereasthosewho havethemanagementofpublicaffairsdomanythingsthroughhatredor

favour.And,asaproofofwhatwehaveadvanced,itmaybeobserved, thatwheneverasickpersonsuspectsthathisphysicianhasbeen persuadedbyhisenemiestobeguiltyofanyfoulpracticetohimin hisprofession,hethenratherchoosestoapplytobooksforhiscure: andnotonlythis[1287b]butevenphysiciansthemselveswhentheyare illcallinotherphysicians:andthosewhoteachothersthegymnastic exercises,exercisewiththoseofthesameprofession,asbeing incapablefromselfpartialitytoformaproperjudgmentofwhat concernsthemselves.Fromwhenceitisevident,thatthosewhoseek forwhatisjust,seekforamean;nowlawisamean.Moreover;the morallawisfarsuperiorandconversantwithfarsuperiorobjects thanthewrittenlaw;forthesuprememagistrateissafertobe trustedtothantheone,thoughheisinferiortotheother.Butasit isimpossiblethatonepersonshouldhaveaneyetoeverything himself,itwillbenecessarythatthesuprememagistrateshould employseveralsubordinateonesunderhim;whythenshouldnotthisbe doneatfirst,insteadofappointingonepersoninthismanner? Besides,if,accordingtowhathasbeenalreadysaid,themanofworth isonthataccountfittogovern,twomenofwortharecertainly betterthanone:as,forinstance,inHomer,"Lettwotogethergo:" andalsoAgamemnon'swish;"Weretensuchfaithfulcounselmine!"Not butthatthereareevennowsomeparticularmagistratesinvestedwith supremepowertodecide,asjudges,thosethingswhichthelawcannot, asbeingoneofthosecaseswhichcomesnotproperlyunderits jurisdiction;forofthosewhichcanthereisnodoubt:sincethen lawscomprehendsomethings,butnotall,itisnecessarytoenquire andconsiderwhichofthetwoispreferable,thatthebestmanorthe bestlawshouldgovern;fortoreduceeverysubjectwhichcancome underthedeliberationofmanintoalawisimpossible. Noonethendenies,thatitisnecessarythatthereshouldbesome persontodecidethosecaseswhichcannotcomeunderthecognisanceof awrittenlaw:butwesay,thatitisbettertohavemanythanone; forthougheveryonewhodecidesaccordingtotheprinciplesofthe lawdecidesjustly;yetsurelyitseemsabsurdtosuppose,thatone personcanseebetterwithtwoeyes,andhearbetterwithtwoears,or dobetterwithtwohandsandtwofeet,thanmanycandowithmany:for weseethatabsolutemonarchsnowfurnishthemselveswithmanyeyes andearsandhandsandfeet;fortheyentrustthosewhoarefriendsto themandtheirgovernmentwithpartoftheirpower;foriftheyare notfriendstothemonarch,theywillnotdowhathechooses;butif theyarefriendstohim,theyarefriendsalsotohisgovernment:but afriendisanequalandlikehisfriend:ifthenhethinksthatsuch shouldgovern,hethinksthathisequalalsoshouldgovern.Theseare nearlytheobjectionswhichareusuallymadetoakinglypower.

 CHAPTERXVII Probablywhatwehavesaidmaybetrueofsomepersons,butnotof others;forsomemenarebynatureformedtobeunderthegovernment ofamaster;others,ofaking;others,tobethecitizensofafree state,justanduseful;butatyrannyisnotaccordingtonature,nor theotherpervertedformsofgovernment;fortheyarecontrarytoit. Butitisevidentfromwhathasbeensaid,thatamongequalsitis neitheradvantageousnor[1288a]rightthatonepersonshouldbelord overallwheretherearenoestablishedlaws,buthiswillisthelaw; orwherethereare;norisitrightthatonewhoisgoodshouldhave itoverthosewhoaregood;oronewhoisnotgoodoverthosewhoare notgood;noronewhoissuperiortotherestInworth,exceptina particularmanner,whichshallbedescribed,thoughindeedithasbeen alreadymentioned.Butletusnextdeterminewhatpeoplearebest qualifiedforakinglygovernment,whatforanaristocratic,andwhat forademocratic.And,first,forakingly;anditshouldbethosewho areaccustomedbynaturetosubmitthecivilgovernmentofthemselves toafamilyeminentforvirtue:foranaristocracy,thosewhoare naturallyframedtobeartheruleoffreemen,whosesuperiorvirtue makesthemworthyofthemanagementofothers:forafreestate,a warlikepeople,formedbynaturebothtogovernandbegovernedby lawswhichadmitthepoorestcitizentosharethehonoursofthe commonwealthaccordingtohisworth.Butwheneverawholefamilyor anyoneofanothershallhappensofartoexcelinvirtueastoexceed allotherpersonsinthecommunity,thenitisrightthatthekingly powershouldbeinthem,orifitisanindividualwhodoesso,that heshouldbekingandlordofall;forthis,aswehavejust mentioned,isnotonlycorrespondenttothatprincipleofrightwhich allfoundersofallstates,whetheraristocracies,oligarchies,or democracies,havearegardto(forinplacingthesupremepowerthey allthinkitrighttofixittoexcellence,thoughnotthesame);but itisalsoagreeabletowhathasbeenalreadysaid;asitwouldnotbe righttokill,orbanish,orostracisesuchaoneforhissuperior merit.Norwoulditbepropertolethimhavethesupremepoweronly inturn;foritiscontrarytonaturethatwhatishighestshouldever belowest:butthiswouldbethecaseshouldsuchaoneeverbe governedbyothers.Sothattherecannothingelsebedonebutto submit,andpermithimcontinuallytoenjoythesupremepower.And thusmuchwithrespecttokinglypowerindifferentstates,and whetheritisorisnotadvantageoustothem,andtowhat,andinwhat manner.

CHAPTERXVIII Sincethenwehavesaidthattherearethreesortsofregular governments,andofthesethebestmustnecessarilybethatwhichis administeredbythebestmen(andthismustbethatwhichhappensto haveoneman,oronefamily,oranumberofpersonsexcellingallthe restinvirtue,whoareabletogovernandbegovernedinsucha manneraswillmakelifemostagreeable,andwehavealreadyshown thatthevirtueofagoodmanandofacitizeninthemostperfect governmentwillbethesame),itisevident,thatinthesamemanner, andforthoseveryqualitieswhichwouldprocureamanthecharacter ofgood,anyonewouldsay,thatthegovernmentofastatewasa wellestablishedaristocracyorkingdom;sothatitwillbefoundto beeducationand[1288b]moralsthatarealmostthewholewhichgoto makeagoodman,andthesamequalitieswillmakeagoodcitizenor goodking. Theseparticularsbeingtreatedof,wewillnowproceedtoconsider whatsortofgovernmentisbest,howitnaturallyarises,andhowit isestablished;foritisnecessarytomakeaproperinquiry concerningthis. BOOKIV CHAPTERI Ineveryartandsciencewhichisnotconversantinpartsbutinsome onegenusinwhichitiscomplete,itisthebusinessofthatart alonetodeterminewhatisfittedtoitsparticulargenus;aswhat particularexerciseisfittedtoacertainparticularbody,andsuits itbest:forthatbodywhichisformedbynaturethemostperfectand superiortoothersnecessarilyrequiresthebestexerciseandalsoof whatonekindthatmustbewhichwillsuitthegenerality;andthisis thebusinessofthegymnasticarts:andalthoughanyoneshouldnot desiretoacquireanexactknowledgeandskillintheseexercises,yet itisnot,onthataccount,thelessnecessarythathewhoprofesses tobeamasterandinstructtheyouthinthemshouldbeperfect therein:andweseethatthisiswhatequallybefallsthehealing, shipbuilding,clothmaking,andindeedallotherarts;sothatit evidentlybelongstothesamearttofindoutwhatkindofgovernment

isbest,andwouldofallothersbemostcorrespondenttoourwish, whileitreceivednomolestationfromwithout:andwhatparticular speciesofitisadaptedtoparticularpersons;fortherearemanywho probablyareincapableofenjoyingthebestform:sothatthe legislator,andhewhoistrulyapolitician,oughttobeacquainted notonlywiththatwhichismostperfectimaginable,butalsothat whichisthebestsuitedtoanygivencircumstances.Thereis, moreover,athirdsort,animaginaryone,andheought,ifsuchaone shouldbepresentedtohisconsideration,tobeabletodiscernwhat sortofoneitwouldbeatthebeginning;and,whenonceestablished, whatwouldbethepropermeanstopreserveitalongtime.Imean,for instance,ifastateshouldhappennottohavethebestformof government,orbedeficientinwhatwasnecessary,ornotreceive everyadvantagepossible,butsomethingless.And,besidesallthis, itisnecessarytoknowwhatsortofgovernmentisbestfittingfor allcities:formostofthosewriterswhohavetreatedthissubject, howeverspeciouslytheymayhandleotherpartsofit,havefailedin describingthepracticalparts:foritisnotenoughtobeableto perceivewhatisbestwithoutitiswhatcanbeputinpractice.It shouldalsobesimple,andeasyforalltoattainto.Butsomeseek onlythemostsubtileformsofgovernment.Othersagain,choosing [1289a]rathertotreatofwhatiscommon,censurethoseunderwhich theylive,andextoltheexcellenceofaparticularstate,asthe Lacedaemonian,orsomeother:buteverylegislatoroughttoestablish suchaformofgovernmentasfromthepresentstateanddispositionof thepeoplewhoaretoreceiveittheywillmostreadilysubmittoand persuadethecommunitytopartakeof:foritisnotabusinessofless troubletocorrectthemistakesofanestablishedgovernmentthanto formanewone;asitisasdifficulttorecoverwhatwehaveforgot astolearnanythingafresh.He,therefore,whoaspirestothe characterofalegislator,ought,besidesallwehavealreadysaid,to beabletocorrectthemistakesofagovernmentalreadyestablished, aswehavebeforementioned.Butthisisimpossibletobedonebyhim whodoesnotknowhowmanydifferentformsofgovernmentthereare: somepersonsthinkthatthereisonlyonespeciesbothofdemocracy andoligarchy;butthisisnottrue:sothateveryoneshouldbe acquaintedwiththedifferenceofthesegovernments,howgreatthey are,andwhencetheyarise;andshouldhaveequalknowledgeto perceivewhatlawsarebest,andwhataremostsuitabletoeach particulargovernment:foralllawsare,andoughttobe,framed agreeabletothestatethatistobegovernedbythem,andnotthe statetothelaws:forgovernmentisacertainorderinginastate whichparticularlyrespectsthemagistratesinwhatmannertheyshall beregulated,andwherethesupremepowershallbeplaced;andwhat shallbethefinalobjectwhicheachcommunityshallhaveinview;but thelawsaresomethingdifferentfromwhatregulatesandexpressesthe formoftheconstitutionitistheirofficetodirecttheconductof themagistrateintheexecutionofhisofficeandthepunishmentof

offenders.Fromwhenceitisevident,thatthefoundersoflawsshould attendbothtothenumberandthedifferentsortsofgovernment;for itisimpossiblethatthesamelawsshouldbecalculatedforallsorts ofoligarchiesandallsortsofdemocracies,forofboththese governmentstherearemanyspecies,notoneonly. CHAPTERII Since,then,accordingtoourfirstmethodintreatingofthe differentformsofgovernment,wehavedividedthosewhichareregular intothreesorts,thekingly,thearistocratical,thefreestates, andshownthethreeexcesseswhichtheseareliableto:thekingly,of becomingtyrannical;thearistocratical,oligarchical;andthefree state,democratical:andaswehavealreadytreatedofthe aristocraticalandkingly;fortoenterintoaninquirywhatsortof governmentisbestisthesamethingastotreatofthesetwo expressly;foreachofthemdesirestobeestablisheduponthe principlesofvirtue:andas,moreover,wehavealreadydetermined whereinakinglypowerandanaristocracydifferfromeachother,and whenastatemaybesaidtobegovernedbyaking,itnowremainsthat weexamineintoafreestate,andalsotheseothergovernments,an oligarchy,ademocracy,anda[1289b]tyranny;anditisevidentof thesethreeexcesseswhichmustbetheworstofall,andwhichnextto it;for,ofcourse,theexcessesofthebestandmostholymustbethe worst;foritmustnecessarilyhappeneitherthatthenameofking onlywillremain,orelsethatthekingwillassumemorepowerthan belongstohim,fromwhencetyrannywillarise,theworstexcess imaginable,agovernmentthemostcontrarypossibletoafreestate. Theexcessnexthurtfulisanoligarchy;foranaristocracydiffers muchfromthissortofgovernment:thatwhichisleastsoisa democracy.Thissubjecthasbeenalreadytreatedofbyoneofthose writerswhohavegonebeforeme,thoughhissentimentsarenotthe sameasmine:forhethought,thatofallexcellentconstitutions,as agoodoligarchyorthelike,ademocracywastheworst,butofall badones,thebest. NowIaffirm,thatallthesestateshave,withoutexception,fallen intoexcess;andalsothatheshouldnothavesaidthatoneoligarchy wasbetterthananother,butthatitwasnotquitesobad.Butthis questionweshallnotenterintoatpresent.Weshallfirstinquire howmanydifferentsortsoffreestatesthereare;sincethereare manyspeciesofdemocraciesandoligarchies;andwhichofthemisthe mostcomprehensive,andmostdesirableafterthebestformof government;orifthereisanyotherlikeanaristocracy,well

established;andalsowhichoftheseisbestadaptedtomostcities, andwhichofthemispreferableforparticularpersons:for,probably, somemaysuitbetterwithanoligarchythanademocracy,andothers betterwithademocracythananoligarchy;andafterwardsinwhat manneranyoneoughttoproceedwhodesirestoestablisheitherof thesestates,Imeaneveryspeciesofdemocracy,andalsoof oligarchy.Andtoconclude,whenweshallhavebrieflygonethrough everythingthatisnecessary,wewillendeavourtopointoutthe sourcesofcorruption,andstability,ingovernment,aswellthose whicharecommontoallasthosewhicharepeculiartoeachstate,and fromwhatcausestheychieflyarise. CHAPTERIII Thereasonfortherebeingmanydifferentsortsofgovernmentsis this,thateachstateconsistsofagreatnumberofparts;for,inthe firstplace,weseethatallcitiesaremadeupoffamilies:and again,ofthemultitudeofthesesomemustberich,somepoor,and othersinthemiddlestation;andthat,bothoftherichandpoor, somewillbeusedtoarms,othersnot.Weseealso,thatsomeofthe commonpeoplearehusbandmen,othersattendthemarket,andothersare artificers.Thereisalsoadifferencebetweenthenoblesintheir wealth,andthedignityinwhichtheylive:forinstance,inthe numberofhorsestheybreed;forthiscannotbesupportedwithouta largefortune:forwhichreason,informertimes,thosecitieswhose strengthconsistedinhorsebecamebythatmeansoligarchies;andthey usedhorseintheirexpeditionsagainsttheneighbouringcities;as theEretrianstheChalcidians,theMagnetians,wholivednearthe riverMeander,andmanyothersinAsia.Moreover,besidesthe differenceoffortune,thereisthatwhicharisesfromfamilyand merit;or,ifthereareanyotherdistinctions[1290a]whichmakepart ofthecity,theyhavebeenalreadymentionedintreatingofan aristocracy,forthereweconsideredhowmanypartseachcitymust necessarilybecomposedof;andsometimeseachofthesehaveashare inthegovernment,sometimesafew,sometimesmore. Itisevidentthen,thattheremustbemanyformsofgovernment, differingfromeachotherintheirparticularconstitution:forthe partsofwhichtheyarecomposedeachdifferfromtheother.For governmentistheorderingofthemagistraciesofthestate;andthese thecommunitysharebetweenthemselves,eitherastheycanattainthem byforce,oraccordingtosomecommonequalitywhichthereisamongst them,aspoverty,wealth,orsomethingwhichtheybothpartakeof. Theremustthereforenecessarilybeasmanydifferentformsof

governmentsastherearedifferentranksinthesociety,arisingfrom thesuperiorityofsomeoverothers,andtheirdifferentsituations. Andtheseseemchieflytobetwo,astheysay,ofthewinds:namely, thenorthandthesouth;andalltheothersaredeclinationsfrom these.Andthusinpolitics,thereisthegovernmentofthemanyand thegovernmentofthefew;orademocracyandanoligarchy:foran aristocracymaybeconsideredasaspeciesofoligarchy,asbeingalso agovernmentofthefew;andwhatwecallafreestatemaybe consideredasademocracy:asinthewindstheyconsiderthewestas partofthenorth,andtheeastaspartofthesouth:andthusitis inmusic,accordingtosome,whosaythereareonlytwospeciesofit, theDoricandthePhrygian,andallotherspeciesofcompositionthey callafteroneofthesenames;andmanypeopleareaccustomedto considerthenatureofgovernmentinthesamelight;butitisboth moreconvenientandmorecorrespondenttotruthtodistinguish governmentsasIhavedone,intotwospecies:one,ofthosewhichare establisheduponproperprinciples;ofwhichtheremaybeoneortwo sorts:theother,whichincludesallthedifferentexcessesofthese; sothatwemaycomparethebestformofgovernmenttothemost harmoniouspieceofmusic;theoligarchicanddespotictothemore violenttunes;andthedemocratictothesoftandgentleairs. CHAPTERIV Weoughtnottodefineademocracyassomedo,whosaysimply,thatit isagovernmentwherethesupremepowerislodgedinthepeople;for eveninoligarchiesthesupremepowerisinthemajority.Norshould theydefineanoligarchyagovernmentwherethesupremepowerisin thehandsofafew:forletussupposethenumberofapeopletobe thirteenhundred,andthatoftheseonethousandwererich,whowould notpermitthethreehundredpoortohaveanyshareinthegovernment, althoughtheywerefree,andtheirequalineverythingelse;noone wouldsay,thatthisgovernmentwasademocracy.Inlikemanner,if thepoor,whenfewinnumber,shouldacquirethepowerovertherich, thoughmorethanthemselves,noonewouldsay,thatthiswasan oligarchy;northis,whentherestwhoarerichhavenoshareinthe administration.Weshouldrathersay,thatademocracyiswhenthe supremepowerisinthe[1290b]handsofthefreemen;anoligarchy, whenitisinthehandsoftherich:ithappensindeedthatintheone casethemanywillpossessit,intheotherthefew;becausethereare manypoorandfewrich.Andifthepowerofthestatewastobe distributedaccordingtothesizeofthecitizens,astheysayitis inEthiopia,oraccordingtotheirbeauty,itwouldbeanoligarchy: forthenumberofthosewhoarelargeandbeautifulissmall.

 Norarethosethingswhichwehavealreadymentionedalonesufficient todescribethesestates;forsincetherearemanyspeciesbothofa democracyandanoligarchy,thematterrequiresfurtherconsideration; aswecannotadmit,thatifafewpersonswhoarefreepossessthe supremepoweroverthemanywhoarenotfree,thatthisgovernmentis ademocracy:asinApollonia,inIonia,andinThera:forineachof thesecitiesthehonoursofthestatebelongtosomefewparticular families,whofirstfoundedthecolonies.Norwouldtherich,because theyaresuperiorinnumbers,formademocracy,asformerlyat Colophon;fortherethemajorityhadlargepossessionsbeforethe Lydianwar:butademocracyisastatewherethefreemenandthepoor, beingthemajority,areinvestedwiththepowerofthestate.An oligarchyisastatewheretherichandthoseofnoblefamilies,being few,possessit. Wehavenowprovedthattherearevariousformsofgovernmentandhave assignedareasonforit;andshallproceedtoshowthatthereare evenmorethanthese,andwhattheyare,andwhy;settingoutwiththe principlewehavealreadylaiddown.Weadmitthateverycityconsists notofone,butmanyparts:thus,ifweshouldendeavourtocomprehend thedifferentspeciesofanimalsweshouldfirstofallnotethose partswhicheveryanimalmusthave,asacertainsensorium,andalso whatisnecessarytoacquireandretainfood,asamouthandabelly; besidescertainpartstoenableittomovefromplacetoplace.If, then,thesearetheonlypartsofananimalandtherearedifferences betweenthem;namely,intheirvarioussortsofstomachs,bellies,and sensoriums:towhichwemustaddtheirmotivepowers;thenumberof thecombinationsofallthesemustnecessarilymakeupthedifferent speciesofanimals.Foritisnotpossiblethatthesamekindof animalshouldhaveanyverygreatdifferenceinitsmouthorears;so thatwhenallthesearecollected,whohappentohavethesethings similarinall,theymakeupaspeciesofanimalsofwhichthereare asmanyasthereareofthesegeneralcombinationsofnecessaryparts. Thesamethingistrueofwhatarecalledstates;foracityisnot madeofonebutmanyparts,ashasalreadybeenoftensaid;oneof whichisthosewhosupplyitwithprovisions,calledhusbandmen, anothercalledmechanics,[1291a]whoseemploymentisinthemanual arts,withoutwhichthecitycouldnotbeinhabited;ofthesesomeare busiedaboutwhatisabsolutelynecessary,othersinwhatcontribute totheeleganciesandpleasuresoflife;thethirdsortareyour exchangemen,Imeanbytheseyourbuyers,sellers,merchants,and victuallers;thefourthareyourhiredlabourersorworkmen;thefifth arethemenatarms,aranknotlessusefulthantheother,without youwouldhavethecommunityslavestoeveryinvader;butwhatcannot defenditselfisunworthyofthenameofacity;foracityis selfsufficient,aslavenot.SothatwhenSocrates,inPlato's

Republic,saysthatacityisnecessarilycomposedoffoursortsof people,hespeakselegantlybutnotcorrectly,andtheseare, accordingtohim,weavers,husbandmen,shoemakers,andbuilders;he thenadds,asifthesewerenotsufficient,smiths,herdsmenforwhat cattlearenecessary,andalsomerchantsandvictuallers,andthese arebywayofappendixtohisfirstlist;asifacitywasestablished fornecessity,andnothappiness,orasifashoemakeranda husbandmanwereequallyuseful.Hereckonsnotthemilitaryapart beforetheincreaseofterritoryandjoiningtothebordersofthe neighbouringpowerswillmakewarnecessary:andevenamongstthemwho composehisfourdivisions,orwhoeverhaveanyconnectionwitheach other,itwillbenecessarytohavesomeonetodistributejustice, anddeterminebetweenmanandman.If,then,themindisamore valuablepartofmanthanthebody,everyonewouldwishtohavethose thingsmoreregardedinhiscitywhichtendtotheadvantageofthese thancommonmatters,sucharewarandjustice;towhichmaybeadded council,whichisthebusinessofcivilwisdom(norisitofany consequencewhetherthesedifferentemploymentsarefilledby differentpersonsorone,asthesamemanisoftentimesbothasoldier andahusbandman):sothatifboththejudgeandthesenatorareparts ofthecity,itnecessarilyfollowsthatthesoldiermustbesoalso. Theseventhsortarethosewhoservethepublicinexpensive employmentsattheirowncharge:thesearecalledtherich.Theeighth arethosewhoexecutethedifferentofficesofthestate,andwithout theseitcouldnotpossiblysubsist:itisthereforenecessarythat thereshouldbesomepersonscapableofgoverningandfillingthe placesinthecity;andthiseitherforlifeorinrotation:the officeofsenator,andjudge,ofwhichwehavealreadysufficiently treated,aretheonlyonesremaining.If,then,thesethingsare necessaryforastate,thatitmaybehappyandjust,itfollowsthat thecitizenswhoengageinpublicaffairsshouldbemenofabilities therein.[1291b]Severalpersonsthink,thatdifferentemploymentsmay beallottedtothesameperson;asasoldier's,ahusbandman's,andan artificer's;asalsothatothersmaybebothsenatorsandjudges. Besides,everyonesupposeshimselfamanofpoliticalabilities,and thatheisqualifiedforalmosteverydepartmentinthestate.Butthe samepersoncannotatoncebepoorandrich:forwhichreasonthemost obviousdivisionofthecityisintotwoparts,thepoorandrich; moreover,sinceforthegeneralitytheonearefew,theothermany, theyseemofallthepartsofacitymostcontrarytoeachother;so thatastheoneortheotherprevailtheyformdifferentstates;and thesearethedemocracyandtheoligarchy. Butthattherearemanydifferentstates,andfromwhatcausesthey arise,hasbeenalreadymentioned:andthattherearealsodifferent speciesbothofdemocraciesandoligarchieswewillnowshow.Though thisindeedisevidentfromwhatwehavealreadysaid:therearealso

manydifferentsortsofcommonpeople,andalsoofthosewhoare calledgentlemen.Ofthedifferentsortsofthefirstarehusbandmen, artificers,exchangemen,whoareemployedinbuyingandselling, seamen,ofwhichsomeareengagedinwar,someintraffic,somein carryinggoodsandpassengersfromplacetoplace,othersinfishing, andofeachofthesethereareoftenmany,asfishermenatTarentum andByzantium,mastersofgalleysatAthens,merchantsatAEginaand Chios,thosewholetshipsonfreightatTenedos;wemayaddtothese thosewholivebytheirmanuallabourandhavebutlittleproperty;so thattheycannotlivewithoutsomeemploy:andalsothosewhoarenot freebornonbothsides,andwhateverothersortofcommonpeople theremaybe.Asforgentlemen,theyaresuchasaredistinguished eitherbytheirfortune,theirbirth,theirabilities,ortheir education,oranysuchlikeexcellencewhichisattributedtothem. Themostpuredemocracyisthatwhichissocalledprincipallyfrom thatequalitywhichprevailsinit:forthisiswhatthelawinthat statedirects;thatthepoorshallbeinnogreatersubjectionthan therich;northatthesupremepowershallbelodgedwitheitherof these,butthatbothshallshareit.Foriflibertyandequality,as somepersonssuppose,arechieflytobefoundinademocracy,itmust bemostsobyeverydepartmentofgovernmentbeingalikeopentoall; butasthepeoplearethemajority,andwhattheyvoteislaw,it followsthatsuchastatemustbeademocracy.This,then,isone speciesthereof.Anotheris,whenthemagistratesareelectedbya certaincensus;butthisshouldbebutsmall,andeveryonewhowas includedinitshouldbeeligible,butassoonashewasbelowit shouldlosethatright.[1292a]Anothersortis,inwhichevery citizenwhoisnotinfamoushasashareinthegovernment,butwhere thegovernmentisinthelaws.Another,whereeverycitizenwithout exceptionhasthisright.Anotherisliketheseinotherparticulars, buttherethepeoplegovern,andnotthelaw:andthistakesplace wheneverythingisdeterminedbyamajorityofvotes,andnotbya law;whichhappenswhenthepeopleareinfluencedbythedemagogues: forwhereademocracyisgovernedbystatedlawsthereisnoroomfor them,butmenofworthfillthefirstofficesinthestate:butwhere thepowerisnotvestedinthelaws,theredemagoguesabound:for therethepeoplerulewithkinglypower:thewholecomposingonebody; fortheyaresupreme,notasindividualsbutintheircollective capacity. Homeralsodiscommendsthegovernmentofmany;butwhetherhemeans thiswearespeakingof,orwhereeachpersonexerciseshispower separately,isuncertain.Whenthepeoplepossessthispowerthey desiretobealtogetherabsolute,thattheymaynotbeunderthe controlofthelaw,andthisisthetimewhenflatterersareheldin repute.Noristhereanydifferencebetweensuchapeopleandmonarchs inatyranny:fortheirmannersarethesame,andtheybothholda

despoticpoweroverbetterpersonsthanthemselves.Fortheirdecrees areliketheothers'edicts;theirdemagoguesliketheothers' flatterers:buttheirgreatestresemblanceconsistsinthemutual supporttheygivetoeachother,theflatterertothetyrant,the demagoguetothepeople:andtothemitisowingthatthesupreme powerislodgedinthevotesofthepeople,andnotinthelaws;for theybringeverythingbeforethem,astheirinfluenceisowingto theirbeingsupremewhoseopinionstheyentirelydirect;fortheseare theywhomthemultitudeobey.Besides,thosewhoaccusethe magistratesinsistuponit,thattherightofdeterminingontheir conductliesinthepeople,whogladlyreceivetheircomplaintsasthe meansofdestroyingalltheiroffices. Anyone,therefore,maywithgreatjusticeblamesuchagovernmentas beingademocracy,andnotafreestate;forwherethegovernmentis notinthelaws,thenthereisnofreestate,forthelawoughttobe supremeoverallthings;andparticularincidentswhichariseshould bedeterminedbythemagistratesorthestate.If,therefore,a democracyistobereckonedafreestate,itisevidentthatanysuch establishmentwhichcentresallpowerinthevotesofthepeople cannot,properlyspeaking,beademocracy:fortheirdecreescannotbe generalintheirextent.Thus,then,wemaydescribetheseveral speciesofdemocracies. CHAPTERV Ofthedifferentspeciesofoligarchiesoneis,whentherighttothe officesisregulatedbyacertaincensus;sothatthepoor,although themajority,havenoshareinit;whileallthosewhoareincluded thereintakepartinthemanagementofpublicaffairs.Anothersort is,when[1292b]themagistratesaremenofverysmallfortune,who uponanyvacancydothemselvesfillitup:andiftheydothisoutof thecommunityatlarge,thestateapproachestoanaristocracy;ifout ofanyparticularclassofpeople,itwillbeanoligarchy.Another sortofoligarchyis,whenthepowerisanhereditarynobility.The fourthis,whenthepowerisinthesamehandsastheother,butnot underthecontroloflaw;andthissortofoligarchyexactly correspondstoatyrannyinmonarchies,andtothatparticularspecies ofdemocracieswhichIlastmentionedintreatingofthatstate:this hastheparticularnameofadynasty.Thesearethedifferentsortsof oligarchiesanddemocracies. Itshouldalsobeknown,thatitoftenhappensthatafreestate, wherethesupremepowerisinthelaws,maynotbedemocratic,andyet

inconsequenceoftheestablishedmannersandcustomsofthepeople, maybegovernedasifitwas;so,ontheotherhand,wherethelaws maycountenanceamoredemocraticformofgovernment,thesemaymake thestateincliningtoanoligarchy;andthischieflyhappenswhen therehasbeenanyalterationinthegovernment;forthepeopledonot easilychange,butlovetheirownancientcustoms;anditisbysmall degreesonlythatonethingtakesplaceofanother;sothatthe ancientlawswillremain,whilethepowerwillbeinthehandsof thosewhohavebroughtaboutarevolutioninthestate. CHAPTERVI Itisevidentfromwhathasbeensaid,thatthereareasmany differentsortsofdemocraciesandoligarchiesasIhavereckonedup: for,ofnecessity,eitherallranksofthepeoplewhichIhave enumeratedmusthaveashareinthegovernment,orsomeonly,and othersnot;forwhenthehusbandmen,andthoseonlywhopossess moderatefortunes,havethesupremepower,theywillgovernaccording tolaw;forastheymustgettheirlivingsbytheiremploys,theyhave butlittleleisureforpublicbusiness:theywillthereforeestablish properlaws,andnevercallpublicassembliesbutwhenthereisa necessityforthem;andtheywillreadilyleteveryonepartakewith themintheadministrationofpublicaffairsassoonastheypossess thatfortunewhichthelawrequiresfortheirqualification:every one,therefore,whoisqualifiedwillhavehisshareinthe government:fortoexcludeanywouldbetomakethegovernmentan oligarchy,andforalltohaveleisuretoattendwithouttheyhada subsistencewouldbeimpossible:forthesereasons,therefore,this governmentisaspeciesofdemocracy.Anotherspeciesisdistinguished bythemodeofelectingtheirmagistrates,inwhicheveryoneis eligible,towhosebirththerearenoobjections,providedheis supposedtohaveleisuretoattend:forwhichreasoninsucha democracythesupremepowerwillbevestedinthelaws,astherewill benothingpaidtothosewhogotothepublicassemblies.Athird speciesiswhereeveryfreemanhasarighttoashareinthe government,whichhewillnotacceptforthecausealreadyassigned; forwhichreasonherealsothesupremepowerwillbeinthelaw.The fourthspecies[1293a]ofdemocracy,thelastwhichwasestablishedin orderoftime,arosewhencitiesweregreatlyenlargedtowhatthey wereatfirst,andwhenthepublicrevenuebecamesomething considerable;forthenthepopulace,onaccountoftheirnumbers,were admittedtoshareinthemanagementofpublicaffairs,fortheneven thepoorestpeoplewereatleisuretoattendtothem,astheyreceived wagesforsodoing;nay,theyweremoresothanothers,astheywere

nothinderedbyhavinganythingoftheirowntomind,astherichhad; forwhichreasontheselastveryoftendidnotfrequentthepublic assembliesandthecourtsofjustice:thusthesupremepowerwas lodgedinthepoor,andnotinthelaws.Thesearethedifferentsorts ofdemocracies,andsucharethecauseswhichnecessarilygavebirth tothem. Thefirstspeciesofoligarchyis,whenthegeneralityofthestate aremenofmoderateandnottoolargeproperty;forthisgivesthem leisureforthemanagementofpublicaffairs:and,astheyarea numerousbody,itnecessarilyfollowsthatthesupremepowermustbe inthelaws,andnotinmen;forastheyarefarremovedfroma monarchicalgovernment,andhavenotsufficientfortunetoneglect theirprivateaffairs,whiletheyaretoomanytobesupportedbythe public,theywillofcoursedeterminetobegovernedbythelaws,and notbyeachother.Butifthemenofpropertyinthestatearebut few,andtheirpropertyislarge,thenanoligarchyofthesecondsort willtakeplace;forthosewhohavemostpowerwillthinkthatthey havearighttolorditovertheothers;and,toaccomplishthis,they willassociatetothemselvessomewhohaveaninclinationforpublic affairs,andastheyarenotpowerfulenoughtogovernwithoutlaw, theywillmakealawforthatpurpose.Andifthosefewwhohavelarge fortunesshouldacquirestillgreaterpower,theoligarchywillthen alterintooneofthethirdsort;fortheywillgetalltheofficesof thestateintotheirownhandsbyalawwhichdirectsthesonto succeeduponthedeathofhisfather;and,afterthat,when,bymeans oftheirincreasingwealthandpowerfulconnections,theyextendstill furthertheiroppression,amonarchicaldynastywilldirectlysucceed whereinmenwillbesupreme,andnotthelaw;andthisisthefourth speciesofanoligarchycorrespondenttothelastmentionedclassof democracies. CHAPTERVII Therearebesidestwootherstates,ademocracyandanoligarchy,one ofwhichallspeakof,anditisalwaysesteemedaspeciesofthefour sorts;andthustheyreckonthemup;amonarchy,anoligarchy,a democracy,andthisfourthwhichtheycallanaristocracy.Thereis alsoafifth,whichbearsanamethatisalsocommontotheother four,namely,astate:butasthisisseldomtobemetwith,ithas escapedthosewhohaveendeavouredtoenumeratethedifferentsortsof governments,which[1293b]theyfixatfouronly,asdoesPlatoinhis Republic.

Anaristocracy,ofwhichIhavealreadytreatedinthefirstbook,is rightlycalledso;forastategovernedbythebestmen,uponthemost virtuousprinciples,andnotuponanyhypothesis,whichevengoodmen maypropose,hasalonearighttobecalledanaristocracy,foritis thereonlythatamanisatonceagoodmanandagoodcitizen;while inotherstatesmenaregoodonlyrelativetothosestates.Moreover, therearesomeotherstateswhicharecalledbythesamename,that differbothfromoligarchiesandfreestates,whereinnotonlythe richbutalsothevirtuoushaveashareintheadministration;and havethereforeacquiredthenameofaristocracies;forinthose governmentswhereinvirtueisnottheircommoncare,therearestill menofworthandapprovedgoodness.Whateverstate,then,likethe Carthaginians,favourstherich,thevirtuous,andthecitizensat large,isasortofaristocracy:whenonlythetwolatterareheldin esteem,asatLacedaemon,andthestateisjointlycomposedofthese, itisavirtuousdemocracy.Thesearethetwospeciesofaristocracies afterthefirst,whichisthebestofallgovernments.Thereisalsoa third,whichis,wheneverafreestateinclinestothedominionofa few. CHAPTERVIII Itnowremainsforustotreatofthatgovernmentwhichis particularlycalledafreestate,andalsoofatyranny;andthe reasonformychoosingtoplacethatfreestatehereis,becausethis, aswellasthosearistocraciesalreadymentioned,althoughtheydonot seemexcesses,yet,tospeaktrue,theyhavealldepartedfromwhata perfectgovernmentis.Nay,theyaredeviationsbothofthemequally fromotherforms,asIsaidatthebeginning.Itispropertomention atyrannythelastofallgovernments,foritisofallothersthe leastlikeone:butasmyintentionistotreatofallgovernmentsin general,forthisreasonthatalso,asIhavesaid,willbetakeninto considerationinitsproperplace. Ishallnowinquireintoafreestateandshowwhatitis;andwe shallthebetterunderstanditspositivenatureaswehavealready describedanoligarchyandademocracy;forafreestateisindeed nothingmorethanamixtureofthem,andithasbeenusualtocall thosewhichinclinemosttoademocracy,afreestate;thosewhich inclinemosttoanoligarchy,anaristocracy,becausethosewhoare richaregenerallymenoffamilyandeducation;besides,theyenjoy thosethingswhichothersareoftenguiltyofcrimestoprocure:for whichreasontheyareregardedasmenofworthandhonourandnote.

Since,then,itisthegeniusofanaristocracytoallotthelarger partofthegovernmenttothebestcitizens,theythereforesay,that anoligarchyischieflycomposedofthosemenwhoareworthyand honourable:nowit[1294a]seemsimpossiblethatwherethegovernment isinthehandsofthegood,therethelawsshouldnotbegood,but bad;or,onthecontrary,thatwherethegovernmentisinthehandsof thebad,therethelawsshouldbegood;norisagovernmentwell constitutedbecausethelawsare,withoutatthesametimecareis takenthattheyareobserved;fortoenforceobediencetothelaws whichitmakesisoneproofofagoodconstitutioninthe stateanotheris,tohavelawswellcalculatedforthosewhoareto abidebythem;foriftheyareimpropertheymustbeobeyed:andthis maybedonetwoways,eitherbytheirbeingthebestrelativetothe particularstate,orthebestabsolutely.Anaristocracyseemsmost likelytoconferthehonoursofthestateonthevirtuous;forvirtue istheobjectofanaristocracy,richesofanoligarchy,andliberty ofademocracy;forwhatisapprovedofbythemajoritywillprevail inallorineachofthesethreedifferentstates;andthatwhich seemsgoodtomostofthosewhocomposethecommunitywillprevail: forwhatiscalledastateprevailsinmanycommunities,whichaimat amixtureofrichandpoor,richesandliberty:asfortherich,they areusuallysupposedtotaketheplaceoftheworthyandhonourable. Astherearethreethingswhichclaimanequalrankinthestate, freedom,riches,andvirtue(forasforthefourth,rank,itisan attendantontwooftheothers,forvirtueandrichesaretheorigin offamily),itisevident,thattheconjunctureoftherichandthe poormakeupafreestate;butthatallthreetendtoanaristocracy morethananyother,exceptthatwhichistrulyso,whichholdsthe firstrank. Wehavealreadyseenthattherearegovernmentsdifferentfroma monarchy,ademocracy,andanoligarchy;andwhattheyare,and whereintheydifferfromeachother;andalsoaristocraciesandstates properlysocalled,whicharederivedfromthem;anditisevident thatthesearenotmuchunlikeeachother. CHAPTERIX Weshallnextproceedtoshowhowthatgovernmentwhichispeculiarly calledastatearisesalongsideofdemocracyandoligarchy,andhowit oughttobeestablished;andthiswillatthesametimeshowwhatare theproperboundariesofboththesegovernments,forwemustmarkout whereintheydifferfromoneanother,andthenfromboththesecompose astateofsuchpartsofeachofthemaswillshowfromwhencethey

weretaken. Therearethreedifferentwaysinwhichtwostatesmaybeblendedand joinedtogether;for,inthefirstplace,allthoserulesmaybe adoptedwhichthelawsofeachofthemhaveordered;asforinstance inthejudicialdepartment,forinanoligarchythericharefinedif theydonotcometothecourtasjurymen,butthepoorarenotpaid fortheirattendance;butindemocraciestheyare,whiletherichare notfinedfortheirneglect.Nowthesethings,asbeingcommonto both,arefittobeobservedinafree[1294b]statewhichiscomposed ofboth.This,then,isonewayinwhichtheymaybejoinedtogether. Inthesecondplace,amediummaybetakenbetweenthedifferent methodswhicheachstateobserves;forinstance,inademocracythe righttovoteinthepublicassemblyiseitherconfinedbynocensus atall,orlimitedbyaverysmallone;inanoligarchynoneenjoyit butthosewhosecensusishigh:therefore,asthesetwopracticesare contrarytoeachother,acensusbetweeneachmaybeestablishedin suchastate.Inthethirdplace,differentlawsofeachcommunitymay beadopted;as,forinstance,asitseemscorrespondenttothenature ofademocracy,thatthemagistratesshouldbechosenbylot,butan aristocracybyvote,andintheonestateaccordingtoacensus,but notintheother:let,then,anaristocracyandafreestatecopy somethingfromeachofthem;letthemfollowanoligarchyinchoosing theirmagistratesbyvote,butademocracyinnotadmittingofany census,andthusblendtogetherthedifferentcustomsofthetwo governments.Butthebestproofofahappymixtureofademocracyand anoligarchyisthis,whenapersonmayproperlycallthesamestatea democracyandanoligarchy.Itisevidentthatthosewhospeakofit inthismannerareinducedtoitbecauseboththesegovernmentsare therewellblendedtogether:andindeedthisiscommontoallmediums, thattheextremesofeachsideshouldbediscernedtherein,asat Lacedaemon;formanyaffirmthatitisademocracyfromthemany particularsinwhichitfollowsthatformofgovernment;asfor instance,inthefirstplace,inthebringingupoftheirchildren, fortherichandpoorarebroughtupinthesamemanner;andtheir educationissuchthatthechildrenofthepoormaypartakeofit;and thesamerulesareobservedwhentheyareyouthsandmen,thereisno distinctionbetweenarichpersonandapoorone;andintheirpublic tablesthesameprovisionisservedtoall.Therichalsowearonly suchclothesasthepoorestmanisabletopurchase.Moreover,with respecttotwomagistraciesofthehighestrank,onetheyhavearight toelectto,theothertofill;namely,thesenateandtheephori. Othersconsideritasanoligarchy,theprinciplesofwhichitfollows inmanythings,asinchoosingalltheirofficersbyvote,andnotby lot;intherebeingbutafewwhohavearighttositinjudgmenton capitalcausesandthelike.Indeed,astatewhichiswellcomposedof twoothersoughttoresemblethemboth,andneither,Suchastate oughttohaveitsmeansofpreservationinitself,andnotwithout;

andwhenIsayinitself,Idonotmeanthatitshouldowethistothe forbearanceoftheirneighbours,forthismayhappentoabad government,buttoeverymemberofthecommunity'snotbeingwilling thatthereshouldbetheleastalterationintheirconstitution.Such isthemethodinwhichafreestateoraristocracyoughttobe established. CHAPTERX Itnowremainstotreatofatyranny;notthatthereis[1295a]much tobesaidonthatsubject,butasitmakespartofourplan,sincewe enumerateditamongstourdifferentsortsofgovernments.Inthe beginningofthisworkweinquiredintothenatureofkingly government,andenteredintoaparticularexaminationofwhatwasmost properlycalledso,andwhetheritwasadvantageoustoastateornot, andwhatitshouldbe,andhowestablished;andwedividedatyranny intotwopieceswhenwewereuponthissubject,becausethereis somethinganalogousbetweenthisandakinglygovernment,fortheyare bothofthemestablishedbylaw;foramongsomeofthebarbarians theyelectamonarchwithabsolutepower,andformerlyamongthe Greeksthereweresomesuch,whomtheycalledsesumnetes.Now thesedifferfromeachother;forsomepossessonlykinglypower regulatedbylaw,andrulethosewhovoluntarilysubmittotheir government;othersruledespoticallyaccordingtotheirownwill. Thereisathirdspeciesoftyranny,mostproperlysocalled,whichis theveryoppositetokinglypower;forthisisthegovernmentofone whorulesoverhisequalsandsuperiorswithoutbeingaccountablefor hisconduct,andwhoseobjectishisownadvantage,andnotthe advantageofthosehegoverns;forwhichreasonherulesby compulsion,fornofreemenwilleverwillinglysubmittosucha government.Thesearethedifferentspeciesoftyrannies,their principles,andtheircauses. CHAPTERXI Weproceednowtoinquirewhatformofgovernmentandwhatmannerof lifeisbestforcommunitiesingeneral,notadaptingittothat superiorvirtuewhichisabovethereachofthevulgar,orthat educationwhicheveryadvantageofnatureandfortuneonlycan furnish,nortothoseimaginaryplanswhichmaybeformedatpleasure;

buttothatmodeoflifewhichthegreaterpartofmankindcanattain to,andthatgovernmentwhichmostcitiesmayestablish:forasto thosearistocracieswhichwehavenowmentioned,theyareeithertoo perfectforastatetosupport,oronesonearlyaliketothatstate wenowgoingtoinquireinto,thatweshalltreatofthembothasone. Theopinionswhichweformuponthesesubjectsmustdependuponone commonprinciple:forifwhatIhavesaidinmytreatiseonMorals istrue,ahappylifemustarisefromanuninterruptedcourseof virtue;andifvirtueconsistsinacertainmedium,themiddlelife mustcertainlybethehappiest;whichmediumisattainable[1295b]by everyone.Theboundariesofvirtueandviceinthestatemustalso necessarilybethesameasinaprivateperson;fortheformof governmentisthelifeofthecity.Ineverycitythepeopleare dividedintothreesorts;theveryrich,theverypoor,andthosewho arebetweenthem.Ifthisisuniversallyadmitted,thatthemeanis best,itisevidentthateveninpointoffortunemediocrityistobe preferred;forthatstateismostsubmissivetoreason;forthosewho areveryhandsome,orverystrong,orverynoble,orveryrich;or,on thecontrary;thosewhoareverypoor,orveryweak,orverymean, withdifficultyobeyit;fortheonearecapriciousandgreatly flagitious,theotherrascallyandmean,thecrimesofeacharising fromtheirdifferentexcesses:norwilltheygothroughthedifferent officesofthestate;whichisdetrimentaltoit:besides,thosewho excelinstrength,inriches,orfriends,orthelike,neitherknow hownorarewillingtosubmittocommand:andthisbeginsathomewhen theyareboys;fortheretheyarebroughtuptoodelicatelytobe accustomedtoobeytheirpreceptors:asfortheverypoor,their generalandexcessivewantofwhattherichenjoyreducesthemtoa statetoomean:sothattheoneknownothowtocommand,buttobe commandedasslaves,theothersknownothowtosubmittoanycommand, nortocommandthemselvesbutwithdespoticpower. Acitycomposedofsuchmenmustthereforeconsistofslavesand masters,notfreemen;whereonepartymusthate,andtheother despise,wheretherecouldbenopossibilityoffriendshipor politicalcommunity:forcommunitysupposesaffection;forwedonot evenontheroadassociatewithourenemies.Itisalsothegeniusof acitytobecomposedasmuchaspossibleofequals;whichwillbe mostsowhentheinhabitantsareinthemiddlestate:fromwhenceit follows,thatthatcitymustbebestframedwhichiscomposedofthose whomwesayarenaturallyitspropermembers.Itismenofthis stationalsowhowillbebestassuredofsafetyandprotection;for theywillneithercovetwhatbelongstoothers,asthepoordo;nor willotherscovetwhatistheirs,asthepoordowhatbelongstothe rich;andthus,withoutplottingagainstanyone,orhavinganyone plotagainstthem,theywilllivefreefromdanger:forwhichreason Phocylideswiselywishesforthemiddlestate,asbeingmost

productiveofhappiness.Itisplain,then,thatthemostperfect politicalcommunitymustbeamongstthosewhoareinthemiddlerank, andthosestatesarebestinstitutedwhereinthesearealargerand morerespectablepart,ifpossible,thanboththeother;or,ifthat cannotbe,atleastthaneitherofthemseparate;sothatbeingthrown intothebalanceitmaypreventeitherscalefrompreponderating. Itisthereforethegreatesthappinesswhichthecitizenscanenjoyto possessamoderateandconvenientfortune;forwhensomepossesstoo much,andothersnothingat[1296a]all,thegovernmentmusteitherbe inthehandsofthemeanestrabbleorelseapureoligarchy;or,from theexcessesofboth,atyranny;forthisarisesfromaheadstrong democracyoranoligarchy,butveryseldomwhenthemembersofthe communityarenearlyonanequalitywitheachother.Wewillassigna reasonforthiswhenwecometotreatofthealterationswhich differentstatesarelikelytoundergo.Themiddlestateistherefore best,asbeingleastliabletothoseseditionsandinsurrectionswhich disturbthecommunity;andforthesamereasonextensivegovernments areleastliabletotheseinconveniences;fortherethoseinamiddle stateareverynumerous,whereasinsmallonesitiseasytopassto thetwoextremes,soashardlytohaveanyinamediumremaining,but theonehalfrich,theotherpoor:andfromthesameprincipleitis thatdemocraciesaremorefirmlyestablishedandoflongercontinuance thanoligarchies;buteveninthosewhenthereisawantofaproper numberofmenofmiddlingfortune,thepoorextendtheirpowertoo far,abusesarise,andthegovernmentissoonatanend. WeoughttoconsiderasaproofofwhatInowadvance,thatthebest lawgiversthemselveswerethoseinthemiddlerankoflife,amongst whomwasSolon,asisevidentfromhispoems,andLycurgus,forhewas notaking,andCharondas,andindeedmostothers.Whathasbeensaid willshowuswhyofsomanyfreestatessomehavechangedto democracies,otherstooligarchies:forwheneverthenumberofthose inthemiddlestatehasbeentoosmall,thosewhowerethemore numerous,whethertherichorthepoor,alwaysoverpoweredthemand assumedtothemselvestheadministrationofpublicaffairs;fromhence aroseeitherademocracyoranoligarchy.Moreover,whenin consequenceoftheirdisputesandquarrelswitheachother,eitherthe richgetthebetterofthepoor,orthepooroftherich,neitherof themwillestablishafreestate;but,astherecordoftheirvictory, onewhichinclinestotheirownprinciples,andformeithera democracyoranoligarchy. ThosewhomadeconquestsinGreece,havingallofthemaneyetothe respectiveformsofgovernmentintheirowncities,establishedeither democraciesoroligarchies,notconsideringwhatwasserviceableto thestate,butwhatwassimilartotheirown;forwhichreasona governmenthasneverbeenestablishedwherethesupremepowerhasbeen

placedamongstthoseofthemiddlingrank,orveryseldom;and, amongstafew,onemanonlyofthosewhohaveyetbeenconquerorshas beenpersuadedtogivethepreferencetothisorderof[1296b]men:it isindeedanestablishedcustomwiththeinhabitantsofmostcities nottodesireanequality,buteithertoaspiretogovern,orwhen theyareconquered,tosubmit. Thuswehaveshownwhatthebeststateis,andwhy.Itwillnotbe difficulttoperceiveofthemanystateswhichthereare,forwehave seenthattherearevariousformsbothofdemocraciesandoligarchies, towhichweshouldgivethefirstplace,towhichthesecond,andin thesamemannerthenextalso;andtoobservewhataretheparticular excellencesanddefectsofeach,afterwehavefirstdescribedthe bestpossible;forthatmustbethebestwhichisnearesttothis, thatworstwhichismostdistantfromthemedium,withoutanyonehas aparticularplanofhisownwhichhejudgesby.Imeanbythis,that itmayhappen,thatalthoughoneformofgovernmentmaybebetterthan another,yetthereisnoreasontopreventanotherfrombeing preferablethereuntoinparticularcircumstancesandforparticular purposes. CHAPTERXII Afterwhathasbeensaid,itfollowsthatweshouldnowshowwhat particularformofgovernmentismostsuitableforparticularpersons; firstlayingthisdownasageneralmaxim,thatthatpartywhich desirestosupporttheactualadministrationofthestateoughtalways tobesuperiortothatwhichwouldalterit.Everycityismadeupof qualityandquantity:byqualityImeanliberty,riches,education, andfamily,andbyquantityitsrelativepopulousness:nowitmay happenthatqualitymayexistinoneofthosepartsofwhichthecity iscomposed,andquantityinanother;thusthenumberoftheignoble maybegreaterthanthenumberofthoseoffamily,thenumberofthe poorthanthatoftherich;butnotsothatthequantityoftheone shalloverbalancethequalityoftheother;thosemustbeproperly adjustedtoeachother;forwherethenumberofthepoorexceedsthe proportionwehavementioned,thereademocracywillriseup,andif thehusbandryshouldhavemorepowerthanothers,itwillbea democracyofhusbandmen;andthedemocracywillbeaparticular speciesaccordingtothatclassofmenwhichmayhappentobemost numerous:thus,shouldthesebethehusbandmen,itwillbeofthese, andthebest;ifofmechanicsandthosewhohirethemselvesout,the worstpossible:inthesamemanneritmaybeofanyothersetbetween thesetwo.Butwhentherichandthenobleprevailmorebytheir

qualitythantheyaredeficientinquantity,thereanoligarchy ensues;andthisoligarchymaybeofdifferentspecies,accordingto thenatureoftheprevailingparty.Everylegislatorinframinghis constitutionoughttohaveaparticularregardtothoseinthemiddle rankoflife;andifheintendsanoligarchy,theseshouldbethe objectofhislaws;ifademocracy,tothesetheyshouldbeentrusted; andwhenevertheirnumberexceedsthatofthetwoothers,oratleast oneofthem,theygive[1297a]stabilitytotheconstitution;for thereisnofearthattherichandthepoorshouldagreetoconspire togetheragainstthem,forneitherofthesewillchoosetoservethe other.Ifanyonewouldchoosetofixtheadministrationonthewidest basis,hewillfindnonepreferabletothis;fortorulebyturnsis whattherichandthepoorwillnotsubmitto,onaccountoftheir hatredtoeachother.Itis,moreover,allowedthatanarbitratoris themostproperpersonforbothpartiestotrustto;nowthis arbitratoristhemiddlerank. Thosewhowouldestablisharistocraticalgovernmentsaremistakennot onlyingivingtoomuchpowertotherich,butalsoindeceivingthe commonpeople;foratlast,insteadofanimaginarygood,theymust feelarealevil,fortheencroachmentsofthericharemore destructivetothestatethanthoseofthepoor. CHAPTERXIII Therearefiveparticularsinwhich,underfairpretences,therich craftilyendeavourtounderminetherightsofthepeople,theseare theirpublicassemblies,theirofficesofstate,theircourtsof justice,theirmilitarypower,andtheirgymnasticexercises.With respecttotheirpublicassemblies,inhavingthemopentoall,butin finingtherichonly,orothersverylittle,fornotattending;with respecttooffices,inpermittingthepoortoswearoff,butnot grantingthisindulgencetothosewhoarewithinthecensus;with respecttotheircourtsofjustice,infiningtherichfor nonattendance,butthepoornotatall,orthoseagreatdeal,and theseverylittle,aswasdonebythelawsofCharondas.Insome placeseverycitizenwhowasenrolledhadarighttoattendthepublic assembliesandtotrycauses;whichiftheydidnotdo,averyheavy finewaslaiduponthem;thatthroughfearofthefinetheymight avoidbeingenrolled,astheywerethenobligedtodoneithertheone northeother.Thesamespiritoflegislationprevailedwithrespect totheirbearingarmsandtheirgymnasticexercises;forthepoorare excusediftheyhavenoarms,butthericharefined;thesamemethod takesplaceiftheydonotattendtheirgymnasticexercises,thereis

nopenaltyonone,butthereisontheother:theconsequenceofwhich is,thatthefearofthispenaltyinducestherichtokeeptheoneand attendtheother,whilethepoordoneither.Thesearethedeceitful contrivancesofoligarchicallegislators. Thecontraryprevailsinademocracy;fortheretheymakethepoora properallowanceforattendingtheassembliesandthecourts,butgive therichnothingfordoingit:whenceitisevident,thatifanyone wouldproperlyblendthesecustomstogether,theymustextendboththe payandthefinetoeverymemberofthecommunity,andtheneveryone wouldshareinit,whereaspartonlynowdo.Thecitizensofafree stateoughtto[1297b]consistofthoseonlywhobeararms:with respecttotheircensusitisnoteasytodetermineexactlywhatit oughttobe,buttherulethatshoulddirectuponthissubjectshould betomakeitasextensiveaspossible,sothatthosewhoareenrolled initmakeupagreaterpartofthepeoplethanthosewhoarenot;for thosewhoarepoor,althoughtheypartakenotoftheofficesofthe state,arewillingtolivequiet,providedthatnoonedisturbsthem intheirproperty:butthisisnotaneasymatter;foritmaynot alwayshappen,thatthosewhoareattheheadofpublicaffairsareof ahumanebehaviour.Intimeofwarthepoorareaccustomedtoshowno alacritywithouttheyhaveprovisionsfoundthem;whentheyhave,then indeedtheyarewillingtofight. Insomegovernmentsthepowerisvestednotonlyinthosewhobear arms,butalsointhosewhohavebornethem.AmongtheMaliensesthe statewascomposedoftheselatteronly,foralltheofficerswere soldierswhohadservedtheirtime.AndthefirststatesinGreece whichsucceededthosewherekinglypowerwasestablished,were governedbythemilitary.Firstofallthehorse,foratthattimethe strengthandexcellenceofthearmydependedonthehorse,forasto theheavyarmedfoottheywereuselesswithoutproperdiscipline;but theartoftacticswasnotknowntotheancients,forwhichreason theirstrengthlayintheirhorse:butwhencitiesgrewlarger,and theydependedmoreontheirfoot,greaternumberspartookofthe freedomofthecity;forwhichreasonwhatwecallrepublicswere formerlycalleddemocracies.Theancientgovernmentswereproperly oligarchiesorkingdoms;foronaccountofthefewpersonsineach state,itwouldhavebeenimpossibletohavefoundasufficientnumber ofthemiddlerank;sothesebeingbutfew,andthoseusedto subordination,theymoreeasilysubmittedtobegoverned. Wehavenowshownwhytherearemanysortsofgovernments,andothers differentfromthosewehavetreatedof:fortherearemorespeciesof democraciesthanone,andthelikeistrueofotherforms,andwhat aretheirdifferences,andwhencetheyarise;andalsoofallothers whichisthebest,atleastingeneral;andwhichisbestsuitedfor particularpeople.

 CHAPTERXIV Wewillnowproceedtomakesomegeneralreflectionsuponthe governmentsnextinorder,andalsotoconsidereachofthemin particular;beginningwiththoseprincipleswhichappertaintoeach: nowtherearethreethingsinallstateswhichacarefullegislator oughtwelltoconsider,whichareofgreatconsequencetoall,and whichproperlyattendedtothestatemustnecessarilybehappy;and accordingtothevariationofwhichtheonewilldifferfromthe other.Thefirstoftheseisthe[1298a]publicassembly;thesecond theofficersofthestate,thatis,whotheyoughttobe,andwith whatpowertheyshouldbeentrusted,andinwhatmannertheyshouldbe appointed;thethird,thejudicialdepartment. Nowitistheproperbusinessofthepublicassemblytodetermine concerningwarandpeace,makingorbreakingoffalliances,toenact laws,tosentencetodeath,banishment,orconfiscationofgoods,and tocallthemagistratestoaccountfortheirbehaviourwheninoffice. Nowthesepowersmustnecessarilybeentrustedtothecitizensin general,orallofthemtosome;eithertoonemagistrateormore;or sometoone,andsometoanother,orsometoall,butotherstosome: toentrustalltoallisinthespiritofademocracy,forthepeople aimatequality.Therearemanymethodsofdelegatingthesepowersto thecitizensatlarge,oneofwhichistoletthemexecutethemby turn,andnotaltogether,aswasdonebyTellecles,theMilesian,in hisstate.Inothersthesupremecounciliscomposedofthedifferent magistrates,andtheysucceedtotheofficesofthecommunityby properdivisionsoftribes,wards,andotherverysmallproportions, tilleveryoneinhisturngoesthroughthem:nordoesthewhole communityevermeettogether,withoutitiswhennewlawsareenacted, orsomenationalaffairisdebated,ortohearwhatthemagistrates havetoproposetothem.Anothermethodisforthepeopletomeetina collectivebody,butonlyforthepurposeofholdingthecomitia, makinglaws,determiningconcerningwarorpeace,andinquiringinto theconductoftheirmagistrates,whiletheremainingpartofthe publicbusinessisconductedbythemagistrates,whohavetheir separatedepartments,andarechosenoutofthewholecommunityeither byvoteorballot.Anothermethodisforthepeopleingeneraltomeet forthechoiceofthemagistrates,andtoexamineintotheirconduct; andalsotodeliberateconcerningwarandalliances,andtoleave otherthingstothemagistrates,whoeverhappentobechosen,whose particularemploymentsaresuchasnecessarilyrequirepersonswell skilledtherein.Afourthmethodisforeverypersontodeliberate

uponeverysubjectinpublicassembly,wherethemagistratescan determinenothingofthemselves,andhaveonlytheprivilegeofgiving theiropinionsfirst;andthisisthemethodofthemostpure democracy,whichisanalogoustotheproceedingsinadynastic oligarchyandatyrannicmonarchy. These,then,arethemethodsinwhichpublicbusinessisconductedin ademocracy.Whenthepowerisinthehandsofpartofthecommunity only,itisanoligarchyandthisalsoadmitsofdifferentcustoms; forwhenevertheofficersofthestatearechosenoutofthosewho haveamoderatefortune,andthesefromthatcircumstancearemany, andwhentheydepartnotfromthatlinewhichthelawhaslaiddown, butcarefullyfollowit,andwhenallwithinthecensusareeligible, certainlyitisthenanoligarchy,butfoundedontrueprinciplesof government[1298b]fromitsmoderation.Whenthepeopleingeneraldo notpartakeofthedeliberativepower,butcertainpersonschosenfor thatpurpose,whogovernaccordingtolaw;thisalso,likethefirst, isanoligarchy.Whenthosewhohavethedeliberativepowerelecteach other,andthesonsucceedstothefather,andwhentheycansupersede thelaws,suchagovernmentisofnecessityastrictoligarchy.When somepersonsdetermineononething,andothersonanother,aswarand peace,andwhenallinquireintotheconductoftheirmagistrates,and otherthingsarelefttodifferentofficers,electedeitherbyvoteor lot,thenthegovernmentisanaristocracyorafreestate.Whensome arechosenbyvoteandothersbylot,andtheseeitherfromthepeople ingeneral,orfromacertainnumberelectedforthatpurpose,orif boththevotesandthelotsareopentoall,suchastateispartlyan aristocracy,partlyafreegovernmentitself.Thesearethedifferent methodsinwhichthedeliberativepowerisvestedindifferentstates, allofwhomfollowsomeregulationherelaiddown.Itisadvantageous toademocracy,inthepresentsenseoftheword,bywhichImeana statewhereinthepeopleatlargehaveasupremepower,evenoverthe laws,toholdfrequentpublicassemblies;anditwillbebestinthis particulartoimitatetheexampleofoligarchiesintheircourtsof justice;fortheyfinethosewhoareappointedtotrycausesifthey donotattend,soshouldtheyrewardthepoorforcomingtothepublic assemblies:andtheircounselswillbebestwhenalladvisewitheach other,thecitizenswiththenobles,thenobleswiththecitizens.It isalsoadvisablewhenthecouncilistobecomposedofpartofthe citizens,toelect,eitherbyvoteorlot,anequalnumberofboth ranks.Itisalsoproper,ifthecommonpeopleinthestatearevery numerous,eithernottopayeveryoneforhisattendance,butsucha numberonlyaswillmakethemequaltothenobles,ortorejectmany ofthembylot. Inanoligarchytheyshouldeithercallupsomeofthecommonpeople tothecouncil,orelseestablishacourt,asisdoneinsomeother states,whomtheycallpreadvisersorguardiansofthelaws,whose

businessshouldbetoproposefirstwhattheyshouldafterwardsenact. Bythismeansthepeoplewouldhaveaplaceintheadministrationof publicaffairs,withouthavingitintheirpowertooccasionany disorderinthegovernment.Moreover,thepeoplemaybeallowedto haveavoteinwhateverbillisproposed,butmaynotthemselves proposeanythingcontrarythereto;ortheymaygivetheiradvice, whilethepowerofdeterminingmaybewiththemagistratesonly.Itis alsonecessarytofollowacontrarypracticetowhatisestablishedin democracies,forthepeopleshouldbeallowedthepowerofpardoning, butnotofcondemning,forthecauseshouldbereferredbackagainto themagistrates:whereasthecontrarytakesplaceinrepublics;for thepowerofpardoningiswiththefew,butnotofcondemning,which isalwaysreferred[1299a]tothepeopleatlarge.Andthuswe determineconcerningthedeliberativepowerinanystate,andinwhose handsitshallbe. CHAPTERXV Wenowproceedtoconsiderthechoiceofmagistrates;forthisbranch ofpublicbusinesscontainsmanydifferentParts,ashowmanythere shallbe,whatshallbetheirparticularoffice,andwithrespectto timehowlongeachofthemshallcontinueinplace;forsomemakeit sixmonths,othersshorter,othersforayear,othersforamuch longertime;orwhethertheyshouldbeperpetualorforalongtime, orneither;forthesamepersonmayfillthesameofficeseveral times,orhemaynotbeallowedtoenjoyiteventwice,butonlyonce: andalsowithrespecttotheappointmentofmagistrates,whoaretobe eligible,whoistochoosethem,andinwhatmanner;forinallthese particularsweoughtproperlytodistinguishthedifferentwayswhich maybefollowed;andthentoshowwhichoftheseisbestsuitedto suchandsuchgovernments. Nowitisnoteasytodeterminetowhomweoughtproperlytogivethe nameofmagistrate,foragovernmentrequiresmanypersonsinoffice; buteveryoneofthosewhoiseitherchosenbyvoteorlotisnotto bereckonedamagistrate.Thepriests,forinstance,inthefirst place;forthesearetobeconsideredasverydifferentfromcivil magistrates:tothesewemayaddthechoregiandheralds;nay,even ambassadorsareelected:therearesomecivilemploymentswhichbelong tothecitizens;andtheseareeitherwhentheyareallengagedinone thing,aswhenassoldierstheyobeytheirgeneral,orwhenpartof themonlyare,asingoverningthewomenoreducatingtheyouth;and alsosomeeconomic,fortheyoftenelectcornmeters:othersare servile,andinwhich,iftheyarerich,theyemployslaves.But

indeedtheyaremostproperlycalledmagistrates,whoaremembersof thedeliberativecouncil,ordecidecauses,orareinsomecommand, thelastmoreespecially,fortocommandispeculiartomagistrates. Buttospeaktruth,thisquestionisofnogreatconsequence,noris ittheprovinceofthejudgestodecidebetweenthosewhodispute aboutwords;itmayindeedbeanobjectofspeculativeinquiry;butto inquirewhatofficersarenecessaryinastate,andhowmany,and what,thoughnotmostnecessary,mayyetbeadvantageousina wellestablishedgovernment,isamuchmoreusefulemployment,and thiswithrespecttoallstatesingeneral,aswellastosmall cities. Inextensivegovernmentsitispropertoallotoneemploymenttoone person,astherearemanytoservethepublicinsonumerousa society,wheresomemaybepassedoverforalongtime,andothers neverbeinofficebutonce;andindeedeverythingisbetterdone whichhasthewholeattentionofoneperson,thanwhenthat[1299b] attentionisdividedamongstmany;butinsmallstatesitisnecessary thatafewofthecitizensshouldexecutemanyemployments;fortheir numbersaresosmallitwillnotbeconvenienttohavemanyofthemin officeatthesametime;forwhereshallwefindotherstosucceed theminturn?Smallstateswillsometimeswantthesamemagistrates andthesamelawsaslargeones;buttheonewillnotwanttoemploy themsooftenastheother;sothatdifferentchargesmaybeintrusted tothesamepersonwithoutanyinconvenience,fortheywillnot interferewitheachother,andforwantofsufficientmembersinthe communityitwillbenecessary.Ifwecouldtellhowmanymagistrates arenecessaryineverycity,andhowmany,thoughnotnecessary,itis yetpropertohave,wecouldthenthebetterknowhowmanydifferent officesonemightassigntoonemagistrate.Itisalsonecessaryto knowwhattribunalsindifferentplacesshouldhavedifferentthings undertheirjurisdiction,andalsowhatthingsshouldalwayscome underthecognisanceofthesamemagistrate;as,forinstance,decency ofmanners,shalltheclerkofthemarkettakecognisanceofthatif thecausearisesinthemarket,andanothermagistrateinanother place,orthesamemagistrateeverywhere:orshalltherebea distinctionmadeofthefact,ortheparties?as,forinstance,in decencyofmanners,shallitbeonecausewhenitrelatestoaman, anotherwhenitrelatestoawoman? Indifferentstatesshallthemagistratesbedifferentorthesame?I mean,whetherinademocracy,anoligarchy,anaristocracy,anda monarchy,thesamepersonsshallhavethesamepower?orshallitvary accordingtothedifferentformationofthegovernment?asinan aristocracytheofficesofthestateareallottedtothosewhoare welleducated;inanoligarchytothosewhoarerich;inademocracy tothefreemen?Orshallthemagistratesdifferasthecommunities differ?Foritmayhappenthattheverysamemaybesometimesproper,

sometimesotherwise:inthisstateitmaybenecessarythatthe magistratehavegreatpowers,inthatbutsmall.Therearealso certainmagistratespeculiartocertainstatesasthepreadvisers arenotproperinademocracy,butasenateis;foronesuchorderis necessary,whosebusinessshallbetoconsiderbeforehandandprepare thosebillswhichshallbebroughtbeforethepeoplethattheymay haveleisuretoattendtotheirownaffairs;andwhenthesearefewin numberthestateinclinestoanoligarchy.Thepreadvisersindeed mustalwaysbefewfortheyarepeculiartoanoligarchy:andwhere thereareboththeseofficesinthesamestate,thepreadviser'sis superiortothesenator's,theonehavingonlyademocraticalpower, theotheranoligarchical:andindeedthe[1300a]powerofthesenate islostinthosedemocracies,inwhichthepeople,meetinginone publicassembly,takeallthebusinessintotheirownhands;andthis islikelytohappeneitherwhenthecommunityingeneralareineasy circumstances,orwhentheyarepaidfortheirattendance;forthey arethenatleisureoftentomeettogetheranddetermineeverything forthemselves.Amagistratewhosebusinessistocontrolthemanners oftheboys,orwomen,orwhotakesanydepartmentsimilartothis,is tobefoundinanaristocracy,notinademocracy;forwhocanforbid thewivesofthepoorfromappearinginpublic?neitherissuchaone tobemetwithinanoligarchy;forthewomentherearetoodelicate tobearcontrol.Andthusmuchforthissubject.Letusendeavourto treatatlargeoftheestablishmentofmagistrates,beginningfrom firstprinciples.Now,theydifferfromeachotherinthreeways,from which,blendedtogether,allthevarietieswhichcanbeimagined arise.Thefirstofthesedifferencesisinthosewhoappointthe magistrates,thesecondconsistsinthosewhoareappointed,thethird inthemodeofappointment;andeachofthesethreedifferinthree manners;foreitherallthecitizensmayappointcollectively,orsome outoftheirwholebody,orsomeoutofaparticularorderinit, accordingtofortune,family,orvirtue,orsomeotherrule(asat Megara,wheretherightofelectionwasamongstthosewhohadreturned togethertotheircountry,andhadreinstatedthemselvesbyforceof arms)andthiseitherbyvoteorlot.Again,theseseveralmodesmay bedifferentlyformedtogether,assomemagistratesmaybechosenby partofthecommunity,othersbythewhole;someoutofpart,others outofthewhole;somebyvote,othersbylot:andeachofthese differentmodesadmitofafourfoldsubdivision;foreitherallmay electallbyvoteorbylot;andwhenallelect,theymayeither proceedwithoutanydistinction,ortheymayelectbyacertain divisionoftribes,wards,orcompanies,tilltheyhavegonethrough thewholecommunity:andsomemagistratesmaybeelectedoneway,and othersanother.Again,ifsomemagistratesareelectedeitherbyvote orlotofallthecitizens,orbythevoteofsomeandthelotof some,orsomeonewayandsomeanother;thatistosay,somebythe voteofall,othersbythelotofall,therewillthenbetwelve differentmethodsofelectingthemagistrates,withoutblendingthe

twotogether.Ofthesetherearetwoadaptedtoademocracy;namely, tohaveallthemagistrateschosenoutofallthepeople,eitherby voteorlot,orboth;thatistosay,someofthembylot,someby vote.Inafreestatethewholecommunityshouldnotelectatthesame time,butsomeoutofthewhole,oroutofsomeparticularrank;and thiseitherbylot,orvote,orboth:andtheyshouldelecteitherout ofthewholecommunity,oroutofsomeparticularpersonsinit,and thisbothbylotandvote.Inanoligarchyitispropertochoosesome magistratesoutofthewholebodyofthecitizens,somebyvote,some bylot,othersbyboth:bylotismostcorrespondenttothatformof government.Inafreearistocracy,somemagistrates[1300b]shouldbe chosenoutofthecommunityingeneral,othersoutofaparticular rank,orthesebychoice,thosebylot.Inapureoligarchy,the magistratesshouldbechosenoutofcertainranks,andbycertain persons,andsomeofthosebylot,othersbybothmethods;butto choosethemoutofthewholecommunityisnotcorrespondenttothe natureofthisgovernment.Itisproperinanaristocracyforthe wholecommunitytoelecttheirmagistratesoutofparticularpersons, andthisbyvote.Thesethenareallthedifferentwaysofelectingof magistrates;andtheyhavebeenallottedaccordingtothenatureof thedifferentcommunities;butwhatmodeofproceedingisproperfor differentcommunities,orhowtheofficesoughttobeestablished,or withwhatpowersshallbeparticularlyexplained.Imeanbythepowers ofamagistrate,whatshouldbehisparticularprovince,asthe managementofthefinancesorthelawsofthestate;fordifferent magistrateshavedifferentpowers,asthatofthegeneralofthearmy differsfromtheclerkofthemarket. CHAPTERXVI Ofthethreepartsofwhichagovernmentisformed,wenowcometo considerthejudicial;andthisalsoweshalldivideinthesame manneraswedidthemagisterial,intothreeparts.Ofwhomthejudges shallconsist,andforwhatcauses,andhow.WhenIsayofwhom,I meanwhethertheyshallbethewholepeople,orsomeparticulars;by forwhatcausesImean,howmanydifferentcourtsshallbeappointed; byhow,whethertheyshallbeelectedbyvoteorlot.Letusfirst determinehowmanydifferentcourtsthereoughttobe.Nowtheseare eight.Thefirstoftheseisthecourtofinspectionoverthe behaviourofthemagistrateswhentheyhavequittedtheiroffice;the secondistopunishthosewhohaveinjuredthepublic;thethirdisto takecognisanceofthosecausesinwhichthestateisaparty;the fourthistodecidebetweenmagistratesandprivatepersons,who appealfromafinelaiduponthem;thefifthistodeterminedisputes

whichmayariseconcerningcontractsofgreatvalue;thesixthisto judgebetweenforeigners,andofmurders,ofwhichtherearedifferent species;andthesemayallbetriedbythesamejudgesorbydifferent ones;fortherearemurdersofmaliceprepenseandofchancemedley; thereisalsojustifiablehomicide,wherethefactisadmitted,and thelegalityofitdisputed. ThereisalsoanothercourtcalledatAthenstheCourtofPhreattae, whichdeterminespointsrelatingtoamurdercommittedbyonewhohas runaway,todecidewhetherheshallreturn;thoughsuchanaffair happensbutseldom,andinverylargecities;theseventh,to determinecauseswhereinstrangersareconcerned,andthiswhether theyarebetweenstrangerandstrangerorbetweenastrangeranda citizen.Theeighthandlastisforsmallactions,fromonetofive drachma's,oralittlemore;fortheseoughtalsotobelegally determined,butnottobebroughtbeforethewholebodyofthejudges. Butwithoutenteringintoanyparticularsconcerningactionsfor murder,andthosewhereinstrangersaretheparties,letus particularlytreatofthosecourtswhichhavethejurisdictionof thosematterswhichmoreparticularlyrelatetotheaffairsofthe communityandwhichifnotwellconductedoccasionseditionsand commotionsinthestate.Now,ofnecessity,eitherallpersonsmust havearighttojudgeofallthesedifferentcauses,appointedfor thatpurpose,eitherbyvoteorlot,orallofall,someofthemby vote,andothersbylot,orinsomecausesbyvote,inothersbylot. Thustherewillbefoursortsofjudges.There[1301a]willbejust thesamenumberalsoiftheyarechosenoutofpartofthepeople only;foreitherallthejudgesmustbechosenoutofthatparteither byvoteorlot,orsomebylotandsomebyvote,orthejudgesin particularcausesmustbechosensomebyvote,othersbylot;bywhich meanstherewillbethesamenumberofthemalsoaswasmentioned. Besides,differentjudgesmaybejoinedtogether;Imeanthosewhoare chosenoutofthewholepeopleorpartofthemorboth;sothatall threemaysittogetherinthesamecourt,andthiseitherbyvote, lot,orboth.Andthusmuchforthedifferentsortsofjudges.Of theseappointmentsthatwhichadmitsallthecommunitytobejudgesin allcausesismostsuitabletoademocracy;thesecond,whichappoints thatcertainpersonsshalljudgeallcauses,toanoligarchy;the third,whichappointsthewholecommunitytobejudgesinsomecauses, butparticularpersonsinothers,toanaristocracyorfreestate. BOOKV

 CHAPTERI Wehavenowgonethroughthoseparticularsweproposedtospeakof;it remainsthatwenextconsiderfromwhatcausesandhowalterationsin governmentarise,andofwhatnaturetheyare,andtowhatthe destructionofeachstateisowing;andalsotowhatformanyformof polityismostlikelytoshiftinto,andwhatarethemeanstobeused forthegeneralpreservationofgovernments,aswellaswhatare applicabletoanyparticularstate;andalsooftheremedieswhichare tobeappliedeithertoallingeneral,ortoanyoneconsidered separately,whentheyareinastateofcorruption:andhereweought firsttolaydownthisprinciple,thattherearemanygovernments,all ofwhichapproveofwhatisjustandwhatisanalogicallyequal;and yethavefailedfromattainingthereunto,aswehavealready mentioned;thusdemocracieshavearisenfromsupposingthatthosewho areequalinonethingaresoineveryothercircumstance;as,because theyareequalinliberty,theyareequalineverythingelse;and oligarchies,fromsupposingthatthosewhoareunequalinonething areunequalinall;thatwhenmenaresoinpointoffortune,that inequalityextendstoeverythingelse.Henceitfollows,thatthose whoinsomerespectsareequalwithothersthinkitrighttoendeavour topartakeofanequalitywiththemineverything;andthosewhoare superiortoothersendeavourtogetstillmore;anditisthismore whichistheinequality:thusmoststates,thoughtheyhavesome notionofwhatisjust,yetarealmosttotallywrong;and,uponthis account,wheneitherpartyhasnotthatshareintheadministration whichanswerstohisexpectations,hebecomesseditious:butthosewho ofallothershavethegreatestrighttobesoarethelastthatare; namely,thosewhoexcelinvirtue;fortheyalonecanbecalled generallysuperior.Thereare,too,somepersonsofdistinguished familieswho,becausetheyareso,disdaintobeonanequalitywith others,forthoseesteemthemselvesnoblewhoboastoftheir ancestors'meritandfortune:these,tospeaktruth,aretheorigin andfountainfromwhenceseditionsarise.Thealterationswhichmen mayproposetomakeingovernmentsaretwo;foreithertheymaychange thestatealreadyestablishedintosomeother,aswhentheyproposeto erectanoligarchywherethereisademocracy;orademocracy,orfree state,wherethereisanoligarchy,oranaristocracyfromthese,or thosefromthat;orelse,whentheyhavenoobjectiontothe establishedgovernment,whichtheylikeverywell,butchoosetohave thesolemanagementinitthemselves;eitherinthehandsofafewor oneonly.Theywillalsoraisecommotionsconcerningthedegreein whichtheywouldhavetheestablishedpower;asif,forinstance,the governmentisanoligarchy,tohaveitmorepurelyso,andinthesame mannerifitisademocracy,orelsetohaveitlessso;and,inlike manner,whatevermaybethenatureofthegovernment,eithertoextend

orcontractitspowers;orelsetomakesomealterationsinsomeparts ofit;astoestablishorabolishaparticularmagistracy,assome personssayLysanderendeavouredtoabolishthekinglypowerin Sparta;andPausaniasthatoftheephori.ThusinEpidamnustherewas analterationinonepartoftheconstitution,forinsteadofthe philarchitheyestablishedasenate.Itisalsonecessaryforallthe magistratesatAthens;toattendinthecourtoftheHeliseawhenany newmagistrateiscreated:thepowerofthearchonalsointhatstate partakesofthenatureofanoligarchy:inequalityisalwaysthe occasionofsedition,butnotwhenthosewhoareunequalaretreated inadifferentmannercorrespondenttothatinequality.Thuskingly powerisunequalwhenexercisedoverequals.Uponthewhole,thosewho aimafteranequalityarethecauseofseditions.Equalityistwofold, eitherinnumberorvalue.Equalityinnumberiswhentwothings containthesamepartsorthesamequantity;equalityinvalueisby proportionastwoexceedsone,andthreetwobythesamenumberthus byproportionfourexceedstwo,andtwooneinthesamedegree,for twoisthesamepartoffourthatoneisoftwo;thatistosay,half. Now,allagreeinwhatisabsolutelyandsimplyjust;but,aswehave alreadysaidtheydisputeconcerningproportionatevalue;forsome persons,iftheyareequalinonerespect,thinkthemselvesequalin all;others,iftheyaresuperiorinonething,thinktheymayclaim thesuperiorityinall;fromwhencechieflyarisetwosortsof governments,ademocracyandanoligarchy;fornobilityandvirtueare tobefoundonly[1302a]amongstafew;thecontraryamongstthemany; therebeinginnoplaceahundredofthefirsttobemetwith,but enoughofthelasteverywhere.Buttoestablishagovernmententirely uponeitheroftheseequalitiesiswrong,andthistheexampleof thosesoestablishedmakesevident,fornoneofthemhavebeenstable; andforthisreason,thatitisimpossiblethatwhateveriswrongat thefirstandinitsprinciplesshouldnotatlastmeetwithabad end:forwhichreasoninsomethingsanequalityofnumbersoughtto takeplace,inothersanequalityinvalue.However,ademocracyis saferandlessliabletoseditionthananoligarchy;forinthis latteritmayarisefromtwocauses,foreitherthefewinpowermay conspireagainsteachotheroragainstthepeople;butinademocracy onlyone;namely,againstthefewwhoaimatexclusivepower;but thereisnoinstanceworthspeakingof,ofaseditionofthepeople againstthemselves.Moreover,agovernmentcomposedofmenofmoderate fortunescomesmuchnearertoademocracythananoligarchy,andis thesafestofallsuchstates. CHAPTERII

Sinceweareinquiringintothecausesofseditionsandrevolutionsin governments,wemustbeginentirelywiththefirstprinciplesfrom whencetheyarise.Nowthese,sotospeak,arenearlythreeinnumber; whichwemustfirstdistinguishingeneralfromeachother,and endeavourtoshowinwhatsituationpeoplearewhobeginasedition; andforwhatcauses;andthirdly,whatarethebeginningsofpolitical troublesandmutualquarrelswitheachother.Nowthatcausewhichof allothersmostuniversallyinclinesmentodesiretobringabouta changeingovernmentisthatwhichIhavealreadymentioned;forthose whoaimatequalitywillbeeverreadyforsedition,iftheyseethose whomtheyesteemtheirequalspossessmorethantheydo,aswellas thosealsowhoarenotcontentwithequalitybutaimatsuperiority, iftheythinkthatwhiletheydeservemorethan,theyhaveonlyequal with,orlessthan,theirinferiors.Now,whattheyaimatmaybe eitherjustorunjust;just,whenthosewhoareinferiorare seditious,thattheymaybeequal;unjust,whenthosewhoareequal areso,thattheymaybesuperior.These,then,arethesituationsin whichmenwillbeseditious:thecausesforwhichtheywillbesoare profitandhonour;andtheircontrary:for,toavoiddishonourorloss offortunebymulcts,eitherontheirownaccountortheirfriends, theywillraiseacommotioninthestate.Theoriginalcauseswhich disposementothethingswhichIhavementionedare,takeninone manner,seveninnumber,inanothertheyaremore;twoofwhichare thesamewiththosethathavebeenalreadymentioned:butinfluencing inadifferentmanner;forprofitandhonoursharpenmenagainsteach other;nottogetthepossessionofthemforthemselves(whichwas whatIjustnowsupposed),butwhentheyseeothers,somejustly, others[1302b]unjustly,engrossingthem.Theothercausesare haughtiness,fear,eminence,contempt,disproportionateincreasein somepartofthestate.Therearealsootherthingswhichina differentmannerwilloccasionrevolutionsingovernments;aselection intrigues,neglect,wantofnumbers,atoogreatdissimilarityof circumstances. CHAPTERIII Whatinfluenceilltreatmentandprofithaveforthispurpose,andhow theymaybethecausesofsedition,isalmostselfevident;forwhen themagistratesarehaughtyandendeavourtomakegreaterprofitsthan theirofficegivesthem,theynotonlyoccasionseditionsamongsteach other,butagainstthestatealsowhogavethemtheirpower;andthis theiravaricehastwoobjects,eitherprivatepropertyortheproperty ofthestate.Whatinfluencehonourshave,andhowtheymayoccasion sedition,isevidentenough;forthosewhoarethemselvesunhonoured

whiletheyseeothershonoured,willbereadyforanydisturbance:and thesethingsaredoneunjustlywhenanyoneiseitherhonouredor discardedcontrarytotheirdeserts,justlywhentheyareaccordingto them.Excessivehonoursarealsoacauseofseditionwhenoneperson ormorearegreaterthanthestateandthepowerofthegovernmentcan permit;forthenamonarchyoradynastyisusuallyestablished:on whichaccounttheostracismwasintroducedinsomeplaces,asatArgos andAthens:thoughitisbettertoguardagainstsuchexcessesinthe foundingofastate,thanwhentheyhavebeenpermittedtotakeplace, tocorrectthemafterward.Thosewhohavebeenguiltyofcrimeswill bethecauseofsedition,throughfearofpunishment;aswillthose alsowhoexpectaninjury,thattheymaypreventit;aswasthecase atRhodes,whenthenoblesconspiredagainstthepeopleonaccountof thedecreestheyexpectedwouldpassagainstthem.Contemptalsoisa causeofseditionandconspiracies;asinoligarchies,wherethereare manywhohavenoshareintheadministration.Therichalsoevenin democracies,despisingthedisorderandanarchywhichwillarise,hope tobetterthemselvesbythesamemeanswhichhappenedatThebesafter thebattleofOenophyta,where,inconsequenceofbadadministration, thedemocracywasdestroyed;asitwasatMegara,wherethepowerof thepeoplewaslostthroughanarchyanddisorder;thesamething happenedatSyracusebeforethetyrannyofGelon;andatRhodesthere wasthesameseditionbeforethepopulargovernmentwasoverthrown. Revolutionsinstatewillalsoarisefromadisproportionateincrease; forasthebodyconsistsofmanyparts,itoughttoincrease proportionablytopreserveitssymmetry,whichwouldotherwisebe destroyed;asifthefootwastobefourcubitslong,andtherestof thebodybuttwopalms;itmightotherwise[1303a]bechangedintoan animalofadifferentform,ifitincreasebeyondproportionnotonly inquantity,butalsoindispositionofparts;soalsoacityconsists ofparts,someofwhichmayoftenincreasewithoutnotice,asthe numberofpoorindemocraciesandfreestates.Theywillalso sometimeshappenbyaccident,asatTarentum,alittleafterthe Medianwar,wheresomanyofthenobleswerekilledinabattlebythe lapygi,thatfromafreestatethegovernmentwasturnedintoa democracy;andatArgos,wheresomanyofthecitizenswerekilledby CleomenestheSpartan,thattheywereobligedtoadmitseveral husbandmentothefreedomofthestate:andatAthens,throughthe unfortunateeventoftheinfantrybattles,thenumberofthenobles wasreducedbythesoldiersbeingchosenfromthelistofcitizensin theLacedaemonianwars.Revolutionsalsosometimestakeplaceina democracy,thoughseldomer;forwheretherichgrownumerousor propertiesincrease,theybecomeoligarchiesordynasties.Governments alsosometimesalterwithoutseditionsbyacombinationofthemeaner people;asatHersea:forwhichpurposetheychangedthemodeof electionfromvotestolots,andthusgotthemselveschosen:andby negligence,aswhenthecitizensadmitthosewhoarenotfriendsto theconstitutionintothechiefofficesofthestate,whichhappened

atOrus,whentheoligarchyofthearchonswasputanendtoatthe electionofHeracleodorus,whochangedthatformofgovernmentintoa democraticfreestate.Bylittleandlittle,Imeanbythis,thatvery oftengreatalterationssilentlytakeplaceintheformofgovernment frompeople'soverlookingsmallmatters;asatAmbracia,wherethe censuswasoriginallysmall,butatlastbecamenothingatall,asif alittleandnothingatallwerenearlyorentirelyalike.Thatstate alsoisliabletoseditionswhichiscomposedofdifferentnations, tilltheirdifferencesareblendedtogetherandundistinguishable;for asacitycannotbecomposedofeverymultitude,soneithercanitin everygiventime;forwhichreasonallthoserepublicswhichhave hithertobeenoriginallycomposedofdifferentpeopleorafterwards admittedtheirneighbourstothefreedomoftheircity,havebeenmost liabletorevolutions;aswhentheAchaeansjoinedwiththe TraezeniansinfoundingSybaris;forsoonafter,growingmorepowerful thantheTraezenians,theyexpelledthemfromthecity;fromwhence cametheproverbofSybaritewickedness:andagain,disputesfroma likecausehappenedatThuriumbetweentheSybaritesandthosewhohad joinedwiththeminbuildingthecity;fortheyassuminguponthese, onaccountofthecountrybeingtheirown,weredrivenout.Andat Byzantiumthenewcitizens,beingdetectedinplotsagainstthestate, weredrivenoutofthecitybyforceofarms.TheAntisseansalso, havingtakeninthosewhowerebanishedfromChios,afterwardsdidthe samething;andalsotheZancleans,afterhavingtakeninthepeople ofSamos.TheAppolloniats,intheEuxineSea,havingadmittedtheir sojournerstothefreedomoftheircity,weretroubledwithseditions: andtheSyracusians,aftertheexpulsionoftheirtyrants,having enrolled[1303b]strangersandmercenariesamongsttheircitizens, quarrelledwitheachotherandcametoanopenrupture:andthepeople ofAmphipolis,havingtakeninacolonyofChalcidians,werethe greaterpartofthemdrivenoutofthecitybythem.Manypersons occasionseditionsinoligarchiesbecausetheythinkthemselves illusedinnotsharingthehonoursofthestatewiththeirequals,as Ihavealreadymentioned;butindemocraciestheprincipalpeopledo thesamebecausetheyhavenotmorethananequalsharewithothers whoarenotequaltothem.Thesituationoftheplacewillalso sometimesoccasiondisturbancesinthestatewhenthegroundisnot welladaptedforonecity;asatClazomene,wherethepeoplewholived inthatpartofthetowncalledChytrumquarrelledwiththemwholived intheisland,andtheColophonianswiththeNotians.AtAthenstoo thedispositionofthecitizensisnotthesame,forthosewholivein thePiraeusaremoreattachedtoapopulargovernmentthanthosewho liveinthecityproperlysocalled;forastheinterpositionofa rivulet,howeversmall,willoccasionthelineofthephalanxto fluctuate,soanytriflingdisagreementwillbethecauseof seditions;buttheywillnotsosoonflowfromanythingelseasfrom thedisagreementbetweenvirtueandvice,andnexttothatbetween povertyandriches,andsooninorder,onecausehavingmore

influencethananother;oneofwhichthatIlastmentioned. CHAPTERIV Butseditionsingovernmentdonotariseforlittlethings,butfrom them;fortheirimmediatecauseissomethingofmoment.Now,trifling quarrelsareattendedwiththegreatestconsequenceswhentheyarise betweenpersonsofthefirstdistinctioninthestate,aswasthecase withtheSyracusiansinaremoteperiod;forarevolutioninthe governmentwasbroughtaboutbyaquarrelbetweentwoyoungmenwho wereinoffice,uponaloveaffair;foroneofthembeingabsent,the otherseducedhismistress;heinhisturn,offendedwiththis, persuadedhisfriend'swifetocomeandlivewithhim;anduponthis thewholecitytookparteitherwiththeoneortheother,andthe governmentwasoverturned:thereforeeveryoneatthebeginningof suchdisputesoughttotakecaretoavoidtheconsequences;andto smotherupallquarrelswhichmayhappentoariseamongstthosein power,forthemischiefliesinthebeginning;forthebeginningis saidtobehalfofthebusiness,sothatwhatwasthenbutalittle faultwillbefoundafterwardstobearitsfullproportiontowhat follows.Moreover,disputesbetweenmenofnoteinvolvethewholecity intheirconsequences;inHestiaea,aftertheMedianwar:twobrothers havingadisputeabouttheirpaternalestate;hewhowasthepoorer, fromtheother'shavingconcealedpartoftheeffects,andsomemoney whichhisfatherhadfound,engagedthepopularpartyonhisside, whiletheother,whowasrich,themenoffashion.AndatDelphos, [1304a]aquarrelaboutaweddingwasthebeginningofallthe seditionsthatafterwardsaroseamongstthem;forthebridegroom, beingterrifiedbysomeunluckyomenuponwaitinguponthebride,went awaywithoutmarryingher;whichherrelationsresenting,contrived secretlytoconveysomesacredmoneyintohispocketwhilehewas sacrificing,andthenkilledhimasanimpiousperson.AtMitylene also,adispute,whicharoseconcerningarightofheritage,wasthe beginningofgreatevils,andawarwiththeAthenians,inwhich Pachestooktheircity,forTimophanes,amanoffortune,leavingtwo daughters,Doxander,whowascircumventedinprocuringthemin marriageforhistwosons,beganasedition,andexcitedtheAthenians toattackthem,beingthehostofthatstate.Therewasalsoadispute atPhocea,concerningarightofinheritance,betweenMnasis,the fatherofMnasis,andEuthucrates,thefatherofOnomarchus,which broughtonthePhoceansthesacredwar.Thegovernmenttooof Epidamnuswaschangedfromaquarrelthatarosefromanintended marriage;foracertainmanhavingcontractedhisdaughterin marriage,thefatheroftheyoungpersontowhomshewascontracted,

beingarchon,punisheshim,uponwhichaccounthe,resentingthe affront,associatedhimselfwiththosewhowereexcludedfromany shareinthegovernment,andbroughtaboutarevolution.Agovernment maybechangedeitherintoanoligarchy,democracy,orafreestate; whenthemagistrates,oranypartofthecityacquiregreatcredit,or areincreasedinpower,asthecourtofAreopagusatAthens,having procuredgreatcreditduringtheMedianwar,addedfirmnesstotheir administration;and,ontheotherhand,themaritimeforce,composed ofthecommonalty,havinggainedthevictoryatSalamis,bytheir poweratsea,gottheleadinthestate,andstrengthenedthepopular party:andatArgos,thenobles,havinggainedgreatcreditbythe battleofMantineaagainsttheLacedaemonians,endeavouredtodissolve thedemocracy.AndatSyracuse,thevictoryintheirwarwiththe Atheniansbeingowingtothecommonpeople,theychangedtheirfree stateintoademocracy:andatChalcis,thepeoplehavingtakenoff thetyrantPhocis,togetherwiththenobles,immediatelyseizedthe government:andatAmbraciaalsothepeople,havingexpelledthe tyrantPeriander,withhisparty,placedthesupremepowerin themselves.Andthisingeneraloughttobeknown,thatwhosoeverhas beentheoccasionofastatebeingpowerful,whetherprivatepersons, ormagistrates,acertaintribe,oranyparticularpartofthe citizens,orthemultitude,betheywhotheywill,willbethecause ofdisputesinthestate.Foreithersomepersons,whoenvythemthe honourstheyhaveacquired,willbegintobeseditious,orthey,on accountofthedignitytheyhaveacquired,willnotbecontentwith theirformerequality.Astateisalsoliabletocommotionswhenthose partsofitwhichseemtobeoppositetoeachotherapproachtoan [1304b]equality,astherichandthecommonpeople;sothatthepart whichisbetweenthembothiseithernothingatall,ortoolittleto benoticed;forifonepartyissomuchmorepowerfulthantheother, astobeevidentlystronger,thatotherwillnotbewillingtohazard thedanger:forwhichreasonthosewhoaresuperiorinexcellenceand virtuewillneverbethecauseofseditions;fortheywillbetoofew forthatpurposewhencomparedtothemany.Ingeneral,thebeginning andthecausesofseditionsinallstatesaresuchasIhavenow described,andrevolutionsthereinarebroughtaboutintwoways, eitherbyviolenceorfraud:ifbyviolence,eitheratfirstby compellingthemtosubmittothechangewhenitismade.Itmayalso bebroughtaboutbyfraudintwodifferentways,eitherwhenthe people,beingatfirstdeceived,willinglyconsenttoanalterationin theirgovernment,andareafterwardsobligedbyforcetoabidebyit: as,forinstance,whenthefourhundredimposeduponthepeopleby tellingthemthatthekingofPersiawouldsupplythemwithmoneyfor thewaragainsttheLacedaemonians;andaftertheyhadbeenguiltyof thisfalsity,theyendeavouredtokeeppossessionofthesupreme power;orwhentheyareatfirstpersuadedandafterwardsconsentto begoverned:andbyoneofthesemethodswhichIhavementionedare allrevolutionsingovernmentsbroughtabout.

 CHAPTERV Weoughtnowtoinquireintothoseeventswhichwillarisefromthese causesineveryspeciesofgovernment.Democracieswillbemost subjecttorevolutionsfromthedishonestyoftheirdemagogues;for partly,byinformingagainstmenofproperty,theyinducethemtojoin togetherthroughselfdefence,foracommonfearwillmakethe greatestenemiesunite;andpartlybysettingthecommonpeople againstthem:andthisiswhatanyonemaycontinuallyseepractised inmanystates.IntheislandofCos,forinstance,thedemocracywas subvertedbythewickednessofthedemagogues,forthenoblesentered intoacombinationwitheachother.AndatRhodesthedemagogues,by distributingofbribes,preventedthepeoplefrompayingthe trierarchswhatwasowingtothem,whowereobligedbythenumberof actionstheywereharassedwithtoconspiretogetheranddestroythe popularstate.ThesamethingwasbroughtaboutatHeraclea,soon afterthesettlementofthecity,bythesamepersons;forthe citizensofnote,beingilltreatedbythem,quittedthecity,but afterwardsjoiningtogethertheyreturnedandoverthrewthepopular state.JustinthesamemannerthedemocracywasdestroyedinMegara; fortherethedemagogues,toprocuremoneybyconfiscations,droveout thenobles,tillthenumberofthosewhowerebanishedwas considerable,who,[1305a]returning,gotthebetterofthepeoplein abattle,andestablishedanoligarchy.ThelikehappenedatCume, duringthetimeofthedemocracy,whichThrasymachusdestroyed;and whoeverconsiderswhathashappenedinotherstatesmayperceivethe samerevolutionstohavearisenfromthesamecauses.Thedemagogues, tocurryfavourwiththepeople,drivethenoblestoconspire together,eitherbydividingtheirestates,orobligingthemtospend themonpublicservices,orbybanishingthem,thattheymay confiscatethefortunesofthewealthy.Informertimes,whenthesame personwasbothdemagogueandgeneral,thedemocracieswerechanged intotyrannies;andindeedmostoftheancienttyranniesarosefrom thosestates:areasonforwhichthensubsisted,butnotnow;forat thattimethedemagogueswereofthesoldiery;fortheywerenotthen powerfulbytheireloquence;but,nowtheartoforatoryis cultivated,theablespeakersareatpresentthedemagogues;but,as theyareunqualifiedtoactinamilitarycapacity,theycannotimpose themselvesonthepeopleastyrants,ifweexceptinoneortwo triflinginstances.Formerly,too,tyranniesweremorecommonthan now,onaccountoftheveryextensivepowerswithwhichsome magistrateswereentrusted:astheprytanesatMiletus;fortheywere supremeinmanythingsofthelastconsequence;andalsobecauseat

thattimethecitieswerenotofthatverygreatextent,thepeoplein generallivinginthecountry,andbeingemployedinhusbandry,which gavethem,whotooktheleadinpublicaffairs,anopportunity,if theyhadaturnforwar,tomakethemselvestyrants;whichtheyall didwhentheyhadgainedtheconfidenceofthepeople;andthis confidencewastheirhatredtotherich.Thiswasthecaseof PisistratusatAthens,whenheopposedthePediaci:andofTheagenes inMegara,whoslaughteredthecattlebelongingtotherich,afterhe hadseizedthosewhokeptthembytheriverside.Dionysiusalso,for accusingDaphnseusandtherich,wasthoughtworthyofbeingraisedto atyranny,fromtheconfidencewhichthepeoplehadofhisbeinga popularmaninconsequenceoftheseenmities.Agovernmentshallalso alterfromitsancientandapproveddemocraticformintooneentirely new,ifthereisnocensustoregulatetheelectionofmagistrates; for,astheelectioniswiththepeople,thedemagogueswhoare desirousofbeinginoffice,toflatterthem,willendeavourwithall theirpowertomakethepeoplesuperioreventothelaws.Toprevent thisentirely,oratleastinagreatmeasure,themagistratesshould beelectedbythetribes,andnotbythepeopleatlarge.Theseare nearlytherevolutionstowhichdemocraciesareliable,andalsothe causesfromwhencetheyarise. CHAPTERVI Therearetwothingswhichofallothersmostevidentlyoccasiona revolutioninanoligarchy;oneis,whenthepeopleareillused,for theneveryindividualisripefor[1305b]sedition;moreparticularly ifoneoftheoligarchyshouldhappentobetheirleader;asLygdamis, atNaxus,whowasafterwardstyrantofthatisland.Seditionsalso whicharisefromdifferentcauseswilldifferfromeachother;for sometimesarevolutionisbroughtaboutbytherichwhohavenoshare intheadministration,whichisinthehandsofaveryfewindeed:and thishappenedatMassilia,Ister,Heraclea,andothercities;for thosewhohadnoshareinthegovernmentceasednottoraisedisputes tilltheywereadmittedtoit:firsttheelderbrothers,andthenthe youngeralso:forinsomeplacesthefatherandsonareneverin officeatthesametime;inotherstheelderandyoungerbrother:and wherethisisobservedtheoligarchypartakessomethingofafree state.AtIsteritwaschangedintoademocracy;inHeraclea,instead ofbeinginthehandsofafew,itconsistedofsixhundred.AtCnidus theoligarchywasdestroyedbythenoblesquarrellingwitheachother, becausethegovernmentwasinthehandsofsofew:forthere,aswe havejustmentioned,ifthefatherwasinoffice,thesoncouldnot; or,ifthereweremanybrothers,theeldestonly;forthepeople,

takingadvantageoftheirdisputes,electedoneofthenoblesfor theirgeneral,andgotthevictory:forwherethereareseditions governmentisweak.AndformerlyatErithria,duringtheoligarchyof theBasilides,althoughthestateflourishedgreatlyundertheir excellentmanagement,yetbecausethepeopleweredispleasedthatthe powershouldbeinthehandsofsofew,theychangedthegovernment. Oligarchiesalsoaresubjecttorevolutions,fromthosewhoarein officetherein,fromthequarrelsofthedemagogueswitheachother. Thedemagoguesareoftwosorts;onewhoflatterthefewwhentheyare inpower:foreventhesehavetheirdemagogues;suchwasChariclesat Athens,whohadgreatinfluenceoverthethirty;and,inthesame manner,Phrynichusoverthefourhundred.Theothersarethose demagogueswhohaveashareintheoligarchy,andflatterthepeople: suchwerethestateguardiansatLarissa,whoflatteredthepeople becausetheywereelectedbythem.Andthiswillalwayshappenin everyoligarchywherethemagistratesdonotelectthemselves,butare chosenoutofmeneitherofgreatfortuneorcertainranks,bythe soldiersorbythepeople;aswasthecustomatAbydos.Andwhenthe judicialdepartmentisnotinthehandsofthesupremepower,the demagogues,favouringthepeopleintheircauses,overturnthe government;whichhappenedatHeracleainPontus:andalsowhensome desiretocontractthepoweroftheoligarchyintofewerhands;for thosewhoendeavourtosupportanequalityareobligedtoapplytothe peopleforassistance.Anoligarchyisalsosubjecttorevolutions whenthenobilityspendtheirfortunesbyluxury;forsuchpersonsare desirousofinnovations,andeitherendeavourtobetyrantsthemselves ortosupportothersinbeingso,as[1306a]Hypparinussupported DionysiusofSyracuse.AndatAmphipolisoneCleotimuscollecteda colonyofChalcidians,andwhentheycamesetthemtoquarrelwith therich:andatAEginaacertainpersonwhobroughtanactionagainst Charesattemptedonthataccounttoalterthegovernment.Sometimes theywilltrytoraisecommotions,sometimestheywillrobthepublic, andthenquarrelwitheachother,orelsefightwiththosewho endeavourtodetectthem;whichwasthecaseatApolloniainPontus. Butifthemembersofanoligarchyagreeamongthemselvesthestateis notveryeasilydestroyedwithoutsomeexternalforce.Pharsalusisa proofofthis,where,thoughtheplaceissmall,yetthecitizenshave greatpower,fromtheprudentusetheymakeofit.Anoligarchyalso willbedestroyedwhentheycreateanotheroligarchyunderit;that is,whenthemanagementofpublicaffairsisinthehandsofafew, andnotequally,butwhenallofthemdonotpartakeofthesupreme power,ashappenedonceatElis,wherethesupremepoweringeneral wasinthehandsofaveryfewoutofwhomasenatewaschosen, consistingbutofninety'whoheldtheirplacesforlife;andtheir modeofelectionwascalculatedtopreservethepoweramongsteach other'sfamilies,likethesenatorsatLacedaemon.Anoligarchyis liabletoarevolutionbothintimeofwarandpeace;inwar,because throughadistrustinthecitizensthegovernmentisobligedtoemploy

mercenarytroops,andhetowhomtheygivethecommandofthearmy willveryoftenassumethetyranny,asTimophanesdidatCorinth;and iftheyappointmorethanonegeneral,theywillveryprobably establishadynasty:andsometimes,throughfearofthis,theyare forcedtoletthepeopleingeneralhavesomeshareinthegovernment, becausetheyareobligedtoemploythem.Inpeace,fromtheirwantof confidenceineachother,theywillentrusttheguardianshipofthe statetomercenariesandtheirgeneral,whowillbeanarbiterbetween them,andsometimesbecomemasterofboth,whichhappenedatLarissa, whenSimosandtheAleuadaehadthechiefpower.Thesamething happenedatAbydos,duringthetimeofthepoliticalclubs,ofwhich Iphiades'wasone.Commotionsalsowillhappeninanoligarchyfrom oneparty'soverbearingandinsultinganother,orfromtheir quarrellingabouttheirlawsuitsormarriages.Howtheirmarriages, forinstance,willhavethateffecthasbeenalreadyshown:andin Eretria,Diagorasdestroyedtheoligarchyoftheknightsuponthesame account.AseditionalsoaroseatHeraclea,fromacertainperson beingcondemnedbythecourt;andatThebes,inconsequenceofaman's beingguiltyofadultery;[1306b]thepunishmentindeedwhichEurytion sufferedatHeracleawasjust,yetitwasillegallyexecuted:aswas thatatThebesuponArchias;fortheirenemiesendeavouredtohave thempubliclyboundinthepillory.Manyrevolutionsalsohavebeen broughtaboutinoligarchiesbythosewhocouldnotbrookthe despotismwhichthosepersonsassumedwhowereinpower,asatCnidus andChios.Changesalsomayhappenbyaccidentinwhatwecallafree stateandinanoligarchy;wheresoeverthesenators,judges,and magistratesarechosenaccordingtoacertaincensus;foritoften happensthatthehighestcensusisfixedatfirst;sothatafewonly couldhaveashareinthegovernment,inanoligarchy,orinafree statethoseofmoderatefortunesonly;whenthecitygrowsrich, throughpeaceorsomeotherhappycause,itbecomessolittlethat everyone'sfortuneisequaltothecensus,sothatthewhole communitymaypartakeofallthehonoursofgovernment;andthis changesometimeshappensbylittleandlittle,andinsensible approaches,sometimesquicker.Thesearetherevolutionsandseditions thatariseinoligarchies,andthecausestowhichtheyareowing:and indeedbothdemocraciesandoligarchiessometimesalter,notinto governmentsofacontraryform,butintothoseofthesamegovernment; as,forinstance,fromhavingthesupremepowerinthelawtovestit intherulingparty,orthecontrariwise. CHAPTERVII Commotionsalsoariseinaristocracies,fromtherebeingsofew

personsinpower(aswehavealreadyobservedtheydoinoligarchies, forinthisparticularanaristocracyismostnearanoligarchy,for inboththesestatestheadministrationofpublicaffairsisinthe handsofafew;notthatthisarisesfromthesamecauseinboth, thoughhereintheychieflyseemalike):andthesewillnecessarilybe mostlikelytohappenwhenthegeneralityofthepeopleare highspiritedandthinkthemselvesequaltoeachotherinmerit;such werethoseatLacedasmon,calledthePartheniae(forthesewere,as wellasothers,descendantsofcitizens),whobeingdetectedina conspiracyagainstthestate,weresenttofoundTarentum.Theywill happenalsowhensomegreatmenaredisgracedbythosewhohave receivedhigherhonoursthanthemselves,towhomtheyarenoways inferiorinabilities,asLysanderbythekings:orwhenanambitious mancannotgetintopower,asCinadon,who,inthereignofAgesilaus, waschiefinaconspiracyagainsttheSpartans:andalsowhensomeare toopoorandotherstoorich,whichwillmostfrequentlyhappenin timeofwar;asatLacedaemonduringtheMessenianwar,whichis provedbyapoemofTyrtaeus,[1307a]called"Eunomia;"forsome personsbeingreducedthereby,desiredthatthelandsmightbe divided:andalsowhensomepersonofveryhighrankmightstillbe higherifhecouldrulealone,whichseemedtobePausanias's intentionatLacedaemon,whenhewastheirgeneralintheMedianwar, andAnno'satCarthage.Butfreestatesandaristocraciesaremostly destroyedfromwantofafixedadministrationofpublicaffairs;the causeofwhichevilarisesatfirstfromwantofaduemixtureofthe democraticandtheoligarchicpartsinafreestate;andinan aristocracyfromthesamecauses,andalsofromvirtuenotbeing properlyjoinedtopower;butchieflyfromthetwofirst,Imeanthe unduemixtureofthedemocraticandoligarchicparts;forthesetwo arewhatallfreestatesendeavourtoblendtogether,andmanyof thosewhichwecallaristocracies,inthisparticularthesestates differfromeachother,andonthisaccounttheoneofthemisless stablethantheother,forthatstatewhichinclinesmosttoan oligarchyiscalledanaristocracy,andthatwhichinclinesmosttoa democracyiscalledafreestate;onwhichaccountthislatterismore securethantheformer,forthewiderthefoundationthesecurerthe building,anditiseverbesttolivewhereequalityprevails.Butthe rich,ifthecommunitygivesthemrank,veryoftenendeavourtoinsult andtyranniseoverothers.Onthewhole,whicheverwayagovernment inclines,inthatitwillsettle,eachpartysupportingtheirown. Thusafreestatewillbecomeademocracy;anaristocracyan oligarchy;orthecontrary,anaristocracymaychangeintoademocracy (forthepoor,iftheythinkthemselvesinjured,directlytakepart withthecontraryside)andafreestateintoanoligarchy.Theonly firmstateisthatwhereeveryoneenjoysthatequalityhehasaright toandfullypossesseswhatishisown.AndwhatIhavebeenspeaking ofhappenedtotheThurians;forthemagistratesbeingelected accordingtoaveryhighcensus,itwasalteredtoalower,andthey

weresubdividedintomorecourts,butinconsequenceofthenobles possessingalltheland,contrarytolaw;thestatewastoomuchofan oligarchy,whichgavethemanopportunityofencroachinggreatlyon therestofthepeople;butthese,aftertheyhadbeenwellinuredto war,sofargotthebetteroftheirguardsastoexpeleveryoneout ofthecountrywhopossessedmorethanheought.Moreover,asall aristocraciesarefreeoligarchies,thenoblesthereinendeavourto haverathertoomuchpower,asatLacedaemon,wherepropertyisnow inthehandsofafew,andthenobleshavetoomuchlibertytodoas theypleaseandmakesuchalliancesastheyplease.Thusthecityof theLocrianswasruinedfromanalliancewithDionysius;whichstate wasneitherademocracynorwelltemperedaristocracy.Butan aristocracychieflyapproachestoasecretchangebyitsbeing destroyedbydegrees,aswe[1307b]havealreadysaidofall governmentsingeneral;andthishappensfromthecauseofthe alterationbeingtrifling;forwheneveranythingwhichintheleast regardsthestateistreatedwithcontempt,afterthatsomethingelse, andthisofalittlemoreconsequence,willbemoreeasilyaltered, untilthewholefabricofgovernmentisentirelysubverted,which happenedinthegovernmentofThurium;forthelawbeingthatthey shouldcontinuesoldiersforfiveyears,someyoungmenofamartial disposition,whowereingreatesteemamongsttheirofficers, despisingthosewhohadthemanagementofpublicaffairs,and imaginingtheycouldeasilyaccomplishtheirintention,first endeavouredtoabolishthislaw,withaviewofhavingitlawfulto continuethesamepersonperpetuallyinthemilitary,perceivingthat thepeoplewouldreadilyappointthem.Uponthis,themagistrateswho arecalledcounsellersfirstjoinedtogetherwithanintentionto opposeitbutwereafterwardsinducedtoagreetoit,fromabelief thatifthatlawwasnotrepealedtheywouldpermitthemanagementof allotherpublicaffairstoremainintheirhands;butafterwards, whentheyendeavouredtorestrainsomefreshalterationsthatwere making,theyfoundthattheycoulddonothing,forthewholeformof governmentwasalteredintoadynastyofthosewhofirstintroduced theinnovations.Inshort,allgovernmentsareliabletobedestroyed eitherfromwithinorfromwithout;fromwithoutwhentheyhavefor theirneighbourastatewhosepolicyiscontrarytotheirs,andindeed ifithasgreatpowerthesamethingwillhappenifitisnottheir neighbour;ofwhichboththeAtheniansandtheLacedaemoniansarea proof;fortheone,whenconquerorseverywheredestroyedthe oligarchies;theotherthedemocracies.Thesearethechiefcausesof revolutionsanddissensionsingovernments. CHAPTERVIII

 Wearenowtoconsideruponwhatthepreservationofgovernmentsin generalandofeachstateinparticulardepends;and,inthefirst place,itisevidentthatifwearerightinthecauseswehave assignedfortheirdestruction,weknowalsothemeansoftheir preservation;forthingscontraryproducecontraries:butdestruction andpreservationarecontrarytoeachother.Inwelltempered governmentsitrequiresasmuchcareasanythingwhatsoever,that nothingbedonecontrarytolaw:andthisoughtchieflytobeattended toinmattersofsmallconsequence;foranillegalitythatapproaches insensibly,approachessecretly,asinafamilysmallexpenses continuallyrepeatedconsumeaman'sincome;fortheunderstandingis deceivedthereby,asbythisfalseargument;ifeverypartislittle, thenthewholeislittle:now,thisinonesenseistrue,inanother isfalse,forthewholeandallthepartstogetherarelarge,though madeupofsmallparts.Thefirstthereforeofanythingiswhatthe stateoughttoguardagainst.Inthenextplace,nocreditoughttobe giventothosewhoendeavourtodeceivethepeoplewithfalse pretences;fortheywillbe[1308a]confutedbyfacts.Thedifferent waysinwhichtheywillattempttodothishavebeenalready mentioned.Youmayoftenperceivebotharistocraciesandoligarchies continuingfirm,notfromthestabilityoftheirformsofgovernment, butfromthewiseconductofthemagistrates,bothtowardsthosewho haveapartinthemanagementofpublicaffairs,andthosealsowho havenot:towardsthosewhohavenot,byneverinjuringthem;andalso introducingthosewhoareofmostconsequenceamongsttheminto office;nordisgracingthosewhoaredesirousofhonour;or encroachingonthepropertyofindividuals;towardsthosewhohave,by behavingtoeachotheruponanequality;forthatequalitywhichthe favourersofademocracydesiretohaveestablishedinthestateis notonlyjust,butconvenientalso,amongstthosewhoareofthesame rank:forwhichreason,iftheadministrationisinthehandsofmany, thoseruleswhichareestablishedindemocracieswillbeveryuseful; astoletnoonecontinueinofficelongerthansixmonths:thatall thosewhoareofthesamerankmayhavetheirturn;forbetweenthese thereisasortofdemocracy:forwhichreasondemagoguesaremost likelytoariseupamongstthem,aswehavealreadymentioned: besides,bythismeansbotharistocraciesanddemocracieswillbethe lessliabletobecorruptedintodynasties,becauseitwillnotbeso easyforthosewhoaremagistratesforalittletodoasmuchmischief astheycouldinalongtime:foritisfromhencethattyrannies ariseindemocraciesandoligarchies;foreitherthosewhoaremost powerfulineachstateestablishatyranny,asthedemagoguesinthe one,thedynastiesintheother,orthechiefmagistrateswhohave beenlonginpower.Governmentsaresometimespreservednotonlyby havingthemeansoftheircorruptionatagreatdistance,butalsoby itsbeingverynearthem;forthosewhoarealarmedatsomeimpending evilkeepastricterhandoverthestate;forwhichreasonitis

necessaryforthosewhohavetheguardianshipoftheconstitutionto beabletoawakenthefearsofthepeople,thattheymaypreserveit, andnotlikeanightguardtoberemissinprotectingthestate,but tomakethedistantdangerappearathand.Greatcareoughtalsotobe usedtoendeavourtorestrainthequarrelsanddisputesofthenobles bylaws,aswellastopreventthosewhoarenotalreadyengagedin themfromtakingaparttherein;fortoperceiveanevilatitsvery firstapproachisnotthelotofeveryone,butofthepolitician.To preventanyalterationtakingplaceinanoligarchyorfreestateon accountofthecensus,ifthathappenstocontinuethesamewhilethe quantityofmoneyisincreased,itwillbeusefultotakeageneral accountofthewholeamountofitinformertimes,tocompareitwith thepresent,andtodothiseveryyearinthosecitieswherethe censusisyearly,[1308b]inlargercommunitiesonceinthreeorfive years;andifthewholeshouldbefoundmuchlargerormuchlessthan itwasatthetimewhenthecensuswasfirstestablishedinthestate, lettherebealaweithertoextendorcontractit,doingboththese accordingtoitsincreaseordecrease;ifitincreasesmakingthe censuslarger,ifitdecreasessmaller:andifthislatterisnotdone inoligarchiesandfreestates,youwillhaveadynastyariseinthe one,anoligarchyintheother:iftheformerisnot,freestateswill bechangedintodemocracies,andoligarchiesintofreestatesor democracies.Itisageneralmaximindemocracies,oligarchies, monarchies,andindeedinallgovernments,nottoletanyoneacquire arankfarsuperiortotherestofthecommunity,butratherto endeavourtoconfermoderatehonoursforacontinuancethangreatones forashorttime;fortheselatterspoilmen,foritisnoteveryone whocanbearprosperity:butifthisruleisnotobserved,letnot thosehonourswhichwereconferredallatoncebeallatoncetaken away,butratherbydegrees.But,aboveallthings,letthis regulationbemadebythelaw,thatnooneshallhavetoomuchpower, eitherbymeansofhisfortuneorfriends;butifhehas,forhis excesstherein,letitbecontrivedthatheshallquitthecountry. Now,asmanypersonspromoteinnovations,thattheymayenjoytheir ownparticularmannerofliving,thereoughttobeaparticular officertoinspectthemannersofeveryone,andseethattheseare notcontrarytothegeniusofthestateinwhichhelives,whetherit maybeanoligarchy,ademocracy,oranyotherformofgovernment; and,forthesamereason,thoseshouldbeguardedagainstwhoaremost prosperousinthecity:themeansofdoingwhichisbyappointing thosewhoareotherwisetothebusinessandtheofficesofthestate. Imean,toopposemenofaccounttothecommonpeople,thepoortothe rich,andtoblendboththeseintoonebody,andtoincreasethe numbersofthosewhoareinthemiddlerank;andthiswillprevent thoseseditionswhicharisefromaninequalityofcondition.Butabove all,ineverystateitisnecessary,bothbythelawsandeveryother methodpossible,topreventthosewhoareemployedbythepublicfrom beingvenal,andthisparticularlyinanoligarchy;forthenthe

peoplewillnotbesomuchdispleasedfromseeingthemselvesexcluded fromashareinthegovernment(nay,theywillratherbegladtohave leisuretoattendtheirprivateaffairs)asatsuspectingthatthe officersofthestatestealthepublicmoney,thenindeedtheyare afflictedwithdoubleconcern,bothbecausetheyaredeprivedofthe honoursofthestate,andpillagedbythosewhoenjoythem.Thereis onemethodofblendingtogetherademocracyandanaristocracy, [1309a]ifofficebroughtnoprofit;bywhichmeansboththerichand thepoorwillenjoywhattheydesire;fortoadmitalltoasharein thegovernmentisdemocratical;thattherichshouldbeinofficeis aristocratical.Thismustbedonebylettingnopublicemployment whatsoeverbeattendedwithanyemolument;forthepoorwillnot desiretobeinofficewhentheycangetnothingbyit,buthadrather attendtotheirownaffairs:buttherichwillchooseit,astheywant nothingofthecommunity.Thusthepoorwillincreasetheirfortunes bybeingwhollyemployedintheirownconcerns;andtheprincipalpart ofthepeoplewillnotbegovernedbythelowersort.Topreventthe exchequerfrombeingdefrauded,letallpublicmoneybedeliveredout openlyinthefaceofthewholecity,andletcopiesoftheaccounts bedepositedinthedifferentwardstribes,anddivisions.But,asthe magistratesaretoexecutetheirofficeswithoutanyadvantages,the lawoughttoprovideproperhonoursforthosewhoexecutethemwell. Indemocraciesalsoitisnecessarythattherichshouldbeprotected, bynotpermittingtheirlandstobedivided,noreventheproduceof them,whichinsomestatesisdoneunperceivably.Itwouldbealso betterifthepeoplewouldpreventthemwhentheyoffertoexhibita numberofunnecessaryandyetexpensivepublicentertainmentsof plays,music,processions,andthelike.Inanoligarchyitis necessarytotakegreatcareofthepoor,andallotthempublic employmentswhicharegainful;and,ifanyoftherichinsultthem,to lettheirpunishmentbesevererthaniftheyinsultedoneoftheirown rank;andtoletestatespassbyaffinity,andnotgift:nortopermit anypersontohavemorethanone;forbythismeanspropertywillbe moreequallydivided,andthegreaterpartofthepoorgetintobetter circumstances.Itisalsoserviceableinademocracyandanoligarchy toallotthosewhotakenopartinpublicaffairsanequalityora preferenceinotherthings;therichinademocracy,tothepoorinan oligarchy:butstillalltheprincipalofficesinthestatetobe filledonlybythosewhoarebestqualifiedtodischargethem. CHAPTERIX Therearethreequalificationsnecessaryforthosewhofillthefirst departmentsingovernment;firstofall,anaffectionforthe

establishedconstitution;secondplace,abilitieseverywaycompletely equaltothebusinessoftheiroffice;inthethird,virtueand justicecorrespondenttothenatureofthatparticularstatetheyare placedin;forifjusticeisnotthesameinallstates,itisevident thattheremustbedifferentspeciesthereof.Theremaybesomedoubt, whenallthesequalificationsdonotinthesamepersons,inwhat mannerthechoiceshallbemade;asforinstance,supposethatone personisanaccomplishedgeneral,butabadmanandnofriendtothe [1309b]constitution;anotherisjustandafriendtoit,whichshall oneprefer?weshouldthenconsideroftwoqualities,whichofthem thegeneralitypossessinagreaterdegree,whichinaless;forwhich reasoninthechoiceofageneralweshouldregardhiscouragemore thanhisvirtueasthemoreuncommonquality;astherearefewer capableofconductinganarmythantherearegoodmen:but,toprotect thestateormanagethefinances,thecontraryruleshouldbe followed;fortheserequiregreatervirtuethanthegeneralityare possessedof,butonlythatknowledgewhichiscommontoall.Itmay beasked,ifamanhasabilitiesequaltohisappointmentinthe state,andisaffectionatetotheconstitution,whatoccasionisthere forbeingvirtuous,sincethesetwothingsalonearesufficientto enablehimtobeusefultothepublic?itis,becausethosewho possessthosequalitiesareoftendeficientinprudence;for,asthey oftenneglecttheirownaffairs,thoughtheyknowthemandlove themselves,sonothingwillpreventtheirservingthepublicinthe samemanner.Inshort,whatsoeverthelawscontainwhichweallowto beusefultothestatecontributestoitspreservation:butitsfirst andprincipalsupportis(ashasbeenofteninsistedupon)tohavethe numberofthosewhodesiretopreserveitgreaterthanthosewhowish todestroyit.Aboveallthingsthatoughtnottobeforgottenwhich manygovernmentsnowcorruptedneglect;namely,topreserveamean. Formanythingsseeminglyfavourabletoademocracydestroya democracy,andmanythingsseeminglyfavourabletoanoligarchy destroyanoligarchy.Thosewhothinkthistheonlyvirtueextendit toexcess,notconsideringthatasanosewhichvariesalittlefrom perfectstraightness,eithertowardsahooknoseoraflatone,may yetbebeautifulandagreeabletolookat;butifthisparticularity isextendedbeyondmeasure,firstofallthepropertiesofthepartis lost,butatlastitcanhardlybeadmittedtobeanoseatall,on accountoftheexcessoftheriseorsinking:thusitiswithother partsofthehumanbody;soalsothesamethingistruewithrespect tostates;forbothanoligarchyandademocracymaysomethingvary fromtheirmostperfectformandyetbewellconstituted;butifany oneendeavourstoextendeitherofthemtoofar,atfirsthewillmake thegovernmenttheworseforit,butatlasttherewillbeno governmentatallremaining.Thelawgiverandthepoliticiantherefore shouldknowwellwhatpreservesandwhatdestroysademocracyoran oligarchy,forneithertheonenortheothercanpossiblycontinue withoutrichandpoor:butthatwheneveranentireequalityof

circumstances[1310a]prevails,thestatemustnecessarilybecomeof anotherform;sothatthosewhodestroytheselaws,whichauthorisean inequalityinproperty,destroythegovernment.Itisalsoanerrorin democraciesforthedemagoguestoendeavourtomakethecommonpeople superiortothelaws;andthusbysettingthematvariancewiththe rich,dividingonecityintotwo;whereastheyoughtrathertospeak infavouroftherich.Inoligarchies,onthecontrary,itiswrongto supportthosewhoareinadministrationagainstthepeople.Theoaths alsowhichtheytakeinanoligarchyoughttobecontrarytowhatthey noware;for,atpresent,insomeplacestheyswear,"Iwillbe adversetothecommonpeople,andcontriveallIcanagainstthem;" whereastheyoughtrathertosupposeandpretendthecontrary; expressingintheiroaths,thattheywillnotinjurethepeople.But ofallthingswhichIhavementioned,thatwhichcontributesmostto preservethestateis,whatisnowmostdespised,toeducateyour childrenforthestate;forthemostusefullaws,andmostapprovedby everystatesman,willbeofnoserviceifthecitizensarenot accustomedtoandbroughtupintheprinciplesoftheconstitution;of ademocracy,ifthatisbylawestablished;ofanoligarchy,ifthat is;foriftherearebadmoralsinoneman,thereareinthecity.But toeducateachildfitforthestate,itmustnotbedoneinthe mannerwhichwouldpleaseeitherthosewhohavethepowerinan oligarchyorthosewhodesireademocracy,butsoastheymaybeable toconducteitheroftheseformsofgovernments.Butnowthechildren ofthemagistratesinanoligarchyarebroughtuptoodelicately,and thechildrenofthepoorhardywithexerciseandlabour;sothatthey arebothdesirousofandabletopromoteinnovations.Indemocracies ofthepurestformtheypursueamethodwhichiscontrarytotheir welfare;thereasonofwhichis,thattheydefinelibertywrong:now, therearetwothingswhichseemtobetheobjectsofademocracy,that thepeopleingeneralshouldpossessthesupremepower,andallenjoy freedom;forthatwhichisjustseemstobeequal,andwhatthepeople thinkequal,thatisalaw:now,theirfreedomandequalityconsists ineveryone'sdoingwhattheyplease:thatisinsuchademocracy everyonemayliveashelikes;"ashisinclinationguides,"inthe wordsofEuripides:butthisiswrong,fornooneoughttothinkit slaverytoliveinsubjectiontogovernment,butprotection.ThusI havementionedthecausesofcorruptionindifferentstates,andthe meansoftheirpreservation. CHAPTERX Itnowremainsthatwespeakofmonarchies,theircausesof corruption,andmeansofpreservation;andindeedalmostthesame

thingswhichhavebeensaidofothergovernmentshappentokingdoms andtyrannies;forakingdompartakesofanaristocracy,atyrannyof theworstspeciesofanoligarchyanddemocracy;forwhichreasonit istheworstthatmancansubmitto,asbeingcomposedoftwo,bothof whicharebad,andcollectivelyretainsallthecorruptionsandall thedefectsofboththesestates.Thesetwospeciesofmonarchies arisefromprinciplescontrarytoeachother:akingdomisformedto protectthebettersortofpeopleagainstthemultitude,andkingsare appointedoutofthose,whoarechoseneitherfortheirsuperior virtueandactionsflowingfromvirtuousprinciples,orelsefrom theirnobledescent;butatyrantischosenoutofthemeanest populace;anenemytothebettersort,thatthecommonpeoplemaynot beoppressedbythem.Thatthisistrueexperienceconvincesus;for thegeneralityoftyrantswereindeedmeredemagogues,whogained creditwiththepeoplebyoppressingthenobles.Sometyrannieswere establishedinthismannerafterthecitieswereconsiderably enlargedothersbeforethattime,bykingswhoexceededthepower whichtheircountryallowedthem,fromadesireofgoverning despotically:otherswerefoundedbythosewhowereelectedtothe superiorofficesinthestate;forformerlythepeopleappointed officersforlife,whocametobeattheheadofcivilandreligious affairs,andthesechoseoneoutoftheirbodyinwhomthesupreme poweroverallthemagistrateswasplaced.Byallthesemeansitwas easytoestablishatyranny,iftheychoseit;fortheirpowerwas readyathand,eitherbytheirbeingkings,orelsebyenjoyingthe honoursofthestate;thusPhidonatArgosandothertyrantsenjoyed originallythekinglypower;PhalarisandothersinIonia,thehonours ofthestate.PansetiusatLeontium,CypselusatCorinth,Pisistratus atAthens,DionysiusatSyracuse,andothers,acquiredtheirsby havingbeendemagogues.Akingdom,aswehavesaid,partakesmuchof thenatureofanaristocracy,andisbestowedaccordingtoworth,as eithervirtue,family,beneficentactions,orthesejoinedwithpower; forthosewhohavebeenbenefactorstocitiesandstates,orhaveit intheirpowerstobeso,haveacquiredthishonour,andthosewho havepreventedapeoplefromfallingintoslaverybywar,asCodrus, orthosewhohavefreedthemfromit,asCyrus,orthefoundersof cities,orsettlersofcolonies,asthekingsofSparta,Macedon,and Molossus.Akingdesirestobetheguardianofhispeople,thatthose whohavepropertymaybesecureinthepossessionofit,andthatthe peopleingeneralmeetwithnoinjury;butatyrant,ashasbeenoften said,hasnoregardtothecommongood,exceptforhisownadvantage; hisonlyobjectispleasure,butaking'sisvirtue:whatatyrant thereforeisambitiousofengrossingiswealth,butakingrather honour.Theguardstooofakingarecitizens,atyrant'sforeigners. Thatatyrannycontainsallthatisbadbothinademocracyandan oligarchyisevident;withanoligarchyithasforitsendgain,as theonlymeansofprovidingthetyrantwithguardsandtheluxuriesof

life;likethatitplacesnoconfidenceinthepeople;andtherefore deprivesthemoftheuseofarms:itisalsocommontothembothto persecutethepopulace,todrivethemoutofthecityandtheirown habitations.Withademocracyitquarrelswiththenobles,and destroysthembothpubliclyandprivately,ordrivestheminto banishment,asrivalsandanimpedimenttothegovernment;hence naturallyariseconspiraciesbothamongstthosewhodesiretogovern andthosewhodesirenottobeslaves;hencearosePeriander'sadvice toThrasybulustotakeoffthetalleststalks,hintingthereby,that itwasnecessarytomakeawaywiththeeminentcitizens.Weoughtthen inreason,ashasbeenalreadysaid,toaccountforthechangeswhich ariseinamonarchyfromthesamecauseswhichproducetheminother states:for,throughinjusticereceived,fear,andcontempt,manyof thosewhoareunderamonarchicalgovernmentconspireagainstit;but ofallspeciesofinjustice,injuriouscontempthasmostinfluenceon themforthatpurpose:sometimesitisowingtotheirbeingdeprived oftheirprivatefortunes.Thedissolutiontooofakingdomanda tyrannyaregenerallythesame;formonarchsaboundinwealthand honour,whichallaredesiroustoobtain.Ofplots:someaimatthe lifeofthosewhogovern,othersattheirgovernment;thefirstarises fromhatredtotheirpersons;whichhatredmaybeowingtomany causes,eitherofwhichwillbesufficienttoexcitetheiranger,and thegeneralityofthosewhoareundertheinfluenceofthatpassion willjoininaconspiracy,notforthesakeoftheirownadvancement, butforrevenge.ThustheplotagainstthechildrenofPisistratus arosefromtheirinjurioustreatmentofHarmodius'ssister,and insultinghimalso;forHarmodiusresentingtheinjurydonetohis sister,andAristogitontheinjurydonetoHarmodius.Perianderthe tyrantofAmbraciaalsolosthislifebyaconspiracy,forsome improperlibertieshetookwithaboyinhiscups:andPhilipwas slainbyPausaniasforneglectingtorevengehimoftheaffronthehad receivedfromAttains;aswasAmintastheLittlebyDarda,for insultinghimonaccountofhisage;andtheeunuchbyEvagorasthe Cyprianinrevengeforhavingtakenhisson'swifeawayfromhim.... Manyalsowhohavehadtheirbodiesscourgedwithstripeshave, throughresentment,eitherkilledthosewhocausedthemtobe inflictedorconspiredagainstthem,evenwhentheyhadkinglypower, asatMityleneMegacles,joiningwithhisfriends,killedthe Penthelidee,whousedtogoaboutstrikingthosetheymetwithclubs. Thus,inlatertimes,SmendeskilledPenthilusforwhippinghimand dragginghimawayfromhiswife.Decamnichusalsowasthechiefcause oftheconspiracyagainstArchelaus,forheurgedotherson:the occasionofhisresentmentwashishavingdeliveredhimtoEuripides thepoettobescourged;forEuripideswasgreatlyoffendedwithhim forhavingsaidsomethingofthefoulnessofhisbreath.Andmany othershavebeenkilledorconspiredagainstonthesameaccount.Fear tooisacausewhichproducesthesameeffects,aswellinmonarchies

asinotherstates:thusArtabanesconspiredagainstXerxesthrough fearofpunishmentforhavinghangedDariusaccordingtohisorders, whomhesupposedheintendedtopardon,astheorderwasgivenat suppertime.Somekingsalsohavebeen[1312a]dethronedandkilledin consequenceofthecontempttheywereheldinbythepeople;assome oneconspiredagainstSardanapalus,havingseenhimspinningwithhis wife,ifwhatisrelatedofhimistrue,orifnotofhim,itmayvery probablybetrueofsomeoneelse.Dionalsoconspiredagainst DionysiustheYounger,seeinghissubjectsdesirousofaconspiracy, andthathehimselfwasalwaysdrunk:andevenaman'sfriendswilldo thisiftheydespisehim;forfromtheconfidenceheplacesinthem, theythinkthattheyshallnotbefoundout.Thosealsowhothinkthey shallgainhisthronewillconspireagainstakingthroughcontempt; forastheyarepowerfulthemselves,anddespisethedanger,on accountoftheirownstrength,theywillreadilyattemptit.Thusa generalattheheadofhisarmywillendeavourtodethronethe monarch,asCyrusdidAstyages,despisingbothhismanneroflifeand hisforces;hisforcesforwantofaction,hislifeforits effeminacy:thusSuthes,theThracian,whowasgeneraltoAmadocus, conspiredagainsthim.Sometimesmorethanoneofthesecauseswill excitementoenterintoconspiracies,ascontemptanddesireofgain; asintheinstanceofMithridatesagainstAriobarzanes.Thosealsowho areofabolddisposition,andhavegainedmilitaryhonoursamongst kings,willofallothersbemostliketoengageinsedition;for strengthandcourageunitedinspiregreatbravery:whenever, therefore,thesejoininoneperson,hewillbeveryreadyfor conspiracies,ashewilleasilyconquer.Thosewhoconspireagainsta tyrantthroughloveofgloryandhonourhaveadifferentmotivein viewfromwhatIhavealreadymentioned;for,likeallotherswho embracedanger,theyhaveonlygloryandhonourinview,andthink, notassomedo,ofthewealthandpomptheymayacquire,butengagein thisastheywouldinanyothernobleaction,thattheymaybe illustriousanddistinguished,anddestroyatyrant,nottosucceedin histyranny,buttoacquirerenown.Nodoubtbutthenumberofthose whoactuponthisprincipleissmall,forwemustsupposetheyregard theirownsafetyasnothingincasetheyshouldnotsucceed,andmust embracetheopinionofDion(whichfewcando)whenhemadewarupon Dionysiuswithaveryfewtroops;forhesaid,thatlettheadvantage hemadebeeversolittleitwouldsatisfyhimtohavegainedit;and that,shoulditbehislottodiethemomenthehadgainedfootingin hiscountry,heshouldthinkhisdeathsufficientlyglorious.A tyrannyalsoisexposedtothesamedestructionasallotherstates are,fromtoopowerfulneighbours:foritisevident,thatan oppositionofprincipleswillmakethemdesirousofsubvertingit;and whattheydesire,allwhocan,do:andthereisaprincipleof oppositioninonestatetoanother,asademocracyagainstatyranny, assaysHesiod,"apotteragainstapotter;"fortheextremeofa democracyisatyranny;akinglypoweragainstanaristocracy,from

theirdifferentformsofgovernmentforwhichreasonthe Lacedaemoniansdestroyedmanytyrannies;asdidtheSyracusiansduring theprosperityoftheirstate.Noraretheyonlydestroyedfrom without,butalsofromwithin,whenthosewhohavenoshareinthe powerbringaboutarevolution,ashappenedtoGelon,andlatelyto Dionysius;tothefirst,bymeansofThrasybulus,thebrotherof Hiero,whonatteredGelon'sson,andinducedhimtoleadalifeof pleasure,thathehimselfmightgovern;butthefamilyjoinedtogether andendeavouredtosupportthetyrannyandexpelThrasybulus;but thosewhomtheymadeoftheirpartyseizedtheopportunityand expelledthewholefamily.Dionmadewaragainsthisrelation Dionysius,andbeingassistedbythepeople,firstexpelledandthen killedhim.Astherearetwocauseswhichchieflyinducemento conspireagainsttyrants,hatredandcontempt,oneofthese,namely hatred,seemsinseparablefromthem.Contemptalsoisoftenthecause oftheirdestruction:forthough,forinstance,thosewhoraised themselvestothesupremepowergenerallypreservedit;butthosewho receiveditfromthemhave,tospeaktruth,almostimmediatelyallof themlostit;for,fallingintoaneffeminatewayoflife,theysoon grewdespicable,andgenerallyfellvictimstoconspiracies.Partof theirhatredmaybeveryfitlyascribedtoanger;forinsomecases thisistheirmotivetoaction:foritisoftenacausewhichimpels themtoactmorepowerfullythanhatred,andtheyproceedwithgreater obstinacyagainstthosewhomtheyattack,asthispassionisnotunder thedirectionofreason.Manypersonsalsoindulgethispassion throughcontempt;whichoccasionedthefallofthePisistratidaeand manyothers.Buthatredismorepowerfulthananger;forangeris accompaniedwithgrief,whichpreventstheentranceofreason;but hatredisfreefromit.Inshort,whatevercausesmaybeassignedas thedestructionofapureoligarchyunmixedwithanyothergovernment andanextremedemocracy,thesamemaybeappliedtoatyranny;for thesearedividedtyrannies. Kingdomsareseldomdestroyedbyanyoutwardattack;forwhichreason theyaregenerallyverystable;buttheyhavemanycausesof subversionwithin;ofwhichtwoaretheprincipal;oneiswhenthose whoareinpower[1313a]exciteasedition,theotherwhenthey endeavourtoestablishatyrannybyassuminggreaterpowerthanthe lawgivesthem.Akingdom,indeed,isnotwhatweeverseeerectedin ourtimes,butrathermonarchiesandtyrannies;forakingly governmentisonethatisvoluntarilysubmittedto,anditssupreme poweradmittedupongreatoccasions:butwheremanyareequal,and therearenoneinanyrespectsomuchbetterthananotherastobe qualifiedforthegreatnessanddignityofgovernmentoverthem,then theseequalswillnotwillinglysubmittobecommanded;butifanyone assumesthegovernment,eitherbyforceorfraud,thisisatyranny. Towhatwehavealreadysaidweshalladd,thecausesofrevolutions inanhereditarykingdom.Oneoftheseis,thatmanyofthosewho

enjoyitarenaturallyproperobjectsofcontemptonly:anotheris, thattheyareinsolentwhiletheirpowerisnotdespotic;butthey possesskinglyhonoursonly.Suchastateissoondestroyed;fora kingexistsbutwhilethepeoplearewillingtoobey,astheir submissiontohimisvoluntary,buttoatyrantinvoluntary.Theseand suchlikearethecausesofthedestructionofmonarchies. CHAPTERXI Monarchies,inaword,arepreservedbymeanscontrarytowhatIhave alreadymentionedasthecauseoftheirdestruction;buttospeakto eachseparately:thestabilityofakingdomwilldependuponthepower oftheking'sbeingkeptwithinmoderatebounds;forbyhowmuchthe lessextensivehispoweris,bysomuchthelongerwillhisgovernment continue;forhewillbelessdespoticandmoreuponanequalityof conditionwiththosehegoverns;who,onthataccount,willenvyhim theless. ItwasonthisaccountthatthekingdomoftheMolossicontinuedso long;andtheLacedaemoniansfromtheirgovernment'sbeingfromthe beginningdividedintotwoparts,andalsobythemoderation introducedintotheotherpartsofitbyTheopompus,andhis establishmentoftheephori;forbytakingsomethingfromthepowerhe increasedthedurationofthekingdom,sothatinsomemeasurehemade itnotless,butbigger;astheysayherepliedtohiswife,whoasked himifhewasnotashamedtodeliverdownhiskingdomtohischildren reducedfromwhathereceiveditfromhisancestors?No,sayshe,I giveithimmorelasting.Tyranniesarepreservedtwowaysmost oppositetoeachother,oneofwhichiswhenthepowerisdelegated fromonetotheother,andinthismannermanytyrantsgovernintheir states.ReportsaysthatPerianderfoundedmanyofthese.Thereare alsomanyofthemtobemetwithamongstthePersians.Whathasbeen alreadymentionedisasconduciveasanythingcanbetopreservea tyranny;namely,tokeepdownthosewhoareofanaspiring disposition,totakeoffthosewhowillnotsubmit,toallownopublic meals,noclubs,noeducation,nothingatall,buttoguardagainst everythingthatgivesrisetohighspiritsormutualconfidence;nor tosufferthelearnedmeetingsofthosewhoareatleisuretohold conversationwitheachother;andtoendeavourbyeverymeanspossible tokeepallthepeoplestrangerstoeachother;forknowledge increasesmutualconfidence;andtoobligeallstrangerstoappearin public,andtolivenearthecitygate,thatalltheiractionsmaybe sufficientlyseen;forthosewhoarekeptlikeslavesseldomentertain anynoblethoughts:inshort,toimitateeverythingwhichthePersians

andbarbariansdo,fortheyallcontributetosupportslavery;andto endeavourtoknowwhateveryonewhoisundertheirpowerdoesand says;andforthispurposetoemployspies:suchwerethosewomenwhom theSyracusianscalledpotagogidesHieroalsousedtosendout listenerswherevertherewasanymeetingorconversation;forthe peopledarenotspeakwithfreedomforfearofsuchpersons;andif anyonedoes,thereisthelesschanceofitsbeingconcealed;andto endeavourthatthewholecommunityshouldmutuallyaccuseandcometo blowswitheachother,friendwithfriend,thecommonswiththe nobles,andtherichwitheachother.Itisalsoadvantageousfora tyrannythatallthosewhoareunderitshouldbeoppressedwith poverty,thattheymaynotbeabletocomposeaguard;andthat,being employedinprocuringtheirdailybread,theymayhavenoleisureto conspireagainsttheirtyrants.ThePyramidsofEgyptareaproofof this,andthevotiveedificesoftheCyposelidse,andthetempleof JupiterOlympus,builtbythePisistratidae,andtheworksof PolycratesatSamos;foralltheseproducedoneend,thekeepingthe peoplepoor.Itisnecessaryalsotomultiplytaxes,asatSyracuse; whereDionysiusinthespaceoffiveyearscollectedalltheprivate propertyofhissubjectsintohisowncoffers.Atyrantalsoshould endeavourtoengagehissubjectsinawar,thattheymayhave employmentandcontinuallydependupontheirgeneral.Akingis preservedbyhisfriends,butatyrantisofallpersonsthemanwho canplacenoconfidenceinfriends,aseveryonehasitinhisdesire andthesechieflyintheirpowertodestroyhim.Allthesethingsalso whicharedoneinanextremedemocracyshouldbedoneinatyranny,as permittinggreatlicentiousnesstothewomeninthehouse,thatthey mayrevealtheirhusbands'secrets;andshowinggreatindulgenceto slavesalsoforthesamereason;forslavesandwomenconspirenot againsttyrants:butwhentheyaretreatedwithkindness,bothofthem areabettorsoftyrants,andextremedemocraciesalso;andthepeople tooinsuchastatedesiretobedespotic.Forwhichreasonflatterers areinreputeinboththese:thedemagogueinthedemocracy,forheis theproperflattererofthepeople;amongtyrants,hewhowill servilelyadapthimselftotheirhumours;forthisisthebusinessof [1314a]flatterers.Andforthisreasontyrantsalwayslovetheworst ofwretches,fortheyrejoiceinbeingflattered,whichnomanofa liberalspiritwillsubmitto;fortheylovethevirtuous,butflatter none.Badmentooarefitforbadpurposes;"liketolike,"asthe proverbsays.Atyrantalsoshouldshownofavourtoamanofworthor afreeman;forheshouldthink,thatnoonedeservedtobethought thesebuthimself;forhewhosupportshisdignity,andisafriendto freedom,encroachesuponthesuperiorityandthedespotismofthe tyrant:suchmen,therefore,theynaturallyhate,asdestructiveto theirgovernment.Atyrantalsoshouldratheradmitstrangerstohis tableandfamiliaritythancitizens,asthesearehisenemies,butthe othershavenodesignagainsthim.Theseandsuchlikearethe supportsofatyranny,foritcomprehendswhatsoeveriswicked.But

allthesethingsmaybecomprehendedinthreedivisions,forthereare threeobjectswhichatyrannyhasinview;oneofwhichis,thatthe citizensshouldbeofpoorabjectdispositions;forsuchmennever proposetoconspireagainstanyone.Thesecondis,thattheyshould havenoconfidenceineachother;forwhiletheyhavenotthis,the tyrantissafeenoughfromdestruction.Forwhichreasontheyare alwaysatenmitywiththoseofmerit,ashurtfultotheirgovernment; notonlyastheyscorntobegoverneddespotically,butalsobecause theycanrelyuponeachother'sfidelity,andotherscanrelyupon theirs,andbecausetheywillnotinformagainsttheirassociates,nor anyoneelse.Thethirdis,thattheyshallbetotallywithoutthe meansofdoinganything;fornooneundertakeswhatisimpossiblefor himtoperform:sothatwithoutpoweratyrannycanneverbe destroyed.These,then,arethethreeobjectswhichtheinclinations oftyrantsdesiretoseeaccomplished;foralltheirtyrannicalplans tendtopromoteoneofthesethreeends,thattheirpeoplemayneither havemutualconfidence,power,norspirit.This,then,isoneofthe twomethodsofpreservingtyrannies:theotherproceedsinawayquite contrarytowhathasbeenalreadydescribed,andwhichmaybe discernedfromconsideringtowhatthedestructionofakingdomis owing;forasonecauseofthatis,makingthegovernmentapproach neartoatyranny,sothesafetyofatyrannyconsistsinmakingthe governmentnearlykingly;preservingonlyonething,namelypower, thatnotonlythewilling,buttheunwillingalso,mustbeobligedto submit;forifthisisoncelost,thetyrannyisatanend.This, then,asthefoundation,mustbepreserved:inotherparticulars carefullydoandaffecttoseemlikeaking;first,appeartopaya greatattention[1314b]towhatbelongstothepublic;normakesuch profusepresentsaswilloffendthepeople;whiletheyaretosupply themoneyoutofthehardlabouroftheirownhands,andseeitgiven inprofusiontomistresses,foreigners,andfiddlers;keepinganexact accountbothofwhatyoureceiveandpay;whichisapracticesome tyrantsdoactuallyfollow,bywhichmeanstheyseemratherfathersof familiesthantyrants:norneedyoueverfearthewantofmoneywhile youhavethesupremepowerofthestateinyourownhands.Itisalso muchbetterforthosetyrantswhoquittheirkingdomtodothisthan toleavebehindthemmoneytheyhavehoardedup;fortheirregents willbemuchlessdesirousofmakinginnovations,andtheyaremoreto bedreadedbyabsenttyrantsthanthecitizens;forsuchofthemashe suspectshetakeswithhim,buttheseregentsmustbeleftbehind.He shouldalsoendeavourtoappeartocollectsuchtaxesandrequiresuch servicesastheexigenciesofthestatedemand,thatwhenevertheyare wantedtheymaybereadyintimeofwar;andparticularlytotakecare thatheappeartocollectandkeepthemnotashisownproperty,but thepublic's.Hisappearancealsoshouldnotbesevere,but respectable,sothatheshouldinspirethosewhoapproachhimwith venerationandnotfear;butthiswillnotbeeasilyaccomplishedif heisdespised.If,therefore,hewillnottakethepainstoacquire

anyother,heoughttoendeavourtobeamanofpoliticalabilities, andtofixthatopinionofhimselfinthejudgmentofhissubjects.He shouldalsotakecarenottoappeartobeguiltyoftheleastoffence againstmodesty,nortosufferitinthoseunderhim:nortopermit thewomenofhisfamilytotreatothershaughtily;forthehaughtiness ofwomenhasbeentheruinofmanytyrants.Withrespecttothe pleasuresofsense,heoughttododirectlycontrarytothepractice ofsometyrantsatpresent;fortheydonotonlycontinuallyindulge themselvesinthemformanydaystogether,buttheyseemalsoto desiretohaveotherwitnessesofit,thattheymaywonderattheir happiness;whereasheoughtreallytobemoderateinthese,and,if not,toappeartootherstoavoidthemforitisnotthesobermanwho isexposedeithertoplotsorcontempt,butthedrunkard;notthe earlyriser,butthesluggard.Hisconductingeneralshouldalsobe contrarytowhatisreportedofformertyrants;forheoughtto improveandadornhiscity,soastoseemaguardianandnotatyrant; and,moreover.,alwaysto[1315a]seemparticularlyattentivetothe worshipofthegods;forfrompersonsofsuchacharactermen entertainlessfearsofsufferinganythingillegalwhiletheysuppose thathewhogovernsthemisreligiousandreverencesthegods;and theywillbelessinclinedtoraiseinsinuationsagainstsuchaone, asbeingpeculiarlyundertheirprotection:butthismustbesodone astogivenooccasionforanysuspicionofhypocrisy.Heshouldalso takecaretoshowsuchrespecttomenofmeritineveryparticular, thattheyshouldnotthinktheycouldbetreatedwithgreater distinctionbytheirfellowcitizensinafreestate.Heshouldalso letallhonoursflowimmediatelyfromhimself,buteverycensurefrom hissubordinateofficersandjudges.Itisalsoacommonprotection ofallmonarchiesnottomakeonepersontoogreat,or,certainly,not many;fortheywillsupporteachother:but,ifitisnecessaryto entrustanylargepowerstooneperson,totakecarethatitisnot oneofanardentspirit;forthisdispositionisuponevery opportunitymostreadyforarevolution:and,ifitshouldseem necessarytodepriveanyoneofhispower,todoitbydegrees,and notreducehimallatonce.Itisalsonecessarytoabstainfromall kindsofinsolence;moreparticularlyfromcorporalpunishment;which youmustbemostcautiousnevertoexerciseoverthosewhohavea delicatesenseofhonour;for,asthosewholovemoneyaretouchedto thequickwhenanythingaffectstheirproperty,soaremenofhonour andprinciplewhentheyreceiveanydisgrace:therefore,eithernever employpersonalpunishment,or,ifyoudo,letitbeonlyinthe mannerinwhichafatherwouldcorrecthisson,andnotwithcontempt; and,uponthewhole,makeamendsforanyseemingdisgracebybestowing greaterhonours.Butofallpersonswhoaremostlikelytoentertain designsagainstthepersonofatyrant,thosearechieflytobefeared andguardedagainstwhoregardasnothingthelossoftheirownlives, sothattheycanbutaccomplishtheirpurpose:beverycareful thereforeofthosewhoeitherthinkthemselvesaffronted,orthosewho

aredeartothem;forthosewhoareexcitedbyangertorevengeregard asnothingtheirownpersons:for,asHeraclitussays,itisdangerous tofightwithanangrymanwhowillpurchasewithhislifethething heaimsat.Asallcitiesarecomposedoftwosortsofpersons,the richandthepoor,itisnecessarythatboththeseshouldfindequal protectionfromhimwhogovernsthem,andthattheonepartyshould nothaveitintheirpowertoinjuretheother;butthatthetyrant shouldattachtohimselfthatpartywhichisthemostpowerful;which, ifhedoes,hewillhavenooccasioneithertomakehisslavesfree, ortodeprivecitizensoftheirarms;forthestrengthofeitherof thepartiesaddedtohisownforceswillrenderhimsuperiortoany conspiracy.Itwouldbesuperfluoustogothroughallparticulars;for theruleofconductwhichthetyrantoughttopursueisevident enough,andthatis,toaffecttoappearnotthetyrant,buttheking; theguardianofthosehegoverns,nottheirplunderer,[1315b]but theirprotector,andtoaffectthemiddlerankinlife,notone superiortoallothers:heshould,therefore,associatehisnobles withhimandsoothehispeople;forhisgovernmentwillnotonlybe necessarilymorehonourableandworthyofimitation,asitwillbe overmenofworth,andnotabjectwretcheswhoperpetuallybothhate andfearhim;butitwillbealsomoredurable.Lethimalsoframehis lifesothathismannersmaybeconsentaneoustovirtue,oratleast lethalfofthembeso,thathemaynotbealtogetherwicked,butonly soinpart. CHAPTERXII Indeedanoligarchyandatyrannyareofallgovernmentsofthe shortestduration.ThetyrannyofOrthagorasandhisfamilyatSicyon, itistrue,continuedlongerthananyother:thereasonforwhichwas, thattheyusedtheirpowerwithmoderation,andwereinmany particularsobedienttothelaws;and,asClistheneswasanable general,heneverfellintocontempt,andbythecarehetookthatin manyparticularshisgovernmentshouldbepopular.Heisreportedalso tohavepresentedapersonwithacrownwhoadjudgedthevictoryto another;andsomesaythatitisthestatueofthatjudgewhichis placedintheforum. Theysayalso,thatPisistratussubmittedtobesummonedintothe courtoftheAreopagites.Thesecondthatweshallmentionisthe tyrannyoftheCypselidse,atCorinth,whichcontinuedseventyseven yearsandsixmonths;forCypseluswastyranttherethirtyyears, Perianderfortyfour,andPsammetichus,thesonofGeorgias,three years;thereasonforwhichwas,thatCypseluswasapopularman,and

governedwithoutguards.Perianderindeedruledlikeatyrant,but thenhewasanablegeneral.ThethirdwasthatofthePisistradidae atAthens;butitwasnotcontinual:forPisistratushimselfwastwice expelled;sothatoutofthirtythreeyearshewasonlyfifteenin power,andhissoneighteen;sothatthewholetimewasthirtythree years.OftherestweshallmentionthatofHiero,andGeloat Syracuse;andthisdidnotcontinuelong,forboththeirreignswere onlyeighteenyears;forGelodiedintheeighthyearofhistyranny, andHieroinhistenth.Thrasybulusfellinhiseleventhmonth,and manyothertyrannieshavecontinuedaveryshorttime.Wehavenow gonethroughthegeneralcasesofcorruptionand[1316a]meansof preservationbothinfreestatesandmonarchies.InPlato'sRepublic, Socratesisintroducedtreatinguponthechangeswhichdifferent governmentsareliableto:buthisdiscourseisfaulty;forhedoes notparticularlymentionwhatchangesthebestandfirstgovernments areliableto;forheonlyassignsthegeneralcause,ofnothingbeing immutable,butthatintimeeverythingwillalter[***tr.:textis unintelligiblehere***]heconceivesthatnaturewillthen producebadmen,whowillnotsubmittoeducation,andinthis, probably,heisnotwrong;foritiscertainthattherearesome personswhomitisimpossiblebyanyeducationtomakegoodmen;but whyshouldthischangebemorepeculiartowhathecallsthe bestformedgovernment,thantoallotherforms,andindeedtoall otherthingsthatexist?andinrespecttohisassignedtime,asthe causeofthealterationofallthings,wefindthatthosewhichdid notbegintoexistatthesametimeceasetobeatthesametime;so that,ifanythingcameintobeginningthedaybeforethesolstice,it mustalteratthesametime.Besides,whyshouldsuchaformof governmentbechangedintotheLacedaemonian?for,ingeneral,when governmentsalter,theyalterintothecontraryspeciestowhatthey beforewere,andnotintooneliketheirformer.Andthisreasoning holdstrueofotherchanges;forhesays,thatfromtheLacedaemonian formitchangesintoanoligarchy,andfromthenceintoademocracy, andfromademocracyintoatyranny:andsometimesacontrarychange takesplace,asfromademocracyintoanoligarchy,ratherthanintoa monarchy.Withrespecttoatyrannyheneithersayswhethertherewill beanychangeinit;orifnot,towhatcauseitwillbeowing;orif thereis,intowhatotherstateitwillalter:butthereasonofthis is,thatatyrannyisanindeterminategovernment;and,accordingto him,everystateoughttoalterintothefirst,andmostperfect,thus thecontinuityandcirclewouldbepreserved.Butonetyrannyoften changedintoanother;asatSyria,fromMyron'stoClisthenes';or intoanoligarchy,aswasAntileo'satChalcas;orintoademocracy, aswasGelo'satSyracuse;orintoanaristocracy,aswasCharilaus's atLacedsemon,andatCarthage.Anoligarchyisalsochangedintoa tyranny;suchwastheriseofmostoftheancienttyranniesinSicily; atLeontini,intothetyrannyofPanaetius;atGela,intothatof Cleander;atRhegiumintothatofAnaxilaus;andthelikeinmany

othercities.Itisabsurdalsotosuppose,thatastateischanged intoanoligarchybecausethosewhoareinpowerareavariciousand greedyofmoney,andnotbecausethosewhoarebyfarricherthan theirfellowcitizensthinkitunfairthatthosewhohavenothing shouldhaveanequalshareintheruleofthestatewiththemselves, whopossesssomuchforinmanyoligarchiesitisnotallowabletobe employedinmoneygetting,andtherearemanylawstopreventit.But inCarthage,whichisademocracy,moneygettingiscreditable,and yettheirformofgovernmentremainsunaltered.Itisalsoabsurdto say,thatinanoligarchytherearetwocities,oneofthepoorand anotheroftherich;forwhyshouldthishappentothemmorethanto theLacedaemonians,oranyotherstatewhereallpossessnotequal property,orwhereallarenotequallygood?forthoughnoonemember ofthecommunityshouldbepoorerthanhewasbefore,yetademocracy mightneverthelesschangeintoanoligarchy;iftherichshouldbe morepowerfulthanthepoor,andtheonetoonegligent,andtheother attentive:andthoughthesechangesareowingtomanycauses,yethe mentionsbutoneonly,thatthecitizensbecomepoorbyluxury,and payinginterestmoney;asifatfirsttheywereallrich,orthe greaterpartofthem:butthisisnotso,butwhensomeofthosewho havetheprincipalmanagementofpublicaffairslosetheirfortunes, theywillendeavourtobringaboutarevolution;butwhenothersdo, nothingofconsequencewillfollow,norwhensuchstatesdoalteris thereanymorereasonfortheiralteringintoademocracythanany other.Besides,thoughsomeofthemembersofthecommunitymaynot havespenttheirfortunes,yetiftheysharenotinthehonoursofthe state,oriftheyareillusedandinsulted,theywillendeavourto raiseseditions,andbringaboutarevolution,thattheymaybe allowedtodoastheylike;which,Platosays,arisesfromtoomuch liberty.Althoughtherearemanyoligarchiesanddemocracies,yet Socrates,whenheistreatingofthechangestheymayundergo,speaks ofthemasiftherewasbutoneofeachsort. BOOKVI CHAPTERI Wehavealreadyshownwhatisthenatureofthesupremecouncilinthe state,andwhereinonemaydifferfromanother,andhowthedifferent magistratesshouldberegulated;andalsothejudicialdepartment,and whatisbestsuitedtowhatstate;andalsotowhatcausesboththe

destructionandpreservationofgovernmentsareowing. Asthereareverymanyspeciesofdemocracies,aswellasofother states,itwillnotbeamisstoconsideratthesametimeanything whichwemayhaveomittedtomentionconcerningeitherofthem,andto allottoeachthatmodeofconductwhichispeculiartoand advantageousforthem;andalsotoinquireintothecombinationsof allthesedifferentmodesofgovernmentwhichwe[1317a]have mentioned;forastheseareblendedtogetherthegovernmentis altered,asfromanaristocracytobeanoligarchy,andfromafree statetobeademocracy.Now,Imeanbythosecombinationsof government(whichIoughttoexamineinto,buthavenotyetdone), namely,whetherthedeliberativedepartmentandtheelectionof magistratesisregulatedinamannercorrespondenttoanoligarchy,or thejudicialtoanaristocracy,orthedeliberativepartonlytoan oligarchy,andtheelectionofmagistratestoanaristocracy,or whether,inanyothermanner,everythingisnotregulatedaccordingto thenatureofthegovernment.Butwewillfirstconsiderwhat particularsortofdemocracyisfittedtoaparticularcity,andalso whatparticularoligarchytoaparticularpeople;andofotherstates, whatisadvantageoustowhat.Itisalsonecessarytoshowclearly, notonlywhichofthesegovernmentsisbestforastate,butalsohow itoughttobeestablishedthere,andotherthingswewilltreatof briefly. Andfirst,wewillspeakofademocracy;andthiswillatthesame timeshowclearlythenatureofitsoppositewhichsomepersonscall anoligarchy;andindoingthiswemustexamineintoallthepartsof ademocracy,andeverythingthatisconnectedtherewith;forfromthe mannerinwhichthesearecompoundedtogetherdifferentspeciesof democraciesarise:andhenceitisthattheyaremorethanone,andof variousnatures.Now,therearetwocauseswhichoccasiontherebeing somanydemocracies;oneofwhichisthatwhichwehavealready mentioned;namely,therebeingdifferentsortsofpeople;forinone countrythemajorityarehusbandmen,inanothermechanics,andhired servants;ifthefirstoftheseisaddedtothesecond,andthethird tobothofthem,thedemocracywillnotonlydifferintheparticular ofbetterorworse,butinthis,thatitwillbenolongerthesame government;theotheristhatwhichwewillnowspeakof.The differentthingswhichareconnectedwithdemocraciesandseemtomake partofthesestates,do,fromtheirbeingjoinedtothem,renderthem differentfromothers:thisattendingafew,thatmore,andanother all.Itisnecessarythathewhowouldfoundanystatewhichhemay happentoapproveof,orcorrectone,shouldbeacquaintedwithall theseparticulars.Allfoundersofstatesendeavourtocomprehend withintheirownplaneverythingofnearlythesamekindwithit;but indoingthistheyerr,inthemannerIhavealreadydescribedin treatingofthepreservationanddestructionofgovernments.Iwill

nowspeakofthesefirstprinciplesandmanners,andwhateverelsea democraticalstaterequires. CHAPTERII Nowthefoundationofademocraticalstateisliberty,andpeoplehave beenaccustomedtosaythisasifhereonlylibertywastobefound; fortheyaffirmthatthisistheendproposedbyeverydemocracy.But onepartoflibertyistogovernandbegovernedalternately;for, accordingtodemocraticaljustice,equalityismeasuredbynumbers, andnotbyworth:andthisbeingjust,itisnecessarythatthe supremepowershouldbevestedinthepeopleatlarge;andthatwhat themajoritydetermineshouldbefinal:sothatinademocracythe pooroughttohavemorepowerthantherich,asbeingthegreater number;forthisisonemarkoflibertywhichallframersofa democracylaydownasacriterionofthatstate;anotheris,tolive aseveryonelikes;forthis,theysay,isarightwhichliberty gives,sinceheisaslavewhomustliveashelikesnot.This,then, isanothercriterionofademocracy.Hencearisestheclaimtobe undernocommandwhatsoevertoanyone,uponanyaccount,any otherwisethanbyrotation,andthatjustasfaronlyasthatperson is,inhisturn,underhisalso.Thisalsoisconducivetothat equalitywhichlibertydemands.Thesethingsbeingpremised,andsuch beingthegovernment,itfollowsthatsuchrulesasthefollowing shouldbeobservedinit,thatallthemagistratesshouldbechosen outofallthepeople,andalltocommandeach,andeachinhisturn all:thatallthemagistratesshouldbechosenbylot,excepttothose officesonlywhichrequiredsomeparticularknowledgeandskill:that nocensus,oraverysmallone,shouldberequiredtoqualifyaman foranyoffice:thatnoneshouldbeinthesameemploymenttwice,or veryfew,andveryseldom,exceptinthearmy:thatalltheir appointmentsshouldbelimitedtoaveryshorttime,oratleastas manyaspossible:thatthewholecommunityshouldbequalifiedto judgeinallcauseswhatsoever,lettheobjectbeeversoextensive, eversointeresting,orofeversohighanature;asatAthens,where thepeopleatlargejudgethemagistrateswhentheycomeoutof office,anddecideconcerningpublicaffairsaswellasprivate contracts:thatthesupremepowershouldbeinthepublicassembly; andthatnomagistrateshouldbeallowedanydiscretionarypowerbut inafewinstances,andofnoconsequencetopublicbusiness.Ofall magistratesasenateisbestsuitedtoademocracy,wherethewhole communityisnotpaidforgivingtheirattendance;forinthatcase it;losesitspower;forthenthepeoplewillbringallcausesbefore them,byappeal,aswehavealreadymentionedinaformerbook.Inthe

nextplace,thereshould,ifpossible,beafundtopayallthe citizenswhohaveanyshareinthemanagementofpublicaffairs, eitherasmembersoftheassembly,judges,andmagistrates;butif thiscannotbedone,atleastthemagistrates,thejudgesthe senators,andmembersofthesupremeassembly,andalsothoseofficers whoareobligedtoeatatacommontableoughttobepaid.Moreover, asanoligarchyissaidtobeagovernmentofmenoffamily,fortune, andeducation;so,onthecontrary,ademocracyisagovernmentinthe handsofmenofnobirth,indigentcircumstances,andmechanical employments.Inthisstatealsonooffice[1318a]shouldbeforlife; and,ifanysuchshouldremainafterthegovernmenthasbeenlong changedintoademocracy,theyshouldendeavourbydegreestodiminish thepower;andalsoelectbylotinsteadofvote.Thesethings,then, appertaintoalldemocracies;namely,tobeestablishedonthat principleofjusticewhichishomogeneoustothosegovernments;that is,thatallthemembersofthestate,bynumber,shouldenjoyan equality,whichseemschieflytoconstituteademocracy,orgovernment ofthepeople:foritseemsperfectlyequalthattherichshouldhave nomoreshareinthegovernmentthanthepoor,norbealoneinpower; butthatallshouldbeequal,accordingtonumber;forthus,they think,theequalityandlibertyofthestatebestpreserved. CHAPTERIII Inthenextplacewemustinquirehowthisequalityistobeprocured. Shallthequalificationsbedividedsothatfivehundredrichshould beequaltoathousandpoor,orshallthethousandhaveequalpower withthefivehundred?orshallwenotestablishourequalityinthis manner?butdivideindeedthus,andafterwardstakinganequalnumber bothoutofthefivehundredandthethousand,investthemwiththe powerofcreatingthemagistratesandjudges.Isthisstatethen establishedaccordingtoperfectdemocraticaljustice,orratherthat whichisguidedbynumbersonly?Forthedefendersofademocracysay, thatthatisjustwhichthemajorityapproveof:butthefavourersof anoligarchysay,thatthatisjustwhichthosewhohavemostapprove of;andthatweoughttobedirectedbythevalueofproperty.Both thepropositionsareunjust;forifweagreewithwhatthefewpropose weerectatyranny:forifitshouldhappenthatanindividualshould havemorethantherestwhoarerich,accordingtooligarchical justice,thismanalonehasarighttothesupremepower;butif superiorityofnumbersistoprevail,injusticewillthenbedoneby confiscatingthepropertyoftherich,whoarefew,aswehavealready said.Whatthenthatequalityis,whichbothpartieswilladmit,must becollectedfromthedefinitionofrightwhichiscommontothem

both;fortheybothsaythatwhatthemajorityofthestateapproves ofoughttobeestablished.Beitso;butnotentirely:butsincea cityhappenstobemadeupoftwodifferentranksofpeople,therich andthepoor,letthatbeestablishedwhichisapprovedofbyboth these,orthegreaterpart:butshouldtherebeoppositesentiments, letthatbeestablishedwhichshallbeapprovedofbythegreater part:butletthisbeaccordingtothecensus;forinstance,ifthere shouldbetenoftherichandtwentyofthepoor,andsixofthefirst andfifteenofthelastshouldagreeuponanymeasure,andthe remainingfouroftherichshouldjoinwiththeremainingfiveofthe poorinopposingit,thatpartywhosecensuswhenaddedtogether shoulddeterminewhichopinionshouldbelaw,andshouldthesehappen tobeequal,itshouldberegardedasacasesimilartoanassemblyor courtofjusticedividingequallyuponanyquestionthatcomesbefore them,whoeitherdetermineitbylotorsomesuchmethod.But although,with[1318b]respecttowhatisequalandjust,itmaybe verydifficulttoestablishthetruth,yetitismucheasiertodo thantopersuadethosewhohaveitintheirpowertoencroachupon otherstobeguidedthereby;fortheweakalwaysdesirewhatisequal andjust,butthepowerfulpaynoregardthereunto. CHAPTERIV Therearefourkindsofdemocracies.Thebestisthatwhichis composedofthosefirstinorder,aswehavealreadysaid,andthis alsoisthemostancientofany.Icallthatthefirstwhicheveryone wouldplaceso,washetodividethepeople;forthebestpartof thesearethehusbandmen.Wesee,then,thatademocracymaybeframed wherethemajoritylivebytillageorpasturage;for,astheir propertyisbutsmall,theywillnotbeatleisureperpetuallytohold publicassemblies,butwillbecontinuallyemployedinfollowingtheir ownbusiness,nothavingotherwisethemeansofliving;norwillthey bedesirousofwhatanotherenjoys,butwillratherliketofollow theirownbusinessthanmeddlewithstateaffairsandacceptthe officesofgovernment,whichwillbeattendedwithnogreatprofit; forthemajorpartofmankindareratherdesirousofrichesthan honour(aproofofthisis,thattheysubmittedtothetyranniesin ancienttimes,anddonowsubmittotheoligarchies,ifnoonehinders themintheirusualoccupations,ordeprivesthemoftheirproperty; forsomeofthemsoongetrich,othersareremovedfrompoverty); besides,theirhavingtherightofelectionandcallingtheir magistratestoaccountfortheirconductwhentheycomeoutofoffice, willsatisfytheirdesireofhonours,ifanyofthementertainthat passion:forinsomestates,thoughthecommonaltyhavenottheright

ofelectingthemagistrates,yetitisvestedinpartofthatbody chosentorepresentthem:anditissufficientforthepeopleatlarge topossessthedeliberativepower:andthisoughttobeconsideredas aspeciesofdemocracy;suchwasthatformerlyatMantinsea:forwhich reasonitisproperforthedemocracywehavebeennowtreatingofto haveapower(andithasbeenusualforthemtohaveit)ofcensuring theirmagistrateswhenoutofoffice,andsittinginjudgmentuponall causes:butthatthechiefmagistratesshouldbeelected,and accordingtoacertaincensus,whichshouldvarywiththerankof theiroffice,orelsenotbyacensus,butaccordingtotheir abilitiesfortheirrespectiveappointments.Astatethusconstituted mustbewellconstituted;forthemagistracieswillbealwaysfilled withthebestmenwiththeapprobationofthepeople;whowillnot envytheirsuperiors:andtheseandthenoblesshouldbecontentwith thispartintheadministration;fortheywillnotbegovernedby theirinferiors.Theywillbealsocarefultousetheirpowerwith moderation,asthereareotherstowhomfullpowerisdelegatedto censuretheirconduct;foritisveryserviceabletothestatetohave themdependentuponothers,andnottobepermittedtodowhatsoever theychoose;forwithsuchalibertytherewouldbenochecktothat evilparticlethereisineveryone:thereforeitis[1319a]necessary andmostforthebenefitofthestatethattheofficesthereofshould befilledbytheprincipalpersonsinit,whosecharactersare unblemished,andthatthepeoplearenotoppressed.Itisnowevident thatthisisthebestspeciesofdemocracy,andonwhataccount; becausethepeoplearesuchandhavesuchpowersastheyoughtto have.Toestablishademocracyofhusbandmensomeofthoselawswhich wereobservedinmanyancientstatesareuniversallyuseful;as,for instance,onnoaccounttopermitanyonetopossessmorethana certainquantityofland,orwithinacertaindistancefromthecity. Formerlyalso,insomestates,noonewasallowedtoselltheir originallotofland.TheyalsomentionalawofoneOxylus,which forbadeanyonetoaddtotheirpatrimonybyusury.Weoughtalsoto followthelawoftheAphutaeans,asusefultodirectusinthis particularwearenowspeakingof;fortheyhavingbutverylittle ground,whiletheywereanumerouspeople,andatthesametimewere allhusbandmen,didnotincludealltheirlandswithinthecensus,but dividedtheminsuchamannerthat,accordingtothecensus,thepoor hadmorepowerthantherich.Nexttothecommonaltyofhusbandmenis oneofshepherdsandherdsmen;fortheyhavemanythingsincommon withthem,and,bytheirwayoflife,areexcellentlyqualifiedto makegoodsoldiers,stoutinbody,andabletocontinueintheopen airallnight.Thegeneralityofthepeopleofwhomotherdemocracies arecomposedaremuchworsethanthese;fortheirlivesarewretched norhavetheyanybusinesswithvirtueinanythingtheydo;theseare yourmechanics,yourexchangemen,andhiredservants;asallthese sortsofmenfrequenttheexchangeandthecitadel,theycanreadily attendthepublicassembly;whereasthehusbandmen,beingmore

dispersedinthecountry,cannotsoeasilymeettogethernorarethey equallydesirousofdoingitwiththeseothers!Whenacountryhappens tobesosituatedthatagreatpartofthelandliesatadistance fromthecity,thereitiseasytoestablishagooddemocracyora freestateforthepeopleingeneralwillbeobligedtoliveinthe country;sothatitwillbenecessaryinsuchademocracy,though theremaybeanexchangemobathand,nevertoallowalegalassembly withouttheinhabitantsofthecountryattend.Wehaveshowninwhat mannerthefirstandbestdemocracyoughttobeestablished,andit willbeequallyevidentastotherest,forfromthesewe[1319b] shouldproceedasaguide,andalwaysseparatethemeanestofthe peoplefromtherest.Butthelastandworst,whichgivestoevery citizenwithoutdistinctionashareineverypartofthe administration,iswhatfewcitizenscanbear,norisiteasyto preserveforanylongtime,unlesswellsupportedbylawsandmanners. Wehavealreadynoticedalmosteverycausethatcandestroyeither thisoranyotherstate.Thosewhohavetakentheleadinsucha democracyhaveendeavouredtosupportit,andmakethepeoplepowerful bycollectingtogetherasmanypersonsastheycouldandgivingthem theirfreedom,notonlylegitimatelybutnaturallyborn,andalsoif eitheroftheirparentswerecitizens,thatistosay,ifeithertheir fatherormother;andthismethodisbettersuitedtothisstatethan anyother:andthusthedemagogueshaveusuallymanaged.Theyought, however,totakecare,anddothisnolongerthanthecommonpeople aresuperiortothenoblesandthoseofthemiddlerank,andthen stop;for,iftheyproceedstillfurther,theywillmakethestate disorderly,andthenobleswillillbrookthepowerofthecommon people,andbefullofresentmentagainstit;whichwasthecauseof aninsurrectionatCyrene:foralittleevilisoverlooked,butwhen itbecomesagreatoneitstrikestheeye.Itis,moreover, veryusefulinsuchastatetodoasClisthenesdidatAthens,whenhe wasdesirousofincreasingthepowerofthepeople,andasthosedid whoestablishedthedemocracyinCyrene;thatis,toinstitutemany tribesandfraternities,andtomakethereligiousritesofprivate personsfew,andthosecommon;andeverymeansistobecontrivedto associateandblendthepeopletogetherasmuchaspossible;andthat allformercustomsbebrokenthrough.Moreover,whatsoeveris practisedinatyrannyseemsadaptedtoademocracyofthisspecies; as,forinstance,thelicentiousnessoftheslaves,thewomen,andthe children;forthistoacertaindegreeisusefulinsuchastate;and alsotooverlookeveryone'slivingastheychoose;formanywill supportsuchagovernment:foritismoreagreeabletomanytolive withoutanycontrolthanasprudencewoulddirect. CHAPTERV

 Itisalsothebusinessofthelegislatorandallthosewhowould supportagovernmentofthissortnottomakeittoogreatawork,or tooperfect;buttoaimonlytorenderitstable:for,letastatebe constitutedeversobadly,thereisnodifficultyinitscontinuinga fewdays:theyshouldthereforeendeavourtoprocureitssafetybyall thosewayswhichwehavedescribedinassigningthecausesofthe preservationanddestructionofgovernments;avoidingwhatishurtful, andbyframingsuchlaws,writtenandunwritten,ascontainthose thingswhichchieflytendtothepreservationofthestate;norto supposethatthatisusefuleitherforademocraticor[1320a]an oligarchicformofgovernmentwhichcontributestomakethemmore purelyso,butwhatwillcontributetotheirduration:butour demagoguesatpresent,toflatterthepeople,occasionfrequent confiscationsinthecourts;forwhichreasonthosewhohavethe welfareofthestatereallyatheartshouldactdirectlyoppositeto whattheydo,andenactalawtopreventforfeituresfrombeing dividedamongstthepeopleorpaidintothetreasury,buttohavethem setapartforsacreduses:forthosewhoareofabaddisposition wouldnotthenbethelesscautious,astheirpunishmentwouldbethe same;andthecommunitywouldnotbesoreadytocondemnthosewhom theysatinjudgmentonwhentheyweretogetnothingbyit:they shouldalsotakecarethatthecauseswhicharebroughtbeforethe publicshouldbeasfewaspossible,andpunishwiththeutmost severitythosewhorashlybroughtanactionagainstanyone;foritis notthecommonsbutthenobleswhoaregenerallyprosecuted:forin allthingsthecitizensofthesamestateoughttobeaffectionateto eachother,atleastnottotreatthosewhohavethechiefpowerinit astheirenemies.Now,asthedemocracieswhichhavebeenlately establishedareverynumerous,anditisdifficulttogetthecommon peopletoattendthepublicassemblieswithouttheyarepaidforit, this,whenthereisnotasufficientpublicrevenue,isfataltothe nobles;forthedeficienciesthereinmustbenecessarilymadeupby taxes,confiscations,andfinesimposedbycorruptcourtsofjustice: whichthingshavealreadydestroyedmanydemocracies.Whenever,then, therevenuesofthestatearesmall,thereshouldbebutfewpublic assembliesandbutfewcourtsofjustice:these,however,shouldhave veryextensivejurisdictions,butshouldcontinuesittingafewdays only,forbythismeanstherichwouldnotfeartheexpense,although theyshouldreceivenothingfortheirattendance,thoughthepoordid; andjudgmentalsowouldbegivenmuchbetter;fortherichwillnot choosetobelongabsentfromtheirownaffairs,butwillwillinglybe soforashorttime:and,whentherearesufficientrevenues,a differentconductoughttobepursuedfromwhatthedemagoguesat presentfollow;fornowtheydividethesurplusofthepublicmoney amongstthepoor;thesereceiveitandagainwantthesamesupply, whilethegivingitislikepouringwaterintoasieve:butthetrue

patriotinademocracyoughttotakecarethatthemajorityofthe communityarenottoopoor,forthisisthecauseofrapacityinthat government;hethereforeshouldendeavourthattheymayenjoy perpetualplenty;andasthisalsoisadvantageoustotherich,what canbesavedoutofthepublicmoneyshouldbeputby,andthen dividedatonceamongstthepoor,ifpossible,insuchaquantityas mayenableeveryoneofthemtopurchasealittlefield,and,ifthat cannotbedone,atleasttogiveeachofthemenoughtoprocurethe implements[1320b]oftradeandhusbandry;andifthereisnotenough foralltoreceivesomuchatonce,thentodivideitaccordingto tribesoranyotherallotment.Inthemeantimelettherichpaythem fornecessaryservices,butnotbeobligedtofindtheminuseless amusements.Andsomethinglikethiswasthemannerinwhichthey managedatCarthage,andpreservedtheaffectionsofthepeople;for bycontinuallysendingsomeoftheircommunityintocoloniesthey procuredplenty.Itisalsoworthyofasensibleandgenerousnobility todividethepooramongstthem,andsupplyingthemwithwhatis necessary,inducethemtowork;ortoimitatetheconductofthe peopleatTarentum:forthey,permittingthepoortopartakeincommon ofeverythingwhichisneedfulforthem,gaintheaffectionsofthe commonalty.Theyhavealsotwodifferentwaysofelectingtheir magistrates;forsomearechosenbyvote,othersbylot;bythelast, thatthepeopleatlargemayhavesomeshareintheadministration;by theformer,thatthestatemaybewellgoverned:thesamemaybe accomplishedifofthesamemagistratesyouchoosesomebyvote, othersbylot.Andthusmuchforthemannerinwhichdemocraciesought tobeestablished. CHAPTERVI Whathasbeenalreadysaidwillalmostofitselfsufficientlyshowhow anoligarchyoughttobefounded;forhewhowouldframesuchastate shouldhaveinhisviewademocracytoopposeit;foreveryspeciesof oligarchyshouldbefoundedonprinciplesdiametricallyoppositeto somespeciesofdemocracy. Thefirstandbestframedoligarchyisthatwhichapproachesnearto whatwecallafreestate;inwhichthereoughttobetwodifferent census,theonehigh,theotherlow:fromthosewhoarewithinthe lattertheordinaryofficersofthestateoughttobechosen;fromthe formerthesuprememagistrates:norshouldanyonebeexcludedfroma partoftheadministrationwhowaswithinthecensus;whichshouldbe soregulatedthatthecommonaltywhoareincludedinitshouldby meansthereofbesuperiortothosewhohavenoshareinthe

government;forthosewhoaretohavethemanagementofpublicaffairs oughtalwaystobechosenoutofthebettersortofthepeople.Much inthesamemanneroughtthatoligarchytobeestablishedwhichis nextinorder:butastothatwhichismostoppositetoapure democracy,andapproachesnearesttoadynastyandatyranny,asitis ofallotherstheworst,soitrequiresthegreatestcareandcaution topreserveit:forasbodiesofsoundandhealthyconstitutionsand shipswhicharewellmannedandwellfoundforsailingcanbearmany injurieswithoutperishing,whileadiseasedbodyoraleakyshipwith anindifferentcrewcannotsupportthe[1321a]leastshock;sothe worstestablishedgovernmentswantmostlookingafter.Anumberof citizensisthepreservationofademocracy;fortheseareopposedto thoserightswhicharefoundedinrank:onthecontrary,the preservationofanoligarchydependsuponthedueregulationofthe differentordersinthesociety. CHAPTERVII Asthegreaterpartofthecommunityaredividedintofoursortsof people;husbandmen,mechanics,traders,andhiredservants;andas thosewhoareemployedinwarmaylikewisebedividedintofour;the horsemen,theheavyarmedsoldier,thelightarmed,andthesailor, wherethenatureofthecountrycanadmitagreatnumberofhorse; thereapowerfuloligarchymaybeeasilyestablished:forthesafety oftheinhabitantsdependsuponaforceofthatsort;butthosewho cansupporttheexpenseofhorsemenmustbepersonsofsome considerablefortune.Wherethetroopsarechieflyheavyarmed,there anoligarchy,inferiorinpowertotheother,maybeestablished;for theheavyarmedarerathermadeupofmenofsubstancethanthepoor: butthelightarmedandthesailorsalwayscontributetosupporta democracy:butwherethenumberoftheseisverygreatandasedition arises,theotherpartsofthecommunityfightatadisadvantage;but aremedyforthisevilistobelearnedfromskilfulgenerals,who alwaysmixapropernumberoflightarmedsoldierswiththeirhorse andheavyarmed:foritiswiththosethatthepopulacegetthebetter ofthemenoffortuneinaninsurrection;forthesebeinglighterare easilyamatchforthehorseandtheheavyarmed:sothatforan oligarchytoformabodyoftroopsfromtheseistoformitagainst itself:butasacityiscomposedofpersonsofdifferentages,some youngandsomeold,thefathersshouldteachtheirsons,whilethey wereveryyoung,alightandeasyexercise;but,whentheyaregrown up,theyshouldbeperfectineverywarlikeexercise.Now,the admissionofthepeopletoanyshareinthegovernmentshouldeither be(asIsaidbefore)regulatedbyacensus,orelse,asatThebes,

allowedtothosewhoforacertaintimehaveceasedfromanymechanic employment,orasatMassalia,wheretheyarechosenaccordingto theirworth,whethercitizensorforeigners.Withrespecttothe magistratesofthehighestrankwhichitmaybenecessarytohaveina state,theservicestheyareboundtodothepublicshouldbe expresslylaiddown,topreventthecommonpeoplefrombeingdesirous ofacceptingtheiremployments,andalsotoinducethemtoregard theirmagistrateswithfavourwhentheyknowwhatapricetheypayfor theirhonours.Itisalsonecessarythatthemagistrates,upon enteringintotheiroffices,shouldmakemagnificentsacrificesand erectsomepublicstructure,thatthepeoplepartakingofthe entertainment,andseeingthecityornamentedwithvotivegiftsin theirtemplesandpublicstructures,mayseewithpleasurethe stabilityofthegovernment:addtothisalso,thatthenobleswill havetheirgenerosityrecorded:butnowthisisnottheconductwhich thosewhoareatpresentattheheadofanoligarchypursue,butthe contrary;fortheyarenotmoredesirousofhonourthanofgain;for whichreasonsucholigarchiesmaymoreproperlybecalledlittle democracies.Thus[1321b]wehaveexplainedonwhatprinciplesa democracyandanoligarchyoughttobeestablished. CHAPTERVIII AfterwhathasbeensaidIproceednexttotreatparticularlyofthe magistrates;ofwhatnaturetheyshouldbe,howmany,andforwhat purpose,asIhavealreadymentioned:forwithoutnecessary magistratesnostatecanexist,norwithoutthosewhichcontributeto itsdignityandgoodordercanexisthappily:nowitisnecessarythat insmallstatesthemagistratesshouldbefew;inalargeone,many: alsotoknowwellwhatofficesmaybejoinedtogether,andwhatought tobeseparated.Thefirstthingnecessaryistoestablishproper regulatorsinthemarkets;forwhichpurposeacertainmagistrate shouldbeappointedtoinspecttheircontractsandpreservegood order;forofnecessity,inalmosteverycitytheremustbeboth buyersandsellerstosupplyeachother'smutualwants:andthisis whatismostproductiveofthecomfortsoflife;forthesakeofwhich menseemtohavejoinedtogetherinonecommunity.Asecondcare,and nearlyrelatedtothefirst,istohaveaneyebothtothepublicand privateedificesinthecity,thattheymaybeanornament;andalso totakecareofallbuildingswhicharelikelytofall:andtosee thatthehighwaysarekeptinproperrepair;andalsothatthe landmarksbetweendifferentestatesarepreserved,thattheremaybe nodisputesonthataccount;andallotherbusinessofthesame nature.Now,thisbusinessmaybedividedintoseveralbranches,over

eachofwhichinpopulouscitiestheyappointaseparateperson;one toinspectthebuildings,anotherthefountains,anothertheharbours; andtheyarecalledtheinspectorsofthecity.Athird,whichis verylikethelast,andconversantnearlyaboutthesameobjects,only inthecountry,istotakecareofwhatisdoneoutofthecity.The officerswhohavethisemploymentwecallinspectorsofthelands,or inspectorsofthewoods;butthebusinessofallthreeofthemisthe same.Theremustalsobeotherofficersappointedtoreceivethe publicrevenueandtodeliveritouttothosewhoareinthedifferent departmentsofthestate:thesearecalledreceiversorquaestors. Theremustalsobeanother,beforewhomallprivatecontractsand sentencesofcourtsshouldbeenrolled,aswellasproceedingsand declarations.Sometimesthisemploymentisdividedamongstmany,but thereisonesupremeovertherest;thesearecalledproctors, notaries,andthelike.Nexttotheseisanofficerwhosebusinessis ofallothersthemostnecessary,andyetmostdifficult;namely,to takecarethatsentenceisexecuteduponthosewhoarecondemned;and thateveryonepaysthefineslaidonhim;andalsotohavethecharge ofthosewhoareinprison.[1322a]Thisofficeisverydisagreeable onaccountoftheodiumattendingit,sothatnoonewillengage thereinwithoutitismadeveryprofitable,or,iftheydo,willthey bewillingtoexecuteitaccordingtolaw;butitismostnecessary, asitisofnoservicetopassjudgmentinanycausewithoutthat judgmentiscarriedintoexecution:forwithoutthishumansociety couldnotsubsist:forwhichreasonitisbestthatthisofficeshould notbeexecutedbyoneperson,butbysomeofthemagistratesofthe othercourts.Inlikemanner,thetakingcarethatthosefineswhich areorderedbythejudgesareleviedshouldbedividedamongst differentpersons.Andasdifferentmagistratesjudgedifferent causes,letthecausesoftheyoungbeheardbytheyoung:andasto thosewhicharealreadybroughttoahearing,letonepersonpass sentence,andanotherseeitexecuted:as,forinstance,letthe magistrateswhohavethecareofthepublicbuildingsexecutethe sentencewhichtheinspectorsofthemarketshavepassed,andthelike inothercases:forbysomuchthelessodiumattendsthosewhocarry thelawsintoexecution,bysomuchtheeasierwilltheybeproperly putinforce:thereforeforthesamepersonstopassthesentenceand toexecuteitwillsubjectthemtogeneralhatred;andiftheypassit uponall,theywillbeconsideredastheenemiesofall.Thusone personhasoftenthecustodyoftheprisoner'sbody,whileanother seesthesentenceagainsthimexecuted,astheelevendidatAthens: forwhichreasonitisprudenttoseparatetheseoffices,andtogive greatattentionthereuntoasequallynecessarywithanythingwehave alreadymentioned;foritwillcertainlyhappenthatmenofcharacter willdeclineacceptingthisoffice,andworthlesspersonscannot properlybeentrustedwithit,ashavingthemselvesratheranoccasion foraguardthanbeingqualifiedtoguardothers.This,therefore, oughtbynomeanstobeaseparateofficefromothers;norshouldit

becontinuallyallottedtoanyindividuals,buttheyoungmen;where thereisacityguard,theyouthsoughtinturnstotaketheseoffices uponthem.These,then,asthemostnecessarymagistrates,oughttobe firstmentioned:nexttotheseareothersnolessnecessary,butof muchhigherrank,fortheyoughttobemenofgreatskilland fidelity.Thesearetheywhohavetheguardofthecity,andprovide everythingthatisnecessaryforwar;whosebusinessitis,bothin warandpeace,todefendthewallsandthegates,andtotakecareto musterandmarshalthecitizens.Overallthesetherearesometimes moreofficers,sometimesfewer:thusinlittlecitiesthereisonly onewhomtheycalleithergeneralorpolemarch;butwherethereare horseandlightarmedtroops,andbowmen,andsailors,theysometimes putdistinctcommandersovereachofthese;whoagainhaveothers underthem,accordingtotheirdifferentdivisions;allofwhichjoin togethertomakeonemilitarybody:andthusmuchforthisdepartment. Sincesomeofthemagistrates,ifnotall,havebusinesswiththe publicmoney,itisnecessarythatthereshouldbeotherofficers, whoseemploymentshouldbenothingelsethantotakeanaccountof whattheyhave,andcorrectanymismanagementtherein.Butbesidesall thesemagistratesthereisonewhoissupremeoverthemall,whovery oftenhasinhisownpowerthedisposalofthepublicrevenueand taxes;whopresidesoverthepeoplewhenthesupremepowerisinthem; fortheremustbesomemagistratewhohasapowertosummonthem together,andtopresideasheadofthestate.Thesearesometimes calledpreadvisers;butwheretherearemany,moreproperlyacouncil. Thesearenearlythecivilmagistrateswhicharerequisitetoa government:butthereareotherpersonswhosebusinessisconfinedto religion;asthepriests,andthosewhoaretotakecareofthe temples,thattheyarekeptinproperrepair,or,iftheyfalldown, thattheymayberebuilt;andwhateverelsebelongstopublicworship. Thischargeissometimesentrustedtooneperson,asinverysmall cities:inothersitisdelegatedtomany,andthesedistinctfromthe priesthood,asthebuildersorkeepersofholyplaces,andofficersof thesacredrevenue.Nexttothesearethosewhoareappointedtohave thegeneralcareofallthosepublicsacrificestothetutelargodof thestate,whichthelawsdonotentrusttothepriests:andthesein differentstateshavedifferentappellations.Toenumerateinfew wordsthedifferentdepartmentsofallthosemagistrateswhoare necessary:theseareeitherreligion,war,taxes,expenditures, markets,publicbuildings,harbours,highways.Belongingtothecourts ofjusticetherearescribestoenrollprivatecontracts;andthere mustalsobeguardssetovertheprisoners,otherstoseethelawis executed,counciloneitherside,andalsootherstowatchoverthe conductofthosewhoaretodecidethecauses.Amongstthemagistrates alsomayfinallybereckonedthosewhoaretogivetheiradvicein publicaffairs.Butseparatestates,whoarepeculiarlyhappyandhave leisuretoattendtomoreminuteparticulars,andareveryattentive togoodorder,requireparticularmagistratesforthemselves;suchas

thosewhohavethegovernmentofthewomen;whoaretoseethelaws areexecuted;whotakecareoftheboysandpresideovertheir education.Tothesemaybeaddedthosewhohavethecareoftheir gymnasticexercises,[1323a]theirtheatres,andeveryotherpublic spectaclewhichtheremayhappentobe.Someofthese,however,are notofgeneraluse;asthegovernorsofthewomen:forthepoorare obligedtoemploytheirwivesandchildreninservileofficesforwant ofslaves.Astherearethreemagistratestowhomsomestatesentrust thesupremepower;namely,guardiansofthelaws,preadvisers,and senators;guardiansofthelawssuitbesttoanaristocracy, preadviserstoanoligarchy,andasenatetoademocracy.Andthus muchbrieflyconcerningallmagistrates. BOOKVII CHAPTERI Hewhoproposestomakethatinquirywhichisnecessaryconcerning whatgovernmentisbest,oughtfirsttodeterminewhatmannerof livingismosteligible;forwhilethisremainsuncertainitwillalso beequallyuncertainwhatgovernmentisbest:for,providedno unexpectedaccidentsinterfere,itishighlyprobable,thatthosewho enjoythebestgovernmentwilllivethemosthappilyaccordingto theircircumstances;heought,therefore,firsttoknowwhatmannerof lifeismostdesirableforall;andafterwardswhetherthislifeis thesametothemanandthecitizen,ordifferent.AsIimaginethatI havealreadysufficientlyshownwhatsortoflifeisbestinmy populardiscoursesonthatsubject,IthinkImayveryproperlyrepeat thesamehere;asmostcertainlynooneevercalledinquestionthe proprietyofoneofthedivisions;namely,thataswhatisgood, relativetoman,maybedividedintothreesorts,whatisexternal, whatappertainstothebody,andwhattothesoul,itisevidentthat allthesemustconspiretomakeamanhappy:fornoonewouldsaythat amanwashappywhohadnofortitude,notemperance,nojustice,no prudence;butwasafraidofthefliesthatflewroundhim:norwould abstainfromthemeanesttheftifhewaseitherhungryordry,or wouldmurderhisdearestfriendforafarthing;andalsowasinevery particularaswantinginhisunderstandingasaninfantoranidiot. Thesetruthsaresoevidentthatallmustagreetothem;thoughsome maydisputeaboutthequantityandthedegree:fortheymaythink, thataverylittlevirtueissufficientforhappiness;butforriches,

property,power,honour,andallsuchthings,theyendeavourto increasethemwithoutbounds:buttosuchwereply,thatitiseasyto provefromwhatexperienceteachesusinthesecases,thatthese externalgoodsproducenotvirtue,butvirtuethem.Astoahappy life,whetheritistobefoundinpleasureorvirtueorboth,certain itis,thatthosewhosemoralsaremostpure,andwhoseunderstandings arebestcultivated,willenjoymoreofit,althoughtheirfortuneis butmoderatethanthosedowhoownanexuberanceofwealth,are deficientinthose;andthisutilityanyonewhoreflectsmayeasily convincehimselfof;forwhatsoeverisexternalhasitsboundary,asa machine,andwhatsoeverisusefulinitsexcessiseithernecessarily hurtful,oratbestuselesstothepossessor;buteverygoodquality ofthesoulthehigheritisindegree,somuchthemoreusefulitis, ifitispermittedonthissubjecttousethewordusefulaswellas noble.Itisalsoveryevident,thattheaccidentsofeachsubject takeplaceofeachother,asthesubjectsthemselves,ofwhichwe allowtheyareaccidents,differfromeachotherinvalue;sothatif thesoulismorenoblethananyoutwardpossession,asthebody,both initselfandwithrespecttous,itmustbeadmittedofcoursethat thebestaccidentsofeachmustfollowthesameanalogy.Besides,it isforthesakeofthesoulthatthesethingsaredesirable;anditis onthisaccountthatwisemenshoulddesirethem,notthesoulfor them.Letusthereforebewellassured,thateveryoneenjoysasmuch happinessashepossessesvirtueandwisdom,andactsaccordingto theirdictates;sinceforthiswehavetheexampleofGODHimself,WHO ISCOMPLETELYHAPPY,NOTFROMANYEXTERNALGOOD;BUTINHlMSELF,AND BECAUSESUCHISHISNATURE.Forgoodfortuneissomethingdifferent fromhappiness,aseverygoodwhichdependsnotonthemindisowing tochanceorfortune;butitisnotfromfortunethatanyoneiswise andjust:henceitfollows,thatthatcityishappiestwhichisthe bestandactsbest:fornoonecandowellwhoactsnotwell;norcan thedeedseitherofmanorcitybepraiseworthywithoutvirtueand wisdom;forwhatsoeverisjust,orwise,orprudentinaman,thesame thingsarejust,wise,andprudentinacity. Thusmuchbywayofintroduction;forIcouldnotbutjusttouchupon thissubject,thoughIcouldnotgothroughacompleteinvestigation ofit,asitproperlybelongstoanotherquestion:letusatpresent supposesomuch,thataman'shappiestlife,bothasanindividualand asacitizen,isalifeofvirtue,accompaniedwiththoseenjoyments whichvirtueusuallyprocures.If[1324a]thereareanywhoarenot convincedbywhatIhavesaid,theirdoubtsshallbeanswered hereafter,atpresentweshallproceedaccordingtoourintended method.

CHAPTERII Itnowremainsforustosaywhetherthehappinessofanyindividual manandthecityisthesameordifferent:butthisalsoisevident; forwhosoeversupposesthatricheswillmakeapersonhappy,must placethehappinessofthecityinrichesifitpossessesthem;those whopreferalifewhichenjoysatyrannicpoweroverotherswillalso think,thatthecitywhichhasmanyothersunderitscommandismost happy:thusalsoifanyoneapprovesamanforhisvirtue,hewill thinkthemostworthycitythehappiest:butheretherearetwo particularswhichrequireconsideration,oneofwhichis,whetherit isthemosteligiblelifetobeamemberofthecommunityandenjoy therightsofacitizen,orwhethertoliveasastranger,without interferinginpublicaffairs;andalsowhatformofgovernmentisto bepreferred,andwhatdispositionofthestateisbest;whetherthe wholecommunityshouldbeeligibletoashareintheadministration, oronlythegreaterpart,andsomeonly:asthis,therefore,isa subjectofpoliticalexaminationandspeculation,andnotwhat concernstheindividual,andthefirstoftheseiswhatweareat presentengagedin,theoneoftheseIamnotobligedtospeakto,the otheristheproperbusinessofmypresentdesign.Itisevidentthat governmentmustbethebestwhichissoestablished,thateveryone thereinmayhaveitinhispowertoactvirtuouslyandlivehappily: butsome,whoadmitthatalifeo!virtueismosteligible,still doubtwhichispreferableapubliclifeofactivevirtue,orone entirelydisengagedfromwhatiswithoutandspentincontemplation; whichsomesayistheonlyoneworthyofaphilosopher;andoneof thesetwodifferentmodesoflifebothnowandformerlyseemtohave beenchosenbyallthosewhowerethemostvirtuousmen;Imeanthe publicorphilosophic.Andyetitisofnolittleconsequenceonwhich sidethetruthlies;foramanofsensemustnaturallyinclinetothe betterchoice;bothasanindividualandacitizen.Somethinkthata tyrannicgovernmentoverthosenearusisthegreatestinjustice;but thatapoliticaloneisnotunjust:butthatstillisarestrainton thepleasuresandtranquillityoflife.Othersholdthequite contraryopinion,andthinkthatapublicandactivelifeistheonly lifeforman:forthatprivatepersonshavenoopportunityof practisinganyonevirtue,morethantheyhavewhoareengagedin publiclifethemanagementofthe[1324b]state.Thesearetheir sentiments;otherssay,thatatyrannicalanddespoticalmodeof governmentistheonlyhappyone;forevenamongstsomefreestates theobjectoftheirlawsseemstobetotyranniseovertheir neighbours:sothatthegeneralityofpoliticalinstitutions, wheresoeverdispersed,iftheyhaveanyonecommonobjectinview, haveallofthemthis,toconquerandgovern.Itisevident,bothfrom thelawsoftheLacedaemoniansandCretans,aswellasbythemanner inwhichtheyeducatedtheirchildren,thatallwhichtheyhadinview

wastomakethemsoldiers:besides,amongallnations,thosewhohave powerenoughandreduceotherstoservitudearehonouredonthat account;asweretheScythians,Persians,Thracians,andGauls:with sometherearelawstoheightenthevirtueofcourage;thustheytell usthatatCarthagetheyallowedeverypersontowearasmanyrings fordistinctionashehadservedcampaigns.Therewasalsoalawin Macedonia,thatamanwhohadnothimselfkilledanenemyshouldbe obligedtowearahalter;amongtheScythians,atafestival,none werepermittedtodrinkoutofthecupwascarriedaboutwhohadnot donethesamething.AmongtheIberians,awarlikenation,theyfixed asmanycolumnsuponaman'stombashehadslainenemies:andamong differentnationsdifferentthingsofthissortprevail,someofthem establishedbylaw,othersbycustom.Probablyitmayseemtooabsurd tothosewhoarewillingtotakethissubjectintotheirconsideration toinquirewhetheritisthebusinessofalegislatortobeableto pointoutbywhatmeansastatemaygovernandtyranniseoverits neighbours,whethertheywill,orwillnot:forhowcanthatbelong eithertothepoliticianorlegislatorwhichisunlawful?forthat cannotbelawfulwhichisdonenotonlyjustly,butunjustlyalso:for aconquestmaybeunjustlymade.Butweseenothingofthisinthe arts:foritisthebusinessneitherofthephysiciannorthepilotto useeitherpersuasionorforce,theonetohispatients,theotherto hispassengers:andyetmanyseemtothinkadespoticgovernmentisa politicalone,andwhattheywouldnotallowtobejustorproper,if exercisedoverthemselves,theywillnotblushtoexerciseover others;fortheyendeavourtobewiselygovernedthemselves,butthink itofnoconsequencewhetherothersaresoornot:butadespotic powerisabsurd,exceptonlywherenaturehasframedtheonepartyfor dominion,theotherforsubordination;andthereforenooneoughtto assumeitoverallingeneral,butthoseonlywhicharetheproper objectsthereof:thusnooneshouldhuntmeneitherforfoodor sacrifice,butwhatisfitforthosepurposes,andthesearewild animalswhichareeatable. Nowacitywhichiswellgovernedmightbevery[1325a]happyin itselfwhileitenjoyedagoodsystemoflaws,althoughitshould happentobesosituatedastohavenoconnectionwithanyother state,thoughitsconstitutionshouldnotbeframedforwaror conquest;foritwouldthenhavenooccasionforthese.Itisevident thereforethatthebusinessofwaristobeconsideredascommendable, notasafinalend,butasthemeansofprocuringit.Itistheduty ofagoodlegislatortoexaminecarefullyintohisstate;andthe natureofthepeople,andhowtheymaypartakeofeveryintercourse, ofagoodlife,andofthehappinesswhichresultsfromit:andin thisrespectsomelawsandcustomsdifferfromothers.Itisalsothe dutyofalegislator,ifhehasanyneighbouringstatestoconsiderin whatmannerheshallopposeeachofthem'orwhatgoodofficeshe shallshowthem.Butwhatshouldbethefinalendofthebest

governmentswillbeconsideredhereafter. CHAPTERIII Wewillnowspeaktothosewho,whiletheyagreethatalifeofvirtue ismosteligible,yetdifferintheuseofitaddressingourselvesto boththeseparties;fortherearesomewhodisapproveofallpolitical governments,andthinkthatthelifeofonewhoisreallyfreeis differentfromthelifeofacitizen,andofallothersmosteligible: othersagainthinkthatthecitizenisthebest;andthatitis impossibleforhimwhodoesnothingtobewellemployed;butthat virtuousactivityandhappinessarethesamething.Nowbothparties insomeparticularssaywhatisright,inotherswhatiswrong,thus, thatthelifeofafreemanisbetterthanthelifeofaslaveistrue, foraslave,asaslave,isemployedinnothinghonourable;forthe commonservileemploymentswhichheiscommandedtoperformhave nothingvirtuousinthem;but,ontheotherhand,itisnottruethat asubmissiontoallsortsofgovernmentsisslavery;forthe governmentoffreemendiffersnotmorefromthegovernmentofslaves thanslaveryandfreedomdifferfromeachotherintheirnature;and howtheydohasbeenalreadymentioned.Topreferdoingofnothingto virtuousactivityisalsowrong,forhappinessconsistsinaction,and manynobleendsareproducedbytheactionsofthejustandwise.From whatwehavealreadydeterminedonthissubject,someoneprobablymay think,thatsupremepowerisofallthingsbest,asthatwillenablea mantocommandverymanyusefulservicesfromothers;sothathewho canobtainthisoughtnottogiveituptoanother,butratherto seizeit:and,forthispurpose,thefathershouldhavenoattention orregardfortheson,orthesonforthefather,orfriendfor friend;forwhatisbestismosteligible:buttobeamemberofthe communityandbeinfelicityisbest.Whatthesepersonsadvancemight probablybetrue,ifthesupremegoodwascertainlytheirswhoplunder anduseviolencetoothers:butitis[1325b]mostunlikelythatit shouldbeso;foritisameresupposition:foritdoesnotfollow thattheiractionsarehonourablewhothusassumethesupremepower overothers,withouttheywerebynatureassuperiortothemasaman toawoman,afathertoachild,amastertoaslave:sothathewho sofarforsakesthepathsofvirtuecanneverreturnbackfromwhence hedepartedfromthem:foramongstequalswhateverisfairandjust oughttobereciprocal;forthisisequalandright;butthatequals shouldnotpartakeofwhatisequal,orliketolike,iscontraryto nature:butwhateveriscontrarytonatureisnotright;therefore,if thereisanyonesuperiortotherestofthecommunityinvirtueand abilitiesforactivelife,himitispropertofollow,himitisright

toobey,buttheonealonewillnotdo,butmustbejoinedtothe otheralso:and,ifwearerightinwhatwehavenowsaid,itfollows thathappinessconsistsinvirtuousactivity,andthatbothwith respecttothecommunityaswellastheindividualanactivelifeis thehappiest:notthatanactivelifemustnecessarilyrefertoother persons,assomethink,orthatthosestudiesalonearepractical whicharepursuedtoteachotherswhattodo;forthosearemuchmore sowhosefinalobjectisinthemselves,andtoimprovethejudgment andunderstandingoftheman;forvirtuousactivityhasanend, thereforeissomethingpractical;nay,thosewhocontrivetheplan whichothersfollowaremoreparticularlysaidtoact,andare superiortotheworkmenwhoexecutetheirdesigns.Butitisnot necessarythatstateswhichchoosetohavenointercoursewithothers shouldremaininactive;fortheseveralmembersthereofmayhave mutualintercoursewitheachother;fortherearemanyopportunities forthisamongthedifferentcitizens;thesamethingistrueofevery individual:for,wasitotherwise,neithercouldtheDeitynorthe universebeperfect;toneitherofwhomcananythingexternal separatelyexist.Henceitisevidentthatthatverysamelifewhich ishappyforeachindividualishappyalsoforthestateandevery memberofit. CHAPTERIV AsIhavenowfinishedwhatwasintroductorytothissubject,and consideredatlargethenatureofotherstates,itnowremainsthatI shouldfirstsaywhatoughttobetheestablishmentofacitywhich oneshouldformaccordingtoone'swish;fornogoodstatecanexist withoutamoderateproportionofwhatisnecessary.Manythings thereforeoughttobeforethoughtofasdesirable,butnoneofthem suchasareimpossible:Imeanrelativetothenumberofcitizensand theextentoftheterritory:forasotherartificers,suchasthe weaverandtheshipwright,oughttohavesuchmaterialsasarefitfor theirwork,sincesomuchthebettertheyare,bysomuch[1326a] superiorwilltheworkitselfnecessarilybe;soalsooughtthe legislatorandpoliticianendeavourtoprocurepropermaterialsfor thebusinesstheyhaveinhand.Nowthefirstandprincipalinstrument ofthepoliticianisthenumberofthepeople;heshouldtherefore knowhowmany,andwhattheynaturallyoughttobe:inlikemannerthe country,howlarge,andwhatitis.Mostpersonsthinkthatitis necessaryforacitytobelargetobehappy:but,shouldthisbe true,theycannottellwhatisalargeoneandwhatasmallone;for accordingtothemultitudeoftheinhabitantstheyestimatethe greatnessofit;buttheyoughtrathertoconsideritsstrengththan

itsnumbers;forastatehasacertainobjectinview,andfromthe powerwhichithasinitselfofaccomplishingit,itsgreatnessought tobeestimated;asapersonmightsay,thatHippocrateswasagreater physician,thoughnotagreaterman,thanonethatexceededhiminthe sizeofhisbody:butifitwaspropertodeterminethestrengthof thecityfromthenumberoftheinhabitants,itshouldneverbe collectedfromthemultitudeingeneralwhomayhappentobeinit; forinacitytheremustnecessarilybemanyslaves,sojourners,and foreigners;butfromthosewhoarereallypartofthecityand properlyconstituteitsmembers;amultitudeoftheseisindeeda proofofalargecity,butinastatewherealargenumberof mechanicsinhabit,andbutfewsoldiers,suchastatecannotbegreat; forthegreatnessofthecity,andthenumberofmeninit,arenot thesamething.Thistooisevidentfromfact,thatitisvery difficult,ifnotimpossible,togovernproperlyaverynumerousbody ofmen;forofallthestateswhichappearwellgovernedwefindnot onewheretherightsofacitizenareopentoanindiscriminate multitude.Andthisisalsoevidentfromthenatureofthething;for aslawisacertainorder,sogoodlawisofcourseacertaingood order:buttoolargeamultitudeareincapableofthis,unlessunder thegovernmentofthatDIVINEPOWERwhichcomprehendstheuniverse. Notbutthat,asquantityandvarietyareusuallyessentialtobeauty, theperfectionofacityconsistsinthelargenessofitasfaras thatlargenessisconsistentwiththatorderalreadymentioned:but stillthereisadeterminatesizetoallcities,aswellaseverything else,whetheranimals,plants,ormachines,foreachofthese,ifthey areneithertoolittlenortoobig,havetheirproperpowers;butwhen theyhavenottheirduegrowth,orarebadlyconstructed,asashipa spanlongisnotproperlyaship,noroneoftwofurlongslength,but whenitisofafitsize;foreitherfromitssmallnessorfromits largenessitmaybequiteuseless:soisitwithacity;onethatis toosmallhasnot[1326b]initselfthepowerofselfdefence,but thisisessentialtoacity:onethatistoolargeiscapableof selfdefenceinwhatisnecessary;butthenitisanationandnota city:foritwillbeverydifficulttoaccommodateaformof governmenttoit:forwhowouldchoosetobethegeneralofsuchan unwieldymultitude,orwhocouldbetheirheraldbutastentor?The firstthingthereforenecessaryis,thatacityshouldconsistofsuch numbersaswillbesufficienttoenabletheinhabitantstolive happilyintheirpoliticalcommunity:anditfollows,thatthemore theinhabitantsexceedthatnecessarynumberthegreaterwillthecity be:butthismustnotbe,aswehavealreadysaid,withoutbounds;but whatisitsproperlimitexperiencewilleasilyshow,andthis experienceistobecollectedfromtheactionsbothofthegovernors andthegoverned.Now,asitbelongstothefirsttodirectthe inferiormagistratesandtoactasjudges,itfollowsthattheycan neitherdeterminecauseswithjusticenorissuetheirorderswith proprietywithouttheyknowthecharactersoftheirfellowcitizens:

sothatwheneverthishappensnottobedoneinthesetwoparticulars, thestatemustofnecessitybebadlymanaged;forinbothofthemit isnotrighttodeterminetoohastilyandwithoutproperknowledge, whichmustevidentlybethecasewherethenumberofthecitizensis toomany:besides,itismoreeasyforstrangersandsojournersto assumetherightsofcitizens,astheywilleasilyescapedetectionin sogreatamultitude.Itisevident,then,thatthebestboundaryfor acityisthatwhereinthenumbersarethegreatestpossible,that theymaybethebetterabletobesufficientinthemselves,whileat thesametimetheyarenottoolargetobeundertheeyeand governmentofthemagistrates.Andthusletusdeterminetheextentof acity. CHAPTERV Whatwehavesaidconcerningacitymaynearlybeappliedtoa country;forastowhatsoilitshouldbe,everyoneevidentlywill commenditifitissuchasissufficientinitselftofurnishwhat willmaketheinhabitantshappy;forwhichpurposeitmustbeableto supplythemwithallthenecessariesoflife;foritisthehaving theseinplenty,withoutanywant,whichmakesthemcontent.Astoits extent,itshouldbesuchasmayenabletheinhabitantstoliveat theireasewithfreedomandtemperance.Whetherwehavedonerightor wronginfixingthislimittotheterritoryshallbeconsideredmore minutelyhereafter,whenwecomeparticularlytoinquireinto property,andwhatfortuneisrequisiteforamantoliveon,andhow andinwhatmannertheyoughttoemployit;fortherearemanydoubts uponthisquestion,whileeachpartyinsistsupontheirownplanof lifebeingcarriedtoanexcess,theoneofseverity,theotherof indulgence.Whatthesituationofthecountryshouldbeitisnot difficulttodetermine,insomeparticularsrespectingthatweought tobeadvisedbythosewhoareskilfulinmilitaryaffairs.Itshould bedifficultofaccesstoanenemy,buteasytotheinhabitants:and aswesaid,thatthenumberof[1327a]inhabitantsoughttobesuchas cancomeundertheeyeofthemagistrate,soshoulditbewiththe country;forthenitiseasilydefended.Astothepositionofthe city,ifonecouldplaceittoone'swish,itisconvenienttofixit ontheseaside:withrespecttothecountry,onesituationwhichit oughttohavehasbeenalreadymentioned,namely,thatitshouldbeso placedaseasilytogiveassistancetoallplaces,andalsotoreceive thenecessariesoflifefromallparts,andalsowood,oranyother materialswhichmayhappentobeinthecountry.

 CHAPTERVI Butwithrespecttoplacingacityintheneighbourhoodofthesea, therearesomewhohavemanydoubtswhetheritisserviceableor hurtfultoawellregulatedstate;fortheysay,thattheresortof personsbroughtupunderadifferentsystemofgovernmentis disserviceabletothestate,aswellbyimpedingthelawsasbytheir numbers;foramultitudeofmerchantsmustnecessarilyarisefrom theirtraffickingbackwardandforwardupontheseas,whichwill hinderthewellgoverningofthecity:butifthisinconvenience shouldnotarise,itisevidentthatitisbetter,bothonaccountof safetyandalsofortheeasieracquisitionofthenecessariesoflife, thatboththecityandthecountryshouldbenearthesea;foritis necessarythatthosewhoaretosustaintheattackoftheenemyshould bereadywiththeirassistancebothbylandandbysea,andtooppose anyinroad,bothwaysifpossiblebutifnot,atleastwheretheyare mostpowerful,whichtheymaydowhiletheypossessboth.Amaritime situationisalsousefulforreceivingfromotherswhatyourown countrywillnotproduce,andexportingthosenecessariesofyourown growthwhicharemorethanyouhaveoccasionfor;butacityoughtto traffictosupplyitsownwants,andnotthewantsofothers;for thosewhothemselvesfurnishanopenmarketforeveryone,doitfor thesakeofgain;whichitisnotproperforawellestablishedstate todo,neithershouldtheyencouragesuchacommerce.Now,aswesee thatmanyplacesandcitieshavedocksandharbourslyingvery convenientforthecity,whilethosewhofrequentthemhaveno communicationwiththecitadel,andyettheyarenottoofaroff,but aresurroundedbywallsandsuchlikefortifications,itisevident, thatifanygoodarisesfromsuchanintercoursethecitywillreceive it,butifanythinghurtful,itwillbeeasytorestrainitbyalaw declaringanddeputingwhomthestatewillallowtohavean intercoursewitheachother,andwhomnot.Astoanavalpower,itis bynomeansdoubtfulthatitisnecessarytohaveonetoacertain degree;andthisnotonlyforthesakeofthe[1327b]cityitself,but alsobecauseitmaybenecessarytoappearformidabletosomeofthe neighbouringstates,ortobeabletoassistthemaswellbyseaasby land;buttoknowhowgreatthatforceshouldbe,thehealthofthe stateshouldbeinquiredinto,andifthatappearsvigorousand enableshertotaketheleadofothercommunities,itisnecessary thatherforceshouldcorrespondwithheractions.Asforthat multitudeofpeoplewhichamaritimepowercreates,theyarebyno meansnecessarytoastate,noroughttheytomakeapartofthe citizens;forthemarinersandinfantry,whohavethecommand,are freemen,anduponthesedependsanavalengagement:butwhenthereare manyservantsandhusbandmen,theretheywillalwayshaveanumberof

sailors,aswenowseehappenstosomestates,asinHeraclea,where theymanmanytriremes,thoughtheextentoftheircityismuch inferiortosomeothers.Andthuswedetermineconcerningthecountry, theport,thecity,thesea,andamaritimepower:astothenumberof thecitizens,whatthatoughttobewehavealreadysaid. CHAPTERVII Wenowproceedtopointoutwhatnaturaldispositionthemembersof thecommunityoughttobeof:butthisanyonewilleasilyperceive whowillcasthiseyeoverthestatesofGreece,ofallothersthe mostcelebrated,andalsotheotherdifferentnationsofthis habitableworld.Thosewholiveincoldcountries,asthenorthof Europe,arefullofcourage,butwantinginunderstandingandthe arts:thereforetheyareverytenaciousoftheirliberty;but,not beingpoliticians,theycannotreducetheirneighboursundertheir power:buttheAsiatics,whoseunderstandingsarequick,andwhoare conversantinthearts,aredeficientincourage;andthereforeare alwaysconqueredandtheslavesofothers:buttheGrecians,placedas itwerebetweenthesetwoboundaries,sopartakeofthembothastobe atthesametimebothcourageousandsensible;forwhichreasonGreece continuesfree,andgovernedinthebestmannerpossible,andcapable ofcommandingthewholeworld,couldtheyagreeupononesystemof policy.NowthisisthedifferencebetweentheGreciansandother nations,thatthelatterhavebutoneofthesequalities,whereasin theformertheyarebothhappilyblendedtogether.Henceitis evident,thatthosepersonsoughttobebothsensibleandcourageous whowillreadilyobeyalegislator,theobjectofwhoselawsis virtue.Astowhatsomepersonssay,thatthemilitarymustbemild andtendertothosetheyknow,butsevereandcrueltothosetheyknow not,itiscouragewhich[1328a]makesanyonelovely;forthatisthe facultyofthesoulwhichwemostadmire:asaproofofthis,our resentmentriseshigheragainstourfriendsandacquaintancethan againstthoseweknownot:forwhichreasonArchilausaccusinghis friendssaysveryproperlytohimself,Shallmyfriendsinsultme?The spiritoffreedomandcommandalsoiswhatallinheritwhoareofthis dispositionforcourageiscommandingandinvincible.Italsoisnot rightforanyonetosay,thatyoushouldbeseveretothoseyouknow not;forthisbehaviourisproperfornoone:norarethosewhoareof anobledispositionharshintheirmanners,exceptingonlytothe wicked;andwhentheyareparticularlyso,itis,ashasbeenalready said,againsttheirfriends,whentheythinktheyhaveinjuredthem; whichisagreeabletoreason:forwhenthosewhothinktheyoughtto receiveafavourfromanyonedonotreceiveit,besidetheinjury

donethem,theyconsiderwhattheyaredeprivedof:hencethesaying, "Cruelarethewarsofbrothers;"andthis,"Thosewhohavegreatly loveddogreatlyhate."Andthuswehavenearlydeterminedhowmany theinhabitantsofacityoughttobe,andwhattheirnatural disposition,andalsothecountryhowlarge,andofwhatsortis necessary;Isaynearly,becauseitisneedlesstoendeavouratas greataccuracyinthosethingswhicharetheobjectsofthesensesas inthosewhichareinquiredintobytheunderstandingonly. CHAPTERVIII Asinnaturalbodiesthosethingsarenotadmittedtobepartsofthem withoutwhichthewholewouldnotexist,soalsoitisevidentthatin apoliticalstateeverythingthatisnecessarythereuntoisnottobe consideredasapartofit,noranyothercommunityfromwhenceone wholeismade;foronethingoughttobecommonandthesametothe community,whethertheypartakeofitequallyorunequally,as,for instance,food,land,orthelike;butwhenonethingisforthe benefitofoneperson,andanotherforthebenefitofanother,inthis thereisnothinglikeacommunity,exceptingthatonemakesitandthe otherusesit;as,forinstance,betweenanyinstrumentemployedin makinganywork,andtheworkmen,asthereisnothingcommonbetween thehouseandthebuilder,buttheartofthebuilderisemployedon thehouse.Thuspropertyisnecessaryforstates,butpropertyisno partofthestate,thoughmanyspeciesofithavelife;butacityis acommunityofequals,forthepurposeofenjoyingthebestlife possible:butthehappiestlifeisthebestwhichconsistsinthe perfectpracticeofvirtuousenergies:asthereforesomepersonshave great,otherslittleornoopportunityofbeingemployedinthese,it isevidentthatthisisthecauseofthedifferencethereisbetween thedifferentcitiesandcommunitiestherearetobefound;forwhile eachoftheseendeavourtoacquirewhatisbestbyvariousand differentmeans,theygive[1328b]risetodifferentmodesofliving anddifferentformsofgovernment.Wearenowtoconsiderwhatthose thingsarewithoutwhichacitycannotpossiblyexist;forwhatwe callpartsofthecitymustofnecessityinhereinit:andthiswe shallplainlyunderstand,ifweknowthenumberofthingsnecessaryto acity:first,theinhabitantsmusthavefood:secondly,arts,for manyinstrumentsarenecessaryinlife:thirdly,arms,foritis necessarythatthecommunityshouldhaveanarmedforcewithin themselves,bothtosupporttheirgovernmentagainstthoseoftheir ownbodywhomightrefuseobediencetoit,andalsotodefenditfrom thosewhomightattempttoattackitfromwithout:fourthly,acertain revenue,aswellfortheinternalnecessitiesofthestateasforthe

businessofwar:fifthly,whichisindeedthechiefconcern,a religiousestablishment:sixthlyinorder,butfirstofallin necessity,acourttodeterminebothcriminalandcivilcauses.These thingsareabsolutelynecessary,sotospeak,ineverystate;fora cityisanumberofpeoplenotaccidentallymettogether,butwitha purposeofensuringtothemselvessufficientindependencyand selfprotection;andifanythingnecessaryforthesepurposesis wanting,itisimpossiblethatinsuchasituationtheseendscanbe obtained.Itisnecessarythereforethatacityshouldbecapableof acquiringallthesethings:forthispurposeapropernumberof husbandmenarenecessarytoprocurefood,alsoartificersand soldiers,andrichmen,andpriestsandjudges,todeterminewhatis rightandproper. CHAPTERIX Havingdeterminedthusfar,itremainsthatweconsiderwhetherall thesedifferentemploymentsshallbeopentoall;foritispossible tocontinuethesamepersonsalwayshusbandmen,artificers,judges,or counsellors;orshallweappointdifferentpersonstoeachofthose employmentswhichwehavealreadymentioned;orshallsomeofthembe appropriatedtoparticulars,andothersofcoursecommontoall?but thisdoesnottakeplaceineverystate,for,aswehavealreadysaid, itispossiblethatallmaybecommontoall,ornot,butonlycommon tosome;andthisisthedifferencebetweenonegovernmentand another:forindemocraciesthewholecommunitypartakesof everything,butinoligarchiesitisdifferent. Sinceweareinquiringwhatisthebestgovernmentpossible,anditis admittedtobethatinwhichthecitizensarehappy;andthat,aswe havealreadysaid,itisimpossibletoobtainhappinesswithout virtue;itfollows,thatinthebestgovernedstates,wherethe citizensarereallymenofintrinsicandnotrelativegoodness,none ofthemshouldbepermittedtoexerciseanymechanicemploymentor followmerchandise,asbeingignobleanddestructivetovirtue; neithershouldtheybehusband[1329a]men,thattheymaybeat leisuretoimproveinvirtueandperformthedutytheyowetothe state.Withrespecttotheemploymentsofasoldier,asenator,anda judge,whichareevidentlynecessarytothecommunity,shalltheybe allottedtodifferentpersons,orshallthesamepersonexecuteboth? Thisquestion,too,iseasilyanswered:forinsomecasesthesame personsmayexecutethem,inotherstheyshouldbedifferent,where thedifferentemploymentsrequiredifferentabilities,aswhencourage iswantingforone,judgmentfortheother,theretheyshouldbe

allottedtodifferentpersons;butwhenitisevident,thatitis impossibletoobligethosewhohavearmsintheirhands,andcan insistontheirownterms,tobealwaysundercommand;therethese differentemploymentsshouldbetrustedtooneperson;forthosewho havearmsintheirhandshaveitintheiroptionwhethertheywillor willnotassumethesupremepower:tothesetwo(namely,thosewho havecourageandjudgment)thegovernmentmustbeentrusted;butnot inthesamemanner,butasnaturedirects;whatrequirescourageto theyoung,whatrequiresjudgmenttotheold;forwiththeyoungis courage,withtheoldiswisdom:thuseachwillbeallottedthepart theyarefitforaccordingtotheirdifferentmerits.Itisalso necessarythatthelandedpropertyshouldbelongtothesemen;forit isnecessarythatthecitizensshouldberich,andthesearethemen properforcitizens;fornomechanicoughttobeadmittedtothe rightsofacitizen,noranyothersortofpeoplewhoseemploymentis notentirelynoble,honourable,andvirtuous;thisisevidentfromthe principleweatfirstsetoutwith;fortobehappyitisnecessaryto bevirtuous;andnooneshouldsaythatacityishappywhilehe considersonlyonepartofitscitizens,butforthatpurposeheought toexamineintoallofthem.Itisevident,therefore,thatthelanded propertyshouldbelongtothese,thoughitmaybenecessaryforthem tohavehusbandmen,eitherslaves,barbarians,orservants.There remainsofthedifferentclassesofthepeoplewhomwehave enumerated,thepriests,fortheseevidentlycomposearankby themselves;forneitheraretheytobereckonedamongstthehusbandmen northemechanics;forreverencetothegodsishighlybecomingevery state:andsincethecitizenshavebeendividedintoorders,the militaryandthecouncil,anditispropertoofferdueworshiptothe gods,andsinceitisnecessarythatthosewhoareemployedintheir serviceshouldhavenothingelsetodo,letthebusinessofthe priesthoodbeallottedtothosewhoareinyears.Wehavenowshown whatisnecessarytotheexistenceofacity,andofwhatpartsit consists,andthathusbandmen,mechanic,andmercenaryservantsare necessarytoacity;butthatthepartsofitaresoldiersand sailors,andthatthesearealwaysdifferentfromthose,butfromeach otheronlyoccasionally. CHAPTERX Itseemsneithernownorverylatelytohavebeenknown[1329b]to thosephilosopherswhohavemadepoliticstheirstudy,thatacity oughttobedividedbyfamiliesintodifferentordersofmen;andthat thehusbandmenandsoldiersshouldbekeptseparatefromeachother; whichcustomiseventothisdaypreservedinEgyptandinCrete;also

SesostrishavingfoundeditinEgypt,MinosinCrete.Commonmeals seemalsotohavebeenanancientregulation,andtohavebeen establishedinCreteduringthereignofMinos,andinastillmore remoteperiodinItaly;forthosewhoarethebestjudgesinthat countrysaythatoneItalusbeingkingofAEnotria.,fromwhomthe people,changingtheirnames,werecalledItaliansinsteadof AEnotrians,andthatpartofEuropewascalledItalywhichisbounded bytheScylleticGulfontheonesideandtheLameticontheother, thedistancebetweenwhichisabouthalfaday'sjourney.ThisItalus, theyrelate,madetheAEnotrians,whowereformerlyshepherds, husbandmen,andgavethemdifferentlawsfromwhattheyhadbefore, andtohavebeenthefirstwhoestablishedcommonmeals,forwhich reasonsomeofhisdescendantsstillusethem,andobservesomeofhis laws.TheOpiciinhabitthatpartwhichliestowardstheTyrrhenian Sea,whobothnowareandformerlywerecalledAusonians.TheChones inhabitedtheparttowardIapigiaandtheIonianSeawhichiscalled Syrtis.TheseChonesweredescendedfromtheAEnotrians.Hencearose thecustomofcommonmeals,buttheseparationofthecitizensinto differentfamiliesfromEgypt:forthereignofSesostrisisofmuch higherantiquitythanthatofMinos.Asweoughttothinkthatmost otherthingswerefoundoutinalong,nay,eveninaboundlesstime (reasonteachingusthatwantwouldmakeusfirstinventthatwhich wasnecessary,and,whenthatwasobtained,thenthosethingswhich wererequisitefortheconveniencesandornamentoflife),soshould weconcludethesamewithrespecttoapoliticalstate;noweverything inEgyptbearsthemarksofthemostremoteantiquity,forthese peopleseemtobethemostancientofallothers,andtohaveacquired lawsandpoliticalorder;weshouldthereforemakeaproperuseof whatistoldusofthem,andendeavourtofindoutwhattheyhave omitted.Wehavealreadysaid,thatthelandedpropertyoughtto belongtothemilitaryandthosewhopartakeofthegovernmentofthe state;andthatthereforethehusbandmenshouldbeaseparateorderof people;andhowlargeandofwhatnaturethecountryoughttobe:we willfirsttreatofthedivisionoftheland,andofthehusbandmen, howmanyandofwhatsorttheyoughttobe;sincewebynomeanshold thatpropertyoughttobecommon,assomepersonshavesaid,onlythus far,infriendship,it[1330a]shouldbetheircustomtoletno citizenwantsubsistence.Astocommonmeals,itisingeneralagreed thattheyareproperinwellregulatedcities;myreasonsfor approvingofthemshallbementionedhereafter:theyarewhatallthe: citizensoughttopartakeof;butitwillnotbeeasyforthepoor, outofwhatistheirown,tofurnishasmuchastheyareorderedto do,andsupplytheirownhousebesides.Theexpensealsoofreligious worshipshouldbedefrayedbythewholestate.Ofnecessitytherefore thelandoughttobedividedintotwoparts,oneofwhichshould belongtothecommunityingeneral,theothertotheindividuals separately;andeachofthesepartsshouldagainbesubdividedinto two:halfofthatwhichbelongstothepublicshouldbeappropriated

tomaintaintheworshipofthegods,theotherhalftosupportthe commonmeals.Halfofthatwhichbelongstotheindividualsshouldbe attheextremityofthecountry,theotherhalfnearthecity,sothat thesetwoportionsbeingallottedtoeachperson,allwouldpartakeof landinbothplaces,whichwouldbebothequalandright;andinduce themtoactinconcertwithgreaterharmonyinanywarwiththeir neighbours:forwhenthelandisnotdividedinthismanner,oneparty neglectstheinroadsoftheenemyontheborders,theothermakesita matteroftoomuchconsequenceandmorethanisnecessary;forwhich reasoninsomeplacesthereisalawwhichforbidstheinhabitantsof theborderstohaveanyvoteinthecouncilwhentheyaredebating uponawarwhichismadeagainstthemastheirprivateinterestmight preventtheirvotingimpartially.Thusthereforethecountryoughtto bedividedandforthereasonsbeforementioned.Couldonehaveone's choice,thehusbandmenshouldbyallmeansbeslaves,notofthesame nation,ormenofanyspirit;forthustheywouldbelaboriousin theirbusiness,andsafefromattemptinganynovelties:nexttothese barbarianservantsaretobepreferred,similarinnaturaldisposition tothesewehavealreadymentioned.Ofthese,letthosewhoareto cultivatetheprivatepropertyoftheindividualbelongtothat individual,andthosewhoaretocultivatethepublicterritorybelong tothepublic.Inwhatmannertheseslavesoughttobeused,andfor whatreasonitisveryproperthattheyshouldhavethepromiseof theirlibertymadethem,asarewardfortheirservices,shallbe mentionedhereafter. CHAPTERXI Wehavealreadymentioned,thatboththecityandallthecountry shouldcommunicatebothwiththeseaandthecontinentasmuchas possible.Therearethesefourthingswhichweshouldbeparticularly desirousofinthepositionofthecitywithrespecttoitself:inthe firstplace,healthistobeconsultedasthefirstthingnecessary: nowacitywhichfrontstheeastandreceivesthewindswhichblow fromthenceisesteemedmosthealthful;nexttothisthatwhichhasa northernpositionistobepreferred,asbestinwinter.Itshould nextbecontrivedthatitmayhaveapropersituationforthebusiness ofgovernmentandfordefenceinwar:thatinwarthecitizensmay [1330b]haveeasyaccesstoit;butthatitmaybedifficultofaccess to,andhardlytobetakenby,theenemy.Inthenextplace particularly,thattheremaybeplentyofwater,andriversnearat hand:butifthosecannotbefound,verylargecisternsmustbe preparedtosaverainwater,sothattheremaybenowantofitin casetheyshouldbedrivenintothetownintimeofwar.Andasgreat

careshouldbetakenofthehealthoftheinhabitants,thefirstthing tobeattendedtois,thatthecityshouldhaveagoodsituationanda goodposition;thesecondis,thattheymayhavegoodwatertodrink; andthisnotbenegligentlytakencareof;forwhatwechieflyand mostfrequentlyuseforthesupportofthebodymustprincipally influencethehealthofit;andthisinfluenceiswhattheairand waternaturallyhave:forwhichreasoninallwisegovernmentsthe watersoughttobeappropriatedtodifferentpurposes,andiftheyare notequallygood,andifthereisnotaplentyofnecessarywater, thatwhichistodrinkshouldbeseparatedfromthatwhichisfor otheruses.Astofortifiedplaces,whatisproperforsome governmentsisnotproperforall;as,forinstance,aloftycitadel isproperforamonarchyandanoligarchy;acitybuiltuponaplain suitsademocracy;neitheroftheseforanaristocracy,butrather manystrongplaces.Astotheformofprivatehouses,thoseare thoughttobebestandmostusefulfortheirdifferentpurposeswhich aredistinctandseparatefromeachother,andbuiltinthemodern manner,aftertheplanofHippodamus:butforsafetyintimeofwar, onthecontrary,theyshouldbebuiltastheyformerlywere;forthey weresuchthatstrangerscouldnoteasilyfindtheirwayoutofthem, andthemethodofaccesstothemsuchasanenemycouldwith difficultyfindoutifheproposedtobesiegethem.Acitytherefore shouldhaveboththesesortsofbuildings,whichmayeasilybe contrivedifanyonewillsoregulatethemastheplantersdotheir rowsofvines;notthatthebuildingsthroughoutthecityshouldbe detachedfromeachother,onlyinsomepartsofit;thuseleganceand safetywillbeequallyconsulted.Withrespecttowalls,thosewhosay thatacourageouspeopleoughtnottohaveany,paytoomuchrespect toobsoletenotions;particularlyaswemayseethosewhopride themselvesthereincontinuallyconfutedbyfacts.Itisindeed disreputableforthosewhoareequal,ornearlyso,totheenemy,to endeavourtotakerefugewithintheirwallsbutsinceitveryoften happens,thatthosewhomaketheattackaretoopowerfulforthe braveryandcourageofthosefewwhoopposethemtoresist,ifyou wouldnotsufferthecalamitiesofwarandtheinsolenceoftheenemy, itmustbethoughtthepartofagoodsoldiertoseekforsafetyunder theshelterandprotectionofwallsmoreespeciallysincesomany missileweaponsandmachineshavebeenmostingeniouslyinventedto besiegecitieswith.Indeedtoneglectsurroundingacitywithawall wouldbesimilartochoosingacountrywhichiseasyofaccesstoan enemy,orlevellingtheeminencesofit;orasifanindividualshould nothaveawalltohishouselestitshouldbethoughtthattheowner ofitwasacoward:norshouldthisbeleftunconsidered,thatthose whohaveacitysurroundedwithwallsmayactbothways,eitherasif ithadorasifithadnot;butwhereithasnottheycannotdothis. Ifthisistrue,itisnotonlynecessarytohavewalls,butcaremust betakenthattheymaybeaproperornamenttothecity,aswellasa defenceintimeofwar;notonlyaccordingtotheoldmethods,butthe

modernimprovementsalso:forasthosewhomakeoffensivewar endeavourbyeverywaypossibletogainadvantagesovertheir adversaries,soshouldthosewhoareuponthedefensiveemployallthe meansalreadyknown,andsuchnewonesasphilosophycaninvent,to defendthemselves:forthosewhoarewellpreparedareseldomfirst attacked. CHAPTERXII Asthecitizensingeneralaretoeatatpublictablesincertain companies,anditisnecessarythatthewallsshouldhavebulwarksand towersinproperplacesandatproperdistances,itisevidentthatit willbeverynecessarytohavesomeoftheseinthetowers;letthe buildingsforthispurposebemadetheornamentsofthewalls.Asto templesforpublicworship,andthehallforthepublictablesofthe chiefmagistrates,theyoughttobebuiltinproperplaces,and contiguoustoeachother,exceptthosetempleswhichthelaworthe oracleorderstobeseparatefromallotherbuildings;andletthese beinsuchaconspicuouseminence,thattheymayhaveeveryadvantage ofsituation,andintheneighbourhoodofthatpartofthecitywhich isbestfortified.Adjoiningtothisplacethereoughttobealarge square,likethatwhichtheycallinThessalyTheSquareofFreedom, inwhichnothingispermittedtobeboughtorsold;intowhichno mechanicnorhusbandman,noranysuchperson,shouldbepermittedto enter,unlesscommandedbythemagistrates.Itwillalsobean ornamenttothisplaceifthegymnasticexercisesoftheeldersare performedinit.Itisalsoproper,thatforperformingthese exercisesthecitizensshouldbedividedintodistinctclasses, accordingtotheirages,andthattheyoungpersonsshouldhaveproper officerstobewiththem,andthattheseniorsshouldbewiththe magistrates;forhavingthembeforetheireyeswouldgreatlyinspire truemodestyandingenuousfear.Thereoughttobeanothersquare [1331b]separatefromthisforbuyingandselling,whichshouldbeso situatedastobecommodiousforthereceptionofgoodsbothbysea andland.Asthecitizensmaybedividedintomagistratesandpriests, itisproperthatthepublictablesofthepriestsshouldbein buildingsnearthetemples.Thoseofthemagistrateswhopresideover contracts,indictments,andsuchlike,andalsooverthemarkets,and thepublicstreetsnearthesquare,orsomepublicway,Imeanthe squarewherethingsareboughtandsold;forIintendedtheotherfor thosewhoareatleisure,andthisfornecessarybusiness.Thesame orderwhichIhavedirectedhereshouldbeobservedalsointhe country;fortherealsotheirmagistratessuchasthesurveyorsofthe woodsandoverseersofthegrounds,mustnecessarilyhavetheircommon

tablesandtheirtowers,forthepurposeofprotectionagainstan enemy.Thereoughtalsotobetempleserectedatproperplaces,both tothegodsandtheheroes;butitisunnecessarytodwelllongerand mostminutelyontheseparticularsforitisbynomeansdifficultto planthesethings,itisrathersotocarrythemintoexecution;for thetheoryisthechildofourwishes,butthepracticalpartmust dependuponfortune;forwhichreasonweshalldeclinesayinganything fartheruponthesesubjects. CHAPTERXIII Wewillnowshowofwhatnumbersandofwhatsortofpeoplea governmentoughttoconsist,thatthestatemaybehappyandwell administered.Astherearetwoparticularsonwhichtheexcellenceand perfectionofeverythingdepend,oneoftheseis,thattheobjectand endproposedshouldbeproper;theother,thatthemeanstoaccomplish itshouldbeadaptedtothatpurpose;foritmayhappenthatthesemay eitheragreeordisagreewitheachother;fortheendweproposemay begood,butintakingthemeanstoobtainitwemayerr;atother timeswemayhavetherightandpropermeansinourpower,buttheend maybebad,andsometimeswemaymistakeinboth;asintheartof medicinethephysiciandoesnotsometimesknowinwhatsituationthe bodyoughttobe,tobehealthy;norwhattodotoprocuretheendhe aimsat.Ineveryartandscience,therefore,weshouldbemasterof thisknowledge,namely,theproperend,andthemeanstoobtainit. Nowitisevidentthatallpersonsaredesiroustolivewellandbe happy;butthatsomehavethemeansthereofintheirownpower,others not;andthiseitherthroughnature[1332a]orfortune;formany ingredientsarenecessarytoahappylife;butfewertothosewhoare ofagoodthantothosewhoareofabaddisposition.Thereareothers whocontinuallyhavethemeansofhappinessintheirownpower,butdo notrightlyapplythem.Sinceweproposetoinquirewhatgovernmentis best,namely,thatbywhichastatemaybebestadministered,andthat stateisbestadministeredwherethepeoplearethehappiest,itis evidentthathappinessisathingweshouldnotbeunacquaintedwith. Now,IhavealreadysaidinmytreatiseonMorals(ifImayheremake anyuseofwhatIhavethereshown),thathappinessconsistsinthe energyandperfectpracticeofvirtue;andthisnotrelatively,but simply;Imeanbyrelatively,whatisnecessaryinsomecertain circumstances;bysimply,whatisgoodandfairinitself:ofthe firstsortarejustpunishments,andrestraintsinajustcause;for theyarisefromvirtueandarenecessary,andonthataccountare virtuous;thoughitismoredesirablethatneitheranystatenorany individualshouldstandinneedofthem;butthoseactionswhichare

intendedeithertoprocurehonourorwealtharesimplygood;the otherseligibleonlytoremoveanevil;these,onthecontrary,are thefoundationandmeansofrelativegood.Aworthymanindeedwill bearpoverty,disease,andotherunfortunateaccidentswithanoble mind;buthappinessconsistsinthecontrarytothese(nowwehave alreadydeterminedinourtreatiseonMorals,thatheisamanof worthwhoconsiderswhatisgoodbecauseitisvirtuousaswhatis simplygood;itisevident,therefore,thatalltheactionsofsucha onemustbeworthyandsimplygood):thishasledsomepersonsto conclude,thatthecauseofhappinesswasexternalgoods;whichwould beasifanyoneshouldsupposethattheplayingwelluponthelyre wasowingtotheinstrument,andnottotheart.Itnecessarily followsfromwhathasbeensaid,thatsomethingsshouldbereadyat handandothersprocuredbythelegislator;forwhichreasonin foundingacityweearnestlywishthattheremaybeplentyofthose thingswhicharesupposedtobeunderthedominionoffortune(for somethingsweadmithertobemistressover);butforastatetobe worthyandgreatisnotonlytheworkoffortunebutofknowledgeand judgmentalso.Butforastatetobeworthyitisnecessarythatthose citizenswhichareintheadministrationshouldbeworthyalso;butas inourcityeverycitizenistobeso,wemustconsiderhowthismay beaccomplished;forifthisiswhateveryonecouldbe,andnotsome individualsonly,itwouldbemoredesirable;forthenitwould follow,thatwhatmightbedonebyonemightbedonebyall.Menare worthyandgoodthreeways;bynature,bycustom,byreason.Inthe firstplace,amanoughttobebornaman,andnotanyotheranimal; thatistosay,heoughttohavebothabodyandsoul;butitavails nottobeonlyborn[1332b]withsomethings,forcustommakesgreat alterations;fortherearesomethingsinnaturecapableofalteration eitherwaywhicharefixedbycustom,eitherforthebetterorthe worse.Now,otheranimalslivechieflyalifeofnature;andinvery fewthingsaccordingtocustom;butmanlivesaccordingtoreason also,whichhealoneisendowedwith;whereforeheoughttomakeall theseaccordwitheachother;forifmenfollowedreason,andwere persuadedthatitwasbesttoobeyher,theywouldactinmany respectscontrarytonatureandcustom.Whatmenoughtnaturallyto be,tomakegoodmembersofacommunity,Ihavealreadydetermined; therestofthisdiscoursethereforeshallbeuponeducation;forsome thingsareacquiredbyhabit,othersbyhearingthem. CHAPTERXIV Aseverypoliticalcommunityconsistsofthosewhogovernandofthose whoaregoverned,letusconsiderwhetherduringthecontinuanceof

theirlivestheyoughttobethesamepersonsordifferent;foritis evidentthatthemodeofeducationshouldbeadaptedtothis distinction.Now,ifonemandifferedfromanotherasmuch,aswe believe,thegodsandheroesdifferfrommen:inthefirstplace, beingfartheirsuperiorsinbody;and,secondly,inthesoul:sothat thesuperiorityofthegovernorsoverthegovernedmightbeevident beyondadoubt,itiscertainthatitwouldbebetterfortheone alwaystogovern,theotheralwaystobegoverned:but,asthisisnot easytoobtain,andkingsarenotsosuperiortothosetheygovernas ScylaxinformsustheyareinIndia,itisevidentthatformany reasonsitisnecessarythatallintheirturnsshouldbothgovernand begoverned:foritisjustthatthosewhoareequalshouldhave everythingalike;anditisdifficultforastatetocontinuewhichis foundedininjustice;forallthoseinthecountrywhoaredesirousof innovationwillapplythemselvestothosewhoareunderthegovernment oftherest,andsuchwillbetheirnumbersinthestate,thatitwill beimpossibleforthemagistratestogetthebetterofthem.Butthat thegovernorsoughttoexcelthegovernedisbeyondadoubt;the legislatorthereforeoughttoconsiderhowthisshallbe,andhowit maybecontrivedthatallshallhavetheirequalshareinthe administration.Now,withrespecttothisitwillbefirstsaid,that natureherselfhasdirectedusinourchoice,layingdowntheselfsame thingwhenshehasmadesomeyoung,othersold:thefirstofwhomit becomestoobey,thelattertocommand;fornoonewhenheisyoungis offendedathisbeingundergovernment,orthinkshimselftoogoodfor it;moreespeciallywhenheconsidersthathehimselfshallreceive thesamehonourswhichhepayswhenheshallarriveataproperage. Insomerespectsitmustbeacknowledgedthatthegovernorsandthe governedarethesame,inotherstheyaredifferent;itistherefore necessarythattheireducationshouldbein[1333a]somerespectthe same,inothersdifferent:astheysay,thathewillbeagood governorwhohasfirstlearnttoobey.Nowofgovernments,aswehave alreadysaid,someareinstitutedforthesakeofhimwhocommands; othersforhimwhoobeys:ofthefirstsortisthatofthemasterover theservant;ofthelatter,thatoffreemenovereachother.Nowsome thingswhicharecommandeddifferfromothers;notinthebusiness, butintheendproposedthereby:forwhichreasonmanyworks,evenof aservilenature,arenotdisgracefulforyoungfreementoperform; formanythingswhichareorderedtobedonearenothonourableor dishonourablesomuchintheirownnatureasintheendwhichis proposed,andthereasonforwhichtheyareundertaken.Sincethenwe havedetermined,thatthevirtueofagoodcitizenandgoodgovernor isthesameasofagoodman;andthateveryonebeforehecommands shouldhavefirstobeyed,itisthebusinessofthelegislatorto considerhowhiscitizensmaybegoodmen,whateducationisnecessary tothatpurpose,andwhatisthefinalobjectofagoodlife.Thesoul ofmanmaybedividedintotwoparts;thatwhichhasreasoninitself, andthatwhichhathnot,butiscapableofobeyingitsdictates:and

accordingtothevirtuesofthesetwopartsamanissaidtobegood: butofthosevirtueswhicharetheends,itwillnotbedifficultfor thosetodeterminewhoadoptthedivisionIhavealreadygiven;for theinferiorisalwaysforthesakeofthesuperior;andthisis equallyevidentbothintheworksofartaswellasinthoseof nature;butthatissuperiorwhichhasreason.Reasonitselfalsois dividedintotwoparts,inthemannerweusuallydivideit;the theoreticandthepractical;whichdivisionthereforeseemsnecessary forthispartalso:thesameanalogyholdsgoodwithrespectto actions;ofwhichthosewhichareofasuperiornatureoughtalwaysto bechosenbythosewhohaveitintheirpower;forthatisalwaysmost eligibletoeveryonewhichwillprocurethebestends.Nowlifeis dividedintolabourandrest,warandpeace;andofwhatwedothe objectsarepartlynecessaryanduseful,partlynoble:andweshould givethesamepreferencetothesethatwedotothedifferentpartsof thesoulanditsactions,aswartoprocurepeace;labour,rest;and theuseful,thenoble.Thepolitician,therefore,whocomposesabody oflawsoughttoextendhisviewstoeverything;thedifferentparts ofthesoulandtheiractions;moreparticularlytothosethingswhich areofasuperiornatureandends;and,inthesamemanner,tothe livesofmenandtheirdifferentactions. Theyoughttobefittedbothforlabourandwar,butrather[1333b] forrestandpeace;andalsotodowhatisnecessaryanduseful,but ratherwhatisfairandnoble.Itistothoseobjectsthatthe educationofthechildrenoughttotend,andofalltheyouthswho wantinstruction.AlltheGrecianstateswhichnowseembestgoverned, andthelegislatorswhofoundedthosestates,appearnottohave framedtheirpolitywithaviewtothebestend,ortoeveryvirtue, intheirlawsandeducation;buteagerlytohaveattendedtowhatis usefulandproductiveofgain:andnearlyofthesameopinionwith thesearesomepersonswhohavewrittenlately,who,bypraisingthe Lacedaemonianstate,showtheyapproveoftheintentionofthe legislatorinmakingwarandvictorytheendofhisgovernment.But howcontrarytoreasonthisis,iseasilyprovedbyargument,andhas alreadybeenprovedbyfacts(butasthegeneralityofmendesireto haveanextensivecommand,thattheymayhaveeverythingdesirablein thegreaterabundance;soThibronandotherswhohavewrittenonthat stateseemtoapproveoftheirlegislatorforhavingprocuredtheman extensivecommandbycontinuallyenuringthemtoallsortsofdangers andhardships):foritisevident,sincetheLacedemonianshavenowno hopethatthesupremepowerwillbeintheirownhand,thatneither aretheyhappynorwastheirlegislatorwise.Thisalsoisridiculous, thatwhiletheypreservedanobediencetotheirlaws,andnoone opposedtheirbeinggovernedbythem,theylostthemeansofbeing honourable:butthesepeopleunderstandnotrightlywhatsortof governmentitiswhichoughttoreflecthonouronthelegislator;for agovernmentoffreemenisnoblerthandespoticpower,andmore

consonanttovirtue.Moreover,neithershouldacitybethoughthappy, norshouldalegislatorbecommended,becausehehassotrainedthe peopleastoconquertheirneighbours;forinthisthereisagreat inconvenience:sinceitisevidentthatuponthisprincipleevery citizenwhocanwillendeavourtoprocurethesupremepowerinhisown city;whichcrimetheLacedaemoniansaccusePausaniasof,thoughhe enjoyedsuchgreathonours. Suchreasoningandsuchlawsareneitherpolitical,usefulnortrue: butalegislatoroughttoinstilthoselawsonthemindsofmenwhich aremostusefulforthem,bothintheirpublicandprivatecapacities. Therenderingapeoplefitforwar,thattheymayenslavetheir inferiorsoughtnottobethecareofthelegislator;butthatthey maynotthemselvesbereducedtoslaverybyothers.In[1334a]the nextplace,heshouldtakecarethattheobjectofhisgovernmentis thesafetyofthosewhoareunderit,andnotadespotismoverall:in thethirdplace,thatthoseonlyareslaveswhoarefittobeonlyso. Reasonindeedconcurswithexperienceinshowingthatallthe attentionwhichthelegislatorpaystothebusinessofwar,andall otherruleswhichhelaysdown,shouldhavefortheirobjectrestand peace;sincemostofthosestates(whichweusuallysee)arepreserved bywar;but,aftertheyhaveacquiredasupremepoweroverthose aroundthem,areruined;forduringpeace,likeasword,theylose theirbrightness:thefaultofwhichliesinthelegislator,whonever taughtthemhowtobeatrest. CHAPTERXV Asthereisoneendcommontoamanbothasanindividualanda citizen,itisevidentthatagoodmanandagoodcitizenmusthave thesameobjectinview;itisevidentthatallthevirtueswhichlead torestarenecessary;for,aswehaveoftensaid,theendofwaris peace,oflabour,rest;butthosevirtueswhoseobjectisrest,and thosealsowhoseobjectislabour,arenecessaryforaliberallife andrest;forwewantasupplyofmanynecessarythingsthatwemaybe atrest.Acitythereforeoughttobetemperate,brave,andpatient; for,accordingtotheproverb,"Restisnotforslaves;"butthosewho cannotbravelyfacedangeraretheslavesofthosewhoattackthem. Bravery,therefore,andpatiencearenecessaryforlabour,philosophy forrest,andtemperanceandjusticeinboth;butthesechieflyin timeofpeaceandrest;forwarobligesmentobejustandtemperate; buttheenjoymentofpleasure,withtherestofpeace,ismoreaptto produceinsolence;thoseindeedwhoareeasyintheircircumstances, andenjoyeverythingthatcanmakethemhappy,havegreatoccasionfor

thevirtuesoftemperanceandjustice.Thusifthereare,asthepoets tellus,anyinhabitantsinthehappyisles,totheseahigherdegree ofphilosophy,temperance,andjusticewillbenecessary,astheylive attheireaseinthefullplentyofeverysensualpleasure.Itis evident,therefore,thatthesevirtuesarenecessaryineverystate thatwouldbehappyorworthy;forhewhoisworthlesscanneverenjoy realgood,muchlessishequalifiedtobeatrest;butcanappear goodonlybylabourandbeingatwar,butinpeaceandatrestthe meanestofcreatures.Forwhichreasonvirtueshouldnotbecultivated astheLacedaemoniansdid;fortheydidnotdifferfromothersin theiropinionconcerningthesupremegood,butin[1334b]imagining thisgoodwastobeprocuredbyaparticularvirtue;butsincethere aregreatergoodsthanthoseofwar,itisevidentthattheenjoyment ofthosewhicharevaluableinthemselvesshouldbedesired,rather thanthosevirtueswhichareusefulinwar;buthowandbywhatmeans thisistobeacquiredisnowtobeconsidered.Wehavealready assignedthreecausesonwhichitwilldepend;nature,custom,and reason,aridshownwhatsortofmennaturemustproduceforthis purpose;itremainsthenthatwedeterminewhichweshallfirstbegin byineducation,reasonorcustom,fortheseoughtalwaystopreserve themostentireharmonywitheachother;foritmayhappenthatreason mayerrfromtheendproposed,andbecorrectedbycustom.Inthe firstplace,itisevidentthatinthisasinotherthings,its beginningorproductionarisesfromsomeprinciple,anditsendalso arisesfromanotherprinciple,whichisitselfanend.Now,withus, reasonandintelligencearetheendofnature;ourproduction, therefore,andourmannersoughttobeaccommodatedtoboththese.In thenextplace,asthesoulandthebodyaretwodistinctthings,so alsoweseethatthesoulisdividedintotwoparts,thereasoningand notreasoning,withtheirhabitswhicharetwoinnumber,one belongingtoeach,namelyappetiteandintelligence;andasthebody isinproductionbeforethesoul,soisthenotreasoningpartofthe soulbeforethereasoning;andthisisevident;foranger,willand desirearetobeseeninchildrennearlyassoonastheyareborn;but reasonandintelligencespringupastheygrowtomaturity.Thebody, therefore,necessarilydemandsourcarebeforethesoul;nextthe appetitesforthesakeofthemind;thebodyforthesakeofthesoul. CHAPTERXVI Ifthenthelegislatoroughttotakecarethatthebodiesofthe childrenareasperfectaspossible,hisfirstattentionoughttobe giventomatrimony;atwhattimeandinwhatsituationitisproper thatthecitizensshouldengageinthenuptialcontract.Now,with

respecttothisalliance,thelegislatoroughtbothtoconsiderthe partiesandtheirtimeoflife,thattheymaygrowoldatthesame partoftime,andthattheirbodilypowersmaynotbedifferent;that istosay,themanbeingabletohavechildren,butthewomantooold tobearthem;or,onthecontrary,thewomanbeyoungenoughto producechildren,butthemantoooldtobeafather;forfromsucha situationdiscordsanddisputescontinuallyarise.Inthenextplace, withrespecttothesuccessionofchildren,thereoughtnottobetoo greatanintervaloftimebetweenthemandtheirparents;forwhen thereis,theparentcanreceivenobenefitfromhischild's affection,orthechildanyadvantagefromhisfather'sprotection; [1335a]neithershouldthedifferenceinyearsbetoolittle,asgreat inconveniencesmayarisefromit;asitpreventsthatproperreverence beingshowntoafatherbyaboywhoconsidershimasnearlyhisequal inage,andalsofromthedisputesitoccasionsintheeconomyofthe family.But,toreturnfromthisdigression,careoughttobetaken thatthebodiesofthechildrenmaybesuchaswillanswerthe expectationsofthelegislator;thisalsowillbeaffectedbythesame means.Sinceseasonfortheproductionofchildrenisdetermined(not exactly,buttospeakingeneral),namely,forthemantillseventy years,andthewomantillfifty,theenteringintothemarriagestate, asfarastimeisconcerned,shouldberegulatedbytheseperiods.It isextremelybadforthechildrenwhenthefatheristooyoung;forin allanimalswhatsoeverthepartsoftheyoungareimperfect,andare morelikelytobeproductiveoffemalesthanmales,anddiminutive alsoinsize;thesamethingofcoursenecessarilyholdstrueinmen; asaproofofthisyoumayseeinthosecitieswherethemenandwomen usuallymarryveryyoung,thepeopleingeneralareverysmallandill framed;inchildbirthalsothewomensuffermore,andmanyofthem die.AndthussomepersonstellustheoracleofTraezeniumshouldbe explained,asifitreferredtothemanywomenwhoweredestroyedby tooearlymarriages,andnottheirgatheringtheirfruitstoosoon.It isalsoconducivetotemperancenottomarrytoosoon;forwomenwho dosoareapttobeintemperate.Italsopreventsthebodiesofmen fromacquiringtheirfullsizeiftheymarrybeforetheirgrowthis completed;forthisisthedeterminateperiod,whichpreventsany furtherincrease;forwhichreasonthepropertimeforawomanto marryiseighteen,foramanthirtyseven,alittlemoreorless;for whentheymarryatthattimetheirbodiesareinperfection,andthey willalsoceasetohavechildrenatapropertime;andmoreoverwith respecttothesuccessionofthechildren,iftheyhavethematthe timewhichmayreasonablybeexpected,theywillbejustarrivinginto perfectionwhentheirparentsaresinkingdownundertheloadof seventyyears.Andthusmuchforthetimewhichisproperfor marriage;butmoreoveraproperseasonoftheyearshouldbeobserved, asmanypersonsdonow,andappropriatethewinterforthisbusiness. Themarriedcoupleoughtalsotoregardthepreceptsofphysiciansand naturalists,eachofwhomhavetreatedonthese[1335b]subjects.What

isthefitdispositionofthebodywillbebettermentionedwhenwe cometospeakoftheeducationofthechild;wewilljustslightly mentionafewparticulars.Now,thereisnooccasionthatanyone shouldhavethehabitofbodyofawrestlertobeeitheragood citizen,ortoenjoyagoodconstitution,ortobethefatherof healthychildren;neithershouldhebeinfirmortoomuchdispirited bymisfortunes,butbetweenboththese.Heoughttohaveahabitof labour,butnotoftooviolentlabour;norshouldthatbeconfined tooneobjectonly,asthewrestler'sis;buttosuchthingsasare properforfreemen.Thesethingsareequallynecessarybothformen andwomen.Womenwithchildshouldalsotakecarethattheirdiet isnottoosparing,andthattheyusesufficientexercise;whichit willbeeasyforthelegislatortoeffectifhecommandsthemonce everydaytorepairtotheworshipofthegodswhoaresupposedto presideovermatrimony.But,contrarytowhatisproperforthe body,themindoughttobekeptastranquilaspossible;forasplants partakeofthenatureofthesoil,sodoesthechildreceivemuchof thedispositionofthemother.Withrespecttotheexposingor bringingupofchildren,letitbealaw,thatnothingimperfector maimedshallbebroughtup,..........Asthepropertimehasbeen pointedoutforamanandawomantoenterintothemarriagestate,so alsoletusdeterminehowlongitisadvantageousforthecommunity thattheyshouldhavechildren;forasthechildrenofthosewhoare tooyoungareimperfectbothinbodyandmind,soalsothosewhose parentsaretoooldareweakinboth:whilethereforethebody continuesinperfection,which(assomepoetssay,whoreckonthe differentperiodsoflifebysevens)istillfiftyyears,orfouror fivemore,thechildrenmaybeequallyperfect;butwhentheparents arepastthatageitisbettertheyshouldhavenomore.Withrespect toanyconnectionbetweenamanandawoman,orawomanandaman, wheneitherofthepartiesarebetrothed,letitbeheldinutter detestation[1336a]onanypretextwhatsoever;butshouldanyonebe guiltyofsuchathingafterthemarriageisconsummated,lethis infamybeasgreatashisguiltdeserves. CHAPTERXVII Whenachildisbornitmustbesupposedthatthestrengthofitsbody willdependgreatlyuponthequalityofitsfood.Nowwhoeverwill examineintothenatureofanimals,andalsoobservethosepeoplewho areverydesiroustheirchildrenshouldacquireawarlikehabit,will findthattheyfeedthemchieflywithmilk,asbeingbestaccommodated totheirbodies,butwithoutwine,topreventanydistempers:those motionsalsowhicharenaturaltotheirageareveryserviceable;and

topreventanyoftheirlimbsfrombeingcrooked,onaccountoftheir extremeductility,somepeopleevennowuseparticularmachinesthat theirbodiesmaynotbedistorted.Itisalsousefultoenurethemto thecoldwhentheyareverylittle;forthisisveryserviceablefor theirhealth;andalsotoenurethemtothebusinessofwar;forwhich reasonitiscustomarywithmanyofthebarbarianstodiptheir childreninriverswhenthewateriscold;withotherstoclothethem veryslightly,asamongtheCelts;forwhateveritispossibleto accustomchildrento,itisbesttoaccustomthemtoitatfirst,but todoitbydegrees:besides,boyshavenaturallyahabitofloving thecold,onaccountoftheheat.These,then,andsuchlikethings oughttobethefirstobjectofourattention:thenextagetothis continuestillthechildisfiveyearsold;duringwhichtimeitis besttoteachhimnothingatall,notevennecessarylabour,lestit shouldhinderhisgrowth;butheshouldbeaccustomedtousesomuch motionasnottoacquirealazyhabitofbody;whichhewillgetby variousmeansandbyplayalso:hisplayalsooughttobeneither illiberalnortoolaboriousnorlazy.Theirgovernorsandpreceptors alsoshouldtakecarewhatsortoftalesandstoriesitmaybeproper forthemtohear;foralltheseoughttopavethewayfortheirfuture instruction:forwhichreasonthegeneralityoftheirplayshouldbe imitationsofwhattheyareafterwardstodoseriously.Theytoodo wrongwhoforbidbylawsthedisputesbetweenboysandtheirquarrels, fortheycontributetoincreasetheirgrowthastheyareasortof exercisetothebody:forthestrugglesoftheheartandthe compressionofthespiritsgivestrengthtothosewholabour,which happenstoboysintheirdisputes.Thepreceptorsalsooughttohave aneyeupontheirmanneroflife,andthosewithwhomtheyconverse; andtotakecarethattheyareneverinthecompanyofslaves.Atthis timeandtilltheyareseven[1336b]yearsolditisnecessarythat theyshouldbeeducatedathome.Itisalsoverypropertobanish, bothfromtheirhearingandsight,everythingwhichisilliberaland thelike.Indeeditisasmuchthebusinessofthelegislatoras anythingelse,tobanisheveryindecentexpressionoutofthestate: forfromapermissiontospeakwhateverisshameful,veryquickly arisesthedoingit,andthisparticularlywithyoungpeople:for whichreasonletthemneverspeaknorhearanysuchthing:butifit appearsthatanyfreemanhasdoneorsaidanythingthatisforbidden beforeheisofagetobethoughtfittopartakeofthecommonmeals, lethimbepunishedbydisgraceandstripes;butifapersonabove thatagedoesso,lethimbetreatedasyouwouldaslave,onaccount ofhisbeinginfamous.Sinceweforbidhisspeakingeverythingwhich isforbidden,itisnecessarythatheneitherseesobscenestoriesnor pictures;themagistratesthereforearetotakecarethatthereareno statuesorpicturesofanythingofthisnature,exceptonlytothose godstowhomthelawpermitsthem,andtowhichthelawallowspersons ofacertainagetopaytheirdevotions,forthemselves,theirwives, andchildren.Itshouldalsobeillegalforyoungpersonstobe

presenteitheratiambicsorcomediesbeforetheyarearrivedatthat agewhentheyareallowedtopartakeofthepleasuresofthetable: indeedagoodeducationwillpreservethemfromalltheevilswhich attendonthesethings.Wehaveatpresentjusttoucheduponthis subject;itwillbeourbusinesshereafter,whenweproperlycometo it,todeterminewhetherthiscareofchildrenisunnecessary,or,if necessary,inwhatmanneritmustbedone;atpresentwehaveonly mentioneditasnecessary.ProbablythesayingofTheodoras,the tragicactor,wasnotabadone:Thathewouldpermitnoone,noteven themeanestactor,togouponthestagebeforehim,thathemight firstengagetheearoftheaudience.Thesamethinghappensbothin ourconnectionswithmenandthings:whatwemeetwithfirstpleases best;forwhichreasonchildrenshouldbekeptstrangerstoeverything whichisbad,moreparticularlywhatsoeverislooseandoffensiveto goodmanners.Whenfiveyearsareaccomplished,thetwonextmaybe veryproperlyemployedinbeingspectatorsofthoseexercisesthey willafterwardshavetolearn.Therearetwoperiodsintowhich educationoughttobedivided,accordingtotheageofthechild;the oneisfromhisbeingsevenyearsofagetothetimeofpuberty;the otherfromthencetillheisoneandtwenty:forthosewhodivideages bythenumberseven[1337a]areingeneralwrong:itismuchbetterto followthedivisionofnature;foreveryartandeveryinstructionis intendedtocompletewhatnaturehasleftdefective:wemustfirst considerifanyregulationwhatsoeverisrequisiteforchildren;in thenextplace,ifitisadvantageoustomakeitacommoncare,or thateveryoneshouldactthereinashepleases,whichisthegeneral practiceinmostcities;inthethirdplace,whatitoughttobe. BOOKVIII CHAPTERI Noonecandoubtthatthemaigstrateoughtgreatlytointeresthimself inthecareofyouth;forwhereitisneglecteditishurtfultothe city,foreverystateoughttobegovernedaccordingtoitsparticular nature;fortheformandmannersofeachgovernmentarepeculiarto itself;andthese,astheyoriginallyestablishedit,sotheyusually stillpreserveit.Forinstance,democraticformsandmannersa democracy;oligarchic,anoligarchy:but,universally,thebest mannersproducethebestgovernment.Besides,asineverybusinessand arttherearesomethingswhichmenaretolearnfirstandbemade

accustomedto,whicharenecessarytoperformtheirseveralworks;so itisevidentthatthesamethingisnecessaryinthepracticeof virtue.Asthereisoneendinviewineverycity,itisevidentthat educationoughttobeoneandthesameineach;andthatthisshould beacommoncare,andnottheindividual's,asitnowis,whenevery onetakescareofhisownchildrenseparately;andtheirinstructions areparticularalso,eachpersonteachingthemastheyplease;but whatoughttobeengagedinoughttobecommontoall.Besides,noone oughttothinkthatanycitizenbelongstohiminparticular,butto thestateingeneral;foreachoneisapartofthestate,anditis thenaturaldutyofeachparttoregardthegoodofthewhole:andfor thistheLacedaemoniansmaybepraised;fortheygivethegreatest attentiontoeducation,andmakeitpublic.Itisevident,then,that thereshouldbelawsconcerningeducation,andthatitshouldbe public. CHAPTERII Whateducationis,andhowchildrenoughttobeinstructed,iswhat shouldbewellknown;fortherearedoubtsconcerningthebusinessof it,asallpeopledonotagreeinthosethingstheywouldhaveachild taught,bothwithrespecttotheirimprovementinvirtueandahappy life:norisitclearwhethertheobjectofitshouldbetoimprove thereasonorrectifythemorals.Fromthepresentmodeofeducation wecannotdeterminewithcertaintytowhichmenincline,whetherto instructachildinwhatwillbeusefultohiminlife;orwhattends tovirtue,andwhatisexcellent:forallthesethingshavetheir separatedefenders.Astovirtue,thereisnoparticular[1337b]in whichtheyallagree:forasalldonotequallyesteemallvirtues,it reasonablyfollowsthattheywillnotcultivatethesame.Itis evidentthatwhatisnecessaryoughttobetaughttoall:butthat whichisnecessaryforoneisnotnecessaryforall;forthereought tobeadistinctionbetweentheemploymentofafreemanandaslave. Thefirstoftheseshouldbetaughteverythingusefulwhichwillnot makethosewhoknowitmean.Everyworkistobeesteemedmean,and everyartandeverydisciplinewhichrendersthebody,themind,or theunderstandingoffreemenunfitforthehabitandpracticeof virtue:forwhichreasonallthoseartswhichtendtodeformthebody arecalledmean,andallthoseemploymentswhichareexercisedfor gain;fortheytakeofffromthefreedomofthemindandrenderit sordid.Therearealsosomeliberalartswhicharenotimproperfor freementoapplytoinacertaindegree;buttoendeavourtoacquirea perfectskillinthemisexposedtothefaultsIhavejustmentioned; forthereisagreatdealofdifferenceinthereasonforwhichany

onedoesorlearnsanything:foritisnotilliberaltoengageinit forone'sself,one'sfriend,orinthecauseofvirtue;while,atthe sametime,todoitforthesakeofanothermayseemtobeactingthe partofaservantandaslave.Themodeofinstructionwhichnow prevailsseemstopartakeofbothparts. CHAPTERIII Therearefourthingswhichitisusualtoteachchildrenreading, gymnasticexercises,andmusic,towhich(inthefourthplace)some addpainting.Readingandpaintingarebothofthemofsingularuse inlife,andgymnasticexercises,asproductiveofcourage.Asto music,somepersonsmaydoubt,asmostpersonsnowuseitforthesake ofpleasure:butthosewhooriginallymadeitpartofeducationdid itbecause,ashasbeenalreadysaid,naturerequiresthatweshould notonlybeproperlyemployed,buttobeabletoenjoyleisure honourably:forthis(torepeatwhatIhavealreadysaid)isofall thingstheprincipal.But,thoughbothlabourandrestare necessary,yetthelatterispreferabletothefirst;andbyallmeans weoughttolearnwhatweshoulddowhenatrest:forweoughtnotto employthattimeatplay;forthenplaywouldbethenecessary businessofourlives.Butifthiscannotbe,playismorenecessary forthosewholabourthanthosewhoareatrest:forhewholabours requiresrelaxation;whichplaywillsupply:foraslabourisattended withpainandcontinuedexertion,itisnecessarythatplay shouldbeintroduced,underproperregulations,asamedicine:for suchanemploymentofthemindisarelaxationtoit,andeaseswith pleasure.[1338a]Nowrestitselfseemstopartakeofpleasure,of happiness,andanagreeablelife:butthiscannotbetheirswho labour,buttheirswhoareatrest;forhewholabours,laboursfor thesakeofsomeendwhichhehasnot:buthappinessisanendwhich allpersonsthinkisattendedwithpleasureandnotwithpain:but allpersonsdonotagreeinmakingthispleasureconsistinthesame thing;foreachonehashisparticularstandard,correspondenttohis ownhabits;butthebestmanproposesthebestpleasure,andthat whicharisesfromthenoblestactions.Butitisevident,thattolive alifeofresttherearesomethingswhichamanmustlearnandbe instructedin;andthattheobjectofthislearningandthis instructioncentresintheiracquisition:butthelearningand instructionwhichisgivenforlabourhasforitsobjectotherthings; forwhichreasontheancientsmademusicapartofeducation;notasa thingnecessary,foritisnotofthatnature,norasathinguseful, asreading,inthecommoncourseoflife,orformanagingofafamily, orforlearninganythingasusefulinpubliclife.Paintingalsoseems

usefultoenableamantojudgemoreaccuratelyoftheproductionsof thefinerarts:norisitlikethegymnasticexercises,which contributetohealthandstrength;forneitherofthesethingsdowe seeproducedbymusic;thereremainsforitthentobetheemployment ofourrest,whichtheyhadinviewwhointroducedit;and,thinking itaproperemploymentforfreemen,tothemtheyallottedit;asHomer sings: "HowrighttocallThaliatothefeast:"andofsomeothershe says: "Thebardwascall'd,toravisheveryear:" and,inanotherplace,hemakesUlyssessaythehappiestpartofman's lifeis "Whenatthefestalboard,inorderplac'd,Theyhearthesong." Itisevident,then,thatthereisacertaineducationinwhicha childmaybeinstructed,notasusefulnorasnecessary,butasnoble andliberal:butwhetherthisisoneormorethanone,andofwhat sorttheyare,andhowtobetaught,shallbeconsideredhereafter:we arenowgotsofaronourwayastoshowthatwehavethetestimonyof theancientsinourfavour,bywhattheyhavedelivereddownupon educationformusicmakesthisplain.Moreover,itisnecessaryto instructchildreninwhatisuseful,notonlyonaccountofitsbeing usefulinitself,as,forinstance,tolearntoread,butalsoasthe meansofacquiringotherdifferentsortsofinstruction:thusthey shouldbeinstructedinpainting,notonlytopreventtheirbeing mistakeninpurchasingpictures,orinbuyingorsellingofvases,but ratherasitmakes[1338b]themjudgesofthebeautiesofthehuman form;fortobealwayshuntingaftertheprofitableillagreeswith greatandfreebornsouls.Asitisevidentwhetheraboyshouldbe firsttaughtmoralsorreasoning,andwhetherhisbodyorhis understandingshouldbefirstcultivated,itisplainthatboysshould befirstputunderthecareofthedifferentmastersofthegymnastic arts,bothtoformtheirbodiesandteachthemtheirexercises. CHAPTERIV Nowthosestateswhichseemtotakethegreatestcareoftheir children'seducation,bestowtheirchiefattentiononwrestling, thoughitbothpreventstheincreaseofthebodyandhurtstheformof it.ThisfaulttheLacedaemoniansdidnotfallinto,fortheymade

theirchildrenfiercebypainfullabour,aschieflyusefultoinspire themwithcourage:though,aswehavealreadyoftensaid,thisis neithertheonlythingnortheprincipalthingnecessarytoattendto; andevenwithrespecttothistheymaynotthusattaintheirend;for wedonotfindeitherinotheranimals,orothernations,thatcourage necessarilyattendsthemostcruel,butratherthemilder,andthose whohavethedispositionsoflions:fortherearemanypeoplewhoare eagerbothtokillmenandtodevourhumanflesh,astheAchaeansand HeniochiinPontus,andmanyothersinAsia,someofwhomareasbad, othersworsethanthese,whoindeedlivebytyranny,butaremenofno courage.Nay,weknowthattheLacedaemoniansthemselves,whilethey continuedthosepainfullabours,andweresuperiortoallothers (thoughnowtheyareinferiortomany,bothinwarandgymnastic exercises),didnotacquiretheirsuperioritybytrainingtheiryouth totheseexercises,butbecausethosewhoweredisciplinedopposed thosewhowerenotdisciplinedatall.Whatisfairandhonourable oughtthentotakeplaceineducationofwhatisfierceandcruel:for itisnotawolf,noranyotherwildbeast,whichwillbraveanynoble danger,butratheragoodman.Sothatthosewhopermitboystoengage tooearnestlyintheseexercises,whiletheydonottakecareto instructtheminwhatisnecessarytodo,tospeaktherealtruth, renderthemmeanandvile,accomplishedonlyinonedutyofacitizen, andineveryotherrespect,asreasonevinces,goodfornothing.Nor shouldweformourjudgmentsfrompastevents,butfromwhatweseeat present:fornowtheyhaverivalsintheirmodeofeducation,whereas formerlytheyhadnot.Thatgymnasticexercisesareuseful,andin whatmanner,isadmitted;forduringyouthitisverypropertogo throughacourseofthosewhicharemostgentle,omittingthatviolent dietandthosepainfulexerciseswhichareprescribedasnecessary; thattheymaynotpreventthegrowthofthebody:anditisnosmall proofthattheyhavethiseffect,thatamongsttheOlympiccandidates wecanscarcefindtwoorthreewhohavegainedavictorybothwhen boysandmen:becausethenecessaryexercisestheywentthroughwhen youngdeprivedthemoftheirstrength.Whentheyhaveallottedthree yearsfromthetimeofpubertytootherpartsofeducation,theyare thenofaproperagetosubmittolabourandaregulateddiet;forit isimpossibleforthemindandbodybothtolabouratthesametime, astheyareproductiveofcontraryevilstoeachother;thelabourof thebodypreventingtheprogressofthemind,andthemindofthe body. CHAPTERV Withrespecttomusicwehavealreadyspokenalittleinadoubtful

manneruponthissubject.Itwillbepropertogooveragainmore particularlywhatwethensaid,whichmayserveasanintroductionto whatanyotherpersonmaychoosetoofferthereon;foritisnoeasy mattertodistinctlypointoutwhatpowerithas,noronwhataccounts oneshouldapplyit,whetherasanamusementandrefreshment,assleep orwine;asthesearenothingserious,butpleasing,andthekillers ofcare,asEuripidessays;forwhichreasontheyclassinthesame orderanduseforthesamepurposeallthese,namely,sleep,wine,and music,towhichsomeadddancing;orshallwerathersupposethat musictendstobeproductiveofvirtue,havingapower,asthe gymnasticexerciseshavetoformthebodyinacertainway,to influencethemannerssoastoaccustomitsprofessorstorejoice rightly?orshallwesay,thatitisofanyserviceintheconductof life,andanassistanttoprudence?forthisalsoisathirdproperty whichhasbeenattributedtoit.Nowthatboysarenottobe instructedinitasplayisevident;forthosewholearndon'tplay, fortolearnisrathertroublesome;neitherisitpropertopermit boysattheiragetoenjoyperfectleisure;fortoceasetoimproveis bynomeansfitforwhatisasyetimperfect;butitmaybethought thattheearnestattentionofboysinthisartisforthesakeofthat amusementtheywillenjoywhentheycometobemenandcompletely formed;but,ifthisisthecase,whyaretheythemselvestolearnit, andnotfollowthepracticeofthekingsoftheMedesandPersians, whoenjoythepleasureofmusicbyhearingothersplay,andbeing shownitsbeautiesbythem;forofnecessitythosemustbebetter skilledthereinwhomakethissciencetheirparticularstudyand business,thanthosewhohaveonlyspentsomuchtimeatitaswas sufficientjusttolearntheprinciplesofit.Butifthisisareason forachild'sbeingtaughtanything,theyoughtalsotolearntheart ofcookery,butthisisabsurd.Thesamedoubtoccursifmusichasa powerofimprovingthemanners;forwhyshouldtheyonthisaccount themselveslearnit,andnotreapeveryadvantageofregulatingthe passionsorformingajudgment[1339b]onthemeritsofthe performancebyhearingothers,astheLacedaemonians;forthey, withouthavingeverlearntmusic,areyetabletojudgeaccurately whatisgoodandwhatisbad;thesamereasoningmaybeappliedif musicissupposedtobetheamusementofthosewholiveanelegantand easylife,whyshouldtheylearnthemselves,andnotratherenjoythe benefitofothers'skill.Letushereconsiderwhatisourbeliefof theimmortalgodsinthisparticular.Nowwefindthepoetsnever representJupiterhimselfassingingandplaying;nay,weourselves treattheprofessorsoftheseartsasmeanpeople,andsaythatnoone wouldpractisethembutadrunkardorabuffoon.Butprobablywemay considerthissubjectmoreatlargehereafter.Thefirstquestionis, whethermusicisorisnottomakeapartofeducation?andofthose threethingswhichhavebeenassignedasitsproperemployment,which istheright?Isittoinstruct,toamuse,ortoemploythevacant hoursofthosewholiveatrest?ormaynotallthreebeproperly

allottedtoit?foritappearstopartakeofthemall;forplayis necessaryforrelaxation,andrelaxationpleasant,asitisamedicine forthatuneasinesswhicharisesfromlabour.Itisadmittedalsothat ahappylifemustbeanhonourableone,andapleasantonetoo,since happinessconsistsinboththese;andweallagreethatmusicisone ofthemostpleasingthings,whetheraloneoraccompaniedwitha voice;asMusseussays,"Music'sthesweetestjoyofman;"forwhich reasonitisjustlyadmittedintoeverycompanyandeveryhappylife, ashavingthepowerofinspiringjoy.Sothatfromthisanyonemay supposethatitisnecessarytoinstructyoungpersonsinit;forall thosepleasureswhichareharmlessarenotonlyconducivetothefinal endoflife,butservealsoasrelaxations;and,asmenarebutrarely intheattainmentofthatfinalend,theyoftenceasefromtheir labourandapplytoamusement,withnofurtherviewthantoacquire thepleasureattendingit.Itisthereforeusefultoenjoysuch pleasuresasthese.Therearesomepersonswhomakeplayandamusement theirend,andprobablythatendhassomepleasureannexedtoit,but notwhatshouldbe;butwhilemenseektheonetheyaccepttheother forit;becausethereissomelikenessinhumanactionstotheend; fortheendispursuedforthesakeofnothingelsethatattendsit; butforitselfonly;andpleasureslikethesearesoughtfor,noton accountofwhatfollowsthem,butonaccountofwhathasgonebefore them,aslabourandgrief;forwhichreasontheyseekforhappinessin thesesortofpleasures;andthatthisisthereasonanyonemay easilyperceive.Thatmusicshouldbepursued,notonthisaccount only,butalsoasitisveryserviceableduringthehoursof relaxationfromlabour,probablyno[1340a]onedoubts;weshouldalso inquirewhetherbesidesthisuseitmaynotalsohaveanotherof noblernatureandweoughtnotonlytopartakeofthecommonpleasure arisingfromit(whichallhavethesensationof,formusicnaturally givespleasure,thereforetheuseofitisagreeabletoallagesand alldispositions);butalsotoexamineifittendsanythingtoimprove ourmannersandoursouls.Andthiswillbeeasilyknownifwefeel ourdispositionsanywayinfluencedthereby;andthattheyaresois evidentfrommanyotherinstances,aswellasthemusicattheOlympic games;andthisconfessedlyfillsthesoulwithenthusiasm;but enthusiasmisanaffectionofthesoulwhichstronglyagitatesthe disposition.Besides,allthosewhohearanyimitationssympathise therewith;andthiswhentheyareconveyedevenwithoutrhythmor verse.Moreover,asmusicisoneofthosethingswhicharepleasant, andasvirtueitselfconsistsinrightlyenjoying,loving,andhating, itisevidentthatweoughtnottolearnoraccustomourselvesto anythingsomuchastojudgerightandrejoiceinhonourablemanners andnobleactions.Butangerandmildness,courageandmodesty,and theircontraries,aswellasallotherdispositionsofthemind,are mostnaturallyimitatedbymusicandpoetry;whichisplainby experience,forwhenweheartheseourverysoulisaltered;andhe whoisaffectedeitherwithjoyorgriefbytheimitationofany

objects,isinverynearlythesamesituationasifhewasaffectedby theobjectsthemselves;thus,ifanypersonispleasedwithseeinga statueofanyoneonnootheraccountbutitsbeauty,itisevident thatthesightoftheoriginalfromwhenceitwastakenwouldalsobe pleasing;nowithappensintheothersensesthereisnoimitationof manners;thatistosay,inthetouchandthetaste;intheobjectsof sight,averylittle;forthesearemerelyrepresentationsofthings, andtheperceptionswhichtheyexciteareinamannercommontoall. Besides,statuesandpaintingsarenotproperlyimitationsofmanners, butrathersignsandmarkswhichshowthebodyisaffectedbysome passion.However,thedifferenceisnotgreat,yetyoungmenoughtnot toviewthepaintingsofPauso,butofPolygnotus,oranyother painterorstatuarywhoexpressesmanners.Butinpoetryandmusic thereareimitationsofmanners;andthisisevident,fordifferent harmoniesdifferfromeachothersomuchbynature,thatthosewho hearthemaredifferentlyaffected,andarenotinthesame dispositionofmindwhenoneisperformedaswhenanotheris;theone, forinstance,occasionsgrief13406andcontractsthesoul,asthe mixedLydian:otherssoftenthemind,andasitweredissolvethe heart:othersfixitinafirmandsettledstate,suchisthepowerof theDoricmusiconly;whilethePhrygianfillsthesoulwith enthusiasm,ashasbeenwelldescribedbythosewhohavewritten philosophicallyuponthispartofeducation;fortheybringexamples ofwhattheyadvancefromthethingsthemselves.Thesameholdstrue withrespecttorhythm;somefixthedisposition,othersoccasiona changeinit;someactmoreviolently,othersmoreliberally.From whathasbeensaiditisevidentwhataninfluencemusichasoverthe dispositionofthemind,andhowvariouslyitcanfascinateit:andif itcandothis,mostcertainlyitiswhatyouthoughttobeinstructed in.Andindeedthelearningofmusicisparticularlyadaptedtotheir disposition;forattheirtimeoflifetheydonotwillinglyattendto anythingwhichisnotagreeable;butmusicisnaturallyoneofthe mostagreeablethings;andthereseemstobeacertainconnection betweenharmonyandrhythm;forwhichreasonsomewisemenheldthe soulitselftobeharmony;others,thatitcontainsit. CHAPTERVI Wewillnowdeterminewhetheritisproperthatchildrenshouldbe taughttosing,andplayuponanyinstrument,whichwehavebefore madeamatterofdoubt.Now,itiswellknownthatitmakesagreat dealofdifferencewhenyouwouldqualifyanyoneinanyart,forthe personhimselftolearnthepracticalpartofit;foritisathing verydifficult,ifnotimpossible,foramantobeagoodjudgeof

whathehimselfcannotdo.Itisalsoverynecessarythatchildren shouldhavesomeemploymentwhichwillamusethem;forwhichreason therattleofArchytasseemswellcontrived,whichtheygivechildren toplaywith,topreventtheirbreakingthosethingswhichareabout thehouse;forattheiragetheycannotsitstill:thisthereforeis welladaptedtoinfants,asinstructionoughttobetheirrattleas theygrowup;henceitisevidentthattheyshouldbesotaughtmusic astobeabletopractiseit.Norisitdifficulttosaywhatis becomingorunbecomingoftheirage,ortoanswertheobjectionswhich somemaketothisemploymentasmeanandlow.Inthefirstplace,it isnecessaryforthemtopractise,thattheymaybejudgesoftheart: forwhichreasonthisshouldbedonewhentheyareyoung;butwhen theyaregrownolderthepracticalpartmaybedropped;whilethey willstillcontinuejudgesofwhatisexcellentintheart,andtakea properpleasuretherein,fromtheknowledgetheyacquiredofitin theiryouth.Astothecensurewhichsomepersonsthrowuponmusic,as somethingmeanandlow,itisnotdifficulttoanswerthat,ifwewill butconsiderhowfarweproposethosewhoaretobeeducatedsoasto becomegoodcitizensshouldbeinstructedinthisart,[1341a]and whatmusicandwhatrhythmstheyshouldbeacquaintedwith;andalso whatinstrumentstheyshouldplayupon;forinthesethereisprobably adifference.Suchthenistheproperanswertothatcensure:forit mustbeadmitted,thatinsomecasesnothingcanpreventmusicbeing attended,toacertaindegree,withthebadeffectswhichareascribed toit;itisthereforeclearthatthelearningofitshouldnever preventthebusinessofriperyears;norrenderthebodyeffeminate, andunfitforthebusinessofwarorthestate;butitshouldbe practisedbytheyoung,judgedofbytheold.Thatchildrenmaylearn musicproperly,itisnecessarythattheyshouldnotbeemployedin thosepartsofitwhicharetheobjectsofdisputebetweenthemasters inthatscience;norshouldtheyperformsuchpiecesasarewondered atfromthedifficultyoftheirexecution;andwhich,frombeingfirst exhibitedinthepublicgames,arenowbecomeapartofeducation;but letthemlearnsomuchofitastobeabletoreceiveproperpleasure fromexcellentmusicandrhythms;andnotthatonlywhichmusicmust makeallanimalsfeel,andalsoslavesandboys,butmore.Itis thereforeplainwhatinstrumentstheyshoulduse;thus,theyshould neverbetaughttoplayupontheflute,oranyotherinstrumentwhich requiresgreatskill,astheharporthelike,butonsuchaswill makethemgoodjudgesofmusic,oranyotherinstruction:besides,the fluteisnotamoralinstrument,butratheronethatwillinflamethe passions,andisthereforerathertobeusedwhenthesoulistobe animatedthanwheninstructionisintended.Letmeaddalso,that thereissomethingthereinwhichisquitecontrarytowhateducation requires;astheplayeronthefluteispreventedfromspeaking:for whichreasonourforefathersveryproperlyforbadetheuseofitto youthandfreemen,thoughtheythemselvesatfirstusedit;forwhen theirrichesprocuredthemgreaterleisure,theygrewmoreanimatedin

thecauseofvirtue;andbothbeforeandaftertheMedianwartheir nobleactionssoexaltedtheirmindsthattheyattendedtoeverypart ofeducation;selectingnooneinparticular,butendeavouringto collectthewhole:forwhichreasontheyintroducedtheflutealso,as oneoftheinstrumentstheyweretolearntoplayon.AtLacedaemon thechoregushimselfplayedontheflute;anditwassocommonat Athensthatalmosteveryfreemanunderstoodit,asisevidentfromthe tabletwhichThrasippusdedicatedwhenhewaschoregus;butafterwards theyrejecteditasdangerous;havingbecomebetterjudgesofwhat tendedtopromotevirtueandwhatdidnot.Forthesamereasonmanyof theancientinstrumentswerethrownaside,asthedulcimerandthe lyre;asalsothosewhichweretoinspirethosewhoplayedonthem withpleasure,andwhichrequiredanicefingerandgreatskillto playwellon.Whattheancientstellus,bywayoffable,oftheflute isindeedveryrational;namely,thatafterMinervahadfoundit,she threwitaway:noraretheywrongwhosaythatthegoddessdislikedit fordeformingthefaceofhimwhoplayedthereon:notbutthatitis moreprobablethatsherejecteditastheknowledgethereof contributednothingtotheimprovementofthemind.Now,weregard Minervaastheinventressofartsandsciences.Aswedisapproveofa child'sbeingtaughttounderstandinstruments,andtoplaylikea master(whichwewouldhaveconfinedtothosewhoarecandidatesfor theprizeinthatscience;fortheyplaynottoimprovethemselvesin virtue,buttopleasethosewhohearthem,andgratifytheir importunity);thereforewethinkthepracticeofitunfitforfreemen; butthenitshouldbeconfinedtothosewhoarepaidfordoingit;for itusuallygivespeoplesordidnotions,fortheendtheyhaveinview isbad:fortheimpertinentspectatorisaccustomedtomakethem changetheirmusic;sothattheartistswhoattendtohimregulate theirbodiesaccordingtohismotions. CHAPTERVII Wearenowtoenterintoaninquiryconcerningharmonyandrhythm; whetherallsortsofthesearetobeemployedineducation,orwhether somepeculiaronesaretobeselected;andalsowhetherweshouldgive thesamedirectionstothosewhoareengagedinmusicaspartof education,orwhetherthereissomethingdifferentfromthesetwo. Now,asallmusicconsistsinmelodyandrhythm,weoughtnottobe unacquaintedwiththepowerwhicheachofthesehasineducation;and whetherweshouldratherchoosemusicinwhichmelodyprevails,or rhythm:butwhenIconsiderhowmanythingshavebeenwellwritten uponthesesubjects,notonlybysomemusiciansofthepresentage, butalsobysomephilosopherswhoareperfectlyskilledinthatpart

ofmusicwhichbelongstoeducation;wewillreferthosewhodesirea veryparticularknowledgethereintothosewriters,andshallonly treatofitingeneralterms,withoutdescendingtoparticulars. Melodyisdividedbysomephilosophers,whosenotionsweapproveof, intomoral,practical,andthatwhichfillsthemindwithenthusiasm: theyalsoallottoeachoftheseaparticularkindofharmonywhich naturallycorrespondstherewith:andwesaythatmusicshouldnotbe appliedtoonepurposeonly,butmany;bothforinstructionand purifyingthesoul(nowIusethewordpurifyingatpresentwithout anyexplanation,butshallspeakmoreatlargeofitinmyPoetics); and,inthethirdplace,asanagreeablemannerofspendingthetime andarelaxationfromtheuneasinessofthemind.[1342a]Itis evidentthatallharmoniesaretobeused;butnotforallpurposes; butthemostmoralineducation:buttopleasetheear,whenothers play,themostactiveandenthusiastic;forthatpassionwhichisto befoundverystronginsomesoulsistobemetwithalsoinall;but thedifferenceindifferentpersonsconsistsinitsbeinginalessor greaterdegree,aspity,fear,andenthusiasmalso;whichlatterisso powerfulinsomeastooverpowerthesoul:andyetweseethose persons,bytheapplicationofsacredmusictosoothetheirmind, renderedassedateandcomposedasiftheyhademployedtheartofthe physician:andthismustnecessarilyhappentothecompassionate,the fearful,andallthosewhoaresubduedbytheirpassions:nay,all persons,asfarastheyareaffectedwiththosepassions,admitofthe samecure,andarerestoredtotranquillitywithpleasure.Inthesame manner,allmusicwhichhasthepowerofpurifyingthesoulaffordsa harmlesspleasuretoman.Such,therefore,shouldbetheharmonyand suchthemusicwhichthosewhocontendwitheachotherinthetheatre shouldexhibit:butastheaudienceiscomposedoftwosortsof people,thefreeandthewellinstructed,therudethemeanmechanics, andhiredservants,andalongcollectionofthelike,theremustbe somemusicandsomespectaclestopleaseandsoothethem;forastheir mindsareasitwerepervertedfromtheirnaturalhabits,soalsois thereanunnaturalharmony,andoverchargedmusicwhichis accommodatedtotheirtaste:butwhatisaccordingtonaturegives pleasuretoeveryone,thereforethosewhoaretocontenduponthe theatreshouldbeallowedtousethisspeciesofmusic.Butin educationethicmelodyandethicharmonyshouldbeused,whichisthe Doric,aswehavealreadysaid,oranyotherwhichthosephilosophers whoareskilfulinthatmusicwhichistobeemployedineducation shallapproveof.ButSocrates,inPlato'sRepublic,isverywrong whenhe[1342b]permitsonlythePhrygianmusictobeusedaswellas theDoric,particularlyasamongstotherinstrumentshebanishesthe flute;forthePhrygianmusichasthesamepowerinharmonyasthe flutehasamongsttheinstruments;fortheyarebothpatheticand raisethemind:andthisthepracticeofthepoetsproves;forin theirbacchanalsongs,orwhenevertheydescribeanyviolentemotions ofthemind,thefluteistheinstrumenttheychieflyuse:andthe

Phrygianharmonyismostsuitabletothesesubjects.Now,thatthe dithyrambicmeasureisPhrygianisallowedbygeneralconsent;and thosewhoareconversantinstudiesofthissortbringmanyproofsof it;as,forinstance,whenPhiloxenusendeavouredtocompose dithyrambicmusicforDoricharmony,henaturallyfellbackagaininto Phrygian,asbeingfittestforthatpurpose;aseveryoneindeed agrees,thattheDoricmusicismostserious,andfittesttoinspire courage:and,aswealwayscommendthemiddleasbeingbetweenthetwo extremes,andtheDorichasthisrelationwithrespecttoother harmonies,itisevidentthatiswhattheyouthoughttobeinstructed in.Therearetwothingstobetakenintoconsideration,bothwhatis possibleandwhatisproper;everyonethenshouldchieflyendeavour toattainthosethingswhichcontainboththesequalities:butthisis toberegulatedbydifferenttimesoflife;forinstance,itisnot easyforthosewhoareadvancedinyearstosingsuchpiecesofmusic asrequireveryhighnotes,fornaturepointsouttothemthosewhich aregentleandrequirelittlestrengthofvoice(forwhichreasonsome whoareskilfulinmusicjustlyfindfaultwithSocratesfor forbiddingtheyouthtobeinstructedingentleharmony;asif,like wine,itwouldmakethemdrunk,whereastheeffectofthatisto rendermenbacchanals,andnotmakethemlanguid):thesethereforeare whatshouldemploythosewhoaregrownold.Moreover,ifthereisany harmonywhichisproperforachild'sage,asbeingatthesametime elegantandinstructive,astheLydianofallothersseemschieflyto beThesethenareasitwerethethreeboundariesofeducation, moderation,possibility,anddecorum. INDEX ACHILLES,76 Actofthecity,what,69 Actions,theiroriginalspring,i Administration,76;whethertobesharedbythewholecommunity,203 AEsumnetes,96 AEthiopia,inwhatmannerthepowerofthestateisthereregulated, 112 Alterationsingovernment,whencetheyarise,142;whattheyare, 143

 Ambractia,thegovernmentof,changed,151 AndromadasReginus,alawgivertotheThracianCalcidians,65 Animals,theirdifferentprovisionsbynature,14;intendedby natureforthebenefitofman,14;whatconstitutestheirdifferent species,113 Animals,tame,whybetterthanwild,8 Arbitratorandjudge,theirdifference,49 Architashisrattle,248 Areopagus,senateof,63 ArgonautsrefusetotakeHerculeswiththem,93 Aristocracies,causesofcommotionsinthem,157;chiefcauseof theiralteration,158;maydegenerateintoanoligarchy,79 Aristocracy,what,78;treatedof,120;itsobject,121 Art,worksof,whichmostexcellent,20 Artificersandslaves,theirdifference,24 Assemblies,public,advantageoustoademocracy,134 Assembly,public,itsproper business,133Athens,differentdispositionsof thecitizensof,149 Barter,itsoriginal,15 Being,whatthenatureofevery oneis,3Beings,whysomecommand, othersobey,2Bodybynaturetobegoverned, 8;requiresourcarebefore thesoul,232

Calchis,thegovernmentof,changed,151 Calcidians,65 Carthaginiangovernmentdescribed,60 Censusinafreestateshouldbeasextensiveaspossible,131;howto bealtered,162 CharondassupposedtobethescholarofZaleucus,64 Child,howtobemanagedwhenfirstborn,235;shouldbetaught nothingtillheisfiveyearsold,235;howthentobeeducated,236 Children,thepropergovernmentof,22;whattheirpropervirtues, 23;whattheyareusuallytaught,240 Cities,howgovernedatfirst,3;what,3;theworkofnature,3; priorincontemplationtoafamily,oranindividual,4 Citizen,whoisone?66,68;shouldknowbothhowtocommandand obey,73 Citizensmusthavesomethingsincommon,26;shouldbeexemptedfrom servilelabour,51;privilegesdifferentin differentgovernments,68;ifillegallymade,whetherillegal,69;who admittedtobe,75;inthebeststatesoughtnottofollow merchandise,216 City,maybetoomuchone,27,35;what,66,82;whenitcontinuesthe same,70;forwhosesakeestablished,76;itsend,83;ofwhatparts madeup,113;bestcomposedofequals,126 Cityofthebestform,whatitsestablishmentoughttobe,149; whereinitsgreatnessconsists,149;maybeeithertoolargeortoo small,209;whatshouldbeitssituation,211;whetherpropernearthe sea,211;oughttobedividedbyfamiliesintodifferentsortsof men,218 Cityandconfederacy,theirdifference,37;whereinitshouldbe one,27 Commandamongstequalsshouldbeinrotation,101 CommonmealsnotwellestablishedatLacedaemonwellatCrete,56;the modelfromwhencetheLacedaemonianwastaken,56;inferiortoitin somerespects,56

 Community,itsrecommendationsdeceitful,34;intowhatpeopleit maybedivided,194 Communityofchildren,29,30;inconveniencesattendingit,31 Communityofgoods,itsinconveniences,28;destructiveofmodesty andliberality,34 Communityofwives,itsinconveniences,27 Contemptacauseofsedition,146 Courageofamandifferentfromawoman's,74 Courts,howmanythereoughttobe,140 Courtsofjusticeshouldbefewinasmallstate,192 CretancustomssimilartotheLacedasmonian,57;assemblyopento everycitizen,58 Cretans,theirpower,58;theirpublicmeals,howconducted58 Crete,thegovernmentof,57;descriptionoftheislandof57 CustomsatCarthage,Lacedsemon,andamongsttheScythiansand Iberians,concerningthosewhohadkilledanenemy,204,205 Dadalus'sstatues,6. Delphos,anaccountofaseditionthere,150 Demagogues,theirinfluenceinademocracy,116. Democracies.aroseoutoftyrannies,100;whencetheyarose,142;when changedintotyrannies,153;theirdifferentsorts,184,188;general rulesfortheirestablishment,185;shouldnotbemadetooperfect, 191 Democracy,what,79,80;itsdefinition,112,113;differentsorts of,115,118;itsobject,122;howsubvertedintheIsleofCos,152 Democracyandaristocracy,howtheymaybeblendedtogether,163 Democraticalstate,itsfoundation,184 Despoticpowerabsurd,205

 Dion,hisnobleresolution,171 Dionysius,histaxes,175 Dissolutionofkingdomsandtyrannies,169 Domesticemploymentsofmenandwomendifferent,74 Domesticgovernment,itsobject,77 Domesticsocietythefirst,3 Draco,65 Dyrrachium,governmentof,101 Economyandmoneygetting,difference,17 Educationnecessaryforthehappinessofthecity,90;ofall thingsmostnecessarytopreservethestate,166;whatitoughttobe, 166;theobjects ofit,228,229;shouldbetakencareofbythemagistrate,and correspondtothenatureofgovernment,238;shouldbeacommoncare, andregulatedbylaws,238 Employment,onetobeallottedtoonepersoninanextensive government,136 Employmentsinthestate,howtobedisposedof,8890;whetherall shouldbeopentoall,216 EphialtesabridgesthepowerofthesenateofAreopagus,63 Ephori,atSparta,theirpowertoogreat,54;improperlychosen,54; flatteredbytheirkings,54;thesupremejudges,55;manneroflife tooindulgent,55 Epidamnus,anaccountofarevolutionthere,150 Equality,howtwofold,143;inademocracy,howtobeprocured,186 Euripidesquoted,72 Familygovernment,ofwhatitconsists,5 Fathershouldnotbetooyoung,232

 Femalesandslaves,whereintheydiffer,2;whyuponalevelamongst barbarians,3 Forfeitures,howtobeapplied,192 Fortuneimproperpretensionforpower,91 Freemeningeneral,whatpowertheyoughttohave,86 Freestatetreatedof,121;howitarisesoutofademocracyand oligarchy,122,123 Friendshipweakenedbyacommunityofchildren,31 General,theofficeof,howtobe disposedof,98Gods,whysupposedsubjectto kinglygovernment,3Good,relativetoman,how divided,201Goodandevil,theperceptionof, necessarytoformafamilyand acity,4 Goodfortunesomethingdifferentfromhappiness,202 Governmentshouldcontinueasmuchaspossibleinthesamehands,28; inwhatmanneritshouldbeinrotation,28;what,66;whichbest,of agoodmanorgoodlaws,98;good,towhatitshouldoweits preservation,124;whatthebest,225 Governmentofthemasterovertheslavesometimesreciprocallyuseful, ii Governments,howdifferentfromeachother,67;whethermorethan oneformshouldbeestablished,76;shouldendeavourtopreventothers frombeingtoopowerfulinstancesofit,93;howcomparedtomusic, in;ingeneral,towhattheyowetheirpreservation,160 Governments,political,regal,family,andservile,their differencefromeachother,i Governorsandgoverned,whethertheirvirtuesarethesameor different,23;whethertheyshouldbethesamepersonsordifferent, 227

 Grecians,theirsuperiorityoverotherpeople,213 Guardsofakingnatives,96,168;ofatyrantforeigners,96,168 Gymnasticexercises,whentobeperformed,223;howfartheyshouldbe madeapartofeducation,242,243 Happiness,whereinitconsists, 207Happylife,wheremostlikelyto befound,202Harmony,whetherallkindsofit aretobeusedineducation, 251 HelotstroublesometotheLacedaemonians,87 Herdsmencomposethesecondbestdemocracy,189 Hippodamus,anaccountof,46;hisplanofgovernment,46,47: objectedto,47,48 Homerquoted,95,116 Honours,aninequalityof,occasionsseditions,44 Horsemostsuitabletoanoligarchy,195 Houses,private,theirbestform, 221Humanfleshdevouredbysome nations,242Husbandmencomposethebest democracy,189;willchooseto governaccordingtolaw,118Husbandry,artof,whetherpart ofmoneygetting,13 Instruments,theirdifferencefromeachother,6;whereinthey differfrompossessions,6 Italy,itsancientboundary,218

Jason'sdeclaration,72Judgeshouldnotactasan arbitrator,48,49;whichisbestforanindividual,orthepeople ingeneral,98,99Judges,manybetterthanone,102;ofwhomto consist,102;howmanydifferentsortsarenecessary,141Judicial partofgovernment, howtobedivided,140Jurymen,particularpowerssometimes appointedtothatoffice,68 Justice,what,88;thecourseof,impededinCrete,59;differentin differentsituations,74 King,fromwhomtobechosen60;theguardianofhispeople168King's children,whattobedone with,100King'spower,whatitshouldbe 100;whenunequal,143Kingdom,what,78Kingdoms,theirobject, 167, howbestowed,168;causes oftheirdissolution,173;how preserved,173Kinglygovernmentintheheroic times,what,96Kinglypowerregulatedbythe lawsatSpartainpeace,95; absoluteinwar,95 KingsformerlyinCrete,58; theirpowerafterwardsdevolvedtothekosmoi,58; methodofelectingthemat Carthage,60Knowledgeofthemasterand slavedifferentfromeachother, iiK.oafj.01,thepowerof,58;their number,58;whereininferior totheephori,58;allowedto

resigntheirofficebeforetheir timeiselapsed,59 Lacedamoniancustomssimilar totheCretan,57Lacedaemoniangovernmentmuchesteemed,41;the faultsofit,5356;calculatedonlyforwar,56;howcomposedofa democracyandoligarchy,124Lacedaemonianrevenuebadly raised,56,57 Lacedaemonians,whereintheyadmitthingstobecommon,33Land shouldbedividedintotwo parts,219 Lawmakesonemanaslave,anotherfree,6;whetherjustornot,9;at Thebesrespectingtradesmen,75;nothingshouldbedonecontraryto it,160Lawandgovernment,their difference,107,108Laws,whenadvantageoustoalterthem,49,50,52; ofeverystatewillbelikethestate,88;whomtheyshouldbe calculatedfor,92;decidebetterthanmen,101;moralpreferableto written,102;mustsometimesbendtoancientcustoms,117;shouldbe framedtothestate,107;thesamesuitnotallgovernments,108 100,^+Legislatoroughttoknownotonlywhatis best,butwhatispractical,nLegislatorsshouldfixaproper mediuminproperty,46Liberty,whereinitpartlyconsists,184,185 Life,happy,owingtoacourseof virtue,125;howdivided,228Locriansforbidmentoselltheir property,43 Lycophron'saccountoflaw,82Lycurgusgaveoverreducing thewomentoobedience,53; madeitinfamousforanyone tosellhispossessions,53; someofhislawscensured,54;

spentmuchtimeatCrete,57; supposedtobethescholarof Thales,64Lysanderwantedtoabolishthe kinglypowerinSparta,143 Magistrate,towhomthatnameisproperlygiven,136 Magistrates,whentheymakethestateinclinetoanoligarchy,61; whentoanaristocracy,61;atAthens,fromwhomtobechosen,64;to determinethosecauseswhichthelawcannotbeappliedto,88;whether theirpoweristobethesame,ordifferentindifferentcommunities, 137;howtheydifferfromeachother,138:inthosewhoappointthem, 138;shouldbecontinuedbutashorttimeindemocracies,161;howto bechoseninademocracy,185;differentsortsandemployments,196 Makingandusing,theirdifference,6 Malienses,theirformofgovernment,131 Manprovedtobeapoliticalanimal,4;hasaloneaperceptionofgood andevil,4;withoutlawandjusticetheworstofbeings,5 Master,powerof,whenceitarises,assomethink,5 Matrimony,whentobeengagedin,232 Meals,common,establishedinCreteandItaly,218;expenseof, shouldbedefrayedbythewholestate,219 Mechanicemploymentsusefulforcitizens,73 Mechanics,whethertheyshouldbeallowedtobecitizens,74,75; cannotacquirethepracticeofvirtue,75;admittedtobecitizensin anoligarchy, 75 Mediumofcircumstancesbest,126 Membersofthecommunity,theirdifferentpretencestothe employmentsofthestate,90;whatnaturaldispositionstheyoughtto beof,213 Men,somedistinguishedbynatureforgovernors,otherstobe governed,7;theirdifferentmodesofliving,13;worthythreeways,

226 Merchandise,threedifferentwaysofcarryingiton,20 Middlerankofmenmakethebestcitizens,127;mostconducivetothe preservationofthestate,128;shouldbeparticularlyattendedtoby thelegislators,130 Military,howdivided,194 Mitylen^,anaccountofadisputethere,150 Monarch,absolute,100 Monarchies,theirnature,95,96;sometimeselective,95;sometimes hereditary,95;whencetheysometimesarise,146;causesofcorruption inthem,167;howpreserved,173 Money,howitmadeitswayintocommerce,16;firstweighed,16; afterwardsstamped,16;itsvaluedependentonagreement,16;how gainedbyexchange,19 Moneygettingconsideredatlarge,17,18 Monopolisinggainful,21;sometimespractisedbycities,21 MonopolyofironinSicily,aremarkableinstanceoftheprofitof it,21 Music,howmanyspeciesofit,in;whyapartofeducation,240;how faritshouldbetaught,242,243;professorsofitconsideredasmean people,244;imitatesthe dispositionofthemind,246;improvesourmanners,246;Lydian, softensthemind,247;piecesof,difficultintheirexecution,notto betaughttochildren,249 Naturerequiresequalityamongst equals,101Navalpowershouldberegulated bythestrengthofthecity, 212Necessarypartsofacity,what, 215Nobles,thedifferencebetween them,no;shouldtakecare

 ofthepoor,193 Oath,animproperoneinanoligarchy,166 Officersofstate,whotheyoughttobe,135;howlongtocontinue, 135;whotochoosethem,136 Offices,distinctionbetweenthem,67;whensubversiveoftherights ofthepeople,130 Offspring,aninstanceofthelikenessof,tothesire,30 Oligarchiesarisewherethestrengthofthestateconsistsin horse,no;whencetheyarose,142 Oligarchyadmitsnothiredservantstobecitizens,75;itsobject, 79;what,79,81;itsdefinition,112;differentsortsof,117,119; itsobject,122;howitoughttobefounded,195 Onomacritussupposedtohavedrawnuplaws,64 Ostracism,whyestablished,93,146;itspower,93;aweaponinthe handofsedition,94 Painting,whyitshouldbemade apartofeducation,241Particulars,five,inwhichthe rightsofthepeoplewillbe undermined,130Pausaniaswantedtoabolishthe ephori,143People,howtheyshouldbe madeone,35;ofAthens assumeupontheirvictoryovertheMedes,64;whatbesttosubmittoa kinglygovernment,104:toanaristocratic,104:toafreestate,104; shouldbeallowedthepowerofpardoning,notofcondemning,135 Periander'sadvicetoThrasybulus,93,169 Periclesintroducesthepayingofthosewhoattendedthecourtof justice,64 Philolaus,aThebanlegislator,quitshisnativecountry,64

Phocea,anaccountofadisputethere,150 Physician,hisbusiness,86 Physicians,theirmodeofpracticeinEgypt,98;whenillconsult others,102 Pittacus,65 Platocensured,180 Poorexcusedfrombearingarmsandfromgymnasticexercisesinan oligarchy,131;paidforattendingthepublicassembliesina democracy,131 Powerofthemaster,itsobject,77 Power,supreme,whereitoughttobelodged,84;whywiththemany, 85,87 Powersofastate,differentmethodsofdelegatingthemtothe citizens,132134 Preadvisers,courtof,135 Priesthood,towhomtobeallotted,217 Prisonersofwar,whethertheymaybejustlymadeslaves,9 Privatepropertynotregulatedthesourceofsedition,42;Phaleas wouldhaveitequal,42;howPhaleaswouldcorrecttheirregularities ofit,43;Platowouldallowacertaindifferenceinit,43 Property,itsnature,12;howitshouldberegulated,32,33;the advantagesofhavingitprivate,34;whatquantitythepublicoughtto have,44;oughtnottobecommon,219 Publicassemblies,whensubversiveofthelibertiesofthepeople, 130 Publicmoney,howtobedivided,193 Qualificationsnecessaryforthosewhoaretofillthefirst departmentsingovernment,164 Qualityofacity,whatmeantbyit,129 Quantity,129

 Restandpeacetheproperobjectsofthelegislator,230 Revolutionsinademocracy,whencetheyarise,152;inanoligarchy, 156 Richfinedinanoligarchyfornotbearingarmsandattendingthe gymnasticexercises,131;receivenothingforattendingthepublic assembliesinademocracy,131 Rightsofacitizen,whetheradvantageousornot,203 Seditionssometimespreventedbyequality,45;theircauses,144146; howtobeprevented,163 Senatesuitsademocracy,185 Shepherdscomposethesecondbestdemocracy,189 Slave,hisnatureanduse,6;achattel,7;bylaw,how,9 Slaverynotfoundedinnaturebutlaw,assomethink,6 Slaves,aninquiryintothevirtuestheyarecapableof,23; difficulttomanageproperly,51;theirdifferentsorts,73 Societynecessarytoman,77 Society,civil,thegreatestblessingtoman,4;differentfroma commercialintercourse,82 Socrates,hismistakesongovernment,BookII.passim;hisdivisionof theinhabitants,38;wouldhavethewomengotowar,38;Aristotle's opinionofhisdiscourses,38;hiscitywouldrequireacountryof immeasurableextent,39;hiscomparisonofthehumanspeciestodifferentkindsof metals,40;hisaccountofthedifferentordersofmeninacity imperfect,3 Sojourners,theirsituation,66 Solon'sopinionofriches,14;lawforrestrainingproperty,43; alterstheAtheniangovernment,63 Soulbynaturethegovernoroverthebody,andinwhatmanner,8;of manhowdivided,228,231 Speechaproofthatmanwasformedforsociety,4

State,each,consistsofagreatnumberofparts,109;its disproportionateincreasethecauseofrevolutions,147;firm,what, 159 Stealing,howtobeprevented,44 Submissiontogovernment,whenitisslavery,206 Supremepowershouldbeultimatelyvestedinthelaws,101 Syracuse,thegovernmentof,languid,151 Temperanceinamandifferentfromawoman,74 Temples,howtobebuilt,223 Thales,hiscontrivancetogetmoney,21;supposedtobethe companionofOnomacritus,64 Thingsnecessarytobeknownforthemanagementofdomesticaffairs, 19,20;necessaryinthepositionofacity,220 Tribunals,whatdifferentthingstheyshouldhaveundertheir jurisdictions,137 Tyrannies,howestablished,168;howpreserved,174,176;ofshort duration,180;instancesthereof,180 Tyranny,what,79;notnatural,103;whenceitarises,108;treated of,124;containsallthatisbadinallgovernments,125 Tyrant,fromwhomusuallychosen,167;hisobject,168;hisguards, 168 Tyrants,manyofthemoriginallyenjoyedonlykinglypower,168;the causesoftheirbeingconspiredagainst,169,170;alwayslovethe worstofmen,175 Usesofpossessions,two,15Usurydetested,19 Venalitytobeguardedagainst, IDS Village,what,3 Virtueofacitizenhasreferencetothestate,71;differentin differentgovernments,71

 Virtuesdifferentindifferentpersons,23,24;whetherthesame constituteagoodmanandavaluablecitizen,71 Wallsnecessaryforacity,222 War,whatisgainedbyitinsomedegreeanaturalacquisition,14; notafinalend,205,229 Wife,thepropergovernmentof,22 Women,whattheirpropervirtue,23;nottobeindulgedinimproper liberties,52;hadgreatinfluenceatLacedaemon,52;ofgreat disservicetotheLacedemonians,52;whyindulgedbythem,53;their propertimeofmarrying,233,howtobemanagedwhenwithchild,234 Zaleucus,legislatoroftheWesternLocrians,64;supposedtobe thescholarofThales,64 ***ENDOFTHEPROJECTGUTENBERGEBOOK,ATREATISEONGOVERNMENT*** Thisfileshouldbenamedtgovt10.txtortgovt10.zip CorrectedEDITIONSofoureBooksgetanewNUMBER,tgovt11.txt VERSIONSbasedonseparatesourcesgetnewLETTER,tgovt10a.txt ProjectGutenbergeBooksareoftencreatedfromseveralprinted editions,allofwhichareconfirmedasPublicDomainintheUS unlessacopyrightnoticeisincluded.Thus,weusuallydonot keepeBooksincompliancewithanyparticularpaperedition. WearenowtryingtoreleasealloureBooksoneyearinadvance oftheofficialreleasedates,leavingtimeforbetterediting. Pleasebeencouragedtotellusaboutanyerrororcorrections, evenyearsaftertheofficialpublicationdate. Pleasenoteneitherthislistingnoritscontentsarefinaltil midnightofthelastdayofthemonthofanysuchannouncement. TheofficialreleasedateofallProjectGutenbergeBooksisat Midnight,CentralTime,ofthelastdayofthestatedmonth.A preliminaryversionmayoftenbepostedforsuggestion,comment andeditingbythosewhowishtodoso. MostpeoplestartatourWebsitesat:

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