Rtheories of International Regimes

Integrating Theories of International Regimes Author(s): Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger Reviewed work(s): Source: Review
of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 3-33 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097653 . Accessed: 03/01/2012 12:05
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Review of International Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
Review
of International
Studies
(2000),
26, 3-33
Copyright
? British
International
Studies
Association
Integrating
ANDREAS VOLKER
theories
of international
PETER MAYER,
regimes
AND
HASENCLEVER, RITTBERGER1
Abstract. international rules, areas. and
Several
years
after there
students continues
of
international
relations
started
regimes,
issue procedures decision-making a international have been focus of and theoretical Indeed, major empirical regimes for many in International research Relations schools of thought have years now. Three shaped on constellations which of interests; the discussion thus far: neoliberalism, bases its analyses treats power states as its key variable; which relations and cognitivism, which realism, among actors' and causal defended Each of these schools of has knowledge. thought on view of the origins, and consequences stability, we the possibilities of achieving this article additional explore a synthesis international of of toward study regimes by working and social a distinct
to be a strong that govern
interest scholarly the behaviour of
to ask questions in the principles, in particular states
about norms,
emphasizes articulated international explanatory these schools
In regimes. in the power of thought.
Introduction
than twenty years international regimes or 'sets of [...] principles, norms, which actors' expectations and around decision converge in rules, making procedures a given area of international relations'2 have been on the agenda of International International Relations.3 institution.4 type of international regimes are a major are international orders on either a constructed, deliberately partial Regimes regional or a global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue-areas of inter For more national politics from the sphere of self-help behaviour. By creating shared expecta tions about appropriate behaviour and by upgrading in the the level of transparency a to states to other with view issue-area, regimes help cooperate (and actors) reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security. If we classify international
a couple of ideas we put forward in the concluding article further develops chapter of our book, Theories of International Press, 1997). Earlier versions Regimes Cambridge (Cambridge: University were presented on 'International at a conference and discussed Politics and Transnational Relations', Mexico 1997 and in seminars at the Department of Political Science of Stanford City, 1December and the Centre for International of the University of T?bingen. The authors are Relations University This
to Helmut Petra Rotes and all the other Breitmeier, Gary Goertz, grateful Stephen Krasner, on the paper. individuals who, on these and other occasions, commented 2 as Intervening and Regime Consequences: 'Structural Causes Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes in Krasner Variables', Press, 1983), p. 2. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University (ed.), International Regimes 3 to Technology: The seminal article is John Gerard Ruggie, 'International and Responses Concepts 4 Trends', International Organization, For this typology of international in International State Power: Essays 29 (1975), pp. 557-83. see Robert O. Keohane, Institutions International and institutions Relations Press, 1989), pp. 3-4. Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
value being at issue,5 we find that regimes exist in all issue-areas by the dominant of contemporary world politics: there are security regimes such as the domains economic nuclear non-proliferation trade regimes such as the international regime;6 as the for environmental such the of international regimes regime protection regime;7 ozone layer;8 and, finally, human rights regimes such as the one the stratospheric on Human Rights.9 based on the European Convention In the early 1980s, less than ten years after it had been launched, regime analysis as had turned into something of a cottage industry within International Relations10 than before the conditions under which began to study more systematically wax in and the theories of regime international wane, process developing regimes about the political formation and change. At the same time, they asked questions norms and regimes: How effective are the agreed-upon significance of international scholars rules by which we define regimes? Are they reliable predictors for actors' behaviour or does narrowly defined self-interest induce actors to ignore regime injunctions whenever they turn out to be inconvenient? And how resilient or robust are regimes to exogenous is an challenges or shocks in the issue-area or beyond? For example, erosion of the power structure that prevailed when the regime was created bound to lead to a collapse of the regime as well? Or do regimes assume a 'life of their own' acquiring tion and their forma of independence of the conditions that facilitated norms were in the the and that 'constitutional adopted shaped principles some regimes more is it that makes contract' of the regime? And, finally, what effective (or more robust) than others?11 the rise of regime analysis has dimin Some of the early noise that accompanied mean not the field this does has ceased to exist. On the contrary, the ished; however, no is fact that the regime concept longer the object of heated scholarly controversies as an indication that the study of international should be taken regimes (or, more
5
a measure
Internationale Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell See Ernst-Otto (Paderborn: 1981), Czempiel, Sch?ningh, p. 198. 6 for Contemporary the Non-Proliferation See Roger K. Smith, Regime: Anomalies 'Explaining 41 (1987), pp. 253-82; International and Harald Relations International Organization, Theory', Das Beispiel Nonproliferation', in Beate Kohler-Koch und Sicherheitspolitik: M?ller, 'Regimeanalyse in den internationalen Nomos, (Baden-Baden: Beziehungen 1989), pp. 277-313. (ed.), Regime 7 and Mark W. Zacher, 'The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: See Jock A. Finlayson in Krasner and Michael and Functions', pp. 273-314; Regimes, (ed.), International Regime Dynamics J. Trebilcock The Regulation Trade: Political Economy and Legal and Robert Howse, of International 8 Order (London: Routledge, 1995). in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, the Ozone Layer', and See Edward A. Parson, 'Protecting Protection Marc A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective Environmental Wie entstehen globale Breitmeier, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 27-73; and Helmut zum Schutz der Ozonschicht Der Konfliktaustrag und des globalen Klimas Umweltregime? (Opladen: Leske
& Budrich, 1996). in (West)Europa?Eine 'Rechtstaatlichkeit See Martin List, Betrachtung', regimeanalytische 33 (1992), pp. 622^2; and Andrew Moravcsik, Politische 'Explaining Vierteljahresschrift, Journal Liberal Theory and Western International Human Rights Regimes: Europe', European 1 (1995), pp. 157-89. International Relations, 10 'Theories of International International See Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, Regimes', 9
of
41 (1987), pp. 491-517; and Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael 'The Z?rn, Organization, Journal of International 1 (1995), pp. 267-330. Relations, Regimes', European Study of International 11 as dimensions of effectiveness and robustness of the significance For the distinction between and Rittberger, international Theories, pp. 2-3. The term Mayer, regimes see Hasenclever, 'constitutional Formation: 45 (1991), is borrowed contract' of On the Development p. 282. from Oran Institutions R. Young, 'Political Leadership and Regime in International International Organization, Society',
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
and become a firmly has matured institutions) broadly, the study of international should we conclude that established sub-field of International Relations.12 Nor a work has is deal of been stagnating; indeed, good interesting pub regime analysis lished over the last decade.13 Thus, issue-areas that earlier had attracted little atten students of regimes have become major foci of empirical research. One is international environmental example politics before and after the Rio Conference often brought against of 1992.14 And in response to the charge of state-centrism more to have been made consider the role regime analysis,15 attempts systematically actors in bringing about, implementing, and developing of non-state international tion from so-called epistemic communi regimes.16 Thus, students of regimes have addressed issue who i.e. transnational networks of share both a body of causal ties, experts or the social that require international processes physical knowledge regarding action and a vision of a better public policy which they seek to help materialize. Influential epistemic communities have been identified in diverse international issue seas arms to the from What is of control.17 areas, ranging more, protection regional have begun to inquire into the theoretical possibility and empirical reality a i.e. of of transnational normative institutions scope regimes, transboundary created and maintained themselves. Examples of such by private actors among international of large trans regimes include the rule-based cooperation private in sectors such as insurance, banking, or shipping.18 national companies scholars three schools of thought have shaped the discussion of regimes:19 Basically of interests; realism, which neoliberalism, which bases its analyses on constellations treats power relations among states as its key variable; and cognitivism, which actors' causal and social knowledge.20 Each of these three schools of emphasizes
a European-American See Robert O. Keohane, 'The Analysis of International Towards Regimes: in Volker Rittberger Research Relations (ed.), Regime Theory and International (Oxford: Programme', Clarendon and Volker Rittberger, 'Research on International in Press, 1993), pp. 23^5; Regimes The Adaptive Internalization of an American Social Science Concept', in Rittberger Germany: (ed.), Regime Theory, pp. 3-22. 13 For a recent collection of papers dealing with different aspects of international regimes from diverse theoretical angles see Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory. 14 and Marc A. Levy, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, Protection International Environmental Effective (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourse: in Global Environmental Science and Politics Cooperation (Irvington, NY: Columbia at Sea: Environmental B. Mitchell, International Oil Pollution Press, 1994); Ronald University Policy and Treaty Compliance Global Governance: (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1994); and Oran R. Young, the Environmental Drawing Experience Insights from (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 15 A Critique See Susan Strange, 'Cave! Hie Dragones: of Regime Analysis', in Krasner (ed.), International Acta Pol?tica, Ti pp. 349-51; and Gerd Junne, 'Beyond Regime Theory', Regimes, (1992), pp. 17-21. 16 zur Bildung See Berhard Zangl, 'Politik auf zwei Ebenen: Hypothesen internationaler Regime', 1 (1994), pp. 279-312. f?r Internationale Beziehungen, Zeitschrift 17 See Peter M. Haas in Special Issue of Power, and International (ed.), Knowledge, Policy Coordination, 46:1 1992). Organization, See Virginia Haufler, Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and theManagement Risk of International 'Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Press, 1997); Charles Lipson, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University in Rescheduling in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy Sovereign Debts', Cooperation and Mark W. Zacher with Brent A. Press, 1986), pp. 200-25; (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University International and Communication Sutton, Governing Global Networks: Regimes for Transportation Press, 1996). (Cambridge: Cambridge University 19 For an early observation of this pattern see Krasner, 'Structural Causes', pp. 1-2, 5-10. 20 See also Oran R. Young of International and Gail Osherenko, 'The Formation Regimes: Hypotheses in Young and Cases', and Osherenko International Environmental Creating (eds.), Polar Politics: Press, 1993), pp. 1-21. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Regimes 18 International 12
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger and one
the and within the neoliberals, realists, study of competition cognitivists no a a case can has international doubt been be made that it is one, regimes healthy more time students of international the regimes explored systematically possibilities of a synthesis or division of labour among the three schools of thought. The prima for such an endeavour is that each of the three schools offers a facie argument coherent and plausible vision of international regimes and is capable of bolstering its preferred interpretation with considerable empirical support, while none of this or strong enough to establish one school as a clear winner. evidence is compelling, between This that the variables separately suggests the possibility and schools?interests, power, by knowledge?somehow emphasized interact in bringing about and shaping international regimes. If so, theories of international regimes that play off one variable against the other two are ipso facto inmany situations, both as truncated. As a result, they are likely to prove misleading as same token, the promise for the devices and guides foreign policy. By predictive a more or more holds is that it allows for that a theoretical synthesis complete ambiguous the three accurate This explanation consideration of international regimes. justifies an attempt to combine state of affairs
a distinct view on the origins, stability, and defended thought has articulated of international consequences regimes. At the same time, they have engaged in extended, and often fascinating, intellectual discourses.21 Although another
elements of neoliberal, realist, to international to form a more complex theory. and cognitivist approaches regimes its success, however. Thus, the loss of parsimony that comes It does not guarantee with adding variables to a given theoretical framework, may not be overcompensated by the gain in explanatory power, resulting in a theory that provides less rather than more explanatory variables Furthermore, leverage than the original formulation.22 must not merely be lumped together, they must be integrated, with their mutual there is a significant danger of ending up relationship clearly specified. Otherwise some sort of 'grab-bag' theorizing, where the 'theory' consists of a set of with to trying out independent unrelated explanatory variables and 'explaining' amounts the case at hand. Finally, those interested in variables until one is found that matches a synthesis of concepts and assumptions in different schools of thought originating must take care that the resulting more complex theory still forms a coherent whole and remains internally consistent. In this article we offer some ideas on what a synthesis avoiding these pitfalls or in such a rather: how students of international interested look like, regimes might we to More undertake defend three specifically, might proceed. synthesis propositions:
21
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate See David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism (New York: and Edward D. Mansfield Columbia Press, 1993); Friedrich V. Kratochwil (eds.), University A Reader International 1994); James Der Derian (ed.), Organization: (Glasgow: HarperCollins, International Macmillan, (Basingstoke: 1995); and Charles W. Kegley, Theory: Critical Investigations in International and the Neoliberal Relations Jr. (ed.), Controversies Theory: Realism Challenge Macmillan, 1995). (Basingstoke: between parsimony and explanatory For the distinction leverage see Gary King, Robert in Qualitative Social Inquiry: Scientific Research and Sidney Verba, Designing Inference 104. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 29-30, O. Keohane, (Princeton,
22
Integrating (1) Neoliberalism metatheoretical
regimes
explaining rationalist theory of international institutions. the cognitivist school, which we refer to as (2) There is a distinct strand within 'weak cognitivism', which can serve as an analytically necessary supplement to, and, as such, can be incorporated into, the rationalist account of inter national regimes. one that includes the more radical, or 'strong', forms A (3) 'grand synthesis'?i.e. as well?is not on the cards. 'Strong cognitivists' of cognitivism have onto commitments that are strictly opposed to those of logical and epistemological neoliberals and realists. In this case, continued intellectual competition is both more likely and more desirable than ill-fated attempts to merge two mutually exclusive paradigms of inquiry. To provide the necessary to our argument we begin background essence of each of the three schools of thought in regime analysis. by outlining
to rationalism23 as a and realism not only share a commitment it comes to stance, but may fruitfully work together when a more international thus the of unified prospect regimes, offering
the
Schools
of thought
in the study of international
regimes24
Neoliberalism
Neoliberals the role of international emphasize regimes in helping states to realize common interests.25 In so doing, they portray states as rational egoists who care only for their own (absolute) gains. International politics is not the realm of pure conflict. Often cooperation would make all participants better off, but it is hard to achieve to the that characterizes international life. In particular, owing pervasive uncertainty as to whether can on states are uncertain their they rely cooperation partners' transparency of behaviour and linking issues promises. By way of increasing mutual through time (thus making reciprocal strategies applicable),26 regimes reduce this or of the fear uncertainty: they mitigate cheating being exploited by the other parties, and thus make it easier for states to embark on collaborative ventures. Neoliberals have drawn heavily on economic theories of institutions focusing on are likened to investments the role of information and transaction costs.27 Regimes to states (and hence the more that are the more profitable likely to be made by
in international states as self-interested, Rationalism relations actors theory portrays goal-seeking can be accounted whose behaviour for in terms of the maximization of individual utility. 24 For a book-length see in contemporary study of the three schools of thought regime analysis and Rittberger, Theories. Hasenclever, Mayer, 25 See Robert O. Keohane, 'The Demand for International in Krasner Regimes', (ed.), International and Collaboration: in an Anarchic Regimes, pp. 141-71; Arthur A. Stein, 'Coordination Regimes in Krasner and Robert Axelrod and Robert O. World', pp. 115^0; (ed.), International Regimes, under Anarchy: and Institutions', in Oye (ed.), Cooperation Achieving Strategies pp. 226-54. Cooperation, 26 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984). of Cooperation 27 costs are the costs associated with the conclusion, Transaction and enforcement of monitoring Keohane, agreements. 23
8 them), models
Peter Mayer,
in the issue-area concerned.28 Game-theoretic the higher is the 'issue-density' or the Battle of the Sexes29 have been such as the Prisoner's Dilemma to constellations of interests that underly different characterize types of applied on contracts 'collaboration based formal international and regimes (e.g. regimes' on a and also the based affect likelihood of 'coordination conventions) regimes'
regime being created in the first place.30 Thus, the 'structure of the situation' (defined in terms of the nature of the game that is being played) is held in large part ease in the of creation situations of mixed for the and regime responsible probability common and interests motives (where divergent coexist).31 to world essential elements of the realist approach Deliberately appropriating the plausibility of structural realism's scepticism politics, neoliberals have challenged institutions. They attempt to show that this scepticism cannot vis-?-vis international in fact be based on the assumptions realists make about the nature of states and the states to coordinate their behav international system. Regimes help self-interested can be states and iour such that they may avoid collectively outcomes, suboptimal even when the that factors shown to have an interest inmaintaining existing regimes no are them into being longer operative. brought states lack a sense of obligation, Neoliberals point out that, although they think for oppor rules. States with a reputation agreed-upon as partners in the future to be accepted in a difficult are since international institutions difficult beneficial potentially regime. Moreover, to construct, states will hesitate to put an existing regime at risk (e.g. by making the on in of their conditional fundamental the continuation changes cooperation are resilient because international they embody regimes regime). In other words: twice before they violate tunism will find it more 'sunk costs',
put to other
i.e. they are political

uses.32
investments
which
cannot
easily be recovered
and
Realism
to realists in the Waltzian vein33 have paid little attention structural Although on see as which international international institutions, they affecting politics only
28 in the World Political Economy and Discord O. Keohane, Cooperation After Hegemony: Press, 1984), pp. 79-80. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 29 to study strategic in economics formal models and employs Game interaction. theory originated are defined of independent, actors in terms of the preference Games utility-maximizing orderings are subject to certain knowledge The Prisoner's Dilemma is a conditions). (who, moreover, non game with two players, where each prefers mutual (CC) to mutual cooperation symmetrical is unrequited that his own cooperation that (CD), and desires most (DD), fears most cooperation game with the (DC). Battle of the Sexes is also a symmetrical only the other player cooperates characteristic (where '>' stands for 'is preferred over'). ordering: DC>CD>DD>CC preference 30 for Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Duncan 'Coordination See Stein, 'Coordination'; Snidal, Implications Political 79 (1985), pp. 923^2 and Regimes', American Science Review, International Cooperation 46 (1992), pp. International and Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', Organization, See Robert 765-92. 31 in der internationalen Politik: Grundlegung und Institutionen und See Michael Z?rn, Interessen Ansatzes des situationsstrukturellen (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1992), ch. 2. Anwendung 32 See Keohane, pp. 98-106. After Hegemony, 33 Politics See Kenneth N. Waltz, House, (New York: Random 1979). See also Theory of International International 19 of International 'The False Promise John J.Mearsheimer, Institutions', Security, (1995), pp. 5^9.
Integrating the margin,
regimes
that other, 'post-classical' or 'modified structural', realists34 acknowledge a in is is need of Realist interstate that reality cooperation explanation. regime-based students of international regimes such as Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner or Joseph than in discord among Grieco argue that power is no less central in cooperation to these authors, the distribution of capabilities among actors nations.35 According critically affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an issue-area and the nature of the regimes that result, especially insofar as the is concerned. An early formulation of the benefits from cooperation of as which is the theory of hegemonic inter interprets regimes stability national public goods that are in short supply unless a dominant actor (or hegemon) of hegemonic takes the lead in their provision and enforcement. Theorists stability doubt that regimes can be upheld in the absence of a strong leader who has a stake allocation this idea the possibility of a 'hegemonic i.e. a admit, however, afterglow', the uncontested of time in which of the leader has superiority as or but fear factors such of from inertia, habit, vanished, instability resulting state had established at the change work in favour of the regimes the once dominant height of its power.36 We have noted that neoliberals hark back to some realist notions when making in them. They limited period case for the significance their comparatively of international optimistic regimes, for the of international acknowledging, example, anarchy and the importance primacy of states in world politics. Realists have taken up this challenge by pointing out that their opponents' is flawed because it fails fully to appreciate the argument of those realist assumptions that neoliberals claim to have incorporated meaning into their theory. In particular, anarchy not only creates fears of being cheated by one's cooperation involves states in a the lack of common partners; government constant struggle for survival and independence denying them the luxury of being egoists who, by definition, are indifferent to how well others do. Rather, they need to take into account both absolute and relative gains when contemplating regime-based with others. Since today's friend may be tomorrow's foe, states are cooperation sensitive to relative gains in favour of their partners. Therefore, they may sometimes even when abstain from cooperation it would be beneficial for them in absolute terms. The overall result for realist students of international is that inter institutions national regimes are more difficult to create and harder to maintain than neoliberals would have us believe. The likelihood for a regime to be put in place and to be stable
34
For
35
the distinction between 'classical realists' (i.e. Morgenthau and his fellow combatants), are Waltz 'neorealists' and Mearsheimer), and 'post-classical realists' (whose leading representatives see Stephen G. Brooks, 51 (1997), pp. 445-77. International The Organization, 'Dueling Realisms', latter group of authors has also been referred to as 'modified structural realists'. See Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, A Tale of Two Realisms: the Institutions Debate', Mershon Expanding International Studies Review, 41 (1997), p. 9. See Robert
36
inWorld Politics Press, 1981); Gilpin, War and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier', 'Global Communications Stephen D. Krasner, World Politics, 43 (1991), pp. 336-66; and Joseph M. Grieco, among Nations: Cooperation Europe, to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University and Non-Tariff Barriers America, Press, 1990). See Charles P. Kindleberger, in the International 'Dominance and Leadership Economy: and Free Rides', International Studies Quarterly, 25 (1981), pp. 242-54; Public Goods, Exploitation, or and David A. Lake, and the International Naked 'Leadership, Hegemony, Economy: Emperor 37 (1993), pp. 459-89. Tattered Monarch with Potential?', International Studies Quarterly,
10 is greatest members)
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger (at least for the most powerful
when the expected gains are 'balanced' such that relative losses do not accrue.37
Cognitivism?weak
and strong
too, have been sharply Cognitivists, national institutions. Yet the thrust of realist one: from the cognitivist point some of the that it has misconstrued
critical
of
this criticism
about the nature of world as a can be traced back its limits of institutions international theory politics. Rather, to still in various realist neoliberal theories. Thus, directly 'heritages' operative of all shades criticize realists and for neoliberals alike cognitivists treating actors' as as and i.e. facts which are exogenous (perceived) preferences 'givens', options to but not theorized about. By this move, either assumed or observed, according a significant source of realists and neoliberals cognitivists, ignore or trivialize variation in international behaviour. two strands within It is useful to distinguish the cognitivist school of thought in 'weak' and Weak (or minimalist) cognitivists regime analysis: 'strong' cognitivism.38 to focus on the role of causal beliefs in regime formation and change.39 According
of view, realist assumptions
to inter the neoliberal approach to that of the is directly opposed the problem with neoliberalism is not
weak
which
neoliberals and realists underrate both the degree of uncertainty cognitivists, in face decision-makers many issue-areas today and their capacity for complex to both means extends and ends.40 Uncertainty about causal learning, which creates a demand on the part of decision-makers for reliable issue relationships in turn, can become a source of political influence for which, specific knowledge, those who can
therefore, have studied the role of supply it.41Weak cognitivists, in international policy coordination and, more generally, the epistemic communities and mechanisms of governmental conditions learning. stress the intellectual underpinnings If weak cognitivists of international institu names also the 'reflectivists'42 tions, strong (or maximalist) go by cognitivists?who the social character of international relations. No and 'constructivists'43?emphasize are less than weak cognitivists, concerned with actors' strong cognitivists knowledge,
37 A Realist Critique See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: of the Newest 42 (1988), pp. 485-507. International Liberal Institutionalism', Organization, 38 and Rittberger, See Hasenclever, pp. 136-9, 154-7. Theories, Mayer, 39 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', in Goldstein and Political and Keohane Institutions, (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Change Press, 1993), pp. 3-30. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University See Joseph S. Nye, and US-Soviet International Jr., 'Nuclear Learning Security Regimes', 41 (1987), pp. 371-402. For a useful review of the literature on learning in foreign Organization, see Jack S. Levy, a Conceptual Minefield', 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping policy 48 (1994), pp. 279-312. International Organization, See Peter M. Haas
40
and International in 'Introduction: Communities Haas, Epistemic Policy Coordination', pp. 1-35. (ed.), Knowledge, 42 Two Approaches', 32 'International Institutions: International Studies Quarterly, Robert O. Keohane, (1988), pp. 379-96. 43 Nicholas Greenwood Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Onuf, World of Our Making: of South Carolina Relations SC: University Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Anarchy (Columbia, is WTiat States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Polities', International 46 Organization, (1992), pp. 391-425.
41
Integrating
regimes
11
of but rather than causal beliefs they accentuate social knowledge (i.e. knowledge norms and understandings stance brings them of self and other). This sociological to realists and neoliberals than their weak counter into even sharper opposition not the of states as rational parts. Strong (but weak) cognitivists reject conception in the sense that their identities, power, and fundamental actors, who are atomistic States are as much interests are prior to international society and its institutions. as institutions international them.44 argue shaped by they shape Strong cognitivists that any durable pattern of interaction affects actors' self-understandings and their In to the institutionalized is of others. initiate a likely cooperation image particular, actors in and which actors' is process egoism dampened increasingly respect, rather the legitimate interests of others.45 In the process, take into account, are even norms when, internalized, initially, they were viewed by the cooperative to further their individual goals. As a consequence, actors as mere instruments theories tend to attribute a greater measure of effectiveness and strongly cognitivist robustness to international institutions than do either realist or neoliberal ones. than merely Table 1 :Schools of Thought in the Study of International Regimes
Realism
Neoliberalism
Cognitivism (especially 'strong cognitivism') knowledge sociological
Central Variable
Metatheoretical Orientation
power
interests
rationalist
rationalist
Behavioural Model
relative
gains
seeker
absolute maximizer
gains
role player
Institutionalism
Note: A school's 'institutionalism'
weak is measured
medium the causal
strong significance that (i.e. the effectiveness
by
and robustness)
that, although
that it attributes
scholars of different
to international
paradigmatic
regimes. This dimension

orientations agree
reflects the fact

make a
institutions
difference inworld politics, they systematically disagree on how large that difference is.
If realists and neoliberals the behavioural portray states as utility maximizers, at model that underlies is that of a 'role player'.46 Role-playing strong cognitivism the international vis-?-vis other level occurs when governments perceive obligations states and the community of states to be real and binding they do not (although
44
and International in Ernst-Otto See Alexander Wendt and Raymond 'Institutions Duvall, Order', to and James N. Rosenau Challenges: (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Czempiel Approaches World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73. 45 'Collective and the International See Alexander Political Wendt, State', American Identity Formation 88 (1994), pp. 384-96. Science Review, 46 See Oran R. Young, 'International Toward a New Theory of Institutions', World Politics, Regimes: are idealizations, even according to their 39 (1986), pp. 117-21. Note that both models which, match proponents, reality only up to a point.
12
Peter Mayer,
international norms operate as an always honour them). In a world of role-players in states' selecting of foreign policy goals and options.47 A role essential yardstick a decision asks what is appropriate for it to do in a given situation, player making its individually defined goals.48 The concept is not rather than how it can maximize to imply that international roles are highly differentiated, of although examples specific roles which are defined by specific (informal) rights and duties do exist in the international role of the balancer or even society as well. Think of the traditional that of the 'world's policeman'.
Integrating
regimes: open doors and dead ends
Contextualizing
rationalist
approaches
to international
regimes
In this section we try to lend substance to our first proposition, to which according on international neoliberal and realist perspectives in regimes not only have much common?which is generally admitted?but may well be combined to yield a more possibility which tends to be ignored or downplayed by the satisfactory theory?a of the debate.49 protagonists Realists have recently been engaged in an intense dispute about and neoliberals to analyse and explain international which of the two schools is better equipped other of world and regimes phenomena politics. A remarkable feature of this dispute is that both realists and neoliberals have suggested that the members of the other can be seen as camp are not altogether wrong but that their theoretical propositions a special case of one's own account of international politics and regimes. Realists to international have argued that their approach regimes subsumes neoliberalism, a have made the inverse claim. For instance, Robert Keohane, and neoliberals 'In comparing has observed: neoliberal institutionalism with leading neoliberal, we must understand that neoliberal institutionalism is not simply an neorealism to neorealism, alternative but, in fact, claims to subsume it'.50 Conversely, Joseph a prominent out that, by virtue of its Grieco, realist, has pointed 'post-classical' of states' concerns with both absolute and relative gains, 'realism recognition than does theory of the problem of cooperation provides a more comprehensive neoliberal institutionalism'.51 As claims about priority and subordination these among theoretical positions are in sharp opposition a notable to one another. There statements is, however, common denominator suggesting that students of international regimes who adhere to a rationalist mode of analysis (as do both neoliberals and realists) are likely to on their project by seeking to enlarge and exploit make more these progress
See Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 48 are spelt out in greater detail in the The alternative behavioural models implicit in this juxtaposition final section of this article. 49 The word needs stessing, for our argument in this article ismainly and cannot theoretical, 'possibility' and will not anticipate the results of empirical testing. 50 International Institutions, p. 15. Keohane, 51 Grieco, Anarchy', p. 503. 47
Integrating
regimes
13
Theory of State Motivation Linking Given Situations/

Relationships to Contexts
(see below)
selects
1
'Realist' Context: Neoliberal 'Context':
Relative Gains Are Important implies validity of Realist Hypotheses about Regime
Formation and Change derive
Relative Gains Are Not Important
Neoliberal Hypotheses about Regime

Formation and Change
Explanation/ Prediction
Explanation/ Prediction
Figure
1. Structure
of a contextualized
rationalist
theory
of
international
regimes.
commonalities than by going for full victory, as it were. The crucial point is that neoliberals and realists concede to one another that the other side's arguments and are valid provided that certain conditions hold which their opponents predictions and to specify so far. If agreement on these conditions have failed to acknowledge could be reached, the door to a neoliberal-realist synthesis would appear to be wide open. Therefore, future theoretical and empirical work along rationalist lines should or build upon this limited mutual the conditions recognition and aim at establishing contexts in which 'neoliberal' (i.e. optimistic) rather than 'realist' (i.e. pessimistic) about international regimes are likely to apply and vice versa.52 Serious expectations towards this end might not only further our understanding regimes but also reveal a broader zone of agreement between these so far. has been perceived and acknowledged This consideration offers the prospect of a contextualized theory is given by Figure 1. As regimes the formal structure of which Figure, advocating a synthesis of realist and neoliberal approaches efforts these lines is not tantamount to simply saying right and sometimes
52
of international two schools than of international
the other. The
specification
that sometimes of the contexts
indicated by the to regimes along one school will be under
or conditions
in International Relations and Relative Gains American Powell, Absolute Theory', Science Review, 85 (1991), pp. 1303-20. For a sophisticated book-length study of the role of see Gary Goertz, in shaping state behaviour, Contexts Politcs of International (Cambridge: Press, 1994). Cambridge University See Robert Political contexts
14 which
Andreas Hasenclever, different propositions and grounded
Peter Mayer,
be (i.e. realist or neoliberals ones) apply must at least in principle, i.e. it must, allow for testable, theoretically the two literatures are rich with observations before the fact. Fortunately, predictions can an in and arguments which be mined attempt to construct such a contextualized rationalist theory of regimes. Much of the recent debate between realists and neoliberals has centred on the in international of relative gains orientations significance politics. There are two in a given situation, states issues here. First: what difference does it make whether, seek absolute or relative gains? And second: when are states actually preoccupied
with
relative gains? We look at the two issues the rationalist synthesis we are proposing. The first issue refers to the consequences of states at least sometimes take a strong interest less well than their cooperation partners, what of international tion make for the prospects
in turn because
both
are relevant
for
that relative gains concerns. Assuming in doing better or, at a minimum, not difference (if any) does this motiva and for the nature and cooperation
regimes? efficacy of international Neoliberals have argued that regimes are created and maintained by states for the serve in In particular, mixed-motives sake of certain functions situations.53 they states to for mutual benefit and cooperate regimes help by reducing uncertainty that include verification rules and Thus, regimes asymmetries. of fears cheated their them to reduce states' partners, permitting by procedures being The case that comes to mind immediately is focus on the benefits from cooperation. in which the the nuclear non-proliferation International Atomic Energy regime, informational Agency
regime
is entrusted
provisions.54
with monitoring
members'
compliance
with
the substantive
have responded that the neoliberal argument is flawed because it is based on the untenable assumption that states care only for absolute gains.55 This assump not concur with the fact that states, even as they are to does tion, according realists, cease not to be competitors for power and wealth. Hence, do cooperating peacefully, assurance that regime members live up to their promises may not be enough: states and that, over fear that others reap the lion's share of the gains from cooperation a can in them where this relative time, they implement advantage may place position Realists a policy to the that hurts their less successful cooperation partners.56 Threats a a are an extreme state of such but of form other, less policy, military security a state to turn be able its relative also exist: for instance, may spectacular, dangers a even to it force better deals into permanent bargaining advantage, permitting gains an two to states in its the future. between liberalize Thus, upon agreement partners an important industrial sector (say, microelectronics) may generate sizeable welfare same at the the accord for both time, may help one state's firms to parties; yet, gains increase possibility a decisive
53 54 55 56 57
their market
the other state confronts the shares up to a point where base and hence its ability to have that its very industrial or technological say in international economic deliberations may be at risk.57
and Analysis'. See Keohane, 'Demand'; See M?ller, 'Regimeanalyse'. See Grieco, Anarchy'. See Waltz, Theory, p. 105. and Michael See Grieco, Mastanduno, Cooperation; to Japanese International Industrial Policy', Security,
'Do Relative Gains Matter? 16 (1991), pp. 73-113.
America's
Response
Integrating The
regimes
15
realists may be quite right, but does it follow that regimes are absent or in situations where relative performance matters? the Perhaps inconsequential can and advanced the neoliberals is be functional argument only incomplete by to take into account both obstacles in a straightforward manner to inter extended national cooperation: fear of cheating and relative gains concerns. as well as neoliberal realist authors have suggested that, in a Interestingly, to put up with gaps in gains from cooperation in situation where states are unwilling not be in favour of their partners, international need but fact irrelevant, may regimes assume additional functions the purpose of which is to mitigate members' relative often include international concerns.58 Thus, gains regimes stipulations providing for treatment of weaker partners who are less well able to exploit the oppor differential cooperation. A case in point is the Generalized resulting from regime-based of Preferences international which the System by trading regime sought to accom modate the developing countries who feared that full acceptance of the GATT in to than them rather assist their efforts catch up with the principles might hamper serve as to industrialized also institutional frameworks world.59 Regimes may to improve the relative performance facilitate the arrangement of side-payments of actors. Thus, the regular review conferences prescribed by the otherwise dissatisfied tunities component procedural voice their concerns
corrections.
of many about the
regimes skewed
allow relatively distribution of
states to disadvantaged to and gains push for
to the competitive the scholarly discussion that has dominated Owing approach so far, insufficient attention has been paid to this somewhat surprising turn of the debate. Surely, empirical research has yet to establish whether (and when) regimes relative gains concerns may indeed serve the purpose of helping states to manage and how this function is reflected in their normative and procedural content. Yet, for the time being, this can be regarded as an excellent example for how realist and neoliberal to work together to produce arguments may be made interesting new institutions.60 hypotheses about international a contextualized In light of these considerations, rationalist theory of inter or contexts. national regimes would be concerned with three types of situations or to not be whether distinguished Strategic situations would first according they are
58 See Joseph M. Grieco, 'Realist Theory and the Problem of International with Cooperation: Analysis an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), pp. 600-24; Grieco, pp. Cooperation, in Frank R. Pfetsch 'The New Institutionalism and the Relative-Gains-Debate', 233^; Otto Keck, and Pan-Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Relations (ed.), International Approaches Findings and Lisa L. Martin, 'The Promise of (M?nster: Lit, 1993), pp. 35-62; and Robert O. Keohane 20 (1995), pp. 45-6. Institutionalist International Security, Theory', 59 See Finlayson and Zacher, and Michel Kostecki, The 'GATT', pp. 293-6; and Bernard Hoekman to WTO Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University of the Global Trading System: From GATT 60 Press, 1995), pp. 237-8. Note that our argument to combine realist and neoliberal for using a strategy of contextualization institutions does not hinge upon the truth of this particular, insights into international 'post-classical of international of significant relative gains concerns. For realist', account regimes under conditions if it turned out that relative gains concerns have much more devastating effects on example, international than the above considerations inclined suggest (as some more cooperation traditionally realists might argue), part of the content of the contextualized theory, but not itsform or structure in Figure that the cooperation 1), would have to be altered. For an argument indicating see Duncan effect of relative gains concerns is easily overrated 'International Snidal, inhibiting Among Relative Gain Maximizers', International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), (as
given
Cooperation pp. 387-402.
16
Table
2: Contexts Context and Hypotheses
Peter Mayer,
in a Rationalist

Synthesis Relative-Gains Dominated Situations Absolute-Gains Dominated
Non-problematic
Social Situations
(Zero-Sum or
Situations ('Neoliberal Situations') high
Harmony) Hypotheses Overall Likelihood of Regime Creation Factors Affecting Likelihood of

Regime Creation very low
('Realist Situations')
low
power
structure
availability of
formula regime balanced gains securing
(in zero-sum situations)
issue-density; situation-structure
(PD, Battle etc.)

'contract' compliance with
Regime
Features
imposed regime with skewed distribution of gains

(in zero-sum
balanced gains;
mechanisms gains making more
mechanisms
'convention'
(PD) or
'equitable'
situations) Regime Stability

low very (in zero-sum low
(Battle)
high
situations)
Note: given In a that a rationale of Harmony, its most-preferred receives player on what does. the other (See Arthur situation for regime-building outcome and Stein, Why is very each Nations hard to choice imagine, is not Circum
each
player's
contingent
A.
Cooperate: which
stance and Choice

29-30.) Therefore, to be the contrary
in International Relations
the second, do the case,
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1990), pp.

presuppose
in this Table, and fourth dimensions third, not apply to Harmony situations.
is one in A problematic situation social (or mixed-motives) socially problematic. in a one's individual interest result of which the uncoordinated may pursuit nor zero-sum true This is of neither outcome.61 Harmony collectively suboptimal situations the theory would expect international situations. In such non-problematic if they are.62 (Some power regimes not to be created or to be inconsequential, that common interests are a conditio sine the assumption theorists have challenged out that dominant actors sometimes qua non of regime-building, pointing impose on if the game is with limited weaker ones, although regimes success.)63 Conversely, one of mixed motives such that cooperation is desirable from the point of view of the actors, but may fail to come to pass nevertheless (as owing to various obstacles
61 see Z?rn, Interessen, of a problematic social situation pp. 153-61. The term 'mixed See his The Strategy of Conflict Schelling. (Cambridge, MA: game' was coined by Thomas Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 89. 62 is a symmetrical game defined by the preference Harmony Harmony ordering: CC>DC>CD>DD. of what the other because each player prefers to cooperate poses no cooperation irrespective problem, sense: there is no possibility are zero-sum in this technical for situations does. Neither problematic to fall apart in a zero-sum of rationality and collective individual game, because every interpretations For the concept motives 63 is Pareto-efficient. See Stein, Why Nations pp. 16-18, 25-6. Cooperate, in Rittberger and Human See Stephen D. Krasner, Rights', (ed.), Regime 'Sovereignty, Regimes, The Rise and Fall of International Theory, pp. 139-67. See also Oran R. Young, 'Regime Dynamics: in Krasner pp. 100-101. Regimes, (ed.), International Regimes', outcome
Integrating
regimes
17
and realists), international regimes would be considered specified by neoliberals a would be introduced: between prob At this second distinction point possible. or mainly in which actors are exclusively lematic social situations concerned with in which relative gains concerns are dominant. absolute gains and situations The that in the first type of situation neoliberal go on to postulate theory would in the latter hypotheses (regarding regime formation, stability etc.) apply, whereas those hypotheses that have been advanced type of situation by realists are to outline some appropriate. Table 2 uses familiar neoliberal and realist expectations of the resulting theoretical relationships.64 Since the presence of relative gains concerns makes a difference for international regimes, it is worthwhile asking when states can be expected to care about how well to themselves. This is where the second issue of the recent others do as compared are states concerned debate comes in: under what circumstances realist-neoliberal with relative gains? Even realists such as Grieco readily admit that relative gains con over relationships but vary considerably and across issue a of this for observation contextualized rationalist implications theory are obvious: constructing such a theory becomes a matter of specifying the conditions under which relative gains concerns are severe and the conditions under which they are slight or completely dominated of absolute gain. Grieco has by calculations areas. The presented a list of such conditions in his discussion of the determinants of states' to relative losses.65 sensitivity to Grieco, states' intolerance for relative losses is influenced by both According the present and the past of the relationship concerned. It makes a difference whether a is one's (potential) cooperation partner longtime ally or a longtime foe; whether are at the brink of war or are members the states in question of a Deutschean cerns are not a constant
it can be hypothesized that cooperation Thus, pluralistic security community.66 between France and Germany is less inhibited by today considerably strongly relative gains concerns than it was before 1914 or in the interwar period. Moreover, tend to be suppressed when the states concerned share a relative gains concerns common adversary67 or when the power difference between them is so large that no conceivable gap in payoffs from cooperation is likely to affect their relative positions to a noticeable degree.68 Both conditions were met in the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War and, thus, may help to explain the unusually high level of in this region.69 States whose power base is or appears institutionalized cooperation to be shrinking to relative losses than, e.g., rising tend to be more sensitive This be illustrated of US-Japanese hegemons. hypothesis may by the development trade relations since World War where the United who had initially II, States, on specific in tolerated considerable has insisted openness, asymmetries increasingly
international additional realist and neoliberal hypotheses regarding regimes which are directly to the relative vs. absolute in the proposed gains issue and therefore might be included see Grieco, pp. 227-9. synthesis Cooperation, 65 See 'Realist Theory', and Cooperation, pp. 45-7. Grieco, pp. 610-13; 66 et al., Political and the North Atlantic Area: International Karl W. Deutsch Community Organization in the Light of Historical Press, 1957). (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Experience 67 and Free Trade', American Political See Joanne Gowa, Science Review, 83 'Bipolarity, Multipolarity, (1989), pp. 1245-56. 68 See Duncan 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Political American Snidal, Cooperation', Science Review, 85 (1991), p. 725, n. 33. 69 See Schweller and Priess, 'Tale', p. 20. For linked
18
Peter Mayer,
i.e. reciprocity which is defined as balanced outcomes.70 Moreover, the reciprocity, nature of the issue is important.71 Cooperation in economic issue-areas is less likely to be inhibited by relative gains concerns states than security cooperation. Also, (ceteris paribus) are the more strongly concerned with how well their partners do as to themselves, the more easily the gains at stake are transformed into compared relative capabilities (i.e. military strength or bargaining power). of variables affecting Grieco's concise discussion the severity of relative gains concerns a contextualized to those interested in constructing is most relevant rationalist theory of international regimes. It provides an excellent starting point for the development of what might be called a theory of state motivation, i.e. a theory in which absolute gains seeking which specifies the kinds of situation or relationship relative gains concerns and vice versa. Such a theory would be a necessary dominates of the desired synthesis, because it would provide the a priori foundation component social situation, as to whether needed to infer, with respect to a given problematic realist or neoliberal hypotheses about international regimes apply.72 We refer to Grieco's analysis as a starting point (if an excellent one) rather than as an accomplishment for two reasons: First, Grieco fails to explicate in detail the that account for the items on his list, although he is clear rationale (or rationales) as a result, the mutual that perceptions of threat are of critical importance; to of the and the relative variables he adduces are difficult relationships weights a assess. Second, his discussion realist bias. he Thus, (not surprisingly) displays expects 'every state's [sensitivity to relative losses] to be greater than zero in virtually It is true that whether or not Grieco is correct all of its cooperative relationships'.73 on this count is an empirical question. But it is equally true that there is no a priori reason for building the desired theory of state motivation on such a narrow base. It to system-level to confine oneself is not even necessary and variables.74 arguments Thus,
among 70
the literature on the democratic

democracies virtually eliminates
peace
suggests
gains
that the stable peace

concerns as an
that exists
obstacle to
relative
cooperation
See Robert
between
states with
this type of polity.75
in International O. Keohane, International 40 Relations', Organization, 'Reciprocity and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting Sandholtz the European (1986), pp. 1-27; and Wayne Bargain', 42 (1989), p. 124. World Politics, 71 'International in Economic and Security Affairs', World Politics, 37 See Charles Lipson, Cooperation (1984), pp. 1-23. 72 not only are we unlikely to move beyond the 'grab-bag' stage of Without such a foundation, but our synthesis is likely to be non-falsifiable. theorizing, 73 to Robert Jervis's observation that 'when a state Grieco, pp. 46-7. This is in contrast Cooperation, believes that another not only is not likely to be an adversary, but has sufficient interests in common an increase in the it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome World Politics, 30 [1978], p. 175). See under the Security Dilemma', 74 A not locates the causes of state behaviour argument systems-level but in the way they are themselves (e.g. their domestic institutions), with anarchical structure Analysis of Theoretical other's power' ('Cooperation also Gowa, p. 1249. 'Bipolarity', in attributes of the states (units) related to one another (e.g. the
See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A international politics). Press, 1959). Both realism and neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University influences on state behaviour; liberalism is a unit-level systemic by contrast, emphasize theory. See Andrew Moravcsik, of International Polities', 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory 51 (1997), pp. 513-53. International Organization, 75 The European See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: Influence on US Foreign sources for the democratic Press, 1995), p. 30. Valuable Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University include Bruce Russett, the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold peace proposition Grasping War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton and Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, Democracy University International Peace Proposition SC: University of the Democratic (Columbia, Conflict: An Evaluation of South Carolina E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller Press, 1995); and Michael (eds.), Peace the Democratic (London: MIT Press, 1996). Debating
Integrating
regimes
19
To sum up, both perspectives, and realism, might offer valid insights neoliberalism into the nature and efficacy of international regimes once we adopt the reading that contexts of action. To their predictions presuppose different, indeed complementary, a systematic in this complementarity, unleash the potential for synthesis dormant is needed of the variables of exploration (at both the systems- and unit-levels analysis) that influence the strength of relative gains concerns and, hence, the nature of the context in which choices are made. Before we move on to an illustration of how this approach may be used to explain particular instances of regime-building, one caveat is in order. On the preceding pages we have spelt out the case for a structured division of labour among specific (postclassical) realist and neoliberal an emcompassing to international approaches regimes. We have not advocated on world politics. Nor do we synthesis of the realist and neoliberal perspectives intend to imply that each and any 'power-based' (realist) or 'interest-based' (neo can or should become part of the of international institutions liberal) account Indeed, there is reason to suspect that attempts to come synthesis we have outlined. theories of international up with an all-inclusive merger of realist and neoliberal are are loosely defined, that both neoliberalism and realism regimes misguided, given and not perfectly homogeneous, 'schools of thought' rather than well-specified and in to consistent 'theories'. has rise diverse Realism, internally particular, given on international the reconciliation of which in a single, institutions, perspectives or not it includes a neoliberal coherent theory?whether be very component?may difficult at the least.76
Illustrating
the theory: the case of conventional
arms control
inEurope
The contextualized rationalist theory we have described main components arms control in Europe conventional down in two periods: breaks history relative losses is high, and a later
structure and regimes whose on to shed the may light history of since the early 1970s.77 As we shall argue, this an earlier period in which intolerance for concerns are in which relative period gains attenuated and the parties to the conflict can focus on absolute gains. Accordingly, to realist expectations. actors' behaviour in the first period conforms In particular, come not in does about. the second regime-based cooperation Conversely, period of international be used
76 Even post-classical realists sometimes appear to differ in quite fundamental ways. Thus, both Krasner and Grieco the role of power in processes of regime formation, but the former seems to emphasize to be more focus on power as a means the latter appears interested (or 'coordination device'), whereas a in power as a goal of statecraft As a result, Grieco expects regimes to produce ('positionalism'). 'balanced' distribution power is preserved),
of gains for their members distribution of (such that the pre-cooperation to be reflected whereas Krasner in the distribution of expects power asymmetries See Krasner, 'Global Communications' and Grieco, gains from regime-based cooperation. 'Anarchy'. 77 to test the theory. A single case, even should not be mistaken The following illustration for an attempt over time, can hardly sustain such far-reaching if it permits several independent observations as are involved in carrying out a theory test. Moreover, as we have indicated, conclusions important a test at this stage would be premature. WTiat we details of the theory have yet to be specified. Hence, to warrant seek to provide is a 'plausibility that the theory is promising the probe' suggesting enough effort of working it out more fully and subjecting it to rigorous tests. For the concept of a plausibility in Political in F. I. Greenstein 'Case Study and Theory and N. W. Science', probe see Harry Eckstein, vol. VII (Reading: Addison-Wesley, Science, Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political 1975), pp. 79-138.
20
Peter Mayer,
state behaviour assumes a more 'neoliberal' character and the actors finally succeed of conventional in establishing a regime regulating the deployment forces in Europe. can be attributed to a (partial) change in the context in This change in behaviour which the parties interact. concentration During most of the Cold War, Europe saw the highest peace-time and the Warsaw Pact, were of conventional forces worldwide.78 Both sides, NATO high costs in terms of trapped in a security dilemma which not only produced defied the unilateral efforts to defence but persistently opponents' expenditures, secure higher levels of security for themselves by improving (or 'modernizing') their was as the the situation rather On unstable, contrary, perceived military capabilities. and fears of a surprise attack were widespread, among Western security particularly as a clear and to what they perceived experts and military planners who pointed threatening superiority of theWarsaw Pact with regard to both troops and tanks. on ceilings for Collective efforts to stop the arms race and to reach agreement armament in Europe began in 1973, when the Soviet and personnel conventional over conventional forces with the US and its Union agreed to enter into negotiations in in the took Vienna and which, These which allies. place European negotiations, as came to MBFR balanced force be known talks, came West, ('mutual reduction') a as the in NATO Warsaw Pact's deal which had of about part accepted package a on in for Conference and demand Cooperation Europe Security long-standing the territorial status quo in Europe. in which the West was to recognize (CSCE), on broad principles at Vienna the negotiations notwithstanding, Early agreement soon bogged down on the details. The parties agreed that the security of neither side must be reduced by the regime to be created and that the goal should be parity of so long as NATO and forces, but these areas of consensus proved inconsequential on were of the status the characteristics unable to reach agreement the Warsaw Pact
quo.
important, the Eastern bloc denied the very existence of the imbalance that in the West. At the same time, it did not consent to on-site decision-makers a as means in support of its of verifying the data that it produced inspections to consider extending the In addition, the Eastern side was unwilling contention. zone of application of a treaty to the Western part of the Soviet Union, which, as to move Pact quickly of NATO feared, would allow the Warsaw large quantities to to. In NATO to the centre of Europe whenever it wished this, response weaponry and wanted a treaty to obligate the refused to talk about a reduction in armaments these cuts would have to be asym only. Moreover, parties to troops reductions Most worried demand metrical, analysis of the existing balance of forces. Neither given NATO's was acceptable to the Warsaw refusal to negotiate Pact, however, as was NATO's to the West upper levels for air and naval forces, where the Soviet Union perceived stances of both sides tended to be the negotiation have an advantage. Thus,
78 and analyses narratives Useful Reinhard Mutz, Konventionelle arms accord for Europe include the efforts to reach a conventional inEuropa: Die Bundesrepublik und MBFR Deutschland Abr?stung L. George, 'The MBFR in Alexander Nomos, 1984); Coit D. Blacker, Experience', (Baden-Baden: Dallin Failures, Achievements, Security Cooperation: (eds.), US-Soviet Philip J. Farley and Alexander Lessons Press, Zellner, Die Verhandlungen 1988), pp. 123^13; Wolfgang (New York: Oxford University in Europa: Konventionelle die neue politische ?ber konventionelle Lage in R?stungskontrolle, Streitkr?fte of Deutschland Nomos, (Baden-Baden: Order: The Origins and Consequences 1994); and Richard of the CFE Treaty A.
Europa und die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military 1995). (London: MIT Press,
Integrating
regimes
21
in concessions inflexible, and neither side was willing or able to offer substantial beneficial security regime. order to permit the formation of a mutually As a result, the talks continued for more than ten years without any producing success were of there when results. Whatever d?tente, prospects tangible evaporated the MBFR had been, gave way to the 'second Cold whose offspring negotiations the talks were not formally abandoned until War' at the end of the 1970s. Although forces in 1987, for more than half a decade a substantial treaty limiting conventional a more ever. remote Within few seemed than this years, however, picture Europe to the Gorbachev-Shevardnadse and dramatically. changed unexpectedly Owing in Soviet foreign and security policy, the stalemate could be overcome, turnaround arms in the formation of a conventional and a process was launched that culminated regime for Europe. after Gorbachev's indicated that it was coming to power, the Soviet Union a new to to the of take whole range prepared security issues that had approach soon began to overshadowed its relations with the West. What ismore, Gorbachev suit the action to the words. Largely due to the new conciliatory attitude of the Soon Pact succeeded in creating two important and the Warsaw a the short of time: 'confidence- and within security regimes regime defining period set which the of and vague, measures', security-building loosely-knit, replaced ineffective rules that had been agreed upon as part of the Helsinki Accord,79 and the to the once highly contentious the 'double-zero solution' regime that sanctioned In Nuclear Forces both cases, the Soviet Union issue.80 (INF) Intermediate-Range had departed from its traditional of secrecy over the policy prioritizing military Soviet Union, NATO sense of security that can emerge from increased and enhanced to consented intrusive verification transparency, provisions. Encouraged by these developments and by a series of Soviet concessions (including the announce ment to reduce its troops by half a million and to withdraw 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe), NATO accepted the Warsaw Pact's offer to enter into new talks on a conventional arms control regime for Europe. on 'conventional These new Vienna forces in Europe' talks, labelled negotiations mutual confidence and (CFE), proved highly
complex, far-reaching,
control
successful.
and
The most
arms
tangible outcome
control agreement,
was an unprecedentedly
which has become a
intrusive
central pillar of the new European Moreover, security architecture. given the intricate nature of the issues on the table, observers were amazed at the speed of the which officially began in March 1989 and ended in November the negotiations, was not the agreement following year. Finally, only signed but survived the turbulent ratification period during which one of the two military alliances (or 'groups' in the the accord (the Warsaw Pact) as well as language of the treaty) that had negotiated one of the key parties to the agreement (the Soviet Union) broke up.81 The specifies
79
CFE
Treaty, which regional numerical
applies ceilings
to the area from the Atlantic to the Urals, on both land and air forces, including tanks,
a Cooperative See James E. Goodby, 'The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating Security System for in George, pp. 144-72; and Volker Farley and Dallin (eds.), US-Soviet Security Cooperation, 'Toward an East-West The Case Efinger, and Martin Mendier, Security Regime: Rittberger, Manfred of ConfidenceJournal of Peace Research, and Security-Building 11 (1990), pp. 55-74. Measures', 80 Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control See Thomas Risse-Kappen, (Boulder, CO: Europe', Westview, 1988). 81 The treaty entered into force on July 17, 1992.
22
Peter Mayer,
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. The excess to their within a specified undertake weaponry parties destroy (or convert) an to time and the results of allocation of period subject intra-group process.82 The an which establishes intrusive verification enables the treaty 'regime', parties to make sure that the provisions to be honoured. of the treaty continue The treaty meets to the geo demands such as those pertaining many of the long-standing Western to the of the on-site accept obligation inspections and, most regime, graphical scope cuts two of the which takes account of the distribution among important, 'groups', in favour of the (former) Warsaw Pact countries. The the pre-existing asymmetries Soviet Union was not the only party to make concessions, too, though. NATO, than before, when it endorsed the inclusion of air forces showed greater flexibility into the negotiations.83 rationalist (realist-neoliberal) What can the contextualized theory of international sense to of this in offer make the regimes important episode history of East-West First of all, it accounts well for a general feature of this case: achieving arms control in Europe proved to be a in the issue-area of conventional cooperation and sometimes difficult, protracted, painful process, which was inhibited by mutual for the and an aversity to risk that, for a long time, made it impossible mistrust no comes as to From the of view this compromise. theory's point parties surprise. to Grieco, The (case-specific) values of most of the variables which, according determine the nature of the context of interaction suggest that realism's more on international should go a long way towards cooperation pessimistic perspective relations? explaining the case. of the two alliances was one of Thus, the history of the mutual relationship a common each was the adversary, enmity rather than amity. Far from sharing in power between the two blocs were other's most frightening opponent. Differences to the weaker or to make too small to permit the stronger to ignore what happened so that it could hardly do anything to increase its the weaker helpless and dependent chances of survival. Gaps in gains from cooperation, therefore, could matter for the to the realm of the issue-area belonged fate of either bloc and its leader. Finally, (or defection) security, and obviously many of the potential gains from cooperation in this field are readily converted into military capabilities, which was bound to alert collaboration. the actors to the likely distributional implications of regime-based A second observation is even more significant, the history of though. Reviewing we a find since the distribution of typically the issue-area early 1970s, temporal more that corresponds well with 'realist' and nearly 'neoliberal' modes of behaviour a partial (as defined by our realist-neoliberal change in the context of interaction theory).84 The narrative has brought out two periods, which are clearly set off from
82
share of treaty-limited is constrained process equipment by a rule that defines the maximum to possess Order, any one party is allowed ('sufficiency rule'). See Falkenrath, Europe's Military pp. xv-xvi. 83 was NATO's taken at the beginning of the negotiations, concession Another decision, important on a possible successor to the aging Lance nuclear missile its deliberations short-range postpone This 84 The 1992. See Falkenrath, Order, pp. 50-53. Europe's Military is a partial one, because many of the context-defining change change over time. This is not to say that the change was of minor theory cannot
that
to until
in that it fails to attach weights is as yet underspecified or what kind of, change in advance how much, know to up-grade is needed the theory's and empirical work theoretical
features of the situation did not the importance. As we have noted, to the individual variables. Hence, we is required to tip the balance. Both specificity.
Integrating one another
regimes
23
in terms of the actors' ability to focus on common interests and to resist to engage In the first period, which in distributive the temptation bargaining. were predominant on MBFR coincides with the tactics talks, bargaining roughly to accept arrangements both sides which indicate that the parties were unwilling that, although beneficial to themselves, would have increased the other side's security
to an even greater extent.85
Thus, up until late in the which would have preserved would have benefited from a terms of national security,
cuts insisted on symmetrical 1980s, the Soviet Union in its favour. While both sides the existing imbalance lower level of deployed forces both economically and in a more two distribution of the troops among equal
alliances would have reduced the Soviet Union's ability to launch a surprise attack on Central Europe, when to protect her vital interests. she believed it necessary a was to not NATO deal that would not have done accept Conversely, prepared in favour of about the the Warsaw Pact. Even if anything security gap perceived on this central of contention had been it is reached agreement object unlikely that success given the sharp disagreement on the negotiations would have met with the verification issue. While NATO argued that, without adequate compliance a arms reduction conventional mechanisms, treaty would be useless and undesirable, the Soviet Union and its allies refused to receive on-site inspections, arguing that the to engage in espionage. Under a stringent verifica West would use this opportunity not only the West would have been likely to reap 'surplus' sanctioned too, would have had the by the regime; Eastern inspectors, over and above the information obtain militarily relevant information decide whether or not NATO honoured its obligations under the treaty. tion scheme gains not chance to needed to
Given the two in that existed between the and transparency social systems gap openness the military the West would have stood to gain however, (including sub-systems), more from the proposed verfication stance on this issue, 'regime'. The Soviet Union's our that relative gains con therefore, provides additional supports for hypothesis cerns were pronounced during this period. If the parties' conduct in the first period is well accounted for by the?realist? to avoid relative losses even where this meant that states were anxious hypothesis for improving the negotiation that behaviour foregoing opportunities stability, in the second period, which set in soon after the new Soviet leadership prevailed came into office, could hardly have occurred had the parties, and above all the Soviet not begun to up-grade the weight of absolute gains in their utility calcula Union,
85 It might seem that this could not be the case. One might argue that in the security realm common in this field the distinction between gains (if any) must be equally shared by the parties, because absolute and relative gains breaks down: itmakes no sense, so the argument goes, to say that country As security has been improved in an absolute at the same time it has lost security vis sense, although ?-vis its adversary B. In that case country As security will simply have not been improved at all. This a bipolar it presupposes however, argument, equates security with power. (Moreover, situation.) A more plausible two partially between of dimensions conceptualization distinguishes independent a state is the more secure the less likely is an attack on its to this definition, security: according secure the better are its prospects for victory in war. On this understanding territory and it is the more of the concept of security, a state may well increase its security in absolute terms and at the same time suffer a relative loss. This is when, due to some (bilateral) itwins on the security arrangement, first dimension but loses on the second. This conceptualization also helps to distinguish realist and neoliberal in the field of security: realists, believing that states tend to base their expectations in this realm on worst-case to trade superiority decisions scenarios, do not expect states to be willing for a decreased for war to break out, whereas neoliberals probability predict just that.
24
Peter Mayer,
was prepared is reflected in the fact that Gorbachev to tions. The new motivation consent to NATO's for would demand which cuts, long-standing asymmetrical fears of a Soviet increase stability (a joint security gain) and dissipate Western as we not have he did eschew from attack. noted, Indeed, surprise enacting unilateral a in order of This reductions troops significant magnitude. spectacular move helped to convince sceptical Western of the seriousness of his intent and decision-makers of their own. increased pressure on them to make concessions the security dilemma, the East-West the rapprochement Although mitigated to be a socially problematic forces continued situation with regard to conventional one. More specifically, the basic features of the Prisoner's Dilemma were still intact. to be dealt with, even when problem Consequently, cheating remained a potential so no much about relative in keeping worried parties longer gains.86 Therefore?and extensive with neoliberal parties established compliance expectations?the on the anisms to assure one another of sufficient levels of rule-compliance both present and future governments. the the diminishing But whence importance of relative gains that marked arms in control and of the of conventional appears Europe period history been mech part of second to have
that could be achieved? The combined the immediate cause of the cooperation we in the preceding have of outlined Section realist-neoliberal regimes theory accounts in terms of a change in the context of interaction. As for this process Grieco notes, the severity of relative gains concerns likely to shape a given relation location on a hypothetical ship at a given time is a function of this relationship's war is to a continuum between all-out and stable peace. The closer the relationship more state of (actual) war, the will be restrained by considerations of cooperation their relative gains. This is because states have to be careful not to help strengthen them to have partners, when, and to the extent that, they perceive cooperation incentives to pursue a policy that hurts their vital interests. In a cold war relation are pervasive, whereas d?tente involves a slackening of the ship such perceptions to de such that the parties are encouraged fear and distrust adversaries' mutual in their deliberations distribution of gains the the expected about emphasize a desirability of given cooperative project. of Soviet foreign and security policy in the mid-1980s had the The reorientation the East-West from a (recently restored) cold war to a effect of moving relationship new d?tente which came much closer to the stable peace end of the continuum than to the creation had its 1970s precursor. In the language of the theory this amounted in which rational actors could focus on absolute of a new context of interaction, famous 'new thinking' was that it rather than relative gains.87 Part of Gorbachev's Not states. of capitalist the Leninist doctrine of the inherent aggressiveness to deny that liberal democracies difficult had only had it been increasingly historical had stable and economically successful, proven politically experience suggested to the new leadership that the threat they posed to the Socialist world had broke with
of being because gains concerns intensify fears of cheating, they increase the disutility double-crossed partners. by one's cooperation 87 to the success and the speed of the CFE to observers, A factor that, according contributed was that civilian leaders on both sides deliberately reduced the influence of the military negotiations on the bargaining to the MBFR talks with their much greater involvement process. This is in contrast did no longer assume their interests to be best of the military Obviously, governments bureaucracy. Relative planners. served by the (realist) worst-case See Mutz, Konventionelle forms part of the professional thinking which p. 246 and Falkenrath, Abr?stung, Europe's Military role of military Order, p. 249. 86
Integrating
regimes
25
relations been grossly exaggerated by the traditional Soviet theory of international and that capitalism was indeed compatible with peace.88 for launching a large-scale con nuclear parity had made capabilities Moreover, as a deterrent. redundant ventional offensive Western Indeed, against Europe to the attempt to increase realize that civilian leaders in the Soviet Union began to an offensive force posture was likely to be self national security by clinging to respond by enhancing and because it caused NATO its detrimental, defeating own military a on and burden East-West relations.89 placed heavy preparedness Traditional Soviet security policy had proven excessively costly in both economic and political terms, and both types of costs were now seen as being intimately condition overcome In Gorbachev's relations with the West was a pre strategy, improving for the success of the internal reforms through which he sought to the economic crisis of the Soviet Union and to arrest its relative decline as a superpower.90 In a nutshell, reviving d?tente was both possible and necessary from linked.
the point of view of the new Soviet government. or not this (sketchy) explanation of the formation of the CFE regime is Whether felt to be convincing in its own terms, itmay be criticized for lacking 'causal depth'. Context change may have caused actors to reconsider their utility functions, making them place more weight on absolute gains than before, and this, in turn, may help to in an issue-area where this explain why they achieved regime-based cooperation we hitherto had proven But how do then, explain the change of the impossible. the above analysis not leave the most interesting part of the story for? The factor that contributed most to the context change is that the Soviet Union and to re-define its interests as a began to see the world differently result. But what accounts for this spectacular and consequential instance of govern mental of developing learning? In the following Section we discuss two possibilities the rationalist synthesis so as to accommodate certain cognitive variables and, thus, to allow for deeper explanations of international regimes. context? Does unaccounted
Using weakly
cognitivist
variables
to supplement
rationalist
theories of regimes
we wish to defend in this essay is that rationalist explana The second proposition tions of international and thus improved by a variant regimes may be supplemented we as to of cognitivist which referred above 'weak cognitivism'. The basic theorizing idea here is that weakly cognitivist theories?i.e. theories which are concerned with or simple and complex learning?may such as epistemic communities be phenomena used
88
to fill frequently
admitted
gaps
in both
neoliberal
and realist
approaches
to
See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'International Sources of Soviet Change', International 16 (1991/92), pp. 89-90. Security, See Falkenrath, Order, pp. 37-8. Europe's Military 90 This case suggests that Grieco's that relative decline increases the sensitivity for relative hypothesis losses may need to be qualified. It was rational (or, at least, not plainly irrational for the Soviet Union as part of a strategy that aimed at to accept short-term relative losses in various security issue-areas decline with its negative for long-term national consequences halting and reversing an economic 89 and the relatively benign and security. Both nuclear deterrence (see Deudney security environment 'International Sources', pp. 82-97) can help to explain why, in the case at hand, this course Ikenberry, of action was (or could appear to be) a rational choice for a leader committed to the national interest.
26
Peter Mayer,
(a) Cognitive Variables Causally Preceding Rationalist Ones

Ideas State Interests Outcomes
help shape
(b) Cognitive Variables Causally Succeeding Rationalist Ones

State Interests
Ideas
intervene
Outcomes
Figure
2. Models
of a rationalist-cognitivist
synthesis.
core of these the study of international the rationalist regimes without violating a a As of fruitful division labour different schools consequence, among approaches. of thought need not be confined to realism and neoliberalism, but may extend to some cognitivist approaches as well. variables with rationalist Integrating weakly explanations cognitivist requires a seen different form of synthesis, We have that realist and neoliberal though. to international into a single regimes can be reconciled and organized approaches whole by specifying the conditions of validity of each, i.e. by theorizing the contexts in, or conditions under, which realist and neoliberal predictions apply, respectively. and weakly rationalist appear to be working arguments cognitivist By contrast, links in a single causal together best when they are seen as addressing subsequent
chain.
As Figure 2 indicates, weakly cognitivist variables may be either causally prior or ones. This opens up two possibilities to the rationalist for a causally posterior division of labour between rationalist and (weakly) cognitivist theories of inter national regimes. The first way in which weakly theories may supplement rationalist cognitivist at least in principle: cogni accounts of international institutions is straightforward, tivists study features of a strategic (or choice) situation which are self-consciously left unexplained models that rationalists employ. Recall that a by the game-theoretic answers to three basic questions: (1) who are the game-theoretic analysis requires (2) what are the options that the the payoffs (or utilities) these three pieces of information be analysed, using the hypotheses actors? they perceive to have in the situation? (3) what are actors attribute to each possible outcome?91 With a game matrix can be constructed, which then can
to account for both the rationalists have developed environ formation and the institutional attributes of regimes in varying decision as In ments Battle of the such Prisoner's Dilemma, Sexes, etc.). (such analyses nor their preferences are prob alternatives neither actors nor their behavioural these essential components of rationalist lematized. Rather, analyses are used as are or ex post. either assumed established unexplained points of departure, which an on at influence least the Since actors' beliefs about cause-effect relationships have
91 See Z?rn, Interessen, p. 324.
Integrating
regimes
27
i.e. perceived options and payoffs, weakly cognitivist latter two of these components, of governmental the conditions theories that seek to illuminate learning and to account for the careers of ideas may be adduced to fashion deeper explanations of
regimes and other outcomes.
issue-area of trade provides a classical example of how new causal beliefs actors to redefine their interests:92 eighteenth induce may century mercantilist on was welfare is As a result, inter the idea that fixed. global premised thought in which incentives for cooperation national trade appeared as a constant-sum game, or the creation of international not did exist. contrast, laissez-faire By regimes is variable and can be enhanced liberalism by an taught that global welfare The trade that international unrestricted exchange of goods and services, which meant as or came to be seen as a variable-sum Prisoner's Dilemma game (such perhaps even Harmony) to cooperation A and regime-building.93 which was amenable a a to in in in neutral the beliefs sense) helps (i.e. learning explain change change of interests, which, in turn, led to a change in policy. constellation can also be employed to supplement, or Weakly cognitivist variables and models based on the contextualized lend more causal depth to, explanations rationalist arms the case of conventional theory of regimes we have sketched above. Again, control in Europe may help to illustrate our point. As we have seen, governmental learning on the part of the Soviet Union was an important cause of the context and the Warsaw Pact to focus on absolute rather than change that enabled NATO relative gains in the issue area of conventional forces in Europe and, eventually, to arms a settle upon beneficial control Gorbachev's 'new agreement. mutually to both the basic assumptions and the strategic prescriptions thinking' extended of the former included a new guiding Soviet foreign and security policy. Revisions was no longer regarded as inherently aggressive and image of the adversary, who of the latter?made and possible by that new worldview imperialistic. Revisions driven of the security dilemma?were by a better understanding immediately relevant to the case at hand: first, given that, within the East-West setting, national it should be sought primarily security was, to a large extent, indivisible, through
efforts that included the opponent; and second, military cooperative preparedness should not exceed the level of 'reasonable sufficiency', because excessive armament was certain to breed mistrust counter-measures, and, by provoking likely to reduce security in the longer run.94 have been used to explain the content and the Weakly cognitivist approaches that was at the root of the Soviet foreign policy timing of the learning process has argued that structural and functional revolution. Thus, Thomas Risse-Kappen in the Soviet Union's models alone cannot account for the turnaround foreign and
92 93
but not when it is Harmony. As we have is unlikely, because cooperation emerges to a situation where each state believes cutting in the trade case corresponds Harmony spontaneously. down tariffs is in its interest, even when the others do not follow suit. See Stein, Why Nations pp. 29-30. Cooperate, 94 See Jeff Checkel, and the Gorbachev World Politics, 'Ideas, Institutions, Foreign Policy Revolution', recent book 45 (1993), pp. 281. For a fuller account of these momentous refer to Checkel's changes is PD, Ideas Haven, and International Political Change: SovietlRussian CT: Yale University Press, 1998). Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New
See Stein, Why Nations p. 120. Cooperate, the latter applies when the situation Strictly speaking, noted above, in a situation of Harmony regime-building
28
Peter Mayer,
security policy (and for the West's response to it)95 and have to be supplemented by that not only take ideas seriously, but shed light on the conditions under arguments which particular ideas begin to have an impact on the choices of policymakers. In his framework he emphasizes the role of transnational networks of experts and ideas, and the importance politicians, who develop and spread new policy-relevant of the 'domestic structure' of the target countries, which determines how difficult it is for a given set of ideas and their carriers to gain access to, and to influence, central decision-makers. More argues that specifically, Risse-Kappen
some of the ideas that notions informed of the reconceptualization and of Soviet security interests and centered Western in the security' sufficiency' originated arms control in the United supporters community comprizing as well as peace States inWestern researchers and left-of-center This parties political Europe. in the foreign formed with 'new thinkers' and elsewhere networks institutes community policy in the former Soviet Union.96 liberal internationalist around 'common 'reasonable
According
to Risse-Kappen, contacts were these transnational in instrumental the new basic assumptions about the international system, the relation transforming of class values to human values, and the nature of capitalism into a coherent set of as we have noted, downplayed which, foreign and security beliefs and maxims, and oriented) stratagems in favour of a more cooperative competitive (relative-gains approach. in this first model of a rationalist-cognitivist division of labour, interests While, and cognitive such that the latter precede the former in the factors are combined causal chain, in the second type of synthesis of rationalist and cognitivist approaches the sequence is reversed: here ideas, rather than helping to explain preferences and inclusivist
in turn, explain outcomes (see Figure perceived options which, 2a), intervene between interests (which may or may not be accounted for in cognitivist terms) and a outcomes In to this such as regime formation rationalist (see Figure 2b). approach as 'focal points', to ideas operate i.e. salient solutions cognitivist synthesis, a to the which coordinate their in behaviour parties negotiation problems help beneficial way.97 This approach is exemplified Garrett and mutually by Geoffrey of the European Community's Barry Weingast's intriguing study of the completion in the late 1980s.98 internal market The problem with conventional functional explanations of cooperation, according to Garrett and Weingast, is that they fail to take into account that actors in a mixed motives situation usually face several possibilities for cooperating (i.e. multiple
to the Soviet Union. At a minimum, the members had to learn of NATO Learning was not confined how to interpret the new and, to many, bewildering (as had, of signals that came from the Kremlin of the other Warsaw Pact states). course, the governments 96 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Domestic Structures, Coalitions, and the End of the Cold War', International 48 (1994), p. 186. For a cognitivist Organization, study sources of Soviet see Checkel, 'new thinking' along similar lines which focuses on the domestic actors on Soviet/Russian 'Ideas'. For additional insights on the impact of transnational security 'Transnational Domestic and Security Policy Relations, Structures, policy see Matthew Evangelista, in Thomas Risse-Kappen the USSR and Russia', Relations Transnational Back In: (ed.), Bringing Institutions and International Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, Cambridge (Cambridge: Press, 1995), pp. 146-88. University 97 See Schelling, pp. 57-8 and passim. Strategy, 98 and Barry R. Weingast, Garrett the 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Geoffrey Constructing in Goldstein Internal Market', and Keohane European Community's (eds.), Ideas, pp. 173-206. in
95
Integrating
regimes
29
cannot easily be distinguished in terms of Pareto-improving equilibria99) which are under most social and situations self-interest. Therefore, efficiency problematic from a purely interest-oriented the variables determined perspective: employed by rationalists (i.e. efficiency and self-interest) do not suffice to explain the outcome. It is of the post-hoc character of functional that this only because explanations100 scene: enter This where factors the is often overlooked. is for, as deficiency cognitive case create it is often the that ideas which Garrett and Weingast out, convergent point in a mutually beneficial way their behaviour expectations permit actors to coordinate and, at the same time, explain the specific content of the resulting regime. In the mid Consider the case of the completion of the EC's internal market. a to states the EC had incentives launch of trade member 1980s, programme strong on trade grown significantly in the liberalization. Not only had their dependence were were that vis-?-vis there also clear preceding years, signs they losing ground the United States and Japan, whose economies had their main overseas competitors, recovered much more quickly and vigorously from the recession triggered by the a removal of barriers to the free move second oil crisis. Under the circumstances ment of goods, services, labour, and capital promised substantial economic gains for the members of the EC. But this fact at best explains why some institutional was arrangement (or, more accurately, make progress on) agreed upon to complete the internal market. Since a number of options existed, which were not readily in terms of this functional argument cannot explain which efficiency, distinguishable of the institutional possibilities was chosen. The explanatory gap is filled by a 'focal point' or salient solution that was provided by a decision of the European Court of Justice of the late 1970s. In the Cassis de Dijon case the Court had asserted that the states not to restrict the access of goods and Treaty of Rome required member state. Thus, the idea services which are legally produced and sold in another member at of mutual rather the national level than, e.g., pervasive deregulation recognition or extensive standardization at the supranational became the level, principle that the of the internal market relied upon.101 completion are Ideas also important when the available equilibria vary in their distributional i.e. in situations akin to Battle of the Sexes. For example, in the issue-area outcomes, states had to coordinate of international communications their use of the Geo stationary Orbit, but had divergent preferences regarding the coordination principle to be adopted. Whereas the technologically leading states would have maximized their gains under a first-come-first-served regime, the late-comers favoured at least a modicum of ex ante planning consistent with the principle of equal sovereignty in as of frequencies the distribution and orbit slots.102 Under such circumstances, Krasner has convincingly argued, relative power comes into play as an alternative coordinating mechanism. they come up with an
99 A
and Weingast concede this point. What is more, to extend their interesting attempt proposed synthesis of
Garrett
of choices of a game is a constellation such that each choice is optimal (Nash) equilibrium given outcome the choices of the others. A Pareto-inferior is an inefficient outcome in that at least one actor could be made better off without making any of the other actors worse off. In game-theoretic as a collective to overcome ismodelled relations, cooperation attempt analyses of international situations.
Pareto-deficient 100
See Keohane, p. 80. After Hegemony, 101 See Garrett and Weingast, 'Ideas', pp. 187-91. 102 'Global Communications'; and Kai-Uwe Krasner, Zusammenarbeit (K?ln: Carl Heymanns Verlag,
Schrogl, 1993).
Zivile
Satellitennutzung
in internationaler
30
Peter Mayer,
to include specifically power-based neoliberal and cognitivist approaches arguments. In so doing, they make use of the contextual approach to synthesis we have referred to earlier. In particular, they hypothesize that [t]he lesser the distributional
smaller the disparities
asymmetries between contending cooperative equilibria and the

resources of actors, the more important will be ideational
in the power
factors [relative to power factors]. Similarly, the effects of focal points will increase [and the importance of the distribution of power decrease] with the actors' uncertainty about the
consequences of agreements or about relative capabilities. Thus, both power and ideas can be
expected significantly to influence the resolution of multiple-equilibria

relative explanatory power of each is likely to vary significantly with emphasis]103
problems, but the

[our
the context,
to us that this approach to specifying the interrelationship between power, in and the and continuation of rule-based interests, emergence coopera knowledge tion holds considerable promise and should certainly be followed up and further developed.
It seems
Limits
to synthesis:
rationalism
and strong cognitivism
So far our presentation has displayed a great deal of optimism with regard to the the schools of thought to achieve synergetic effects by pooling for three possibilities resources. This optimism, and theoretical items their (selected of) conceptual our comes to an third We contend end with that, in regime however, proposition. a the of the more that also incorporates analysis, 'grand synthesis'?one perspective or can not A feasible. fruitful be, and is radical, dialogue 'strong', cognitivists?is between 'economists' and 'sociologists' (i.e. rationalists) already being, entertained in but it is exceedingly the of international regimes; (i.e. strong cognitivists)104 study a at not to if this rationalist difficult, stage imagine fully-fledged impossible, most the identities the fundamental which would preserve (i.e. sociologist synthesis and and concerns) of both approaches. The reason is that rationalists assumptions are to committed and, ultimately strong cognitivists incompatible epistemologies most of all, ontologies. John Gerard such as Friedrich Kratochwil, As to epistemology, strong cognitivists or made it that hold the Robert have clear Cox positivist theory of they Ruggie a flawed to and for which neoliberal realist scholars adhere responsible knowledge on with its facts of Positivism observable international norms.105 emphasis analysis and objective measurement of variables directs scholars to focus on overt behaviour at the expense of intersubjective to strong thus missing, according understandings, the very essence of international strong cogniti regimes. Consequently, cognitivists, vists have argued the necessity of an interpretivist treatment of this subject, where
103 and Weingast, Garrett 'Ideas', p. 186. 104 see Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy For this terminology (London: Collier MacMillan, 1970). 105 A State of the Art and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International See Friedrich V. Kratochwil Organization: on an Art of the State', International 40 (1986), pp. 753-75; and Robert W. Cox, 'Social Organization, in Robert O. Keohane International Relations Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Theory', and Its Critics Press, 1986), pp. 204-55. (New York: Columbia University (ed.), Neorealism
Integrating the attempt
regimes
31
to understand motives and actions from within replaces the quest for in turn, have reaffirmed from behaviour without. their Rationalists, explaining a as to to what Keohane refers of allegiance positivistic' 'sophisticated explanation international institutions the formulation and of causal including empirical testing to a 'grand synthesis' Of the two obstacles is pre hypotheses.106 epistemology reasons: two the lesser however. This is for one, sumably (1) On the 'subjective' side (i.e. with respect to the epistemological students of regimes hold), not all strong cognitivists identify with of empiricist that others deem methodologies necessary;107 rationalists beliefs that the rejection
conversely, who have begun to study the role of ideas have admitted that an cannot in be such endeavour.108 interpretation ignored beliefs that (2) On the 'objective' side (i.e. with respect to the epistemological students of regimes should hold), it is not clear whether of the aspirations are indeed irreconcilable. 'science' and 'hermeneutics' have Philosophers the traditional of explaining seriously challenged (the goal of opposition as and of basic methods of science) (the goal understanding hermeneutics)
social research.109
for all the uncertainty that surrounds this issue at the moment, there Nevertheless, an remains the claim made by some in the strongly cognitivist that camp adequate in international interested study of those topics that sociologists theory are most as the convincing in?such force of arguments110 or the intersubjective knowledge state identities111?requires methodological procedures and suggests standards which fundamentally differ from those that are accepted epistemological as valid inmainstream rationalist analyses. And while the jury is out on the ultimate truth value of this claim (and may remain there for a long time to come), its face value is large enough to suggest that positivists will find it hard indeed to study these 'new' objects of research with the aid of their traditional tool-box.112 more a fruitful and The second, presumably obstacle formidable, inhibiting in the intellectually appealing synthesis between rationalism and strong cognitivism and strong cognitivists make study of international regimes is ontology. Rationalists different assumptions fundamentally regarding the nature of actors and their inter Rationalists scrutinize a system which is composed of a group of relationships. a interacting utility maximizers; strong cognitivists try to illuminate society which is
106 Keohane, p. 26. Analysis', 107 See Wendt, pp. 393^1. Anarchy', 108 See Goldstein and Keohane, 'Ideas', pp. 26-9. 109 of course, insist that there are indeed 'two stories' to tell?one from the outside, the other Others, can replace the other. See Martin Hollis from the inside?neither of which ultimately and Steve and Understanding Relations International Smith, Explaining Press, 1990). For an (Oxford: Clarendon see Thomas Haussmann, excellent Erkl?ren und Verstehen: Zur Theorie und survey of the discussion der Geschichtswissenschaft a.M: Suhrkamp, Pragmatik (Frankfurt 1991). 110 See Friedrich V. Kratochwil, On the Conditions and Decisions: and Legal Rules, Norms, of Practical in International Relations and Domestic Reasoning Press, Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 111 112 1989). See Wendt, 'Collective Identity'. to bring home For an argument strictly positivist means (Cambridge: Cambridge
that constitutes
the futility of studying facts by linguistic and other institutional see John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language Press, 1969), pp. 50-3. University
32
Peter Mayer,
formed by, as much as it forms, a community of role-players.113 To put it differently, rationalists and strong cognitivists disagree with respect to the very 'logic' that of the actors they study: in the terminology introduced by shapes the behaviour James March and Johan Olsen, rationalists assume that states conform to a 'logic of whereas strong cognitivists consequentially', reject this premise arguing that states, as other social actors, follow a 'logic of appropriateness'. An actor who 'operates' to a logic of consequentiality first examines its options and preferences according courses of action has the best con of the possible calculates which in the light of these goals. By contrast, the 'software programme' that sequences determines to a logic of appropriateness the behaviour of an actor who conforms can be specified by the following reasoning: and then
(1)What kind of situation is this?

have I undertaken? (2) Who am I?What obligations is the most appropriate action for me in this situation? (3) Which Thus, other than actors who conform to the logic of consequentiality, do not merely take norms and rules into account, their behaviour
them.114
these actors is driven by
our point may seem to be overstated and, indeed, many qualifications Again, be added. rationalists have maintained that their approach does not Thus, might a denial of international and admitted the context-dependence of presuppose society rational choice models.115 At the same time, few strong cognitivists contest that the rationalist perspective is capable of providing insights into the behaviour of states in the international arena. However, neither the mutual that one's preferred recognition mode of analysis is inherently that the limited, nor the mutual acknowledgement must alternative has its merits be confused with that the evidence too, respective can our In in work if assessment of fact, approaches question together productively. the obstacles that such a cooperation would confront is correct, evidence of this kind is not likely to be produced. This is not to say that such cautious judgments and respectful attitudes as are expressed by these scholars are insignificant. They enhance the prospects for an open and fruitful scholarly dialogue from which both sides as well as the study of international regimes as a whole can only benefit.
Conclusion
In this article we have drawn attention to some possibilities for theoretical synthesis we perceive are to exist in the study of international regimes. These possibilities
See Hedley UK: Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order inWorld Politics (Basingstoke, and Duvall, 'Institutions'. Macmillan, 1977); and Wendt 114 See James G March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics that the notion that behaviour is rule-driven is (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 23. Note actors have to make consistent with the possibility choices between different that, in a given situation, norms. Moreover, must not be mistaken with the logic of appropriateness for acting in accordance norm is seldom a trivial, The specification and application of the appropriate simple-mindedness. discretion. process, but one that leaves actors with considerable quasi-mechanical 115 'The Game in Oye (ed.), Cooperation, See Duncan Snidal, Polities', p. 45. Theory of International 113
In tegrating
theories of in terna tional regimes
33
is there a guarantee that the but not unlimited. Nor considerable and promising, are more complex theories that would result from integrating different perspectives are more satisfactory than the more simple approaches of. the made they Ultimately, value of a theory cannot be judged before it is empirically tested, and we have made no attempt to conduct such a test here. But this is a necessary and trivial caveat so in less these times), and certainly increasingly post-positivist (although perhaps one that should not discourage students of international regimes from exploring the potential synergetic effects that could be achieved by integrating different theoretical are not mutually two such possibilities, which approaches. We have suggested exclusive: and realism (or, at least, important strands within these two (1) Neoliberalism schools of thought) might be joined to form a unified rationalist theory of case The form in of is what international this synthesis appropriate regimes. a we have called a 'contextualized' an a i.e. which includes theory, theory of the conditions under which the theoretical different priori specification that enter into it are valid. perspectives treat actors' interests as exogenously Since both realism and neoliberalism (2) be supplemented by a set of approaches, which focus on given, they might precisely we have For these approaches this gap in rationalist theorizing. the label 'weak We have that the argued cognitivism'. incorporation suggested into the rationalist models of the ideational factors that are studied by weak cognitivists would require a different form of synthesis, though: more speci
to base this synthesis on the notion that rationalist fically, we have proposed links in a causal chain (with and cognitive variables represent different cognitive variables either preceding or following rationalist ones). or 'grand', for a comprehensive, Finally, we have cast doubts on the prospect includes even the more radical variants of cognitivism that synthesis, one which we have termed with regard to both 'strong cognitivism'. Sharp disagreements and ontology separate this group of scholars from their rationalist epistemology a meaningful the dice heavily of their colleagues, loading against synthesis for bad news, however. As we have noted, perspectives. This should not be mistaken a great deal from the competition has benefited of different regime analysis in the past, and there is no reason why this should change in theoretical perspectives the future.

Rtheories of International Regimes

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Rtheories of International Regimes

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Integrating Theories of International Regimes Author(s): Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger Reviewed work(s): Source: Review

Abstract. international rules, areas. and

to be a strong that govern

interest scholarly the behaviour of

to ask questions in the principles, in particular states

emphasizes articulated international explanatory these schools

In regimes. in the power of thought.

and Volker Rittberger

and Volker Rittberger and one

Integrating (1) Neoliberalism metatheoretical

in the study of international

and Volker Rittberger

i.e. they are political

Integrating the margin,

and Volker Rittberger (at least for the most powerful

of view, realist assumptions

Cognitivism (especially 'strong cognitivism') knowledge sociological

medium the causal

strong significance that (i.e. the effectiveness

regimes. This dimension

reflects the fact

and Volker Rittberger

regimes: open doors and dead ends

Theory of State Motivation Linking Given Situations/

Relative Gains Are Not Important

Neoliberal Hypotheses about Regime

of international two schools than of international

the other. The

that sometimes of the contexts

indicated by the to regimes along one school will be under

Andreas Hasenclever, different propositions and grounded

and Volker Rittberger

'Do Relative Gains Matter? 16 (1991), pp. 73-113.

of many about the

allow relatively distribution of

states to disadvantaged to and gains push for

Cooperation pp. 387-402.

and Volker Rittberger

Situations ('Neoliberal Situations') high

Harmony) Hypotheses Overall Likelihood of Regime Creation Factors Affecting Likelihood of

(in zero-sum situations)

(PD, Battle etc.)

imposed regime with skewed distribution of gains

situations) Regime Stability

stance and Choice

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 1990), pp.

and Volker Rittberger

the literature on the democratic

that the stable peace

this type of polity.75

the theory: the case of conventional

and Volker Rittberger

Treaty, which regional numerical

and Volker Rittberger

Integrating one another

and Volker Rittberger

and Volker Rittberger

(a) Cognitive Variables Causally Preceding Rationalist Ones

(b) Cognitive Variables Causally Succeeding Rationalist Ones

and Volker Rittberger

and Volker Rittberger

asymmetries between contending cooperative equilibria and the