A.M. No. 1578-CFI February 20, 1981 GIL F. ECHANO and CAYETANO LUKBAN, complainants, vs. HON.

DELFIN VIR. SUGA, respondent.

ATTY. ECHANO: We have a very good argument to advance. COURT: Submitted. Buntalin kita dian Do not take that. ATTY. ECHANO: Let it appear in the record that the Honorable Judge said to counsel, buntalin kita dian COURT: Next case. (TSN of Mrs. Consolacion B. Bulao pp. 5-6) The respondent did not dispute the above-quoted proceedings but explained his behavior thus: ... Since said complainant's arguments had already been the subject of his written opposition, and that there were many other cases waiting to be called, respondent considered the matter submitted. But said complainant insisted on speaking, saying "This is already dictatorship" and "It is miscarriage of justice". Again, respondent said that the case is submitted, and when said complainant was acting in a defiant manner, respondent had to call for a sheriff to bring him away so as to restore order in the courtroom. Because there was no sheriff who came, said complainant more defiant than before, shouted to respondent that he had a good argument to advance. To stop said complainant's already unruly conduct, respondent once more said, "Submitted". However, due to emotional stress precipitated by said complainant's defiant attitude and derogatory statements which were aggravated all the more by disorder resulting therefrom without any sheriff on hand with the milling of people as in a market place on the groundfloor temporarily occupied by the court with other offices of the government, respondent involuntarily uttered the words: "Buntalin kita diyan," in a soft voice without addressing the same to anyone in particular, much less to complainant Echano The said words translated into English, are: "I box you there", which obviously were in the present tense. The statement was never meant to be a threat, otherwise it would have been, "Bubuntalin kita diyan", in the future tense. Rather, it was

ABAD SANTOS, J.: This is an administrative case against Judge Delfin Vir Suga of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I. The verified complaint of Attorneys Gil F. Echano and Cayetano Lukban charges respondent judge with (1) serious misconduct in office; (2) including a court stenographer to falsify a court record; and (3) acts highly prejudicial to the best interests and to the proper administration of justice. The charges stemmed from the proceedings had in Civil Case No. R-512, Jovito Cu vs. Lorenzo Bienvenuto, et al. As to the first and second charges, it appears that during the hearing on February 10, 1977, a motion to lease a rice mill and a bodega which were under receivership was opposed by Atty. Echano In the course of the hearing, the following took place: ATTY. ECHANO: The leasing will be improper because it will become moot and academic. COURT: Submitted. ATTY. ECHANO: We have a right - this is already dictatorship. We have the right to speak. It is miscarriage of justice and COURT: The case is submitted. Call the sheriff. Sheriff, sheriff, take this man away.

an entirely innocent and harmless utterance in the present tense, without any intent whatsoever, as in fact, it was not accompanied by the corresponding act. It may just be deemed a mere "slip of the tongue". But involuntary as it was, the said statement made by respondent at least relieved him of his emotional stress, so much so that he then no longer thought of punishing said complainant for contempt of court, for his derogatory remarks of "dictatorship" and "miscarriage of justice" against respondent, in the light of the ruling of this Honorable Tribunal, that "Imputations derogatory to the character of a judge expressed in intemperate language and amounting to vilification are contemptuous." (Fontolera vs. Judge A. Amores, G. R. No. L-41361, March 8, 1976). However, realizing that he actually uttered the words, "Buntalin kita diyan", which is clearly an off the record statement, respondent asked the stenographer not to take the same in the record, just like any person who would not want his statement which is irrelevant or immaterial to be placed on record. Nonetheless, complainant Echano taking undue advantage of such statement, asked the stenographer to put it on record, that the words: "Buntalin kita diyan" were uttered by respondent against him, obviously in order to make it appear, as he has now made it appear, that respondent threatened him with fistic blow, when he fully well knew that respondent never did so. To this act of said complainant asking the stenographer to put on record said words, respondent did not make any counter-move, thinking that the same was merely trivial and that he had other important work to do which was the consideration of other cases waiting to be called. (Comment, pp. 3-5.) The charge that the respondent committed acts highly prejudicial to the best interests and to proper administration of justice also relates to his actuations in the aforesaid civil case where the complainants were unable to obtain what they desired. Suffice it to say that the specifications in this charge are not appropriate in an administrative proceeding; the appropriate venue to ventilate them is in a judicial forum. As to the first and second charges, we find that the respondent did not comport himself in a manner that befits one who holds the exalted office of dispenser of justice which requires serenity and the ability to keep one's cool. However, we find the respondent's explanation to be extenuating.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby admonished to be more prudent and restrained in his judicial behaviour. Let a copy of this resolution be placed in his personal file. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976 JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr. K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc. Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quimbo for petitioners Librado Isode, Osmundo, Tolentino and Mariano Bartido. Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors.

By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this 2 Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case. On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal. The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General. The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.

ANTONIO, J.: In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCCXIII1 50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases.

There are important reasons which support the view that in the present proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General. To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General. There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et 3 al., the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 4 about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer. The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the 5 civil action or reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the 6 offended party. The only exception to this is when the offended party

waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction 8 and control of the prosecuting official. " As explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to 9 those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. The right which the procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the 10 criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. As 11 explained in People v. Orais: ... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants

the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58. Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the 12 offense. There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of

the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party. xxx xxx xxx (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. xxx xxx xxx It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter. Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General stated: In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge, petitioners assert that:

(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against petitioners herein; (b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent judge received, through one of his court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal; (c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge, after which the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly contained "something else inside"; (d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the memorandum of the prosecution which was literally copied in said decision although with some corrections; and (e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended his already prepared decision in the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty of double life sentence for the double murder charge against the petitioners to the death penalty. The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the charges made in such affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the

grounds for disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition are disputed. Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in denial of the alleged bribery of respondent judge, we have been informed of evidence obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for us at this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite conclusions on the charges and counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the making of categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice (See Martinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]). Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ... It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner 13 completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical 14 conception, It is a state of mind" and, consequently, the "appearance of 15 impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. It must be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not he should be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot. WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs. Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and concepcion Jr. JJ., concur.

9 Lerion v. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652. 10 People v. Maceda, 73 phil. 679. 11 65 Phil. 744, 746-747; Gonzales v. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846, 855-856. 12 People v. Maceda, supra. 13 Geotina v. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66. 14 U.S. v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 245.

Footnotes 1 Entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Jorge P. Tan, Jr., Cesar Tan, Teofanis. Bonjoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido, and Librado Sode Accused, for Frustrated Murder and Double Murder. 2 Comments of the Solicitor General, pp. 6-8. Rollo pp. 295- 297. 3 69 Phil. 556, 564-565. 4 82 Phil. 453, 459. 5 People v. Evia, 62 Phil. 546; Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672. 6 People v. Dizon, 44 Phil. 267; Herrero v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 489. 7 People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; People v. Capistrano, 90 Phil. 823. 8 Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, etc., 94 Phil. 197 200. Emphasis supplied.

15 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771 May 27, 2004 (Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 99-842-RTJ) SALVADOR SISON, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch 253, respondents, DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a 1 verified Complaint dated October 12, 1999, charging Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, with grave abuse of authority. In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order dated September 15, 1999 in 3 Criminal Case No. 99-002 which the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a traffic incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads, thus: Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the drivers license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did
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the same to somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before. The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand. WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four (24) hours from receipt hereof, the accused is ordered to show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of this Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon the accused immediately and to make a return of his proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the accused is ordered to personally file his comment in Court, within the period allowed him herein. SO ORDERED.
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Because of the complainants failure to appear before the respondent judge as directed, the latter, after verifying that the said order was duly served on 5 the complainant, issued another Order dated September 22, 1999 for the complainants arrest and commitment, and for the latter to appear for hearing before his sala on September 29, 1999. The respondent sheriff then served the order on the complainant. On the scheduled hearing, the 6 complainant appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent 7 judge, thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order. In his complaint, the complainant alleged inter alia the following: 6. That on September 28, 1999, at around 6:00 P.M., the undersigned complainant was greatly surprised when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the respondent Judge, and he was ordered to board a motor vehicle and was brought to the respondent Judge in Las Pias City who ordered him detained in the Las Pias City Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his family to inform them where he was because he failed to return home in the evening;

7. That the next day, September 29, 1999, respondent Teodoro Alvarez informed him that there will be a hearing of his indirect contempt charge before the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Pias City. During the hearing, the complainant was made to admit by the respondent Judge that he made a mistake in apprehending his driver-son[,] conscious that he committed the gravest abuse of his authority, and perhaps in anticipation of the legal action the undersigned complainant may take against him after he is discharged from detention. Thus, after the complainant admitted his mistakes under duress, and upon appeal by his counsel assuring the respondent Judge that the same incident may not be repeated, the complainant was ordered discharged from detention at around 3:30 P.M. on September 29, 1999; 8. That the undersigned complainant did not know of any offense he had committed, except for his issuing a traffic violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent Judge which he is tasked by law to do so for those found violating traffic rules and regulations; 9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a traffic violation within the city limits of Mandaluyong City by the complainant is considered by the respondents as an offense, then complainant should be tried for the said offense in Mandaluyong City, and not in Las Pias City where the respondent judge has no jurisdiction; 10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the undersigned complainant, the acts of respondents in arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge of indirect contempt is heard constitute the gravest ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents; and 11. That the manner the respondents are administering justice in Las Pias City is despotic and barbaric in the sense that they take the law into their own hands without due regard for the rights of the 8 others. The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from the service. In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations against him, contending that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor due to the courts of law. The respondent narrated that on September 8,

1999, he ordered his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to go to the Pasig City Regional Trial Court to secure certain records. While on his way there, he was flagged down by the complainant for an alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the complainant that he was on an errand for his father, the respondent judge, to which the complainant reportedly uttered, "Walang Judge, Judge Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko ." The respondent judge also alleged that he initiated the complaint for contempt pursuant to the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court: a) Section 3(d) and Section 4 of Rule 71; b) Section 5(c) of Rule 135; and, c) the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 71. According to the respondent judge, the complainants allegation that he failed to contact any relative is belied by the fact that during the hearing of September 29, 1999, the complainant was assisted by Atty. Eduardo P. 9 Flores of the MMDA, as evidenced by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the proceedings. The respondent prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of legal or factual basis. For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served copies of the respondent judges orders on the complainant, but averred that he was merely performing his duties as deputy sheriff of the court. As such, he did not commit grave abuse of authority in the performance of his 10 functions. Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbawi ng Reklamo dated November 26, 2002, where he indicated that he was no longer interested in pursuing the administrative complaint against the respondent judge. The complainant recanted his earlier claim, averring that the respondent judges son did not in fact enter a one -way street and that he was standing by the September 29, 1999 Affidavit he executed during the 11 hearing. He then requested that his complaint be duly withdrawn. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court, in a 13 Resolution dated April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the instant administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez for lack of merit; and (b) refer the matter against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report and recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled to Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin. The Investigating Justice, thereafter, submitted his Sealed Report dated February 26, 2004.
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According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never appeared to prove the charges against the respondent judge, the facts averred in the complaint appear to be substantially correct and true. Thus, the respondent judge abused his authority to charge and punish any person 14 for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Investigating Justice recommended that the respondent be admonished and warned, pursuant to Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and Section 11(c) of the same rule. The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the complainant on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz: Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing . After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply 15 with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of 16 society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it may 17 seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly . A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the 18 performance of his duties. At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant for contempt, due to the latters refusal to comply with the judges Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the respondent judges son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by 19 some staff member in the latters sala. In Cortes v. Bangalan, we held that a judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on the judges impartiality through a motion for voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have felt insulted therein. The Court also declared, thus:
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[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for 21 correction and preservation not for retaliation and vindication. We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge should have refrained from ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own son, and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent judge insisted that the complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was deliberately inserted so that the respondent could 22 confront and harass the complainant. We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin: [T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of Sison to let off Caoibes III from the traffic violation apprehension. The refusal of Sison was apparently aggravated by the sons reporting to the father that Sison had supposedly made the remarks of Walang judge, judge Caoibes sa akin; Kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko. ... The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the time) because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of the office or position of the violators father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes IIIs attempt to bluffhis way out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly,

the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and also administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the drivers license after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead of Sison. [T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his son "was at that time working with (sic) me as my personal driver;" and that his errand was to secure some papers from the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City involved in a "personal case" which the respondent Judge had "filed against a bank for specific performance and damages, and since I just suffered a mild stroke at that time, specifically on June 10, 1999, and the incident took place (sic) September, I could not at that time personally go to Pasig to secure the documents I needed for the next hearing of the case so I had to send my son." The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by which to consider Sisons apprehens ion of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated earlier, the act complained against must be any of those specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires that the person obstructed should be performing a duty connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent Judge acted oppressively and vindictively. Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose herein that Caoibes III, already 25 years at the time of the apprehension, was serving his father as the latters personal driver, albeit not officially employed in the Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be doing anything for his father at the time of 23 his apprehension but was in the place for his own purposes. The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that "a judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and 24 impartiality of the judiciary." The very delicate function of administering

justice demands that a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people, for 25 he is the visible representation of the law. The irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge 26 must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in 27 28 such cases ranges from a fine of P2,500; one months salary; suspension 29 from the service without pay for a period of three months; and even the 30 ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service. Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was previously sanctioned by the Court for violating Canon 2 of the Code of 31 Judicial Conduct, where he was meted a fine of P20,000. He was found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind, the instant case falls under "similar conduct," which the Court avowed would be dealt with more severely if repeated, and of which the respondent was duly warned. The respondent was, likewise, found guilty of gross ignorance of procedural law and unreasonable delay in the issuance of an order of execution, where he was 32 meted a fine of P30,000; and delay in resolving a motion to dismiss in a 33 civil case pending before his sala where he was, likewise, fined P40,000. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory. The respondent is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents personnel records. SO ORDERED.