Knysh 2012 Caucasus

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate
Alexander Knysh
a a
Islamic Studies, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA Available online: 19 Mar 2012
To cite this article: Alexander Knysh (2012): Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:4, 315-337 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.656343
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Studies in Conict & Terrorism, 35:315337, 2012 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.656343
Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate
ALEXANDER KNYSH
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Islamic Studies, Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Interpretations and uses of Islam are legion today. Some call for improving or preserving the morals and dignity of a certain local Muslim community or of the global Muslim community (umma) in its entirety. Others are eager to demonstrate that Islam is fully compatible and, in fact, conducive to modernity, democratic governance, and technological advancement of humankind. Still others posit Islam as a powerful means of liberation from occupation and domination/exploitation of Muslims around the world by non-Muslim powers.1 This article addresses one concrete example of how some Muslim insurgents of the Northern Caucasus use Islam to unite the diverse and occasionally mutually hostile ethnic groups of the area in the face of Russian domination with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state based on the Muslim Divine Law (Sharia). After providing a general overview of the history and ideology of this Islamic/Islamist movement, the article focuses on the ways in which its leadership uses the Internet to disseminate its understanding of Islam and to rally young Muslims round the idea of the trans-ethnic Sharia state that they promise to institute after defeating and expelling the Russian occupiers and their local backers. Special attention will be given to the role of Islamic concepts and taxonomies as well as the Arabic language in framing the political grammar of the insurgency movement known as The Caucasus Emirate.2
Religion is an ancient and well tried method of establishing communion through common practice and a sort of brotherhood between people who otherwise have nothing much in common. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, p. 68 Under normal circumstances, the symbolism of language blends into a banal or quotidian view of identity that is hardly noticed in everyday life. However, its potency comes to the fore in situations of strife or conict when it becomes
Received 13 June 2011; accepted 6 November 2011. This article is a spin-off of my earlier article Virtual Jihad in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate, published in Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space 1 (January 2010), pp. 183211. It focuses specically on the role of Islam and the Arabic language in the ongoing construction of a new trans-ethnic and trans-national identity by the Northern Caucasus Islamic ghters (mujahideen). Address correspondence to Alexander Knysh, Islamic Studies, Department of Near Eastern Studies, 3111 Thayer Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-1608, USA. E-mail: alknysh@umich.edu
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A. Knysh particularly urgent to mark the boundaries of the group or the Self as a form of (sometimes atavistic) self-defense. Yasir Suleiman, Arabic, Self and Identity: A Study in Conict and Displacement, p. 1
Legal discourse is a creative speech which brings into existence that which it utters. . . . In other words, it is the divine word, the word of divine right, which, like intuitus originarius which Kant ascribed to God, creates what its states. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 42 One does not often hear of a state whose formation is rst announced on the Internet. Even more rarely does such a state exist primarily in cyberspace. Self-designated the Caucasus Emirate,3 it was established by a group of mujahideen4 of the Northern Caucasus on 31 October 2007. On that day, its founders, who had been waging a bloody war against the Russian Federal state for almost fteen years, declared that their Emirate would supersede the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria that itself had theretofore been no less virtual than its newly declared successor. The abolition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the creation of the trans-ethnic Islamic state (emirate)5 in the Northern Caucasus were ofciated by Mr. Dokku Umarov. Born in 1964 and trained as a construction engineer at the Petroleum Institute in Grozny under Soviet rule, Umarov joined the Chechen struggle for independence from Russia in 1994.6 In his own words, he was moved by patriotic sentiment and indignation over the winter 1994 invasion of his native land by the Russian Federal forces on the orders of President Yeltsin.7 Umarov served as head of the Chechen Security Council under the late President Maskhadov and, following the reoccupation of Chechnya by Russian Federal forces in the fall of 1999, was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen separatist movement. After the successive deaths at the hands of Russian special forces of two presidents of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 2005 and 2006, vice-president Dokka Umarov was proclaimed its fth president in June 2006. He held that ofce for a little more than a year only to announce the abolition of his state and the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate with himself as Emir (Commander-in-Chief) of all Caucasus mujahideen. In this new capacity, Umarov asserted himself as the only legitimate leader of the Caucasus jihad.8 According to the Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate, his jurisdiction now extends beyond the connes of the Caucasus proper to encompass all Muslims oppressed and occupied by Rusnya (a derogatory term for Russia used by the Caucasus mujahideen). Umarovs militarypolitical agenda includes extending the sway of the Caucasus Emirate to the lands of the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions (krais), the Volga region (Povolzhe), and Siberia with the ultimate goal of liberating all of his fellow Muslims from indel Russian rule.9 Think, says Umarov, addressing his followers in a virtual communiqu e, to what extent we have angered Allah, if He sent down upon us these people, the most despicable and the lowest even among [the] kuffar10 (unbelievers). Our glorious forefathers waged Jihad against these enemies, and today Allah is testing our generation, as He tested our fathers. Everything repeats [itself]. Jihad exposes faith and indelity. Today, as in the former times, people [are] divided into Mujahideen, Munaqs and Murtads.11
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After stating who his enemies are, Umarov proceeds to outline the positive social and political program to be implemented by his newly created Islamic state: We, the Mujahideen, went out to ght against the indels not for the sake of ghting, but to restore the Sharia(t) of Allah in our land. . . . It means I, the Amir of [the] Mujahideen, reject everything associated with Taghut (idolatry).12 I reject all kar laws established in the world. I reject all laws and systems established by indels in the lands of the Caucasus. I reject and declare outlawed all names used by indels to divide Muslims. I declare outlawed ethnic, territorial, and colonial zones carrying names of North Caucasian republics, Trans-Caucasian republics and such like. To replace these indel geographical labels, the Emir introduces a new administrative term, vilayet,13 an Arabic word that was applied to administrative units of the Ottoman Empire before its dissolution in 1924. Umarovs manifesto divides the lands of the Caucasus Emirate into six or seven vilayets that more or less correspond to the current division of the Northern Caucasus into the republics of Daghestan (Dagestan), Chechnya, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, and Adygeia. As mentioned, his long-term goal is to re-conquer the now predominantly Slavic areas of the Krasnodarskii and Stavropolskii krais, the Volga region, and so on. At the same time, Umarov is reluctant to dene precisely the borders of his nascent state, because, in his words, Firstly, [the] Caucasus is occupied by kuffar and apostates and is Dar al-Harb, the territory of war, and our nearest [that is, immediateA.K.] task is to make [the] Caucasus Dar as-Salam, establishing the Sharia(t) and expelling the kuffar. Secondly, after expelling the kuffar we must reconquer all historical lands of Muslims, and these borders are beyond the boundaries of the Caucasus.14 Thus, Umarovs ultimate objective is to create an Islamic commonwealth that transcends the borders of any one geographical locale within the Russian Federation and extends into an abstract space that, according to Umarov, was once lost by Muslims to the Russian indels and should re-absorbed into the Abode of Islam (dar al-islam) at some indenite point in the future. This, no doubt, is an ambitious program that some of the Emirs opponents are likely to dismiss as a sheer fantasy. Anticipating the objections of such skeptical individuals, whom he identies as educated and uneducated hypocrites, or munaqs, Umarov insists that he is not establishing an abstract, virtual state, but rather one that is more real than all articial colonial zones existing today. The reality of the Caucasus Emirate, according to Umarov, is assured by the methodical and relentless prosecution of an all-out jihad against the indel Russian state with a view to installing the Sharia(t) as the sole law of the land. Umarovs Declaration contains a veiled threat to those who under various pretexts seek to evade taking part in the jihad, which, in his words, amounts to a grave violation of the will of God as manifested in the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet. Even more importantly, the Emir boldly redenes the goals of the Caucasus jihad. It is no longer a national struggle for independence from Russia waged by Chechens or other ethnic groups/nationalities in the region, namely Daghestanis (Dagestanis), Ingushes, Kabardians, Balkars, Karachais, Adyghes (Circassians), and so on. Rather, the jihad and the new state
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committed to waging it are part and parcel of the global confrontation between the Muslim nation/community (umma) and its enemies worldwide. Says Mr. Umarov: We are an inseparable part of the Islamic Ummah. I am saddened by the position of those Muslims who declare as their enemies only those kuffar who attacked them directly. And at the same time, they seek support and sympathy from other kuffar, forgetting that all indels are one nation. Today in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia [and] Palestine our brothers are ghting. Those, who have attacked Muslims wherever they are, are our enemies, [our] common enemies. Our enemy is not Rusnya only, but also America, England, Israel and anyone who wages war against Islam and Muslims.15 And they are our enemies because they are the enemies of Allah.16 It should be pointed out that despite the vociferous protests of the Chechen foreign minister in exile Akhmed Zaka(y)ev (who currently resides in London) and some other secularminded advocates of Chechnyas independence in the West, the Middle East, and Russia, the majority of Chechen eld commanders accepted Umarovs Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate. Their acceptance has amounted to their de facto recognition of Umarov as their commander-in-chief in the ongoing Caucasus jihad against the Russian government and its local backers.17 No less, or perhaps even more importantly, Umarovs claims have been recognized by the eld commanders of the mujahideen units in the neighboring republics of the Northern Caucasus some of whom were appointed to high positions in the governing structures of the Emirate, such as, for example, the Kabardian eld commander Anzor Astemirov, who until recently held the post of the chief Islamic judge (qadi) of the Emirate.18 Some Chechen eld commanders originally opposed to the creation of a mythical new state in all of the Caucasus have eventually come around, leaving Zaka(y)ev and other secular-minded Chechen nationalist leaders residing in the West in the position of generals without an army.19 In his lengthy defense of the Declaration that appeared about a month after its rst publication on the Internet (28 November 2007), Movladi Udugov, the 49-year-old former minister of information of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, who is widely believed to be the mastermind behind its text,20 provided a detailed justication of the radical shift in the strategy and goals of the anti-Russian resistance movement in the Northern Caucasus. Being the Emirates most detailed manifesto so far, it merits a closer look. Udugov begins by stridently denouncing Chechen critics of the Emirate with special reference to the deposed foreign minister Akhmed Zaka(y)ev,21 whom he dismisses as a sellout and potential collaborator with the apostate regime of Ramzan Kadyrov, the pro-Russian president of the Chechen Republic. Looking on the bright side, Udugov views the rift within the Chechen separatist leadership as a timely and healthy parting of ways between the mujahideen and the alien elements of Chechen resistance that, in his words, harbor hatred toward Islam and the Sharia(t) under the guise of supporting the Chechen jihad.22 The loud bemoaning of the demise of the secular Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by the opponents of the Sharia(t) is, according to Udugov, not only misguided, but also outright wrong. It ignores the fact that the Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate has simply restored the Sharia(t) states of Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus as a whole that were established in the eighteenthearly twentieth centuries under such prominent leaders of the Caucasus jihad as Shaykh Mansur Ushurma (d. 1791), Imam Shamil (d. 1871), and Shaykh Uzun Hajji (d. 1920).23
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To reiterate, Mr. Udugov energetically denies that there is any split within the ranks of the Chechen resistance movement. Rather, he describes the recent developments in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus as a healthy process of purifying the Caucasus jihad movement from alien anti-Muslim and secular-nationalist elements. This process, in Udugovs opinion, will result in the eventual liberation of the Muslims of the Caucasus from chimeras and false fears of the past decades. According to Udugov, the antiSharia(t) elements of the Chechen resistance movement that reside in Europe (Udugov mockingly dubs them Euro-Chechens) are but the ideological bedfellows of the proMoscow apostates currently in power in Chechnya, namely, Kadyrov and his retinue. In the words of Udugov,
In London, Moscow and in occupied Johar (Grozny) these people [namely, the opponents of the Emirate] talk about the same things, that is, Wahhabism, al-Qaida, and international terrorism. They thus use the same language, the same words. Sooner or later they will unite. It does not matter under what pretext this unication will take place, because they have a common enemy . . . the muhajideen and the Islamic state.24 Udugov pins his hopes on the new generation of devout Muslims who genuinely believe in the basic precepts of Islam and the Sharia(t) and who refuse to utilize them as simple political and rhetorical tools, which, in his view, is exactly what the Euro-Chechens have done until their parting of the ways with the leaders of the Caucasus Emirate. When asked about the exact character of the new state, Udugov atly rejects all Western forms of government, such as democracy, communism, monarchy, totalitarianism, and so on, as being contrary to Islam. He insists that every state is based on an ideology, the rest being derivative. Because, in his view, there is only one true ideologyIslam, the state can be either Islamic or pagan (idolatrous). Idolatry being the greatest sin condemned by the Quran, it must be fought by every faithful Muslim to the bitter end. Quoting a prophetic hadith, Udugov predicts the eventual cessation of divisions within the worldwide Muslim community (umma) followed by the rise of a virtuous and just Islamic caliphate. These goals can only be achieved by a consistent and uncompromising adherence to the divine commands as enshrined in the Quran and the Prophets Custom (sunna). Using examples from the life of the rst Muslim community in Medina (this gold standard of Sala, or fundamentalist, Muslims of all stripes), Udugov energetically denies the legitimacy and validity of any tactical concessions to, and negotiations with, Russia and/or the West, which is the political course advocated by the exiled Euro-Chechens. On the practical plane, Udugovs position effectively means an outright rejection of international diplomacy; he vocally decries having faith in and recourse to any international forums and institutions, such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Criminal Court, and so on.25 In line with this position, Mr. Udugov derides the alleged diplomatic achievements of the Euro-Chechen exiles in Europe and the United States as a dangerous self-delusion. In his word, seeking the conrmation of our legitimacy from our enemies is ridiculous, because one cannot complain to one group of kars about [the misdeeds] of the other.26 Attempts by the secular-minded Euro-Chechen leaders in exile to please the Western governments and public at large by removing any mention of the Sharia(t) and Islamic state from their political programs are wrongheaded and futile. The Euro-Chechens themselves might view this as a clever tactical stratagem, but it is, in Udugovs view, nothing short of a shameful betrayal of Islam. In support of his argument Udugov points out the failure of
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similar compromises between Islamist movements and secular rulers in Nassers Egypt, in King Husayns Jordan, in Kerimovs Uzbekistan, and in Ataturks Turkey. Only an uncompromising, consistent faithfulness to Islamic values and the Sharia(t) can, in his opinion, guarantee the Muslim community (umma) genuine freedom and independence from Western dominance. This goal, Udugov insists emphatically, can only be achieved by a relentless prosecution of jihad and, if necessary, dying in the path of God. It is, says Udugov, time for us to decide whether we should be praying in the direction of Strasbourg or Mecca.27 For him, Islam is indeed a religion of peace, but only when it is in power.28 The new generation of Muslims, according to Mr. Udugov, should free themselves from the empty fantasies about the language of diplomacy and international law that are still being entertained by the older generation of Chechen leaders in their naive belief in Western ideals and institutions. The events of the recent decades, he argues, have proved his secularist counterparts dead wrong. The West and Russia have always regarded Islam and Muslims as their enemies, and this attitude is not about to change. We should, concludes Udugov, act according the norms of the Sharia(t), and rely not on the [international] public opinion or the good will of the kars, but on Allah alone.29 There is no plurality of religions; there are only two faithsIslam and paganism. Likewise, there is no plurality of types of statehood. There are only two types of statesa state that is based on the sovereignty of God, and a state that rests on the sovereignty of Taghut (that is, a set of idolatrous codes and norms) that may manifest itself in different forms from dictatorship to democracy.30 The principal points of Udugovs creed are echoed in the pronouncements of the late rebel amir of Kabarda, Balkaria, and Karachai Anzor Astemirov. Like Udugov, Mr. Astemirov rejects democratic system of government and the pagan convictions and teachings associated with it. Defending the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate against its secular-minded critics, Astemirov argues that Human rights, international law, referendum, freedom of speech and belief, the expression of the will of the peopleall these notions are incompatible with our religion and have absolutely nothing to do with the mujahideen of the Caucasus.31 Mr. Astemirov then proceeds to add a moral and ethical dimension to the debate between the Islamists of the Caucasus Emirate and their secular-minded opponents, saying: [All] sensible people see the [detrimental] results of permissiveness and Western pop culture. Freedom of belief to which the kars are calling is but freedom to be an atheist. From the very early age our children are being encouraged towards lechery and shamelessness; their schools impose upon them democracy, Christianity, Darwinism and other destructive doctrines. The least they try to teach Muslims is to be tolerant of evil and unbelief.32 There is nothing particularly new about the ideas advocated by Messrs. Udugov and Astemirov. They can be traced back to the anti-Western, radical Sala (fundamentalist) creed of the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966) and the Indian-Pakistani Muslim leader Abu Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979),33 on the one hand, and the puritanical teachings of the conservative Arabian reformer Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1791), on the other.34 The inuence of the former two is evident in Udugovs and Astemirovs common rejection as pagan or idolatrous of Western social, cultural, and political values
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and institutions and in their unanimous condemnation of any society not governed by the Sharia(t) as being in the state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya). As an alternative, the Emirates ideologists propose to institute the rule of God (hakimiyya), which is exactly what both Qutb and Mawdudi insisted on.35 The Wahhabi inuence comes to the fore in the ubiquitous use by Messrs. Udugov and Astemirov of such typical Wahhabi notions as kufr al-tawhid (indelity [resulting from abandonment of] the principle of monotheism), kufr al-wala (indelity [caused by] associating with indels), al-wala wa l-bara (association [with fellow monotheists] and dissociation [from indels and apostates]), shirk (polytheism), bida (heretical innovation [in religion]), and so on. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Qutb and Mawdudi considered jihad to be the only effective remedy for the evils of ungodly existence into which their respective societies had sunk. On this issue Messrs. Udugov and Astemirov are in full agreement with their intellectual forebears. What concerns us here is the ways in which these familiar Sala ideas in general and the jihadist ideology of the Caucasus Emirate in particular are rhetorically and linguistically packaged and disseminated via the Internet media. How do jihad-oriented resistance movements such as the Caucasus Emirate conceive themselves and what image do they want to project to the outside world by means of multimedia technology? It is within the context of these broad questions that the article now examines the role of Islam and the Arabic language in articulating the ideological positions of the Caucasus Emirate. The principal source is the Emirates ofcial website, kavkazcenter.com. The author chose this Internet forum because some Western commentators consider it to be one of the earliest overtly jihadi website[s].36 It is also credited with pioneering the use of video clips portraying attacks of mujahideen as a propaganda and recruitment tool.37 Established as early as 1999, it is described by a major Western expert on cyber-jihad as a regularly updated, well-designed site, which is fully searchable.38 No less importantly, it prominently links to numerous other Islamic websites and is, in turn, featured on major Islamist Internet forums, such as the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), Azzam.com, Islam Q@A, as well as various religiopolitical websites in South and Southeast Asia.39 Kavkazcenter.com has distinguished itself as a staunch supporter of the Palestinian resistance movement and received accolades from some radical Palestinian groups in the aftermath of the martyrdom operations conducted by Chechen and Ingush suicide squads.40 The remarkable international prominence and longevity of kavkazcenter.com make this forum worthy of a closer look. The sites content is available in Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, Arabic, and Englisha good indication of its target audiences. The Russian version of the site is updated daily and contains information that is often missing, abbreviated, or edited out on the other language sites. Each language site is designed to cater to the cultural and religious sensitivities of the target audience without, however, compromising the Emirates overall ideological message. The Russian language site is occasionally shut down by hackers who may or may not have connection to the Russian Security Service (FSB). In addition to kavkazcenter.com, this article draws on the postings on its sister-sites, such as http://www. Islamdin.com/ (Kabarda, Balkariia, Karachai), http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/ (Daghestan), http://hunafa.com/ (Ingushetia), and http://abror.info/ (Ingushetia). They usually replicate the postings of the kavkazcenter.com, while giving more attention to the events in their respective geographical areas. The kavkazcenter.com site features numerous rubrics, links, and chat rooms, such as Opinions, Literature, Photographs, Interviews, Analysis, History, and so on. On its home page one can watch video clips featuring interviews with amirs of the mujahideen, a portrait gallery of martyrs, and a running band with images of Russian atrocities
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in Chechnya and Ingushetia. There are occasional video clips criticizing or ridiculing Kadyrovs puppet regime41 in the Chechen Republic. Overall, the dominant theme of the website is the global jihad that Muslims around the world are waging against their indel oppressors or the apostate local agents of the latter. This theme determines the sites focus on various hotbeds of conict between Muslim mujahideen and their adversaries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir, the Philippines, Somalia, Yemen, the Indonesian Archipelago, Eastern Turkestan/Xinjiang, and Palestine. Special attention is given to the jihad in Afghanistan, with the Taliban depicted as the avant-garde of valiant defenders of Islam against the indel Western aggressors and their local clients. A frequent visitor to the kavkazcenter.com website gains the impression of a permanent life-and-death struggle between the Muslim mujahideen and their enemies the world over. The site administrators depict the former as fearless warriors ghting against great odds, yet managing to score one victory after another. Their opponents, on the other hand, are portrayed as agents of Satan bent on subjugating the Muslims to their ungodly rule and robbing Muslim countries of their wealth. While there is no doubt that the Emirate and its martyrdom operations squad named The Gardens of the Righteous (Arab. Riyad al-salihin) have been responsible for suicide attacks on the Russian police and security forces as well as civilian targets,42 its leadership also claims to have been behind natural and man-made disasters such as the SaianoShushenskaya hydroelectric power station catastrophe in August 2009, the deadly explosion at the city of Ulyanovsk ammunition depot in November 2009 or the forest res that scorched Central and Eastern Russia in the summer of 2010. In some cases, the press releases of the rebel website allude to a shadowy group of Russian mujahideen allegedly acting in league with their North Caucasus comrades.43 Despite their blatant improbability, such reports are deemed to accentuate the capacity of the mujahideen to attack targets far outside their immediate theater of operations and, in so doing, to strike terror in the hearts of ordinary Russian citizens. When the cause of an accident cannot be credibly attributed to a mujahid unit, the wrath of God is invoked44 explicitly or implicitly, in much the same way as the disastrous 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia or the Hurricane Katrina were interpreted by some English-language jihadi website as acts of God that strike the beaches of debauchery, nudism, and prostitution.45 A permanent rubric of kavkazcenter.com is devoted to showcasing the progressive decay and perversity of the Russian state with special attention to the unscrupulousness, ruthlessness, and immorality of its rulers. The depravity and moral turpitude of ordinary Russians are also highlighted.46 The level of anti-Russian hatred is quite staggering, despite occasional attempts on the part of the website administrators not to paint ordinary Russians and their despotic rulers with the same brush. For the sites administrators (i.e., Movladi Udugov & Co.), the only good Russians are those who have dared to embrace Islam. Some of them are frequent contributors to the website invariably voicing their disgust at Russias former and current crimes against humanity and its Muslim populations in particular. The Russian converts routinely denounce Russian Orthodox religion and Russian culture as ungodly and immoral, simultaneously servile and authoritarianin short, abominable by any human standard. The incurable depravity of the Russian nation is juxtaposed with the highly moral, valiant, and altruistic ethos of the Caucasus Muslims exemplied by the Emirates mujahideen. Bad as it is, Russia is by no means the only anti-Muslim country. Also frequently mentioned are instances of persecution, discrimination, and hate crimes against Muslims in the United States, China, India, and Europe. Finally, the administrators of the site regularly report the atrocities allegedly committed against true Muslims by the ungodly rulers of such nominally Muslim countries as Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi
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Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, and so on. Such reportage is designed to inculcate in the sites visitors empathy for the suffering of Muslims the world over, while at the same time projecting the image . . . of a global, and globalized, [jihadi] campaign.47 In line with the Emirates ideological premises outlined above, its leaders starkly divide the whole world into the faithful followers of the Sharia(t) and the adherents of man-made, pagan laws and customs (Taghut), who are identied as indels (Arab. kars or kuffar). This overriding Sharia-versus-Taghut dichotomy determines the resultant taxonomies of human actors involved in its maintenance. The Sharia(t) aspect of the dichotomy is represented by the mujahideen. Those Muslims who live by the Taghut customs and enforce the Taghut laws are condemned as murtads,48 namely apostates, who, under the Sharia(t) code, are subject to capital punishment. For the supporters of the Emirate, the pro-Russian President Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya and his ofcials are the prime embodiments of the most heinous type of apostasy. The Muslims who observe Muslim religious duties but refuse to join the ranks of the mujahideen or dare to criticize them are labeled munaqs49 or hypocrites. The quartile taxonomy of mujahideen, kuffar, murtads, and munaqs is applied consistently in the postings of the resistance websites that have just been described, creating a bi-polar world in which one realm, in the words of a Saudi jihadist leader, is that of a dark image, lled with idolatry, indelity, sedition, injustice, outrage, and immorality, while the other is a bright one, radiant with rays of light, faith, true religion, piety, and virtue, under whose protection the monotheistic mujahid youth . . . are prominent.50 While ubiquitous, this taxonomy is not without gray areas. Thus, the borderline between the murtads and the munaqs is rather fuzzy. On some occasions, the munaqs are described as children of the Devil, who are not only blind and stupid but also morally awed.51 Their qibla (direction of prayer) is Moscows Kremlin; they violate every conceivable Islamic prohibition, for instance, by sipping vodka like water during Russias pagan holidays, then having st-ghts with their drug-addicted sons.52 The only difference between them and the full-blown apostates seems to be that they do not actively support or participate in the abominations of the ruling clique. Thus, while Chechnyas President Kadyrov is an out-and-out apostate, because he believes in the trinity of the Sharia(t), tariqa(t) and the Russian constitution, enjoys close relations with Putin, and celebrates the pagan holiday of New Year dressed as Father Frost,53 the secularized Euro-Chechens with Zaka(y)ev as their spokesman are merely hypocrites. Their position outside the pale of true Islam is determined by their wrongheaded belief in the Taghut as enshrined in international laws, the UN Charter, and all manner [of similar] aberrations (prochie nenormalnosti).54 It appears that the only distinction between Kadyrov and Zaka(y)ev is that the latter does not actively cooperate with the indel Russian government led by Putin.55 By adopting indel European customs and dress-code and by residing in Western capitals, Zaka(y)ev and his fellow nationalists in exile have sold their souls to the Devil. According to the ideologists of kavkazcenter.com, Zaka(y)evs blind faith in Western ideas and institutions as evidenced by his attempts to elevate the secular Chechen constitution above the Quran have effectively put him into the category of false prophets.56 Relatively minor differences in their respective levels of delusion and perdy notwithstanding, both the murtads and munaqs are consistently dissociated from the true Muslim monotheists (muwahhidun) exemplied by the Emirates mujahideen. The ideologists of the Emirate tend to see traces of the pagan Taghut lurking everywhere: in the celebrations by Muslim families of New Year and other Russian state holidays as well as birthdays of their members. Even Muslim athletes participation in the Olympic games is condemned due to the pagan origins of this sporting event. Despite
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their honorable status as the custodians of the Two [Muslim] Sanctuaries,57 the rulers of Saudi Arabia do not escape the site administrators opprobrium, because they allow the Saudi national team to circumambulate the sacred Olympic re at the opening of the Olympiad in the same way Muslim pilgrims to Mecca circle around the Kaba.58 This practice is denounced as a blameworthy innovation and a conscious or unconscious concession to the pagan tradition of ancient Greece (i.e., a typical example of the Taghut). No wonder therefore that in one of the websites postings the Saudi ruling family is branded as heads of hypocrisy.59 However, it is Su Islam and its local leaders (shaykhs and ustadhs) that bear the brunt of the righteous indignation of the Emirates ideologists. They view Susm as the most insidious manifestation of the corruptive, tyrannical forces of the pagan Taghut. The Qadiri Su dance performed collectively by members of Daghestani, Chechen, and Ingush Su communities is ridiculed as an idolatrous form of worship imitating monkeyplay. The medieval Su doctrine of the unity of all being60 is condemned as shirk and kufr, namely, polytheism and unbelief, while Su masters are being dismissed as manipulative and unscrupulous charlatans. This hostile attitude toward Susm is hardly surprising given the fact that Chechnyas President Ramzan Kadyrov has made a concerted effort to position Susm as the legitimate form of traditional Chechen Islam, thereby making it an ideological alternative to the politically active Sala interpretations of Islam that he has routinely denounced as Wahhabism, terrorism, or extremism.61 The same is true of the ofcial religious leaders of Daghestan who advocate Su Islam as the foremost ideological alternative to Wahhabism. The cozy relations between the local Su groups and the ruling elites of Daghestan and other republics of the Northern Caucasus62 have not been lost on the leaders of the Emirate, rendering their vituperations against Su beliefs and practices ever more ferocious. The following satirical verses are typical of their deeply ingrained resentment of Su masters (shaykhs) and their disciples (murids): Watch how the Su disciples have grown blind and how fear has turned them into women! They are but moral cripples, who are being led astray by blind men [who claim to possess] eyesight. These miserable wretches dream of nothing but being pussy-cats of their fraudulent Su masters (shaykhs)! They [Su disciples] spread gossips, like old women, while also being greedy, and their masters are despicable agents and commissars of Satan. They are weaving cozy nooks for themselves from the words of God, then, like ostriches hide their heads in the sand! Fed with a fatty broth, they are like a hoard of dirty pigs; they fawn before the [Russian] kars and are slaves of the butchers of Kremlin!63 In short, the Sus are invariably portrayed as the complete antipodes of the Emirates mujahideen and the pure (chistyi) Islam they claim to embody. They are, in the words of a Russian contributor to the Islamdin.com website, a pack of dogs of Hell in the service
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of the kars and murtads. Intolerant of any teachings other than their own, they are always eager to attack and bite fellow Muslims who refuse to join their mystical brotherhood (Arab. tariqat).64 Even this very cursory survey of the contents of the Emirate websites is sufcient to demonstrate the ubiquitous and consistent presence of religiously charged rhetoric and Arabic terminology. This is hardly surprising, as many of the younger amirs of this virtual state have been educated in religious colleges of the Middle East and North Africa,65 whereas others have studied Islamic theological and juridical literature and the Arabic language in Russia either formally or informally. The interviews and statements of the mujahideen leaders are richly sprinkled with long-winded quotations from the Quran and hadith. They seem to be particularly fond of uttering standard Arabic formulas that are commonly associated with piety and righteousness, such as There is no power or might except from Allah, May God guide us on the straight path, I seek refuge in God from the accursed Satan, Praise be to God, the One and Only, and so on.66 Public speeches of and interviews with some foreign-educated mujahideen feature a nearly Macaronic mixture of Russian and Arabic words and phrases. When making a video-recorded policy statement, they usually do so against the background of a green or black banner with the Arabic inscription of the shahada. Religious hymns in praise of jihad and martyrdom posted on the Emirates websites are broadcast in Arabic (sung by male voices only with no musical accompaniment).67 In their blogs, visitors of the kavkazcenter.com site and its afliates frequently ask each other where and how this or that Arabic hymn can be accessed and downloaded. Using Arabic is both fashionable and authoritative with the sites administrators and patrons. The extensive use of Arabic/Islamic terminology in the predominantly Russophone poetry and prose composed by contributors to the rebel websites often requires an annotation to explain its meaning to the uninitiated. When speaking before cameras, the young amirs occasionally have to provide a running commentary on or translations of the Arabic words and phrases they deploy so generously as to make their messages almost unintelligible to audiences not steeped in the Arabic language and/or Islamic history, theology and jurisprudence. In this way, the pronouncements of the Emirates leaders and the poetry and prose of contributors of its websites become sacralized and endowed with the higher authority associated with Arabic, the language of the divine revelation. Quotations from the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet are so numerous and long-winded that it is sometimes impossible to comprehend the exact purpose for which they are so abundantly marshaled by the Emirates spokesmen. This discursive strategy of the leadership of the Caucasus mujahideen may conjure up the image of the Hanbalis from the Abbasid era whom their opponents ridiculed for lling their speeches with scriptural quotations to such an extent that the original object of their discourses was all but obscured.68 It seems that the Emirates spokesmen see their prociency in the two foundational sources of Islam and the Arabic language as a decisive advantage over their opponents, be they the despised munaqun or the hated kuffar. In any event, they routinely debunk their critics among the ofcially appointed clergy of the North Caucasus republics for their lack of knowledge of the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet and Islamic theological terminology.69 This is not to say that the mujahideen are alone in their extensive use of ArabicIslamic concepts as a means to demonstrate their religious expertise and personal piety and to imbue their pronouncements with scriptural authority. Their religious opponents, too, are prone to intersperse their denunciations of the religious extremism and incompetence of the mujahideen (whom they dub Wahhabis or Kharijis) with Arabic words and Islamic legal vocabulary.70 In this way, the Arabic language and the Islamic tradition based on it
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have become a site of contestation for both the Emirates mujahideen and their ideological opponents who are usually classied as either Sus or adherents of traditional Islam.71 One should point out that the use of Arabic, and especially of ArabicIslamic religious and legal terminology, is far from supercial. One may argue that it decisively shapes the very conceptual framework and mindset of the speakers as the following quotation from a statement by the Emirates late chief judge (qadi) Anzor Astemirov nely demonstrates: Taqlid (that is, following the opinion of [authoritative] scholars) is not allowed when it comes to the fundamentals of the aqida72 (that is, usul al-din). Before one can accept somebodys statement concerning a matter of creed, one should ask for a clear dalil (that is, a proof [derived] from a religiously sound source). As for the furu (that is, branches or details) of the Sharia(t) law, in this respect we follow the opinion of those who have knowledge [of such things] and do not need to request a dalil on each issue. The gist of Astemirovs argument that can be extracted from the overall context of his statement is that the Emirates mujahideen need not have an extensive scholarly expertise to understand and practice the basic precepts of their religion (which, according to Astemirov, include the divine command to wage jihad against indels and polytheists). For him, they are self-evident. If and when re-interpreted in a novel way, the interpreter should justify his interpretation by producing a cogent scriptural proof. However, the mujahideen, not being formally trained jurists, should seek council of religious jurists (fuqaha) when dealing with ambiguous matters pertaining to the implementation of some ner points of the Sharia(t). It should be pointed out that Astemirovs argument cited above comes in response to those learned critics of the Emirate who argue that its leaders do not possess the requisite theological and legal competence to declare and wage jihad. Seen from this vantage point, the ArabicIslamic theological terminology employed by Astemirov can be construed as a deliberate rhetorical stratagem aimed at countering a theological/juridical objection to the mujahideens interpretation of Islam. Couched in a carefully selected Arabic terminology, it is aimed at showcasing Astemirovs expertise in Islamic juridical theory (qh), while simultaneously calling in doubt the juridical competence of his critics. The critics, in this case, are the ofcial religious scholars of Astemirovs native Kabardino-Balkaria, who had been trying to dissuade the republics pious youth from taking arms against the Federal and republican authorities and police force. Overall, our analysis of postings on kavkazcenter.com and the afliated rebel Internet forums seems to conrm Gilles Kepels observation that On websites in every European language, whether jihadist or pietist, trendy jargon blends in with an intense polemic founded on obscure religious reference to medieval scholars whose work was written in abstruse Arabic.73 The use of Arabic is not conned to academic debates over differing interpretations of Islam. It may appear in much graver contexts, for example, in the recordings of last conversations between small groups of Daghestani mujahideen surrounded by police units and their families and friends. Breathing heavily in the face of inevitable death,74 the doomed ghters often prelude their nal farewells and instructions to their loved ones and comrades-in-arms with a battery of pious Arabic phrases and creedal statements75 aimed at asserting their abiding loyalty to Islam (or at least their understanding of Islam) even in the face of an impending doom.76 To an outsider, these formulaic pronouncements
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may occasionally sound like magic incantations deemed to strengthen the resolve of the ghters to sacrice their lives in the path of God. Their families are usually tearful, their comrades-in-arms encouraging and, occasionally, envious of their friends being on the brink martyrdom and, consequently, at the gates of paradise. From the viewpoint of the mujahideen, the ArabicIslamic formulas they utter in the precious last minutes of their young lives are a pass of sorts to the felicitous life to come. In this way, Arabic, the language of the Islamic revelation, imbues them with strength and heroism. Finally, there were a recent series of postings on the rebel websites that call for the adoption of Arabic as the ofcial language of the new state. Their authors emphasize the role of Arabic as the unifying factor that helped Muslims to overcome their ethnic and cultural divisions at the time of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. If we examine [our] history, argues the blogger who names himself Abu-Zayd, it will become obvious that each time an Islamic community neglected the Arabic language, it set on the path of moral decay and fell victim to foreign military and political aggression.77 In the present conditions, when Islam and the Muslims are under attack from all sides, The Arabic language serves as the primary means of communications among foreign mujahideen in every country where jihad is waged. Without knowing it, we are [doomed to] to talking only to each other. It is very important that [all] mujahideen have a common language, and the Arabic language is the perfect candidate for this [role]. This is why it is so important that the amirs of the jamaats78 [of the mujahideen] make it obligatory for their mujahideen to study the Quran and the Arabic language at least one hour a day.79 No less importantly, the mastery of Arabic is presented by its advocates as the surest way to preserve the purity of Islam, because, in the words one writer, understanding the Book (Koran) and the Sunna is a [religious] duty, and one is unable to understand them, without the knowledge of Arabic. That without which a religious duty cannot be properly fullled also becomes a duty.80 This is why, insists one author, all of us should study the Arabic language and teach it to our children. It is not as difcult as it seems at rst sight. Studying for two-three hours once a week is enough. I dont think one would have a problem nding time [to do this]. All we should do is to eliminate from our schedules some unnecessary activities, such as idle talk with friends, interacting with them through the Internet, watching the TV, as so on.81 While one does occasionally hear dissenting voices that propose to adopt Ottoman Turkish as the state language of the Emirate,82 the majority of postings on the rebel sites gives preference to Arabic. The adoption of Ottoman Turkish is considered to be opportunistic in that it is justied by its advocates by the recent strength of the Ottoman Empire and its inuential role in the Caucasus politics. However, the majority opinion is that by virtue of its being the language of the Islamic revelation Arabic is elevated above such transient geopolitical considerations. It is an eternal value that is not subject to uctuation of ckle human fortunes.83 The debate just described has proved important enough for the reclusive and elusive amir of the Emirate Dokku Umarov to weigh in, suggesting that the discussion of this issue be broadened [and] suggestions, comments and arguments [regarding this matter] be systematized and carefully analyzed.84
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Let us now place our survey of the uses of the Arabic language and Islamic terminology by the spokesmen and supporters of the Caucasus Emirate into a broader cultural, political, and historical context. The creation of this trans-ethnic political entity, albeit largely virtual, may be seen as an attempt by its leaders to bridge, if only on a symbolic and rhetorical level, the vast disparity between their opponentsthe increasingly assertive Russian state with its modern armed forces and relatively strong economy ush with oil wealth, on the one handand the small bands of poorly equipped and underfunded Islamist guerillas, no matter how highly motivated and courageous, on the other. The relative scarcity of the mujahideens physical presence on the ground is at least partially compensated by their robust presence in cyberspace projected via several jihadist websites.85 Furthermore, one can argue that this virtual presence has given the Caucasus Emirate an aura of invincibility and permanencewhile individual mujahideen and their tiny ghting units are being chased and destroyed by Russian Federal forces, Kadyrovs militia, and republican police units, the websites analyzed continue to be updated regularly and to provide a pro-rebel spin on the events in the region, Russia, the former Soviet Union, and internationally. The irredentist jihadist rhetoric and prompt reaction to the latest developments on the part of the sites administrators project an image of competence (i.e., being au courant) and self-condence to the outside world. This virtual strategy seems to be consciously designed to facilitate recruitment of young ghters for the political and military causes espoused by the Emirate. Another ideological benet of the transformation of the movement for Chechen national liberation into as a trans-ethnic Islamist one is that it gives the ghters a feeling of belonging to a global imagined community of the faithful, the umma.86 By occasionally accessing the websites postings via their laptop computers or smart phones, the Caucasus mujahideen no longer feel alone or forgotten in their unequal battle against perceived or real injustices of the social and political order they have vowed to abolish. Rather, they can now conceive of themselves as yet another detachment in the global army of Muslim sisters and brothers united in their cosmic battle for a noble, divinely sanctioned, transcendent cause. This perception imbues the Caucasus mujahideen with the self-condence and sense of purpose that localized, ethnic-based secessionist movements are unable to furnish.
Instead of a Conclusion: Some Loosely Strung Thoughts About Language, Religion, and Identity
The establishment of the Caucasus Emirate is a direct outcome of the two decades of the post-Soviet turmoil in a region that enjoyed neither social stability nor economic prosperity even in its better days, under the heavy but relatively benevolent hand of the Soviet regime. During the Soviet period, the subsidized economies of the Northern Caucasus republics managed to provide for the basic needs of their populations.87 Then came Gorbachevs Perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union, bringing in its wake social, economic, and political upheavals on an unprecedented scale. Several armed conicts ared up across the Caucasus, the RussoChechen war of 19941996 being the most devastating one.88 It destroyed thousands of human lives, much of the Chechen republics Soviet-era infrastructure, displaced hundreds of thousands of people and all but ruined its economy. Furthermore, it also triggered the rise of anti-government insurgencies in the name of Islam not just in Chechnya but in the neighboring Muslim republics of the Northern Caucasus as well. As one can see from the evidence adduced earlier in this article, the deadly struggle between the Russian Federal troops and the Chechen separatists has led to the progressive
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marginalization of Chechen nationalist ideology espoused by its founders in favor of a panIslamist one. This development seems like a logical outcome of the lack of international recognition of the Chechens right to secede from Russia and, later on, of the failure of the leadership of the rst independent Chechen state (19961999)89 to deliver law, order, and economic prosperity to its war-weary population. In retrospect, the recent declaration of the Caucasus Emirate by Umarov, one of the founding fathers of the Chechen national resistance and state, seems not only logical, but, in fact, inevitable. Faced with the military defeat of 1999 and goaded by Russias efforts to indigenize the conict by co-opting some members of the Chechen national elite in return for generous nancial infusions from the Federal Center (as well as promises of broad autonomy), the irredentist wing of the Chechen separatist movement had no choice but to turn to the jihadist international. While the creators of the Caucasus Emirate may have hoped that their new strategy would give them better access to the resources of rich Islamic states and charities worldwide, their immediate goal seems to have been quite local. Faced with the military power of the Russian state they sought to unify the theretofore isolated regional pockets of anti-Russian, separatist insurgency under the aegis of a transnational and trans-ethnic resistance movement headed by Chechen military commanders. The role of the ideological scaffolding of this new militarypolitical formation was assigned to Islam. In practical terms, the Islamization of Chechen separatism entailed the enforcement of the norms of the Sharia(t), the ubiquitous deployment of the Arabic language and Islamic symbols, and the relentless and uncompromising prosecution of the anti-Russian jihad. The founders of this new Islamist/jihadist polity had good reasons to believe that they would achieve at least some level of success in their bold undertaking. First, as already pointed out, the long conict in Chechnya had spilled over into the neighboring republics via young Muslim volunteers who at one point or the other joined the Chechen resistance; after undergoing baptism by re in Chechnya, they returned home ready to take on their own ruling regimes (which were and still are uniformly secular and pro-Russian) in the name of the international jihad waged by the global umma against the overwhelming powers of Taghut. Second, the preaching of jihad by the returning veterans of the RussoChechen wars and by the jihadi websites fell on a fertile soil due to numerous popular grievances and discontents in the region that had been engendered by the local corruption, authoritarianism, and misrule.90 Islamist/jihadist appeals to justice and equity under the aegis of the divinely revealed law, the Sharia(t), found an eager hearing among the Caucasus Muslims, especially younger ones, who were marginalized by the social and economic status quo and who had little hope to make their voices heard under the heavy-handed, corrupt and nepotistic governance of the pro-Russian political elites of their republics.91 The claim of the late Kabardian guerilla leader Anzor Astemirov that he had been advocating for the creation of a supra-ethnic Islamic polity in the Northern Caucasus already in 2005 rings true.92 He seems to have persuaded the fourth president of Chechnya Abdulkhalim (Abd al-Halim) Sadulayev (Sad Allah) to lay the ground for the declaration of a Sharia(t) state throughout the entire Northern Caucasus. Sadulayevs untimely death in June 2006 at the hands of a Russian special force unit interfered with this master plan.93 It was, therefore, only a matter of time for an Islamic state to be declared outside Chechnya by an ambitious jihadi leader such as Astemirov. One can say that the idea was oating in the air. Faced with this eventuality, it was only natural for Umarov, Udugov, and their close circle of followers to seize the initiative and declare a Chechnya-based Emirate before it was announced elsewhere in the Northern Caucasus. On the debit side, the pursuit of an ambitious global agenda by these newly minted transnationalist jihadists94 has inevitably alienated them from the secular-minded
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Caucasus nationalists whose goal is much more local in scope, that is, to secure their republics national sovereignty and independence from Russia. Hence, the oft-cited fundamental conict95 between the abstract, universal agenda of global jihadism, and the particularistic identities, grievances, and aspirations of local Muslim communities. Inevitably, acerbic mutual recriminations have ensued between their respective supporters, resulting in a fateful split in the ranks of the former comrades-in-arms. Lines of loyalty and ideological underpinnings have now been sharply redrawn, values and principles polarized, and the parting of ways becomes inevitable. This parting of ways has been accentuated by the use of diametrically opposed idioms and concepts (Arabic/Islamic versus Russian/Western), by appeals to different sources of authority (the Quran, Sunna, and Sharia(t) versus Russian and Western secular laws and institutions), and even by outward means of self-expression, such as a distinct dress-code and physical appearance (military fatigues or free-owing Islamic dresses versus well-tailored secular suites; Islamic scalp-caps versus Western-style hats; unkempt beards versus trimmed ones or no beards at all, etc.).96 In this way, the two factions mutual dissociation has been rendered complete and nal. The extensive deployment of ArabicIslamic religious terminology by the Emirates spokesmen is meant to accentuate their drastic departure from the secular Russo-centric culture that continues to dominate their societies. One is witnessing, in essence, a concerted attempt by the Caucasus mujahideen to create a new, Islamic vocabulary to convey their experiences and challenge the dominant secular Russian idiom. In response to a situation of strife and conict, a new religious and cultural identity/self is being forged.97 As has been seen, Arabic is widely and deliberately deployed by the Emirates spokesmen as an alternative symbolic capital aimed at setting its users apart from both the predominantly Russian-speaking ruling elites of the Northern Caucasus republics as well as the local ethnic nationalists anxious to revive their local vernaculars in order to reassert their newly discovered and re-imagined national identities.98 A new, Islamic (Arabophone) linguistic community is thus being consciously or subconsciously constructed, in which the use of the Arabic language and Islamic conceptual apparatus serves as an important marker of religious [self-]identication.99 Participants in this nascent linguistic and conceptual community consciously and consistently aunt their distinctiveness as they seek to transcend both the Russo-centric and ethno-centric nationalist idioms/rhetoric that have been predominant in their societies over the past one hundred years or so. By consistently deploying ArabicIslamic vocabulary, they seek symbolically to reach out to, and identify themselves with, the imagined transnational umma based on its single-minded allegiance to the Muslim revelation and the linguistic vehicle in which it was originally expressed. In the spirit of Pierre Bourdieus statement quoted in an epigraph to this article,100 the Arabic language, and ArabicIslamic legal terminology in particular, simultaneously legitimize and create the new reality as it is envisioned by the founding fathers of the Caucasus Emirate. For them, Islam thus serves as that ancient and well-tried method of establishing communion through common practice which Eric Hobsbawm mentions in the other epigraph cited at the beginning of this article.101 True as Hobsbaums generalization may appear at rst blush, one should keep in mind that the opponents of the Emirate equally rely on the ArabIslamic idiom to refute the Emirates claims to be the sole representatives of pure and correct Islam.102 So, in and of itself the Arabic language and the Islamic concepts it enshrines is not enough to construct a new religious and cultural identity/self. The language and the concepts it articulates are just containers for the distinctive meanings and interpretations that thus
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are, pace Hobsbaum, the real method of establishing communion through the process of communication and intellectual participation of like-minded individuals in the same discursive/ideological formation. Thus, what matters is not the language or religion per se, but how they are spoken about, understood, deployed, and, eventually, acted on by the speakers and their target audience(s). In other words, the same language and concepts may be (and in fact quite often are) interpreted in an almost diametrically opposed manner by North Caucasus Muslims (supposedly no less or more personally pious than the mujahideen), who prefer accommodation and compromise with the ungodly but still powerful state to a lifeor-death armed struggle in the name of the global jihad. As mentioned, this is the position maintained by most Su-based communities in the region, whom the mujahideen denounce as apostates. And now to the issue of the remarkable transition from the heady ethnic nationalism of the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period to a local version of transnational Islamism, understood as political, social, and cultural action in the name of Islam, the global umma, and the Sharia(t). This transition is not new of course. It is familiar to us from the recent history of many Muslim countries and regions, such as, for instance, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Maghreb, Jordan, Palestine, and so on. In each of these countries this momentous transition had its own logic and driving forces. For example, in Egypt and Algeria the pious urban poor, university students, and recent migrants from the countryside aligned themselves with the petty bourgeoisie, low-ranking army ofcers and state ofcials in a shared aspiration to establish a just and equitable social order on the basis of the Sharia(t).103 In the case of the Northern Caucasus, establishing the rule of the Sharia(t) and adopting Arabic as the ofcial language of the Emirate are declared to be the ultimate goals of the local insurgency waged in the name of Islam. Once achieved, the local societies would be empowered to overcome their ethnic and clannish fragmentation that has heretofore prevented them from forming a unied front against the Russian state. In this respect, there is an obvious resemblance between the ideological agenda of the Caucasus Emirate and the Sharia(t)-enforcing strategy embraced by the leaders of the Caucasus jihad movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. As in the past,104 the leaders of the Emirate have chosen Arabic as their preferred vehicle of religious and social discourse, statesmanship, and legislature. As with Shamils and Uzun Hajjis Imamates (18321859 and 19191920, respectively),105 the Emirate leaders claim to be implementers and enforcers of the will of God as inscribed in Arabic in the Sharia(t) has become a means of not only legitimizing the new jihadi state but also of transcending ethnic divisions among the local mountaineer communities as well as divergent political, cultural, and economic aspirations of their elites. At this stage, it is hard to predict how effective or otherwise this new strategy will turn out to be in the long run. Having just mentioned the historical antecedents to building Islamic states in the region, one cannot avoid pursuing this parallel a step further. When, in the wake of the 1917 collapse of the Russian Empire, the regions independence from an unstable and weak Bolshevik state became a strong possibility, the mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus found themselves split over the place and scope of the Sharia(t)-based legislation in the life of their societies.106 One group, the supporters of the Sharia(t) (Rus. shariatisty), demanded a comprehensive and unconditional implementation of Sharia(t) norms in all spheres of public life and politics of the newly created state. Their opponents among the left-leaning revolutionary intelligentsia, on the other hand, sought to restrict Islam to the realm of private faith and worship and to implement secular codes to regulate public relations, legal transactions, and political decision making in the newly created federation of mountaineer peoples (gorskie narody). This latter group eventually triumphed (in 1922)
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thanks, in large part, to the support of Russias Bolshevik government.107 In retrospect, one can argue that the pro-Sharia(t) faction probably stood a better chance of resisting the subsequent imposition of Bolshevik rule on the Muslim communities of the Northern Caucasus due to the strong support it enjoyed among the masses.108 This may indeed have been the case then. Now, after seventy years of Soviet communist rule, two decades of the post-Soviet transformation, and in the face of Putins government determination to keep the region under Russian control at all costs, the viability of the Islamic state in the Northern Caucasus is tenuous at best. What cannot be disputed is that both armed and ideological struggle under Islamic/Islamist slogans against Russian domination and its local backers is likely to continue for years, if not decades to come. In this scenario, Arabic, the sacred language of the Muslim scriptures, and the Islamic concepts articulated in it have a major role to play as the rhetoric and ideological underpinning of Islamist insurgency.
Notes
1. As argued in the present authors book Islam in Historical Perspective (Boston, Columbus, Indianapolis, etc.: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2011), chapters 2325. 2. The present authors article does not address the so-called New Muslims movement whose members are united by their commitment to practicing pure Islam unadulterated by local customs and practices that they consider un-Islamic. Marat Shterin and Akhmet Yarlykapov in their recent article, Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: The New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and Its Path to Violence, Religion, State and Society 39(34) (JuneSeptember 2011), pp. 303325, have argued that North Caucasus Muslims (usually young) espousing this version of Islam are not necessarily violent (jihadist) by their nature; they can, however, become radicalized under certain conditions. The article argues convincingly that one such condition has been the RussoChechen conict of the last two decades (see p. 318). It has given rise to the jihadist insurgency discussed in what follows. 3. Rus. Imarat Kavkaz. 4. From the Arabic mujahid, pl. mujahidun, namely, jihad warrior; literally, this term refers to someone who exerts himself on the path of God. This is a preferred self-denition of the individuals who are commonly referred to as jihadists or Muslim terrorists/militants in the Western and Russian multimedia and academic discourse; for a recent example of the latter, see Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis Path to Self-Destruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. xix. 5. Namely, an Islamic state ruled by a military commander (Arab. amir or emir); in what follows both spellings of this Arabic word will be used. 6. Iuri Vershov, Doku Umarov bolshe ne ubiitsa, Rosbalt, Rossia, Sankt-Peterburg, 22 December 2010; last modied 11 June 2011, p. 1. Available at http://www.rosbalt.ru/2010/12/22/ 803088.html 7. RFE/RL Interviews Chechen Field Commander Umarov (an interview by Andrei Babitsky). Available at http://www.rferl.org/atricleprintview/1060266.html (accessed 13 June 2009); cf. Vershov, Doku Umarov. 8. The Ofcial Version of Amir Dokkas Statement of Declaration of the Caucasian Emirate. Available at http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.html (accessed 15 January 2010). 9. Amir Emirata Kavkaz Dokku Umarov, My osvobodim Krasnodarskii krai, Astrakhan i Povolzhskie zemli, 8 March 2010. Last modied 11 June 2011. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter. com/russ/content/2010/03/08/71087.shtml 10. The plural of the Arabic kar (unbeliever; indel); the Emirates spokesmen use the plurals kars and kuffar interchangeably. 11. That is, the Arabic for jihad-ghters, hypocrites, and apostates; Umarov, My osvobodim.
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12. For the historical roots of this concept in pagan Arabia, see T. Fahd and F. H. Stewart, Taghut in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 19542004); online edition: http://www.brillonline.nl 13. An area ruled by wali/veli, a governor appointed by the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. 14. Umarov, My osvobodim. 15. This phrase was later omitted from Umarovs statement, but was preserved on some websites, such as Jihad Unspun. Available at http://www.jihadunspun.com/intheatre internal.php? article=109196 (accessed 21 March 2010). 16. Ibid. 17. See, for instance, Sheikh Salakh: Vse mudjahedy podderzhivaiut provozglashenie Imarata Kavkaz. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com//russ/content/2008/09/25/61268.shtml (accessed 12 June 2009); Amir Supian, Prezhde chem provozglasit Imarat Kavkaz, byli skazany bole vazhnye slova. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/02/0763864.html (accessed 12 June 2009). 18. On him see note 24. Astemirov was ambushed and killed in Nalchik by a police unit on 24 March 2010; cf. Shaykh Salakh: Vse modzhahedy. The two chief qadis of the Caucasus Emirate appointed after the death of Astemirov hail from Daghestan. 19. Mairbek Vatchagaev, Zakaevs Attempts to Persuade Dokka Umarov are in Vain, Jamestown Foundation, North Caucasus Weekly 9(24) (19 June 2008). Available at http://www. jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261a e3e&tx ttnews%5Bexact search%5D=Zakaev%92s%20Attempts%20to%20Persuade%20Dokka% 20Umarov%20Are%20in%20Vain&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=5007&tx ttnews%5BbackPid%5D =7&cHash=c38828dec230d6f40fe6a5ba5757081e (accessed 11 June 2011). 20. Movladi Udugov, Voina idiot za obraz zhizni. Available at http://www.kavkazce nter.com/russ/content/2007/11/28/54654.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011); for Udugovs alleged role of the mastermind of the Declaration see, for example, Vatchagaev, Zakaevs Attempts. 21. In the aftermath of the Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate Zaka(y)ev declared himself the prime minister of the Republic of Ichkeria that was abolished by Umarovs decree. 22. Udugov, Voina. 23. For an illuminating comparison between Uzun Hajjs emirate and that of Dokku Umarov see Mairbek Vatchagaevs Uzun Hajis and Dokka Umarovs Emirates: A Retrospective, Jamestown Foundation, North Caucasus Weekly 9(10) (13 March 2008). Available at http://www.jamestown. org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx ttnews%5Bany of the words%5D=uzun%20haji%27s&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=4785&tx ttnew s%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b40b431a5c) (accessed 11 June 2011); for the history of the Islamic movements led by these three leaders see my entries Ushurma, Mansur; Shamil; and al-Kabk (the Caucasus) pt. 3, in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 19542004); online edition: http://www.brillonline.nl. 24. Udugov, Voina; this idea is echoed by the late Kabardian amir Astemirov who was also the Emirates chief qadi, who argues that the [only] difference between the democrats [of the Republic of Ichkeria], who reside in Europe, and between todays Kremlins stooges in Chechnya is that the former want to live under the wing of the West, whereas the latter under the wing of Russia; see Amir Seifulla o protsesse podgotovki k provozglasheniiu Kavkazskogo Emirata, 20 November 2007. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/11/20/54479.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 25. Udugov, Voina. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Amir Seifulla o protsesse.
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32. Ibid. 33. As discussed in the present authors Islam in Historical Perspective, pp. 431445. 34. Ibid., pp. 401405. 35. Ibid., p. 434 and Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 2nd ed., trans. by Anthony Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), p. 26. 36. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), p. 127. 37. Gary Bunt, iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 223. 38. Gary Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 70. 39. Bunt, Islam, pp. 67, 70, 112113, 138, 161, and so on. 40. See, for instance, Umm Iklil, Pobeda ili rai, 1 February 2009. Available at http:// www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/02/01/63732.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011); Amir Muhannad, Kavkaz podderzhivaet Gazu. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/ content/2009/02/01/63732.shtml (accessed 2 April 2009); Andrew McGregor, Distant Relations: Hamas and the Mujahideen of Chechnya, Jamestown Foundation 7(8) (23 February 2006). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=3166 (accessed 11 June 2011); Press Release of Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), 19 July 2006. Available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/ malam multimedia/English/eng n/html/hamas ch e.htm (accessed 3 April 2009); Khamas prizyvaet palestintsev brat primer s chechenskikh boevikov, 23 September 2004. Available at http://lenta.ru/terror/2004/09/23/propaganda/ (accessed 11 June 2011). 41. Thus, Kadyrov is routinely called Kafyrova damning pun on the Arabic word kar, meaning indel. 42. As documented by Gordon Hahn in his publications for the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program. Available at http://montrep.miis.edu/ (accessed 11 June 2011). 43. See, for instance, Rostekhnadzor kosvenno podtverdil, chto osennii pavodok mozhet unichtozhit SSh GES, 30 August 2009. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/ 2009/08/30/67721.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011); Na unichtozhennykh voennykh bazakh v Ulianovske nakhdilos khimicheskoe oruzhie? 14 November 2009. Available at http://www. kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/11/14/69144.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 44. V Permi sgorel tsvet goroda, 5 December 2009. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter. com/russ/content/2009/12/05/69533.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011); Demogracheskaia katastrofa, 4 January 2010. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/01/04/69917.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 45. Bunt, eMuslims, p. 8. 46. What follows are the recurrent themes of kavkazcenter.com and its sister websites, which absolves the present author from documenting every instance of their appearance. 47. Bunt, iMuslims, p. 199. 48. The correct transliteration of this Arabic word is murtadd, but the gemination (doubling) of the nal consonant of the Arabic stem is ignored in the transliteration system adopted by the website administrators. 49. A Quranic term originally applied to the prophet Muhammads opponents in Medina, who adopted Islam outwardly out of expediency, while harboring a deep-seated unbelief and hatred of the Muslim community. 50. Norman Cigar (trans.), Al-Qaidas Doctrine for Insurgency: Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrins A Practical Guide for Guerilla War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 1617; the present author has made a minor change to the translation by replacing the word unitarian (muwahhid) with monotheistic. 51. Akbar al-Madzhid, Novatorstvo islamskogo poeta. 17 March 2009. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/09/03/60756.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 52. Akbar al-Madzhid, Novatorstvo.
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53. Ded Moroz i kadyrovskaia troitsa. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/ content/2008/12/04/62601.html (accessed 15 January 2009). 54. Amir Supian, Prezhde chem. 55. In the sites chat rooms, Putin is routinely nick-named Pukin, namely, farter; see, for example, http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/content/view/508/29/#comments (accessed 5 September 2010). 56. Shamil Mansur, Padshii bard. 12 August 2008. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter. com/russ/content/2008/08/12/60137.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 57. Namely, Mecca and Medina. 58. Amir Supian, Prezhde chem; the circumambulation of the Kaba sanctuary (tawaf ) constitutes one of the central events of the annual Muslim pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca. 59. Ded Moroz. 60. For the heated theological polemic around this controversial Su teaching see the present authors book Ibn Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999). 61. Shterin and Yarlykapov, Reconsidering Radicalization, pp. 304 and 322 note 6. 62. For details see the present authors article Contextualizing the Su-Sala Conict: From the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt, Middle Eastern Studies 43(4) (2007), pp. 503530. 63. Shamil Mansur, V edinstve sila musulman. 24 February 2009. Available at http://www. kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/02/24/64175.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 64. Amin, russkii muslim, Oskal suzma. 27 October 2009. Available at http://www. islamdin.com/index.php?view=article&catid=36%3A2009-11-12-19-39-41&id=546%3A2009-1027-21-15-16&option=com content&Itemid=32/ (accessed 11 June 2011); see also ibid., Suiskaia schetina i moskovskaia svinina. 19 November 2009. Available at http://www.islamdin. com/index.php?view=article&catid=36%3A2009-11-12-19-39-41&id=569%3A2009-11-19-19-2858&option=com content&Itemid=32/ (accessed 7 March 2010). 65. For some representative examples see http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/09/ 25/61268.shtml (regarding Shaykh Salakh of Tevazanin) (accessed 11 June 2011); http://vip. lenta.ru/news/2004/09/27/qaracaevo (regarding Ramazan Borlakov of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and his religious school at the village of Uchkeken) (accessed 11 June 2011); another typical example is the late Musa (Artur) Mukozhev, who studied at the Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and his successor Anzor Astemirov, Shterin and Yarlykapov, Reconsidering Radicalisation, p. 311; cf. Mairbek Vatchagaev, The Northern Caucasus Remains Combustible, The Jamestown Foundation, North Caucasus Weekly 1(19) (15 May 2009). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f 378576261ae3e&tx ttnews%5Bany of the words%5D=combustible&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D= 35000&tx ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=cf459067776ad9b033138a78dccf522b (accessed 11 June 2011). Special mention should be made of Said Buriatskiy (Said Abu Sad al-Buryati), the Russian-Buriat convert to Islam who has acted as the principal spokesman and ideologist of the Emirate until his death in March 2010. A uent speaker of Arabic, he studied Islamic subjects in religious colleges of Yemen and Egypt: V Ingushetii ubit boevik Said Buriatskii. Available at http://www.infpol.ru/newspaper/number.php?ELEMENT ID=30498/ (accessed 25 April 2010). 66. Cf. Bunt, eMuslims, p. 15. 67. Music is shunned by the followers of pure Islam in accordance with the more strident (puritan) interpretation of the Sharia. 68. See, for example, Hashwiyya, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 19542004); online edition: http://www.brillonline.nl. 69. As shown, for example, by Vladimir Bobrovnikov in his article, Ordinary Wahhabism vs Ordinary Susm? Filming Islam for the Post-Soviet Young People, Religion, State and Society 39 (23) (June-September 2011), pp. 291295; the present author expresses profound gratitude to Dr. Bobrovnikov for sharing his work before its publication. 70. Bobrovnikov, Ordinary Wahhabism, pp. 285287; alongside such common Arabic words used by Daghestani Muslims as tariqa(t), wird (Su community), murid, ustadh, hadith,
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ziyara(t), and so on. Daghestani critics of Wahhabism also employ relatively rare terms such as tasliya, fatwa,shafaa, talqin, nazm, sharh, taqlid, usul al-din, and so on, which are less familiar (if at all) to the average Daghestani believer with no formal religious education. For a study of the application of the historical concept of Kharijism to various strands of the jihadi movement worldwide see Lahoud, The Jihadis Path, passim. 71. For details, see the present authors article, Contextualizing the Su-Sala Conict. 72. Interestingly, Astemirov leaves this Arabic word for creed or profession of faith without translation, which indicates that it is already familiar not only to the mujahideen but to his potential listeners/readers outside the movement as well. However, he deems it necessary to explain the meaning of usul al-din (the foundations or fundamentals of religion). The fact that Astemirovs explanation itself contains an Arabic religious term is quite revealing. 73. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), p. 256. 74. In the overwhelming majority of cases the mujahideen prefer death to captivity, unless betrayed, drugged, or overpowered in their sleep. 75. Usually, the shahada, the praises of the Prophet, his family, and his companions and of the Muslims the world over. 76. See, for example, Poslednii razgovor Salakhuddina (Rustama) Zakariaeva. 25 September 2010. Available at http://guraba.info/index.php?option=com content&view=article& id=934&catid=17&Itemid=37 (accessed 11 June 2011); Poslednii zvonok pered smertiu. 4 September 2008. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eo-rRYM7eKE&playnext=1& list=PLF44CA4326BDA2432 (accessed 11 June 2011). Poslednii zvonok mudzhakhida Shamilkalinskogo raiona. No date. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8QgV90X 5Zc&feature=related (accessed 11 June 2011). 77. Abu-Zayd, Ia za arabskii gosuderstvennyi iazyk Imarata Kavkaz. 21 November 2010. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/11/21/76670.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 78. That is, community, band, or group. 79. Abu-Zayd, Ia za arabskii. 80. Otdel pisem (The letter section), KavkazTsentr, Status arabskogo iazyka v Islame. 17 December 2010. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/12/17/77358.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011); cf. Abu-Zayd, Ia za arabskii. 81. Status arabskogo iazyka. 82. Said-Magomed Tokayev, Kakoi gosudarstvennyi iazyk dolzhen byt v Imarate Kavkaz, 27 November 2010. Available http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/11/27/76817.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 83. Abu Khafs (Abu Hafs), I vsio zhe, arabskii! 30 April 2011. Available at http:// kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/04/30/81182 html (accessed 11 June 2011). 84. Otdel operativnoi informatsii (Department of Strategic Information), Amir Dokku Abu Usman kratko prokommentiroval temu gosudarstvennogo iazyka Imarata Kavkaz. 21 January 2011. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/01/22/78411.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 85. One can argue that this presence is quite robust with insurgent attacks on Federal troops and police forces in the region taking place on an almost daily basis; however, it has denitely been on the wane compared to the previous decade (19992009). 86. For a perceptive if controversial analysis of this phenomenon see Oliver Roys Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 87. For some pertinent observations relevant to the Soviet economy in general and that of the North Caucasus region in particular, see Georgi Derluguian, Bourdieus Secret Admirer in the Caucasus (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2005), pp. 7277, 104124, 132137, and so on. 88. The other conicts of that period are the AzeriArmenian war for Nagorno-Karabakh, the war between Abkhazia and Georgia, and the armed conict between the Ossetian and Ingush communities in North Ossetia.
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89. Its ofcial title at that time was The Republic of Ichkeria. 90. For an illuminating discussion of the clumsy and counterproductive measures to contain Islamic extremism by the authorities of the republic of Kabardino-Balkariia see Shterin and Yarlykapov, Reconsidering Radicalisation, pp. 318321. 91. For a percipient analysis of the disproportionate role of young Muslims (primarily men) in the Islamization of North Caucasus societies and dissemination of various versions of pure Islam, see Shterin and Yarlykapov, Reconsidering Radicalisation, pp. 307310; for the attractiveness of Sala Islam to younger generations of Muslims in general see Roel Meijer, Introduction, in Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salasm: Islams New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 132. 92. Astemirov Takes Credit for Idea of Caucasian Emirate. 30 November 2007. Available at http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/30/9148.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 93. Amir Seifulla. 94. This term was coined and widely used by Fawaz Gerges in his Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 119150 et passim. 95. Manuel Castellis, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 3. 96. Compare, for instance, the video clips of Chechen mujahideen on YouTube to the televised public appearances of Euro-Chechen leaders in exile, such as the aforementioned Akhmed Zaka(y)ev and Ilyas Akhmadov, Chechnyas foreign minister under the late president Maskhadov, who currently resides in the United States. 97. See the excerpt from Yasir Suleimans Arabic, Self and Identity (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 1, which is quoted in the epigraph to this article. 98. Postings on the Emirates websites are replete with condemnations of various manifestations of ethnic nationalism, which are seen as a conscious or unconscious attempt on the part of its advocates to undermine the unity of the global Muslim umma in general and that of the Caucasian Muslims in particular; see, for example, Amir Seifullakh (Sayf Allah), O gnilom zapakhe natsionalizma. 29 September 2008. Available at http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/content/2008/09/29/61307.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011); cf. Amir Seifullakh dal interviu Dzheimstaunskomu fondu. 26 March 2009. Available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/03/26/64698.shtml (accessed 11 June 2011). 99. Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance. When Religion and Culture Part Ways, trans. Ros Schwartz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 102. 100. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, Ed. John Thompson, trans. by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 42. 101. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 68. 102. As evidenced, for example, by Astemirovs rejoinder to their arguments cited earlier. 103. As argued, for instance, in Gilles Kepels Jihad, chapters 4, 7, 11, and 12 (in regard to Egypt and Algeria). 104. For the role of Arabic as the lingua franca and vehicle of Islamic learning in the Muslim communities of the Northern Caucasus in the nineteenthearly twentieth centuries see, for instance, Ignatii Krachkovskii, Izbrannye sochineniia (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 19551960), vol. 6 and A. Genko, Arabskii iazyk i kavkazovedenie, Trudy vtoroi sessii assotsiatsii arabistov (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1941), pp. 81110. 105. Mairbek Vatchagaev, Uzun Hajis and Dokka Umarovs Emirates: A Retrospective, North Caucasus Analysis 9(10) (13 March 2008), Jamestown Foundation. Available at http://www. jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=4785 (accessed 11 June 2011). 106. At that time (1920), the republics of the Northern Caucasus formed the Autonomous Mountain Soviet Socialist Republic (see the present authors article, Kabk, in the 2nd ed. of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 19532004), online edition: http://www.brillonline.nl 107. Ibid. 108. See, for instance, Vatchgaev, Uzun Hajis.

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