1 Introduction to the Economics of Altruism, Giving, and Reciprocity Serge-Christophe KOLM First think, then compute (A teacher of mathematics)

Content
Foreword I GENERA !"ER"IE# $% &he economics of moral sentiments '% (otives for altruism and altruistic giving )% *tructures of altruism +% Altruism and democracy, Altruistic -oint giving and its pu.lic implementation /% (otives and reasons for nonaltruistic giving 0% &he structure of nonaltruistic giving 6.1 From motives to forms 6.2 Contradictions and possibilities in the logic of motives 1% &he inefficiency of individual giving when -oint or pu.lic giving is possi.le, the perple2ing -oint giving theorem 3% Reciprocities 8.1 An overview 8.2 !man roc"s on which societies are b!ilt# 8.$ %he special games of reciprocit& 4% Importance and scope of giving, altruism, and pro5social conduct '.1 (verview '.2 Families '.$ %he political and p!blic sector '.$.1 )!blic services and general political motives '.$.2 Actors of the political and p!blic s&stem '.* +iving in philanthrop&, solidarit&, and charit& '.*.1 -ocial sit!ation '.*.2 .otives './ +eneral respect, civilit&, socialit&, and help '.6 %he correction of fail!res# of e0changes and organi1ations '.2 Associations, cl!bs, cooperatives '.8 %he wor"place and labo!r relations '.' -ocial giving3 relation, s&mbol, stat!s '.14 5ormative economics and the good societ& $6% Giving reactions 14.1 Abo!t two partic!lar iss!es that ca!ght the fanc& of economists3 intertemporal giving and the internali1ation of the gift e0ternalit& 14.1.1 6ntertemporal giving, both wa&s3 be7!est and the retro8gift p!blic debt 14.1.2 9conomic internali1ation of helping e0ternalities 14.2 6nterferences with altr!istic giving3 general view $$% *olving 7Adam *mith8s pro.lem9 $'% &he causes of and reasons for altruism II A &R:I*(* AN; GI"ING $)% Altruisms, types and causes or reasons 1$.1 +eneral presentation 1$.1.1 6ntrod!ction 1$.1.2 %he twelve basic t&pes of altr!ism 1$.1.$ %he ob:ects of reasons for giving and altr!isms +ift or receiver;s sit!ation

2
)aternalism# 1$.2 5at!ral or hedonistic altr!isms 1$.2.1 9motional contagion 1$.2.2 9mpathies 1$.2.$ Affection and s&mpath& 1$.2.* Compassion and pit& 1$.2./ <elations and nat!re of hedonistic altr!ism 1$.$ 5ormative altr!ism 1$.$.1 %he three t&pes of normative altr!ism3 moral, social and rational 1$.$.2 .oral and social normative altr!ism and giving 5at!re and distinction Applications Comparisons3 nat!ral, normative, moral, social %he ambig!o!s stat!s of social normative motives A societ& is more altr!istic than its members -elf8image .oral a"rasia 1$.$.$ <ational altr!ism +eneral principle -!bstit!tion )!tative reciprocities =!stice >niversali1ation $+% Altruism and -ustice< impartial altruism 1*.1 Altr!ism and :!stice 1*.2 6mpartial altr!ism 1*.$ istor& 1*.* Altr!ism and :!stice3 consistenc& or conflict, force or freedom $/% Giving, an a.undance and variety of motives and reasons 1/.1 An overview 1/.2 -ocial effects 1/.2.1 (pinion 1/.2.2 -it!ation 1/.2.$ <elation 1/.$ 6ntrinsicall& normative (non8altr!istic) giving 1/.* -elf8interested giving 1/.*.1 6ntrod!ction 1/.*.2 +ifts and interests 1/.*.$ +iver;s benefit from the gift;s effect on processes and their o!tcome %he general propert& %he transfer parado0# thro!gh effects on prices, mar"ets, or e0change <edistrib!tion 90ploiting the ret!rn gift, se7!ential e0change, reverse reciprocit& <ep!tation, social effects, image, stat!s 1/./ +iving in social relations and comm!nities III "A :E* AN; =I*&!R> $0% &he normative economics of altruism and giving 16.1 %he ethics of economics 16.2 %he intrinsic val!e of altr!ism and giving 16.$ +iving as improving fairness in freedom 16.* Altr!ism, giving, reciprocit&, and fail!res of economic interactions 16.*.1 Ca!sing mar"et fail!res 16.*.2 C!ring mar"et fail!res 16./ ?iberal social contracts and :oint giving 16./.1 ?iberal social contracts 16./.2 )!blic goods and :oint giving 16./.$ %he core with interdependent coalitions 16.6 <etrogifts and the process8liberal p!blic debt 16.2 -elfish altr!ism3 %he sit!ation of the other person ma& be &o!r own

$
16.8 @istrib!tion as a p!blic good3 the distrib!tive s!rpl!s $1% =istorical landmar?s 12.1 9conomics and altr!ism 12.2 6nterdependent !tilities and social choice 12.$ Altr!ism and !ncertaint& 12.* 6nterdependent !tilities and interdependent giving 12./ A notable debate3 blood and the efficienc& of giving 12.6 Aol!mes in the economics of giving, altr!ism and reciprocit& Appendi2 to *ection 1, &he -oint giving theorem References and @i.liography 14.2 6nterferences with altr!istic giving3 general view

%able $. .otives for non8altr!istic giving Foreword ?ove, :!stice, and compassion move people, allocate goods, and str!ct!re societies. Families B the instit!tions for love B form and endow children, th!s creating most of acc!m!lation and growth. 90change and mar"ets rest on the respect of rights and r!les, m!ch of which is spontaneo!s. Compassion alleviates miseries collectivel& thro!gh the s!pport of p!blic aid, and individ!all& thro!gh private and organi1ed charit&. Aoting and political action are importantl& motivated b& views of the common good, the p!blic interest, and fairness, and the& determine the high level of ta0es paid. All organi1ations re7!ire some m!t!al aid and tr!st among their members. Aario!s associations are created with the main or sole p!rpose of acting together or en:o&ing each other. ?ife in societ& and its 7!alit& re7!ire the respect of others and their rights, basic fairness, and readiness to help. %he 7!est for self8interest is often in fact that of means to give to one;s famil&, sec!re the respect of others, and sometimes help others or s!pport ca!ses. Citho!t the re7!ired concerns for others, self8interested interactions wo!ld prod!ce miseries, fail to wor" thro!gh e0change, and degenerate into wars of all against all. 6f &o! cannot ma"e good literat!re with good sentiments,# as AndrD +ide wrote, &o! can hardl& ma"e good economics with onl& poor ones. .an is neither angel nor beast.# Altr!ism, giving or respecting, and reciprocities B i.e., answering a gift with another gift B are h!man roc"s on which societies are b!ilt.# (.. .a!ss). 1 %his incl!des their econom&. %his topic wo!ld have to become the new frontier of economics, were it not, in fact, its oldest concern and tradition. 9conomics has alwa&s st!died altr!ism and giving, with landmar"s in wor"s of Adam -mith, =ohn -t!art .ill, Esidro 9dgeworth, Ailfredo )areto, ?Don Calras, or )hilip Cic"steed, for instance. %hese st!dies inc!rred an !ps!rge in the last third of the 24th cent!r&, notabl& with anal&ses of interdependent !tilities# motivated b& affection, compassion, or a sense of :!stice, and of reciprocities. Altr!ism also relates to the field of normative economics and social choice# since caring abo!t the 7!alit& or fairness of societ& implies caring abo!t other persons. %hese st!dies seem to have proved that the general concepts and methods of economic anal&sis can be ver& helpf!l for the st!d& of altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit&, provided that the relevant motives, sentiments, and t&pes of relations are ade7!atel& considered. %he present introd!ctor& chapter aims at providing the necessar& basis for the economic anal&sis of altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit&. 6ts core is the second of its three parts, which presents the vario!s t&pes of altr!ism and of giving, whose specification is necessar& for !nderstanding the phenomena !nder consideration. %he third part foc!ses on the normative implications of altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit&, and on historical landmar"s of
1

Essay on the Gift, 1'2*.

* their anal&sis. %he first part presents main iss!es abo!t the economics of altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit&. %his first part presents, in partic!lar, the social importance and the scope of the vario!s "inds of relations of giving and altr!ism (-ection ')F the vario!s str!ct!res of altr!istic concerns for others and of their interdependences (-ection $)F the motives and str!ct!res of non8altr!istic giving (-ections / and 6)F an o!tline of the 7!estion of reciprocities (-ection 8)F the iss!e of the efficient crowding o!t of altr!istic :oint giving b& transfers of p!blic aid (-ection 2)F the reactions of giving to transfers, and in partic!lar the 7!estions of intergenerational transfers thro!gh be7!ests and the p!blic debt, and of giving ind!ced b& redistrib!tion (-ection 14)F the relation between selfish and altr!istic motives and cond!cts (-ection 11)F and the origin of altr!ism (-ection 12). Altr!ism and giving have man& different t&pes which, however, divide into main categories. Altr!ism is hedonistic (or nat!ral), or normative. edonistic or nat!ral altr!ism incl!des affective altr!ism (affection and the milder s&mpath&), p!re hedonistic altr!ism which is either empath& or emotional contagion, and moral hedonistic altr!ism which incl!des compassion and pit&. 5ormative altr!ism refers to int!itive# moral val!es and norms, to non8 moral social val!es and norms, and to rational moral principles (e.g., impartialit& and :!stice, !niversali1ation s!ch as GantHs, or p!tative reciprocit&). All t&pes of altr!ism can motivate giving and helping. Eet, giving and helping can also res!lt from other motives, which are to obe& intrinsic norms or to ind!ce vario!s social effects, or are more p!rel& self8interested. %he social effects of giving can consist of :!dgments or sentiments (praise, esteem, stat!s of virt!o!sness, gratit!de, affection), social sit!ations (giving can res!lt from or create both a higher or lower stat!s), and social relations (peace, goodwill, agreement, friendship, li"ing, and en:o&ing the social interco!rse). +iving can also favo!r the self interest of the giver thro!gh vario!s effects which can be ret!rn8gifts, rewards of vario!s origins, conse7!ences of stat!s, or indirect effects thro!gh mar"ets or political or other social processes. %he most important effect of altr!ism is probabl& the respect of other persons and their rights and properties, which co!ld not s!fficientl& and well be sec!red onl& b& self8defence and the police. %his permits peace, social freedom defined b& this respect B it is the basic social ethic of o!r societies B, and the general amenit& of societ&. %his respect is in partic!lar a condition of a wor"ing mar"et s&stem. .oreover, f!rther norms of cond!ct and reciprocities provide the spontaneo!s correction of vario!s mar"et fail!res and of similar potential deficiencies of organi1ations (&et, coll!sions and reciprocities also sometimes create mar"et fail!res). Families constit!te of co!rse a prominent field of displa& of the sentiments and cond!cts !nder consideration. %he economic effects of be7!ests are partic!larl& important. Finall&, altr!istic care for alleviating miser& leads to charit&, which is important in some societies, and also to political s!pport of the large fiscal transfers where this motive associates with a sense of :!stice (and the large n!mber of !ncoordinated givers ma"es p!blic transfers a priori the efficient means).2
2

.an& 7!estions considered in this introd!ction have been disc!ssed with =ean .ercier Ethier, sometimes for a long time. =ean also read in detail and commented the te0t, in proposing man& improvements alwa&s relevant and often adopted. <emaining imperfections of all "inds can onl& show m& own limitations. 6 also want to e0press m& gratit!de to all contrib!tors of these vol!mes, for giving me the e0ceptional opport!nit& to read and comment their chapters, and for disc!ssions d!ring the two meetings which prepared this wor" and a previo!s research vol!me on the same topic ( The Economics

I GENERA !"ER"IE# $% &he economics of moral sentiments (ne of the best "nown and most often 7!oted of all te0ts is the first lines of the first boo" on societ& of the fo!nding father of economics, Adam -mith3 Chap. I Of Sympathy How selfish soever man may e suppose!, there are evi!ently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, an! ren!er their happiness necessary to him, thou"h he !erives nothin" from it e#cept the pleasure of seein" it. Of this kin! is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are ma!e to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often !erive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too o vious to re$uire any instances to prove it % for this sentiment, like all the other ori"inal passions of human nature, is y no means confine! to the virtuous an! humane, thou"h they perhaps may feel it with the most e#$uisite sensi ility. The "reatest ruffian, the most har!ene! violator of the laws of society, is not alto"ether without it. (The Theory of &oral Sentiments, )art 1, -ection 1, Chapter 1). -mith wo!ld probabl& want his remar" to appl& even to economists. owever, later economists wo!ld prefer to e0press it in a spirit of geometr&# rather than in -mithHs spirit of finesse# or s!btlet& (as Ilaise )ascal p!ts it). %he& wo!ld represent the higher or lower level of happiness of individ!al i b& the val!e of an ordinal !tilit& f!nction ui, and write the infl!ence emphasi1ed b& -mith as uiJui(u'i, #i), (1) where u'iJKu(L(i is the set of the levels u( for all individ!als (i, and #i denotes other factors of individ!al iHs happiness, incl!ding her own cons!mption.$ %he !niversal sentiment described b& -mith ma"es each ui be an increasing f!nction of each u( for all (i, partic!larl& for low levels of u( representing individ!al (Hs miser&. -mith even sa&s that s!fficientl& high levels of u( for (i are necessar&# to individ!al i, which can probabl& be translated as necessar& for ui to have a s!fficient level. %he specific sentiment -mith has in mind does not even allow that some ui does not depend on some u(, b!t the infl!ence ma& have vario!s magnit!des. .alevolence, malice, scha!enfreu!e, env&, and even plain indifference to othersH pain or :o&, are other topics and are probabl& s!itabl& considered as pathologies of h!man sentiments.* owever, we sho!ld never forget that, as histor& teaches !s, it is also a fact that practicall& an& h!man being can ver& easil& "ill others if he has been s!fficientl& pers!aded that the& are different from him and no0io!s to his societ&. .an is capable, towards his fellow men, of the deepest love and the most admirable sacrifice, as well as entrenched hatred and the most atrocio!s cr!elt&, and an&thing in between. %his vol!me, fort!natel&, restricts its concern to altr!ism and giving B incl!ding reciprocit& that the social science classicall& defines as a set of related gifts.
of )eciprocity, Givin" an! *ltruism, 2444, ?ondon, .c.illan, for the 6nternational 9conomic Association). $ -ee Golm 1'66a. * %he economics of env& and other comparative social sentiments is presented in Golm 1''/.

%he main importance of altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit&, is that the& constit!te essential facts of societies, which "eep them together, are basic aspects of them, provide some of their main properties, and infl!ence all other aspects. %he& appear in general socialit& and the general respect of people and their rights, in families, in all gro!ps or comm!nities, in wor"s of charit&, and in and thro!gh political life and p!blic polic&. %he& are importantl& and sometimes cr!ciall& enlightened b& their economic anal&sis, and the& are essential in the wor"ing and performance of the economic s&stem. %he& both permit e0changes and remed& their vario!s fail!res. 9ven in "eeping to the most s!perficial aspect B n!mbers B, private charit& transfers some /M of +5) in the >-. owever, this :oint giving to the poor and need& people is a p!blic good and we will see that efficienc&, democrac&, consistenc&, and morals demand that it be reali1ed b& p!blic transfers3 this is indeed the case for several times this amo!nt in most co!ntries. .oreover, gifts to children in ed!cation and be7!est acco!nt for abo!t 84M of savings, and hence of investment, capital acc!m!lation, technical progress, and growth./ '% (otives for altruism and altruistic giving Altr!ism is the preference for the good of some other people in itself, and it also denotes acting in favo!r of this good for this motive. 6t has more ca!ses or reasons than noted in -mithHs introd!ction. -mith notes compassion and pity. e later mentions a sentiment which is a "ind of what we now call B after .a0 -cheler B empathy from imagining oneself in the place of the other person. e also s!ggests a conta"ion of emotions (-pino1a;s imitatio affectuum). %he term sympathy he emplo&s rather means nowada&s a wea" "ind of affection or likin" (altho!gh it is et&mologicall& 7!ite close to compassion). %he ind!ced emotions are generall& of a different nat!re and lower intensit& than those of the observed ones, &et in being similarl& agreeable or disagreeable and similarl& more or less intense. %hese effects constit!te he!onistic (or natural) altruism. owever, if these sentiments ma"e &o! desire the good of other people beca!se this a!gments &o!r pleas!re or diminishes &o!r displeas!re, as -mith has it, this is not a moral reasonF in partic!lar this is not a moral motive for helping other people. Eet, there also e0ist morals that ma"es &o! desire the good of other people, as some non8moral social norms can also do (the difference between both is in partic!lar revealed b& the sentiment ind!ced b& fail!re to abide b& the r!le3 g!ilt in one case and shame in the other)F these two t&pes of motives constit!te normative altruism. All these sentiments ind!ce &o! to help the other person or to give something to her when the cost is compensated b& the relief, pleas!re, or sense of moral or social properness that these sentiments ind!ce in &o! as a conse7!ence of the res!lting relief or pleas!re of the beneficiar&, or of other improvements in her sit!ation. owever, altho!gh empath&, compassion, pit&, s&mpath&, or affection, as ca!ses of altr!ism and giving, are not moral ca!ses, the& nevertheless are commonl& considered as moral in themselves. 6ndeed, morals demand not onl& that &o! help others b!t also, if possible, that &o! feel the corresponding altr!istic sentiment. %he& demand that &o! feel compassion or pit& and val!e that &o! show sincere s&mpath&. %he& occasionall& demand that &o! practice empath&. %he& demand that &o! both help and li"e other people in a wa& and intensit& that depends on the pro0imit& and t&pe of &o!r relation, in partic!lar in the famil& and in comm!nities of vario!s t&pes. 6n a more demanding version, however, morals demand, on the contrar&, that &o! both treat and li"e other people e7!all&, that is, that &o! behave :!stl& towards them. %he& also sometimes demand that &o! help and li"e some others, or all
/

-ee Gotli"off and -!mmers (1'81), and +ale and -cholt1 (1''*).

2 others, as &o!rself# (which is again :!stice), or even more than &o!rself B as A!g!ste Comte !nderstood the terms altr!ism# and altr!ist# when he introd!ced them. And man& gro!ps sociall& val!e that &o! ind!lge in emotional contagion. .orals incl!de :!stice and fairness B altho!gh non8moral social r!les also incl!de vario!s norms of fairness. +iving and e0change are the two "inds of free transfers, b!t giving also affects the distrib!tion of wealth, income, or cons!mption in societ&. +iving th!s elicits :!dgments of distrib!tive :!stice, and also the most ac!te conflicts among them. +iving to &o!r children, notabl& thro!gh be7!ests and ed!cation, res!lts from &o!r affection and &o!r right to freel& !se &o!r reso!rces, and &o!r parental love, &o!r right, and &o!r s!pport are all praised or approved of b& basic social and moral val!es. Eet, from the point of view of the beneficiaries, these grants are not allocated according to need, merit, or e7!alit&. Eo!r children onl& too" the pain to be born,# as Iea!marchais p!ts it. %his is the main so!rce of ine7!alit&, and the paragon of ine7!alit& of opport!nit&. I& contrast, giving to the need& people or to the poor satisfies basic needs and tends to red!ce ine7!alit& than"s to a free choice of the giver. An& sense of :!stice or fairness implies caring abo!t the good of other persons, that is, altr!ism. And an& consistent altr!ism towards several persons in a world of scarcities faces the 7!estion of distrib!tive :!stice. Conversel&, a sense of :!stice necessaril& implies altr!ism, even if &o! !se it to defend &o!r interest. 6ndeed, :!stice being impartial b& nat!re and definition, if &o! claim it for &o!rself it has to be for some ob:ective# reason which also applies or co!ld appl& to other people (note that if &o! ma"e !p this arg!ment for the sole p!rpose of defending &o!r interest, that is, &o! are a pharisian, this implies that &o! believe that it ma& have an infl!ence, and hence that some other people have the corresponding altr!ism). %his str!ct!re is basic for Adam -mith, who emphasi1es that impartialit& implies altr!ism B and empath& favo!rs impartialit&. e describes o!r capacit& to be impartial b& the s!ccessf!l image or concept of the impartial spectator# that each of !s harbo!rs in her breast.# =ohn -t!art .ill even sees all altr!ism as the res!lt of impartialit& (which, however, he sees as the restricted and problematic form of a !tilitarian val!ation of the s!m of !tilities). Eet, &o! appl& &o!r opinions abo!t :!stice or fairness sometimes in individ!al giving, b!t often in attempts to pers!ade b& disc!ssion and to infl!ence p!blic constraints thro!gh political participation. 6ndeed, :!stice or fairness often implies a constraint on some people and, in a state of law, the p!blic sector has the monopol& of the legitimate constraint on ad!lts (apart from self8defence). )% *tructures of altruism %he set of relations (1) for all i has ver& important conse7!ences and a few possible variants, which will shortl& be considered. 6ndivid!al i wants to give to individ!al ( in transferring goods from #i to #( if this s!fficientl& increases u( (pl!s other indirect effects) for overcompensating, in ui, the decrease of i;s goods in #i. %he interdependence of !tilities# shows that each individ!al;s happiness# (or !tilit& level) or cons!mption is, in economic parlance, an e0ternalit&# for each other, and a collective concern or p!blic good# for all others. A priori, this s!ggests that it sho!ld be a concern of the social, collective, political and p!blic level and sphere of action. %here is also m!t!al concern between individ!als (b!t this is not the standard concept or reciprocit& B shortl& considered B which relates either the gifts both wa&s or the f!nctions ui(u() and u((ui), rather than the levels of !tilit&, income or cons!mption). %he set of e7!ations (1) can be solved for the ui in giving uiJvi(#) where #JK#(L

8 is the set of the #( for all (.6 ?ow levels of altr!ism (ui depends little on u() ind!ce a !ni7!e sol!tion. owever, high m!t!al concerns (dependence between the ui) can lead to m!ltiple sol!tions s!ch that some are worse for ever&one than others, incl!ding among stable states when a d&namics of ad:!stment is considered B this prod!ces classical sit!ations in gro!ps s!ch as co!ples or families which are st!c" with m!t!all& created miser& or are engaged in d&namics of worsening relations (for instance with ui(u() and u((ui) for a co!ple).2 (ther reasons for the concern for others sometimes lead to different str!ct!res. .oral paternalistic# conceptions see the good of an individ!al in something other than her happiness, and conceptions of :!stice also often consider as relevant other items concerning an individ!al than her happiness. %hese reasons ma"e ui depend directl& on individ!al (;s cons!mption or sit!ation, sa& #(, and one can have uiJui(u8i, #) where #JK#(L is the set of #( for all (. %his can even become ui(#) if individ!al i is no longer directl& concerned with others; !tilities# or happiness u'i. Eet, a sentiment of comparative :!stice abo!t the distrib!tion of happiness B or of the social val!e of some e!demonistic aggregate B can ma"e individ!al i be concerned abo!t the set u of all u(, incl!ding ui, th!s leading to the forms uiJui(u, #i) or uiJui(u, #). Finall&, what ma& be relevant, concerning #i, is some concept of individ!al welfare of individ!al i, represented b& an inde0 wiJwi(#i) B )areto;s ophelimit&# B, or the income yi of individ!al i with which she freel& b!&s the goods she !ses. )ossibl& res!lting forms are uiJui(u8i,wi) solved as uiJvi(w) where wJKw(L denotes the set of the w( for all (, or directl& ui(w). %hese are partic!lar forms.8 Eet, the latter is proposed b& Ailfredo )areto in his article of 1'1$ Il &assimo !i utilit+ per una collettivit+ in sociolo"ia# (also reprinted as a long footnote in his Treatise of Sociolo"y and in &in! an! Society), and Esidro 9dgeworth had considered in &athematical ,sychic (1881) the partic!lar case of two individ!als and linear !tilities, u1Jw1Nw2 and u2Jw2NOw1.' Ioth a!thors note that, with increasing s!ch f!nctions ui, )areto efficienc& relative to the !tilities ui implies )areto8efficienc& relative to the ophelimities wi, b!t there are ophelimit&8)areto8efficient states that are not !tilit&8)areto8efficient. %his is described b& 9dgeworth as a shrin"ing of the contract c!rve# in the space of the goods in the #i. 5ow, competitive mar"ets sec!re )areto efficienc& with ophelimities onl&, whereas the ethicall& meaningf!l propert& is )areto efficienc& with !tilities. ence, competitive mar"ets sec!re this latter propert& solel& with some restriction on the distrib!tion of reso!rces, and the& ma& have to be accompanied b& the appropriate redistrib!tion.14 %he redistrib!tions that can have this effect can be favo!red at !nanimit&, than"s to altr!ism. Compassion, pit&, or a sense of :!stice !s!all& ma"e them redistrib!te towards the poorer and diminish ine7!alit&. )eople co!ld a priori decide this b&
6

%his sol!tion of the set of interdependent !tilities is disc!ssed in detail in Golm 1'66a (see also 1'8*a). 2 %hese m!ltiplicities, d&namics, and stabilit&, are anal&sed in Golm 1'8*a. 8 %he f!nction ui(u'i, #i) can be replaced b& ui(u'i, wi) when the ordering of instances of #i b& f!nction ui does not depend on the levels u( for (i. %he f!nctions ui(#) can be replaced b& ui(w) when the ordering of instances of #( for each ( b& f!nction ui depend neither on the #k for k( nor on i. ' )areto writes the relation in differential form !uiJai(!w(. owever he notes that the coefficients ai( are not constant and depend on the sit!ation. .oreover, he do!btlessl& considered these differential forms as integrable (&o! cannot climb !p the B smooth B hill of pleas!re# along non8integrable paths). 14 -ee also Golm (1'6$), Cinter (1'6'), Collard (1'2/), Archibald and @onaldson (1'22).

' direct agreement between themselves, b!t, generall&, their n!mber precl!des this sol!tion and, therefore, the redistrib!tion has to be made b& the p!blic sector (see -ections * and 2). )areto;s altr!ism with uiJui(w), or more general altr!istic forms uiJui(w8i, #i) where w8 iJKw(L(i is the set of the w( for (i, differ from the forms uiJui(u8i, #i) or uiJui(u8i,wi) b& the ass!mption that individ!al i derives no pleas!re from the pleas!re that other persons derive from the pleas!re of other persons, or that she finds this pleas!re of hers or of other people to be irrelevant for her choice ma0imi1ing ui. %his is at odds with the view of the apostle of the moralit& of pleas!re, =erem& Ientham, who asserts that the pleas!re that others derive from the pleas!re of others e0ists and sho!ld be co!nted. %hat is, however, for the social ethical p!rpose of ma0imi1ing the !tilitarian s!m which Ientham th!s ta"es as ui (whereas most modern !tilitarians wo!ld prefer the other alternative in !sing wi). Eet, )areto also considers a social ethical ma0imand above individ!als; !tilities or ophelimities. owever, he re:ects the s!m of !tilities beca!se we can neither compare nor add them, beca!se we ignore the ratio of !nits in which the& are e0pressed.#11 e th!s considers more general non8linear social welfare f!nctions# of the form -(u), th!s ass!ming the moral val!e of the pleas!re that people derive from the welfare of other people, if not from their pleas!re (&et, )areto had !sed a form .(w) in his Cours !/Economie ,oliti$ue (18'2), b!t this can be reconciled with his later view as being .(w)J-Pu(w)Q). ?argel& 7!oting )areto, Abram Iergson considers social welfare f!nctions# in insisting on the fact that the& represent the social ethical views of specific individ!als, be the& advisors,# officials,# or the economist,# and which are, with the previo!s notations, .i(w) (1'/*) or -iPu(#)Q (1'66) where i is the inde0 of one s!ch individ!al (this inde0 is e0plicit in the first reference and implicit in the second). %he first form!lation is also formall& a"in to the )aretian !tilit& of individ!al i. owever, the s!rest thing abo!t Iergson;s ma0imands is that the& intend to describe moral views. 5othing is said abo!t the place of individ!al i;s partic!lar satisfaction that she derives from her own cons!mption or from her children;s. 5evertheless, these f!nctions are increasing in all their arg!ments, which implies a t&pe of altr!ism of individ!al i. %his altr!ism is of the moral "ind, contrar& to the altr!ism described b& Adam -mith as deriving from empath& or emotional contagion (that which he calls s&mpath&#) and is of a hedonistic# or nat!ral# "ind B &et, -mith also later anal&ses d!t& .12 Finall&, one can consider preferences abo!t income distrib!tion. owever, this has to be :!stified, notabl& with respect to two essential iss!es (see Golm, 1'66a). First, the incomes in 7!estion sho!ld be defined when reso!rce !ses are variable and notabl& in the common case where the& incl!de earned incomes and labo!r can var&. -econd, the set of )areto8 efficient income distrib!tions is ver& large when most altr!isms are wea", which is the case in a large societ& (nations for instance). ence this concept is of little !sef!lness in itself for specif&ing the sociall& desirable distrib!tions. %herefore, one sho!ld consider more finel& individ!als; preferences abo!t the distrib!tive str!ct!re and their possible scope of consens!s, and normative sol!tions for specif&ing the desired distrib!tion. 6f individ!al i b!&s her b!ndle of cons!mption goods with income yi and a given price vector pi (which ma& a priori depend on individ!al i, for instance if one good is leis!re bo!ght in wor"ing less at a price which is individ!al i;s wage rate), then relation (1) can be written as
11

Cours !/Economie ,oliti$ue, 66, p.24. %he iss!e of the strong limitation of the logical possibilit& of !sing a !tilitarian s!m is presented in Golm 1''6, Chapter 1*. 12 All the reasons for being concerned b& other persons can be :ointl& present in Golm 1'66a.

14
R uiJ u i (u'i, yi, pi), and if this holds for all i a sol!tion of this s&stem (with the same disc!ssion as above) can be uiJvi(y, p), where yJKy(L is the set of the y(, and p is the set of the price R vectors pi. (ne ma& also have directl& uiJ u i (y, p) if individ!al i considers that individ!al ( is responsible, and hence acco!ntable, for the goods she b!&s with her income yi, and is acco!ntable for her tastes which enable her to derive satisfaction from her cons!mption. -imilar final forms can also res!lt from derived uiJvi(w) or direct uiJui(w) in writing the R (y , p ). 6n all cases, with constant prices p, one has indirect (<o&) ophelimit& f!nctions wJ w i i uiJ0i(y).

6f earned income is incl!ded, the income yi can for instance be that which, associated with a notional given labo!r, is considered b& individ!al i to be as good as her act!al pair of income and labo!r. 6t can be, in partic!lar, the leis!rel& e7!ivalent income# where the reference given income is 1ero. F!rthermore, in a large societ& where most of the corresponding altr!isms are wea" (most willingnesses to pa& for others; incomes (0iSy()S (0iSyi) are small B altho!gh nonnegative), the set of )areto8efficient distrib!tions y is ver& large. ence the interest of this propert& is 7!ite limited. %herefore, other criteria of the social val!e of distrib!tions y are necessar&. %hese criteria belong to principles of distrib!tive :!stice. ence, the forms 0i(y) led to the theor& of the comparison and meas!res of ine7!alities based on s!ch distrib!tional preferences, with the presentation of the meaningf!l properties of redistrib!tions, of their relations, and of people;s preferences abo!t them. Another sol!tion res!lted from the treatment of the distrib!tion y as a p!blic good for the individ!als (see -ection 16). %he simple fact of f!nctions 0i(y) and of !nanimo!sl& preferred redistrib!tions was also considered b& ochman and <odgers (1'6') and other st!dies.1$ All the specific motives and reasons to be concerned abo!t other people give specific str!ct!res to the f!nctions defined above. %hese str!ct!res have often remar"able properties and conse7!ences. -ome of these motives and reasons are be&ond the scope of the present vol!me, s!ch as the hostile sentiments of malevolence, malice, spite, and scha!enfreu!e, and the comparative sentiments which are negative with env&, :ealo!s&, and sentiments of inferiorit& or s!periorit&, and more ne!tral with preference for conforming or on the contrar& for distinction for oneself or for other persons, or preference for social !niformit& or diversit& per se.1* (ther social sentiments are on the contrar& closel& related to the present topic, s!ch as the sense of :!stice or fairness, whose str!ct!re has given rise to a partic!larl& ab!ndant literat!re.1/ 6n fact, a basic method in social ethics (called endogeno!s social choice#) consists of the determination of the str!ct!res of individ!als; preferences abo!t social states that are common to all members of a societ&.16 An important point is that individ!als; :!dgments of vario!s t&pes B s!ch as self8interested preferences and social ethical views B are sometimes independent and dis:oint in a str!ct!re of m!ltiple selves with vario!s possible
1$

.!sgrave (1'24), +oldfarb (1'24), Iergstrom (1'24), (lsen (1'21), Tec"ha!ser (1'21), F!rstenberg and .!eller (1'21), %h!row (1'21), .ishan (1'22), @al& and +iert1 (1'22), -cott (1'22), and others. 1* %he comparative normative principle of e7!it&# anal&sed in Golm 1'21a is related to env& and :ealo!s&. 9nv&, :ealo!s&, and sentiments of s!periorit& and inferiorit& constit!te a basis of the ta0ation of conspic!o!s cons!mption (Golm 1'21b). Eet, the f!ll anal&sis of the economics of comparative sentiments is presented (abo!t the case of env&) in Golm 1''/. 6t is in partic!lar shown how individ!al preferences can be la!ndered# or cleansed# from these sentiments in replacing notionall&, in !tilit& f!nctions for instance, the items of other people on which this sentiment bears b& the individ!alHs own corresponding item B th!s leading to env&8free preferences or !tilit& f!nctions.# 1/ -ee Golm 1'66a, -ections 6 and 2, and a general s!rve& in -ilber, ed. 2444. 16 -ee Golm 244*.

11 t&pes of relations between them, and sometimes incorporated in the same overall eval!ation. As an e0ample of the second case, for social ethical :!dgments that deem individ!als to be both responsible for spending their income in free e0change and acco!ntable for their capacities to be satisfied and other needs, the relevant variables are incomes y(, one can write R 0i(y)J 0 i ( y i , y ) where the second (vector8) arg!ment y is the ob:ect of the social ethical R eval!ation, and 0 i as f!nction of this arg!ment y is increasing for e0pressing benevolence, s&mmetrical for e0pressing impartialit&, possibl& a!gmented b& transfers from rich to poor (i.e. rectifiant,# hence -ch!r8concave with the s&mmetr&), var&ing in specific wa&s !nder specific changes of y, and so on. %he retained set of properties determines a specific str!ct!re for 0i, for !se in applications.12 %he above noted interdependences appl& to sets of individ!als constit!ting vario!s gro!ps or societies, of all possible t&pe and si1e, from the d&ad (sometimes a co!ple), small gro!ps (families or others), larger gro!ps (e.g. some organi1ation or categor& of people), nations (in which a large part of redistrib!tions motivated b& overall :!stice ta"e place), or the whole world. A specific model can describe p!re sentiments or mi0ed ones. 6n the latter case, the f!nctions incorporate the effect of the s&nthesis of their vario!s sentiments b& the individ!als (this can be smooth associations or compromises among desires or d!ties or the o!tcome of a tempest !nder a s"!ll# as Aictor !go p!ts it). %he f!nctions can be !sed for eval!ating the state of the societ& !nder consideration B possibl& for choosing p!blic action abo!t distrib!tion B, or for providing a step in e0plaining or forecasting the cond!ct of people, incl!ding in interactions, giving, or voting. owever, the models constit!ted b& the noted f!nctions e0pressing individ!als; concerns abo!t others are limited when ta"en b& themselves, and sho!ld be completed or incorporated in other models, in two essential respects concerning eval!ation and action, respectivel&. First, individ!als; eval!ation of the distrib!tion (of goods, incomes, welfare, or happiness) often depends on specific facts or acts, and often on the past, and the relevant variables or parameters have then to be introd!ced or made e0plicit when a more advanced anal&sis is so!ght or re7!ired. For instance, an individ!al ma& be tho!ght to deserve or merit some good, income, or satisfaction beca!se of specific acts or choices of hers (e.g., labo!r, effort). 6ndivid!al needs ma& be relevant and ma& have to be more e0plicit than onl& incorporated in the str!ct!re of !tilit& or welfare f!nctions (e.g., famil& si1e, health, age). An individ!al ma& be entitled to an income or a good beca!se she has earned it, or beca!se it has been given to her (basic social freedom or process liberalism). An individ!alHs concern abo!t others generall& depends on their social relation to herF it is in partic!lar more intense when the social distance# between them is shorter (e.g., famil&, e0tended famil&, belonging to the same gro!p of vario!s possible "inds, in partic!lar to the same nation). %he second iss!e is that individ!als act in different conte0ts, each of which mobilises a partic!lar set of sentiments and motives, with often a dominant (sometimes !ni7!e) sentiment. For instance, self8centeredness is dominant in mar"et e0changes (this is )hilip Cic"steedHs non8t!ism# B see -ection 11 below) altho!gh fairness, promise8"eeping and tr!th8telling also have important roles in these interactions. Families are the instit!tions for love and giving, altho!gh the& displa& also all other possible "inds of social sentiments. Charit& is s!pposed to be motivated b& pit&, compassion, and solidarit& altho!gh we will see that if the& were the onl& motives, private charit& sho!ld be replaced b& p!blic transfers. %he variet& of motives at wor" in the political and p!blic sectors incl!de some altr!ism and sense of :!stice, notabl& in
12

-t!dies that !se specific str!ct!res of f!nctions 0i witho!t :!stification, hence arbitrar& str!ct!res, prima facie transmit this shortcoming to their concl!sions.

12 militanc& and to some degree in voting (see -ection '.$). -olidarit& is often partic!larl& important within cl!bs and associations. ence, the effects of the vario!s t&pes of sentiments and attit!des towards other people and societ& are in a large part segmented among vario!s attit!des and t&pes of relations, altho!gh in each case other, possibl& second8order, sentiments often also pla& important roles. %his more or less segmented aspect of h!man life into vario!s activities, and of 7!estioning abo!t the world into diverse iss!es, gives practical relevance to the 7!estion whether an individ!al is B or is better represented as B a single, integrated self, or several selves, one for each activit& or 7!estion. 9ach s!ch self can be considered as endowed with one preference ordering or !tilit& f!nction. 9conomists tend to have a preference for the single, integrated self, who in partic!lar chooses among different alternatives possibl& in choosing or compromising among vario!s interests or val!es. owever, individ!als; social ethical val!es are often considered separatel&, b& a proper ordering of eval!ation f!nction. %his is probabl& the meaning of Iergson;s social welfare f!nction, and what the field of social choice calls individ!al val!es. =ohn -t!art .ill and ?Don Calras see the individ!al as either self8interested or altr!istic and moral according to the moments. And vario!s models foc!s on specific sentiments for anal&sis or application. +% Altruism and democracy, Altruistic -oint giving and its pu.lic implementation An improvement in individ!al (;s sit!ation #(, for instance an increase in her cons!mption or income, increases u( or w(, and hence also altr!istic ui for i(, possibl& with indirect effects in the first form!lation (ui depending on u'i), and it ma& also increase ui directl&. %his ma"es individ!al i give to individ!al ( if this effect overcompensates for her the corresponding loss and the worsening of #i. owever, as -mith emphasises in the second paragraph of the Theory, the increase in satisfaction that an individ!al derives from an improvement in another;s sit!ation is generall& lower than the increase in satisfaction she wo!ld inc!r if this improvement were in her own sit!ation.18 ence, this altr!ism does not generall& lead to gift giving, or it does onl& when the other is s!fficientl& miserable B and in a rather small amo!nt B or for the few people partic!larl& close to the giver s!ch as the members of her famil&. Eet, an individ!al;s happiness (u(), welfare (w(), or sit!ation (#(), and gifts that improve them, are a priori favo!red b& all other individ!als. %he& are p!blic goods# for them. ence, if these others co!ld agree that each gives to individ!al (, each co!ld find that her own contrib!tion is worth the overall improvement in #( or u(. %his individ!al contrib!tion ma& be small if the individ!als are n!mero!s. Act!all&, individ!als are ver& n!mero!s, and hence onl& ver& low degrees of altr!ism s!ffice. %he set of transfers wo!ld then be favo!red !nanimo!sl&. %he givers can implement this res!lt in ma"ing a collective agreement abo!t their gifts. As for an& other contract, this agreement wo!ld be enforced b& the legal s&stem and the p!blic force. owever, when the& are n!mero!s the& cannot, practicall&, enter into the necessar& contact and bargaining. %hen, it is a role of the p!blic sector to reali1e nevertheless this set of transfers !nanimo!sl& desired. As in the implementation of an& contract, each individ!al is forced to &ield her contrib!tion, altho!gh she prefers the whole set of transfers to its absence B if the contrib!tions of the other individ!als are given, she prefers to &ield less or not at all. I!t since there is no act!al contract, this forced contrib!tion appears as a ta0. 6n this choice, the p!blic sector can either tr& to ma"e o!t what the collective agreement wo!ld have
-mith interestingl& e0plains that individ!al i tends to consider the f!nction uiPu((#()Q as Uui(#() with V1, in p!tting herself in the other;s shoes# concerning her sit!ation (rather than also her propensit& to en:o& or s!ffer), and in disco!nting the intensit& of the effect.
18

1$ been if it were possible (this is a liberal social contract#), or introd!ce other conceptions of distrib!tive :!stice (since this is another of its f!nctions) (see -ection 16). ence, s!ch a s&stem of redistrib!tive ta0es can be !nanimo!sl& preferred to its absence. %hat is, its absence is not )areto efficient. 5ow, a democratic political s&stem normall& sec!res )areto efficienc&. For instance, even with the imperfect democrac& of o!r electoral competition, an& political program that is not )areto efficient can be defeated b& other possible programs at the !nanimit& of e0pressed votes, b& the ver& definition of this propert&. ence, a democratic political s&stem will reali1e the s&stem of redistrib!tive ta0es manifesting !nanimo!sl& desired altr!istic :oint giving. %he necessar& p!blic implementation of :oint giving has been noticed for a long time. For instance, )rivate charit& is ins!fficient beca!se the benefits from it accr!e to people other than those who made the giftW Ce might all of !s be willing to contrib!te to the relief of povert&, provi!e! ever&one else did. Ce might not be willing to contrib!te the same amo!nt witho!t s!ch ass!ranceW# And this :!stifies government action to alleviate povert&.# (.ilton Friedman, Capitalism an! Free!om, 1'62). ?ogic, in fact, goes f!rther than that, as we will shortl& see, since it concl!des that onl& government sho!ld alleviate povert& in a democratic, efficient, and altr!istic societ& (-ection 2). ence, when private giving to the poor is observed, either the motives are not altr!istic, or the societ& is not democratic and is inefficient (and the waste concerns aid to the neediest). 5one of these alternatives is r!led o!t, which shows a scope for both political and moral progress. 6n partic!lar, there are man& other possible reasons for giving to people in need than to alleviate povert& and s!ffering. -ome of these motives lead to e0actl& the same concl!sion3 efficienc& and democrac& re7!ire p!blic aid (for instance if the giver cares abo!t having the a!ra of an altr!ist in her e&es or in the e&es of other people and hence behaves li"e one, or if she cares specificall& abo!t her own contrib!tion B private gift pl!s redistrib!tive ta0 B beca!se the& constit!te her sacrifice for the poor). Eet, other motives permit private giving in democrac& b!t, then, the& are often rather immoral and inconsistent. All these possible motives are, indeed, varied. %here can simpl& be a norm for giving in itself, witho!t specific regard for the beneficiar&;s welfare provided the gift goes this wa&. %his norm can be moral, or onl& social in bowing to p!blic opinion. +iving ma& even be a tradition or a habit. %he individ!al ma& care abo!t :!dgments abo!t herself b& other people or b& herself. %his :!dgment can b!ild an image of the person. %his :!dgment, however, can foc!s on vario!s items. %he f!ll moral :!dgment is the praise for being an altr!ist. Eet, this ma& not s!ffice for s!fficientl& infl!encing the person;s motive, and th!s ind!cing her to act!all& become an altr!ist. %hen, the :!dgment can withdraw to the praise of behaving li"e an altr!ist, which ind!ces the same behavio!r and effects as if the person were act!all& an altr!ist. %he :!dgment ma& also foc!s on more partial items, and then it is rather inconsistent as a moral :!dgment. 6n partic!lar, it can appreciate the individ!al;s sacrifice in favo!r of the poor, that is her f!ll contrib!tion thro!gh private giving and ta0ation B we have seen that this fails to ind!ce giving. I!t the :!dgment can also emphasi1e the responsibilit& of the giver, and hence onl& her private gift, e0cept if the ta0 represents an implicitl& desired contrib!tion to the :oint giving B and then it again has to be added to the gift. .oreover, people ma& be motivated b& comparisons abo!t the private gifts or the total contrib!tions of themselves and of other people for several possible reasons s!ch as doing one;s fair share if others do theirs,

1* "eeping !p with others, imitation, conforming, distinction, competition in giving or contrib!ting, sentiments of inferiorit& or s!periorit&, env&, or :ealo!s&. %hese comparisons can be the direct view of the person or that of others; :!dgments abo!t which she cares. Finall&, gen!ine altr!ism can be associated with principles of cond!ct which avoids the free riding# of the :oint giving which ma"es ta0ation the efficient sol!tion. A classical s!ch principle is !niversali1ation in the famil& of Gant;s categorical imperative B give in imagining that ever&bod& does li"e &o!. Another case is that of altr!ism motivated b& p!tative reciprocit&#, that is the reasoning 6 help her beca!se she wo!ld have helped me if o!r sit!ations were perm!ted.# /% (otives and reasons for nonaltruistic giving .ore generall&, giving is vol!ntaril& inc!rring a cost for the good of someone else, b!t this ma& onl& be a means for another end. 6n partic!lar, one ma& give for eliciting self8 satisfaction, praise, gratit!de, esteem, admiration, li"ing, or love (Adam -mith emphasi1es the difference between the moral desire to be praiseworth& and the immoral or at best amoral desire to be praised)F for gaining an a!ra of generosit& in one;s own e&es and in the e&es of other persons whose :!dgment one val!esF hence for ac7!iring or maintaining s!ch a rep!tation or stat!s val!ed in itself or for the vario!s other advantages it ma& bestow or permit one to obtain. (ne ma& give for showing and proving one;s friendship, affection, li"ing or love, which tends to elicit or reinforce the desired friendship, affection, li"ing or love of the other person in ret!rn. 6 also often give in given circ!mstances simpl& beca!se the& feel the& have to do it, possibl& beca!se it is a tradition, in considering more or less the :!dgment of their conscience or of other persons, b!t also sometimes b& p!re habit and inertia. Eet, one also sometimes gives or helps to obtain tangible advantages b& indirect effects thro!gh man& possible t&pes of social processes incl!ding rewards from an organi1ation (possibl& a firm) or the famil& B when the aid is within s!ch a gro!p B or from an instit!tion (possibl& an official one)F effects of ind!ced redistrib!tionF political (for instance electoral) advantageF indirect mar"et effects (s!ch as thro!gh the effects of transfers on terms of trade classicall& disc!ssed in international trade)F and so on. 6n partic!lar, one ma& give for eliciting a ret!rn8gift in a reciprocit&F or for obtaining ret!rn8gifts from actors other than the initial receiver in a reverse reciprocit&# which is often presented as vastl& overcompensating the cost of the initial gift (b& Christianit&, <enD @escartes, and Adam -mith, for instance). 6n an& event, give and &o! will be given to# (?!"e). (ne ma& also give as a ret!rn8gift for eliciting a f!rther gift from the initial giver or from someone elseF for maintaining a social balance or fairness b& comparison with an initial giftF for showing gratit!deF or for rewarding generosit& or a deserving giver. .ore generall&, one ma& give to an& giver or benefactor, as an incentive to reiterate her action or as a reward for her merit or deservingnessF and therefore one ma& also give "nowing that one ma& be rem!nerated in this wa& for these reasons. Eet, one ma& also simpl& give as a piece of information for showing and proving peacef!l intentions, or sentiments of friendship, affection, li"ing, love or gratit!de, or a desire to enter in a relation of an& "ind B and the gift ma& show and prove the generosit&, wealth or abilit& of a possible partner, or the 7!alit& of a s!ppl& (sample). %he gift can also onl& be a wa& of drawing information from the reaction, concerning the receiverHs attit!de, intention, or means. )eople th!s give to p!t an end to a disp!te, concl!de a bargaining, seal an agreement, an alliance, or a !nion, and establish or maintain good social relations. %hese gifts can be mere s&mbols of the intention of the giver or be tangible in proving, b& their cost, the sincerit& of the giver. %he acceptance of the gift means accepting the relationship. -!ch gifts are often

1/ both wa&s, and then sometimes materiall& identical. %hese gifts are varied, from pens and pins to wives and cities, in passing b& the m!t!al gifts of identical rings, drin"s, or receptions. )eople also sometimes give for the mere interest of the relationship in the process of giving and receiving. A gift can also soften a hostile attit!de. Eet, one classicall& gives both for showing a s!periorit& over the receiver and on the contrar& for manifesting oneHs s!bmission towards herF and for glorif&ing the receiver or on the contrar& for h!miliating her (for instance in s!ggesting that she is !nable to ta"e care of her needs or of her famil&Hs). (ther gifts intend to ma"e the receiver morall& indebted towards the giver (for the stat!s in itself or for the possibilit& of demanding some service in ret!rn later on), or the& intend on the contrar& to redeem and erase a pending moral debt. (ne ma& finall& give for doing oneHs fair share in giving given that other contrib!tors do theirsF for conforming to othersH giving in a similar sit!ation of the giver and of the circ!mstancesF for "eeping !p with other giversF for not being h!miliated or ashamed b& giving less or not at allF or on the contrar& for eliciting the admiration, possibl& the env&, or even the shame or h!miliation of those who give less or not at allF and for maintaining or con7!ering a relative stat!s in generosit& or wealth, hence possibl& in engaging in conspic!o!s competitive giving (where the gifts are either !sed as in p!blic f!nd8raising operations or )ap!an pig8feasts, or destro&ed as in the potlatch). ence, the variet& of forms of the giving wa& of allocating reso!rces is bewildering. +ifts are provided with ver& different aims, and sometimes strictl& opposite ones. %he& range from the most genero!s sacrifice to being the instr!ment of social sentiments and relations among the most odio!s, in passing b& the plain service of the giver;s self8interest. %he& also range from the most spontaneo!s and even almost !nconscio!s act to res!lting from the most elaborate pondering and strategies. %he& are both the proof of sincerit& and the classical vector of h&pocris& and treachero!s lies. %he& are the free single transfers, b!t are also sometimes insistentl& demanded b& strong social norms. %he& a priori concern two persons, b!t the& are often imbedded in networ"s of social relations. %he& loo" plainl& material, b!t their real nat!re is often in fact, rather, affection, demand of affection, gratit!de, 7!er&, ac7!iescence, confirmation, promise, vainglor&, or spite. %he variet& of the giving relationship is matched b& its pervasiveness and cr!cial importance in societ&, as -ection ' will show. 9ven the main field of economics, mar"ets and e0change, when caref!ll& anal&sed, reveals the essential role of motives that are not self8interest, and hence conscio!sl& favo!r other people often as the res!lt of moral or social normative cond!cts. 6ndeed, first, man& relations of mar"et, e0change, agreement, and cooperation thrive in spite of the presence of classical ca!ses of mar"et fail!res which sho!ld have inhibited them, than"s to the role of vario!s moral cond!cts s!ch as honest&, tr!th telling, promise "eeping, fairness, reciprocit&, tr!st and tr!stworthiness, respect, and benevolence. %his permits them to overcome costs and impossibilities in information and comm!nication, e0cl!sion and constraining, bargaining and transaction, and establishing and enforcing contracts, which ind!ce imperfect contracts, incomplete mar"ets, missing agreements, and free8riding p!blic goods (bargaining is often concl!ded onl& than"s to a fair compromise, or is replaced b& fair arbitration, and &o! often prefer a fair deal to a good dealF vario!s contrib!tions to p!blic goods and collective action are m!ch higher than p!re self8interest leads one to e0pectF most opport!nities to steal and cheat are not sei1edF and so on). -imilar virt!es are essential in the life of firms and other

16 organi1ations, between members and between them and the firm, and the& are powerf!l factors of their efficienc&. -econd, on the contrar&, these behavio!rs also interfere with the efficient price s&stemF for instance, vario!s iss!es of fairness in the labo!r mar"et, among emplo&ees or between emplo&ees and emplo&er, constit!te a main ca!se of wage rigidities and hence of macroeconomic problems. (ther behavio!rs infl!enced b& norms and stat!s, or see"ing stat!s or relative positions, also depart from standard economic models. %hird, vol!ntar& altr!istic respect of propert& and rights is a condition sine $ua non of the ver& e0istence and wor"ing of mar"ets (self8defence is costl& and often impossible, and the police is costl& and co!ld not be s!fficientl& present, informed, and effective). 0% &he structure of nonaltruistic giving 6.1 From motives to forms 5onaltr!istic giving is giving for a final reason other than the receiverHs good, or not onl& for this motive. %he choice of the gift b& the giver can again be described b& the ma0imi1ation of a !tilit& f!nction (or, more generall&, b& finding the best possible element of a preference ordering), altho!gh the interesting part is often the ps&chological, social or philosophical anal&sis of the motives and of their properties and relations with other facts.1' ?et ui denote an ordinal !tilit& level and f!nction of individ!al i, 1i the initial endowment of goods of individ!al i, and "i( a gift from individ!al i to individ!al (. 1i and "i( are defined as vectors of 7!antities of goods (or services) in the space of the 7!antities of goods (the& can in partic!lar be one8dimensional, notabl& meas!red in mone& as an income or wealth and an income transfer, b!t this does not fit for all the cases). After the transfer of the gift "i(, individ!al i has the allocation #iJ1iB"i(, and individ!al ( has the allocation #(J1(N"i(. 6f individ!al i is concerned abo!t her gift "i( onl& beca!se she has altr!istic sentiments (in addition to self8 interest), she chooses "i( that ma0imi1es ui(#i,#(,W)Jui(1iB"i(, 1(N"i(,W) where ui depends on #( for the more or less direct or indirect reasons noted in -ection $. 6f individ!al i ma& give to individ!al ( for other reasons, she chooses "i( that ma0imi1es ui(1iB"i(, "i(, Si) where Si is the set of all relevant variables and parameters other than the first two arg!ments of the f!nction. 6f individ!al i has also some altr!istic motives towards individ!al (, Si incl!des #(J1(N"i(. %he vario!s motives for giving "i( are related to vario!s elements of the set Si. For instance, if "i( is a ret!rn8gift of a reciprocit&, Si incl!des a gift "(i from individ!al ( to individ!al i. 90tended reciprocities# ma"e Si incl!de "ki for some ki or ( in the case of a generali1ed reciprocit&# (&o! tend to help if &o! have been helped, even b& someone else, which is the classical helping behavio!r# of social ps&chologists), or "(k for some ki or ( in the case of a reverse reciprocit&# (&o! tend to help meritorio!s people who help others, a case emphasi1ed b& the philosopher <enD @escartes and b& Adam -mith). %he noted motives of comparative fairness in contrib!tion, conforming, or comparative stat!s in generosit& and competitive giving, ma"e Si incl!de "k( (or "k if is another receiver) for at least one ki or (.
1'

6n partic!lar, norm following can be represented in this wa&. A practicall& imposed norm shows b& a "in"& str!ct!re of the preference ordering. .oreover, most norms can be more or less obe&ed, and this choice can be represented with the ordering. -ocial opinion can be an e0plicit or implicit factor of the ordering. %he preference can also bear on the t&pes of social relations and modes of interaction (this is for instance a central feat!re in the theor& of reciprocit&).

12

5ote that ui is a priori an increasing f!nction of "k( if individ!al i has altr!istic sentiments towards individ!al ( and hence appreciates higher endowments of individ!al ( 1(N"k( or 1(N"i(N"k(, b!t that ui tends to be a decreasing f!nction of "k( if individ!al i is motivated b& giving "i( for conformit&, comparative stat!s, or competitive giving in comparison with "k(. 6n all cases, what ma& matter are gifts in relation to the wealth of givers or receivers (which can e0press a relative sacrifice of the giver or a relative contrib!tion to the receiverHs wealth), and the form!lation allows this in incl!ding the relevant wealths in the set Si. 6ndivid!al i is sometimes also motivated b& her image as giver, in the e&es of other persons or in her own e&es, and b& the associated :!dgment and stat!s. Adam -mith e0plains this own eval!ation of oneself b& empath& of the view of other persons :!dging oneself (or of the view of the impartial spectator). A priori, one ma& praise or critici1e oneself witho!t this deto!r. owever, we will see that in the present case it practicall& happens to be necessar& B i which shows the depth of -mithHs insights. At an& rate, one can denote as I k the image of
i individ!al i in the e&es of individ!al k, and as I i = I k

{ }

i the set of the I k for all individ!als

k. For kJi, I ii is individ!al iHs image of herself. 6ndivid!al iHs images as giver to individ!al ( depend on the gift "i(, I = I ( " i( ) . (ne partic!lar s!ch image of individ!al i is that of the receiver (, I i( , related to the beneficiar&Hs gratit!de (or resentment if she finds that "i( does not match her e0pectations). A concern of individ!al i abo!t her relative stat!s as giver can be represented either b& the incl!sion of "k( (or "k) for other individ!als k among the factors of the images of herself I i , or directl& b& the incl!sion of I k for ki as arg!ments of individ!al iHs !tilit& f!nction. %his f!nction then is ui(1iB"i(, I i , Si) or ui(1iB"i(, I, Si) where IJ {I i } is the set of the images I i of all individ!als i, and Si is the set of other relevant arg!ments (one of them is #(J1(N"i( or 1(Nk"k(, according to the case, if individ!al i also has some altr!istic sentiment towards individ!al (). 6n some cases, the gift "i( has indirect effects providing an e0tra allocation yk("i() to individ!al k (which can notabl& be i or (). %hese indirect effects can have a n!mber of origins B economic, social of vario!s t&pes, etc. B disc!ssed in forthcoming -ection 1/.$ (notabl& concerning yi("i()). %he yk are again vectors of 7!antities of goods, possibl& red!ced to a one8 dimensional mone& or income, and with the possibilit& of negative coordinates for describing a loss. %hen, in the foregoing form!la, 1i'"i( has to be replaced b& 1i'"i(Nyi("i() (and 1(N "i( b& 1iN"i(Ny(("i()). %he vario!s possible origins of the yk incl!des the well8st!died effects thro!gh mar"ets, rewards of vario!s origins, and so on, b!t yi("i() can also be (or incl!de) a ret!rn8gift provided b& individ!al (, yi("i()J8y(("i()J"(i("i() where the last notation denotes the ret!rn gift. 6n a n!mber of cases, yi can overcompensate the loss of the gift "i( and th!s ma"e giving profitable for the giver from a strictl& self8interested point of view. 6.2 Contradiction and possibilities in the logic of motives owever, &o! cannot give onl& to be praised or praiseworth& as an altr!ist, or for a moral action, or in order to have an image or a stat!s as a moral person, beca!se ob:ectives of being praised or being praiseworth& are not moral in themselves, whereas a moral action re7!ires a moral intent, and an& altr!ism re7!ires see"ing the good of the receiver in itself. 9ven simpl& giving in order to be a moral person B and not onl& to act li"e one B ma& not be possible
i i

18 beca!se this is not a moral ob:ective in itself (&o! sho!ld, also, manage to direct &o!r intention towards a moral aim). Eet, acting with a res!lt that helps someone when this is not the final ob:ective can nevertheless deserve some praise, b!t with a lower stat!s and intensit&. %his approval can be stronger if this action is costl& to the actor, as with giving. 6ndeed, even if it is not a vol!ntar& act, a sacrifice that entails benefits for others can elicit positive consideration. .oreover, the nonmoral motive of vol!ntaril& helping someone else ma& nevertheless be normative, b!t in following a nonmoral social norm. %his is the "ind of cond!ct the breach of which elicits shame rather than g!ilt. %hen, the :!dgment of other persons is of primar& importance (&o! sho!ld be ashamed of not helping &o!r brother#), altho!gh it ma& sometimes be onl& imagined (this is the case in -mithHs conception of empathi1ing the imagined :!dgment of other individ!als B or of the impartial spectator B abo!t oneself). Finall&, &o! ma& tr& to deceive other people in pretending to have gen!inel& moral motives, b!t this is specificall& against morals, and it re7!ires again other persons (in a personal, not anon&mo!s, gift, there is at least the receiver, b!t this is onl& one person and often of too low a stat!s to be of importance in this role). 6n all these cases, the contradiction ma& be soften if gen!ine moral altr!ism is one of &o!r motives, along with see"ing praiseworthiness, praise, image, or stat!s. owever, cognitive dissonance tends to ma"e this coe0istence of opposite motives ps&chologicall& !nstable, and sincere benevolence tends to deteriorate the possibilit& of efficient :oint giving B as we will now see. 1% &he inefficiency of individual giving when -oint or pu.lic giving is possi.le, the perple2ing -oint giving theorem =oint altr!ism where several individ!als want the good of the same individ!al(s) is notabl& important for helping the people in need or poor. Ce have seen in -ection * that in these cases efficienc& re7!ires :oint coordinated giving which, when the givers are n!mero!s, is achieved b& transfers of the p!blic sector. As we recalled, .ilton Friedman has admitted that this is a case where p!blic transfers can be :!stified. Eet, a simple theorem sa&s, more precisel&, that )areto efficienc& precl!des the ver& e0istence of individ!all& chosen givings, s!ch as private charit&, and all the transfers sho!ld be thro!gh p!blic ta0es and s!bsidies. %his also holds when the potential givers are not onl& altr!ists in caring for the welfare of the aided people, b!t care also, or onl&, abo!t their own total contrib!tion to them (gift and ta0) in itself, for an& of the motives noted in the previo!s section, s!ch as see"ing praise or praiseworthiness, or image or stat!s in oneHs e&es or in the :!dgment of other persons. (%his also holds when givers care for all povert& b!t speciali1e in the aid of some persons B the& have their poor#). %he Appendi0 at the end of this Chapter shows this :oint giving theorem,# and its vario!s res!lts which are simpl& mentioned here.24 %his theorem sho!ld be compared to facts. )rivatel& decided charitable giving acco!nts for abo!t /M of +5) in the >-A. 6t is ver& m!ch lower in 9!rope. 6n both places, p!blic transfers of aid are s!bstantial. %he& are clearl& higher in 9!rope. Ce have remar"ed above that democrac& implies )areto efficienc& (-ection *). ence, the :oint giving theorem, b& itself, s!ggests the starting and startling concl!sion that B possibl& contrar& to appearances B Cestern 9!ropean societies are less wastef!l and more democratic than the >-. And the waste is first of all in the aid to the poor and need&. Fort!natel&, however, a ne0t section of the theorem has it that an individ!al privatel& chosen giving can be consistent with )areto efficienc& (and hence democrac&) if this individ!al cares for her private gift specificall&, and not onl& beca!se it is a part of her
24

A f!ller anal&sis is provided in Golm 244/.

1' contrib!tion (along with her ta0es that aid the need&) which she wo!ld val!e in itself or beca!se it helps the need& or both. owever, if this person is to be appreciated beca!se of her sacrifice (in favo!r of the need&), it is her whole sacrifice that co!nts, her ta0 pl!s her individ!al gift. %hen, to single o!t the private gift is irrational, and the alternative to lac" of efficienc& and of democrac& is irrationalit&. .oreover, disting!ishing one;s own gest!re for boosting one;s image in one;s own e&es B =im Andreoni;s warm glow# B, or in the e&es of other people B that is, for showing off and vainglor& B is hardl& moral. %his wo!ld also hold for disting!ishing one;s own total contrib!tion (ta0 incl!ded) from its effect on the overall welfare of the beneficiaries, b!t private giving ma& be singled o!t beca!se one;s ta0es are less visible to other people, distrib!tive ta0es are most often mi0ed with general ta0es for all p!rposes, or private responsibilit& is val!ed in itself (whereas it is the total contrib!tion that helps the need&). At an& rate, high private giving reveals either shamef!l waste and a lac" of democrac&, or irrationalit& and immoralit&. .oreover, again, this waste is notabl& in the aid to the poor and need&. And the degree of immoralit& is s!ggested b& still another res!lt of the :oint giving theorem3 on average, an e0tra gift is provided 2 million times more for the glor& of the giver than for the relief of the poor, where 2 millions is the pop!lation of the co!ntr&. 5ote also that if these distrib!tive ta0es are comp!ted as the amo!nt that the pa&er wo!ld have agreed to pa& in an agreement with her co8givers, then the pa&er is also p!tativel& responsible for its amo!nt, there is no reason to disting!ish it from the private individ!al gift (see -ection 16./), and then the e0istence of private giving implies waste and absence of democrac&. owever, the individ!als are sometimes concerned not onl& abo!t their own specific gifts, b!t also abo!t those of other people, notabl& for comparison. %he& wo!ld for instance env& the generosit& of people who give more than the& do, or feel inferior to them, or on the contrar& the& wo!ld feel s!perior to those who give less than the& do. %hese are hardl& nicer sentiments, and hence it is reass!ring that this concern ma"es no difference for the above res!lts. Eet, there is a difference if s!ch concerns are not abo!t the specific gifts of the individ!als b!t are abo!t their specific contrib!tion (gift pl!s ta0), which is more rational B in so far as env& and sentiments of s!periorit& are rational. %hen, indeed, another piece of the :oint giving theorem sa&s that an individ!al can give in efficienc& if the env& (or sentiments of inferiorit& or s!periorit&) towards her are not lower than her altr!ism, on average. (f co!rse, other facts can intervene, three categories of which can be noted here. First, there are other sentiments comparing individ!als; contrib!tions or gifts, which have the same effect ass those noted b!t not the same moral implications. 6ndeed, these comparisons can be motivated b& sheer imitation or desire to conform (desire for distinction ta"es !p bac" to the previo!s cases), or b& the desire to do one;s share if other people do theirs. 6n these cases also, higher contrib!tions or gifts b& the others is costl& for the person. -econd, altr!ism can be associated with or res!lt from other moral reasons which lead one to give irrespective of others; contrib!tions, s!ch as the noted !niversali1ation and p!tative reciprocities (see -ection 1$.$.$).21 %hird, fiscal modes can intervene. %a0es are generall& not l!mp8s!m (with the res!lting disincentive effects and the waste of the b!rden of ta0ation# which :eopardi1es )areto efficienc&). )rivate donations can be ded!ctible from ta0es (the part so recovered can be considered as belonging to the p!blic transfer) or matched b& p!blic s!bsidies. %a0es for aid can be singled o!t or p!blic aid can be financed o!t of general ta0ation. All these iss!es are the ob:ect of specific anal&ses. 3% Reciprocities
21

And, for a f!ll presentation, Golm 244/.

24

.1 !n overvie" A gift or favo!r motivated b& another gift, for instance the ret!rn gift of an initial gift, constit!tes the ver& important social relation of reciprocity. %his is ver& different from a self8 interested e0change where each transfer (or favo!r) is provided !nder the condition that the other is provided, and hence is not a gift (in the proper sense of the term). <eciprocit& has three t&pes of motives, which can be mi0ed. Ialance reciprocit&# aims at maintaining a balance between both gifts (sometimes from a sentiment of fairness), or at avoiding moral indebtedness. 6n li"ing reciprocit&# the ret!rn8gift is provided beca!se the initial receiver li"es the initial giver, either beca!se she receives this gift provided with benevolence, or beca!se she is li"ed b& the initial giver (then this is a reciprocit& of sentiments). owever, the ret!rn gift ma& also aim at ind!cing a f!rther gift B this is contin!ation reciprocit&.# Eet, this latter motive leads to a se7!ence of rec!rring transfers both wa&s, each of which aims at ind!cing the contin!ation of the relation, and which can be self8interested3 this se$uential e#chan"e is in fact a t&pe of e0change rather than reciprocit& proper (however, the last transfer cannot be self8interested if it is well foreseen). .oreover, be&ond the basic reciprocit& where B letters denoting agents B * gives to 3 entails 3 gives to *, one can observe and e0plain e0tended reciprocities# s!ch as generali1ed reciprocit&# where * gives to 3 entails 3 gives to C (as in the classical helping behavio!r# of social ps&cholog&), reverse reciprocit&# where * gives to 3 entails C gives to * (emphasi1ed, as we have recalled, b& the philosopher <enD @escartes and b& Adam -mith), chain reciprocit&# where * gives to 3 who gives to C who gives to 4, etc., and general reciprocit&# which is a reciprocit& between an agent and societ& in general or the set of others (perhaps +. . .ead;s generali1ed other#). 6n replacing giving (or favo!ring) b& its opposite, harming, balance reciprocit& and contin!ation reciprocit& have co!nterparts in revenge and in retaliation for deterrence (altho!gh deterrence stops the relation rather than e0tending it). owever, li"ing reciprocities have no s!ch co!nterparts since &o! do not tend to h!rt someone beca!se &o! disli"e her, or even to disli"e someone onl& beca!se she disli"es &o!. <eciprocit&, and revenge and retaliation, are called reciprocation# B the !nderstanding of the term reciprocit& retained here is that which has for long been classical and standard in the social science. <elationships of reciprocit& are pervasive and often essential. %he general spontaneo!s respect of others and their propert& that is necessar& to the e0istence of a free and peacef!l societ& (with the aid of self8defence and the police), and in partic!lar to the e0istence of propert& rights and of a mar"et, is in fact a reciprocit& since people wo!ld not so respect others if the& were not so respected themselves (this is a general reciprocit&). Families, which have been s!ccessivel& modelled as a pater familias (Iec"er) and as an e0change (Chiappori), are in fact essentiall& a networ" of reciprocities B as the& are now modelled B with relations of other t&pes being more moments of this comple0.22 Ietween generations, in partic!lar, people give to their children given that their children will give to them and to their own children, and given that the& have received gifts from their parentsF and
22

-ee the chapter b& ?!c Arondel and AndrD .asson in this vol!me.

21 the& give to their aging parents given that their parents have given to them and to their own parents, and their children will give to them. %his b!ilds intergenerational reciprocities which are direct, or generali1ed and reverse chain reciprocities. (ther intergenerational chain reciprocities are fo!nd in the general acceptance, in man& societies, of pa&8as8&o!8go pension s&stems (the &o!ng, who will be financed b& the &o!nger, finance the old who have financed the older), and of the p!blic f!nding of ed!cation (ta0pa&ers, whose ed!cation has been financed b& the older, finance that of the &o!ng who will finance that of the &o!nger) B in both cases, there :ointl& is a generali1ed and a reverse reciprocit& (and there can also be a direct reciprocit& of pension for ed!cation). %he presence of reciprocit& constit!tes both a motivational and relational fail!re# of s&stems of mar"et and of command solel& based on self8interest, and the most common ca!se of spontaneo!s remed& to the other fail!res# of these s&stems d!e to diffic!lties in information, comm!nication, or coercion of all t&pes, as we will see. <eciprocit& is also t&pical of comm!nities of all "inds where the& occ!r both between members and between each member and the comm!nit& as s!ch or its instit!tions. Aol!ntar& contrib!tions to non8e0cl!dable p!blic goods are often favo!red b& the "nowledge that the other beneficiaries also contrib!te and do their fair share (in partic!lar, this often happens for :oint giving). -e7!ential m!t!al aid or transfers B which can depend, in partic!lar, on the specific needs of the receiver or means of the giver B are often possible onl& beca!se balance or li"ing reciprocit& motivates the last transfer (and, hence, it also certainl& is one of the motives of previo!s acts). <eciprocit& in tr!st B which is favo!red b& the fact that tr!stworth& people tend to be tr!stf!l (the& tend to :!dge others from the sample of man"ind the& "now best, themselves) B has been shown to be a strong factor of economic efficienc& and prod!ctivit& at the level of firms or of c!lt!ral areas. Iargaining is often concl!ded and sealed b& reciprocal concessions. <eciprocit& of m!t!al help at the wor"place is widespread and often necessar& for its wor"ing and efficienc&. ?abo!r relations are conspic!o!s for occasional conflicts b!t are more often the seat of reciprocities in goodwill, benevolence, effort, and lo&alt&. All these relations entail reciprocit& e7!ilibria which differ from the competitive mar"et model. For instance, reciprocit& among wor"ers chec"s competition among them and creates downward wage rigidities. owever, sociops&chologists have for long anal&sed the fact that people often want to provide their pa&;s worth of labo!r (the e0periments of Adam (1'6$, 1'6/) and Adam and <osenba!m (1'6*) have given rise to m!ch disc!ssion, b!t there were others before, and there has been n!mero!s others later). %his cond!ct is the logical opposite of tipping3 a ret!rn gift of labo!r for pa& rather than a ret!rn gift of mone& for good service. %his cond!ct leads to an appearance of invol!ntar& s!bemplo&ment B this is +eorge A"erlof;s (1'82) theor& of efficienc& wages.# <eciprocit& also constit!tes an economic s&stem in itself, with vario!s possible scopes and e0tensions. .otives and relations of reciprocit& constit!te the ideal of the social movement of cooperatives. %raditional economies are essentiall& s&stems of reciprocit&, and sociall& s!ccessf!l development depends largel& on "eeping and rel&ing !pon specific relations and motives of reciprocit&. )erceptive anal&sts of economic s&stems classicall& retain the threefold division into mar"et e0change, command, and reciprocit&. Act!al societies are a mi0 of all three, in characteristic and varied proportions. <eciprocit& has been the central topic and concept of economic anthropolog& from its inception. Finall&, the political s&stem, and the vast allocation of reso!rces it commands, rests on important aspects of reciprocit&. )eople receive freel& the vast amo!nt of benefits provided b&

22 p!blic services. %he& s!pport politicians and vote for large ta0es. -tatesmen are s!pposed to act for the good of the people whose reciprocal s!pport rests on li"ing and gratit!de. Eet, this is a smaller part of the stor& for political men of lower ambition. .2 #$%man roc&s on "hich societies are b%ilt.' %he fact, the importance, the nat!re, and the vario!s t&pes of reciprocit& co!ld not have escaped Adam -mith3 Of all the persons, however, whom nature points out for our peculiar eneficence, there are none to whom it seems more properly !irecte! than to those whose eneficence we have ourselves alrea!y e#perience!. 2ature, which forme! men for that mutual kin!ness, so necessary for their happiness, ren!ers every man the peculiar o (ect of kin!ness, to the persons to whom he himself has een kin!. Thou"h their "ratitu!e shoul! not always correspon! to his eneficence, yet the sense of his merit, the sympathetic "ratitu!e of the impartial spectator, will always correspon! to it.# (The Theory of &oral Sentiments, )art A6, -ection 2, Chapter 1). %his giving to someone beca!se she has given to &o! was labelled reciprocit& in -mith;s time (b& .orell&,12//).2$ %his pervasive social cond!ct2* was claimed to be one of the h!man roc"s on which societies are b!ilt# b& .arcel .a!ss in his highl& infl!ential Essay on the Gift of 1'2*, and it has been since then a central e0planator& concept of the social science.2/ %his pair of favo!rs both wa&s thoro!ghl& differs from an e0change in the strict and proper sense B for instance a mar"et e0change B beca!se the two transfers are gifts, the& are given, hence, b& definition, each res!lts from an act that is free in isolation, whereas the transfers of an e0change are m!t!all& conditional, that is, each has to be performed b& e0ternal obligation (or promise "eeping) when the other is performed.26 -mith sees several motives as e0plaining reciprocit&. %angible reciprocit& is of beneficence,# b!t it rests on a reciprocit& of "indness. %his refers to both the action and the sentiment that motivates it. %he reciprocit& in sentiment can be described as 6 li"e people who li"e me.# -mith also notes both the gratit!de of the beneficiar& of the gift or "indness towards the first giver, and the merit of the latter. e also mentions the s&mpathetic gratit!de of the impartial spectatorF# the reference to the impartial spectator# s!ggests a reason of fairness. %his incl!des most of the motives for gen!ine reciprocit&. %he& fall into two categories. As we have seen, in likin" reciprocity the ret!rn gift is motivated b& li"ing the initial giver beca!se she provided a benevolent gift, andSor beca!se she li"es the initial
2$

-mith also occasionall& !sed the term reciprocit&. owever, whether he !ses it in this sense or onl& for describing self8centered e0change is a classical debate in smitholog&# (see, e.g., @anner, 1'2$). ?ater proper !ses incl!de )ro!dhon (5e manuel !u sp6culateur + la ourse, 18/$S18/2) and the anthropologist st!dent of Garl .enger %h!rnwald (e.g., 4ie Gemein!e !er 3anaro, 1'2*). 2* Cond!ct is behavio!r pl!s its motives. 2/ -ee Golm, 1'8*a. 26 Altho!gh the definition of reciprocit& in the social science is !nambig!o!s, some other disco!rses have !sed this vocab!lar& in all directions. -ome have seen e0change in the strict sense (as with mar"et e0change) as a t&pe of reciprocit&, while others have called reciprocit& a t&pe of e0change. %he basic iss!e is that disting!ishing the motivations is essential.

2$ receiver. %he latter reason is reciprocal likin", a reciprocit& in sentiment based on affection altr!ism. -mith emphasi1es that reciprocal li"ing is partic!larl& appreciated beca!se nothin" pleases us more than to o serve in other men a fellow'feelin" with all the emotions of our own reast.#22 %he initial gift can have the role of revealing the li"ing or of proving its intensit& (even if the initial giver gives in order to be li"ed as a res!lt of her gift or of her li"ing, her gift reveals how m!ch she wants to be li"ed, and ipso facto how m!ch she li"es, beca!se &o! want more to be li"ed b& someone the more &o! li"e her).28 %he second t&pe of gen!ine reciprocit& is alance reciprocity where the motive of the ret!rn gift is to maintain some social balance with the initial gift, sometimes for a reason of fairness. %his motive often incl!des a desire to avoid moral indebtedness. %he desire of balance or the preference for it is 7!ite primitive and basic, altho!gh people are more or less sensitive to it, depending on personalit&, c!lt!re, ed!cation, and social setting. 6t is to be compared with revenge and the desire for it, its co!nterpart in cond!cts of negative reciprocation. %he :!dgment of other people sometimes matter, b!t not alwa&s and not necessaril&. %he motive has an aspect of a norm for reciprocating or for avoiding moral indebtedness. 6t then belongs to normative altr!ism.2' %his also incl!des the desire of fairness when it is present. %his norm can have dimensions of inner demand or obligation, of a nonmoral social norm, and more or less of a moral norm.$4 %he social aspect is related to the :!dgment of other people, b!t this :!dgment can be imagined or become internali1ed. +ratit!de towards the giver both elicits or favo!rs li"ing her, and favo!rs providing a ret!rn gift with a sense of balance. %he giver;s merit, for her vol!ntar& sacrifice on behalf of the receiver, is a reason for providing her with a corresponding reward. owever, this rem!neration can be provided b& the initial receiver or b& someone else (incl!ding an instit!tion). 6ndeed, Adam -mith contin!es with3 2o enevolent man ever lost alto"ether the fruits of his enevolence. If he !oes not always "ather them from the persons from whom he ou"ht to have "athere! them, he sel!om fails to "ather them from other people.# e even specifies, 7!ite optimisticall&, an! with a tenfol! increase,# before concl!ding generall& that 7in!ness is the parent of kin!ness% an! if to e elove! y our rethern e the "reat o (ect of our am ition, the surest way of o tainin" it is, y our con!uct to show that we really love them.# %his giving to a giver b& agents who are not beneficiaries of the initial gift B the reverse reciprocit&# of the modern theor& of reciprocit& B had been emphasi1ed, in almost the same terms, b& the philosopher <enD @escartes one cent!r& earlier, with the same belief that, in the end, the initial giver will t!rn o!t to be better off.$1 %his relates to classical promises of religions, for ne0t lives or for this one (e.g., ?!"e3 give and &o! will be given to#). 6f a giver is aware of this res!lt, she ma& be tempted to give to obtain this final benefit. 6n this case, however, the gift wo!ld no longer res!lt from li"ing and be the acting part of "indness.

22 28

The Theory of &oral Sentiments, 14. A f!ll anal&sis of these motives, relations, and sentiments is provided in the chapter on reciprocit& in this vol!me. 2' %he norm of reciprocit&# is the title of a renowned st!d& of this topic b& Alvin +o!ldner (1'64). $4 -ee the distinctions in -ection 1$.$. $1 @escartes, 5etter to the 8ueen Christina of Swee!en, -orks, 6A.

2* Eet, among e0tended reciprocities,# this reverse reciprocit& is probabl& less important than the opposite generali1ed reciprocit&# b& which someone who has been helped tends to help others, even those who have not helped her in the first place. %his is the helping behavio!r# of social ps&cholog&, one of the most st!died and doc!mented of h!man cond!cts (these st!dies were especiall& motivated b& the intense debate following a m!ch p!blici1ed crime where none of the n!mero!s onloo"ers intervened or called for help).$2 An individ!al also sometimes gives or helps in ret!rn to his receiving a gift or help, in order to be given to or helped again, b& the initial giver or b& another agent, who then wo!ld be motivated, at least in part, b& the hope to receive again a f!rther ret!rn gift or help. %his leads to a rec!rrent se7!ence of gifts or helpings both wa&s, which occ!r b& themselves or in answer to the occ!rrence of some specific need of the receiver or means of the giver. %he motivations can be p!rel& self8interested or at least partiall& so. Chen the& are p!rel& self8 interested, the relation is b!t a se$uential e#chan"e, where each gives in order that the se7!ence contin!es. %his relation, however, is better classified as an e0change than as a reciprocit&, as far as the cr!cial iss!e of motivation is concerned. .( )he special games of reciprocit* Consider two individ!als i and ( engaged in a simple reciprocit& where the& respectivel& give "i( and "(i to the other, where these two items denote vectors of 7!antities of goods or services. 6ndivid!al i;s !tilit& f!nction is uiJui(1iB"i(N"(i, "i(, "(i, 1(N"i(B"(i), where 1i and 1( denote respectivel& individ!als; i and ( initial endowments of goods or services (the& are vectors of their 7!antities). %he first arg!ment manifests individ!al i;s self interest. %he last arg!ment can describe individ!al i;s altr!ism towards individ!al ( B then ui increases with the 7!antities of goods in this vector B, b!t it ma& also not e0ist (or again it can s!pport descriptions of individ!al i;s env&, sense of inferiorit& or s!periorit&, desire of distinction or of conformit&, and so on). %he pair of central arg!ments, "i( and "(i, can describe preferences abo!t the comparison of both gifts for reasons of balance, fairness, gratit!de, resentment (if the gift received is lower than e0pected), comparative stat!s, or competitive giving. %he presence of the second arg!ment "i( in itself can represent individ!al i;s d!t& or stat!s8see"ing. owever, if the reason for the d!t& or for the stat!s are morals or virt!e, it sho!ld in fact refer to the receiver;s benefit, hence to the last arg!ment 1(N "i(B"(i. Chen "(i is given, the f!nction "i(("(i) denotes the (a) "i( that ma0imi1es ui. -imilar concepts are defined for individ!al (. 6f individ!al i is the first to give, she (more or less) foresees individ!al (;s ret!rn gift "(i("i(). 6f she does not 7!estion this order of the givings, she chooses the (a) gift "i( that ma0imi1es ui with "(iJ"(i("i(). -he is a -tac"elberg leader# in the reciprocit& game. -he can be said to e0ploit# the reciprocal reaction of the other person. 6n so doing, she is p!rel& self8 interested if ui depends onl& on its first arg!ment, uiJuiP1iB"i(N"(i ("i()Q. I!t she is not in the other cases (in partic!lar, she can be also altr!istic). %his is a !omination reciprocity. owever, reciprocit& has a flavo!r of egalitarianism in actions towards the other. 5ow, there being a first and a second pla&er is a strong ine7!alit&, if the& act as described above. 6f the actors e0tend their reciprocitarian sentiments to the orders of the moves in time, the& see" a sol!tion that does not depend on this iss!e, that is, on who is first or second to
$2

%he Gitt& +enovese case, 1'6*.

2/ give or even whether the& give sim!ltaneo!sl&. %hen, a first giver chooses a gift that co!ld be her ret!rn8gift if she were the ret!rn8giver receiving the act!al ret!rn8gift as initial gift. ence, the chosen gifts satisf& the two relations "i(J"i(("(i) and "(iJ"(i("i(). %he sol!tion has the form of a Co!rnot85ash sol!tion, b!t it has a f!ll and rational e0planation which is lac"ing in other cases of one or two8shot games. 6t is a moral Co!rnot85ash sol!tion reali1ing the ordering e7!it&# relative to the order of the moves. %he res!lt is an e$uili rium reciprocity. %he classicall& "nown str!ct!res of these two sol!tions show that it seems that other pairs of gifts can ma"e both individ!als better off3 the& seem not to be )areto efficient (the individ!als; indifference loci are not tangent to each other). owever, the individ!als have to choose these other pairs of gifts. For instance, the& wo!ld ma"e an agreement in this respect. (r, alternativel&, an e0ternal benevolent power wo!ld impose the sol!tion on them. 6n both cases, however, the transfers wo!ld no longer be gifts in the proper sense of the term. 6n the case of an agreement, the transfers wo!ld be parts of an e0change, since the& wo!ld be m!t!all& conditional on each other b& e0ternal obligation or promise8"eeping once the agreement is accepted. 6n the other process, the transfers wo!ld be imposed on the agents. 6n both cases, the related attit!des, meanings, and hence motives, wo!ld be different. ence, the preferences abo!t these transfers, and the str!ct!re of the !tilit& f!nctions, wo!ld a priori be different. %he choice of the agreement or of the imposed transfers wo!ld have to be made with these new preferences. And the individ!als ma& not end !p happier or more satisfied in the end, even if one can ma"e s!ch comparisons when preferences change. 6n partic!lar, the& ma& lose intrinsic 7!alities of the relationship of reciprocit& which the& ma& appreciate, s!ch as m!t!al "indness, consideration or respectF fellow feelingF and not being considered onl& as a means b!t also B at least in part B as an end (good reciprocit& B there are others B is e0change that places the partner in the "ingdom of ends#). $$ 4% Importance and scope of giving, altruism, and pro5social conducts +.1 Overvie" Altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit& have an overwhelming importance in societ&, its econom&, and the allocation of reso!rces. %he& permit their e0istence, performance, and 7!alit& in vario!s wa&s. 5ot onl& do the& r!le the life and the econom& of families and the sector of charit&, and capital acc!m!lation thro!gh gifts to children, b!t the& are a main factor of political life and of the role of the p!blic sector and p!blic finance thro!gh the effects of conceptions of :!stice and of the common good in addition to :oint givingF the& permit the ver& e0istence of a free and peacef!l societ& and of a free mar"et thro!gh the respect of others and of their rights and propert&F the& !nderlie most of the spontaneo!s and decentrali1ed corrections of the vario!s shortcomings and fail!res# of the mar"et and of organi1ations (incl!ding firms)F the& therefore are an essential factor of economic efficienc&, prod!ctivit& and growth thro!gh vario!s wa&sF the& have an important role in labo!r relations and at the wor"placeF the& are a basic ob:ective of man& cooperatives, associations, and cl!bsF the& are cr!cial in general sociabilit& and hence for the essential amenit& of life in societ&F the& constit!te a most basic social bondF and the& are the most !niversal criterion for :!dging the intrinsic 7!alit& of social relations and of individ!als.
$$

A good deal of what goes on in the process of so8called development# consists of replacing relations of reciprocit& b& mar"et e0changes, th!s changing the societ& and, in the end, the personalit& of people, in a wa& that the& generall& cannot forsee or even conceive at the onset of the transformation.

26 +.2 Families %he allocation of reso!rces sho!ld first have people to whom to allocateF and persons also provide the main economic reso!rce, the stoc" of h!man capacities. ence, there sho!ld first be procreation, which !s!all& res!lt from love, a partic!larl& strong t&pe of altr!istic sentiment and of li"ing reciprocit&. $* .oreover, no societ& can s!rvive witho!t someone feeding children and ta"ing care of them B gifts which again essentiall& res!lt from love (and a little from d!t&). %he first social relations and sentiments a h!man being is aware of and e0periences, and the onl& ones for several &ears, are "inds of ver& strong, warm and reciprocal altr!ism. %he first social relations and sentiments man"ind has observed and e0perienced, in the famil&, the e0tended famil&, and small gro!ps, are mostl& giving, strong altr!ism, and reciprocities. .oreover, people tend to mate with altr!ists, notabl& beca!se the& are li"eable and prone to protect them and their common offspring, which favo!rs the spread of genetic config!rations favo!rable both to altr!ism and to being attracted b& altr!ists (and hence again to the reprod!ction of altr!ists).$/ %his selection of the altr!istic gene# is complemented b& the selfish gene# which ma"es &o! help people who mi"ht be genetic relatives, and possibl& b& the selection of cooperative societies among competing gro!ps as conceived b& @arwin and Gropot"in. 5owada&s, more than one half of the American pop!lation depend for their sec!rit& and material satisfactions not !pon the sale of their services b!t rather !pon their relationships to others# (9dm!nd )helps, 1'2/). .oreover, we have noted the impressive fact that gifts to children thro!gh be7!ests and ed!cation prod!ce abo!t 84M of savings and capital acc!m!lation, and hence of investment, technical progress, and per capita economic growth B the rest of growth being d!e to loving procreation B (Gotli"off and -!mmers, 1'81, +ale and -cholt1, 1''*). 9ven economists who scorn altr!ism and cherish the selfish homo economicus live in families where the& themselves probabl& love and give. %he& can hardl& fail to notice the presence of altr!istic sentiments and behavio!r there B or so it seems. 6ndeed, a n!mber of economists have emphasi1ed for long the contrast between the motives in the mar"et and in the famil&. %his was implied b& Cic"steed;s notion of non'tuism, shortl& disc!ssed, or in o!r da&s b& Iec"er;s altr!ism in the famil&, egoism o!tside of the famil&.# Iec"er (1'2*) sees indeed the famil& as dominated b& an altr!istic distrib!ting pater familias. Eet, a n!mber of other economists, on the contrar&, p!sh the consistenc& to the point of seeing even the famil& as a self8interested e0change, and this model was theoreticall& developed (Chiappori;s initial wor"). %his ac"nowledges the effects of interactions and the m!ltipolarit& of a famil&, b!t with a s!rprising view of motivations. %hen, a new new economics of the famil& reconciled interactive m!ltipolarit& with giving and positive affects in basing a theor& of the famil& on reciprocit& (Arrondel and .asson).$6 6n fact, families displa& all forms of relations B giving, e0change, and constraint B, b!t are better seen as a networ" of reciprocities where relations of other t&pes are in fact moments in this broader framewor".
$*

Adam -mith, a life8long bachelor, finds this passion b& which nat!re !nites the two se0es# to be alwa&s, in some meas!re, ridic!lo!s# and holds that this passion appears to ever& bod&, b!t the man who feels it, entirel& disproportionate to the val!e of its ob:ect# ( The Theory of &oral Sentiments, $'). $/ -ee -ection 12. $6 -ee their chapter in this vol!me.

22

%he famil& manifests in partic!lar all si0 t&pes of direct and chain intergenerational reciprocities, since one gives to one;s children and to one;s aging parents, given that one;s children will give to oneself and to their children, and one;s parents have given to oneself and to their parents. owever, giving to children is more important than s!pporting one;s parents in families in developed economies. 6ndeed, people not onl& save for their retirement b!t, in addition, give m!ch to their children in the form of raising, ed!cation, gifts and be7!ests. %his vol!ntar& transmission in fact acco!nts for most of savings and hence of capital formation nowada&s (in co!ntries with pa&8as8&o!r8go pension s&stems, this collective scheme ma"es the &o!ng finance the retirees and saving for one;s retirement is still lower). +.( )he political and p%blic sector 9.:.; ,u lic services an! "eneral political motives Eo! receive vast amo!nts of free p!blic services. Eo! benefit from n!mero!s p!blic goods with free access and free of charge. 6f &o! are poor, &o! are granted p!blic s!bsidies, aids in "ind, the assistance of social services, and again free p!blic services and goodsF this is b& far the largest amo!nt of aid to people in need or poor nowada&s (and if &o! are rich &o! manage to have &o!r area receive the best p!blic services and &o!r firm receive p!blic s!bsidies). (n the whole, the p!blic sectors give between one third to more than one half of +5) in o!r time. Eo! freel& choose to vote for the ver& high ta0es that finance these services (&o! ma& have to choose onl& among high levels, b!t if s!fficientl& man& of !s wanted low levels, some politicians wo!ld propose it). Chat are, however, the motivationsX Chat are, more generall&, the motivations of all the actors who can infl!ence the p!blic choice individ!all& or collectivel&X Are these people egoistic and self8interested, as the& often seem, or are the& altr!istic and aiming at the common good, as the& often sa&X 6ndeed, a school of scholarship, notabl& in economics, ass!mes the first alternative, whereas the actors themselves assert most of the time that their choice is motivated b& the defence or promotion of the general good, incl!ding the reali1ation of :!stice in societ&, or at least that it conforms to this ob:ective. Iefore pointing o!t the main iss!e, specific to the politicalSp!blic sector, in this respect, let !s notice that the vario!s actors commonl& want to help other people in need thro!gh p!blic reg!lation, p!blic action and p!blic finance even if the& have to contrib!te themselves, to some degree, for reasons of compassion, pit&, moral d!t&, solidarit&, :!stice, or f!ndamental reciprocit& (i.e., the reason e0pressed as3 6 help them, given that the& wo!ld have helped me if o!r sit!ations were reversed#).$2 %his is notabl& related to the sit!ation of :oint altr!ism, :oint giving, and its reali1ation b& the p!blic sector (see -ections * and 2). 6n partic!lar, ta0pa&ers choose as voters this aspect of the p!blic finance. .oreover, in most politicalSp!blic choices of all "inds, a characteristic feat!re of this sector is that the two t&pes of motives B self8interested and altr!istic B can lead to the same choice and cannot be disentangled. %he reason is clear and inherent to the nat!re of this sector. 6ndeed, man& of the iss!es in 7!estion concern general aspects of societ& (e.g. moral, national, historical, aesthetic, environmental, etc.), and preferences abo!t them e0press both individ!al tastes and concern abo!t the common good and abo!t what is good for the other
$2

%he term f!ndamental# means that the reverse sit!ation is p!rel& notional. For instance, this can be a reason for helping people born with some relative handicap.

28 people. (ther iss!es concern more ordinar& p!blic goods or reg!lation, that &o! generall& want both for &o!rself and for others3 the latter aspect is an altr!ism. -till other iss!es affect specific personal interests that are best defended in :oining with the other persons having similar interests, in political actions of all t&pes (votes, parties, other forms of e0pression, lobb&ing, revol!tion, etc.). %hen, &o! :ointl& defend &o!r interest and that of the other people in a similar sit!ation. Eo! favo!r and help them as the& favo!r and help &o! B this is solidarit&. Eo!r interest becomes an ob:ective# ca!se, and it sho!ld not be too diffic!lt neither to find a conception of :!stice that shows that the defence or promotion of this interest is right, :!st, or fair, nor for &o! to adopt and possibl& to believe these arg!ments. 6ndeed, apart from the iss!es of p!blic aid noted above, people rarel& defend views of :!stice that oppose their own interests. %his is p!11ling and worr&ing on the gro!nds of h!man rationalit&, since ethics is s!pposed to be an e0ercise in end or val!e rationalit& and its concl!sion sho!ld have no reason to be correlated with the reasoner;s interests. Eet, in ethici1ing their interests in this wa&, people ipso facto transm!te them into an altr!ism towards people having the same interests. owever, these moral arg!ments defending one;s own interests ma& not be sincere. %he& ma& be :!st noise# as a school of economists is fond to sa&. %he& wo!ld be mere pharisianism B that is, defending one;s interests with moral arg!ments in which one does not believe. owever, the e0istence of pharisianism does not s!pport a conception of man as e0cl!sivel& self8interested b!t, on the contrar&, it proves it to be false. Ch&, indeed, wo!ld people care to defend their interests with moral arg!mentsX 6f it is for defending their interests, this implies that these arg!ments infl!ence the behavio!r of some other people. ence, these other people are infl!enced b& morals, at a cost for their own self8interest. -ince their action serves the people who present the arg!ment, this reaction is a moral altr!ism. )harisians believe that the other persons ma& react in this wa& from their e0perience and observations, and possibl& also from introspection and a h&pothesis of analog& of other persons with oneself (or empath& of these others). %herefore, pharisianism, a homage that vice pa&s to virt!e, implies virt!e and proves its e0istence. 9ven if people present the moral arg!ment in order not to appear p!rel& greed&, this implies that the other persons appreciate the moral reason (this is also inferred as :!st noted). And even if the& entertain a view of the righteo!sness of their interest in order not to see themselves as p!rel& ac7!isitive persons, then the& themselves attach some val!e to this moral reason B contrar& to the h&pothesis. ence, the fact that moral arg!ments are sincere or are not is be&ond the point. 6n an& case, their simple !se a priori implies that the& are infl!ential, or e0pected to be from e0perience or introspection, and therefore that some people are infl!enced b& them. %hese people then are moral altr!ists if these arg!ments favo!r the interests of other people. And even arg!ments that onl& aim at softening the image of some people impl& this "ind of recognition. 6n fact, the iss!e of sincerit& is ambig!o!s. )eople often present or emphasi1e arg!ments in order to co!nterbalance other arg!ments presented with opposite concl!sions, so as to ma"e a fair :!dgment possible. 6n these cases, these people can be sincere and &et present biased arg!ments B for a :!stifiable reason. .oreover, when the& defend their interest with moral arg!ments, people are often not clear to themselves whether the& reall& believe the reason the& give or not. %his does not matter, however3 as we have seen, the simple !se of moral reasons proves their infl!ence and, a priori, that of moral altr!ism.

2' Finall&, for e0ample, the fact that freedom of e0change ma& be more defended b& the rich and ine7!alit& more critici1ed b& the poor does not impl& that onl& self8interest matters. 6t implies, on the contrar&, that both conceptions of :!stice can infl!ence act!al political choices. %his implies in t!rn that infl!ential actors are to some degree moral altr!ists motivated b& these opposite conceptions of :!stice. .oreover, in a democrac& where the !ltimate political power rests in the pop!lation B e.g., the electorate B, these moral altr!ists have to be ver& n!mero!s. %he !pshot is well epitomi1ed b& =ean8=ac7!es <o!ssea!;s remar" that morals and politics cannot be separated, and he who wants to st!d& one witho!t the other is bo!nd to mis!nderstand both.# 6ndeed, the ab!ndant and pervasive political disco!rse spea"s of nothing else than the good for societ& and :!stice B corresponding to the two problems politics has to solve, :oint action and sharing. Ioth topics impl& "inds of altr!ism. %his has been noted for the common good. For :!stice, it res!lts from the propert& of impartialit& inherent to the concept, whatever the specific form it ta"es. 6ndeed, this implies that the val!es defended attach to ob:ective# characteristics which can be those of vario!s persons (for :!stice towards individ!als). ence, a position of :!stice that favo!rs the interests of a person also defends those of others, a priori. .oreover, the simple fact of ta"ing an impartial view of individ!als; interests constit!tes a general altr!ism in itself. Conversel&, altr!ism towards several persons, and in partic!lar the altr!ism towards all h!mans emphasi1ed b& Adam -mith, implies and re7!ires definitions of the limits between the interests of people when the& oppose one another. Eet, setting an arbitrar& limit to the interests of someone wo!ld not be altr!istic. ence these borders of interests have to be defined from :!stified, ob:ective, and impartial reasons, that is, from criteria and principles of :!stice. Finall&, the implementation of :!stice and of the chosen common good generall& re7!ires constraints which, in a state of law, are the prerogative of the p!blic sector. 9.:.< *ctors of the political an! pu lic system %he noted close relations between self8interest and aspects of altr!ism affect all actors of the political and p!blic process. 6n addition, for each t&pe of actors there are more or less specific relations between their interested and altr!istic motives. %hese actors are of fo!r t&pes3 votersF s!pporters, militants, activists and part& membersF political personnelF and civil servants. 5o voter, part& member, militant, activist or s!pporter has a decisive infl!ence in a large election, and &et the& spend time, effort, and mone&. ence, the& are not motivated b& their self8interest. %he& sa& that the& do this beca!se it serves other people, or also serves them, which is an altr!istic motive. (ther moral reasons that the& ma& give are specific reasons for moral altr!ism. And, in fact, their actions serve the other people having the interests the& defend or holding the val!es the& promote. %he& also serve man& people in permitting the f!nctioning of a political s&stem if it is better than possible alternatives. 6n addition to these actors, the political and p!blic process has two other categories of actors3 politicians or statesmen, and civil servants, at all levels. Contrar& to the other categories, the& are professional (at least for a part of their life). ence the& can have an interest in their own career. %his polari1es most of the self8interest that there is in their motivations. 9ven if the& had no other motivations, this one wo!ld s!ffice to transmit and implement the ob:ectives of the voters and s!pporters of all "inds, notabl& their altr!istic

$4 intents of all t&pes. owever, as the other actors, the& also have other motivations, and the& have vario!s effective wa&s to translate them into acts and facts. )olitical men see" fame, power, and income. Eet, most of them also want the good of their societ& and of their co8citi1ens and want to do something abo!t it. %he& see these ob:ectives as m!ch more complementar& than opposed, since more power b& election or promotion enables them to better serve and promote their view of the goodF and seeing the good as congr!ent with the positions whose defence and implementation will ma"e them elected or re8elected avoids the !neasiness ca!sed b& cognitive dissonance. Eet, altho!gh political ideals ma& ad:!st to political interests, the& also often determine the choice of a political career and the basic choices in it. @isentangling these two "inds of motives is therefore not eas& or even not possible, even for their holders themselves. .oreover, political men are not onl& implementersF the& also have a ma:or role of infl!ence and in the formation of p!blic opinion. Chen the& are in power, poor information of voters and the distance between elections leaves them a large scope for promoting their own ob:ectives, moral or immoral (=ean8=ac7!es <o!ssea! remar"ed that the 9nglish are free onl& one da& ever& seven &ears, the election da&F and a )resident in his last term is free from electoral threats).$8 Finall&, there is, in a n!mber of societies, a special ethic of the civil service (or p!blic service), at wor" from the bottom to the top of the hierarch&. %his is s!pported to some degree b& promotions which favo!r agents who displa& s!ch a spirit of the p!blic service,# th!s providing them with both a reward in self8interest and an enlarged field of p!blic responsibilit&. %his ethos and ethics incl!des strongl& altr!istic motivations. %he problems that this attit!de leads one to pose have been a ma:or impet!s for the development of p!blic economics and normative economics. +., -iving in philanthrop*. solidarit*. and charit* 9.=.; Social situation )rivate giving o!tside of the famil& has a notable importance. For instance, we noted that it ta"es !p abo!t /M of +5) in the >-A. 6t displa&s a large variet& of forms3 it is to people in need or as s!pport of vario!s specific ca!ses that benefit man& people, direct or thro!gh vario!s organi1ations, in mone&, in "ind, or in giving the labo!r, effort, or bod& parts of the h!man person. )rivate giving has, with both p!blic giving and the mar"et, close relations which are associations, complementarities, s!bstit!tions, or competition. )rivate giving is tied to p!blic contrib!tions thro!gh ta0 ded!ctions and ded!ctibilities, and :oint or matching contrib!tions. Eet, a given s!pport can also often be provided either b& private vol!ntar& contrib!tions or b& the p!blic sector. @ifferent co!ntries often choose different sol!tions in this respect, with a global tendenc& in each co!ntr&, so that the sharing between private and p!blic aid is ver& different from one co!ntr& to the other. As a res!lt, the si1e of the private philanthropic sector varies widel& across co!ntries, as do the si1e of the p!blic sector in an inverse relation.$' -ection 2 has shown how this sharing can depend on the individ!als; motives to give and on political efficienc& in the different co!ntries. %his is notabl& manifested in the traditions and political and social c!lt!re of the
$8

%his view of =ean8=ac7!es <o!ssea! is still nowada&s commonl& proposed b& his -wiss compatriots for praising their s&stem of referend!ms. $' A recent important st!d& b& Alesina and +laeser (244*) compares the modalities of the relief of povert& in the >.-. and in 9!rope.

$1 co!ntr&, and hence in its social, political, instit!tional, and ideological histor&. For instance, the historicall& large role of the p!blic sector in 9!rope :ointl& res!lts from the ethics (or ideolog&) of the Celfare -tate, monarchical traditions (even in <ep!blics), the presence of a professional civil service, and essentiall& the opport!nit& provided b& the fact that p!blic b!dgets increased tremendo!sl& d!ring the Corld Cars and co!ld, when militar& e0pendit!res s!bsided after the wars, be largel& redirected towards social aid B partic!larl& needed at these times B, while the wars had created a sentiment of interclass national solidarit& which hardl& e0isted before. )racticall&, each t&pe of aid tends to occ!p& fields where the other is absent or ins!fficient. )rivate giving is also sometimes an alternative to rel&ing on the mar"et. For instance, the economic profession was impressed b& <ichard %itm!ss;s (1'21) findings that the 9nglish s&stem of giving blood for transf!sion is m!ch s!perior B notabl& in terms of the 7!alit& of blood B to the American s&stem of b!&ing it, and b& Genneth Arrow;s (1'2*) disc!ssion of this iss!e and conse7!entl& of the role of giving and of moral behavio!r in the econom&. 9.=.< &otives An individ!al, indeed, cares abo!t another;s pain more, and wishes its relief more, the larger the pain, the more she "nows it, and generall& the more she "nows the other person, relates to her, and li"es her. %his basic and obvio!s fact can mobili1e vario!s t&pes of sentiments. -entiments of compassion and pit& rest on an emotion and are commonl& s!pported b& a moral demand. 6n most cases, their ob:ect is the pain of another person. %he emotion is then infl!enced b& empath& abo!t this pain (with the possible assistance of some emotional contagion). Eet, pit& and compassion can also attach to an act or a sit!ation of the other person that are deemed improper and not onl& to pain. At an& rate, pit& and compassion re7!ire having a priori some emotional distance from the ob:ect3 the more &o! a priori li"e the other person, the more &o! s!ffer from her pain, b!t the less this is d!e to compassion or pit&. %he intensit& of the sentiment that ind!ces compassion and pit& varies li"e that of the pain that elicits it (ceteris pari us) b!t is !s!all& lower than it. Compassion and pit& lead to wishing an alleviation of this pain, notabl& b& the observer, and also b& others and hence b& :oint giving and b& p!blic aid, and moral altr!ism also ind!ces this desire and action. .oral and (other) social altr!ism also demand both affection and s!pport among members of the same comm!nities, with an intensit& parallel to the degree of closeness and pro0imit&. %his incl!des famil& relationships and other solidarities. .oreover, :!stice and fairness, which are other aspects of social ethics, can also demand the alleviation of the pain. %heir comparative dimension ma& then also specif& who sho!ld pa& for this relief. .oreover, all the vario!s noted normative (moral and social) val!es entail praise or blame of the acts of aid and of the sentiments that ind!ce them, and hence of the persons who give or sho!ld give and e0perience the sentiments, b& other people, b& the person herself, b& societ& in general, or as abstract intrinsic :!dgment made !p b& the person. %his often infl!ences helping behavio!r, and it occasionall& also infl!ences the eval!ated sentiments. %he :!dgment of sentiments ma& foster benevolence, and hence the res!lting propensit& to give. Caring abo!t the :!dgment abo!t oneself as actor is not a properl& moral motive. owever, it can ind!ce giving in cases where act!al benevolence does not s!ffice. %herefore, the motives of aid to the people in need are compassion or pit&, sense of :!stice or fairness, and other moral or normative altr!isms, s!pported b& a sense of comm!nit& with vario!s possible e0tensions, pl!s, possibl&, a 7!est for praise or favo!rable

$2 self8image. %hese motives are largel& different from and incompatible with those of the other main field of giving, the famil&, beca!se affection has emotional priorit& over both compassion or pit&, and moral or normative altr!ism. Eo! ta"e care of &o!r children when the& need it beca!se &o! love them, and &o! neither reall& pit& them nor have to help them beca!se it is &o!r d!t&. %he comparison between these two "inds of altr!ism is, of co!rse, more comple0 and s!btle. A sense of comm!nit& favo!rs both s&mpath& (somehow a mild affection) and compassion. 9mpath& associates nat!rall& with affection and is, to some degree, an ingredient of compassion. Fairness pla&s some roles in the famil&. Eet, the most stri"ing fact of the comparison is the difference and incompatibilit&, and the responsible sentiment is affection, the feeling that bl!rs the border between self and other. Finall&, s!pporting people in need directl& or thro!gh ca!ses is a priori a case of :oint giving with man& participants. Ce have seen in -ection 2 that democrac& or efficienc&, and altr!ism and a n!mber of other motives, lead to the reali1ation of all this aid thro!gh ta0ation and p!blic aid. ence, private giving reali1es the transfers when the political s&stem is deficient (notabl& in democrac& and efficienc&), or when the motives attach to partic!lar variables, s!ch as the giver;s private gift or a comparison with the f!ll contrib!tion (ta0 pl!s gift) of other people. %hese partic!lar sentiments can be reinforced b& others; :!dgments, b!t all these eval!ations are not altr!istic and have a limited rationalit& and moralit&. +./ -eneral respect. civilit*. socialit*. and help %he first altr!ism is restraint from harming. %he first gift is restraint from stealing. %he first reciprocit& is answering respect with respect. .ost of the time, most people neither harm nor steal nor lac" respect, and B it seems B nor even intend to. %he general a priori benevolence and altr!ism towards o!r fellow h!mans :ointl& res!lts from morals and norms, empath&, s&mpath& in all senses, and a priori affection for what is similar to oneself. %his feeling is something ver& important. 9ven if it is moderate, each applies it to man& people and benefits from this attit!de of man& people. 6t ma"es people a priori respect others and be respected b& them. 6t ma"es spontaneo!s order# a priori differ from the war of all against all.# 6t ma"es normal societies differ from the obbesian 6"s described b& the anthropologist %!rnb!ll. Ietween two persons, this sentiment establishes a pres!mption of m!t!al help if needed, rather than war. 6t permits peace witho!t a police state, and, hence, a free and peacef!l societ&. 6t permits rights and propert&, and hence e0change and mar"ets, with a tolerable level of private defence and p!blic protection. 6t paves the wa& to providing help to other people when the& need it. 6n partic!lar and most importantl&, m!ch below the level of need that ind!ces assistance b& some other person, the large n!mber of a priori benevolent others ma"es :oint giving a re7!irement of !nanimit& (a priori implemented b& p!blic aid and transfers). 6n fact, no societ& can e0ist witho!t a large e0tent of vol!ntar& altr!istic respect for others and for their rights and properties. )eace and sec!rit& can res!lt from restraint or constraint, and the latter can be d!e to self8defence or to the police force. <el&ing on self8 defence alone amo!nts to a detestable and !ntenable war of all against all.# <el&ing on the police alone is impossible if there is not one policeman behind each of !s, and it ma"es for an e0ecrable police state. 6n fact, there wo!ld even have to be two policemen behind each policeman for preventing him from self8interestedl& !sing his force. -olel& rel&ing on both

$$ these sol!tions is a mi0t!re of two evils and wo!ld serio!sl& misallocate reso!rces towards the weapon ind!str&. %hese effects can be avoided onl& if vol!ntar& respect solves a notable part of the 7!estion, as is the case in normal societies in normal times (altho!gh both other means are generall& also more or less re7!ired for prevention b& deterrence). 6n partic!lar, this common general respect of other people, their rights, and in partic!lar their properties is indispensable to the normal f!nctioning of an e0tensive and efficient s&stem of e0change. %his basic altr!ism is a re7!irement of a wor"ing mar"et. .oreover, this respect, accompanied b& politeness, menial help, and larger help when needed, in all or most enco!nters, provides the social amenit& necessar& to a normal and s!fficientl& smooth and even agreeable life in societ&. %he closer the relationship between people, the larger this necessit&. %his is indispensable to the general 7!alit& of life and to the efficienc& of activit& in societ&. Altr!ism is the l!bricant of social relations, as necessar& to the wor"ing of societ& as oil& l!bricant is to that of engines. +.6 )he correction of #fail%res' of e0changes and organi1ations %he efficienc& of mar"ets is fettered b& a n!mber of mar"et fail!res# incl!ding e0ternalities, non8e0cl!dable p!blic goods, transaction costs, missing mar"ets, incomplete contracts or impossibilities of establishing or enforcing contracts, and so on. (rgani1ations, notabl& hierarchical ones, are hampered b& diffic!lties in information, transmitting orders, reporting, imposing decisions, and so on. All these vices have two basic ca!ses3 diffic!lties, costs, or impossibilities in information and in constrainin" people. 6mpediments in constraining can be remedied b& the corresponding vol!ntar& action or restraint of the concerned individ!als, and those concerning information can largel& be remedied b& vol!ntar& transmission of information. Chen the actor sees these acts as not being the most favo!rable ones to her interest, the& constit!te gifts. Concerning information, this leads to tr!th8telling, sincerit&, and vol!ntar& disclos!re. Concerning actions, this leads to giving, helping, promise8"eeping, tr!stworthiness, lo&alt&, abstention from cheating, solidarit& in an organi1ation, reciprocal action or contrib!tion, and so on. %he motives are often moral. %he& are also often normative and social of a non8moral "ind B li"e following a social norm whose violation elicits shame rather than g!ilt which is specific to moral fail!re. %hese motives, or at least and partic!larl& the social non8moral ones, can be reinforced b& a 7!est for image or stat!s in the e&es of oneself or of others. 6n the case of an organi1ation, the motives can be lo&alt& or devotion to the gro!p or to its direction, s&mpath& or affection towards the other members, or solidarit& towards them. -&mpath&, affection and solidarit& can also occ!r in an e0change, especiall& when it ta"es place within a comm!nit&. Finall&, these cond!cts ma& be reciprocal and motivated b& a concept of balance, possibl& s!pported b& a sense of fairness B s!ch as helping, contrib!ting to a p!blic good, telling the tr!th, not cheating, "eeping one;s promises, being tr!stworth& and tr!sting, and so on, given that other participants do the same. 9ven if someone so acts in order that the other(s) contin!e to act in this wa& in the f!t!re, this can wor" onl& if the last action has another B not self8interested B motive and hence is a gift, and then this motive do!btlessl& also e0isted before. 6n improving social efficienc&, these vario!s non8strictl&8self8interested cond!cts and motives often end !p favo!ring the strict self8interests of these actors.*4 %hen, disinterested cond!ct favo!rs one;s strict interest in the end, as if b& a "ind of immanent :!stice. )eople
*4

-elf8interest is strict# when it e0cl!des satisfactions from stat!s, image in the e&es of others or of oneself, and the li"e.

$* ma& be aware of this, b!t if the& concl!de that the& will act this wa& for favo!ring this interest, then this motive ind!ces them to act differentl&, the magic of normed and moral action is bro"en, and the !nderl&ing inefficienc& s!rfaces. %his occ!rs in a framewor" of collective action, where each person benefits from this behavio!r of a n!mber of other people, and the ver& original agreement fail!re prevents that the& choose to behave this wa& in a collective binding agreement. owever, these cond!cts are ver& often maintained b& reciprocities3 people behave in the proper wa& given that others do too.*1 .oreover, the fact that all or man& people benefit from these behavio!rs have often led to their becoming social norms, b& a process involving man& interacting individ!al :!dgments rather than conscio!s individ!al decisions. 6n s!ch sit!ations, f!rthermore, the individ!al choice tends to be s!pported b& a generali1ation ethics# of the Gantian t&pe. .ar"et fail!res are also commonl& corrected b& p!blic intervention. Eet, this has limits d!e to diffic!lties in obtaining the necessar& decentrali1ed and local information, costs and impossibilities of constraining, and general problems of the p!blic and political sector ca!sed b& iss!es of motivation in addition to, again, 7!estions of information and of constraining. ence, the decentrali1ed corrections of all these fail!res,# d!e to different motivations incl!ding altr!istic and normative ones, are essential factors of economic and social efficienc&. +.2 !ssociations. cl%bs. cooperatives 6n addition to these altr!istic, giving, and reciprocitarian aspects of e0changes and organi1ations having other ob:ectives, people create a n!mber of social forms where these t&pes of relations p!rposef!ll& have a partic!lar importance. -etting aside the case of marriage alread& noted, the& are associations, cl!bs, and vario!s gro!ps. %heir aims are varied. -haring among members and socialit& are sometimes the onl& aims. Eet, these relations are often important altho!gh there is another ob:ective. %his can be an activit& of the members in c!lt!re or leis!re, m!t!al help which then becomes more than onl& m!t!al ins!rance in terms of social relations, wor"ing for a ca!se or philanthrop&, and so on. .an& instances of cooperation share this spirit. Cooperatives have specific aims, b!t the& are often set !p with the ideal of maintaining, among their members, positive relations that go be&ond m!t!al self8interest. Cooperative movements emphasi1e this aspect, which is sometimes lost in the co!rse of time, b!t also s!rvives in important cases (notabl& when related to a political ca!se). %he networ" of associations with altr!istic m!t!al cooperation or help B be the& traditional or more recent B which e0ist in a societ&, often constit!tes a ma:or aspect of this societ&, !s!all& as a sign and a vector of its 7!alit& in essence and achievements. +. )he "or&place and labo%r relations -ome economists, who wanted to e0plain all behavio!r b& selfishness b!t lived in a famil&, adhered to the view that there is altr!ism within the famil&, egoism o!tside of the famil&.# %he above remar"s show how erroneo!s this simplistic view is. Eet, let !s consider the social insertion of the individ!al which is in a sense the antithesis of the famil&, the wor"place and labo!r relations where the r!le is self8interest served b& command and hierarch&. For simplicit&, let !s forget abo!t famil& firms and abo!t how man& families started at the wor"place. %he latter fact, however, sa&s something. )eople spend at wor" most of their time o!tside of the famil&. %he& find there most of their social relations, and therefore most of their friends. %o begin with, the general socialit& of respect, menial help, and larger help if
*1

%he chapter on reciprocit& in this vol!me anal&ses e0tensivel& the efficienc& effects of reciprocities.

$/ necessar&, applies there. %hese relations are partic!larl& important beca!se of the time and fraction of life the& occ!p&. .oreover, this d!ration, especiall& when the same people are met, or simpl& beca!se the relations occ!r in the same social framewor" which develops !sages and traditions, tends to ma"e this socialit& more intense. )eople wor"ing together "now each other. 9mpath&, s&mpath&, emotional contagion, and reciprocities have a large field of opport!nities for developing. %he help incl!des iss!es relative to the wor" itself, incl!ding in providing information. All relations are reinforced b& the fact that the& tend to be reciprocal. %hese non8strictl& self8interested cond!cts lead to the behavio!rs, noted above, that permit the organi1ation to overcome its inherent fail!res# in information and constraining. 6n addition, co8wor"ers have common interests in wor"ing conditions and wages, with regard to the e0ternal conditions of the organi1ation B incl!ding competition B, or in opposition to other parts of the organi1ation B s!ch as the management. %his elicits and reinforces solidarit&, while raising the p!blic8good and free8riding problems of :oint interest, and their sol!tions b& normed behavio!r and altr!istic and reciprocitarian sentiments. <eciprocit& develops even across hierarchical relations. 9ven if bon!ses are more incentives than gifts, there also is the more s!rprising b!t m!ch st!died behavio!r of wor"ing in order to match and deserve the pa& received (as noticed above, this was applied b& +. A"erlof for e0plaining invol!ntar& !nemplo&ment). 6n the end, labo!r relations incl!de strict command, hierarchical constraint, and e0ploitation, b!t the& b& no means red!ce to that, and ass!ming the& do prevents !nderstanding and e0plaining what happens in this essential part of the econom&. +.+ Social giving3 relation. s*mbol. stat%s +ift giving is a vol!ntar& !nconditional act in favo!r of someone else. 6n its vario!s forms, it constit!tes the positive social relation. Ieing in general more or less costl& for the giver, it is a vol!ntar& sacrifice of the giver in favo!r of the beneficiar&. ence, it can a priori constit!te a strong relation. it is therefore bo!nd and capable to carr& meaning abo!t the giver;s sentiments and intentions, and to be a partic!larl& meaningf!l act in a social relationship. 6ts cost can indicate and meas!re the intensit& of these sentiments and intentions. Eet, even when the cost is low, the act and the gift can "eep their meaning and be s&mbols sending a signal or acting as a reminder of the giver;s sentiments or promises or of the relationship. Accepting a gift is also sometimes an option meaning acceptance of the relationship proposed b& the gift. %he vario!s meanings can be for the giver, the receiver, or other observers of the relation. All these f!nctions of the gift are ver& different from its direct improvement of the receiver;s sit!ation and from an& satisfaction derived from creating this improvement. Eet, the& manifest other8regarding sentiments, social relations, and social bonds, and are sometimes important in their e0istence. %he instances of this role of the gift are ver& varied. %he gifts can be of all si1e and val!e. %he s&mbolic and relational meaning can be essential or min!te, and d!rable or occasional. %he relation and the gift can be fort!ito!s or instit!tionali1ed. %he setting can be the famil&, b!siness relations, and all t&pes of social relations. %he motivating sentiments and intentions can be those e0pressed or other ones. %he& can be benevolent, self8 interested, or malevolent. +ifts can th!s show, manifest, e0press, confirm, and prove b& their cost, vario!s sentiments and intentions towards the receiver. %he& can mean peace, friendliness, acceptation, friendship, li"ing, or love. +ifts seal, celebrate, or confirm an agreement or an e0change. %he& show goodwill in a relation. %he& can manifest consideration and respect. +ifts, indeed, can mean things which are opposite to each other. %he& can initiate a relationship, maintain it, or p!t an end to it. %he& can manifest s!bmission or obedience, as

$6 well as s!periorit& or domination shown b& generosit&. %he& can e0press gratit!de, pa& bac" a moral debt, or intend to bind the receiver b& a moral debt. +iving and receiving, and the relation the& constit!te or manifest, are th!s often related to the social stat!s of the giver or of the receiver, often to a hierarchical stat!s. Aario!s stat!ses impl& obligation to give or to receive or res!lt from s!ch acts. Eo! ma& give beca!se &o! have a stat!s, to maintain a stat!s, to ac7!ire a stat!s, or to get rid of a stat!s. .ore generall&, gift8giving can have man& important social roles, f!nctions, and intentions, other than onl& benefiting the receiver, and this latter effect is sometimes negligible or absent. +iving and accepting provide information abo!t sentiments and intentions, constit!te s&mbols of relations and of promises, and are the occasion of festive enco!nters, in social sit!ations of vario!s t&pes and of all degrees of importance. )eople sometimes find it important to transfer to each other identical rings. (thers alternatel& treat each other with identical drin"s !p to more than the& wish or o!ght. +ifts seal deals and agreements. %he& are !sed to confirm hierarchical relations of all t&pes3 a domination with a gift to a s!bordinate, a s!bmission b& a gift to a s!perior, and even an e7!alit& in a brotherl& gift or reciprocit&. As we have seen, gifts can have as their onl& aim the promotion of the image or stat!s of the giver in the e&es of other people or in her own e&es B altho!gh this cannot be the tr!e image of a moral person B, b!t other gifts are still worse when the& aim at morall& or sociall& enslaving the receiver b& a moral debt, or at h!miliating her in showing that she is not capable to cater for her own need or her famil&;s. Eet, other gift8givings, on the contrar&, permit one to redeem a moral debt or to erase or compensate an inferior stat!s. %he 6n!it people, who have little else to watch b!t their relationships and whose wisdom is e0pressed in sa&ings, have two of them abo!t giving, both concerning its effect on social relations3 the gentle friends ma"e gifts and gifts ma"e friends# is matched b& another view devoid of ill!sion, the gift ma"es the slave as the whip ma"es the dog#. Finall&, the most important conse7!ence of the attit!de and act of giving ma& be the easiest to forget abo!t precisel& beca!se it is !bi7!ito!s and basic. Freel& bowing to another person;s will is a "ind of gift whose pervasiveness, even in moderate degrees and in reciprocit&, constit!te the condition of a viable societ& in a world where scarcities ma"e individ!als; desires oppose one another. +iving, &ielding, accepting, ac7!iescing, or endorsing constit!te the essence of the m!ltifario!s acts and attit!des that ma"e life in societ& possible. %his often goes with a sense of fairness and, to some degree, of fellow8feeling. +.14 5ormative economics and the good societ* ence, even tho!gh giving can be motivated b& self8interest, negative sentiments, and vicio!s intentions, it essentiall& also has all the noted effects cr!cial to the 7!alit& and even the e0istence of societ&, whereas altr!ism !nderlies the vario!s social sentiments that are the main so!rce of h!man satisfaction, and altr!istic giving is !nanimo!sl& considered the most val!able of social relations and the most praiseworth& of social actions. %he good societ& is made of good relations, not onl& of profitable e0change, and of good persons, not onl& of s&baritic cons!mers. (ne discipline cannot forget this is normative economics. 5ormative economics is more traditionall& concerned with the 7!alit& of societ& concerning the efficienc& (notabl& )areto wise) and the fairness and :!stice of the economic s&stem. As for efficienc&, its central topic concerns the fail!res# of mar"ets, agreements, and organi1ations. ence, the ver& important effects of giving, altr!ism, and pro8social and moral

$2 cond!cts, for remed&ing these fail!res are a prime concern of these st!dies B as is, similarl&, the responsibilit& of s!ch cond!cts in creating these fail!res. +iving in all its forms also has important effects on the distrib!tion of reso!rces and hence on its :!stice or fairness. 6n helping poorer people, a free act both has this val!able effect and generall& diminishes ine7!alit&. Eet, the essential giving and s!pport within families is both !s!all& praised and the ma:or so!rce of ine7!alities in opport!nities, non8 earned incomes, and earning capacities created b& ed!cation. Finall&, spontaneo!s respect of people and properties is an essential condition for the protection of social freedom, the f!ndamental val!e of o!r societies. 5ormative economics considers social ethical conceptions with the intention that the& be applied. %his application, however, impl& that these conceptions are endorsed b& some people who want, approve, or accept their reali1ation. 6ndeed, a social ethical view, principle, or set of principles is a priori three things3 an ethical logic in itself B that normative economics st!dies B F a sociological phenomenon of morals and opinion when this view has at least some social importanceF and an individ!al opinion for people who hold this view. <eali1ation B and hence !sef!lness of the anal&sis B implies that the last two aspects e0ist or arrive. 6f this view ta"es as end val!e a concept of what is good for individ!als, its endorsement b& an individ!al constit!tes an altr!ism of the latter. Conversel&, an& altr!ism towards several persons B and in partic!lar the general a priori altr!ism B implies a conception of the best sharing between these people, that is, of distrib!tive :!stice, which is a basic part of a social ethical view. %hese close relations between altr!ism and giving on the one hand and normative economics, social ethics, :!stice, and fairness on the other hand hold at all social levels, from the overall view of societies with often an implementation b& politics and the p!blic sector, to iss!es of local :!stice and direct interactions among agents. %he latter case occ!rs in partic!lar in one of the basic t&pes of reciprocit&. *2 Y 6n the end, altr!ism is e0pressed in varied forms. 6t ma& be individ!al, interpersonal, and !nilateral, as within the famil&. 6t ma& also be cooperative and m!ltilateral, being instit!tionali1ed in agencies of government, vol!ntar& associations or private philanthropies. 6f a tas" of economists is to ill!minate the allocation of reso!rces, then the anal&sis of altr!istic reso!rce !se is a bridge to be crossed.# (9. )helps, 1'2/). %his is to sa& the least. Eet, those among economists who are so fond of 7!oting <obertson;s proposition that the role of economists is to economi1e on love B the scarcest reso!rce B, miss a basic point that the& co!ld read in an alternative reference, Aristotle. Altr!ism, li"e the capacit& to love, is a virt!e, and this t&pe of reso!rce has the partic!larit& that it is more a!gmented than eroded b& !se, that the more &o! !se it, the more &o! have of it, beca!se it is perfected b& training and habit. (ne economist who emphasi1ed this is Alfred .arshall (18'4) who, after noticing that men are capable of more !nselfish service than the& generall& render#, adds that the s!preme aim of the economist is to discover how this latent asset can be developed more 7!ic"l& and t!rned to acco!nt more wisel&.#*$ $6% Giving reactions
*2

%he relations between normative economics and altr!ism and giving will be f!ll& considered in -ections 1*.$, 1/ and 16. *$ -ee -tephano Tamagni (1''/), 6ntrod!ction.

$8

14.1 !bo%t t"o partic%lar iss%es that ca%ght the fanc* of economists3 intertemporal giving and the internali1ation of the gift e0ternalit* ;>.;.; Intertemporal "ivin", oth ways? e$uest an! the retro'"ift pu lic !e t +iving can go thro!gh time, in both directions. @ownstream thro!gh be7!ests, and !pstream b& the appropriate p!blic debt. Ioth are essential social and economic iss!es. Eo! love &o!r grand8da!ghter, and &o!r grand8da!ghter loves &o!. Eo! want to help her when &o! will no longer be here, and &o! do this b& be7!est. -he herself will want to have helped &o! when &o! need it. -he cannot do it b& herself, b!t the government can do it for her than"s to p!blic e0pendit!res financed b& iss!ing p!blic debt that will be later redeemed than"s to ta0es paid b& &o!r grand8da!ghter. ence, a present government serving the people sho!ld foresee and anticipate this desire of &o!r grand8da!ghter as well as possible, and obe& and reali1e it in this wa& (this has been called a retro'"ift).** Altho!gh &o!r grand8da!ghter approves of the whole operation, when the redeeming time comes she generall& has to be forced to pa& beca!se the helping first part of the operation has alread& ta"en place. 5ote that &o!r grand8da!ghter will generall& be richer than &o! are, beca!se of economic growth and technical progress, and of the be7!est she received from &o!. Chen &o! s!ffer from a sit!ation of economic deflation, she wants to help &o!, than"s to debt8financed p!blic e0pendit!res. Eo! accept her benevolent gift. Eo! have a wa& to ref!se it, which is to a!gment correspondingl& &o!r be7!est to herF this cancels o!t both her sacrifice and the present effect of the p!blic e0pendit!re in increasing &o!r savings and decreasing &o!r cons!mption. I!t &o! a priori accept her benevolent gift. %his gift is also, in fact, a ret!rn8gift for the gift of be7!est she receives from &o!. 6n addition, she also provides this gift in her own interest, since maintaining the economic activit& also maintains the formation of capital from which she will benefit, and part of &o!r maintained income will be saved and transmitted to her as be7!est. Financing the p!blic e0pendit!re b& a ta0 is forcing &o! to spend, whereas financing the appropriate e0pendit!re b& a p!blic debt is ma"ing &o! benefit from a gift of &o!r descendents which &o! do not want to ref!se and "now &o! sho!ld not re:ect. ence, the so8 called <icardian e7!ivalence# between ta0 and p!blic debt (<obert Iarro, 1'2*) does not hold a priori, as facts show. 6ts theor& thin"s abo!t &o!r li"ing &o!r grand8da!ghter, b!t not abo!t &o!r grand8da!ghter li"ing &o!. 6n fact, of co!rse, man& other things happen. )eople do not act!all& consider ta0es on their descendents for obvio!s reasons. %he& do not "now the amo!nt of the p!blic borrowing. At an& rate,the global amo!nts sa& nothing to them. %he& do not "now if a part will be paid b& their own descendents, and which one and when. 6n fact, the p!blic debt can never be redeemed and grow as the interest it pa&s (with the proper economic growth). At an& rate, p!blic finance is s!b:ect to man& other effects. %he people do not "now them, and nobod& can foresee the f!t!re factors. )!blic finance other than what the& directl& see of it is opa7!e to them. %he f!t!re at the distance of a generation is ver& !ncertain. .oreover, gifts to descendents are :oint gifts with those of other relatives of the beneficiaries. %hese relatives can be in diverse generations. -ome of them are not &et determined (f!t!re marriages) and
**

-ee Golm 1'8/ (and also 1''6a).

$' cannot be "nown. ence, agreements of :oint giving are not possible. 6n addition, the motives for be7!est are often not p!re altr!ism. %here is a warm glow# of be7!est leading the giver to val!e the be7!est per se. 6n fact, a large part of the vol!me of be7!est probabl& res!lts from !ncertaint& abo!t the date of death B in this respect, be7!est is more accident than gift. Finall&, the p!blic polic& normall& ta"es people;s reaction into acco!nt. And, at an& rate, ta0ation, and notabl& the large ta0 on be7!ests, limits the possible effects on the beneficiaries. ;>.;.< Economic internali@ation of helpin" e#ternalities Chen an agent helps another at a cost that falls short of the val!e of the aid, this help can be ind!ced b& b!&ing it. owever, this is not possible in a n!mber of cases. For instance, the service can be an e0ternalit&. %he relation can also happen between members of a societ& where s!ch b!&ing does not occ!r. For instance the two protagonists are members of an organi1ation, for instance a firm, and the aid increases the prod!ctivit& of the beneficiar&. (r the& can be members or the same famil&. 6n these cases, the b!&ing, thro!gh some material incentive, can be performed b& a dominating agent, who can, for instance, !se for this p!rpose something withdrawn from the beneficiar& or from what she wo!ld have received otherwise. %his agent can for instance be a government who so internali1es the e0ternalit&, possibl& in ta0ing the beneficiar&. (r it can be the management of the organi1ation (firm) who can rem!nerate the helper with a bon!s financed with the e0tra gain. (r again this compensation can be performed within a famil&. %he same o!tcome can res!lt from the a!thorit& p!rs!ing its ob:ectives in choosing in partic!lar financial transfers. For instance, the government ma0imi1es some social welfare f!nction and chooses ta0es and s!bsidies. (r the firm ma0imi1es its profit and chooses the wages of its emplo&ees. (r, again, a famil& head ma0imi1es a f!nction of the !tilit&, cons!mption, or income of the members of the famil& and distrib!tes or redistrib!tes among them. %his ma0imi1ation has the noted effect of overcompensating the helper if it follows the r!le that an increase in the wealth of the gro!p benefits all its members. 6ndeed, the helping increases the wealth of the gro!p b& ass!mption, and the ma0imi1ation with the distrib!tion or redistrib!tion ma"es the helper better off on the whole (as it ma"es all other members better off). %he principle that an increased wealth benefits ever&one has been a national political ideal.*/ %his notion that an increase in an& reso!rce sho!ld benefit ever&one is a classical principle of fairness, called for instance solidarit&# b& Cilliam %homson. %he condition sa&s also that each individ!al welfare is a s!perior good# for the overall wealth. %his is an implicit ass!mption in +ar& Iec"er;s (1'2*) conception of intra8famil& redistrib!tion b& a benevolent pater familias (the so8called rotten "id theorem#). ;>.< Interferences with altruistic "ivin"? "eneral view %he cases of the two foregoing paragraphs, and those of the effects of p!blic transfers on private giving disc!ssed in -ection 2, are partic!lar cases of the effects on giving of other transfers B or their e7!ivalent B between the giver and the receiver, and, more generall&, of the interaction between giving and some interference with the donor, the beneficiar&, or both. Aario!s t&pes of phenomena intervene in these sit!ations which, for simplicit&, are restricted here to cases of altr!istic giving B that is, the donor cares onl& abo!t the receiver;s sit!ation B (other important cases were also considered in -ection 2). %he interference is often that of a p!blic polic&, b!t it can notabl& also be that of an& of the other distrib!ting dominant agents
*/

For instance, the French statesman 9dgar Fa!re opposed redistrib!tion of wealth b!t proposed that ever&one benefits from new benefits (a law&er, he was inspired b& the classical form of the marriage contract called comm!nit& red!ced to ac7!isitions#).

*4 considered in the previo!s section. %he gift can notabl& be aid to poor and need& people in charit&, or intrafamil& gifts and notabl& be7!est. %he interference can affect one of the two parties of the giving or both of them. 6t can be giving to or ta"ing from the giver or the receiver, or a transfer between them, in both possible directions. %he t&pe of interaction between the giver and the interfering agent is a cr!cial determinant. %he general case is that the& pla& a game# which can be cooperative or non8cooperative. 6n the latter case, the sol!tion can notabl& be a Co!rnot85ash or a -tac"elberg e7!ilibri!m, and, in the latter case, either the giver or the interfering agent can be the leader. %he interference can also simpl& be considered as given e0ogeno!sl&, b!t this is a priori a wea" and imperfect model, and there can be a f!ller consideration of this agent;s ob:ective. An e0ogeno!s variation of the giver;s means (a decrease can res!lt from a ta0) ind!ces her to var& her gift in the same direction and of a lower amo!nt if the receiver;s sit!ation is a normal good for her. An e0ogeno!s gift to the beneficiar& leads the giver to red!ce her gift (in the same condition), and the final res!lt sho!ld be the same as if this amo!nt were given to the giver B if she contin!es to give. owever, the sit!ation often t!rns o!t to be an agreement between the two givers B with, for instance, a p!blic s!bsid& (or a ta0 rebate) for the initial giver. As a gift can more or less crowd o!t# another gift to the same person, it can also deter the beneficiar& from helping herself in self8care or effort. %he standard sol!tion consists of providing conditional gifts, s!ch as charit& to the deserving poor# rather than also to the !ndeserving poor# in 1'th cent!r& 9ngland, the present restriction of !nemplo&ment s!bsidies to people activel& see"ing a :ob, or aid tied to own contrib!tion or s!bsidies to effort. %his effect is =ames I!chanan (1'2/);s -amaritan dilemma.# %he cases of transfers imposed between the donor and the beneficiar& has a n!mber of applications. %he transfers have been considered as e0ogeno!sl& given. %he gift then a priori ad:!sts so as to e0actl& compensate the transfer and it erases its effects, if there remains a gift. 6n this wa&, lower private charit& compensates p!blic transfers. A decrease in be7!ests erases the effects of government ta0es to finance e0pendit!res in favo!r of f!t!re generations. Conversel&, an increase in be7!ests compensates the effects of p!blic e0pendit!res financed b& borrowing (Iarro, 1'2*). -imilarl&, the actions of the dominating agents of -ection 14.1.2 amo!nt to transferring from the beneficiar& to the giver, b!t this transfer is e0plicitl& chosen. Act!all&, of co!rse, the transfers are !s!all& chosen in considering the giver;s reactions and vario!s t&pes of game8theoretic relations can ta"e place, and a n!mber of other aspects are also important in each case (see, e.g., -ection 14.1.1). $$% *olving 7Adam *mith8s pro.lem9 As Ilaise )ascal wrote, man is neither angel nor beast# (he added he who wants to pla& angel pla&s beast#). Adam -mith seems to have been obsessed b& the idea that people serve the interests of other people. owever, he relied, for this p!rpose, on two opposite ass!mptions abo!t motivations in his two main wor"s. 6ndeed, the !niversal altr!ist of the Theory of &oral Sentiments stands in a stri"ing contrast with the selfish e0changer of the -ealth of 2ations. %he vivid description of the former ma& lead one to thin" that she is read& to help other people, and &et -mith later sa&s that &o! wo!ld do better to rel& on the other person;s egoism (in e0change) to obtain something from her. %he possible contradiction was even made a topic of scholarship b& +erman scholars !nder the name 4as *!am Smith ,ro lem. 6t is said that -mith reversed his view abo!t h!man nat!re after his visit to France

*1 where he met economists. 6n an& event, he certainl& read the arg!ment of the -ealth of 2ations in the Essays on &oral of the =ansenist )ierre 5icole, written one cent!r& earlier and translated into 9nglish b& =ohn ?oc"e.*6 6n fact, -mith was probabl& read& to welcome the reversal of perspectives abo!t motivations. 6ndeed, the altr!ist of the Theory of &oral Sentiments is onl& limitedl& moral. .!ch of his altr!ism is of the hedonistic "ind. e largel& favo!rs the other person;s pleas!re beca!se, b& spontaneo!s empath& and somewhat b& spontaneo!s emotional contagion, it fosters his own pleas!re. Gant wo!ld sternl& den& that this is moral, or even good (however, -mith also introd!ces both impartialit& and d!t&). At an& rate, -mith praises both the altr!istic and the selfish characters beca!se the& serve other individ!als. For the selfish person, this is in the framewor" of mar"et e0change. %he idea was developed b& )areto into the )areto efficienc& of competitive mar"ets. %his, however, is for individ!als ma0imi1ing their ophelimities wi rather than their altr!istic !tilities ui, whereas the highest !tilit& is what the& in fact want. ence, there is also a ,areto ,ro lem. 6t is stri"ing, in fact, that the economists who anal&sed the efficienc& of selfish e0change the most perceptivel& are those who also emphasised altr!ism (-mith, =ohn -t!art .ill, 9dgeworth, ?Don Calras for solidarit&, )areto). %his raises two 7!estions3 the relations between altr!ism and mar"ets, and the motives of individ!als. %he most important fact is that there is no contradiction between the altr!ism and the selfishness of h!mans, b!t, on the contrar&, essential complementarities in their manifestations and effects, for three reasons3 1) Altho!gh the mar"et rests on selfish behavio!r, some altr!ism is indispensable to its wor"ing, for preventing generali1ed stealing and cheating that self8defence and the police alone co!ld not chec" (moreover, who wo!ld prevent p!rel& self8interested police and armed forces from robbing at g!npointX) 2) Altr!ism co!ld :eopardi1e the efficient wor"ing of the price s&stem thro!gh lac" of competition, price rebates, overpa&ments or overprovision.*2 owever, most of the altr!ism that e0ists in societ& be&ond famil& circles and can lead to transfers is :oint altr!ism towards people in need or poor. 6t re7!ires :oint giving with man& contrib!tors, which cannot occ!r spontaneo!sl&, and has essentiall& to be performed b& the fiscal s&stem if this giving is sociall& efficient, rational, and moral (see -ection 2). ence it is or sho!ld be performed b& the p!blic sector, o!tside of the mar"et. %his permits the efficient wor"ing of the mar"et not to be :eopardi1ed b& intr!sive giving. $) .ar"et e0change, giving, and voting for transfers occ!r in different circ!mstances, at different times, and among people with different relations 8Bthe mar"et, the famil&, charit&, the polit&. Altr!istic behavio!r in mar"ets that wo!ld ind!ce price rebates, overpa&ments or, for a given pa&ment, providing more goods or labo!r or accepting less of them, or again abstaining from competing in s!ppl&ing or demanding items or labo!r, wo!ld destro& the economic efficienc& of the price s&stem as informing agents abo!t relative scarcities and desires. owever, self8interest alone ind!ces one to ta"e rather than to e0change, when the other
*6

%his is li"el& beca!se some passages of the -ealth of 2ations are ver& close to passages of Essays on &oral, for instance those marveling abo!t the ver& large n!mber of persons whose wor" !ltimatel& serve a single one (and of those who !ltimatel& benefit from a person;s wor"). -mith also read .andeville and his presentation of the p!blic virt!e of private vices.# *2 -ee Golm 1'8* and ?awrence Granich 1'88 for a general consideration. A partic!lar instance of this effect is the reciprocitarian labo!r s!ppl& creating apparent s!bemplo&ment (considered b& A"erlof as noted above).

*2 person;s self8defence and the fear of the police are not s!fficient. And, in fact, a minim!m of vol!ntar& respect of others; propert& and of spontaneo!s honest& is necessar& to a normal wor"ing of an e0tensive mar"et s&stem. ence, e0change, which is neither giving nor stealing, implies and re7!ires an altr!ism low eno!gh to limit interfering giving and high eno!gh to limit disr!ptive stealing. ?ow altr!ism co!ld lead to some :oint giving where contrib!tors share the cost, b!t free riding chec"s it (hence an agreement fail!re can prevent a mar"et fail!re), and p!blic reali1ation ta"es ipso facto the iss!e o!t of the mar"et. .ore generall&, individ!als commonl& have different motives depending on whom the& relate to and the circ!mstances and moments. %he& can be selfish B &et, respectf!l B in mar"ets, and altr!istic in the famil&, in giving to charit&, in approving of :oint gifts implemented b& p!blic transfers (while preferring not to pa& themselves), or in letting their vote abo!t p!blic polic& or a constit!tion be infl!enced b& their sense of :!stice. 6ndeed, we have noted that both =ohn -t!art .ill and ?Don Calras point o!t that people can be selfish or concerned abo!t other people or a common good according to their state of mind, the latter case occ!rring in their moments of calm reflection B altho!gh s!pporting the common good in choosing a constit!tion, in cr!cial votes, or in case of collective danger is rather done in collective e0citement B (remember that =ohn -t!art .ill calls altr!ism favo!ring the highest !tilitarian s!m of individ!al !tilities). And )areto disting!ishes the sphere of the econom& where people see" to ma0imi1e their ophelimit& wi from the higher sphere of sociolog&# where the concerns are individ!als; !tilit& ui. Eet, the most elaborate answer to the challenge posed b& Adam -mith;s problem# came from the most s!btle and perceptive of 9nglish economists, )hilip Cic"steed (1888, 1'46, 1'$$).*8 6n addition to his earl& contrib!tions to economic choice theor& (transitivit& and its limits, priorities, revealed preferences, marginal ine7!alities, bo!nded rationalit&, allocation of time, effort and attention, intrafamil& economics, gro!p preferences in comm!nal sense#, etc.), Cic"steed, also a clerg&man and a profo!nd commentator of A!g!ste Comte and Ailfredo )areto, was partic!larl& interested in altr!ism. For him, choice theor& (refined one) applies to this motive of allocation no less and no more than to others. e is of co!rse well aware of economic# e0changes b& which each participant ta"es the other as onl& a means, and &et serves the other;s ends in see"ing onl& her own. e emphasi1es, however, that these ends need not be selfish in themselves. %he& onl& need to be selfish towards the partner in e0change, not towards the rest of the world. Eo! ma& want to benefit in order to s!pport &o!r famil& or give to charit& or other ca!ses. For Cic"steed, there e0ist s!ch economic relations, b!t no economic man in the classical sense. Chat ma"es it an economic transaction is that 6 am not considering &o! e0cept as a lin" in the chain, or considering &o!r desires e0cept as the means b& which 6 ma& gratif& those of someone else B not necessaril& m&self. The economic relation !oes not e#clu!e from my min! every one ut me, it potentially inclu!es everyone ut you# (emphasis added). Cic"steed labels this attit!de non'tuism. e also notes that motives depend on the moment, and that b!siness relations, and especiall& emplo&ment relations, are sometimes not p!rel& non8t!istic. $'% &he causes of and reasons for altruism 6nformation abo!t the ca!ses of and reasons for altr!ism can be !sef!l for two reasons3 for foreseeing altr!ism and its conse7!ences s!ch as respect for other persons or helping them, and for tr&ing to infl!ence altr!ism B essentiall& to promote it beca!se of its mostl&
*8

An interesting recent presentation of the essence of Cic"steed;s Common Sense of ,olitical Economy is proposed b& 6an -teedman (1'8'), Chapter 14.

*$ favo!rable conse7!ences and intrinsic val!e. Altr!ism is the main concern of moral ed!cation, and the topic of the penal s&stem can be said to be its absence or misplacement. ence, the ca!ses of altr!ism and of its absence have been the ob:ect of intense reflection and debate at all times and in all societies (as far as we "now). A standard and main iss!e concerns the relative importance of social infl!ence and ed!cation and of the !nderl&ing biological material, with a partic!lar place for infl!ence d!ring infanc&. %his 7!estion has ta"en prominence beca!se the answer is s!pposed to tell !s what can and what cannot be changed and infl!enced. As far as mere e0planation is concerned, however, this 7!estion is not correctl& posed beca!se c!lt!re is not more recent than other aspects of h!mans and it infl!ences biological selection b& mating and s!rvival rates (h!man nat!ral# genetic selection, as well as h!man nat!re,# are largel& c!lt!re). .oreover, the ver& anatom& of the brain is infl!enced b& c!lt!re which acts in creating connections and ne!rons and not onl& infl!0. 5e!robiologists have fo!nd with relative precision the areas of the brain, ne!ronic circ!its, and hormones responsible# for social emotions and attachments, b!t no !sef!l concl!sion have been derived &et (s!ch as finding o!t someone;s anti8social propensit&). %he main information abo!t the ca!se of altr!ism or lac" of it is to be fo!nd in st!dies in ps&cholog&, notabl& the ps&cholog& of the child and generic ps&cholog& (with the landmar" st!d& of =ean )iaget;s The 3irth of the &oral Sentiment in the Chil! (1'$2) and the wor" of Gohlberg), social ps&cholog&, sociolog&, ps&choanal&sis (cum "rano salis), and histor& and anthropolog&. %hese contrib!tions of other disciplines are, of co!rse, be&ond o!r present topic.*' -ome adepts of the dismal science#, faced with the sad evidence that h!man character is not so sad after all, tried to save selfishness in displacing it from homo economicus to her genes, and hence became interested in the sociobiological selection of altr!ism towards "in. Another selectional ca!se of altr!ism can be fo!nd in gro!p selection B gro!ps of altr!istic co8 operators o!tperform others B, which is as old as selection theor& since it is @arwin;s own theor& of competing tribes. Eet, a third mechanism of genetic selection e0plains altr!ism m!ch more straightforwardl&. 6ndeed, &o! (that is, an& animal) have an interest in mating with altr!ists since the& will protect &o! and &o!r common offspring. %his ma"es the altr!istic gene# (genetic config!rations favo!rable to altr!ism) spread more than alternatives. .oreover, since &o!r mate;s altr!ism helps &o! s!rvive more, the character of being attracted b& altr!ists is also selected and spreads, in addition to conscio!sl& see"ing protection. %he altr!ist protects &o!r common offspring beca!se of hisSher altr!ism and beca!se the& are hisSher offspring B and &o! both care for &o!r offspring (wo!ld it onl& be as a res!lt of the selection of altr!ism towards "in). )eople who give gifts in co!rtship ma& not do it in order to pretend that the& are altr!ists, b!t this behavio!r of theirs ma& have been selected for this ver& reason. (f co!rse, altr!ism also can be a handicap for self8s!rvival, and an e7!ilibri!m obtains. Eet, 6 do not hope that an& biological consideration will provide an& concl!sion s!fficientl& specific, s!btle, and to the point to be !sef!l for !nderstanding h!man altr!ism, given the possibilities of reflective and anal&tical observation. 6 regret it, b!t, for e0ample, the mere variet& of t&pes of altr!isms pointed o!t in the ne0t section seems to vindicate this concl!sion. owever, the biological approach seems to be appreciated b& some people, notabl& in economics, for them to be convinced of the possibilit& of altr!ism.
*'

For a disc!ssion of this literat!re, with s&nthesis and concl!sions, see Golm 1'8*a.

** II A &R:I*(* AN; GI"ING $)% Altruisms, types and causes or reasons 1(.1 -eneral presentation ;:.;.; Intro!uction >nderstanding, e0plaining, and forecasting altr!ism, giving, and their conse7!ences re7!ires having a clear view of the nat!re of these phenomena, each of which has a variet& of t&pes and of ca!ses or reasons. %his is the ob:ective of the remar"s presented in this section. %he ver& definitions of altr!ism and of giving are tric"&, and can onl& reall& be presented after the consideration and anal&sis of the vario!s cases. For a start, an altr!istic view of a person is a view that val!es positivel& and for itself what is good for another person or what it deems to be so./4 And giving is an !nconditional action of a person, p!rposef!ll& favo!rable in some wa& to another and costl& in some wa& for the actor. 5ote that, apart from this cost, the giver ma& benefit from other effects of her action and give for this reason. %he noted persons can be individ!als B as it will be the case here B or an& other relevant entities. An altr!istic view leads its holder to give when this person finds that the val!able conse7!ences according to this view more than compensate the costs for her. An altr!ist is someone who holds altr!istic views, or someone who gives for this reason. Altr!ism means both the e0istence of altr!istic views and the res!lting givings. Altr!istic views are of vario!s t&pes disting!ished b& their ca!ses or reasons. %hese t&pes can more or less be :ointl& present. %he& divide into two categories, he!onistic or natural altruism, and normative altruism. %he social ps&chological phenomena of affection, s&mpath&, empath&, emotional contagion, fellow feeling, compassion, and pit&, ma"e a person feel happ& or sad as a conse7!ence of the happiness or pain, or good or bad sit!ation, of another person. %he& ind!ce nat!ral# or hedonistic# altr!ism. (n the other hand, normative altr!ism is ind!ced b& moral intuition, non8moral social norms, or vario!s applications of reason or rationalit&. .oral int!ition and moral reason ind!ce the two "inds of moral altruism. %here are, of co!rse, man& other reasons to give than altr!ism. %he& do not foc!s on and val!e the improvement of the beneficiar&;s sit!ation in itself. %he most direct s!ch cond!ct is following a simple norm of giving with this propert&. %his norm is ps&chologicall& of a moral "ind witho!t referring to an altr!istic intention (for this reason, one can validl& den& that this cond!ct is moral in an ethical sense). %his norm of giving is a priori s!pported b& a social view, and b& the corresponding opinion of some people (voiced or implicit). .ore generall&, however, :!dgments abo!t giving elicit a n!mber of motives that ind!ce it. %he& are made b& other people, b& some social opinion, and b& the actor herself. %he& lead to see"ing praise and approval, absol!te or relative stat!s, and a good image, from the :!dgments of other people b!t incl!ding self8approval and image of oneself in one;s own e&es (that Adam -mith ta"es to be an empath& of other persons; views of oneself). -ocial :!dgments ind!ce non8moral social norms of the two "inds relevant here3 a norm or val!e for giving per se, and a norm or val!e for caring abo!t the beneficiar&, and hence, possibl&, for giving for her sa"e. +iving beca!se of non8moral social norms is in between giving from an int!itivel& moral motive and giving beca!se of the :!dgment of other people or of societ&, since it is close to the former and &et generall& re7!ires the consideration of the :!dgments of other
/4

%his good# is the happiness, pleas!re, satisfaction, or welfare of this other person onl& as a partic!lar case. %he other cases are what economists call paternalism.#

*/ people (or the imagination of this :!dgment). Eet, failing to abide b& moral val!es and b& non8moral social val!es elicits respectivel& g!ilt and shame, two ver& different sentiments. Ce have also seen the central role of giving in a variet& of t&pes of social relations. Finall&, vario!s social or economic effects of giving can provide strictl& self8interested benefits to the giver. %his incl!des effects thro!gh mar"ets, ret!rn gifts for reasons of balance, fairness, gratit!de, or li"ing, and other social rewards provided either for rewarding merit or for ind!cing f!rther gifts. owever, if these effects are the reason for the giving, a basic intrinsic propert& of this t&pe of action vanishes. %he present part shows the vario!s t&pes of altr!ism (-ection 1$) and of non8altr!istic giving (-ection 1/), with special consideration of the relations between altr!ism and :!stice (-ection 1*). %he varieties of altr!ism and of non8altr!istic giving are s!mmari1ed in tables 1 and $, respectivel&. .otives for giving can foc!s on the beneficiar& or on the giver, and the former case can be paternalistic# or not. -ection 1$.2 presents the vario!s t&pes of nat!ral or hedonistic altr!ism, whereas -ection 1$.$ anal&ses the three "inds of normative altr!ism and their relations and effects. 5on8altr!istic giving can aim at eliciting social effects concerning :!dgments, the giver;s and the receiver;s sit!ation, or social relations (-ection 1/.2), or at favo!ring self8interest thro!gh vario!s possible wa&s (-ection1/.$) B incl!ding indirect economic or social effects, reward, or a ret!rn gift.

*6

;:.;.< The twelve asic types of altruism %able 1 s!mmari1es the str!ct!re of altr!ism and its twelve basic t&pes. -95%6.95%affection affective s&mpath& hedonistic, nat!ral p!re hedonistic direct 8 ass!med own emotional contagion empath& compassion moral hedonistic pit& Altr!ism moral int!ition norms social norm s!bstit!tion selfish# normative rational impartialit&, :!stice social rational !niversali1ation &a.le $% &ypes and structure of altruism ;:.;.: The o (ects of reasons for "ivin" an! altruisms 1$.1.$.1 +ift or receiver;s sit!ation %he relevant iss!e for eval!ating a gift can be either the res!lting sit!ation of the beneficiar&, or the gift in itself. %his distinction practicall& identifies with the two families of reasons for giving3 altr!ism val!es the sit!ation of the receiver, and vario!s other effects of the gift are generall& based on the gift in itself. 5orms or val!es and opinions of all t&pes can attach to these two aspects. From -ections * and 2, appreciation of the gift in itself can res!lt from val!ing the sacrifice or the responsibilit& of the giver (the iss!e of distrib!tive ta0es was also disc!ssed there). -ome instances ma& seem to belong to a case b!t act!all& belong to the other. For e0ample, if someone ma"es a conspic!o!s gift to someone else in order to enhance the receiver;s social stat!s, then this stat!s is the aspect of the receiver;s sit!ation she val!es. p!tative reciprocit& nee!, sufferin" merit ine$uality nee!, sufferin" pro#imity, community merit special eneficiaries norms of fairness frien!s, relations "eneral closeness nee!, sufferin" nee!, sufferin" in "eneral A))?6CA%6(5family

*2 1$.1.$.2 )aternalism# 6n altr!ism, favo!ring what is good for the beneficiar& of a gift can be either according to the receiver;s :!dgment, or according to another conception. %he former case corresponds to economists; classical respect of the preferences# of the receiver. 6t is then !s!all& ta"en to mean val!ing the receiver;s satisfaction. 6t is also classicall& related to the more tangible meaning of val!ing the receiver;s happiness, pleas!re, or :o&, or the relief of her pain, s!ffering, miser&, or dissatisfaction. %he other case is !s!all& called paternalism,# altho!gh this term is ambig!o!s in itself since a benevolent father# ma& also val!e his children;s satisfaction or happiness rather than his own conception of what is good for them if it wo!ld lead to another choice. Altr!ism res!lting from empath& or emotional contagion favo!rs the other person;s :o&, happiness, pleas!re, or lesser pain. 5ormative altr!isms and altr!ism res!lting from affection or compassion can be of both t&pes. .oreover, the dichotom& between the two cases is not simplistic, notabl& for reasons concerning aspects of the beneficiar& with respect to information, wea"ness of the will, and m!ltiple self sim!ltaneo!sl& or over time. %he preferences of a person are not alwa&s a !ni7!e well defined s&stem. %here often are oppositions between her short8term and her long8term interests or desires, her greed and her desire to be a good person or to behave properl&, her choice and what she thin"s she sho!ld choose or what she thin"s e0 post she sho!ld have chosen. %his raises iss!es of pr!dence, moral behavio!r, wea"ness of the will, and regret. An altr!ist who wants the good of the other person as this person conceives it ma& therefore have val!es which oppose some desires, manifestations or e0pressions of this person. %he altr!ist and the person in 7!estion ma& have different relevant information, and one piece of information, or the other, ma& be better. A person ma& even wish to be constrained in her actions in the name of better information, in her short8term pleas!re in the name of her long8 term interest or pr!dence, and in her greed in the name of good or proper behavio!r. %his latter case can be a case of economists; paternalism,# b!t it can also be obedience to one of the person;s desires. An altr!istic sailor on >l&sses; boat sho!ld forcef!ll& tie him to the mast in the name of >l&sses; medi!m8term interest. %he altr!istic span"ing :!stified b& the dict!m $ui ene amat ene casti"at can be both drilling into the father;s ideal (hence so8called paternalism#), or promotion of the victim;s long8term interest or moral ideal (or f!t!re moral ideal). 1(.2 5at%ral or hedonistic altr%isms Chen &o! are happier beca!se someone is happier, or beca!se she is in a sit!ation that &o! thin" is better for her, then &o!r own e!demonism or hedonism ma"es &o! val!e the pleas!re or lesser pain of the other, or the relevant improvement in her sit!ation. %his is nat!ral or hedonistic altr!ism. 6t has several t&pes of ca!ses (which can be :ointl& present). ;:.<.; Emotional conta"ion Emotional conta"ion ma"es &o! have emotions that &o! observe in others. %his is well "nown and also present in animal societies (partic!larl& for fear and anger). %his constit!tes the imitatio affectuum (imitation of affects) so central in -pino1a;s Ethics and for @avid !me. 6t is also a main factor of crowd ps&cholog& (+!stave ?e Ion). %he ind!ced emotion is generall& of lower intensit& than the original one (b!t it is higher in appropriate conditions, and there can be feedbac"s and phenomena of resonance).

*8 ;:.<.< Empathies Eo! can imagine &o!rself being in the place of some other person. %his tho!ght can be called su stitution. Eet, &o! can appl& this to vario!s characteristics of this other person. Iesides the other person;s material, social, or ph&sical sit!ation, &o! can also imagine endorsing vario!s mental characteristics of hers, s!ch as !nderstanding, intentions, tastes and preferences, or some of them or aspects of them. Chen this mental operation affects &o!r emotions or feelings in the direction of those of the other person, one spea"s of empathy (a term d!e to .a0 -cheler). owever, there are three t&pes of empath&, or three aspects of it. (1) 6n !irect empathy, &o! imagine directl& endorsing the other person;s emotional state, or state of her feeling, which &o! infer from her e0pression (verbal, ph&sical, written, etc.). (2) 6n assume! empathy, &o! imagine having emotions or feelings that &o! infer to be those of the other person from what &o! "now abo!t her sit!ation, tastes, sensibilit&, and so on. ($) 6n own empathy, &o! imagine what wo!ld be &o!r own emotions and feelings if &o! were in the other person;s place for the non8emotional characteristics for which &o! imagine the s!bstit!tion. For instance, the empath& described b& Adam -mith (witho!t the name) is own empath&. %hese three t&pes of empath& can be mi0ed and associated. 6n partic!lar, &o! will want a consistenc& between direct and ass!med empath&, that is, between the emotions and feelings that the other person seems to e0perience and their ca!ses or reasons (incl!ding the other person;s tastes, sensibilit&, etc.). (wn empath& wo!ld amo!nt to ass!med empath& if there were f!ll s!bstit!tion for all characteristics that can affect the considered emotions or feelings (incl!ding tastes, sensibilit&, etc.), b!t this ma& not be possible. @irect empath& can easil& be associated with emotional contagion. %hen, these imagined emotions and feelings of &o!rs, ind!ced from the other person;s emotions or feelings or from their ca!ses, ind!ce in &o! derived empath&8emotions which differ from the imagined feeling B and a fortiori from the act!al ones B in being in the same wa& agreeable or painf!l, and with an intensit& which varies in the same direction b!t is generall& lower. %hese empath&8emotions then ind!ce acting, s!ch as giving or helping, if the& appear to be worth the cost. Ce have th!s noticed that empath& implies three levels of emotions, feelings or sentiments3 the original ones of the other person, those imagined for &o!rself, and the res!lting empath&8emotions. %he first and the last are real, whereas the intermediate ones are imagined. .oreover, empath& can be more or less vol!ntar& or invol!ntar&. ;:.<.: *ffection an! sympathy A priori affection towards someone, li"ing her, directl& implies li"ing what is good for her, and notabl& her :o& or the alleviation of her pain. Affection can be associated with empath& (notabl& when one "nows the li"ed person well), and with emotional contagion (notabl& if one is close to her, in fre7!ent contact where she falls !nder one;s attention), b!t it is a proper ca!se of altr!ism b& itself. Affective altr!ism can val!e the pleas!re of the li"ed person, b!t it can also wish aspects of the person;s sit!ation that one deems to be good for her and that are not the most cond!cive to her pleas!re (a paternalism# that can even lead to $ui ene amat ene casti"at). Feeling sympathy towards someone a priori entails en:o&ing her pleas!re and feeling sorrow for her grief. %he ind!ced sentiments are generall& of lower intensit& than the original ones. -&mpath& is favo!rable to empath& and emotional contagion, b!t it is a ca!se of altr!ism in itself. -&mpath& is relativel& close to a mild form of affection, b!t there ma& also

*' be some difference in nat!re. 6n partic!lar, s&mpath& does not entail so close an involvement with the other person;s good, and sense of responsibilit& for it, as affection generall& does. As a conse7!ence, s&mpath& can lead one to val!e and favo!r, in addition to the other person;s pleas!re, her long8term pr!dential interest, b!t probabl& not other aspects of her sit!ation for themselves in a classical paternalistic# fashion. Apart from this present8da& meaning, the term s&mpath& has meant different things. Adam -mith !ses it to mean empath& and, secondaril&, emotional contagion. %he et&mological sense of s&mpath& is abo!t the same as compassion, and it applies well to emotional contagion and to empath&. ;:.<.= Compassion an! pity Compassion and pity are altr!istic sentiments towards people in poor sit!ation. %he miser& that elicits them can be material, b!t also p!rel& mental in relation to some e0pectation or habit. %hese sentiments need no a priori positive sentiment towards the other, s!ch as affection and s&mpath&. (n the contrar&, affection precl!des pit& in crowding it o!t, since the pain &o! feel from the pain of someone &o! li"e m!ch or love a priori leaves no room for a sentiment of pit&. ?ess intense li"ing prod!ces this effect onl& to some degree. owever, notwithstanding the apparent p!rit& of the concepts of compassion and pit&, the& are in fact coc"tails of the other views and feelings. 6ndeed, the& mobili1e elements of empath& and of emotional contagion, and the& also have a dimension of int!itive moral altr!ism B or are closel& associated with it. %he& ind!ce sadness from the other person;s grief, !s!all& with a m!ch lower intensit& (e0cept for saints), and the& sometimes are motivated b& specific aspects of the other;s sit!ation and not onl& her pain, in a "ind of paternalism. )it& can also have an element of condescension. ;:.<.A )elations an! nature of he!onistic altruism %he vario!s forms of nat!ral altr!ism have relations between themselves. %he& can more or less be :ointl& present, some favo!ring others or the converse. Affection and s&mpath& favo!r empath& and emotional contagion beca!se of the "nowledge of the other person the& impl& and of the foc!s of attention on her the& ind!ce. 9mpath& is also favo!red b& the interest in and c!riosit& abo!t the other person ind!ced b& affection and s&mpath&. Compassion and pit& are restricted to poor sit!ations of the other person, we have seen that the& contain some empath& and emotional contagion, b!t that the& rather tend to be e0cl!ded or limited b& the presence of affection or s&mpath& which tend to mobili1e B in a sense B the sentiment towards the s!ffering person. 5at!ral altr!ism can easil& be seen as gen!ine and proper altr!ism, b!t it can also be seen, on the contrar&, as an e0tension of egoism, beca!se it rests on one;s pleas!re, notabl& in the case of empath& and emotional contagion, and beca!se it is, in the case of affection and to some e0tent of s&mpath&, in essence an e0tension of the ego to one;s famil& or friends. %his red!ction of nat!ral altr!ism to egoism wo!ld notabl& oppose it to moral altr!ism. Along this line, Gant wo!ld do!btlessl& classif& nat!ral altr!ism along with other tastes among the individ!al;s inclinations# which morals sho!ld fight (in the name of reason in his view). 1(.( 5ormative altr%isms ;:.:.; The three types of normative altruism? moral, social, an! rational

/4

5ormative altr!ism of an individ!al is her seeing the good of some other people as a val!e in itself, a final or end val!e. %his view can th!s conceive of norms abo!t this good. 6t can motivate giving or helping in spite of the costs. 5ormative altr!ism divides into three categories, which can be called respectivel& intuitively moral, social, and rational. %wo are moral in nat!re3 the int!itivel& moral and the rational t&pes. Eet, int!itivel& moral and social normative altr!ism refer directl& to val!es or norms, in opposition to rational normative altr!ism in which some reasoning of a moral and logical nat!re is basic (altho!gh it is sometimes 7!ite short). %he names !sed re7!ire a few precisions. %he adverb int!itivel&# is meant to disting!ish int!itivel& moral# from rational moral.# 6t is chosen beca!se of the ver& common !se of the term moral int!ition# for describing the nat!re of the val!es in 7!estion (this traditional !se e0trapolates the normal sense of the term int!ition which refers to a "ind of cognition abo!t facts, and in this sense it treats val!es as if the& were tr!ths, which the& are not). .oreover, these int!itive moral val!es are do!btlessl& no less social in origin than the other val!es to which we restrict the term social# for the sa"e of brevit& and convenience, and whose f!ll name sho!ld more e0actl& be non8moral social.# Eet, these two categories are a priori neatl& distinct. A moral val!e or obligation is felt as intrinsic B even if it applies in specific social conte0ts B, it can entail a d!t&, and failing in this respect entails g!ilt. A (non8moral) social val!e or norm basicall& refers to a :!dgment of societ&,# or of other people,# it sa&s what is proper or correct, or what is to be done, and failing in this respect elicits !neasiness or shame. owever, a few remar"s are re7!ired. A social val!e or norm ma& have become internali1ed, it ma& have become a personal habit B and this is in fact the most common case, in addition to the social :!dgment. %he :!dgment of other people or of societ& ma& be onl& imagined. .oral val!es are also ac7!ired b& internali1ation of :!dgments of societ&# or of others, b!t the& are h&posta1iated and ac7!ire an a!tonomo!s stat!s. .oreover, moral val!es are generall& also social in the sense that the& are praised b& societ&# or b& other people.# Eet, this is not necessar& for them. %he criterion is the :!dgment of &o!r conscience. 6ndeed, there are cases, often remar"able, of moral val!es that oppose general opinion. 6n fact, in all these cases, societ&# ma& be a s!b8societ& whose views ma& oppose that of other people or societies. %hese distinctions and relations are s!mmari1ed as follows3 Rational int!itive moral moral social non8moral social

&a.le '% Normative altruisms ;:.:.< &oral an! social normative altruism 1$.$.2.1 5at!re and distinction +iving and helping are prima facie the paragon of actions praised b& morals. Ienevolence as disposition to help, attit!des favo!rable to other persons, and the corresponding sentiments, are the paragon of moral attit!des or sentiments B where moral# is ta"en in its ethical sense. .oral :!dgments, indeed, bear not onl& on acts b!t also on intentions, attit!des, and sentiments. 6n partic!lar, the& do not onl& praise helping per se in general, b!t also :!dge its

/1 motives. %he& disc!ss, endorse or critici1e vario!s moral norms. 6n fact, moral :!dgments hold an action to be moral B and praise it for this B onl& if its intention is, b!t the& can also approve of some acts that are not properl& moral acts in this sense. 6n giving in order to show off, the& approve of giving b!t regret the motive. And the& even condemn the motive when giving aims at h!miliating the receiver. .oral :!dgments even :!dge the motives of nat!ral and hedonistic altr!ism, in spite of the fact that the& are bare ps&chological phenomena3 these :!dgements can hold that &o! o!ght to love &o!r famil& or &o!r neighbo!r,# that &o! sho!ld not be insensitive to other people;s pain, and that &o! sho!ld practice empath&. %he& see favo!rabl& that &o! let &o!rself be emotionall& contaminated when the sentiment is love b!t the& condemn it when it is hatred. A partic!lar religio!s tradition has developed the concept of charit& in acts, sentiments, or :!dgments, towards persons in an !nfort!nate sit!ation of some "ind (other traditions are content with compassion or with general solidarit&). %his moral altr!ism is one "ind of normative altr!ism. Another "ind B social altr!ism B refers to :!dgments of societ&# or in societ&# of praise or blame, that are not moral in the strict sense of ethical. %he& refer to properness,# to what is done# or is not done,# often to c!stom, tradition, or !ses (when not to fashion). A ma:or difference between these two categories of normative :!dgments is that social normative :!dgments foc!s essentiall& on acts and attit!des, whereas moral :!dgments eval!ate also the inner facts of motives and intentions, which even constit!te their most basic reference. %his is d!e to the fact that the :!dgment of other people is essential or at least important in social normative eval!ation3 the actor :!dges herself thro!gh the :!dgment of others, whether it is act!al or imagined b& her. ence, essentiall& visible facts matter, that is, acts and attit!des. .orals, on the other hand, consider more intentions and motives, and even ta"e them as the deepest criterion since the& constit!te the primar& ca!se with respect to the moral a!tonom& basicall& ass!med b& moral eval!ations of cond!ct. 1$.$.2.2 Applications 5ormative altr!ism can be favo!rable to other people in general, more partic!larl& to people with partic!lar needs or with special social relations to oneself, and it incl!des opinions abo!t :!stice or fairness. 6n pit& and compassion, it accompanies the corresponding nat!ral sentiments, sometimes with the addition of some s&mpath& or emotional contagionF indeed, it generall& demands having pit& or feeling compassion to begin with. 9ssential moral :!dgments (and possibl& social normative ones) favo!r what is deemed to be good for people in general, especiall& the relief of their miser& or of vario!s aspects of it, and of their pain. Chen held b& an individ!al, this :!dgment favo!rs what is good for others in this wa&, and hence it is an altr!ism. -!ch :!dgments have two t&pes of application. 5ormative (notabl&, moral) altr!istic :!dgments constit!te one motive for giving, notabl& for helping people in need. .oreover, a complete general benevolent :!dgment m!st also choose when scarcities or other reasons create an opposition among what is deemed to be good for vario!s persons, for instance their interests or well8being. Chen it is a normative :!dgment, this implies that this choice belongs to 7!estions of distrib!tive :!stice or fairness. %he sol!tions refer to iss!es of impartialit& and e7!alit& abo!t vario!s possible items, of merit or deservingness, of needs, of vario!s t&pes of rights, and of tradition and c!stom. %he implementation of these principles is sometimes reali1ed b& giving, b!t it is more often achieved b& more or less coercive p!blic action. .orals incl!des principles of :!stice and fairness, b!t some r!les of fairness belong to (other) social val!es and norms.

/2 .oreover, social normative and moral :!dgments also hold that &o! sho!ld partic!larl& give to and help people who are in a partic!lar social relation with &o!, notabl& members of &o!r famil& and of vario!s gro!ps to which &o! belong. %his is often made red!ndant b& affection (&o! certainl& have a d!t& to ta"e care of &o!r children b!t &o! generall& do not ta"e care of &o!r children beca!se it is a d!t&). Eet, these :!dgments also praise this affection and ma"e it a d!t& (&o! sho!ld also love &o!r children). 1$.$.2.$ Comparisons3 nat!ral, normative, moral, social 5ormative :!dgments are of a nat!re thoro!ghl& different from that of nat!ral altr!ism, altho!gh there are relations between them since the former eval!ate not onl& acts b!t also sometimes sentiments, incl!ding some sentiments that ind!ce nat!ral altr!ism, namel& compassion, pit&, affection, and empath&. 5ormative :!dgments refer to val!es which can belong to morals and ethics, or to social norms or c!stoms. 6n this sense, the& are transcendent to their holders who see them as ob:ective# with respect to the individ!al chooser and, generall& for social norms and sometimes for moral norms, as e0ternal# to themselves B in contrast to the case of tastes BF the& constit!te Fre!d;s supere"o. %hese :!dgments refer to what is proper, right, intrinsicall& good, or to what sho!ld intrinsicall& be the case (which becomes a d!t& when a moral :!dgment refers to a person;s choice). owever, these :!dgments ma& be more chosen b& their holders than are their ordinar& tastes. Eet, this choice !s!all& consists of adopting some position that alread& e0ists in the societ&, held b& some smaller or larger part of its members. And the effects of ed!cation and other social infl!ences are clear. 5ormative :!dgments are !e facto c!lt!ral. .oreover, those considered here are social not onl& b& their nat!re and their origin, b!t also b& their ob:ect. .oral and social normative :!dgments th!s have important common aspects, b!t the& also have important ps&chological and social differences. And the& can both coincide and s!pport one another, and enter into conflict. %he ps&chological and social differences are of five t&pes. 1) .oral val!es are seen as more transcendent# than social ones. -ocial val!es transcend# the individ!al b!t not societ&, whereas moral val!es are felt as transcending# both. 2) .oral val!es attach more importance to motives of action, whereas social :!dgments principall& consider acts. $) -ocial normative motives often re7!ire the :!dgment of societ&# or of other persons, whereas this is not necessar& for properl& moral motives. owever, this social :!dgment# ma& be internali1ed# b& the actor, imagined b& her, performed b& her in a division of personalit&, or sclerosed into habit or tradition. *) )roperness# essentiall& refers to social :!dgments, whereas d!t&# refers to moral val!es. /) Failing to behave (and sometimes thin" or feel) properl& elicits shame for social norms and val!es, whereas failing to behave and feel as re7!ired elicits "uilt for moral norms and val!es./1 (f co!rse, moral and social val!es :!dge not onl& one;s own actions and sentiments, b!t also those of other persons, actions of instit!tions (in partic!lar those concerned with social aid and iss!es of :!stice), and states of societ& (notabl& concerning individ!als; sit!ation and fairness). 6n the case of normative altr!ism, both the actor and the ob:ect of the
/1

-ee the disc!ssion in the chapter b& =on 9lster in this vol!me.

/$ cond!ct can be not onl& individ!als b!t also, b& e0tension, gro!ps of them, instit!tions, or other social entities (e.g., patriotism, with regard to an ob:ect). 1$.$.2.* %he ambig!o!s stat!s of social normative motives -ocial normative :!dgments can lead to giving, b!t their role with respect to altr!ism is in fact ambig!o!s. (n the one hand, the& are sometimes close to moral :!dgments, or even confo!nded with them. (n the other hand, respecting a social norm in order that other people have a good opinion of &o!rself B or that the& do not have a bad one B is not a morall& motivated act since this ob:ective is not moral. 6n partic!lar, caring for the good of someone else, and as a conse7!ence helping her or giving to her, with s!ch an ob:ective, is not moral altr!ism (this is a fortiori the case when the gift or aid in itself aims at eliciting this favo!rable or not !nfavo!rable opinion). %his is not the directl& hedonistic or nat!ral altr!ism described above either. 6n fact, it is not altr!ism at all. %wo aspects participate to this ambig!o!s stat!s. First, altho!gh social norms alwa&s re7!ire that a :!dgment b& societ&# is present somewhere, its enactment ma& more or less p!t this aspect between parentheses. Following the norm ma& have become a habit, a mechanistic behavio!r. owever, if this behavio!r is seen b& other people, notabl& if it concerns interpersonal relations, one sho!ld consider what wo!ld happen if the habit is not followed3 wo!ld there be some disapproval or blame or notX -ocial norms can be simpl& :!stified b& tradition or c!stom B whereas when a moral norm is :!stified in this wa&, this implies a h&postasis of the corresponding social entit&. Fre7!entl&, also, the individ!al has internali1ed# the social norm. %his does not ma"e it a moral norm altho!gh moral norms come into people;s mind largel& in this wa&. -!ch an individ!al has societ& in her head.# 6f she does not respect the norm, the individ!al ma& feel ill at ease, even sometimes embarrassed, and even possibl& ashamed, even when nobod& else relevant "nows it (&et, she does not feel g!ilt& as it wo!ld be the case for a moral norm). %he individ!al ma& also want to be praiseworth& rather than praised, or, if she is praised, she wants to deserve it. %his is also common for moral norms. %his motive does not see" image or stat!s in the e&es of others. A ne0t step is that the individ!al val!es her image of herself in her own view, in itself or b& comparison with other people, and she ma& also val!e a res!lting stat!s (in her view). %his involves a dissociation of personalit&. Adam -mith arg!es that self :!dgment is an empath& of the :!dgment of oneself or of one;s acts b& other persons or b& an impartial spectator.# Eet, this is not necessaril& the case3 ta"ing some distance for eval!ating oneself ma& s!ffice. %hen, the individ!al ma& care for the :!dgment of other people, b!t onl& in imagining it. %his ma& be a dim view of the opinion of societ&# or of a part of it, or it ma& refer to the potential :!dgment of specific other people. Finall&, onl&, the act!al :!dgment of other people ma& come into pla&. %he point is that there is a large spectr!m of cases between what seems to be an own, intrinsic motivation, and the desire to be favo!rabl& :!dged b& other people, in avoiding reprobation or blame, eliciting approval or praise, b!ilding one;s image in other persons; e&es, and see"ing to maintain or ac7!ire some social stat!s in this wa&. %he second iss!e is that there obvio!sl& are non8moral social norms, b!t when the eval!ated act is giving, this is an act which is prima facie morall& praiseworth& in itself, and is a classical res!lt of moral altr!ism. ence, the association and conf!sion of motives occ!rs easil&. As we have seen in -ection 2, a cr!cial iss!e is whether a giver cares abo!t the good of the beneficiar& B and this is altr!ism B, or whether she cares abo!t her gift in itself. Ioth ma& res!lt from social norms or val!es. %he most standard case is val!ing the act, which is

/* e0ternal and visible. Eet, there ma& also be a social val!e of caring abo!t what is good for some other people. owever, this tends to be conf!sed with the effect of moral ed!cation. 1$.$.2./ A societ& is more altr!istic than its members Eo! approve people who give to others whose good &o! val!e (incl!ding to &o!rself), and &o! ma& admire moral or empathic altr!ism in itself. 5ow, the opinion of others abo!t oneself is one of the main motives for action, and for satisfaction or dissatisfaction, in all societies, and for all t&pes of iss!es (incl!ding concerning one;s own cons!mption and wa& of life). ence, giving can be fostered b& approval or b& tr&ing to avoid disapproval. Added to other motives, this can elicit the act or ind!ce giving more. 6t can even be the sole motive present for some giving. Adam -mith emphasi1es that the desire to be praised and the desire to be praiseworth& are ver& different in nat!re, altho!gh the& are related and are often :ointl& present. 6n partic!lar, see"ing approval, or tr&ing to avoid disapproval, are not moral motives in themselves. owever, approval or disapproval, and praise or blame, can be made in the name of some moral reason. 6n this case, acts motivated b& them are determined b& moral :!dgments in the end. .oreover, someone who :!dges others in this wa& ma& not give herself, beca!se she finds it too costl& or, possibl&, beca!se people infl!enced b& these :!dgments B notabl& hers B give s!fficientl&. %hen, there ma& be people who give witho!t moral motives, and people who :!dge morall& witho!t acting morall&, in a nice social division of labo!r where some are moral# in act and not in mind, and others are moral in :!dgment b!t not in action, and &et, collectivel&, there are both the moral :!dgments and the corresponding moral acts determined b& them (the t&pe of economists who en:o& e0pressing scepticism or c&nicism abo!t h!man motives wo!ld th!s li"e these two "inds of individ!als, the h&pocritical moralist and the self8centred stat!s see"er, and &et giving !ltimatel& ca!sed b& morals can act!all& occ!r). -omeone ma& even both give beca!se of the :!dgment of others and :!dge others in this wa&3 then, she both acts morall&# and :!dges morall& b!t she does not act for a moral motive. And this ma& be the case of ever&one in the societ&, where there then are moral acts and moral :!dgments that determine them b!t no moral motive. .ore generall&, however, people wo!ld :ointl& :!dge their own acts and the acts of others, and be sensitive to the :!dgments of others (and of themselves) abo!t themselves. .!t!al approval can th!s be a powerf!l factor of giving in the societ&, ind!cing it or increasing it as a m!ltiplier of individ!al altr!ism. 1$.$.2.6 -elf8image %hese praises or blames, when the& :!dge moral acts (or sentiments), have three noteworth& aspects. First, &o! often :!dge &o!rself also in the same wa&, as if b& an e0ternal observer, in addition to other sentiments concerning &o!r own acts or sentiments. Eo! are satisfied when &o! loo" at &o!rself in the mirror,# or &o! dare not loo" at &o!rself.# Eo! ma& be !nder the scr!tin& of the e&e of &o!r conscience.# %his reinforces the direct moral motive for action. -econd, &o! ma& be concerned b& the h&pothetical :!dgment of the fact b& people who do not "now it (sometimes more or less partic!lar persons s!ch as a member of &o!r famil& or &o!r g!r!, and the& can be deceased persons). 6magining s!ch a h&pothetical :!dgment can merel& become a wa& of tr&ing to determine the right action. %his :!dgment can also become depersonali1ed. 6t then is onl& a wa& of reflecting abo!t the right cond!ct for choosing it, in loo"ing at it from some distance, so to spea". %hird, these :!dgments cr&stalli1e# into an image of &o!rself as a more or less well8behaved or virt!o!s person. Caring abo!t this image

// of &o!rs in the e&es of other people is not a moral motive in itself, b!t caring abo!t this image in &o!r own e&es or as it is b!ilt b& the depersonali1ed and abstract :!dgment can be seen as an aspect of moral reflection. 1$.$.2.2 .oral a"rasia An individ!al ma& act morall&, she ma& be forced to act morall&, and she ma& also welcome being forced to act morall& beca!se she regrets the wea"ness of her moral will B her moral akrasia. 6n partic!lar, giving is a free act b& definition, b!t an individ!al ma& regret her own e0cessive meanness witho!t being able to overcome it as she wo!ld li"e to. %his "ind of mental d!alit& and conflict is a common sit!ation, which leads, for instance, to self8 commitment for pr!dence (long term interest) B as with >l&sses and the call of the sirens. %he person ma& then welcome to be forced to do what she thin"s she o!ght to do b!t cannot do b& herself. %his can notabl& be giving to people in need or whom she o!ght to s!pport. %he person then welcomes to be forced to be as genero!s and good as she thin"s she sho!ld be. %his constraint has to come from the p!blic sector B in a state of law where it has the monopol& of legitimate coercion of ad!lts. And the individ!al ma& favo!r this sit!ation b& s!pporting it on political gro!nds. Aoting in favo!r of the corresponding laws or ta0es is then a form of self8commitment. %he government becomes >l&sses; mast against the sirens of selfishness. A similar sit!ation is ver& common for pr!dential iss!es, leading to safet& reg!lation and comp!lsor& ins!rance or saving. )eople are forced to be free# (to do what the& reall& want to), as <o!ssea! sa&s,/2 and the& ma& be free to be forced to be free in voting for it./$ %his can add to the iss!e of :oint giving for demanding forced distrib!tive transfers for implementing individ!al freedom. ;:.:.: )ational altruism 1$.$.$.1 +eneral principle (ne of the three categories of normative altr!ism is rational altr!ism. 6t is moral as is also int!itive moral altr!ism. 6t opposes the two other categories, int!itivel& moral and social normative altr!isms, in that its vario!s forms each rest on a reasoning !sing more or less co!nterfact!als. %he reasoning can go from the simplest one B s!ch as imagining oneself in the sit!ation of someone else B to the most sophisticated theories of :!stice, fairness, or social ethics (beca!se the& have applications in altr!istic cond!cts, and altr!ism and giving impl& iss!es of :!stice or fairness). A co!nterfact!al is a sit!ation that does not e0ist and &et can infl!ence realit& beca!se it is imagined b& people and, in this wa&, infl!ences their preferences, attit!des, and possibl& choices. For e0ample, a person ma& imagine being in the sit!ation of another, or that their sit!ations are perm!ted, or again that she is an impartial spectator,# or possibl& that all the other persons act as she does or follow the r!le that g!ides her. From the reasoning, the person derives a moral obligation, or a reason to follow a co!rse of action, which can lead her to help or give. Ce will consider three categories of rational altr!ism describing respectivel& s!bstit!tion, perm!tation, and p!tative reciprocit& for one, impartialit& and :!stice for the other, and !niversali1ation (incl!ding Gant;s categorical imperative) for the third.

/2 /$

)robabl& rather abo!t the free riding iss!e. .oreover, voting is comp!lsor& in some co!ntries, where people are then forced to be free to be forced to be free.

/6 %he !se of reasons and of rationalit& differs neatl& from int!itive moral val!es and from social norms and val!es. owever, the& are in fact !sed :ointl& with these other val!es. (n the one hand, these val!es and their application !se, of co!rse, aspects of rationalit& s!ch as basic re7!irements of logic, consistenc&, e7!al treatment of e7!als, and so on. (n the other hand, the !se of reason and of reasonings !s!all& re7!ires at some point the !se of a val!e of another t&pe in order to be complete and applicable. %his val!e determines, for instance, which characteristics of the persons and their sit!ations are considered for s!bstit!tion, perm!tation, or e7!alit& among individ!als, or what are the desired properties of a societ& where ever&bod& follows the same r!le for appl&ing Gant;s categorical imperative.# 6n fact, and more generall&, Gant;s !ltimate general val!e, considering each person in the "ingdom of ends#, or alwa&s treating others also as an end and not onl& as a means,# is a moral altr!ism presented as being of the int!itive# "ind (altho!gh reasoning !sing impartialit& and s!bstit!tion can help s!pporting it). 1$.$.$.2 -!bstit!tion 6magine &o! were in her sit!ation# is commonl& proposed for ind!cing someone to help. %his is an e0hortation to some "ind of empath& with the other person, for ind!cing the corresponding altr!ism, possibl& with an e0tension to compassion or pit&. Eet, the concept!al e0periment of s!ch a s!bstit!tion can, more generall&, provide information abo!t the other person, and this information can be !sed in vario!s t&pes of moral altr!ism. %his can lead to the application of int!itive moral or social val!es, or of the ade7!ate principles of :!stice or fairness (notabl& concerning impartialit& or e7!alit&). 6magining oneself in the place of the other person is also sometimes associated with imagining herself in one;s place, th!s leading to the important reasoning of p!tative reciprocit&#. 1$.$.$.$ )!tative reciprocities 6ndeed, we sho!ld help them beca!se the& wo!ld help !s if this had happened to !s# is a remar" 6 heard from an 88&ears old French girl after the ts!nami in the 6ndian ocean. %his ass!mption was definitivel& a co!nterfact!al given the place where she lives (the Alps). %his reasoning appears not to be infre7!ent. %he help then is motivated as notionall& being a reciprocit&. %he nat!re of this reciprocit& is a balance reciprocit&, with an aspect of fairness, which foc!ses more on the need of the helped person than on the gift or service provided B a distinction that has cr!cial conse7!ences in the case of :oint giving./* %his ob:ect of the reciprocit& is related to the fact that this view also incl!des a reciprocit& in sentiments3 we feel compassion towards them notabl& beca!se, and all the more that, the& wo!ld have felt compassion towards !s if o!r sit!ations were reversed. %he p!tative reciprocit& is also sometimes e0tended3 the belief that &o! wo!ld be helped if &o! needed it ma& ma"e &o! more prone to help others, even if the& are not those who wo!ld help &o! (a generali1ed p!tative reciprocit&)F and &o! ma& be all the more prone to help someone if &o! "now that she wo!ld help others if the& needed it, even if the& are other persons than &o!rself (a reverse p!tative reciprocit&). 1$.$.$.* =!stice

/*

Ialance reciprocit& a priori foc!sses on the gift or help, b!t it can be the gift given the need of the receiver (or the means of the giver).

/2 Another reasoning invites &o! to ta"e an ob:ective view. %hat is, rather than imagining &o!rself in the place of a person who needs help, &o! imagine &o!rself in the place of what classical tho!ght calls the impartial spectator# (&o! ta"e what the philosopher %homas 5agel calls the view from nowhere#). %hen, if &o! consider what is relevantl& good for people, which implies a sol!tion to the 7!estion of sharing between them, &o!r view refers to a notion of :!stice. 6t ma& demand that &o! transfer something from &o!r holdings to some other person, or that &o! help her. %his is a main conception in Adam -mith;s Theory of &oral Sentiments. A priori, an& conception or principle of :!stice can lead to the concl!sion that &o! o!ght to give to someone else or help her.// 6n partic!lar, the general respect of basic rights (or social freedom#) ind!ces &o! to respect the sec!rit& and the properl& ac7!ired propert& of other people. -!ch a general principle and its conse7!ence for the overall distrib!tion of reso!rces constit!tes the macro:!stice# part of the general reali1ation of :!stice in societ&. -ocial freedom, )areto efficienc&, and the relevant facts, impl& that this overall distrib!tive :!stice demands that &o! hand o!t to the other people the e0cess of &o!r wage for a given labo!r over the average wage for this labo!r in societ& (each individ!al being endowed with her proper given prod!ctivit&), or give to each other person the prod!ct of a given labo!r of &o!rs, these notional distrib!tion labo!rs# depending on the degree in which the societ& in 7!estion constit!tes a comm!nit&./6 (ther principles and criteria in micro:!stice# (and meso:!stice#) can demand gifts and help from &o!. Following this aspect of -mith;s tho!ght, =ohn -t!art .ill sees, in the conception of the impartial spectator, the onl& reason for altr!ism. owever, being also strongl& infl!enced b& =erem& Ientham, he considers more specificall& that this impartial spectator is a moral !tilitarian ma0imi1ing a s!m of individ!al !tilities (which cannot be accepted in its classical presentation of a !niversal principle adding !tilities, for reasons that refer to meaning, logic, and also morals with the !s!al !nderstanding of these !tilities)./2 Eet, one ma& find interest in the notion of an impartial spectator practicing empath& with ever& individ!al at once, and hence aggregating their vario!s interests or val!es and balancing among them when scarcities or logic re7!ire it, within her own ps&cholog&, feelings, emotions, and :!dgments. %here have been attempts to give more precision to the concept of the impartial spectator and to the interindivid!al s&nthesi1ing and aggregating operation it implies. Eo! ma& for instance imagine that &o! are in the sit!ation of each individ!al s!ccessivel& for the same d!ration, or that &o! inc!r the ris" of becoming each individ!al with the same probabilit& B these reasonings are moral time'sharin" and moral risk, respectivel&./8 owever, even if &o! consider that being# a partic!lar individ!al implies this fact in all respects (incl!ding all aspects of the person, notabl& her tastes and preferences), the overall view still depends on the observer for two reasons3 (1) individ!als have vario!s preferences abo!t being# vario!s persons (people who fanc& glor& dream that the& are 5apoleon, while altr!istic people wish the& were .other %heresa)F (2) people have different ris"8aversion or preferences abo!t variabilit& in time (for the theories of moral ris" and of moral time8sharing, respectivel&). %hese points have been missed b& =ohn arsan&i in his moral8ris" theor& of the original position.# %hat is, beca!se of these two aspects of individ!al preferences, there is one specific original position for each individ!al. %hen, a consistent sol!tion consists of
//

%he literat!re abo!t the concepts or principles of :!stice is ver& large. +eneral anal&tical s!rve&s are provided in Golm 1''6a and in )art / of Golm 244*. /6 -ee Golm 244*. 6n the first form!lation, people less prod!ctive than average receive an analogo!s s!bsid&. /2 -ee Golm 1''6a, Chapter 1*. /8 %he notions presented in this paragraph are f!ll& developped in Golm 244*, Chapter 21.

/8 considering these original positions for each of the act!al individ!als, and then, similarl&, the original positions of these original positions, and so on rec!rsivel& in a process of infinite regress which is converging./' owever, the ver& red!ction of a choice of :!stice to a self8 interested choice in !ncertaint& is problematic beca!se the individ!al is responsible for her eval!ation of the ris"s she ta"es, whereas a choice of :!stice is acco!ntable towards morals or societ&. Another famil& of classical theories of social ethics or :!stice consists of the theories of the social contract. A social contract is an imaginar&, h&pothetical, and p!tative agreement among people, whose res!lt is ta"en as the social ethical principle to be implemented. .an& instances of applications can be fo!nd. 6n fact, =ohn <awls (1'21) presented his theor& of the original position as a theor& of the social contract B altho!gh he sees people in the original position as having the same preferred choice of principles of :!stice, and hence their agreement is not one with e0change and compromise. Ce will also see how a theor& of the liberal social contract# determines the vario!s individ!al contrib!tions in a :oint giving (-ection 16.6). Eet, one of the most important instances of normative p!tative e0changes nowada&s is that of fun!amental insurance. Chen people differ b& characteristics that are given to them, one can imagine that, at a h&pothetical and notional time before# these characteristics are attrib!ted to them, the& agreed abo!t a m!t!al ins!rance against the ris" of finding oneself with s!ch characteristics of poor 7!alit& and their conse7!ences. %hen, the implementation of this ins!rance constit!tes transfers which compensate more or less for this poor sit!ation and for the ine7!alit&, and it provides a rationale for these compensator& transfers. %hese characteristics can for instance be earning capacities infl!enced b& nat!ral endowments and b& famil& infl!ence notabl& on ed!cation, or having a nat!ral poor health. %he role of individ!al choices in !ncertaint& in the p!tative ins!rance agreement raises the same problem as that noted earlier. owever, if act!al individ!als !nanimo!sl& agree with s!ch a theor&, this :!stifies it. %hen, those who pa& for helping others agree, in the end, with this transfer. A notable e0ample concerns health ins!rance in 9!rope. %his ins!rance is p!blic, and a practicall& !nanimo!s opinion re:ects its privati1ation with the arg!ment3 with private ins!rance, people who have a higher propensit& to be sic" will pa& higher premia or receive lower coverage for given premiaF now it is alread& bad that the& have a poor health, and in addition the& wo!ld have to pa& more, or the& wo!ld receive less care whereas the& need more.# %he compensation for given health handicaps comes !nder the heading of ins!rance beca!se it is associated with the standard ins!rance against health ris". 6n partic!lar, the people with a lower propensit& to be sic" endorse this reasoning, and therefore their corresponding e0tra pa&ment is in fact a gift. %he amo!nts of transfers in 7!estion are ver& important. F!ndamental ins!rance res!lts in :oint giving to the people in need, b!t it avoids the pitfalls of both ins!rance B the moral ha1ard# B and of :oint giving B free riding and m!t!al crowding o!t. .oral ha1ard does not occ!r beca!se the (notionall&) ins!red fact is in realit& a
/'

owever, the res!lt is no longer a !tilitarian8li"e s!m of individ!al !tilities. 5ow this theor& of the impartial spectator of arsan&i is commonl& ta"en to be the central :!stification of a !tilitarian form (altho!gh the added !tilities are the ris"8relevant von 5e!mann8.orgenstern ones rather than those that co!ld represent happiness as classical !tilitarianism has it). %hat is, the idea was in fact that arsan&i had established an impartial spectator who sho!ld be !tilitarian as ass!med b& =ohn -t!art .ill, and in this wa& had vindicated !tilitarianism. ence the foregoing remar"s have a ma:or importance in the histor& of economic and philosophical tho!ght.

/' priori given and does not depend of the agent;s acts. %he diffic!lt& of :oint giving does not occ!r beca!se the relevant variables are the transfers from each giver to each receiver s!pposedl& implementing the ins!rance contract between them, rather than the receiver;s overall welfare (each contract ta"es acco!nt of the sim!ltaneo!s contracts with other people when the& are B notionall& B agreed !pon). Eet, for iss!es covering a large pop!lation, 7!estions of information and practicalit& lead to a p!blic implementation. 1$.$.$./ >niversali1ation %he imagined actions can also be those of other people onl&. For e0ample, people contrib!te to the s!pport of ca!ses when their own action ma"es no practical difference beca!se the& are small in a large n!mber. Chen as"ed wh& the& do it nevertheless, a common answer is what if nobod& contrib!tedX# %he same answer is the most common one when people are as"ed wh& the& care to vote in a large election given that their vote ma"es no act!al difference B a most important iss!e since witho!t vote, de facto there is no democrac&. %hese cond!cts obe& the moral in:!nction3 &o! sho!ld act as if ever&bod& acted similarl&.# %his is individ!all& illogical or irrational if the other people do not act in this wa&. %his cond!ct becomes rational onl& if all people follow the moral in:!nction and this leads them to the same act B then, the ass!mption becomes tr!e. ence, this principle has a "ind of social rationalit&. An obvio!s application is to the vol!ntar& provision of p!blic goods, where this !niversali1ation principle# can chec" free riding. %his applies in partic!lar to :oint giving. Another application is the general respect of the rights of other people and general socialit&. (f co!rse, 6mman!el Gant h&postasiated this common and spontaneo!s principle into his categorical imperative#3 act in s!ch a wa& that &o! can want the ma0im of &o!r action to become a !niversall& followed principle# (it is not the place, here, to disc!ss the specificities of this form!lation). $+% Altruism and -ustice< impartial altruism 1,.1 !ltr%ism and 6%stice 6f &o! come from a famil& with several children, &o! probabl& discovered the pinch of !nfairness and the peace of fairness in &o!r mother;s benevolence towards &o! and &o!r siblings. .ore broadl&, parents; altr!ism providing be7!ests and ed!cation is the main so!rce of ine7!alit& in societ&. 6t is the ver& essence of ine7!alit& of opport!nit&. And ed!cation is a main factor of earnings. .oreover, the sit!ation of elderl& people depends m!ch on the care and s!pport of their children. %herefore, famil& altr!ism is an essential ca!se of in:!stice as tangible ine7!alit&. owever, these res!lts are perfectl& :!st from the point of view of another social ethical conception that defends the legitimac& of free transfers and of their conse7!ences, since gifts are s!ch transfers, along with free e0changes. %hese are the two basic and opposed principles of :!stice in o!r societies. %heir :!dgments abo!t famil& altr!ism are thoro!ghl& opposed. (n the contrar&, the other main application of altr!ism, charit&, mirac!lo!sl& reconciles the two enem& conceptions of :!stice3 it alleviates povert&, satisfies basic needs, and diminishes the ine7!alit& between the giver and the receiver, and it is a free transfer. %he conflicts can be moral and normative3 &o! sho!ld help &o! nephew from normative comm!nit& altr!ism, and &et condemn nepotism from impartial !niversal :!stice. %he scarcit& of desired items B the s!b:ect matter of economics B and the res!lting opposition of the self8interest of individ!als, are the reason for both altr!ism and giving on the one hand, and 7!estions of distrib!tive :!stice or fairness on the other. %he two iss!es are therefore intrinsicall& interfering and closel& related. Eo!r gifts, or their absence, infl!ence

64 the distrib!tion in societ& and hence its fairness. %his also holds for an& other infl!ence of &o!r altr!ism on the distrib!tion (e.g., thro!gh p!blic actions, s!ch as in implementing :oint giving or res!lting from the political process). @istrib!tion is affected b& &o!r sharing &o!r gift or &o!r benevolence between two people, or b& &o!r giving to some and not to others. %he simple fact of &o!r giving affects the distrib!tion between &o!rself and the beneficiar&. -&mmetricall&, an opinion abo!t :!stice in societ& implies a favo!rable concern abo!t what is good for other people, which is an altr!ism. %he iss!e of :!stice refers to social ethics and therefore belongs to morals, as moral normative altr!ism does. %here are, however, a n!mber of r!les of fairness that belong, rather, to social norms, as social normative altr!ism does. .oreover, emotions are raised both b& indignation against in:!stice and b& the ca!ses of hedonistic or nat!ral altr!ism, and the former can be among the strongest. Finall&, empath&, a ca!se of altr!ism, and impartialit&, a necessar& propert& of principles of :!stice, have close relations. %he ps&chological conditions of the application of the logical r!le of impartialit& re7!ire at least some capacit& for empath&, and empath& is in itself a "ind of impartialit& or at least a step in this direction. Altr!ism and :!stice or fairness are the two t&pes of non8egoistic and non8instr!mental :!dgments abo!t the allocation of goods in societ&, the topic of economics (an instr!mental :!dgment can for instance val!e the distrib!tion for its effect on national o!tp!t val!ed for a reason of national power). 9ach of these :!dgments can infl!ence this distrib!tion, b& gifts for altr!ism, and, for :!stice, notabl& b& coercive p!blic actions of transfers or of defence of propert&. ence, the :!dgments of each t&pe :!dge the effects of the :!dgments of the other t&pe. Conceptions of :!stice can blame famil& gifts beca!se the& promote ine7!alit&, or accept them as free acts, as we have seenF and the& can praise charit& beca!se it satisfies needs or red!ces ine7!alit&, or accept it beca!se it is a free act. Famil& altr!ism can :!dge forced transfers affecting relatives or gifts to them as egoism does, whereas pit& can approve of redistrib!tive :!stice that alleviates miser& B whether this is the aim of this polic& or whether this onl& intends to diminish ine7!alit&. %he means of the implementation of the two t&pes of :!dgments B altr!ism and :!stice B are essentiall& opposed to each other abo!t the essential iss!e of freedom, since gifts are free b& definition, whereas distrib!tive transfers and the enforcement of rights constit!te constraints. owever, the relations are more varied even in this respect onl&, since protecting a right to do something or a right ac7!ired b& free e0change or action is also protecting freedom, a sense of :!stice can motivate some benevolent acts or gifts, altr!ism can lead to some spontaneo!s respect of rights, and :oint giving often has to ta"e the form of forced transfers. 6n spite of their differences and oppositions, altr!ism and :!dgments of :!stice re7!ire each other. 6ndeed, a sense of fairness or :!stice towards persons implies caring abo!t something which is ass!med to be favo!rable for them (according to some conception), that is, it implies altr!ism. 5ote that claiming :!stice or fairness for oneself is not an e0ception to this concl!sion. 6ndeed, :!stice has to be impartial, as we will see, hence it can onl& be :!stified b& ob:ective# properties B rather than beca!se &o! are the beneficiar& B, and therefore it applies also to an&one in the same relevant sit!ation (even if, in a given case, &o! happen to be the onl& person to which it applies). Conversel&, altr!ism does not a priori re7!ire or impl& considerations of fairness or :!stice, b!t it is closel& associated with them. (ne t&pe of altr!ism res!lts from some sense of :!stice, impartial altr!ism# considered in the ne0t section (and, historicall&, all of :!stice has been considered as a moral altr!ism, as we shall recall). For the rest, altr!ism per se does not

61 re7!ire considerations of :!stice. 6n partic!lar, ever&one can a priori love ever&one and wish her good witho!t limit (e0cept concerning limited cognitive and affective capacities for attention to others or affection). owever, when altr!ism translates into giving, it meets the constraints of the act!al allocation. %he most common case concerns scarcities when someone wants to give to several others. Eet, there also e0ists, for instance within families and between friends, cases of e0cess of generosit& where each wants to give to the other more than she receives from her. 6n the latter case, the sol!tion necessaril& belongs to the field of fairness beca!se it resolves an opposition between opposite desires. 6n the other case of a giver who gives to several people, a priori the choice co!ld be seen as proceeding from ordinar& preferences or tastes concerning the set of beneficiaries. owever, since the altr!istic giver cares abo!t what she deems to be relevantl& good for the receivers and there is a conflict in this respect, the choice falls b& definition in the domain of distrib!tive :!stice or fairness. For instance, a mother does not onl& allocate her love, care, and other means among her children in e7!ating marginal love. -he importantl& cares abo!t r!les of fairness, as is demanded b& the children themselves B and wo!ld it onl& be for avoiding :ealo!s& among them.64 +enerall&, when nothing relevant disting!ishes beneficiaries, the gift is e7!all& shared, a sol!tion characteristic of the field of :!stice. 6n cases where this is not possible or there are strong economies of scale in the benefit, and the sit!ation is not a part of a contin!ing relationship, the sol!tion consists of !sing a chance draw with an e7!al probabilit& that each person wins B again an egalitarian sol!tion. %he incorporation of considerations of :!stice in altr!ism also occ!rs nat!rall&, witho!t the press!re of conflicting choices. For instance, it is remar"able that the concept of :!stice restricting charit& to the deserving poor# occ!rred notabl& in Aictorian ethics which wanted transfers to the poor as charit& from a sentiment of benevolent pit& and certainl& not for a reason of distrib!tive :!stice, since desert is a concept of :!stice. %his case is an e0ample of a remar"able as&mmetr& between the two polar references of :!stice, namel& need, satisfaction, welfare or happiness, on the one hand, and desert or merit, on the other hand3 whereas the former can be the ob:ects of both benevolence and criteria of :!stice, the latter belong essentiall& to the field of :!stice. -ince a sense of :!stice or fairness re7!ires altr!ism, s!ch views can be seen as constit!ting one t&pe of altr!ism, as we have seen. owever, let !s ma"e it precise that this concerns the most common t&pe of :!stice or fairness b!t not the whole field. %his is :!stice and fairness whose end8val!e is the good of individ!als (some conception of it) B indeed, there can also be :!stice and fairness for other social entities (firms, regions, co!ntries, and so on), and :!stice can eval!ate the sit!ation of individ!als or other entities as the& relate to other val!es ta"en as ends (e.g., national independence or infl!ence). ence, there is a common gro!nd for altr!ism and :!stice or fairness, which constit!tes a rather limited part of altr!ism and most of :!stice or fairness. %his is the field of :!stice or fairness which is considered henceforth. .oreover, when a concept of :!stice favo!rs e7!alit& between individ!al items and each sol!tion with e7!alit& is dominated b& other possible b!t !ne7!al states where the item is better for all individ!als, altr!ism endorsing s!ch a concept of :!stice sho!ld certainl& lead one to choose a second8best egalitarian sol!tion, which is not so dominated b!t where the ine7!alit& is minimal in some sense. 1,.2 7mpartial altr%ism %he characteristic propert& of :!stice is its impartialit& among individ!als for the chosen characteristics of their sit!ation. %hese characteristics can be of vario!s t&pes. -omeone who
64

%here is a limit to Aictor !go;s contention that motherl& love is a p!re p!blic good (a mother;s heart is li"e a bread that a god parta"es and m!ltipliesW each has her share and all have the whole#).

62 gives to several others can th!s be impartial among them. I!t if someone considers :!stice in a societ& to which she belongs, she has to ma"e abstraction of her own specific place in the eval!ated state. 5otabl&, the :!dgment sho!ld consider her own self8interest and the interests of persons she favo!rs beca!se of their partic!lar relation to her ("in, friends, members of specific gro!ps to which she belongs) or beca!se of characteristics she li"es and are irrelevant to the conception of :!stice in 7!estion, as if the& were the interests of an&bod& else. ence, a main difference between altr!ism and :!stice is one of viewpoint3 the person caring for others is e"o in the case of altr!ism and some imagined e0ternal observer in the case of :!stice. )resenting a :!dgment of :!stice implies ta"ing the observer;s viewpoint. ence, people can a priori agree abo!t s!ch a view, whereas self8interest and self8centred favo!ritism are irremediabl& opposed in 7!estions of distrib!tion. A :!dgment of :!stice is that of an altr!istic e0ternal observer. 6n this sense, one can sa& that (ustice is the altruism of society. %he philosopher %homas 5agel calls this perspective the view from nowhere.# Eet, the classical image is Adam -mith;s impartial spectator.# 6n this respect, :!stice is opposed to both individ!al altr!ism and egoism, since the& are views of societ& b& a specific individ!al, for favo!ring others in one case and caring for oneself onl& in the other B malevolence, mischievo!sness and sadism e7!all& belong to this categor&. =!stice becomes individ!al altr!ism solel& when specific individ!als ta"e this viewpoint in their moral :!dgments, either in times when the& are morall& minded, or in association or compromises with a specific val!ation of their self8interest, of their favo!ritism, or of other "inds of altr!ism. Adam -mith describes this internali1ation of the point of view of :!stice as an empath& for the impartial spectator or as having an impartial spectator in one;s breast.# owever, the propert& of impartialit& does not s!ffice for determining the :!dgment. %here remains the choice of the relevant individ!al items, and the str!ct!re of the :!dgment in addition to its impartialit& (this shows, notabl&, when the act!al constraints on the distrib!tional choice prevent reaching the relevant e7!alit& and forces one to resort to a second8best allocation). %hat is, there are a priori several possible impartial spectators, and an individ!al conception of :!stice chooses a specific one. A spectator is nowhere# b!t she still has a specific view. @enote again as #i a set of relevant parameters describing the sit!ation of individ!al i, #BiJK#(L(i the set of #( for all individ!als (i, #JK#(LJ(#i, #Bi) the set of #( for all individ!als, and ui an ordinal !tilit& f!nction of individ!al i. 6f individ!al i is egoistic, uiJui(#i). 6f she is altr!istic in the !s!al sense, uiJui(#i, #Bi) where ui increases when the #( of some individ!als (i improve according to some conception. 5ote that A!g!ste Comte, who introd!ced the terms altr!ist and altr!ism, meant b& it ui(#Bi), that is, the individ!al;s f!ll devotion to others. e forgot that -aint .artin gave onl& one half of his coat to the poor in the cold, not all of it. %his e7!alit& res!lts from impartialit&. Consider, therefore, an impartial :!dgment e0pressing a conception of :!stice. Choose parameters #i that permit its representation. %hese parameters ma& have to incl!de commodities, individ!als; welfare wi, the larger satisfaction or happiness of the individ!als (see the disc!ssion in -ection $, and this ui ma& therefore in fact be the vi of this section), descriptions of needs, freedoms or rights of the individ!als, and relations to their previo!s acts for describing merit or deservingness. As a res!lt, some of the considered !tilit& f!nctions ma& be, or be in part, classical (<o&) indirect !tilit& f!nctions. Ass!me that this impartial :!dgment can compare the states of societ& and sa& if one is preferable to the other from its point of view (or if the& are e7!ivalent in this respect), in leading to a corresponding ordering of these states representable b& an ordinal f!nction s(#). %his f!nction can be seen as the !tilit& f!nction# of the impartial spectator. 6mpartialit& is described b& the fact that f!nction s(#) is s&mmetrical in the relevant parameters of the #i (i.e., its val!e does not change when these sets of relevant parameters are perm!ted). %his moral eval!ation or eval!ator is better seen as benevolent, that is, the val!e of s increases when a #i becomes better according

6$ to the retained conception. (rderings of :!stice are often not representable b& s!ch ma0imand f!nctions beca!se the& incl!de priorities. Eet, an& s!ch ordering can be appro0imated as closel& as one wants b& s!ch a f!nction. .oreover, the appro0imation is often act!all& the priorit& rather than the f!nction, beca!se some degree of compromise is often admitted, even if it is a ver& limited one. %hen, the choice of :!stice ma0imi1es s(#) over possible #. For instance, -aint .artin;s !tilit& f!nction is s(#), or uiPs(#)Q, where #i is the s!rface of cloth allocated to individ!al i. 6t is not even uiP(#i, s(#)Q where ui increases with s, probabl& beca!se he is a saint (or, rather, he was declared one for this reason).61 .ore ordinar& people can have s!ch !tilit& f!nctions uiP(#i, s(#)Q. %his is a partic!lar case of altr!ism that can be called impartial altruism. Adam -mith proposes that individ!al i empathi1es# the view of the impartial spectator, or that f!nction s is, in some sense, in the breast# of f!nction ui. =ohn -t!art .ill thin"s that altr!ism is onl& impartial altr!ism (altho!gh he also !rged Comte to disting!ish benevolence from concern for :!stice). 5ote that impartial altr!ism cannot be the Comte altr!ism noted earlier. owever, there are several possible conceptions of :!stice. 6n the foregoing representation, the& differ from one another abo!t two aspects3 the choice of the relevant parameters in #i and the str!ct!re of f!nction s(#). 6ndivid!al i can choose one of these conceptions, represented b& the partic!lar f!nction si(#), and her !tilit& f!nction becomes uiP(#i, si(#)Q. %hen, individ!als can be opposed abo!t the allocation of goods, and abo!t their conceptions of :!stice. A classical mista"e met in the histor& of tho!ght is the B implicit B belief that impartialit& s!ffices for determining the principle of :!stice or fairness. 9ven Adam -mith seems not to have avoided this pitfall. Eet, it appears most clearl& with =ohn -t!art .ill beca!se he added, to the impartial spectator inherited from Adam -mith, Ientham;s infl!ence which convinced him that social ethics B of which :!stice is an aspect B is the !tilitarian highest s!m of individ!al !tilities. is impartial spectator was therefore a !tilitarian, and she chooses s(#)Jwi or ui (see -ection $). %he impartialit& is described b& Ientham;s famo!s red!ndant dict!m3 each is to co!nt for one and nobod& is to co!nt for more than one.# (f co!rse, .ill also advocated social freedom B a different conception of :!stice B and he co!ld not derive it from !tilitarianism. 6f !tilities or welfare inde0es are so added, then f!nction ui can have a linear form, sa&, with wi for simplicit& (see -ection $) and with n!mbers iZ4 and iZ4, uiJiwiNiw(JwiNi(iw( if one ta"es iNiJ1. Cith onl& two individ!als, this is the form !sed b& 9dgeworth (1881). Eet, with a larger n!mber of individ!als, this differs from a linear form of )areto;s !tilit& uiJwiN(iai( w( beca!se the ai( can differ for different (. %he difference res!lts from the fact that the altr!ism considered is a form of impartial altr!ism, which is not a priori )areto;s ass!mption. For instance, &o! can partic!larl& favo!r &o!r "in over other people with )areto;s form b!t not with the other form. Eet, both t&pes of altr!ism can :ointl& coe0ist with a !tilit& f!nction of the form uiJuiP#i, #Bi, si(#)Q. owever, as we have remar"ed, both =ohn -t!art .ill and ?Don Calras (not a !tilitarian) considered that individ!als are both egoistic and moral, &et not in the noted s&nthetic form of a compromise, b!t in being either one or the other according to the moment. %he& wo!ld be moral in their moments of calm and reflection. %his se7!encing of individ!als;
61

@id the pope who declared him a saint "now the tr!th, namel& that .artin was in fact a Comte altr!ist B and hence still more a saint B since half his coat is all he co!ld give beca!se officers of the <oman arm& owned onl& half of their e7!ipment, the other half belonging to the 9mperor X (nl& this str!ct!re of propert& rights prevented .artin from becoming not onl& a saint b!t also a mart&r.

6* states of mind have do!btlessl& some realism, altho!gh the adoption of impartial constit!tions, or self8sacrifice for saving someone or for a p!blic ca!se, happen more often in times of collective or individ!al e0citement. %hen, people can get o!t of their ever&da& self. %he& can in partic!lar :oin some non8self8centred gro!p mind.# 1,.( $istor* %he relations between :!stice and altr!ism are p!t to the forefront b& a historical transformation of the nat!re of the concept of :!stice in Cestern tho!ght. =!stice is for !s a propert& of a state of societ&, whereas it !sed to be a propert& of actions towards others and of their actors, and, in fact, a t&pe of altr!ism. 6n Anti7!it&, for instance in the perceptive anal&ses of )lato (The 5aws) and Aristotle (2icomachean Ethics and Eu!emian ethics), :!stice is a virt!e of persons who practice it. 6n contrast, b!t with this histor& in mind, =ohn <awls calls :!stice the virt!e of instit!tions.# %he ancient meaning lasted for a long time. For instance, Adam -mith in The Theory of &oral Sentiments sees :!stice as a virt!e. 6t is, for him, motivated b& the impartial spectator# who rests in the breast# of each of !s. %his impartialit& leads to seeing oneself as an& other of one;s fellow h!man beings. %his leads one to want the good of other persons as one wants one;s own self8interest, and hence, possibl&, to act favo!rabl& towards others. 6t th!s is an altr!ism. %his is complementar& to empath& where &o! imagine &o!r feelings if &o! were in the place of the other person. 6t co!ld indeed res!lt from s!fficient empath& practiced e7!all& towards all others. %he impartial spectator can also in fact be imagined as a person specialist in the e0ercise of m!lti8empath&, that is, of empathi1ing the feelings of all people sim!ltaneo!sl& and with the same care. %hen, &o!r empath& of s!ch an imagined e0ternal impartial spectator prod!ces &o!r sentiment of impartial altr!ism. Ce have seen how =ohn -t!art .ill, infl!enced b& Ientham, gives a !tilitarian form to this conception. %his impartial altr!ism can lead one to give. Eet, it does not lead one to give eno!gh according to A!g!ste Comte who B as we have seen B introd!ced the term altr!ism as meaning self8sacrifice giving priorit& to others, hence as the f!ll opposite of egoism, rather than as onl& favo!ring balanced e7!it& (and who, incidentall&, happened to be see"ing .ill;s financial s!pport).62 1,., !ltr%ism and 6%stice3 consistenc* or conflict. force or freedom %hese n!mero!s close relations between altr!ism and :!stice on the gro!nds of logic, ps&cholog& and histor& contrast with the immediate evidence of a strong opposition concerning their reali1ation. 6ndeed, giving is b& definition a free act, whereas conceptions of :!stice are largel& implemented b& p!blic coercion (even tho!gh some of them inspire some individ!al private actions). %he interest of a person ind!ces her to want more for herself. er benevolence ind!ces her to be read& to pa& something for some other person having something. er sense of :!stice can ind!ce her, in addition, to favo!r transfers from some other person to another one. ence, both altr!ism and a sense of :!stice constit!te e0ternalities in preferences, which can ind!ce interferences with other people, b!t the latter
62

A remnant of the ancient meaning of :!stice is fo!nd in <oman lang!ages with the rare !se of the name a :!st# for denoting a person endowed with this virt!e. 5ote that the above historical remar"s have foc!ssed on Cestern tho!ght. 6n man& other tho!ghts, the concept of :!stice as we !nderstand it is altogether ine0istent B and &et these people s!rvive. %here are, of co!rse, norms of fairness or local :!stice for sharing chores or crops B sa& B, and occasional applications of the rationalit& of e7!alit&, b!t no general conception of the propert& of :!stice as we !nderstand it. -ocial r!les can ta"e this place in comm!nitarian ethics. 6n the ver& few other s&stems, the place of the concept of :!stice is occ!pied b& a virt!e in the famil& of altr!ism, for instance compassion in I!ddhism.

6/ onl& can a priori impl& constraints B incl!ding that of simpl& protecting rights. owever, :!dgments of benevolent :!stice val!e the interests of individ!als, even of those the& want to constrain B for instance, the& can recommend a transfer from some person to another while favo!ring an improvement in the former;s sit!ation if it costs nothing (preferring a lower endowment of a better endowed, witho!t an& gain for someone else, beca!se it red!ces an !n:!st ine7!alit&, is most often a perversion of the sense of :!stice3 benevolent :!stice a priori implies a priorit& of benevolence over e7!alit&). %hese views of :!stice wo!ld not e0ist witho!t this concern for the interests of individ!als, and in partic!lar of others. ence, these :!dgments of :!stice differ from benevolence, altr!ism and concern for others, per se, b!t the& re7!ire them for their e0istence, the& rest on them, and the& specif& them. @istrib!tive :!stice, more generall&, draws the line between the interests of persons. 6f necessar&, it demands transfers of mone& or goods, or services, from one to the other. At an& rate, it opposes people who want to ta"e more than what it deems to be their share B that is, it defines theft. %his a priori re7!ires the coercion of the persons who want more or who want to &ield nothing or less than :!stl& demanded. Eet, in a state of law,# coercion of ad!lts is a monopol& of the p!blic sector. %his sector is therefore in charge of this ver& important part of the implementation of :!stice. 6ts actions are determined b& the political and instit!tional setting. =!stice is reali1ed witho!t coercion, hence b& vol!ntar& gifts or respect, onl& when its demand coincides with the free choice of the relevant agents. %his happens when the principle of :!stice endorses the agents; free choices in 7!estion, when agents endorse this principle as a val!e inspiring their individ!al cond!ct, or when a different motive leads nevertheless to an act favo!red b& the principle. %he former case is that of process8liberal# :!stice which val!es social freedom.# %his ethic states that the agents are f!ll& free, e0cept, necessaril&, to violate the freedom of others, that is, to interfere forcef!ll& with them B hence, it amo!nts to freedom from forcef!l interference. 90changes and giving are the two "inds of transfers that respect this r!le. owever, these two "inds are also often disting!ished b& :!dgments abo!t :!stice beca!se giving affects the distrib!tion of the val!e of wealth in societ& B contrar&, a priori, to e0change B and there ma& be a val!e of :!stice other than process8liberalism concerned with this aspect. %hen, giving constit!tes a private interference with this p!blic iss!e, as in the cases of intra8famil& and charit& transfers disc!ssed above. %he freedom of the giver ma& oppose the distrib!tive :!stice of the o!tcome. owever, the coincidence is "ept when the gift improves the :!stice of the res!lting distrib!tion as it is conceived. %his is fre7!ent when helping the poor and need&, which ma& both alleviate s!ffering and red!ce ine7!alit&. Eet, the levels of transfers chosen b& the giver and favo!red b& the principle of :!stice ma& not a priori be the same, and the ta0 regime of donations is often !sed to tr& to ma"e them closer to one another. 6n partic!lar, both effects of satisf&ing needs and red!cing ine7!alit& can motivate both private giving and a p!blic val!e, b!t the mi0 of motives ma& differ, with a gift motivated mainl& b& compassion and a p!blic val!e leaving a larger place for the red!ction of ine7!alit&. 6n other cases, people freel& appl& r!les of fairness that are seen as properl& left to their choice and not interfering with overall val!es of :!stice. %his often occ!rs when there are m!t!al gifts or favo!rs, hence with little overall impact on the overall distrib!tion. For instance, the ret!rn gifts of balance8reciprocit& are often more or less motivated b& a

66 consideration of egalitarian fairness. %his categor& also incl!des r!les of fairness adopted to concl!de an agreement (for instance an e7!al split of a difference is the simplest case). )eople also often choose, accept, or settle for a fair price# (the histor& of the concept of the :!st price# co!ld be recalled here). %he& sometimes prefer a fair deal to a good deal. %he distrib!tive effects of p!blic polic& res!lt from three iss!es, each of which has a relation with altr!ism. (1) %he political fight between gro!ps of persons defending their interests and those of the persons the& li"e or thin" the& sho!ld s!pport. (2) %he implementation of principles of :!stice, which also res!lts from conflicts between the alternative principles and their s!pporters. %hese ethical B or ideological B conflicts parallel those among interests, b!t the& do not coincide with them, beca!se people are not f!ll& pharisians (as proved b& the ver& e0istence of pharisianism which ass!mes that moral reasons have an infl!ence), and beca!se the means are ver& different B the& are threats for conflicts of interest and arg!ments for ethical debates. ($) %he implementation of :oint giving with the appropriate distrib!tion of the contrib!tions (see -ection 2). =oint giving is !nanimo!sl& desired, b& definition, altho!gh each individ!al contrib!tion ma& have to be imposed, and givers; interests are opposed in the choice of their contrib!tion (-ection 16.6 will ta"e !p this 7!estion). 6n contrast, individ!als; interests are opposed in the application of a distrib!tive polic&. 9ven if the polic& foc!ses on some aid, someone has to pa& the ta0 financing it. %his polic& ma& be the political o!tcome of the conflict of interests. owever, it is alwa&s presented as the application of reasons concerning :!stice, and the ver& insistence on this :!stification proves that ethical arg!ments have at least some infl!ence. 6n fact, people are not !ncommonl& of two minds# in admitting that there is something# in a r!le that the& oppose on an& gro!nd. 5o one is thoro!ghl& devoid of some impartial spectator# sleeping in her breast.# 6deall&, politics sho!ld be the social process ind!cing the manifestation of people;s inner spectator,# the s&nthesis of interests rather than their conflict. %his shows once more the perceptive relevance of <o!ssea!;s aphorism that politics and morals cannot be separated, and he who wants to st!d& them separatel& is bo!nd to mis!nderstand both.# 6n fact, this best part of politics commonl& comes from a large acceptance of the r!le of the political process, a large agreement at the constit!tional level. 5ow each s!ch free acceptation, f!ll or partial, direct or indirect, of a r!le, principle, or polic& that does not f!ll& coincide with one;s interest implies the corresponding moral altr!ism. $/% Giving , an a.undance and variety of motives and reasons 1/.1 !n overvie" +iving is vol!ntaril& favo!ring someone else or a p!blic ca!se at a cost for oneself witho!t re7!iring a co!nterpart. 6t occ!rs when the giver;s desire for it overcompensates the cost (and when it is accepted, when this is relevant). %his desire res!lts from one or several motives among a large n!mber of different possible ones. An& anal&sis of giving for e0plaining, forecasting, or eval!ating, cr!ciall& rests on !nderstanding and disting!ishing these motives. (bservation shows that the motives for giving are both ver& n!mero!s and ver& varied in man& respects. A simple ta0onom& of t&pes of motives shows at least fift& of them, and this is not the most detailed distinction, b& far. owever, the& gro!p together in vario!s categories, and, to begin with, into a few broad ones.

62 %he first distinction is probabl& between altruistic giving motivated b& altr!istic sentiments of the giver and giving from other motives. %he twelve broad t&pes of altr!istic motives have been presented in -ection 1$. 9ach motive leads to giving to or helping partic!lar beneficiaries in partic!lar circ!mstances. 6n natural or he!onistic altruism, affection leads to giving in the famil&. -&mpath& elicits giving to friends and ac7!aintances. 9mpath& and emotional contagion lead to helping in general, b!t partic!larl& people in need or pain, and the& are favo!red b& closeness. Compassion and pit& foc!s on need and s!ffering in general. 2ormative altruism has fo!r main dimensions of application3 the relief of the nee!s an! sufferin" of other persons, (ustice an! fairness, giving to people in close social pro#imity with the giver, and "eneral enevolence. 6n partic!lar, all t&pes of normative altr!ism can ind!ce helping people in need or who s!ffer. .oral altr!ism s!pports pit& and compassion. 6nt!itivel& moral and social altr!isms lead one to give to people with whom one has partic!lar relations, as in the famil& or in solidarit& between members of the same comm!nities of vario!s t&pes. %he& also sometimes lead to giving to partic!lar people in the societ&, disting!ished b& a special stat!s, in following a tradition. Finall&, all t&pes of normative altr!ism favo!r certain principles of :!stice or fairness, which can lead to private giving and to demanding or accepting p!blic actions. For all t&pes, these principles can incl!de vario!s "inds of rewards of merit or desert, and of relief of needs. <ational altr!ism emphasi1es impartialit& and e7!alit&. %he other t&pes can val!e r!les provided b& tradition. 6n the end, moral altr!isms can ma"e giving a d!t&. %he other motives for giving, leading to non8altr!istic giving, can be classified into three main categories foc!ssing respectivel& on the social effects of the gift, on normative non'altruistic "ivin", and on self'interest more strictl& conceived. -ocial effects can themselves be divided into the three categories of the opinion of other people, the res!lting social situation of the giver and sometimes of the receiver, and 7!estions of social relations. (pinion leading to praise or blame can attach to giving from all altr!istic motives and can ind!ce the effects on social sit!ations, b!t it has a partic!lar overlap with social normative altr!ism which basicall& implies s!ch :!dgments b& other people. Apart from all these social effects, giving can favo!r the giver;s self8interest in vario!s wa&s, thro!gh indirect effects of vario!s t&pes B either economic thro!gh mar"ets or otherwise social (for instance political) B, in ind!cing a ret!rn gift or maintaining a se7!ential e0change, in ind!cing a reward, or in ind!cing or maintaining a social sit!ation or stat!s that provide some tangible advantage. 6f these benefits are the sole motive, an essential dimension of giving is absent, b!t these benefits can also be associated with other motives. Finall&, giving can be seen as an intrinsic norm (not ind!ced b& altr!ism) ind!cing a d!t& or onl& a habit or a benign tradition. %able 1 of -ection 11, in presenting the vario!s t&pes of altr!ism, has also presented the vario!s t&pes of altr!istic giving. %able $ completes table 1 in s!mmari1ing the t&pes of giving in the two other categories.

68

8eceive others9 vie" AopinionB

praise, esteemF disapproval, contempt li"ing gratit!de stat!s of virt!e higher lower moral liabilit& s!periorit&Sinferiorit& h!miliation

from and for hierarchical status *ocial effects Social sit%ation superiority or lower inferiority? create or s!ppress

Social relation

maintaining or initiating a relation sealing an agreement showing goodwill or peacef!l intentions showing and proving li"ing or love en:o&ing the process of giving

:%t* Normative non5altruist $abit. benign tradition indirect effect receive ret%rn gift *elf5interest receive re"ard from sit%ation or stat%s &a.le )% (otives for non5altruistic giving from others from instit!tions in f!t!re life mar"ets other

6'

1/.2 Social effects ;A.<.; Opinion %he social effects of giving that ind!ce it concern opinion, situation, and relation. Chen &o! give something to someone, or help her, this has two "inds of effects. Eo! improve the sit!ation of this person, and this is a priori appreciated b& her and b& people who are altr!istic towards her, incl!ding possibl& &o!rself (with the effects of possible paternalistic altr!ism). %his is what is described in -ection $. %he people who so val!e the sit!ation of the beneficiar& val!e ipso facto indirectl& &o!r action beca!se of this effect. owever, this action is also bo!nd to raise another :!dgment and sentiment in them, which is praise, approval, esteem, gratit!de in the case of the beneficiar& and people who are strongl& altr!istic towards her, possibl& li"ing, and avoidance of disapproval, blame, criticism, or contempt, when the gift or help was e0pected. %hese :!dgments and sentiments have as ob:ect the giver B &o!rself. %he& are often appreciated b& the giver, and this ma& be a motive for giving. %his motive can be at wor" even when &o! are not altr!istic towards the beneficiar&. 6t ma& ind!ce giving b& itself or in association with an& other motive. A priori, these :!dgments and sentiments are attached to the gift in itself and directl&, rather than on its effect on the sit!ation of the beneficiar& and in addition to this effect, even tho!gh it re7!ires the e0istence of this effect for the beneficiar& (or at least the intention of prod!cing this benefit), and even tho!gh this eval!ation of the gift and the giving is bo!nd to depend on this benefit. ence, &o!r appreciation of these :!dgments and sentiments also depends on these items, and so is &o!r res!lting incentive to give. Ce have seen in -ection 2 how important this iss!e is in the widespread case of :oint giving. %he main reason for this str!ct!re of these :!dgments and sentiments is that the& appreciate that &o! too" the decision to give, and hence that &o! are responsible for the gift or help. %his str!ct!re also generall& res!lts, in addition, from an appreciation of the cost &o! inc!r (in considering the items relevant for appreciating this cost). %hese :!dgments are something else than a possible appreciation of the fact that &o! are an altr!ist towards the beneficiar&. %he& ma& also depend on other items, s!ch as gifts b& other people or other gifts of &o!rs, b& comparison, or a social norm. 6n fact, the approval, non8disapproval, or esteem ma& not be those of specific persons, b!t of a general abstract social opinion that &o! imagine. %hese :!dgments abo!t the giver b& altr!ists are those that lead to the separation between the act of giving or helping and the altr!istic eval!ator disc!ssed in -ection 1$.$.2, with the concl!sion that the& can ma"e societ& as a whole more altr!istic than its members are. 5ote that the praise aims at the gift or aid in itself, b!t that it is motivated b& an altr!istic concern for the beneficiar&;s sit!ation. ;A.<.< Situation %hese :!dgments can provide the giver with a social stat!s, and e0isting stat!ses ma& demand giving. Eo! th!s ma& give to ac7!ire or maintain a stat!s. %his aspect ac7!ires a partic!lar dimension when the receiver enters into the consideration of stat!ses and relative stat!s is emphasi1ed. +iving and receiving then are often important with respect to the relative social

24 situations of the giver and of the receiver. owever, it is remar"able that s!ch givings ma& be from the person of higher stat!s to the person of lower stat!s, or the reverse. +iving to a s!perior can manifest s!bmission or confirm its acceptation. 6t can also be a reward for benevolence, or in fact a price for protection. Eet, it sometimes also is de facto e0tortion !nder threat, disg!ised in the more amiable relation of giving (and the s!perior ma& indeed protect this so!rce of reven!e from e0ternal threats). owever, giving is also often from the s!perior, as a proof or manifestation of s!periorit&, and its acceptance can be an ac"nowledgement of this stat!sF it can then be a displa& of generosit&, possibl& creating a moral indebtedness, or :!st in fact a reward for ind!cing obedience. 6n all "inds of enco!nters, giving can aim at creating a social s!periorit& over the receiver or over other persons, or at erasing or diminishing a similar inferiorit&. 6t can create moral indebtedness of the receiver, or, on the contrar&, erase or diminish a pending moral debt. +iving also sometimes aims at creating and displa&ing an advantage in the comparison of the 7!alit& of the person3 the giver appears as genero!s and disinterested, while in contrast the receiver appears as self8interested and greed&. As we have noted, the aim can even be to h!miliate the receiver (for instance in s!ggesting that she is incapable of catering for her needs or for those of her famil&). All aspects of social sit!ation and stat!s can be :!dged b& the giver, b& the receiver, and b& other persons, and the giver is often sensitive to the corresponding social opinion. ;A.<.: )elation Finall&, as emphasi1ed earlier (-ection '.'), the ver& nat!re of giving as a vol!ntar& sacrifice for the good of the other person gives it a cr!cial f!nction of information and demonstration, ind!cing its widespread role for establishing or maintaining a relationship, in showing and proving goodwill, peacef!l intentions, li"ing, or love, in sealing an agreement, and so on. 6n fact the simple pleas!re of the social relation of the process of giving is a motive in a n!mber of cases, and occasionall& the onl& one. 1/.( 7ntrinsicall* normative ;non-altr%istic< giving )eople often feel the& have to give witho!t m!ch consideration of the sit!ation of the beneficiar&. %he gift sho!ld be !sef!l, b!t the foc!s of intention is on the giving rather than on the relief or benefit. %his is not altr!ism since the motive is not an altr!istic intention. %his motive is in the nat!re of a mental obligation, with vario!s possible intensities. 6t can be a d!t&, or degenerate into a habit or a benign tradition. %his motive for giving is normative and deontic, and not conse7!entialist (as are, for instance, altr!ism or the desire to have some social effect).6$ ence, as for all motives of this "ind, describing it b& a !tilit& f!nction is aw"ward, altho!gh possible in describing the satisfaction of following the norm# or the dissatisfaction of failing to do so B this permits one to ta"e acco!nt of the sentiment abo!t more or less following a norm. %his motive is not moral in the sense of moral altr!ism, and &et some other sentiment of moral val!e, norm, or d!t& can be attached to an act of giving in itself. %he motive ma& be felt as a social norm or val!e or not. 6t can be conceived of as essentiall& personal. I!t it can also be seen as a social norm or val!e, and, then, it can relate to act!al or imagined praise. Finall&, this motive is not, in itself, being satisfied of oneself, altho!gh this sentiment can accompan& it. -eeing s!ch an intrinsicall& normative giving as
6$

6n normative altr!ism, the altr!ism is a conse7!entialist sentiment val!ing the good of the other person, b!t having this sentiment is deonticF

21 val!ed beca!se it wo!ld provide a warm8glow# is drawing it to a conse7!entialist intention, which is not its intrinsic nat!re. Eet, one has also to consider what happens when the agent fails to behave as re7!ired. 9ven if there is no warm8glow# when she obe&s the norm, there ma& come a cold8glow# of g!ilt or shame B and possibl& reprobation B when she does not. 1/., Self-interested giving ;A.=.; Intro!uction +iving can also favo!r the strict self8interest of the giver, in vario!s wa&s. %hese advantages ma& ind!ce her to give beca!se the& overcompensate the cost of the gift, or the& can have this effect in being associated with other motives for giving. A most obvio!s case is that of giving ind!cing a ret!rn gift in a reciprocit&. 6f receiving this benefit is the onl& motive, giving is an e0ploitation of the ret!rn gift, and the relation is a half8reciprocit&.# Eet, the ret!rn gift ma& come from a third agent (this is a reverse reciprocit&#). A n!mber of a!thors have pointed o!t this tendenc& to give to people who give, from agents other than the receiver, and the& often propose that the giver will be better off in the end (<enD @escartes and Adam -mith are cases in point). (ne reason for this gift to the giver is to reward her merit. %his reward can be from private agents or from instit!tions, and one cannot avoid noting here the beliefs in a reward in the ne0t life in vario!s religions. %he material benefits can also be attached to, or res!lt from, a stat!s ac7!ired than"s to giving, helpf!lness, or generosit&. Eet, the giver can also receive benefits irrespective of partic!lar specific motives, as a res!lt of vario!s possible indirect effects. %hese effects can for instance be of an economic, political, or social nat!re (or a combination of s!ch effects). %he consideration of economic effects of this t&pe have a long and famo!s histor&, with the debates abo!t the welfare effects of international transfers (the problem of +erman compensations# after the first Corld Car). %he conditions of the e0istence of s!ch effects thro!gh changes in prices or otherwise have been the ob:ect of intensive st!dies. ;A.=.< Gifts an! interests -elf8interested giving ma& have to be e0cl!ded from "enuine giving characteri1ed b& other motivations. %his wo!ld in partic!lar impl& e0cl!ding se7!ential e0change from reciprocities. Eet this cond!ct e0ists, and its motives are often mi0ed in vario!s wa&s with other, nonselfish motivations. First of all, reciprocit& in general is intrinsicall& s!ch a mi0ed mode, and people often derive a p!rel& personal and material benefit from the set of transfers, in addition to the other t&pes of sentiments, emotions, and motivations. I!t there are also specific forms of selfish givings or selfish reciprocities (possibl& more appropriatel& named pse!do8gifts and pse!do8reciprocities). Eet, the term selfish itself can cover vario!s attit!des. -trict self8 interest# will refer to e0cl!sive attachment, in the actions considered, to one;s own cons!mption in the most standard sense (material# self8interest also e0presses this idea b!t is aw"ward since one ma& have to incl!de vario!s intangible# goods or services, and some intangible# val!ed effects of cons!mption or possession). I!t a n!mber of social# interests are in fact also selfish,# s!ch as see"ing, as ends in themselves, nonreprobation, approval, fame, rep!tation, good image, others; consideration or respect, domination, stat!s, good relations, friendship, and so on. (f co!rse, the meaning of words oppose selfishness to altr!ism, and hence it wo!ld not be serio!s to s!ggest that all gifts wo!ld be selfish# beca!se, being free and vol!ntar& b& definition, the& are desired b& their a!thor, or co!ld be ipso facto considered as providing her with satisfaction or even pleas!re. %his holds for normative altr!ism B one co!ld spea" of the satisfaction of following a norm B, b!t also for

22 nat!ral or hedonistic altr!ism altho!gh the corresponding giving decidedl& ma"es the giver happier or less !nhapp& (b& the effects of emotional contagion, empath&, affection, or pit&). .an& reasons can lead to selfish giving of vario!s t&pes, s!ch as the following ones3 8 %he gift;s effect on some social process favo!rs the giver s!fficientl& to overcompensate the cost of the gift. %his process can be economic, political, made of intra8famil& relations, etc. 8 A gift or a reciprocit& can show and prove goodwill and hence permit a relation that is beneficial to the giver, s!ch as a concession to concl!de a bargaining, a favo!r to seal an agreement, a service or a gift to ind!ce tr!st, and so on. 8 %he gift can have vario!s informational effects favo!rable to the giver, s!ch as informing the receiver of a giver;s offer (as with gifts of samples), signalling some other action of the giver, or eliciting a reaction that !sef!ll& informs the giver. 8 6n partic!lar, a gift ma& in fact constit!te a demand for establishing a relation of vario!s possible t&pes (personal, commercial, political, and so on), and its val!e, or the sacrifice it entails for the giver, ma& indicate the intensit& of the desire for this relation (as well as the means and the generosit& of the partner). 8 A strictl& self8interested se7!ence of two8wa& gifts can constit!te a m!t!all& beneficial se7!ential e0change. 8 A giver ma& self8interestedl& e0ploit the receiver;s ret!rn8gift reaction (a half8 reciprocit&#). 8 A giver can receive gifts from third parties motivated b& a reverse reciprocit&, and a classical moral view is that this will overcompensate the cost of the initial gift. 8 A gift can elicit a variet& of social opinions and sentiments, or of social stat!ses, that not onl& can be favo!red in themselves b& the giver, b!t ma& also entail a n!mber of other advantages. 8 And so on. ;A.=.: Giver/s enefit from the "ift/s effect on processes an! their outcome 1/.*.$.1 %he general propert& A gift a priori infl!ences the processes and interactions in which the giver or the receiver are engaged, and indirectl& other processes and interactions, and hence the res!lts of these processes. %hese effects ma& be favo!rable to the giver or !nfavo!rable to the receiver, or both. And it ma& be that the global, overall effects ma"e gift giving favo!rable to the giver, andSor !nfavo!rable to the receiver, from the point of view of their own strict self8interest. 6f the giver gains in the end and is aware of these ind!ced effects and of this conse7!ence, then her strict self8interest ind!ces her to give. I& the same to"en, if the indirect effects lead to an overall decrease of the receiver;s welfare, giving is deterred b& altr!ism and ind!ced b& malevolence, and the receiver will ref!se the gift if she can and if this can prevent the effect

2$ (since simple destr!ction of goods b& the wo!ld8be giver ma& s!ffice for some t&pes of effects). Aario!s cases will differ b& the nat!re of the mechanism infl!enced b& the gift and infl!encing the welfare of the people concerned. %hese mechanisms can involve mar"ets of vario!s t&pes, other interactions, p!blic and political or famil& redistrib!tions, and so on. A n!mber of disc!ssions that have developed in economics are abo!t instances of this general phenomenon. 1/.*.$.2 %he transfer parado0# thro!gh effects on prices, mar"ets, or e0change For e0ample, the gift can affect s!pplies or demands and hence prices, and this can ind!ce the indirect effect. -ince reso!rce owners sometimes benefit from a partial destr!ction of the reso!rce that boosts its price, the& also benefit from giving this amo!nt or its prod!ct awa& to a distant co!ntr& (as the 9!ropean Comm!nit& gave b!tter to <!ssia for s!pporting Cestern 9!ropean farmers or the >- s!pport their farmers in giving awa& farm prod!cts as foreign aid). Contrar& effects of transfers have gained historical fame in the disc!ssion of the problem of transfers# in international economics, that is, the effects of international transfers on the terms of trade. %he first debate concerned a trib!te# rather than a gift, b!t the logic is the same. 6n the debates abo!t the effects of the +erman war compensations after the first world war, it was arg!ed that the transfers co!ld, b& their effects on s!pplies and demands in international mar"ets, alter the terms of trade so as to diminish the act!al amo!nt of wealth transferred. ?eontief (1'$6, 1'62) then presented a n!merical e0ample where this effect is so large that, in the end, the giver is better off and the receiver is worse off. owever, this first ?eontief parado0# (as 6 called it)6* is e0hibited in a competitive mar"et, and -am!elson (1'*2) s!ggested that it can onl& refer to !nstable e7!ilibria B hence it co!ld not be observed in real life with competitive mar"ets. owever, when there is monopolistic e0ploitation notabl& b& tariffs (which affect prices of internationall& traded goods), the welfare of the e0ploiting nation alwa&s varies in the direction of the transfer, while that of the e0ploited nation can a priori var& either wa& (Golm (1'6', 1'24)). Eet, when this e0ploitation is onl& partial, notabl& beca!se there are other trading co!ntries, then the giver can again benefit on the whole (id.). %his was applied to the anal&sis of foreign aid. Act!all&, of co!rse, agents ma& or ma& not be aware of s!ch perverse effects thro!gh mar"et interaction. %hese res!lts concerning this transfer parado0# and its application to selfish giving appl& to an& mar"ets. Cith a Co!rnot monopolistic domination, the parado0 cannot happen for the dominant (price setting) agent b!t it can for the dominated one who, hence, can have a strict self8interest in giving to the dominant agent. Cith competitive mar"ets, the relation of the transfer parado0 to the stabilit& of e7!ilibria depends on the concept of stabilit&, and standardl& vanishes for more than two traders (Chichilnis"& (1'84, 1'8$), Irecher and Ihagwati (1'81), =ones (1'82), +eana"oplos and eal (1'8$), )olemarcha"is (1'8$), Ihagwati et al. (1'8$), @i0it (1'8$), Eano (1'8$), )ostelwaite and Cebb (1'8*)). Ialas"o (1'28) and -afra (1'8$) consider occ!rrences of the transfer parado0 in the large d!e to m!ltiple e7!ilibria. Advantageo!s transfers where both parties gain, with competitive e7!ilibria and more than two traders, are shown b& +ale (1'2*) in an e0ample and b& +!esnerie and ?affont (1'28) more generall&, and b& ?eonard and .anning (1'8$). )ostelwaite (1'2') showed that the parado0 can occ!r in an& efficient and individ!all&
6*

%he second ?eontief parado0 (often :!st called the ?eontief parado0) is the finding that the e0ports of the >- were more labor intensive and less capital intensive than their imports.

2* beneficial reallocation scheme, and -ertel (1'8', 1''4, 1''*) e0hibited selfish giving in a n!mber of t&pes of interaction.6/ 1/.*.$.$ <edistrib!tion -ection 1482 has disc!ssed sit!ations where an aid or a gift benefits more the receiver than it costs the giver, and &et cannot be bo!ght beca!se it is an e0ternalit& or beca!se this is not done between these agents who are members of the same organi1ation or famil&, and where a s!perior agent (government, firm, famil& head) reali1es transfers that overcompensate the giver, specificall& or in general distrib!tion. 1/.*.$.* 90ploiting the ret!rn gift, se7!ential e0change, reverse reciprocit& 6n man& instances, indeed, giving can be favo!rable to the strict self8interest of the giver in a rather direct wa& b& a reaction of some agent. %his reaction ma& be s!fficientl& large to overcompensate the cost of the gift. <eactions in the famil& of reciprocit& provide a n!mber of instances of this sit!ation. An agent ma& give in order to receive a ret!rn gift from the receiver, whatever the motive of this reaction. .an& instances of this effect can be observed. For e0ample, in a n!mber of cases emplo&ees want to match the pa& the& receive, or an increase in it, b& s!fficient wor" and prod!ctivit&. %his is shown b& n!mero!s observations in st!dies of labo!r relations (reviewed and anal&sed in Golm (1''4)) and b& classical e0periments initiated b& Adam (1'6$, 1'6/) and Adam and <osenba!m (1'6*). %his leads emplo&ers to e0ploit this ret!rn gift in choosing pa&. %his is the basis of the noted proposal b& A"erlof of an e0planation of apparentl& invol!ntar& !nemplo&ment. %he aim of the ret!rn gift, however, ma& be to elicit another gift from the initial giver who ma& then e0pect a new ret!rn gift. %he relation then develops into a se7!ential e0change. Ioth parties ma& be strictl& self8interested in this process. %his is what )eter ammond (1'2/) and .ordechai G!r1 (1'22, 1'28) call altr!ism.# %he motive of the last transfer raises a problem, b!t s!fficient !ncertaint& abo!t the end of the process or abo!t the other agent s!ffices to s!stain it.66 %he reward for giving ma& also be provided b& other agents, in a reverse reciprocit&. A classical moral assertion is that altr!istic giving will be overcompensated b& s!ch benefits, leaving the giver with a net advantage in self8interest in the end B the almost identical form!lations of this view b& <enD @escartes and Adam -mith have been noted B (if this is tr!e, this ma& be a pit&, beca!se this benefit ma& !ndermine the intrinsicall& praiseworth& altr!istic motivation in the long r!n). 1/.*.$./ <ep!tation, social effects, image, stat!s

6/

%he transfer parado0 (and selfish giving) for competitive e7!ilibria nat!rall& also applies to a sit!ation of ?indahl e7!ilibri!m# with p!blic goods, as it appears in the diagrams in Golm 1'24 for the simplest case of two persons and two goods. I!t the receiver can re:ect the gift, an ob:ection that -ertel (1''*) waved in considering three agents and a receiver who also gains.
66

-ee Ias! (1'22, 1'82), <adner (1'84), -male (1'84), A0elrod (1'8*), Greps, .ilgrom, <oberts and Cilson (1'82).

2/ +iving often ind!ces a favo!rable :!dgment of the giver b& other people, which the giver often appreciates in itself, and which can also lead these people to act in wa&s that provide self8interested and notabl& material advantages to the giver. %his occ!rs in man& forms. +iving can elicit tr!st and permit a n!mber of desired or profitable actions or interactions. 6t can provide a stat!s which ma& entail man& advantages of all "inds. 6t can elicit gratit!de or li"ing from which the giver ma& derive vario!s side8benefits. Firms give, most often to enhance their p!blic image and have more c!stomers. )oliticians give to attract votes. 1/./ -iving in social relations and comm%nities Ce have pointed o!t the essential relational, informational and s&mbolic role of giving (-ection '.'). 6ndeed, sacrificing one;s interest for the good of someone else B tr!e giving B is a priori a strong social relation. 6t relates to other social relations and social bonds with infl!ences both wa&s. 5otabl&, when it res!lts from a relation, it often manifests, act!ali1es, shows, proves and activates it, and th!s ma"es it e0ist or last. 6n partic!lar, giving #M of one;s wealth to someone else can be seen as vol!ntaril& s!bmitting #M of one;s economic self to the disposition of someone else. %his is a relation with a priori a strongl& integrative nat!re. 6n fact, gen!ine, altr!istic giving is closel& related to the notion of comm!nit&, as a privileged relation between members. %his is clear for the famil& and vario!s solidarities, and shown b& the fact that the vol!me of private and p!blic aid or redistrib!tion in larger societies is closel& correlated to the prevailing sense of comm!nit&. .an"ind is no less a set of comm!nities than a collection of individ!als, and this str!ct!res the relations of altr!ism and giving. Comm!nities incl!de notabl&, !nder man"ind as a whole, national, c!lt!ral, political, labo!r, local, and "in comm!nities. 9ach individ!al relates to the other members of each of the comm!nities she belongs to, and to the comm!nit& as a whole or its instit!tions. %hese relations incl!de altr!isms of vario!s "inds, and more or less gift8giving for vario!s motives. %hese altr!isms and giving are ind!ced b& the sentiment of common belonging, b!t the& also intrinsicall& constit!te and maintain the comm!nit&. 6n partic!lar, vario!s "inds of gifts, s!pport or aid between members or between members and the gro!p manifest the comm!nit&, prove its e0istence and effectiveness, and contrib!te to the e0istence and d!ration of this social str!ct!re and its instit!tions. %he vario!s t&pes of altr!isms and of reasons for giving, and of comm!nities, have specific relations. -olidarit& denotes the potentiall& m!t!al aid characteristic of comm!nities in general. Comparative :!stice, leading to impartial altr!ism (see -ection 1*), is defined among members of some narrower or broader comm!nit&. )it&, compassion, empath&, and emotional contagion re7!ire a minim!m sentiment of commonness and similarit& with the observed person (being another h!man person sho!ld s!ffice b!t !nfort!natel& does not alwa&s, and some people e0tend these feelings to some animals). %he general altr!ism noted b& Adam -mith, and the a priori respect and common help noted above, manifest the general comm!nit& of man"ind. Aid within comm!nities is commonl& demanded b& moral altr!ism, and still more b& nonmoral social norms. %he intensit& of these sentiments, and hence the importance and fre7!enc& of the res!lting help and giving, correlate with the intensit& of the sense of comm!nit&. %his intensit& is d!e to several factors, incl!ding c!lt!re, interests, tradition, act!al closeness, and si1e. Fiscall& implemented :oint giving manifests solidarit& in the national comm!nit&. %he closest comm!nit& ta"es !s bac" to the famil& and its m!t!al love and s!pport. %he tighter the comm!nit&, a priori the more intense the altr!isms of vario!s "inds and the larger the res!lting giving. owever, the nat!re of these motives changes in the comparison, since the tighter the comm!nit&, the more affection is li"el& to pla& a role, and

26 this sentiment tends to chec" those of pit& and compassion, and to ma"e that of moral d!t& s!perfl!o!s. III "A :E* AN; =I*&!R> $0% &he normative economics of altruism and giving 16.1 )he ethics of economics 6mproving societ& has alwa&s been the basic motive of economics, from its beginnings and permanentl& (even the rather recent economists who did not want to emphasi1e this aspect practiced it b& their in:!nctions which were more assertive the less the& were derived from reflection B and implicit or s!mmar& moral positions have little chance to be so!nd ethics). %his concern of economics implies that some people have ethical concerns, which is a priori in contradiction with an& h&pothesis of p!rel& selfish individ!als. owever, economics has endorsed vario!s moral val!es. %hese val!es t!rn o!t to all have an important relation with iss!es of altr!ism and giving. (ne can begin with efficienc&, in the modern form of )areto efficienc&, based on the social val!e of !nanimit&. %hen come the twin val!es of freedom and welfare. %he basicall& relevant freedom is social free!om, that is, an absence of forcef!l interference with individ!als; actions, incl!ding the intended conse7!ences of these actions, b& individ!als alone, in gro!ps, or in instit!tions. 6ndivid!als; actions are th!s onl& constrained not to forcef!ll& interfere with others; actions. Ioth free e0change and gift giving are non8forcef!l interferences,62 and a free transfer is either a gift or one part of an e0change or agreement. %he ban on forcef!l interference applies in partic!lar to conse7!ences of previo!s free acts respecting social freedom, s!ch as rights ac7!ired b& free e0change or agreement (or received as gifts). -ocial freedom is classicall& presented in vario!s wa&s, depending on the emphasis p!t on vario!s aspects, s!ch as the classical basic rights presenting the general principle and main fields of application, process8freedom# with emphasis on free e0change and mar"ets, or the negative freedom# of 6saiah Ierlin and others (Gant, =.-. .ill, etc.). %he moral endorsement of social freedom is process liberalism.#68 istoricall&, most economists have so endorsed social freedom as an end val!e. Eet, a n!mber of them onl& see its instr!mental val!e, notabl& thro!gh the economic efficienc& of the competitive mar"et for welfare# B this latter emphasis is rather recent altho!gh it follows Adam -mith and Ailfredo )areto. -ocial freedom is a balance of rights between private agents, which a priori differs from the balance of force and threats between them. Altho!gh maintaining it is the ob:ect of law, co!rts, and p!blic coercion, it is also commonl& implemented b& vol!ntar& restraint from harming and stealing. Compared with the sole !se of force and threat, this respect constit!tes an altr!istic gift from the agents who wo!ld benefit from the confrontation. Eet, with social freedom, there remains to allocate the given reso!rces. %he main ones are h!man capacities, notabl& prod!ctive capacities which acco!nt for most of the val!e of the economic o!tp!t.6' %he val!e of the disposition of these capacities (i.e., their rent), can be left to their holders or more or less redistrib!ted. %hen, e7!ali1ation with the proper meas!res leads to an e7!al sharing of the proceeds of an e7!al labo!r of each individ!al (with different given capacities), or e7!al labo!r income e7!ali1ation.# 9ach individ!al "eeps the proceeds
62

?et !s discard here the cases where the beneficiar& of a gift both wishes to ref!se it and cannot ref!se it for material or social reasons. 68 Called simpl& liberalism in other 9!ropean lang!ages and in 9nglish before some moment in the earl& 24th cent!r&. 6' %he 7!estions raised in this paragraph are presented in Golm 244*.

22 of the rest of her freel& chosen labo!r. %his redistrib!tion also amo!nts to each individ!al &ielding to each other the proceeds of the same labo!r. %his aspect of balance or fairness of these bilateral transfers ma& ind!ce their more or less vol!ntar& acceptance, in a "ind of pervasive reciprocit&. -ocial freedom and this distrib!tion implement macro:!stice,# which defines the b!l" of the proper distrib!tion. Eet, there remains man& other iss!es of fairness, for which a n!mber of criteria can be applied. %he anal&sis of these criteria developed in economics since the mid864;s, and it occ!pies most of the field of normative economics nowada&s. 6ts central concerns are iss!es of e7!alit& and ine7!alit&, of vario!s items in vario!s circ!mstances, and provisioning needs, rewarding merit and desert, and satisf&ing legitimate rights. Finall&, economics has even not forgotten what is obvio!s to ever&bod&, namel& that the good societ& is made of good people and good social relations,24 altho!gh the dismal science# brand of economists are prompt to brandish the -ealth of 2ations, the possible efficienc& of mar"ets, and perhaps .andeville to arg!e that private vices ma"e p!blic virt!es# (with relations of e0change). 16.2 )he intrinsic val%e of altr%ism and giving 6n fact, almost all c!lt!res, moral s&stems, and people see in giving and altr!ism the paragon of moral cond!ct and sentiments, a main B often the main B moral val!e and virt!e (especiall& if one incl!des helping one;s "in or gro!p). ence, if economics consistentl& applies its !s!al preference for respecting individ!als; preferences# to all the domain of individ!als; eval!ations, it sho!ld endorse this intrinsic val!e of giving and altr!ism. 6t sho!ld val!e, as people do, acts and sentiments of compassion, benevolence, solidarit&, charit&, fraternit&, favo!ring the common good, or fairness, and the 7!alit& of good social relations that res!lt from them. 6n fact, it can hardl& avoid directl& endorsing this :!dgment. 16.( -iving as improving fairness in freedom .oreover, giving and reciprocit& improve allocative fairness in provisioning the need&, attrib!ting to some people what is d!e to them (according to some criterion), sec!ring fair balance, and diminishing ine7!alit& between donor and beneficiar&. %he& do this in respecting social freedom and than"s to it, b& decentrali1ed actions witho!t coercion. 6n partic!lar, giving to alleviate need or povert& constit!tes a normative blessing since it has one basic val!e, libert&, reali1e a n!mber of others3 it alleviates pain, red!ces povert&, diminishes ine7!alit& between the giver and the receiver and B generall& B overall ine7!alit&, and it is desired b& the two people directl& concerned and B generall& B b& some people while nobod& regrets it. -pecificall&, giving to a poorer individ!al (witho!t ma"ing her richer than the giver) constit!tes a progressive transfer# which !nambig!o!sl& diminishes the ine7!alit& between the incomes or wealths of these two people, and hence also all the meas!res of overall income or wealth ine7!alit& that respect this transfer principle.#21 %he !nanimo!s ()areto#) improvement obtains if ever&one either approves of these free act and red!ction of pain, povert&, and ine7!alit&, or, at least, is indifferent abo!t them. =oint giving that benefits someone poorer than all the givers and in need has the same properties if it res!lts from a free
24 21

Golm 1'8*a. %hat is, meas!res of ine7!alit& that are rectifiant. <ectifiance pl!s s&mmetr& in the considered wealths or incomes B s&mmetr& is :!stified b& the absence of relevance of individ!al characteristics that differ across the considered individ!als B is isophily, which mathematicall& amo!nts to -ch!r conve0it&. -ee Golm 1'66a, 1'66b.

28 agreement between the givers or if it is reali1ed b& a p!blic a!thorit& in s!ch a wa& that ever&one prefers the whole set of transfers, and if the beneficiar& remains poorer than the givers (concerning ine7!alit&, this redistrib!tion amo!nts to a set of progressive transfers). (n the other hand, the m!ch8praised solidarit& or s!pport among members of families or other comm!nities are the main so!rce of ine7!alit& of opport!nit& and oppose ideals of broader impartialit&, e7!alit&, and :!stice. 16., !ltr%ism. giving. reciprocit*. and fail%res of economic interactions ;C.=.; Causin" market failures Altr!ism and giving are no less both the worst and the best of things in the second main field of normative economics, the 7!estion of the vario!s inefficiencies ind!ced b& mar"et fail!res.# +iving violates the mode of behavio!r that constit!tes competitive mar"ets. ence, when it intervenes in a framewor" of e0change, a priori it !ndermines the efficienc& of s!ch mar"ets and of the price s&stem. 6mportant e0amples are fo!nd in coll!sions that bloc" competition and are s!stained b& cond!cts of solidarit&, norms of fairness, or promise "eeping. %hese motives can prevent an agent from competitivel& !nderc!tting a s!ppl& price or overbidding in b!&ing, when it wo!ld be her self8interest to do it. %hese agents ma& finall& gain from their coll!sive behavio!r, b!t the means are often these non8selfish cond!cts, normative and often achieved in reciprocit& with other agents in the similar sit!ations. %he res!lting price rigidities :eopardi1e mar"et efficienc&. 5otabl&, these cond!cts in the labo!r mar"et lead to downward wage rigidities ind!cing !nemplo&ment, and, in this field and others, to behavio!rs cond!cive to inflation. %he non8p!rel&8self8interested cond!ct can also ta"e place between the parties of an e0change. %he competitive model and, a priori, the res!lting efficienc& of the price s&stem, can be !pset b& altr!istic price rebates, overpa&ments, overprovision, accepting !nderprovision, or settling for a :!st price# or fair price# that is not the competitive price. 9mplo&ees providing labo!r from a sense of reciprocit& for the pa& the& receive appl& a cond!ct anal&sed for a long time b& social ps&cholog& (with the landmar" anal&ses and e0periments of Adam and others in the earl& 1'64;s), and which is the basis of the noted possible ca!se of !nemplo&ment pointed o!t b& A"erlof. owever, s!ch disr!ptions of efficienc& in mar"ets are more or less 7!alified b& two aspects. First, as Cic"steed emphasi1ed that people are more non8t!istic than egoists as persons (see -ection 11), the& are also more non8t!istic than altr!ists in e0changes. %hat is, the& largel& "eep their altr!istic and selfish cond!cts for different relations. -econd, altr!ists en:o& what is good for the other, notabl& her welfare or means, and both the donor and the beneficiar& ma& en:o& the relation in itself. %hese benefits ma& overcompensate possible costs in economic efficienc& in a narrow sense. At an& rate, individ!al preferences are no longer those that prod!ce the selfish behavio!r, and this is to be ta"en into acco!nt notabl& for considering the )areto8efficienc& of the relation (this iss!e is disc!ssed in -ection 882 in the case of reciprocit&). ;C.=.< Curin" market failures

2' (n the other hand, altr!ism and reciprocit& are also essential ca!ses of economic efficienc&. A most basic reason rests in the spontaneo!s respect of people and of their rights and properties. %his is an indispensable complement to self8defence and to the role of the police, and societ& is better and more efficient the larger the importance of this spontaneo!s respect. %his respect can be e0tended to that of tr!th in tr!th8telling and of one;s word in promise8 "eeping, and no mar"et can f!nction witho!t a large minim!m of s!ch normed cond!cts. 9conomists have often been s!rprised to see wor"ing interactions where the model ass!ming selfish motives predicts complete fail!re. %his occ!rred for instance, for the reasons noted in -ection '.6, in vol!ntar& contrib!tions to p!blic goods, collective actions, voting, the implementation of incomplete contracts, b&passing missing mar"ets, to which one can add man& cases of tr!th8telling and revelation of private information, promise8"eeping, and spontaneo!s respect of persons, rights, and properties. %he main motives responsible for these cond!cts are moral val!es and norms. %he& are generall& int!itivel&# moral, b!t rational moral val!es sometimes have an important infl!ence, notabl& with !niversali1ations (pop!lar Gantianism#) or p!tative reciprocities (see -ection 1$.$.$). 5on8moral social val!es or norms also often pla& an important role. %here also are desires for rep!tation B possibl& for deriving f!t!re benefits b!t often val!ed in itself B, and for being praised or praiseworth&, and simple self8satisfaction (see -ection 1$.$.2). .oral and simpl& social val!es or norms manifest the corresponding normative altr!ism. A n!mber of these motives are norms of fairness of vario!s t&pes. .an& of these relations are reciprocities, notabl& balance reciprocities which can have a dimension of fairness, in vario!s t&pes of applications. 6ndeed, these reciprocities lead the agents to more or less d!plicate the res!lt of an e0change witho!t the selfish motivation3 one gives not !nder the condition that the other persons give, b!t simpl& given that the& also give (&et, we have seen in -ection 8 that, in fact, the goods or services transferred are not a priori in the same 7!antities or proportions as the& wo!ld have been in the selfish e0change if it had ta"en place). %hese behavio!rs permit the partial or f!ll remed& to the two basic ca!ses of these fail!res of e0changes or agreements3 diffic!lties, costs, or impossibilities in information or constraining. %he& lead to giving given that one is given to, or to contrib!ting given that other persons contrib!te, where these gifts or contrib!tions can be transferring ob:ects, providing services, or revealing information and tr!th8telling, "eeping one;s promises, respecting others and their rights and properties, and so on. $0%/ i.eral social contracts and -oint giving ;C.A.; 5i eral social contracts -ocial freedom meets the vario!s classical ca!ses of mar"et fail!res# d!e to diffic!lties in information, coercion or e0cl!sion, and agreement. -pecific cond!cts that are not p!rel& selfish remed& these problems, b!t onl& in part. Ade7!ate coercion is another mode of sol!tion, notabl& b& the p!blic sector. %he res!lt sho!ld be )areto efficient given all available means (information, coercion, and so on). Eet, there remains the choice of the distrib!tion among the individ!als that res!lts from this action. 6f the distrib!tion that res!lts from social freedom (with the appropriate distrib!tion of given reso!rces) is morall& endorsed, the sol!tion consists of determining the o!tcome that wo!ld res!lt from free action or agreement in the h&pothetical case where the ca!se of the fail!re# is absent. -!ch sol!tions are liberal social contracts# (a social contract is, b& definition, a theor& in social ethics stating that the government sho!ld do what wo!ld have res!lted from a h&pothetical free agreement in

84 specified circ!mstances).22 -!ch an agreement wo!ld achieve )areto efficienc& among its parties in its setting if not reaching it is considered an agreement fail!re, and hence is ass!med awa& for this h&pothetical agreement. .oreover, the res!lting distrib!tion is that res!lting from social freedom. A liberal social contract can th!s be said to protect social freedom from the impediments ca!sing the fail!re,# in enforcing what its res!lt wo!ld be in their absence. 5ote that even when an agreement is act!all& achieved, the enforcement of the contract is sec!red b& p!blic constraint if necessar&. .ore generall&, even if a right is act!all& ac7!ired (possibl& b& labo!r, first occ!panc&, or discover&, and not onl& e0change or agreement), its protection from the encroachment of other people is sec!red b& p!blic constraint towards others if necessar&. ence, the act!al state with fail!re# adds the constraints constit!ted b& the ca!se of this fail!re (ignorance, non8coercion) to the ideal process8free stateF the liberal social contract adds the constraint of its implementation to this act!al stateF b!t, to the ideal state witho!t impediment, whose o!tcome it enforces, it adds no constraint b!t onl& the h&pothetical character of the agreement. ;C.A.< ,u lic "oo!s an! (oint "ivin" A main mar"et fail!re# is the case of :oint concerns or p!blic goods# and of vol!ntar& pa&ments for them. 6n general, p!rel& self8concerned individ!als will not pa&, or pa& s!fficientl&, in an individ!al decision. (%he& will be free riders# of the contrib!tion of other people if there is an&). %his fail!re# has two ca!ses. %he individ!als co!ld sign a collective agreement abo!t their contrib!tions. %he agreement can then be enforced b& the p!blic sector, as an& other contract. %his agreement can ma"e an& beneficiar&8contrib!tor better off than its absence. %hen, each individ!al signs the agreement beca!se if she does not sign or if an& other person does not sign the other sit!ation prevails, whereas if she signs she is in a better sit!ation if all others also sign. owever, if the people concerned are too n!mero!s or dispersed, this vol!ntar& agreement ma& not occ!r beca!se of diffic!lties, costs, or impossibilities of transaction, information, contact, etc. %hen, if people can be e0cl!ded from the benefit of the good, an& agent can prod!ce the good in ma"ing them pa& for access. 6n this case, however, this seller will not "now well which prices to charge. And e0cl!sion is not possible in a class of cases. 6n these sit!ations, the h&pothetical e0istence of s!ch an agent is not a possible sol!tion notabl& beca!se this wo!ld not sa& what to do with the profit (in addition there ma& be other necessar& characteristics of this agent which are !ndetermined, s!ch as her ris"8aversion for choosing in !ncertaint& when choosing which prices to charge). ence, the sol!tion is the h&pothetical collective agreement of a liberal social contract essentiall& implemented b& the p!blic sector. =oint giving is, for altr!istic givers, a case of a p!blic good which is the receiver;s sit!ation or total receipt. %ransfers decided b& a collective agreement abo!t :oint giving are twice free3 as gifts and as ob:ects of a free agreement with co8givers. An altr!istic giver benefits simpl& from "nowing the sit!ation of the receiver (&et, hiding information abo!t this sit!ation is not e0cl!sion from this benefit b!t onl& introd!cing !ncertaint& abo!t it3 the altr!ist does not basicall& want to "now b!t onl& that the receiver;s sit!ation improve). %here generall& are man& possible contrib!tors, notabl& when giving to people in need (the sit!ation is the same if some givers speciali1e in giving to some need& people, since there sho!ld nevertheless be an agreement among all givers when the& are also concerned b& gifts to other
22

%he p!tative contract is between the citi1ens (sometimes their ancestors in some theories), or between them and the government B both contracts are classicall& seen as :ointl& present. %he partic!lar liberal social contracts# between citi1ens are a main topic of Golm 1'8/ and also the ob:ect of a general presentation in Golm 1'82a and 1'82b.

81 people than their poor#).%herefore, the sol!tion implementing the distrib!tive ethic of social freedom is the implementation of the liberal social contract ass!ming the possibilit& of a direct collective agreement. ;C.A.: The core with inter!epen!ent coalitions %here is a set of individ!als. 9ach is free to act, given the possibilities, in the sense of social freedom. %he individ!als of a gro!p of this set are also free to agree to perform acts which the& can do. 6t is ass!med that reaching the agreement and ma"ing it binding for the people who agree is possible and costless B this is the h&pothesis of the liberal social contract (the obligation to abide b& the agreement can be seen as enforcement b& the p!blic force as for an& lawf!l contract). 5ot ma"ing an agreement is a priori a partic!lar possible o!tcome for the gro!p. 6f the gro!p has to choose between two states that it can reali1e, s!ch that all members prefer one to the other, then it certainl& chooses the former. ?et !s consider, in addition, the ass!mption that a gro!p does not reali1e a state that it can reali1e if it can also reali1e another state that all members prefer to the former one. 6f these two states are the onl& possible ones, this amo!nts to the previo!s remar". I!t the ass!mption is something new in the other cases. %his ass!mption can be called one of collective rationalit& (the histor& of tho!ght also s!ggests calling it the Coase h&pothesis B rather than theorem# or con:ect!re B and it is, in fact, the basic ass!mption of cooperative game theor&). %he !nanimo!s preference in 7!estion in the gro!p can be with indifference for some members, b!t not all (this definitional propert& will not be repeated). A conse7!ence of the ass!mption is that each gro!p chooses a state that is )areto efficient among the states that its cooperation can reali1e (b& definition of this propert& of a state3 it is possible and no other possible state is !nanimo!sl& preferred). A cooperating gro!p is classicall& called a coalition.# A conse7!ence of the sit!ation is that the achieved state is s!ch that no coalition can ind!ce another state that is preferred b& all its members. %his is a theor& of the core,# b!t we will see that it has to differ from classical s!ch theories. 6t has in common with other theories of the core that considering the grand coalition# consisting of all agents in 7!estion implies that the achieved state is )areto efficient. Chich of these states prevails res!lts more or less from the consideration of more restricted coalitions. %hen, the sit!ation is 7!ite different from that of other notions of the core or related concepts. 6ndeed, when a (partial) coalition decides that its members provide contrib!tions different from those of a considered set of contrib!tions, the other individ!als concerned b& the p!blic good are affected b& this choice, their preferences lead them to react in choosing other contrib!tions that are the best for them, and this change infl!ences in t!rn the members of the considered coalition. %his holds whether each individ!al action is chosen collectivel& in some coalition or individ!all& (an individ!al is a partic!lar singleton coalition). %hat is, the relevant concept of the core is that of the core with e0ternalit&# or the core with interdependent coalitions.#2$ 6n contrast, in the other theories, a coalition ta"es the actions of other people as either not affecting its members (core for private goods and Fole&;s theor& of the core for p!blic goods) or as given to them, as not reacting to their choice different from the considered allocation (strong 5ash e7!ilibri!m#). 6n the core for private goods, the members of a coalition allocate their own reso!rces among themselves, and the other individ!als are not affected b& this operation (the& are onl& b& the absence of a larger cooperation). I& analog& with the case of private goods, @!ncan Fole&;s (1'24) theor& of a core for p!blic goods
2$

-ee Golm 1'82c, d, e, f, g, 1'8'.

82 ass!mes that the members of a coalition receive no benefit from contrib!tions (gifts for :oint giving) from individ!als who are not members of this coalition. owever, these other individ!als co!ld in fact contrib!te (give) individ!all& or in forming other coalitions. ence, for a non8e0cl!dable p!blic good, this ass!mption a priori does not hold (this is the case of :oint giving). 6f e0cl!sion is possible, it sho!ld be e0plained wh& agents who are not members of the coalition in 7!estion choose to e0cl!de the members of this coalition from the benefits of their contrib!tionsF it co!ld be in order to raise the cost of not accepting the considered allocation (contrib!tions)F however, these non8members co!ld, or not, benefit from the contrib!tions of this coalition, depending on a decision of the coalition if it can also e0cl!de others from the benefits of its contrib!tionsF hence there is an e0cl!sion game which sho!ld be e0plicit. %he e0cl!sion is necessaril& the case onl& in partic!lar t&pes of material sit!ations, for instance if a coalition prod!ces one 7!antit& of the p!blic good and there materiall& cannot be two s!ch 7!antities (b!t, then, which coalition prod!ces the good has to be determined), or if the p!blic good is local and a partial coalition has to emigrateF these are the t&pes of sit!ations where Fole&;s concept applies, and it is not the case of :oint giving. 6n still another theor& in the famil& of the core, that of strong 5ash e7!ilibri!m,# the individ!als o!tside of the coalition do not react to the coalition acting differentl& from the considered sit!ation (a proposed set of contrib!tions). owever, with non8e0cl!sion, this absence of reaction will not be the case in general. Agents o!tside the dissenting coalition have an interest to react, the& therefore will do it, and the coalition has to ta"e this reaction into acco!nt. .oreover, a strong 5ash e7!ilibri!m is both )areto efficient (the case of the grand coalition# noted above) and a Co!rnot85ash e7!ilibri!m (the case of singleton coalitions). 5ow, in the standard cases a Co!rnot85ash e7!ilibri!m is not )areto efficient and, hence, no strong 5ash e7!ilibri!m e0ists. owever, the ass!mption that other people do not react to the choice of a person also holds for ordinar& Co!rnot85ash e7!ilibria and the& are commonl& considered, and )areto efficienc& ma& be desired for its normative val!e.2* %herefore, the obtained state (set of individ!al contrib!tions or gifts) is s!ch that there is no coalition whose members become all more satisfied in acting differentl&, and this ta"es into acco!nt that this change will a priori ind!ce changes in the acts (contrib!tions, gifts) of the other persons. 6n this respect, these other persons can act individ!all&, or cooperate among themselves, or again be partitioned into coalitions with cooperation within each coalition b!t not across coalitions. A coalition ma& consist of a single individ!al, either for the initial, dissenting coalition, or for an& ind!ced one. %he non8cooperative relations among coalitions ma& a priori be of an& t&pe, s!ch as Co!rnot85ash or -tac"elberg. 5otable properties of the res!lt are revealed b& partic!lar str!ct!res that ma& be the case or be s!fficient appro0imations. Cith 7!asilinear !tilities, !s!all& onl& one coalition of a partition of people into non8cooperating coalitions give, and the other individ!als and coalitions are free riders (with a Co!rnot85ash interaction, this is the coalition that gives the largest amo!nt when it alone gives). %he case of a large n!mber of small contrib!tors also shows remar"able properties (and is realistic for aid to people in need). 16.6 8etro-gifts and the process-liberal p%blic debt 6n a societ& where social freedom is f!ll& respected, the onl& possible :!stification of a p!blic debt is to reali1e transfers to earlier generations desired a priori b& the pa&ers of the ta0es that
2*

%he onl& case where Co!rnot85ash e7!ilibria have a f!ll :!stification in one8 or two8shot games is a game of reciprocit& presented in the chapter on reciprocit&.

8$ redeem the debt.2/ (f co!rse, the p!blic sector determining s!ch a borrowing estimates these preferences of f!t!re generations. %hese transfers can in partic!lar be gifts to earlier generations. A notable conse7!ence of this optim!m p!blic debt polic& has been shown in -ection 14. Eo! give to &o!r children and &o!r children give, or will give, to &o!. Eo! can give to &o!r great8grand children b& leaving s!fficient capital for them. A priori, however, in o!r growing economies, the& will need help m!ch less than &o!r great8grand mother did (d!ring the great depression). 6n fact, wise governments of the time provided p!blic aid financed b& a p!blic deficit that is now redeemed than"s to the ta0es we pa&. 6n addition to contrib!ting to reflate the econom&, this achieved e0actl& what &o! want3 &o! give to &o!r great8grand mother. %his is a retro'"ift, which can also benefit someone of the past !nrelated to &o!, notabl& beca!se of her needs and povert&. <etro8gifts are partic!lar cases of retro'transfers, which also incl!de retro'payments in which &o! pa& a previo!s generation for a service it provides to &o! (for instance, the& have planted a forest from which &o! benefit, and this forest has been financed b& p!blic borrowing now reimb!rsed than"s to &o!r ta0es).26 A retro8 gift can also be a part of an intergenerational reciprocit&. %he whole operation of a retrogift, and of a retro8pa&ment for a !nanimo!sl& desired intertemporal e0change, is desired b& the corresponding ta0pa&ers. owever, at the time of the pa&ment of the ta0, the other part has alread& been performed B it is the s!bsid& to the earlier generations or the service the& provide that will benefit later generations B, and hence ta0pa&ers wo!ld a priori prefer not to pa&. %his is a"in to an& comp!lsor& implementation of a contract, b!t more original for gift giving, altho!gh this is similar to the case of :oint giving implemented b& the p!blic sector. <etro8transfers constit!te the onl& process8liberal :!stification of the p!blic debt. %he& remed& the fail!re# of free transfers created b& the arrow of time.# (f co!rse, a retro8gift ma& also be a :oint gift, when several persons want to help the same one(s) in previo!s generations. %he givers ma& be of the same or of different generations. For instance, a person ma& have several descendents who want to help her. 16.2 Selfish altr%ism3 )he sit%ation of the other person ma* be *o%r o"n 6n collective decisions that will affect an !ncertain f!t!re, &o! often care abo!t vario!s individ!al sit!ations for a p!rel& self8interested motive, beca!se &o! do not "now which of these sit!ations will be &o!r own, into which possible individ!al sit!ation &o! will happen to fall. ence, &o! ma& also ta"e care of individ!al sit!ations which will be those of other persons, and then &o! are de facto an altr!ist,# that is, &o! are one in &o!r choice if not in &o!r sentiments. A shift in time transferring this view to the later sit!ation transforms this viewpoint into a common reason provided for helping another person in need, that described b& the arg!ment that it co!ld have happened to &o!.# %his notion is the basis of one of the most famo!s theories of social ethics or :!stice of recent times, the theor& of the original position# notabl& proposed b& =ohn <awls and =ohn arsan&i. Ioth these a!thors propose that the moral choice or polic& is the one that an individ!al wo!ld have chosen in an original position# where it# does not "now what it# will have in all respects in act!al life, incl!ding
2/

owever, if mar"et imperfections create invol!ntar& !nemplo&ment and cannot be directl& corrected, macroeconomic effects of the p!blic debt can :!stif& it b& an e0tended and second8best application of a liberal social contract (see above). 26 -ee Golm, 1'8/.

8* its# own tastes (and, of co!rse, its# se0). %heir two theories differ, b!t we have noticed above a basic iss!e that the& do not face (-ection 1$.$.$.*). A choice in the original position is made with preferences which have to have two given feat!res3 the preference abo!t ris" and the corresponding ris"8aversion, and the preferences abo!t being# vario!s persons (and in partic!lar having their preferences in act!al life). ence, if act!al individ!als are imagined bac" in an original position, the& have to "eep these two aspects of their preferences for their choice in this position, and hence the& generall& are not identical and a priori do not ma"e the same choice. .oreover, the individ!als can be imagined as "eeping still other feat!res of their act!al preferences and sit!ation for their imagined h&pothetical choice in !ncertaint&. %hese are theories of the partiall& original position.#22 -ince the individ!als in this h&pothetical !ncertain sit!ation are not identical, their preferred choices do not a priori present the !nanimit& that wo!ld res!lt from this identit&. %hen, inspired b& the theories of the social contract, one can propose to replace this lac"ing !nanimit& of preferences b& the !nanimit& of a free agreement among these different persons (<awls proposes this reference to the social contract, altho!gh he ass!mes that all persons have the same preferred choice). %he advantage of this agreement over an agreement between act!al individ!als is that these h&pothetical individ!als are more similar among themselves, and, hence, the scope of a priori possible agreements is more restricted. %herefore, these individ!als are ass!med to ma"e a !nanimo!s agreement abo!t what sho!ld be done when an& of the a priori possible sit!ations prevails. -!ch an a priori possible sit!ation is defined b& the fact that the a priori !ncertain (in the considered h&pothetical sit!ation) aspect of each individ!al;s preferences and sit!ation receives a specification. %hen, the decision of this h&pothetical agreement for the case of the act!al preferences and sit!ation is applied. %a"ing a h&pothetical agreement as a social ethical norm is b& definition a theor& of a social contract. %he present theor& differs from other social contracts b& the nat!re of the state in which the agreement is made (called the state of nat!re# in classical contractarian theor&). %he notionall& randomi1ed items, that is, all that the individ!als do not "eep and hence are !ncertain abo!t in this partiall& original position, can in fact be specific and restricted. %he theor& then is a theor& for compensating ine7!alities in this respect in act!al life. For e0ample, this item ma& be given prod!ctive capacities, depending on genetic endowment and ed!cation provided b& the famil&, given health as the propensit& (not) to become sic", or an& other characteristics of individ!als. %he agreement then is in fact a m!t!al ins!rance against the ris" of being poorl& endowed in the characteristic, and the act!al res!lt consists of compensations from the individ!als better endowed to the individ!als poorl& endowed. %his is notabl& considered for items that are given to the individ!als before the& co!ld ta"e o!t an act!al ins!rance, s!ch as given individ!al characteristics, famil& infl!ence, ed!cation received, and given social advantages or handicaps. %his theor& then is a f!ndamental ins!rance# defining act!al compensator& transfers. owever, this choice wants to be abo!t :!stice b!t is determined b& what wo!ld be the individ!als; selfish cond!ct in !ncertaint& and in e0change. %his raises a problem beca!se :!stice and selfish cond!ct have different rationales. 6n partic!lar, an individ!al;s selfish choice in !ncertaint& has no reason to represent a choice of :!stice among the vario!s persons that she co!ld be in the different reali1ations. %he relevant :!stice ma& foc!s on aspects of the individ!als; sit!ation different from their !tilit& (relevant for the self8interested choice). .oreover, when the& can be compared, the moral ine7!alit& aversion tends to e0ceed individ!al ris" aversion. owever, the sit!ation is different if selfish e0change is replaced b& benevolent reciprocit&. %he motive becomes3 6 help this person, given that, if o!r sit!ations
22

-ee Golm 1'8/, 1''8a.

8/ were reversed, she wo!ld have helped me.# %his is the p!tative reciprocit& whose act!al importance and conse7!ences have been noted above (-ection 1$.$.$.$). <eciprocit& is based on sentiments of balance or fairness or of m!t!al li"ing. %hese seem to be morall& acceptable bases of distrib!tive fairness. .oreover, we have also seen that f!ndamental ins!rance is the practicall& !nanimo!sl& endorsed :!stification of p!blic health ins!rance B rather than private one B in man& societies, which implies large basicall& vol!ntar& transfers (be&ond act!arial ins!rance) for helping people with poor given health (-ection 1$.$.$.*). 16. :istrib%tion as a p%blic good3 the distrib%tive s%rpl%s28 6f all individ!als care abo!t what the& have onl&, an& redistrib!tion ma"es someone worse off, in the absence of partic!lar indirect effects.2' Chen some people care abo!t what some others have, the same propert& often holds. Eet, if some s!ch concerns for the sit!ation of other people are s!fficientl& large, there ma& e0ist redistrib!tions that nobod& regrets and some val!e. %he social states from which s!ch redistrib!tions do not e0ist present, b& definition, )areto efficient distrib!tions. )areto efficienc& is a propert& of a social state that is certainl& to be val!ed, beca!se it means that there is no !nanimo!sl& preferred deviation from it (with the possibilit& of indifference for some people). owever, in a large societ& where most of the altr!ism that e0ists is onl& moderate, the set of the )areto efficient distrib!tions is ver& large. %herefore, this propert& does not help m!ch in the 7!est of the +raal of normative economics, the optim!m distrib!tion. -omething else sho!ld be added, and this is the important ingredient. Chen some people care abo!t what some others have, the distrib!tion becomes a collective concern, a p!blic good in this sense. ence, one proposal consists of appl&ing to it the standard principle !sed for the choice of p!blic goods, in benefit8cost anal&sis, the criterion of the s!rpl!s. %his principle, however sho!ld be properl& applied as follows.84 I& definition, the s!rpl!s of a state 3 over a state * is the algebraic s!m of individ!als; mone& e7!ivalent of having state 3 rather than state * (the m8s!rpl!s), or of individ!als; willingness to pa& for having state 3 rather than state * (the p8s!rpl!s). %he difference between both concepts and meas!res res!lts from the fact that, for the m8s!rpl!s, the individ!als are in state * when their mone& e7!ivalent is notionall& given to them for obtaining a state e7!ivalent to state 3F whereas, for the p8s!rpl!s, the individ!als are in state 3 when their willingness to pa& is ta"en o!t from them for obtaining a state e7!ivalent to state *. %hen, the s!rpl!s principle chooses a possible state * s!ch that no s!rpl!s for having an& other possible state 3 rather than state * is positive, both for the m8s!rpl!s and for the p8s!rpl!s. %his condition also amo!nts to the fact that no s!rpl!s for having state * rather than state 3 is negative, for both the m8s!rpl!s and the p8s!rpl!s (the condition for one of the two s!rpl!s concepts amo!nts to that for the other in inverting the states).81
28 2'

-ee Golm 1'66a. 5otabl& in an economic s!rro!nding of perfectl& competitive mar"ets. 84 -ee Golm 1'66a (see also 244*). 81 Calling yi individ!al i;s wealth, yJKyiL, yBiJKy(L(i, and 0 i (y) individ!al i;s ordinal !tilit& as a f!nction of the distrib!tion y, the mone& e7!ivalent and the willingness to pa& of individ!al i for , y) and pi( y , y) defined b& having distrib!tion y rather than distrib!tion y are respectivel& mi( y i P y Nm ( y i , y), yBiQJ 0 ( y ) 0 i i and Bpi( y , y), y i Q. 0 i (y)J 0 i P y i Clearl&, mi(y, y )J B pi( y , y), and pi(y, y )J Bmi ( y , y). @efine as m( y , y)Jmi( y , y) and p(

86

6f all people are p!rel& selfish, this principle specifies no distrib!tion. I!t if the& care abo!t what others have, no matter how little, the principle gives a sol!tion, most of the time a !ni7!e one. %his holds in partic!lar when people val!e their own wealth ver& m!ch more than that of others, sa& with priorit& (le0ical egoism#). %his res!lts from the basic logic of the s!rpl!s method, namel& the following. An individ!als; self8interested mone& val!e of, or willingness to pa& for, a dollar for herself is a dollar. ence, for a redistrib!tion witho!t indirect effects, where the s!m of incomes remains the same b& definition, the val!es meas!ring the self8interests of all individ!als cancel o!t in the s!ms of the s!rpl!s. %herefore, these s!ms depend onl& on the individ!als; val!es of the amo!nts transferred for other reasons, notabl& beca!se of their altr!isms if the& are the social sentiments present (incl!ding the res!lting conceptions of :!stice). 6ndeed, the :!stification of the described distrib!tive s!rpl!s principle is derived from this condition3 if &o! want a distrib!tive criterion that is derived from the opinions of the members of the societ& abo!t the :!stice of this distrib!tion and from their altr!ism onl&, hence discarding their own self8interest, the sol!tion is the distrib!tive s!rpl!s. %he basic reason is that cancelling o!t the self8interested val!es of a redistrib!tion implies !sing the algebraic s!ms of mone& e7!ivalents or willingnesses to pa&. %he idea of deriving the sol!tion form the opinions of the members of the societ& onl&, called endogeno!s social choice#, can be considered as !navoidable, since where else co!ld we find s!ch information for the comprehensive societ& (and for a smaller societ&, imposition from o!tside wo!ld be intr!sion). $1% =istorical landmar?s 12.1 =conomics and altr%ism Almost all ma:or economists in histor& made important contrib!tions to the anal&ses of altr!ism and giving, often in speciali1ed boo"s (Adam -mith, =ohn -t!art .ill, ?Don Calras, Ailfredo )areto, in partic!lar). 6n recent times, the list of economists; wor"s on this iss!e contains several h!ndred entries. (f co!rse, economists have mainl& st!died non8altr!istic e0change, b!t the famo!s homo economicus the& !sed for this p!rpose describes a non8 altr!istic relation and cannot be ass!med to represent the f!ll conception of man of these a!thors. 6ts self8interestedness describes the non'tuism of the relation rather than the egoism of the person, !sing )hilip Cic"steed;s perceptive distinction. .oreover, observation showed that self8interested e0changes or cooperation co!ld not wor" witho!t important inp!ts of a different, other8regarding "ind, based on morals, respect, and, importantl&, reciprocit&. Ch&, indeed, is there e0change rather than theft, wh& are man& promises "ept, wh& do people
y , y) J pi( y , y) the m8s!rpl!s and the p8s!rpl!s, respectivel&. (ne has m( y , y)N p(y, y )J m(y, y )N p( y , y)J4.

6f , is the set of possible distrib!tions, the chosen distrib!tion is y, s!ch that, for all y ,, m( y , y)4, m(y, y )4, p( y , y)4, p(y, y )4 (these ine7!alities constit!te onl& two conditions). Chen y is close to y, sa& y JyN!y, and the 0 i are differentiable, these conditions impl&
i i i i Jy and J 0 ( S 0 i and 0 ( J 0 Sy(. For a p!re redistrib!tion, y i i i i ( i v v v !yiJ4. %hen, since vi J1 for all i, i, ( ( U!y(Di, (i ( U!y(DviU!yi with viJ(i i . ence, the

i, (

v i(

U!y(4 where

v i(

conditions are effective even when the v ( for i( are ver& low (le0ical egoism). Aario!s meanings and properties of this sol!tion, second8order conditions, e0istence, and !ni7!eness, are disc!ssed in Golm 1'66a.

82 engage in collective action, wh& do the& sometimes tell the tr!th, etc.X (nl& part of these behavio!rs can be e0plained b& the fear of p!nishment or of retaliation. F!rthermore, the topic of economics is more broadl& defined as the allocation of reso!rces. %hen, altr!ism sprang to the face of an&one who opened the bo0es of the other main allocative s&stems, the famil&, charit& and donations, and the vast redistrib!tive political and p!blic sector with its comple0 of diverse motivations B from the most cr!el to the most altr!istic and the whole spectr!m in between. 6t is an embarrassing sit!ation, for a field of st!d&, when the c!lminating wor" happens to be the first one, especiall& if it is over two cent!ries old. (ne strateg& is to forget abo!t it B apart from pa&ing lip8service. %his has largel& been the fate of Adam -mith;s Theory of &oral Sentiments, certainl& one of the ma:or wor"s in thin"ing abo!t societ& of all times.82 Ce have seen that m!ch is in this wor" B incl!ding reciprocit&, self8image and praise8 see"ing. +iving a Ienthamite specification to the impartial spectator# of !tcheson, !me and -mith led =ohn -t!art .ill to his !tilitarian altr!ist (in her moments of calm reflection). -ince .ill was both reflective and a person living b& his ideals, this theor& made him a tempting target. %his was not b&passed b& A!g!ste Comte who, fond of new terms as he was, concl!ded that altr!ists sho!ld give mone& to sociologists B as he called these two categories of people B in a letter to =ohn -t!art .ill where he e0plained his financial diffic!lties (18**).8$ .ill then had two b!sinessmen friends of his help Comte o!t. owever, when Comte repeated his demand one &ear later, .ill ref!sed and pointed o!t that altr!ism sho!ld mean an impartial balance of interest rather than self8sacrifice for the other fellow as Comte !nderstood it. Comte angril& answered that, in an& event, b!sinessmen have the d!t& to s!pport philosophers.8* 12.2 7nterdependent %tilities and social choice From .ill;s !tilitarian altr!ism (altr!istic beca!se !tilitarian), the economic st!dies divide into two branches. (ne of them considers individ!als who are :ointl& self8interested and altr!istic, with the same !tilit& f!nction. Eet, since these individ!als also have a partic!lar interest for themselves, it is nat!ral to consider that the intensit& of their altr!ism can depend on the other persons who can be the ob:ects of this sentiment. For instance, the representation of their preferences sho!ld be able to admit that the& ma"e their children co!nt for more than others,# in Ientham;s terms. %hen, after the form!lation of 9dgeworth, restricted to onl& two individ!als and additive welfares# (b!t with the notice of the shrin"ing contract c!rve# propert&), this leads to the more complete form!lation of )areto, with individ!als; !tilities# which can depend on all individ!als; ophelimities.# %he second branch considers separatel& the individ!als; concern for others, in foc!ssing on its moral reason in social ethics. Eet,
82

6t is advised to read The Theory of &oral Sentiments in its French translation, beca!se it has three more chapters than the 9nglish original. %he& were added b& the French translator, -ophie de Condorcet (Antoine;s wife) after Adam -mith;s sta& in )aris B where he was converted, b& their economist friends, to ac"nowledging the magic of e0change which transm!tes the private vice of selfishness# into the p!blic virt!e of apparent altr!ism.# 8$ Comte ma& have borrowed the term altr!ism# from the poet Andrie!0 who was his professor at the 9cole )ol&techni7!e. 8* %his p!t an end to their interesting correspondence. -ee .ill;s 0npu lishe! Correspon!ence (18288 1821) (18'8). Eet, Comte contin!ed to s!rvive than"s to other gifts which became labelled the positivist s!bsid&.#

88 !tilitarianism meets the diffic!lt& of the lac" of general meaning of the operation of addition of !tilit& f!nctions which can describe something li"e individ!al;s happiness.# %his led to Iergson;s more general social welfare f!nction# representing an individ!als; social ethics. owever, since this f!nction is no longer the !ni7!e !tilitarian s!m, what sho!ld it be for representing what is better for societ&X %hese two branches th!s led respectivel& to the two fields of interdependent !tilities# on the one hand and of classical social choice theor&# on the other hand. Finall&, endogeno!s social choice leads to finding sol!tions to the social ethical problem of the latter field in individ!als; embodied# social ethical view described b& the former field.8/ 12.( !ltr%ism and %ncertaint* %he logical problem in adding individ!als; !tilities can res!lt notabl& from their ordinal str!ct!re. %his str!ct!re was pointed o!t sim!ltaneo!sl& b& )areto and b& the mathematician enri )oincarD in a famo!s letter in answer to ?Don Calras. %his answer adds the f!rther remar"3 &o! consider individ!als with perfect foresight and f!ll& egoisticF the second propert& ma& be acceptable, b!t the former one is demanding too m!ch.# )oincarD ma& not have "nown abo!t Calras;s intense concern abo!t positive social sentiments, notabl& e0pressed in his lect!res and boo" abo!t wor"ers; cooperatives and associations. Eet, his remar" points o!t the two iss!es of !ncertaint& and altr!ism, which have logical and ps&chological similarities, and act!al and theoretical interactions, and have been considered and anal&sed b& economics in parallel s!ccessive steps (with a merging in theories of the original position and f!ndamental ins!rance). Ioth concerns abo!t !ncertaint& and altr!ism consist, for an individ!al, of being concerned abo!t several individ!als, who are oneself in several possible prospects in selfish !ncertaint&, and also other individ!als in altr!ism. 6n fact, empath&, one of the main so!rces of altr!ism, consists of imagining oneself in the place of someone else, as one imagines oneself in the vario!s prospects when facing an !ncertaint& that concerns oneself. Ce have also seen that a main theor& in social ethics, the original position# and f!ndamental ins!rance,# consists of b!ilding a rational altr!ism from a notional !ncertaint&. .oreover, interactions among agents can :ointl& involve giving and !ncertaint&, and notabl&, at the deepest level of interaction, reciprocit& and game theor&. %he anal&ses of both domains developed in fo!r parallel steps, concerning views and acts, and single and interacting individ!als. %able * shows these steps. 6ndivid!al views are those of !ncertain prospects and altr!ism. %he& can lead to the individ!al acts of a choice in !ncertaint& and of giving. Cith several interacting individ!als, !ncertaint& leads notabl& to contingent and ins!rance mar"ets, while agents; altr!ism and giving interfere in vario!s notable wa&s with the choices of similar or different agents. .ore deepl&, the ver& views of vario!s agents interfere with each other epistemicall& in games of strateg& and as regards motives for giving in reciprocit&. >ncertaint* !ltr%ism uncertain prospects altruism choice in uncertainty "ivin" contin"ent an! insurance markets interferin" "ivin" "ames of strate"y reciprocities &a.le +, :ncertainty and altruism

individ%al vie" individ%al acts interdependent acts interdependent vie"s

8/

-ee -ection 16.', more f!ll& Golm 1'66a, and more generall& Golm 244*.

8'

12., 7nterdependent %tilities and interdependent giving A main distinction is between concern for the good of other people, that is, altr!ism, and other concerns abo!t gifts and sentiments. %he former phenomenon leads to the 7!estion of interdependent !tilities# in a broad sense. -ection $ has recalled the histor& and the vario!s specific str!ct!res of this concept. %his concept can e0plain or :!stif& transfers and notabl& gifts. %he application has been in three fields, corresponding to three t&pes of instit!tions3 the p!blic sector, charit&, and the famil&. %he p!blic sector is notabl& concerned with two conse7!ences of altr!ism, efficienc& and distrib!tive :!stice. 6t is r!led b& the political s&stem where self8interests and different social ethical views find their e7!ilibri!m. %his application of interdependent !tilities beg!n in the mid 1'64;s. Cith :oint giving, private charit& met the problem of p!blic goods anal&sed notabl& in the late 1'64;s. %hese gifts interfere with p!blic redistrib!tion, and private charit& can onl& be e0plained b& motives different from the onl& concern with the beneficiar&;s welfare, notabl& ethical principles (!niversali1ation, p!tative reciprocit&, f!ndamental ins!rance), or direct concern for the gifts (demonstration effects, warm glow#). %he third application of interdependent !tilities is the economics of the famil&, notabl& with the anal&ses of +. Iec"er (1'2*), and applications s!ch as Iarro;s <icardian e7!ivalence# (1'2*, see -ection 14.1.2). owever, families manifest man& other relations than simple altr!ism, notabl& the direct importance of sentiments and diverse reciprocities. 6n reciprocit&, a gift elicits another gift for a reason of balance, sometimes associated with fairness (which incl!des merit), or beca!se a benevolent gift elicits li"ing the giver B in addition to the different phenomenon of se7!ential e0change. <eciprocit& has constit!ted a central concept in the social science for over eight& &ears, and a topic of economic anal&sis for several decades. %his was accompanied b& applications of the economic theor& of reciprocit& to a n!mber of iss!es s!ch as distrib!tive :!stice, labo!r relations, the famil&, intergenerational transfers, intergenerational financing of pensions and ed!cation, bargaining and the settlement of conflicts, vol!ntar& contrib!tions to p!blic goods, vol!ntar& restraint in the !se of nat!ral reso!rces, non8mar"et economies, and economic development and social change.86 12./ ! notable debate3 blood and the efficienc* of giving For man& epigones of Adam -mith;s second tho!ghts, mar"et e0change is the best wa& of transferring things. ?ater development of economics emphasi1ed notabl& the virt!e of the price s&stem for efficientl& carr&ing the needed information. 6n some cases, however, one can compare modes of transfers, notabl& mar"et e0change and giving, as the& act!all& wor". For instance, blood for medical p!rposes is given in a n!mber of co!ntries and bo!ght in others. 6n 1'21, <ichard %itm!ss compared these two modes, in the cases of the >G and >-, respectivel&. is concl!sion is that the giving s&stem of the >G is s!perior to the b!&ing s&stem of the >- in all respects, for the 7!alit& of the blood, the sit!ation of the donors, and the general attit!de of persons towards others and societ&. %he iss!e of 7!alit& refers in partic!lar to a 7!estion of information in which the mar"et is m!ch inferior to giving. %he reason is clear3 some infections, and notabl& hepatitis, were !ndetectable in blood samples. %he altr!istic people who give their blood abstain from giving when the& "now the& have had
86

-ee, notabl&, .a!ss (1'2*), Adam (1'6$), Golm(1'2$, 1'8*a, 1'8*b, 1''4), A"erlof (1'82), -!gden (1'8*), -wane& (1''4), for vario!s lines of st!d& (and the references in the relevant chapters of this vol!me). %he pse!do8reciprocit&# of self8interested se7!ential e0changes has also been the ob:ect of a n!mber of investigations and applications.

'4 the disease. %he p!rel& self8interested sellers of their blood lac" this motive and practice. %his is a classical sit!ation of as&mmetric information. %itm!ss also intrinsicall& favo!rs the general motive and action that leads to giving, in partic!lar to giving to societ& or others in general rather then to specific "nown others, that is, "eneral "ivin".82 .oreover, he holds that it is not possible to have both s&stems in the same place. %his wor" la!nched a notable debate. <obert -olow (1'21) proposed that its res!lts constit!te a devastating and !nanswerable indictment of the American s&stem.# Genneth Arrow;s (1'2*) review t!rned into a m!ch noticed, perceptive and pioneering disc!ssion of the role of altr!ism and moralit& for sec!ring economic efficienc& in remed&ing mar"et fail!res. 5otabl&, altr!ism and a sense of responsibilit& prevent e0ploiting advantages of as&mmetric information, all commercial transactions impl& an element of tr!st, and, in general, ethical behavio!r can be regarded as a sociall& desirable instit!tion which facilitates the achievement of economic efficienc&.# .oreover, Arrow notices that people who give are motivated b& the res!lt, and also b& their gift in itself, and, for :oint giving, b& some implicit social contract with co8givers (s!ggested b& %. 5agel). owever, Arrow s!ggests that %itm!ss;s contention that there cannot be both giving and a mar"et for blood in the same place B and hence that b!&ing blood crowds o!t the s!perior giving (in a "ind of +resham;s law) B lac"s a theoretical e0planation. %he anal&sis of this iss!e re7!ires that of the vario!s specific motives, b!t let !s onl& remar" here that, if we believe Gant, in ac7!iring a price blood looses its dignit&. 12.6 ?ol%mes in the economics of giving. altr%ism and reciprocit* Altho!gh the anal&sis of altr!ism and giving b& economists has, as we have seen, a long and glorio!s histor&, it became rather rare aro!nd the middle of the 24th cent!r&. %he revival of this field of st!dies in the last third of the 24th cent!r&, notabl& with the consideration of interdependent !tilities# (see -ection $), was in partic!lar mar"ed b& the p!blication of a few vol!mes dealing with the economics of altr!ism, giving, and reciprocit& at a general level. %hree of them are collective boo"s, with a general presentation or introd!ction. %wo gather papers of conferencesF the& are edited b& 9. )helps (1'2/) and b& ?.8A. +Drard8Aaret, -.8Ch. Golm and =. .ercier Ethier (2444). %he third vol!me, edited b& -. Tamagni (1''/), gathers a n!mber of notable articles abo!t altr!ism, mostl& b& economists. %wo vol!mes, b& @. Collard (1'28) and ..argolis (1'81) present models of microeconomic interactions with altr!ism, and a n!mber of applications. A different approach, with more philosophical considerations, is followed b& 6. -teedman (1'8'). An ambitio!s movement aimed at st!d&ing the grant econom&,# with the h!manistic vision of G. Io!lding (1'2$) as programmatic presentation, and collective vol!mes (edited b& Io!lding and )faff, 1'22, and Io!lding and Cilson, 1'28). +rants# are ta"en to mean transfers other than e0changes, incl!ding gifts and things ta"en b& force, private or p!blic. %he association of giving and ta"ing ma& raise a diffic!lt& for anal&sis, b!t we have seen that the important p!blic transfers can associate both modes. Golm (1'8*a) anal&ses reciprocit& and giving, with an interest in the general 7!alit& of societ&. <eciprocit& and giving, e0change, and the !se of force, are the three modes of social interaction and economic transfers, present in vario!s proportions in all societies, with vario!s performances with respect to efficienc&, and ver& different conse7!ences for the 7!alit& of societ&, of its members, and of relations between them. -ocial progress largel& consists of specific evol!tions in this threefold space.

82

-ee Golm 1'8*.

'1 Appendi2 to *ection 1, &he -oint giving theorem %he properties noted in -ection 2 are shown here. %he notations are as follows. 6ndices i or ( denote the individ!als who ma& contrib!te. For individ!al i, consider her free individ!al gift "i4, the distrib!tive ta0 she pa&s ti4, her own total contrib!tion ciJ"iNti, her initial wealth 1i, and her final wealth #iJ1iBci. %he total transfer is cJci. %he beneficiar& has initial wealth 1, final wealth #J1Nc, and an increasing ordinal !tilit& f!nction uJu(#) with derivative u Z4. 6ndivid!al i;s !tilit& f!nction ui increases with #i, it also increases with # or u(#) if individ!al i is an altr!ist, and, for the noted reasons, it ma& increase with ci or "i, and decrease when c( or "( increases for some (i. ence, denoting cBiJKc(L(i and "BiJK"(L(i the sets of the c( and "( for (i respectivel&, uiJui(#i, #, ci, "i, cBi, "Bi) i i i i i uc with the respective partial derivatives u #i Z4, u i 4, u "i 4, u c 4 and u " 4 for # 4, i (i (writing a derivative implies the ass!mption of its e0istence). 5othing is changed if # is replaced b& u(#). %he chosen "i and ti ma"e ci a relativel& small part of 1i and hence no constraint #i4 is relevant.
( (

6ndivid!al i individ!all& chooses her gift "i that ma0imi1es ui (hence, given the other variables "( for (i and t( for all (). %herefore, if "iZ4, i ui ui B u #i N u i (1) # N ci N " i J4. )areto efficienc& for this societ& of potential givers and receivers implies that there e0ist coefficients iZ4 s!ch that 0J( u(Nu is ma0imal (witho!t loss of generalit&). )!blic polic& chooses ta0es ti. Chen it implements a )areto efficient social state, this choice ma0imi1es s!ch a f!nction 0. %his implies, for ta0 ti, i ( ( ui u# i U(B u #i N u i N u ci )N u 4, (2) # N ci )N(i(U( with J4 if tiZ4 and 4 if tiJ4. Conditions (1) and (2) entail i ( Bi u "i N(i(U( u #( N u ci )N u 4.

($)

i -ince u Z4, and u #( 4 and (Z4 for all (, the condition can hold onl& if u "i Z4 andSor

u c( V4 for some (. %herefore, )areto efficienc& implies the following conditions for individ!al i

gifts "i3 6f the individ!als are onl& altr!ists (no direct effects of the ci or "i on !tilities), there is no private giving "i. i 6f, in addition, or instead, the& ma& care abo!t their own specific contrib!tion ( u ci 4), the same res!lt holds. i 6f, in addition, or instead, the& ma& care abo!t the specific gifts of other people ( u " 4), the same res!lt holds. %here can be a gift "iZ4 onl& if individ!al i cares for her own gift andSor her contrib!tion ci is envied b& some other individ!als (or the& en:o& feeling that the& contrib!te more).
(

'2 .oreover, if condition ($) is satisfied than"s to the env& or sentiment of s!periorit& of i ( the other people ( u ci V4, and u " is 1ero or small), then, the u c( sho!ld be on average higher
i
i

than the u #( , that is, in!ivi!uals shoul! e more envious or !omineerin" than altruists, on average.
i 6n the other case of satisfaction of the condition, d!e to u "i Z4 with

u c(

low or 1ero,

i the condition shows that u "i sho!ld be higher than the average u #( b& an order of magnit!de

at least e7!al to that of the pop!lation of the fiscal constit!enc&. ence, in a co!ntr& with a pop!lation of 2 millions, an e#tra "ift is value! at least 2 million times more for the "lory of the "iver than for the relief of the nee!y, on average. Eet, private giving can be compatible with )areto efficienc& when it is motivated b& other, more specific, moral reasons, s!ch as the principle of !niversali1ation (e.g., Gant;s categorical imperative) or p!tative reciprocit&, noted in -ection 1$.$.$ (see Golm 244/). %he welfare u(#) of the aided people is an end8val!e of societ& before being a p!blic good for the givers. %his shows b& the fact that u(#) is a term of the social ethical ma0imand 0. %his ma"es this iss!e formall& different from that of ordinar& p!blic goods. Eet, the foregoing anal&sis translates into that of financing ordinar& p!blic goods b& vol!ntar& contrib!tions or ta0es in writing uJ u J4 in the form!las. <es!lts similar to those obtained above also hold. %his can in partic!lar appl& to the present iss!e if the efficienc& in 7!estion is not that of the whole societ& b!t onl& that of an act!al or p!tative agreement among the givers. (ne difference is that, with a p!re p!blic good or p!re altr!ism B the ui depend onl& on #i and # B, condition ($) can be satisfied with u #( J4 for all (iF b!t this cannot occ!r for more than one i, and hence there is at most one individ!al concerned with # (or altr!ist) in the societ&, and hence there is no p!blic good (or :oint altr!ism) B at least at the margin. %he foregoing res!lts are presented for p!blic goods in general in Golm (1'24), and for giving with an anal&sis of the motivations in Golm (1'8*a). A specific concern for one;s gift or writing the gifts in the !tilit& f!nction# was s!ggested notabl& b& Arrow (1'2*) and Iec"er (1'2*), and also wor"ed o!t b& -teinberg (1'82) and Andreoni (1'8', 1''4). References and @i.liography Abrams, I. A. and ..@. -chmit1 (1'28), %he [crowding8o!t effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contrib!tions#, )!blic Choice $$ (1)3288*4. Adam, =.-. (1'6$), Cage ine7!alities, prod!ctivit& and wor" 7!alit&#, 6nd!strial <elat. $3'8 16. Adam, =.-. (1'6/), 6ne7!it& in social e0change#, in3 Ier"owit1, ed., Advances in 90perimental -ocial )s&cholog&, 2 (Academic )ress, 5ew8Eor"). Adam, =.-. and C.9. <osenba!m (1'6*), %he relationship of wor"er prod!ctivit& to cognitive dissonance abo!t wage ine7!alities#, =o!rnal of Abnormal and -ocial )s&cholog& 6'31'82/. A"erlof, +. (1'82), ?abor contract as partial gift e0change#, \!arterl& =o!rnal of 9conomics '23/*$8/6'.

'$ Alesina, A. and 9. +laeser. (244*), Fighting )overt& in the >- and in 9!rope. A world of difference ((0ford >niversit& )ress, (0ford). Andreoni, =. (1'88a), )rivatel& providedX )!blic goods in a large econom&3 %he limits of altr!ism#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics $/3/282$. Andreoni, =. (1'88b), Ch& free rideX -trategies and learning in p!blic goods e0periments#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics $232'18$4*. Andreoni, =. (1'8'), +iving with imp!re altr!ism3 Applications to charit& and <icardian e7!ivalence#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& '231**281*/8. Andreoni, =. (1''4), 6mp!re altr!ism and donations to p!blic goods3 a theor& of warm8glow giving#, 9conomic =o!rnal 1443*6*8*22. Andreoni, =. (1''/), Carm8glow vers!s cold8pric"le3 %he effects of positive and negative framing on cooperation in e0periments#, \!arterl& =o!rnal of 9conomics 114 (1)31821. Archibald, +.C. and @. @onaldson (1'26), 5on8paternalism and the basic theorems of welfare economics#, Canadian =o!rnal of 9conomics '3*'28/42. Aristotle. 9thi7!e ] 5icoma7!e (1'22, Arin, )aris). Aronfreed, =. (1'24), %he sociali1ation of altr!istic and s&mpathetic behavior3 -ome theoretical and e0perimental anal&ses#, in3 =. .aca!la& et ?. Ier"owit1, eds., Altr!ism and helping behavio!r (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). Aronfreed, =. and A. )as"al (1'6/), Altr!ism, empath&, and the conditioning of positive affect, !np!blished man!script, >niversit& of )enns&lvania. Arrow, G.=. (1'2*), +ift and e0changes#, )hilosoph& and )!blic Affairs 1 (*)3$*$8$62. Arrow, G.=. (1'81), (ptimal and vol!ntar& income distrib!tion#, in3 9conomic Celfare and the 9conomics of -oviet -ocialism3 9ssa&s in onor of Abram Iergson (Cambridge >niversit& )ress, Cambridge) 2628288. A0elrod, <. (1'8*), %he 9vol!tion of Cooperation (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). Ialas"o, E. (1'28), %he transfer problem and the theor& of reg!lar economies#, 6nternational 9conomic <eview 1'368286'*. Ian"s, -. (1'2'), +ift8giving3 A review and an interactive paradigm#, in3 Advances in Cons!mer <esearch, vol. 6, 9d. C. Cil"ie (.6 Association for Cons!mer <esearch, Ann Arbor) $1'8$2*. Iaron, =.5. (1'88), %he emplo&ment relation as a social relation#, =o!rnal of the =apanese and 6nternational 9conomies 23*'28/2/. Iarro, <.=. (1'2*), Are government bonds net wealthX#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& 82 (6)314'/81112. Ias!, G. (1'22), 6nformation and strateg& in iterated prisoners; dilemma#, %heor& and @ecision 832'$82'8. Ias!, G. (1'82), .odelling finitel& repeated games with !ncertain termination#, 9conomic ?etters 2$31*281/1. Iec"er, +.-. (1'61), 5otes on an 9conomic Anal&sis of )hilanthrop&#, 5ational I!rea! of 9conomic <esearch. Iec"er, +.-. (1'2*), A theor& of social interaction#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& 82 (6)3146$814'$. Iec"er, +.-. (1'26), Altr!ism, egoism and genetic fitness3 9conomics and sociobiolog&#, =o!rnal of 9conomic ?iterat!re 1*38128826. Iec"er, +.-. (1'26), %he 9conomic Approach to !man Iehavior (>niversit& of Chicago )ress, Chicago, ?ondon). Iec"er, +.-. (1'81), Altr!ism in the famil& and selfishness in the mar"et place#, 9conometrica *83181/. Iec"er, +.-. (1'81), A %reatise on the Famil& ( arvard >niversit& )ress, Cambridge, .A). Iec"er, . (1'/6), 9mpath&, s&mpath& and -cheler#, 6nternational =o!rnal of -ociometr& 1.

'* Ientham, =. (128'), )rinciples of .orals and ?egislation (Clarendon, (0ford). Ientham, =. (1'/281'/*), %he )hilosoph& of 9conomic -cience#, in3 =erem& Ientham;s 9conomic Critings, edited b& C. -tar". $ vols. (Fran"lin, 5ew Eor"). Ierg, =., =. @ic"ha!t and G. .cCabe (1''/), %r!st, reciprocit& and social histor&#, +ames and 9conomic Iehavior 14312281*2. Iergson, A. (1'66), 9ssa&s in 5ormative 9conomics ( arvard >niversit& )ress, Cambridge, .A). Iergstom, %.C. (1'''), -&stems of benevolent !tilit& f!nctions#, =o!rnal of )!blic %heor& 13218144. Iergstrom, %.C. (1'24), A -candinavian consens!s# sol!tion for efficient income distrib!tion among non8malevolent cons!mers#, =o!rnal of 9conomic %heor& 23$8$8$'8. Iergstrom, %.C., ?. Il!me, and . Aarian. (1'86), (n the private provision of p!blic goods#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics 2'32/8*'. Ier"owit1, ?. (1'24), %he self, selfishness and altr!ism#, in3 = .aca!la& and ?. Ier"owit1, eds., Altr!ism and elping Iehavior (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). Ier"owit1, ?. (1'21), -ocial norms, feelings and other factors affecting helping behavior and altr!ism, !np!blished man!script, >niversit& of Cisconsin. Ier"owit1, ?. and ?. @aniels (1'6$), <esponsibilit& and dependenc&#, =o!rnal of Abnormal and -ocial )s&cholog& 663*2'8*$2. Iernheim, I.@. (1'86), (n the vol!ntar& and invol!ntar& provision of p!blic goods#, American 9conomic <eview 26328'82'$. Iertho1, A. and +. =orland, eds. (244*), ?;9mpathie ((dile =acob, )aris). Ihagwati, =.5., <. Irecher and %. atta (1'8$), %he generali1ed theor& of transfer and welfare3 Iilateral transfers in a m!ltilateral world#, American 9conomic <eview 8$36468618. Iianchi, .. (1''$), ow to learn socialit&3 %r!e and false sol!tions to .andeville problem#, istor& of )olitical 9conom& 2/ (2). Iishop, =. (1'82), %he recognition and reward of emplo&ee performance#, =o!rnal of ?abor 9conomics /3-$68/6. Ioadwa&, <., ). )estiea!, and @. Cildasin (1'8'), %a08transfer policies and the vol!ntar& provision of p!blic goods#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics $'31/28126. Iolton, +. and A. (c"enfels (2444), 9<C B A theor& of e7!it&, reciprocit& and competition#, American 9conomic <eview '4316681'$. Iolton, +., =. Irandts, and A. (c"enfels (1''8), .eas!ring motivations for the reciprocal responses observed in a simple dilemma games#, 90perimental 9conomics 1($)3242821'. Ioorman, -. A. and ).<. ?evitt (1'84), %he +enetics of Altr!ism (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). Io!don, <. (1'2'), ?a logi7!e d! social ( achette, )aris). Io!lding, G. (1'2$), %he 9conomics of ?ove and Fear, A )reface to +rants 9conomics (Cadsworth, Ielmont, CA) Io!lding, G. and .. )faff, eds. (1'22), <edistrib!tion to the <ich and to the )oor (Cadsworth, Ielmont CA). Io!lding, G. and %.F. Cilson, eds. (1'28), <edistrib!tion %hro!gh the Financial -&stem ()raeger, 5ew Eor"). Io!lding, G.9. (1'62), 5otes on a theor& of philanthrop&#, in3 Conflict and @efense. A +eneral %heor& ( arper, 5ew Eor"). Iowles, -. (1''8), 9ndogeno!s preferences3 %he c!lt!ral conse7!ences of mar"ets and other economic instit!tions#, =o!rnal of 9conomic ?iterat!re $6 (1)32/8111. Irecher, <. and =.5. Ihagwati (1'81), Foreign ownership and the theor& of trade and welfare#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& 8'3*'28/18.

'/ Ir!nner, =.G. and =. Fal"inger (1'''), %a0ation in an econom& with private provision of p!blic goods#, <eview of 9conomic @esign *3$/28$2'. Ir&an, =. . and ..A. %est (1'62), .odels and helping3 5at!ralistic st!dies in aiding behavior#, =o!rnal of )ersonalit& and -ocial )s&cholog& 63*448*42. Camerer, C. (1'88), +ifts as economic signals and social s&mbols#, American =o!rnal of -ociolog& '*3/1848/21*. Campbell, @.%. (1'6/), 9thnocentric and other altr!istic motives#, in3 @. ?evine, ed., 5ebras"a -&mposi!m on .otivation (>niversit& of 5ebras"a )ress, ?incoln). Chichilnis"&, +. (1'84), Iasic goods, the effects of commodit& transfers and the international economic order#, =o!rnal of @evelopment 9conomics 23/4/8/1'. Chichilnis"&, +. (1'8$), %he transfer problem with three agents once again3 Characteri1ation, !ni7!eness and stabilit&#, =o!rnal of @evelopment 9conomics 1$32$282*8. Coate, -. and .. <avallion (1''$), <eciprocit& witho!t commitment#, =o!rnal of 9conomic @evelopment *43 182*. Collard, @. (1'28), Altr!ism and the 9conom&. A -t!d& in 5on8-elfish 9conomics (.artin <obertson, (0ford). Coricelli, +., G. .cCabe and A. -mith (2444), %heor& of mind mechanism in personal e0change#, in3 +. otano, 5. ("ada and . %anabe, eds., Affective .inds (9lsevier, Amsterdam). Cornes, <.C. and %. -andler (1'8*), 9as& riders, :oint prod!ction and p!blic goods#, 9conomic =o!rnal '*3 /848/'8. Cornes, <.C. and %. -andler (1'8*), %he comparative static properties of the imp!re p!blic good model#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics /*3*4$8*21. Cornes, <.C. and %. -andler (1'8/), %he simple anal&tics of p!re p!blic good provision#, 9conomica /2314$8116. @al&, +. and F. +iert1 (1'22), Celfare economics and welfare reform#, American 9conomic <eview 6231$181$8. @anner, ).?. (1'2$), -&mpath& and e0changeable val!e3 Ge&s to Adam -mith;s social philosoph&#, <eview of -ocial 9conom& $* ($)3$128$$1. @arwin, C. (1'81), ?a descendance de l;homme, et la sDlection se0!elle (transl. 9. Iarbier, 9d. Comple0e, Ir!ssels). @escartes, <. (18'281'14, 1'6/), ^!vres compl_tes, ed. b& C. Adam and ). %anner& (Arin, )aris ). @ic"inson, F.+. (1'24), %he Changing )osition of )hilanthrop& in the American 9conom& (Col!mbia >niversit& )ress, 5ew Eor") (for3 5at. I!r. 9cono. <es.). @i0it, A. (1'8$), %he m!lti8co!ntr& transfer problem#, 9conomics ?etters 1$3*'8/*. @oland, @. and G. Adelberg (1'62), %he learning of sharing behavior#, Child @evelopment $83 6'/8244. @o!glas, =. (1'8$), Ch& Charit&. %he Case for a %hird -ector (-age )!blications, Ierverl& ills). 9dgeworth, F.E. (1881), .athematical )s&chics3 An 9ssa& on the Application of .athematics to the .oral -ciences, ?ondon -chool of 9conomics (new editions 1888, 1'$2, 1'62, 1'81). 9"stein, <. (1'22), )s&choanal&sis and ed!cation for the facilitation of positive h!man 7!alities#, =o!rnal of -ocial 6ss!es 28 ($). 9lster, =. (1'8'), %he Cement of -ociet& B A -t!d& of -ocial (rder (Cambridge >niversit& )ress, Cambridge). 9lster, =. (1''8), 9motions and economic theor&#, =o!rnal of 9conomic ?iterat!re $63*282*. Fal", A. and >. Fischbacher (2441), A %heor& of <eciprocit&#, C9)< n`$41*, (ctober.

'6 Fehr, 9. and -. +achter (2444), Fairness and retaliation3 %he economics of reciprocit&#, =o!rnal of 9conomic )erspective 1* ($)31/'8181. Fehr, 9., -. +achter, and +. Girchsteiger (1''6), <eciprocal fairness and noncompensating wage differentials#, =o!rnal of 6nstit!tional and %heoretical 9conomics 1/2 (*)364886*4. Fehr, 9., -. +achter, and +. Girchsteiger (1''2), <eciprocit& as a contract enforcement device3 e0perimental evidence#, 9conometrica 6/(*)38$$8864. Fole&, @. (1'24), ?indahl;s sol!tion and the core of an econom& with p!blic goods#, 9conometrica $8366822. Foster, A., -. .o!rato, @. )earce, and 9. b1demirogl! (2444), %he )rice of Airt!e3 %he 9conomic Aal!e of the Charitable -ector (9dward 9lgar, Cheltenham, >nited Gingdom and 5orthampton, .A). Fran", <. . (1'88), )assions Cithin <eason3 %he -trategic <ole of the 9motions (5orton, 5ew Eor"). Fran", <. . (1''4), A theor& of moral sentiments#, in3 =. .ansbridge, ed., Ie&ond -elf8 6nterest (>niversit& of Chicago )ress, Chicago) 218'6. Fre&, I. (1''2), 5ot =!st for the .one& B An 9conomic %heor& of )ersonal .otivation (9dward 9lgar, Cheltenham). Friedman, .. (1'62), Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago >niversit& )ress, Chicago 6?). F!rstenberg, +... von and @.C. .!eller (1'21), %he )areto optimal approach to income redistrib!tion3 a fiscal application#, American 9conomic <eview 61362886$2. +achter, -. and A. Fal" (2442), <ep!tation or reciprocit&X An e0perimental investigation#, -candinavian =o!rnal of 9conometrics 2*. +ale, @. (1'2*), 90change e7!ilibri!m and coalitions3 An e0ample#, =o!rnal of .athematical 9conomics 136$866. +ale, C.+. and =.G. -cholt1 (1''*), 6ntergenerational transfers and the acc!m!lation of wealth#, =o!rnal of 9conomic )erspectives 8 (*)31*/8164. +eana"oplos, =., @. )earce, and 9. -tacchetti (1'8'), )s&chological games and se7!ential rationalit&#, +ames and 9conomic Iehavior 136482'. +eana"oplos, =.@. and +. eal (1'8$), A geometric e0planation of the transfer parado0 in a stable econom&#, =o!rnal of @evelopment 9conomics 1$322$82$6. +Drard8Aaret, ?.8A., -.8Ch. Golm, and =. .ercier Ethier, eds. (2444) %he 9conomics of <eciprocit&, Altr!ism, and +iving, (.ac.illan, ?ondon). +ergen, G., .. +ergen and G..eter (1'22), 6ndivid!al orientations to prosocial behavior#, =o!rnal of -ocial 6ss!es 28 ($). +ide, C. (1'4/), 9conomie sociale (?ibrairie de la -ociDtD d! <ec!eil gDnDral des lois et des arrcts, )aris). +intis, ., -trong reciprocit& and h!man socialit&#, =o!rnal of %heoretical Iiolog&. +iving in America, (1'2/), <eport of the Commission on )rivate )hilanthrop& and )!blic 5eed, =ohn . Filer, Chairman, Cashington, @C., Commission on )rivate )hilanthrop& and )!blic 5eed. +oldfarb, <.-. (1'24), )areto optimal redistrib!tion3 comment#, American 9conomic <eview 643''*8''6. +oodstadt, ..-. (1'21), elping and ref!sal to help3 A test of balance and reactance theories#, =o!rnal of 90perimental -ocial )s&cholog& 236148622. +oranson, <.9. and ?. Ier"owit1 (1'66), <eciprocit& and responsibilit& reactions to prior help#, =o!rnal of )ersonalit& and -ocial )s&cholog& $3 22282$2. +o!ldner, A. (1'64), %he norm of reciprocit&3 A preliminar& statement#, American -ociological <eview 2/31618128. +reenberg, =. (1'28), 9ffects of reward val!e and retaliative power on allocation decisions3 =!stice, generosit& or greedX#, =o!rnal of )ersonalit& and -ocial )s&cholog& $63$628$2'.

'2 +!esnerie, <. and =.8=. ?affont (1'28), Advantageo!s reallocations of initial reso!rces#, 9conometrica *638$/88*1. +!i, I. (2444), Ie&ond transactions3 (n the interpersonal dimension of economic realit&#, Annals of )!blic and Cooperative 9conomics 21 (2)31$'8168. +dth, C. (1''/), An evol!tionar& approach to e0plaining cooperative behavior b& reciprocal incentives#, 6nternational =o!rnal of +ame %heor& 2* (*)3 $2$8$**. +dth, C. and .. Eaari (1''2), An evol!tionar& approach to e0plain reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game#, in3 >. Citt, ed., 90plaining )rocess and Change, Approaches to 9vol!tionar& 9conomics (>niversit& of .ichigan )ress, Ann Arbor). +!&er, ). (1''$), Gant and the 90perience of Freedom (Cambridge >niversit& )ress, Cambridge). amilton, C.@. (1'21), -election of selfish and altr!istic behavior in some e0treme models#, in3 =.F. 9isenberg and C.-. @illon, eds., .an and Ieast3 Comparative -ocial Iehavior (-mithsonian 6nstit!tion )ress, Cashington @.C.). ammond, ). (1'2/), Charit&3 altr!ism or egoism X#, in3 9. )helps, ed., Altr!ism, .oralit&, and 9conomic %heor& (<!ssel -age F!ndation, 5ew Eor"). andlon, I.=. and ). +ross (1'/'), %he development of sharing behavior#, =o!rnal of Abnormal and -ocial )s&cholog& /'3*2/8*28. arris, ?. A. (1'62), A st!d& of altr!ism#, 9lementar& -chool =o!rnal 6831$/81*1. arris, .. (1'24), <eciprocit& and generosit&3 some determinants of sharing behavior#, Child @evelopment *13 $1$8$28. artmann, . (1'64), )s&choanal&sis and .oral Aal!es (6nternational >niversities )ress, 5ew Eor"). eider, F. (1'/8), %he )s&cholog& of 6nterpersonal <elations (Cile&, 5ew Eor"). obho!se, ?.%. (1'46(1'/1)), .orals in 9vol!tion3 A -t!d& in Comparative 9thics (Chapman and ell, ?ondon). ochman, ... and =.@. <odgers (1'6'), )areto optimal redistrib!tion#, American 9conomic <eview /'3/*28//2. ochman, ... and =.@. <odgers (1'24), )areto optimal redistrib!tion3 a repl&#, American 9conomic <eview 643 ''281442. offman, .. (1'24), .oral development#, in3 ). .!ssen, ed., Carmichael;s .an!al of Child @evelopment (Cile&, 5ew Eor"). 6saac, ..<. and =... Cal"er (1'88), Comm!nication and free8riding behavior3 %he vol!ntar& contrib!tion mechanism#, 9conomic 6n7!ir& 263/8/8648. 6saac, ..<. and =... Cal"er (1'88), +ro!p si1e effects in p!blic goods provision3 %he vol!ntar& contrib!tion mechanism#, \!arterl& =o!rnal of 9conomics 14$312'81''. 6saac, ..<., =... Cal"er, and A... Cilliams (1''*), +ro!p si1e and the vol!ntar& provision of p!blic goods3 e0perimental evidence !tili1ing large gro!ps#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics ?6A318$6. 6saac, ..<., =... Cal"er, and -. . %homas (1'8*), @ivergent evidence on free riding3 An e0perimental e0amination of possible e0planations#, )!blic Choice *$ (2)311$81*'. 6saac, ..<., G.F. .cC!e, and C. )lott (1'8/), )!blic goods provision in an e0perimental environment#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics 263/182*. =ones, <. (1'82), 5otes on the transfer problem in a three8agent setting#, .imeo. Gahneman, @. and =.?. Gnetsch (1''2), Aal!ing p!blic goods3 %he p!rchase of moral satisfaction#, =o!rnal of 9nvironmental 9conomics and .anagement 22 (1)3/2824. Gahneman, @., =.?. Gnetsch, and <. . %haler (1'86a), Fairness as a constraint on profit see"ing3 9ntitlements in the mar"et#, American 9conomic <eview 26322882*1. Gahneman, @., =.?. Gnetsch, and <. . %haler (1'86b), Fairness and the ass!mptions of economics#, =o!rnal of I!siness /'3-28/8-$44.

'8 Gant, 6. (12'2 (1''1)), %he .etaph&sic of .orals, translated b& ..=. +regor (Cambridge >niversit& )ress, Cambridge). Gant, 6. (1'84), Fondements de la mDtaph&si7!e des moe!rs (@elagrave, )aris). Gennett, @. A. (1'84), Altr!ism and economic behavio!r#, American =o!rnal of 9conomics and -ociolog& $' (2). Gim, (. and .. Cal"er (1'8*), %he free rider problem3 90perimental evidence#, )!blic Choice *$ (1)3$82*. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'6$), ?es Fondements de l;9conomie )!bli7!e, 6ntrod!ction ] la %hDorie 9conomi7!e de l;9tat (6F), )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'66a), %he optimal prod!ction of social :!stice#, in3 6nternational 9conomic Association Conference on )!blic 9conomics, Iiarrit1. )roceedings ed. b& . +!itton and =. .argolis. 9conomie )!bli7!e (C5<-, )aris), 1'68, 14'822. )!blic 9conomics (.ac.illan, ?ondon), 1'6', 1*/8244. <eprinted in3 ?andmar" )apers in +eneral 97!ilibri!m %heor&, -ocial Choice and Celfare, %he Fo!ndations of 24th Cent!r& 9conomics, selected b& G.=. Arrow and +. @ebre!, 2441, (9dward 9lgar, Cheltenham),64686/$. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'66b), ?es Choi0 Financiers et .onDtaires (@!nod, )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'6'a), ?;e0ploitation des nations par les nations#, <ev!e Dconomi7!e ee (/). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'6'b), %hDorie dDmocrati7!e de la :!stice sociale#, <ev!e d;9conomie politi7!e 131$881*1. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'24), ?;9tat et le -&st_me des )ri0 (@!nod, )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'21a), =!stice et 97!itD (C9)<9.A), reprint 1'22, C5<-, )aris). %ranslation3 =!stice and 97!it&, b& . -ee, 1''8 (.6% )ress Cambridge, .A). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'21b), ?a ta0ation de la consommation ostentatoire#, <ev!e d;9conomie )oliti7!e 136/82'. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'2$), ?a thDorie de la rDciprocitD (C9)<9.A), )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'2/, 1'2'), ?a rDciprocitD gDnDrale (C9)<9.A), )aris) Golm, -.8Ch. (1'2'), Fondements de la thDorie d! don, de la rDciprocitD, et d! choi0 des s&st_mes Dconomi7!es (C9)<9.A), )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'84), )s&chanal&se et thDorie des choi0#, -ocial -cience 6nformation 1' (2)326'8$$'. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'81a), Altr!isme et efficacitD3 le sophisme de <o!ssea!#, -ocial -cience 6nformation 2432'$8$**. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'81b), 9fficacitD et altr!isme3 le sophisme de .andeville, -mith et )areto#, <ev!e 9conomi7!e $23/8$1. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'8$a), Altr!ism and efficienc&#, 9thics '*3 1886/. <eprinted in -. Tamagni, ed., %he 9conomics of Altr!ism, op. cit. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'8$b), 6ntrod!ction ] la rDciprocitD gDnDrale#, -ocial -cience 6nformation 223/6'8621. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'8*a), ?a Ionne 9conomie3 ?a <DciprocitD +DnDrale (+eneral <eciprocit&, %he +ood 9conom&) ()resses >niversitaires de France, )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'8*b), %hDorie de la rDciprocitD et d! choi0 des s&st_mes Dconomi7!es#, <ev!e 9conomi7!e $/38218'14. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'8/), ?e Contrat -ocial ?ibDral (%he ?iberal -ocial Contract) ()resses >niversitaires de France, )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'86), 6s onl& egoism prod!ctiveX#, @evelopment $. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82a), )!blic economics#, in3 =. 9atwell et al., eds., 5ew )algrave @ictionar& in 9conomics (.ac.illan, ?ondon) 14*2814//.

'' Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82b), %he freedom and consens!s normative theor& of the state3 %he ?iberal -ocial Contract#, in3 ). Goslows"i, ed., 6ndivid!al ?ibert& and @emocratic @ecision8mar"ing3 %he 9thics, 9conomics and )olitics of @emocrac& (=.C.I, %dbingen) '28122. Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82c), Freedom and )!blic +oods, C9<A-, n`62 ()aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82d), Free8<iding and Aol!ntar& Contrib!tions in ?arge 5!mbers, C9<A-, n`6$ ()aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82e), Freedoms, Cores and )!blic +oods, C9<A-, n`66 ()aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82f), Freedom and the )rovision of )!blic +oods with all @egrees of 90cl!sion, C9<A-, n`62 ()aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82g), Freedom, Core, 9fficienc& with )!blic +oods in +eneral 6nterdependence, C9<A-, n`68 ()aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'82h), ?; omme )l!ridimensionnel (Albin .ichel, )aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1'8'), Cooperative +ame )roperties of 6nternational Cooperation, C9<A-, n`22 ()aris). Golm, -.8Ch. (1''4), 9mplo&ment and fiscal polic& with a realistic view of the social role of wages#, in3 9ssa&s in onor of 9. .alinva!d (.6% )ress, Cambridge .A) 2268286. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''2), <eciprocit&#, )olitical 9conom& of the +ood societ& 5ewsletter 2 (-!mmer)3186. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''*), %he theor& of reciprocit& and of the choice of economic s&stems#, 6nvestigaciones 9confmicas 18 (1)3628'/. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''/), %he theor& of social sentiments3 the case of env&#, %he =apanese 9conomic <eview 1(*6)36$882. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''6a), .odern %heories of =!stice (.6% )ress, Cambridge, .A). Golm, -.8Ch. (1''6b), .oral p!blic choice#, )!blic Choice 82311281*8. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''2a), 6ntrod!ction to the 9conomics of <eciprocit&, +iving and Altr!ism#, 69A (.arseille)F in3 ?.8A. +Drard8Aaret, -.8Ch. Golm and =. .ercier8Ethier, eds., %he 9conomics of <eciprocit&, +iving and Altr!ism, (2444) (.ac.illan, ?ondon) 18**. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''2b), %he theor& of reciprocit&#, 69A (.arseilles)F in3 ?.8A. +Drard8Aaret, -.8Ch. Golm and =. .ercier8Ethier, eds., %he 9conomics of <eciprocit&, +iving and Altr!ism, (2444) (.ac.illan, ?ondon) 111/811*1. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''8a), Chance and :!stice3 -ocial polic& and the arsan&i8Aic"re&8<awls problem#, 9!ropean 9conomic <eview *2 (8)31$'$81*11. Golm, -.8Ch. (1''8b), >ne introd!ction ] la thDorie de la rDciprocitD et d! choi0 des s&st_mes Dconomi7!es#, in3 F.8<. .ahie! and . <apoport, eds., Altr!isme, Anal&ses 9conomi7!es (9conomica, )aris) 128/4. Golm, -.8Ch. (2444), %he logic of good social relations#, Annals of )!blic and Cooperative 9conomics 22 (2)3121818'. Golm, -.8Ch. (244*), .acro:!stice, the )olitical 9conom& of Fairness (Cambridge >niversit& )ress, 5ew Eor"). Golm, -.8Ch. (244/), %he perple0ing :oint giving theorem#, 6@9) (.arseilles). Gotli"off, ?. and ?. -!mmers (1'81), %he role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital acc!m!lation#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& 8'324682$2. Granish, ?. (1''8), Altr!ism and efficienc&3 a welfare anal&sis of the Calrasian mechanism with transfers#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics $63$6'8$86. Granton, <. (1''*), <eciprocal e0change3 a self8s!staining s&stem#, American 9conomic <eview 86(*)3 8$488/1. Grebs, @. (1'24), Altr!ism3 An e0amination of the concept and a review of the literat!re#, )s&chological I!lletin 2$32/88$42. Greps, @., ). .ilgrom, =. <oberts, and <. Cilson (1'82), <ational cooperation in the finitel& repeated prisoners; dilemma#, =o!rnal of 9conomic %heor& 22 (2)32*/82/2.

144 Gropot"in, ). (18'2), ?a con7!cte d! pain (%resse g -toc", )aris). Gropot"in, ). (18'6818'2), Co8operation3 A repl& to erbert -pencer#, Freedom, dec. 18'68 :an. 18'2. Gropot"in, ). (1'42, 1'22), .!t!al Aid3 A factor of evol!tion (reedition )eng!in Ioo"s, ?ondon). Gropot"in, ). (1'22), ?;Dthi7!e (-toc", )aris). G!r1, .. (1'28), Altr!ism as an o!tcome of social interaction#, American 9conomic <eview 6832168222. G!r1, .. (1'28), Altr!ism as an o!tcome of social interaction#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics $63$6'8$86. G!r1, .. (1'2'), Altr!istic e7!ilibri!m#, in3 I. Ialassa and <. 5elson, eds., 9conomic )rogress, )rivate Aal!es and )olic& (5orth8 olland) 1228244. ?ed&ard, =. (1''/), )!blic goods3 A s!rve& of e0perimental research#, in3 A. <oth and =. Gagel, eds., andboo" of 90perimental 9conomics ()rinceton >niversit& )ress, )rinceton) 11181'*. ?eeds, <. (1'6$), Altr!ism and the norm of giving#, .errill8)almer \!arterl& '322'82*4. ?enrow, ). (1'6/), -t!dies in s&mpath&#, in3 -.-. %omlins and C.9. 61ard, eds., Affect, Cognition, and )ersonalit&3 9mpirical -t!dies (-pringer, 5ew Eor"). ?eonard, @. and <. .anning (1'8$), Advantageo!s reallocations of reso!rces3 a constr!ctive e0ample#, =o!rnal of 6nternational 9conomics 1/($S*)32'182'/. ?eontief, C. (1'62), in3 90plorations in 9conomics3 5otes and 9ssa&s contrib!ted in hono!r of F.C. %a!ssig, (Ioo"s for ?ibrar& )ress, Freeport 5E) 8*8'2. ?eventhal, +. and @. Anderson (1'24), -elf8interest and the maintenance of e7!it&#, =o!rnal of )ersonalit& and -ocial )s&cholog& 1/3/2862. ?evine, @.G. (1''2), .odeling altr!ism and spitef!lness in e0periments#, <eview of 9conomic @&namics 1 ($)3/'$8622. ?Dvi8-tra!ss, C. %he principle of reciprocit&#, in3 ?.A. Coser and +. <osenberg, eds., -ociological %heor& (.ac.illan, 5ew Eor"). ?indbec", A. and =. Ceib!ll (1'88), Altr!ism and time consistenc&3 the economics of the fait accompli#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& '63116/81182. ?indbec", A., -. 5&berg, and =. Ceib!ll (1'''), -ocial norms and economic incentives in the Celfare -tate#, \!arterl& =o!rnal of 9conomics 116 (1)318$/. .aca!la&, =. and ?. Ier"owit1, eds. (1'24), Altr!ism and elping Iehavior (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). .ahie!, F.8<. and . <apoport (1''8), Altr!isme, Anal&ses 9conomi7!es (9conomica, )aris). .andeville, I. (121*), %he Fable of the Iees or )rivate Aices, )!blic Ienefits (Clarendon )ress, (0ford, 1'88). .argolis, . (1'81), -elfishness, Altr!ism and <ationalit& (Cambridge >niversit& )ress, Cambridge). .arshall, A. (1''4), )rinciples of 9conomics (.ac.illan, ?ondon). .arwell, +. and <. Ames (1'81), 9conomists free ride, does an&one elseX3 90periments on the provision of p!blic goods, 6A#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics 1/32'/8$14. .a!ss, .. (1'2*), 9ssai s!r le don, forme archah7!e de l;Dchange#, AnnDe -ociologi7!e n.s. 13 $48186. 9nglish translation (1'62), %he +ift3 Forms and F!nction of 90change in Archaic -ocieties (5orton, 5ew Eor"). .eade, +. . (1'$*), .ind, -elf and -ociet& (>niversit& of Chicago )ress, Chicago). .ercier Ethier, =. (1''$), 97!ilibre gDnDral de dons individ!els#, <ev!e 9conomi7!e '2/8 '/4.

141 .ercier Ethier, =. (1''8), %he distrib!tion of wealth in the liberal social contract#, 9!ropean 9conomic <eview *23$2'8$*2. .ill, =.-. (18'8), Correspondance inDdite (182881821) (Alcan, )aris). .iller, @. (1'88), Altr!ism and the welfare state#, in3 =. @onald .oon, ed., <esponsibilit&, <ights, and Celfare3 %he %heor& of the Celfare -tate (Cestview )ress, Io!lder and ?ondon) 16$8188. .ishan, 9.=. (1'22), %he f!tilit& of )areto8efficient distrib!tion#, American 9conomic <eview 623'218'26. .orell&, (12// (1'/$)), Code de la 5at!re (9ditions sociales, )aris). .!sgrave, <.A. (1'24), )areto optimal redistrib!tion3 comment#, American 9conomic <eview 643''18''$. 5agel, %. (1'24), %he )ossibilit& of Altr!ism ((0ford >niversit& )ress, (0ford). 5agel, %. (1'86), %he Aiew from 5owhere (Clarendon )ress, (0ford). 5icole, ). (162/), 9ssais de .orale ()aris). 5iobe ?a&ton, @. (1'82), )hilanthrop& and vol!ntarism. An annoted bibliograph&#, %he Fo!ndation Center. (lsen, 9.(. (1'21), -ome theorems in the theor& of efficient transfers#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& 2'31668126. (wen, @. (1'6*), 9nglish )hilanthrop& 166481'64 ( arvard >niversit& )ress, Cambridge, .A). )areto, A. (1'16), 6l massimo di !tilit] per !na colletivit]#, +iornale degli 9conomisti $, $$28$*1. <eprinted as a long footnote in3 %reatise of +eneral -ociolog& (and in3 .ind and -ociet&). )areto, A. (1'16), A %reatise on +eneral -ociolog& (@over, 5ew Eor"). )areto, A. (1'66), .an!el d;9conomie politi7!e, 1'46, in3 (e!vres compl_tes, vol. 2 (@ro1, +en_ve). )faff, .. (1'22), ?e domaine de l;Dconomie de don#, Anal&se et )rDvision 1$ (6)32$$82$8. )helps, 9.-., ed. (1'2/), Altr!ism, .oralit&, and 9conomic %heor& (<!ssell -age, 5ew Eor"). )iaget, =. (1'$2), ?a 5aissance d! -entiment .oral che1 l;9nfant ()a&ot, +en_ve). )olemarcha"is, ... (1'8$), (n the transfer parado0#, 6nternational 9conomic <eview 2*32*'8264. )osnett, =. and %. -andler (1'86), =oint s!ppl& and the finance of charitable activit&#, )!blic Finance \!arterl& 1*324'8222. )ostlewaite, A. (1'2'), .anip!lation via endowments#, <eview of 9conomic -t!dies *632//862. )ostlewaite, A. and .. Cebb (1'8*), %he possibilit& of recipient harming, donor benefiting transfers with more than two co!ntries#, =o!rnal of 6nternational 9conomics 16($S*)3$/28$6*. )ro!dhon, ).8=. (18/$S18/2), ?e man!el d! spDc!late!r ] la bo!rse (+arnier, )aris). )r&or, F. (1'22), %he (rigins of the 9conom& (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). <abin, .. (1''$), 6ncorporating fairness into game theor& and economics#, American 9conomic review 8$3128181$42. <abin, .. (1''8), )s&cholog& and 9conomics#, =o!rnal of 9conomic ?iterat!re $63118*6. <adner, <. (1'84), Coll!sion behavio!r in non8cooperative epsilon8e7!ilibria of oligopolies with long b!t finite lives#, =o!rnal of 9conomic %heor& 2231$681/*. <oberts, <.@. (1'8*), A positive model of private charit& and p!blic transfers#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& '231$681*8. <osenhan, @.?. (1'6'), -ome origins of concern for others#, in3 ). .!ssen, .. Covington and =. ?anger, eds., %rends and 6ss!es in @evelopmental )s&cholog& ( olt, <inehart g Cinston, 5ew Eor").

142 <osenhan, @.?. (1'24), %he nat!ral sociali1ation of altr!istic a!tonom&#, in3 =. .aca!la& and ?. Ier"owit1, eds., Altr!ism and elping Iehavior (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). <osenhan, @.?. and +... Chite (1'62), (bservation and rehearsal as determinants of prosocial behavior#, =o!rnal of )ersonalit& and -ocial )s&cholog& /3*2*8*$1. <otemberg, =. (1''*), !man relations in the wor"place#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& 142 (*)368*8212. <!ssel, @.<. (1'8*), A positive model of private charit& and p!blic transfers#, =o!rnal of )olitical 9conom& '231$681*2. -acco, ).?. and -. Tamagni (1''6), An evol!tionar& d&namic approach to altr!ism#, in3 F. Farina, F. ahn, and -. Aann!cci, eds., 9thics, <ationalit&, and 9conomic Iehavior (Clarendon )ress, (0ford) 26/8$44. -acco, ).?. and -. Tamagni, eds. (2442), Complessit] <ela1ionale e Comportamento 9conomico (6l .!lino, Iologna). -afra, T. (1'8$), .anip!lation b& reallocating initial endowments#, =o!rnal of .athematical 9conomics 1231818. -ahlins, .. (1'22), %he >se and Ab!se of Iiolog& (An Anthropological Criti7!e of -ociobiolog&) (%avistoc" )!blications, ?ondon). -am!elson, ).A. (1'*2), Fo!ndations of economic anal&sis ( arvard >niversit& )ress, Cambridge, .A). -cheler, .. (1'21), 5at!res et formes de la s&mpathie ()a&ot, )aris). -chwart1 <. (1'24), )ersonal )hilanthropic Contrib!tions#, =.).9. 28 (6)3126*812'1. -chwart1, I. (1'62), %he social ps&cholog& of the gift#, American =o!rnal of -ociolog& 2$31811. -cott, <. . (1'22), Avarice, altr!ism, and second part& preferences#, \!arterl& =o!rnal of 9conomics 8631818. -elten, <. and A. (c"enfels (1''8), An e0perimental solidarit& game#, =o!rnal of 9conomic Iehavior and (rgani1ation $* (*)3/128/$'. -ertel, .. (1'8'S'4), )redonations resolve prisoners; dilemma, centipedes and the chain store parado0#, .imeo (Ioga1ici >niversit&, 6stanb!l, %!r"e&). -ertel, .. (1''2), %he 5ash bargaining sol!tion manip!lated b& pre8donations is %alm!dic#, 9conomic ?etters *43*/8//. -ertel, .. (1''*), .anip!lating ?indahl e7!ilibri!m via endowments#, 9conomic ?etters *63162821. -ertel, .. and F. Chen (1'8'), <esolving parado0ical centipedes behavioralisticall& or b& !nilateral predonations#, in3 6. )artasenath&, ed., +ame %heor& and 9conomic Applications, (-prinder Aerlag, Ierlin). -ethi, <. and 9. -omanathan (2441), )reference evol!tion and reciprocit&#, =o!rnal of 9conomic %heor& '2322$82'2. -ilber, =, ed. (2444), andboo" on 6ncome 6ne7!alit& .eas!rement (Gl!wer, Ioston .A). -inger, ). (1'2$), Altr!ism and commerce3 A defense of %itm!ss against Arrow#, )hilosoph& and )!blic Affairs 2. -male, -. (1'84), %he prisoner;s dilemma and d&namic s&stems associated to non8 cooperative games#, 9conometrica *831612816$*. -mith, A. (12/'), %he %heor& of -ocial -entiments (1'66, Gell&, 5ew Eor"). -mith, A. (1226), An 6n7!ir& into the 5at!re and Ca!se of the Cealth of 5ations (1'$2, <andom o!se, 5ew Eor"). -olow, <... (1'81), Ilood and th!nder#, Eale ?aw =o!rnal 84316'681211. -oro"in, ). A. (1'/*), Forms and %echni7!es of Altr!istic and -pirit!al +rowth (Ieacon )ress, Ioston). -teedman, 6. (1'8'), From 90ploitation to Altr!ism (Ilac"well, (0ford).

14$ -tein, 9. (1'6*), (n the )roblem of 9mpath& (transl. C. -tein, .artin!s 5i:hoff, @en aag). -teinberg, I. (1'82), Aol!ntar& donations and p!blic e0pendit!res in a federalist s&stem#, American 9conomic <eview 2232*8$6. -totland, 9. (1'6'), 90plorator& investigations of empath&#, in3 ?. Ier"owit1, ed., Advances in 90perimental -ocial )s&cholog& (Academic )ress, 5ew Eor"). -!gden, <. (1'8*), <eciprocit&3 %he s!ppl& of p!blic goods thro!gh vol!ntar& contrib!tion#, 9conomic =o!rnal '*3 2228282. -!gden, <. (1''$), %hin"ing as a team3 %owards an e0planation of nonselfish behavior#, -ocial )hilosoph& and )olic& 1436'88'. -!gden, <. (2444), %eam preferences#, 9conomics and )hilosoph& 16312/824/. -!gden, <. (2442), Ie&ond s&mpath& and empath&3 Adam -mith;s concept of fellow feeling#, 9conomics and )hilosoph& 1836$888. -wane&, =. (1''4), Common propert&, reciprocit&, and comm!nit&#, =o!rnal of 9conomic 6ss!es 2*. %h!rnwald, <. (1'$2), @ie +emeinde der Ianaro. %h!rnwald, <. (1'6'), 9conomics in )rimitive Comm!nities ((0ford >niversit& )ress, ?ondon). %h!row, ?. C. (1'21), %he income distrib!tion as a p!re p!blic good#, \!arterl& =o!rnal of 9conomics 8/3$228$6. %itm!ss, <. .. (1'21), %he +ift <elationship (Allen and >nwin, ?ondon). %ognoli,=. (1'2/), <eciprocation of generosit& and "nowledge of game termination in the decomposed )risoner;s @ilemma +ame#, 9!ropean =o!rnal of -ocial )s&cholog&. %innies, F. (1'22), +emeinschaft !nd +esellschaft (Cissenschaftliche I!chgesellschaft, @armstadt). %o!rnier, ). (1'6$), %he .eaning of +ifts (=ohn Gno0 )ress, <ichmond). %rivers, <.?. (1'21), %he evol!tion of reciprocal altr!ism#, \!arterl& <eview of Iiolog& *63$/8$2. >hlaner, C.=. (1'8'), <elational goods and participation3 6ncorporating sociabilit& into a theor& of rational action#, )!blic Choice 6232/$828/. Aic"re&, C.-. (1'62), (ne 9conomist;s Aiew of )hilanthrop&#, in3 F. @ic"inson, ed., )hilanthrop& and )!blic )olic& (5ational I!rea! of 9conomic <esearch, 5ew Eor") Calras, ?. (186/), ?es Associations pop!laires de consommation, de prod!ction et de crDdit (<istampa anastatica della prima od. dol 186/, )aris, @ent!, a c!ra di (scar 5!ccio, 9d. Ii11arri, <oma, 1'6'). Carr, ).+. (1'82), )areto optimal redistrib!tion and private charit&#, =o!rnal of )!blic 9conomics 1'31$181$8. Carr, ).+. (1'8$), %he private provision of a p!blic good is independent of the distrib!tion of income#, 9conomic ?etters 1232428211. Ceisbrod, I.A. (1'88), %he 5onprofit 9conom& ( arvard >niversit& )ress, Cambridge, .A). Cic"steed, ). . (1888), %he Alphabet of 9conomic -cience (<. . !tton, ?ondon). Cic"steed, ). . (1'46), <eview of )rofessor A. )areto .an!ale di 9conomia )olitica#, 9conomic =o!rnal 163//$8//2. Cic"steed, ). . (1'$$), %he Common -ense of )olitical 9conom& (<obbins 9dn., ?ondon). Cinter, -.=., =r. (1'6'), A simple remar" on the second optimalit& theorem of welfare economics#, =o!rnal of 9conomic %heor&3 ''814$. Cintrobe, <. (1'81), 6t pa&s to do good, b!t not to do more good than it pa&s#, =o!rnal of 9conomic Iehavior and (rgani1ation 23241821$. Cispe, ?. (1'68), -&mpath& and empath&#, in3 @.?. -ills, ed., 6nternational 9nc&clopedia of the -ocial -ciences, vol. 1/ (.ac.illan, 5ew Eor").

14* Cispe, ?., ed. (1'22), )ositive Forms of -ocial Iehavior#, %he =o!rnal of -ocial 6ss!es 28 ($). Colfenden Committee <eport (1'28), %he F!t!re of Aol!ntar& (rgani1ations (Croom elm, ?ondon). Cright, @. (1'21), %he )s&cholog& of .oral Iehavio!r ()elican). Eano, .. (1'8$), Celfare aspects in the transfer problem#, =o!rnal of 6nternational 9conomics 1/322282'4. Tamagni, -., ed. (1''/), %he 9conomics of Altr!ism (9dward 9lgar, Cheltenham). Tec"ha!ser, <. (1'21), (ptimal mechanisms for income transfer#, American 9conomic <eview 613$2*8$$*.