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Contemporary Feminism for Gender Researchers: Not Just ''Our Bodies, Our Cells''
Claire Etaugh and Judith Worell Psychology of Women Quarterly 2012 36: 419 originally published online 26 October 2012 DOI: 10.1177/0361684312461905 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pwq.sagepub.com/content/36/4/419

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Contemporary Feminism for Gender Researchers: Not Just Our Bodies, Our Cells
Claire Etaugh1 and Judith Worell2

Psychology of Women Quarterly 36(4) 419-422 The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0361684312461905 http://pwq.sagepub.com

Salk and Hyde (2012) contend that, over the past two decades, genetic research has evolved from its earlier model of genetic determinism to one which recognizes the nuanced interplay between genes and the environment. They argue that modern genetics therefore is no longer antithetical to feminist perspectives in psychology. We do not disagree with this premise. However, we believe it is important to reiterate the feminist perspective, as outlined in our article on feminist transformations in theory and research (Worell & Etaugh, 1994), and to examine the arguments presented by Salk and Hyde through a feminist lens. Elizabeth Ettorre and her colleagues (Ettorre, Katz Rothman, & Steinberg, 2006) have cogently observed that those involved with the Human Genome Project tend to focus more on changing the individual person than on changing the social environment. They argue that a feminist perspective on genetics needs to confront and make visible this tension between the individual and society, between the personal and the political. We attempt to do so in our response to Salk and Hyde (2012), by examining their arguments within the framework of the six guiding feminist principles addressed in our 1994 article. Principle 1. Challenging the tenets of traditional scientific inquiry; recognizing that values enter into all scientific enterprises and that reality is, in part, created by the scientific process. (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, p. 446) Salk and Hyde (2012, p. 404) state that questions asked by genetic researchers are sometimes shaped by the researchers stereotyped beliefs. As we noted in our article, values enter into all scientific enterprises, which thus are never purely objective. To assume that genetic or any other scientific inquiry is not shaped by individual and cultural values presupposes that research programs and their potential applications are not causally linked, and further assumes implicitly that adequate legal safeguards are in place to prevent abusive and unjust applications. Both of these assumptions are questionable and ignore the extent to which applications of genetic research are driven by social, political, and economic forces (Happe, 19981999).

Furthermore, genetic research often involves downplaying or disregarding the social construction of such concepts as disease, disability, and normalcy (Asch & Geller, 1996). Along these same lines, Plows and Boddington (2006) argue that a reductionist focus on the genetic and biological may obscure not only the social, political, and economic forces at play but also the power flows that help create categories as biological (or otherwise), consequently influencing strategies of action. Not only that, but an emphasis on genetic causes of disease diverts public and private funding sources needed to further examine the complex psychological, social, political, and economic forces that underlie many health problems (Gillis & de Melo-Martin, 2010; Happe, 19981999; Mahowald, 2000). As an example, Salk and Hyde (2012) discuss possible genetically based sex differences in depression. Funding sources might be more readily drawn to the seemingly quicker fix of finding a depression-causing gene than to addressing the more thorny, highly complex, and far-ranging social and economic factors that are known to play a significant role in the higher rates of depression of women (Etaugh & Bridges, 2013). Feminists also emphasize that the subjects of scientific research and procedures should not become objects to be manipulated, but rather should be collaborators in the process. Unfortunately, as several feminist writers have noted, genetic testing can result in the objectification of women, treating them and their bodies as commodities. Women may be treated simply as bearers of oocytes or providers of uteri (Ettorre et al., 2006; McLeod, 2007; see Principle 5 for additional commentary).

1 2

Department of Psychology, Bradley University, Peoria, IL, USA Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA

Corresponding Author: Claire Etaugh, Department of Psychology, Bradley University, 1501 W. Bradley Avenue, Peoria, IL 61625, USA Email: cetaugh@bradley.edu

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420 Principle 2. Focus on the experience and lives of women; look at women who differ from the majority group. (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, p. 446) Feminists have long recognized that women constitute a highly diverse group of individuals with numerous intersecting personal and social identities (Etaugh & Bridges, 2013). They further point out that most psychological and medical research on women has, in fact, focused on a narrow and privileged subset of that group: women who are White, middle-class, Western, well-educated, able-bodied, and heterosexual. Salk and Hyde (2012), however, speak of women as though they constituted a single category. They appear more interested in the diversity of genetic makeups than in the diversity of whole individualsacknowledging the importance of genetic context on how genes are expressed, but not considering the context of womens lives. Feminists are critical of such context stripping (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, p. 447). Salk and Hyde (2012) further limit their diversity perspective by employing the traditional dichotomous femalemale gender model. However, several gender scholars (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Roughgarden, 2009) have argued persuasively for the recognition of additional gender categories, a practice found in a number of non-Western cultures. A multiple-gender model is consistent with data that genetic structure does not always predict either gender or gender-related behaviors (Etaugh & Bridges, 2013). Additionally, some feminist scholars are concerned with the roles genomic research and medicine play in maintaining and even increasing inequalities among various groups of women. Badagliacco and Ruiz (2006), for example, have focused on the impact of genomic medicine on impoverished Appalachian women, who are already burdened with negative stereotypes of deficiency. These researchers examined current birth control practices in Appalachian communities, noting a high incidence of medically recommended tubal ligation (read sterilization). Despite Salk and Hydes (2012) claim that the eugenics movement is a thing of the past, clearly the sentiment underlying this movement appears to be alive and well, albeit in more subtle (and thus more dangerous) forms and with groups of women made relatively invisible by their nonprivileged statuses. Other feminists have highlighted the inequitable distribution of genetic knowledge and genetic testing among various subgroups of women. Mary Mahowald (2000), for example, points out that because genetic testing often is not covered by basic insurance plans, it is thus unaffordable for many women. Even if genetic testing is performed and identifies a treatable medical condition, lack of resources may prevent many women from taking appropriate action. Mahowald cites the example of phenylketonuria, a fairly common form of severe mental impairment of a fetus that can be reduced or virtually eliminated by dietary practices before and during pregnancy. The increased costs of following such a diet, however, limits the ability of low-income women to choose this option.

Psychology of Women Quarterly 36(4) Similarly, less affluent women who are infertile cannot afford the high price of assisted reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, egg donation, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or use of a gestational surrogate. Such women are, in fact, more likely to be the paid provider rather than the recipient, leading some feminists to question the potentially exploitive nature of such transactions (Mahowald, 2000; McLeod, 2007; see Principles 3 and 5 for further commentary on this issue). Principle 3. Viewing power relations as the basis of patriarchal political social arrangements; examining health concerns within the context of power arrangements. (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, p. 447) Feminist ethical perspectives on human genetics and the new reproductive technologies focus on the implications of these technologies as they relate to issues of power, oppression, and exploitation (Dickenson, 2006). Stacey (1996) has pointed out that the unequal distribution of medical power may be exercised both individually (with respect to particular patients) and collectively (through public health programs). She notes that geneticists promotion of screening programs for inherited disorders sends a clear message about the worth of those individuals who carry these disorders, as well as a strong societal mandate to abort impaired fetuses. Thus, although the apparent intention of the new genetic information that allows prenatal screening is to offer a choice that such greater knowledge allows, inequalities of power may result in a pragmatic choice that is not freely made. Another potential consequence of prenatal diagnosis is the widening of existing social divisions among women and their families. Diagnostic tests are more likely to be sought by those who are aware of their risk of having affected children, who know of the existence of testing sites and options, and who can afford to pay both for the tests and for the follow-up actions. Such inequity in accessibility to prenatal diagnosis could result in genetic diseases becoming increasingly confined to less educated and poorer families (Wood-Harper & Harris, 1996). Similarly, if a woman is seeking to maximize certain qualities in her offspring, it is a matter of class privilege that she is able to do so. Relatedly, women who serve as egg donors or gestational surrogates tend to be less well off financially than the couples who pay them, yet another illustration of the power differential that exists between the two parties. A further concern is that the conditions under which women exchange reproductive services for money can involve manipulation and deception. For example, potential egg donors sometimes are not fully informed about the pain and risks involved in the procedure (McLeod, 2007). Principle 4. Recognizing gender as an essential category of analysis; pointing out multiple conceptions of gender; emphasizing the situational context of gender and

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Etaugh and Worell gendering as an active process that structures social interactions. (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, p. 447) In their title, as well as in their ensuing discussion, Salk and Hyde (2012) clearly adopt a two-factor model of gender: women and men. Thus, gender is seen as an independent variable that may be used to explain endogenous group differences. As pointed out by Jeanne Marecek (1995, p. 161), This view of gender holds that the categories man and woman are natural, self-evident, and unequivocal. Further, it regards sex-linked behaviors and traits as fixed and stable properties of separate, autonomous individuals. As noted earlier, many feminist scholars have pointed out the intersectionality of personal and social identities, to which Salk and Hyde refer as diversity. Thus, the category of woman can subsume a number of other social locations, such as race, skin color, hair color, and texture, sexual orientation, social class, age, able-bodiness, culture, ethnicity, and so forth (Dill & Zambrana, 2009; Marecek, 1995). Salk and Hyde suggest adding genotypic variability to this list (p. 405). It then follows that women with varying combinations of these social locations might differ among themselves as much as the twogender model of women versus men. In addition, when applying the two-factor model of gender to the results of animal research (e.g., Faulk & Dolinoy, 2011), the implications for women become further muddied. Another related issue is that Salk and Hyde (2012) give insufficient weight to the role of situational context in determining behavior. For example, they ask why some people who experienced a particular stressor became depressed and others who experienced the same stressor did not (p. 405). Although they concede to many possibilities, one of them they suggest is genetic vulnerability (p. 405). What is the problem here? For any two persons, the seemingly same stressor may not be equivalent in nature, in strength, or in duration. Although we do not rule out the genetic hypothesis, it seems much more plausible that the situational context of the stressor is substantially dissimilar in the two situations, thus producing dissimilar responses. The broad concept of stress is far too diffuse to compare it between groups and across situations. Principle 5. Attention to the use of language and the power to name; reducing the polarity between private and public in womens lives, such as renaming womens work, concepts of family, and the appropriate place of these between private and public domains. (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, pp. 447448) Here, we raise the sensitive concerns around womens work. Is it work for women to sell their bodies for commercial gestational surrogate pregnancy to more affluent women who cannot or who choose not to be child-bearers? Similarly, as we have noted, women in financial need may offer their body parts (private) as public commodities to be sold as oocytes or

421 eggs for in vitro fertilization to the more affluent women who can purchase these parts (McLeod, 2007). Although womens work in selling ones body for the sexual pleasure of another has long been viewed as prostitution and thus demeaning to the woman, is it any more demeaning to sell ones body for surrogate pregnancy or ones body parts for money? In a similar vein, in surrogate pregnancy, concepts of family become muddied. For example, who are family for the offspring of gestational pregnancy of women in financial need who are then given (read sold) at birth to the more affluent family? Is there a moral issue here if the surrogate infant is found in utero or at birth to possess characteristics that are unwelcome to the purchaser (Plows & Boddington, 2006)? Or do such new reproductive technologies enable prospective parents to create designer babies through embryonic screening? Again, some of these more advanced applications will be available only to those with sufficient finances (Wood-Harper & Harris, 1996). Principle 6. Promoting social activism toward the goal of societal change; creating a science that will benefit rather than oppress women, and that will correct as well as document prevalence of inequity, illness, violence, etc. (Worell & Etaugh, 1994, p. 448) Wood-Harper and Harris (1996) are concerned with the ethics of genetic testing. For example, information revealed by genetic testing and screening is of an intensely personal nature . . . and can be predictive of an individuals future health status. . . therefore the potential for misuse is immense. . . (p. 276). These authors point out that medical facilities for these procedures are limited: thus, access will likely be available to more affluent women. Consequently, equity of treatment is not possible, a situation that is inherently unjust (p. 280). Asch and Geller (1996) ask whether people have a right to know or not to know their genetic makeup, and in the case of genetic screening, who else will have access to the results. Our feminist values toward equity in societal change contrasts dramatically with the uses of genetic testing to select more desirable infant characteristics. Examples here include the practice of sex selection, boys typically being more preferred than girls (Stacey, 1996), as well as selection for other culturally preferred characteristics. We urge caution in any of these genetically based procedures for applications to equitable and fair social change. We do not wish to leave readers with the impression that we dismiss the importance of genetics as a factor influencing human behavior. We concur with Salk and Hyde (2012) that gender psychologists need to be integrated into teams focused on studying genetics. What our analysis points out is that these contributions need to be expressly feminist. This point becomes clearest when we bridge genetic research to genetic practicespractices that can affect womens lives, health, and well-being. Salk and Hyde take us some of the way there by focusing on gender and genetics, but we believe

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422 that they do not go far enough in connecting genetic research to the need for a feminist voice. Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Psychology of Women Quarterly 36(4)

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Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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