World War II

I
INTRODUCTION
World War II, global military conflict that, in terms of lives lost and material destruction, was the most devastating war in human history It began in !"#" as a $uro%ean conflict between &ermany and an 'nglo()rench coalition but eventually widened to include most of the nations of the world It ended in !"*+, leaving a new world order dominated by the United ,tates and the U,,R -ore than any %revious war, World War II involved the commitment of nations. entire human and economic resources, the blurring of the distinction between combatant and noncombatant, and the e/%ansion of the battlefield to include all of the enemy.s territory The most im%ortant determinants of its outcome were industrial ca%acity and %ersonnel In the last stages of the war, two radically new wea%ons were introduced0 the long(range roc1et and the atomic bomb In the main, however, the war was fought with the same or im%roved wea%ons of the ty%es used in World War I The greatest advances were in aircraft and tan1s

II

T2$ WOR3D ')T$R WOR3D W'R I

Three ma4or %owers had been dissatisfied with the outcome of World War I &ermany, the %rinci%al defeated nation, bitterly resented the territorial losses and re%arations %ayments im%osed on it by the Treaty of 5ersailles Italy, one of the victors, found its territorial gains far from enough either to offset the cost of the war or to satisfy its ambitions 6a%an, also a victor, was unha%%y about its failure to gain control of China

'

Causes of the War

)rance, the United 7ingdom, and the U , had attained their wartime ob4ectives They had reduced &ermany to a military ci%her and had reorgani8ed $uro%e and the world as they saw fit The )rench and the 9ritish fre:uently disagreed on %olicy in the %ostwar %eriod, however, and were unsure of their ability to defend the %eace settlement The U , , disillusioned by the $uro%eans. failure to re%ay their war debts, retreated into isolationism

'!

The )ailure of ;eace $fforts

During the !"<=s, attem%ts were made to achieve a stable %eace The first was the establishment >!"<=? of the 3eague of Nations as a forum in which nations could settle their dis%utes The league.s %owers were limited to %ersuasion and various levels of moral and economic sanctions that the members were free to carry out as they saw fit 't the Washington Conference of !"<!(<<, the %rinci%al naval %owers agreed to limit their navies according to a fi/ed ratio The 3ocarno Conference >!"<+? %roduced a treaty guarantee of the &erman()rench boundary and an arbitration

agreement between &ermany and ;oland In the ;aris ;eace ;act >!"<@?, A# countries, including all the great %owers e/ce%t the U,,R, renounced war as an instrument of national %olicy and %ledged to resolve all dis%utes among them Bby %acific means C The signatories had agreed beforehand to e/em%t wars of Bself(defense C

'<

The Rise of )ascism

One of the victors. stated aims in World War I had been Bto ma1e the world safe for democracy,C and %ostwar &ermany ado%ted a democratic constitution, as did most of the other states restored or created after the war In the !"<=s, however, the wave of the future a%%eared to be a form of nationalistic, militaristic totalitarianism 1nown by its Italian name, fascism It %romised to minister to %eo%les. wants more effectively than democracy and %resented itself as the one sure defense against communism 9enito -ussolini established the first )ascist dictatorshi% in Italy in !"<<

'#

)ormation of the '/is Coalition

'dolf 2itler, the Fhrer >BleaderC? of the &erman National ,ocialist >Na8i? ;arty, %reached a racist brand of fascism 2itler %romised to overturn the 5ersailles Treaty and secure additional Lebensraum >Bliving s%aceC? for the &erman %eo%le, who he contended deserved more as members of a su%erior race In the early !"#=s, the de%ression hit &ermany The moderate %arties could not agree on what to do about it, and large numbers of voters turned to the Na8is and Communists In !"## 2itler became the &erman chancellor, and in a series of subse:uent moves established himself as dictator 6a%an did not formally ado%t fascism, but the armed forces. %owerful %osition in the government enabled them to im%ose a similar ty%e of totalitarianism 's dismantlers of the world status :uo, the 6a%anese military were well ahead of 2itler They used a minor clash with Chinese troo%s near -u1den in !"#! as a %rete/t for ta1ing over all of -anchuria, where they %roclaimed the %u%%et state of -anchu1uo in !"#< In !"#D(#@ they occu%ied the main Chinese %orts 2aving denounced the disarmament clauses of the 5ersailles Treaty, created a new air force, and reintroduced conscri%tion, 2itler tried out his new wea%ons on the side of right(wing military rebels in the ,%anish Civil War >!"#A(#"? The venture brought him into collaboration with -ussolini, who was also su%%orting the ,%anish revolt after having sei8ed >!"#+(#A? $thio%ia in a small war Treaties between &ermany, Italy, and 6a%an in the %eriod from !"#A to !"*= brought into being the Rome(9erlin(To1yo '/is The '/is thereafter became the collective term for those countries and their allies

'*

&erman 'ggression in $uro%e

2itler launched his own e/%ansionist drive with the anne/ation of 'ustria in -arch !"#@ The way was clear0 -ussolini su%%orted himE and the 9ritish and )rench, overawed by &erman rearmament, acce%ted 2itler.s claim that the status of 'ustria was an internal &erman affair The U , had severely im%aired its ability to act against aggression by %assing a neutrality law that %rohibited material assistance to all %arties in foreign conflicts In ,e%tember !"#@ 2itler threatened war to anne/ the western border area of C8echoslova1ia, the ,udetenland and its # + million ethnic &ermans The 9ritish %rime minister Neville Chamberlain initiated tal1s that culminated at the end of the month in the -unich ;act, by which the C8echs, on 9ritish and )rench urging, relin:uished the ,udetenland in return for 2itler.s %romise not to ta1e any more C8ech territory Chamberlain believed he had achieved B%eace for our time,C but the word -unich soon im%lied ab4ect and futile a%%easement 3ess than si/ months later, in -arch !"#", 2itler sei8ed the remainder of C8echoslova1ia 'larmed by this new aggression and by 2itler.s threats against ;oland, the 9ritish government %ledged to aid that country if &ermany threatened its inde%endence )rance already had a mutual defense treaty with ;oland The turn away from a%%easement brought the ,oviet Union to the fore 6ose%h ,talin, the ,oviet dictator, had offered military hel% to C8echoslova1ia during the !"#@ crisis, but had been ignored by all the %arties to the -unich ;act Now that war threatened, he was courted by both sides, but 2itler made the more attractive offer 'llied with 9ritain and )rance, the ,oviet Union might well have had to fight, but all &ermany as1ed for was its neutrality In -oscow, on the night of 'ugust <#, !"#", the Na8i(,oviet ;act was signed In the %art %ublished the ne/t day, &ermany and the ,oviet Union agreed not to go to war against each other ' secret %rotocol gave ,talin a free hand in )inland, $stonia, 3atvia, eastern ;oland, and eastern Romania

III

-I3IT'RF O;$R'TION,

In the early morning hours of ,e%tember !, !"#", the &erman armies marched into ;oland On ,e%tember # the 9ritish and )rench sur%rised 2itler by declaring war on &ermany, but they had no %lans for rendering active assistance to the ;oles

'

The )irst ;hase0 Dominance of the '/is

-an for man, the &erman and ;olish forces were an even match 2itler committed about ! + million troo%s, and the ;olish commander, -arshal $dward ,migGy(Ryd8, e/%ected to muster ! @ million That was not the whole %icture, however The &ermans had si/ %an8er >armored? and four motori8ed divisionsE the ;oles had one armored and one motori8ed brigade and a few tan1 battalions The &ermans. !A== aircraft were mostly of the latest ty%es 2alf of the ;oles. "#+ %lanes were obsolete

'!

The 9lit81rieg in ;oland

;olish strategic doctrine called for a rigid defense of the whole frontier and antici%ated several wee1s of %reliminary s1irmishing It was wrong on both counts On the morning of ,e%tember !, waves of &erman bombers hit the railroads and ho%elessly snarled the ;olish mobili8ation In four more days, two army grou%sHone on the north out of $ast ;russia, the other on the south out of ,ilesiaHhad bro1en through on relatively narrow fronts and were sending armored s%earheads on fast drives toward Warsaw and 9rest This was blit81rieg >lightning war?0 the use of armor, air %ower, and mobile infantry in a %incers movement to encircle the enemy 9etween ,e%tember @ and !=, the &ermans closed in on Warsaw from the north and south, tra%%ing the ;olish forces west of the ca%ital On ,e%tember !D, a second, dee%er encirclement closed !A= 1m >!== mi? east, near 9rest On that day, too, the ,oviet Red 'rmy lunged across the border 9y ,e%tember <=, %ractically the whole country was in &erman or ,oviet hands, and only isolated %oc1ets continued to resist The last to surrender was the fortress at 7oc1, on October A

'<

The ;hony War

' )rench and 9ritish offensive in the west might have enabled ;oland to fight longer, but until enough 9ritish arrived, it would have had to be mounted mainly by the )renchE )rench strategy, however, was defensive, based on holding the heavily fortified -aginot line The :uic1 finish in ;oland left both sides at loose ends Dismayed, the 9ritish and )rench became %reoccu%ied with schemes to stave off a bloody re%lay of World War I 2itler made a halfhearted %eace offer and at the same time ordered his generals to ready an attac1 on the 3ow Countries and )rance The generals, who did not thin1 they could do against )rance what they had done in ;oland, as1ed for time and insisted they could only ta1e 2olland, 9elgium, and the )rench channel coast $/ce%t at sea, where &erman submarines o%erated against merchant shi%%ing and the 9ritish navy im%osed a bloc1ade, so little was going on after the first wee1 in October that the U , news%a%ers called it the ;hony War

'#

The ,oviet()innish War

On November #=, after two months of di%lomatic wrangling, the ,oviet Union declared war on )inland ,talin was bent on having a blit81rieg of his own, but his %lan faltered The )inns, under -arshal Carl & -annerheim, were e/%ert at winter warfare The ,oviet troo%s, on the other hand, were often badly led, in %art because %olitical %urges had claimed many of the Red 'rmy.s senior officers Outnumbered by at least five to one, the )inns held their own and 1e%t fighting into the new year The attac1 on )inland aroused world o%inion against the ,oviet Union and gave an o%ening to the 9ritish and )rench They had long had their eyes on a mine at 7iruna in northern ,weden that was

&ermany.s main source of iron ore In summer the ore went through the 9altic ,ea, in winter to the ice(free Norwegian %ort of Narvi1 and then through neutral Norwegian waters to &ermany The Narvi1(7iruna railroad also connected on the east with the )innish railroadsE conse:uently, an 'nglo()rench force ostensibly sent to hel% the )inns would automatically be in %osition to occu%y Narvi1 and 7iruna The %roblem was to get Norway and ,weden to coo%erate, which both refused to do In &ermany, the naval chief, 'dmiral $rich Raeder, urged 2itler to occu%y Norway for the sa1e of its o%en(water %orts on the 'tlantic, but 2itler showed little interest until late 6anuary !"*=, when the weather and the discovery of some invasion %lans by 9elgium forced him to delay the attac1 on the 3ow Countries and )rance indefinitely The first studies he had made showed that Norway could best be ta1en by simultaneous landings at eight %ort cities from Narvi1 to Oslo 9ecause the troo%s would have to be trans%orted on warshi%s and because those would be easy %rey for the 9ritish navy, the o%eration would have to be e/ecuted while the nights were long Denmar1, which %osed no military %roblems, could be usefully included because it had airfields close to Norway

'*

Denmar1 and Norway

,talin, fearing outside intervention, ended his war on -arch @ on terms that cost )inland territory but left it inde%endent The 9ritish and )rench then had to find another %rete/t for their %ro4ected action in Narvi1 and 7irunaE they decided to lay mines 4ust outside the Narvi1 harbor This they thought would %rovo1e some 1ind of violent &erman reaction, which would let them s%ring to Norway.s sideHand into Narvi1 2itler a%%roved the incursions into Norway and Denmar1 on '%ril <, and the warshi%s sailed on '%ril D ' 9ritish tas1 force laid the mines the ne/t morning and headed home, %assing the &erman shi%s without seeing them and leaving them to ma1e the landings uno%%osed on the morning of '%ril " Denmar1 surrendered at once, and the landings succeeded everywhere but at Oslo There a fort bloc1ed the a%%roach from the sea, and fog %revented an airborne landing The &ermans occu%ied Oslo by noon, but in the meantime, the Norwegian government, deciding to fight, had moved to $lverum 'lthough the Norwegians, aided by !<,=== 9ritish and )rench, held out in the area between Oslo and Trondheim until -ay #, the conclusion was never in doubt Narvi1 was different There *A== &ermans faced <*,A== 9ritish, )rench, and Norwegians bac1ed by the guns of the 9ritish navy The &ermans had an advantage in the ruggedness of the terrain and a greater one in their o%%onents. slow, methodical moves Thus, they held Narvi1 until -ay <@ In the first wee1 of 6une they were bac1ed against the ,wedish border and close to having to choose surrender or internment, but by then, military disasters in )rance were forcing the 9ritish and )rench to recall their troo%s from Narvi1

'+

The 3ow Countries

9y s%ring, 2itler had found a new and better way of handling the cam%aign against )rance and the 3ow Countries The first %lan had been to have the main force go through 9elgium, as it had in World War I &eneral $rich von -anstein and some other advisers, however, had %ersuaded 2itler to shift the main force south to the area of 3u/embourg and the 'rdennes )orest The 'rdennes was hilly, wooded, and not the best country for tan1s, but -anstein argued that the enemy would not e/%ect a big attac1 there The tan1s could ma1e a fast northwestward swee% from the 'rdennes, behind the 9elgians and 9ritish and %art of the )rench 'fter reaching the coast and defeating the enemy in 9elgium, they could ma1e an about(face and stri1e to the southeast behind the )rench armies along the -aginot line When the attac1 began, on -ay !=, !"*=, the two sides were a%%ro/imately e:ual in numbers of troo%s and tan1sE the &ermans were su%erior in aircraft The decisive advantage of the &ermans, however, was that they 1new e/actly what they were going to do Their o%%onents had to im%rovise, in %art because the 9elgians and Dutch tried to stay neutral to the last The 9ritish and )rench, moreover, had failed to learn from the e/am%le of ;oland, having attributed that country.s defeat to its inherent wea1ness Conse:uently, they were not %re%ared to deal with the &erman armor Their tan1s were scattered among the infantryE those of the &ermans were drawn together in a %an8er grou%, an armored army On -ay != &erman airborne troo%s landed inside 9elgium and 2olland to sei8e airfields and bridges and, most notably, the great 9elgian fortress $ben($mael The Dutch army surrendered on -ay !*, several hours after bombers had destroyed the business section of Rotterdam 'lso on -ay !* the &erman main force, the %an8er grou% in the lead, came out of the 'rdennes to begin the drive to the sea behind the 9ritish and )rench armies su%%orting the 9elgians

'A

The Defeat of )rance

On -ay <= the %an8er grou% too1 'bbeville at the mouth of the ,omme River and began to %ush north along the coastE it covered *== 1m ><+= mi? in !! days 9y -ay <A, the 9ritish and )rench were %ushed into a narrow beachhead around Dun1er:ue The 9elgian 1ing, 3eo%old III, surrendered his army the ne/t day Destroyers and smaller craft of all 1inds rescued ##@,<<A men from Dun1er:ue in a heroic sealift that %robably would not have succeeded if the &erman commander, &eneral &erd von Rundstedt, had not sto%%ed the tan1s to save them for the ne/t %hase On 6une + the &ermans launched a new assault against )rance Italy declared war on )rance and 9ritain on 6une != The -aginot line, which only e/tended to the 9elgian border, was intact, but the )rench commander, &eneral -a/ime Weygand, had nothing with which to screen it or ;aris on the north and west On 6une !D, -arshal 2enri ;hili%%e ;Itain, a World War I hero who had become %remier the day before, as1ed for an armistice The armistice was signed on 6une <+ on terms that gave &ermany control of northern )rance and the 'tlantic coast ;Itain then set u% a ca%ital at 5ichy in the unoccu%ied southeast

'D

The 9attle of 9ritain

In the summer of !"*=, 2itler dominated $uro%e from the North Ca%e to the ;yrenees 2is one remaining active enemyH9ritain, under a new %rime minister, Winston ChurchillHvowed to continue fighting Whether it could was :uestionable The 9ritish army had left most of its wea%ons on the beaches at Dun1er:ue ,talin was in no mood to challenge 2itler The U , , shoc1ed by the fall of )rance, began the first %eacetime conscri%tion in its history and greatly increased its military budget, but %ublic o%inion, although sym%athetic to 9ritain, was against getting into the war The &ermans ho%ed to subdue the 9ritish by starving them out In 6une !"*= they undertoo1 the 9attle of the 'tlantic, using submarine warfare to cut the 9ritish overseas lifelines The &ermans now had submarine bases in Norway and )rance 't the outset the &ermans had only <@ submarines, but more were being builtHenough to 1ee% 9ritain in danger until the s%ring of !"*# and to carry on the battle for months thereafter Invasion was the e/%editious way to finish off 9ritain, but that meant crossing the $nglish ChannelE 2itler would not ris1 it unless the 9ritish air force could be neutrali8ed first 's a result, the 9attle of 9ritain was fought in the air, not on the beaches In 'ugust !"*= the &ermans launched daylight raids against %orts and airfields and in ,e%tember against inland cities The ob4ective was to draw out the 9ritish fighters and destroy them The &ermans failed to rec1on with a new device, radar, which greatly increased the 9ritish fighters. effectiveness 9ecause their own losses were too high, the &ermans had to switch to night bombing at the end of ,e%tember 9etween then and -ay !"*! they made D! ma4or raids on 3ondon and +A on other cities, but the damage they wrought was too indiscriminate to be militarily decisive On ,e%tember !D, !"*=, 2itler %ost%oned the invasion indefinitely, thereby conceding defeat in the 9attle of 9ritain

'@

The 9al1ans and North 'frica >!"*=(!"*!?

In fact, 2itler had told his generals in late 6uly !"*= that the ne/t attac1 would be on the U,,R There, he said, &ermany would get its Bliving s%aceC and defeat 9ritain as well 2e claimed the 9ritish were only being 1e%t in the war by the ho%e of a falling(out between &ermany and the U,,R When the ,oviets had been defeated and 9ritish %ositions in India and the -iddle $ast were threatened, he believed that 9ritain would ma1e %eace 2itler wanted to start in the fall of !"*=, but his advisers %ersuaded him to avoid the ris1s of a winter cam%aign in the ,oviet Union and wait until the s%ring -eanwhile, &ermany.s ally, -ussolini, had staged an unsuccessful attac1 >,e%tember !"*=? on 9ritish(occu%ied $gy%t from the Italian colony of 3ibya and an e:ually abortive invasion >October !"*=? of &reece In res%onse to the latter move, the 9ritish occu%ied airfields on Crete >7rJti? and in &reece 2itler did not want 9ritish %lanes within stri1ing distance of his one ma4or oil source, the ;loieKti fields in Romania, and in November he began to %re%are an o%eration against &reece

$arly in !"*! 9ritish forces %ushed the Italians bac1 into 3ibya, and in )ebruary 2itler sent &eneral $rwin Rommel with a two(division tan1 cor%s, the 'fri1a 7or%s, to hel% his allies 9ecause he would need to cross their territory to get at &reece >and the ,oviet Union?, 2itler brought Romania and 2ungary into the '/is alliance in November !"*=E 9ulgaria 4oined in -arch !"*! When Fugoslavia refused to follow suit, 2itler ordered an invasion of that country

'@a

Fugoslavia

The o%erations against &reece and Fugoslavia began on '%ril A, !"*! The &ermans. %rimary difficulty with the attac1 on Fugoslavia was in %ulling together an army of nine divisions from &ermany and )rance in less than ten days They had to limit themselves for several days to air raids and border s1irmishing On '%ril != they o%ened drives on 9elgrade from the northwest, north, and southeast The city fell on '%ril !#, and the Fugoslav army surrendered the ne/t day Fugoslavia, however, was easier to ta1e than it would be to hold &uerrillasHLetni1s under DraMa -iha4loviN and %artisans under 6osi% 9ro8 >Tito?Hfought throughout the war

'@b

&reece

The &ree1 army of *#=,===, unli1e the Fugoslav, was fully mobili8ed, and to some e/tent battle tested, but national %ride com%elled it to try to defend the -eta/as line northeast of ,aloni1a 9y one short thrust to ,aloni1a, the &ermans forced the surrender on '%ril " of the line and about half of the &ree1 army 'fter the &ree1 )irst 'rmy, %ulling out of 'lbania, was tra%%ed at the -etsOvon ;ass and surrendered on '%ril <<, the 9ritish force of some A<,=== troo%s retreated southward Thereafter, fast &erman drivesHto the Isthmus of Corinth by '%ril <D and through the ;elo%Onnisos by '%ril #=Hforced the 9ritish into an evacuation that cost them !<,=== men 'n airborne assault on -ay <=(<D also brought Crete into &erman hands -eanwhile, Rommel had launched a successful counteroffensive against the 9ritish in 3ibya, e/%elling them from the country >e/ce%t for an isolated garrison at Tobru1? by '%ril !"*!

The ,econd ;hase0 $/%ansion of the War

In the year after the fall of )rance, the war moved toward a new stageHworld war While conducting subsidiary cam%aigns in the 9al1ans, in North 'frica, and in the air against 9ritain, 2itler de%loyed his main forces to the east and brought the countries of southeastern $uro%e >as well as )inland? into a %artnershi% against the U,,R

9!

U , 'id to 9ritain

The U , abandoned strict neutrality in the $uro%ean war and a%%roached a confrontation with 6a%an in 'sia and the ;acific Ocean U , and 9ritish conferences, begun in 6anuary !"*!, determined a basic strategy for the event of a U , entry into the war, namely, that both would center their effort on &ermany, leaving 6a%an, if need be, to be dealt with later In -arch !"*! the U , Congress %assed the 3end(3ease 'ct and a%%ro%riated an initial PD billion to lend or lease wea%ons and other aid to any countries the %resident might designate 9y this means the U , ho%ed to ensure victory over the '/is without involving its own troo%s 9y late summer of !"*!, however, the U , was in a state of undeclared war with &ermany In 6uly, U , -arines were stationed in Iceland, which had been occu%ied by the 9ritish in -ay !"*=, and thereafter the U , Navy too1 over the tas1 of escorting convoys in the waters west of Iceland In ,e%tember ;resident )ran1lin D Roosevelt authori8ed shi%s on convoy duty to attac1 '/is war vessels

9<

)riction 9etween the U , and 6a%an

-eanwhile, 'merican relations with 6a%an continued to deteriorate In ,e%tember !"*= 6a%an coerced 5ichy )rance into giving u% northern Indochina The U , retaliated by %rohibiting the e/%ortation of steel, scra% iron, and aviation gasoline to 6a%an In '%ril !"*!, the 6a%anese signed a neutrality treaty with the U,,R as insurance against an attac1 from that direction if they were to come into conflict with 9ritain or the U , while ta1ing a bigger bite out of ,outheast 'sia When &ermany invaded the U,,R in 6une, 6a%anese leaders considered brea1ing the treaty and 4oining in from the east, but, ma1ing one of the most fateful decisions of the war, they chose instead to intensify their %ush to the southeast On 6uly <# 6a%an occu%ied southern Indochina Two days later, the United ,tates, 9ritain, and the Netherlands fro8e 6a%anese assets The effect was to %revent 6a%an from %urchasing oil, which would, in time, cri%%le its army and ma1e its navy and air force com%letely useless

9#

The &erman Invasion of the U,,R

The war.s most massive encounter began on the morning of 6une <<, !"*!, when slightly more than # million &erman troo%s invaded the U,,R 'lthough &erman %re%arations had been visible for months and had been tal1ed about o%enly among the di%lomats in -oscow, the ,oviet forces were ta1en by sur%rise ,talin, his confidence in the country.s military ca%ability sha1en by the )innish war, had refused to allow any counteractivity for fear of %rovo1ing the &ermans -oreover, the ,oviet military leadershi% had concluded that blit81rieg, as it had been %racticed in ;oland and )rance, would not be %ossible on the scale of a ,oviet(&erman warE both sides would therefore confine themselves for the first several wee1s at least to s%arring along the frontier The ,oviet army had < " million troo%s on the western border and outnumbered the &ermans by two to one in tan1s and by two or three to one in aircraft -any of its tan1s and aircraft were older ty%es, but some of the tan1s, %articularly the later famous T(#*s, were far su%erior to any the &ermans had 3arge numbers of the aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the first day, however, and their

tan1s, li1e those of the )rench, were scattered among the infantry, where they could not be effective against the &erman %an8er grou%s The infantry was first ordered to counterattac1, which was im%ossible, and then forbidden to retreat, which ensured their wholesale destruction or ca%ture

9#a

Initial &erman ,uccesses

)or the invasion, the &ermans had set u% three army grou%s, designated as North, Center, and ,outh, and aimed toward 3eningrad, -oscow, and 7yiv 2itler and his generals had agreed that their main strategic %roblem was to loc1 the ,oviet army in battle and defeat it before it could esca%e into the de%ths of the country They disagreed on how that could best be accom%lished -ost of the generals believed that the ,oviet regime would sacrifice everything to defend -oscow, the ca%ital, the hub of the road and railroad networ1s, and the country.s main industrial center To 2itler, the land and resources of the U1raine and the oil of the Caucasus were more im%ortant, and he wanted to sei8e 3eningrad as well The result had been a com%romiseHthe three thrusts, with the one by 'rmy &rou% Center toward -oscow the strongestHthat tem%orarily satisfied 2itler as well as the generals War games had indicated a victory in about ten wee1s, which was significant because the Russian summer, the ideal time for fighting in the U,,R, was short, and the 9al1ans o%erations had caused a #(wee1 delay at the outset Ten wee1s seemed am%le time Churchill offered the U,,R an alliance, and Roosevelt %romised lend(lease aid, but after the first few days, their staffs believed everything would be over in a month or so 9y the end of the first wee1 in 6uly, 'rmy &rou% Center had ta1en <"=,=== %risoners in encirclements at 9iaGysto1 and -ins1 On 'ugust +, having crossed the Dnie%er River, the last natural barrier west of -oscow, the army grou% wi%ed out a %oc1et near ,molens1 and counted another #==,=== %risoners On reaching ,molens1, it had covered more than two(thirds of the distance to -oscow

9#b

2itler.s Change of ;lan

The Russians were doing e/actly what the &erman generals had wanted, sacrificing enormous numbers of troo%s and wea%ons to defend -oscow 2itler, however, was not satisfied, and over the generals. %rotests, he ordered 'rmy &rou% Center to divert the bul1 of its armor to the north and south to hel% the other two army grou%s, thereby sto%%ing the advance toward -oscow On ,e%tember @ 'rmy &rou% North cut 3eningrad.s land connections and, together with the )innish army on the north, brought the city under siege On ,e%tember !A 'rmy &rou% ,outh closed a gigantic encirclement east of 7yiv that brought in AA+,=== %risoners 2itler then decided to resume the advance toward -oscow and ordered the armor be returned to 'rmy &rou% Center

9#c

The 'ttem%t to Ta1e -oscow

'fter a standstill of si/ wee1s, 'rmy &rou% Center resumed action on October < Within two wee1s, it com%leted three large encirclements and too1 AA#,=== %risoners Then the fall rains set in, turning the un%aved Russian roads to mud and sto%%ing the advance for the better %art of a month In mid(November, the weather turned cold and the ground fro8e 2itler and the commander of 'rmy &rou% Center, )ield -arshal )edor von 9oc1, faced the choice of having the armies dig in where they were or sending them ahead, %ossibly to be overta1en by the winter Wanting to finish the !"*! cam%aign with some sort of a victory at -oscow, they chose to move ahead In the second half of November 9oc1 aimed two armored s%earheads at -oscow 6ust after the turn of the month, one of those, bearing in on the city from the northwest, was less than #< 1m >less than <= mi? away The other, coming from the south, had about A+ 1m >about *= mi? still to go The %an8er divisions had often covered such distances in less than a day, but the tem%erature was falling, snow was drifting on the roads, and neither the men nor the machines were outfitted for e/treme cold On December + the generals commanding the s%earhead armies re%orted that they were sto%%ed0 The tan1s and truc1s were free8ing u%, and the troo%s were losing their will to fight

9#d

,oviet Counteroffensive

,talin, who had stayed in -oscow, and his commander at the front, &eneral &eorgy Qhu1ov, had held bac1 their reserves -any of them were recent recruits, but some were hardened veterans from ,iberia 'll were dressed for winter On December A they counterattac1ed, and within a few days, the &erman s%earheads were rolling bac1 and abandoning large numbers of vehicles and wea%ons, rendered useless by the cold On ,talin.s orders, the -oscow counterattac1 was :uic1ly converted into a counteroffensive on the entire front The &ermans had not built any defense lines to the rear and could not dig in because the ground was fro8en hard as concrete ,ome of the generals recommended retreating to ;oland, but on December !@ 2itler ordered the troo%s to stand fast wherever they were Thereafter, the Russians cho%%ed great chun1s out of the &erman front, but enough of it survived the winter to maintain the siege of 3eningrad, continue the threat to -oscow, and 1ee% the western U1raine in &erman hands

9*

The 9eginning of the War in the ;acific

The seeming imminence of a ,oviet defeat in the summer and fall of !"*! had created dilemmas for 6a%an and the U , The 6a%anese thought they then had the best o%%ortunity to sei8e the %etroleum and other resources of ,outheast 'sia and the ad4acent islandsE on the other hand, they 1new they could not win the war with the U , that would %robably ensue The U , government wanted to sto% 6a%anese e/%ansion but doubted whether the 'merican %eo%le would be willing to go to war to do so -oreover, the U , did not want to get embroiled in a war with 6a%an while it faced the ghastly %ossibility of being alone in the world with a trium%hant &ermany 'fter the oil

embargo, the 6a%anese, also under the %ressure of time, resolved to move in ,outheast 'sia and the nearby islands

9*a

;earl 2arbor

Until December !"*! the 6a%anese leadershi% %ursued two courses0 They tried to get the oil embargo lifted on terms that would still let them ta1e the territory they wanted, and they %re%ared for war The U , demanded that 6a%an withdraw from China and Indochina, but would very li1ely have settled for a to1en withdrawal and a %romise not to ta1e more territory 'fter he became 6a%an.s %remier in mid(October, &eneral TR4R 2ide1i set November <" as the last day on which 6a%an would acce%t a settlement without war TR4R.s deadline, which was 1e%t secret, meant that war was %ractically certain The 6a%anese army and navy had, in fact, devised a war %lan in which they had great confidence They %ro%osed to ma1e fast swee%s into 9urma, -alaya, the $ast Indies, and the ;hili%%ines and, at the same time, set u% a defensive %erimeter in the central and southwest ;acific They e/%ected the United ,tates to declare war but not to be willing to fight long or hard enough to win Their greatest concern was the U , ;acific )leet, based at ;earl 2arbor, 2awaii If it reacted :uic1ly, it could scramble their very tight timetable 's insurance, the 6a%anese navy undertoo1 to cri%%le the ;acific )leet by a sur%rise air attac1 ' few minutes before @ '- on ,unday, December D, !"*!, 6a%anese carrier(based air%lanes struc1 ;earl 2arbor In a raid lasting less than two hours, they san1 or seriously damaged eight battleshi%s and !# other naval vessels The U , authorities had bro1en the 6a%anese di%lomatic code and 1new an attac1 was imminent ' warning had been sent from Washington, but, owing to delays in transmission, it arrived after the raid had begun In one stro1e, the 6a%anese navy scored a brilliant successHand assured the '/is defeat in World War II The 6a%anese attac1 brought the U , into the war on December @Hand brought it in determined to fight to the finish &ermany and Italy declared war on the United ,tates on December !!

9*b

6a%anese Con:uests in 'sia and the ;acific

In the vast area of land and ocean they had mar1ed for con:uest, the 6a%anese seemed to be everywhere at once 9efore the end of December, they too1 9ritish 2ong 7ong and the &ilbert Islands >now 7iribati? and &uam and Wa1e Island >U , %ossessions?, and they had invaded 9ritish 9urma, -alaya, 9orneo, and the 'merican(held ;hili%%ines 9ritish ,inga%ore, long regarded as one of the world.s strongest fortresses, fell to them in )ebruary !"*<, and in -arch they occu%ied the Netherlands $ast Indies and landed on New &uinea The 'merican and ;hili%%ine forces surrendered at 9ataan on '%ril ", and resistance in the ;hili%%ines ended with the surrender of Corregidor on -ay A

'ccording to the 6a%anese %lan, it would be time for them to ta1e a defensive stance when they had ca%tured northern New &uinea >an 'ustralian %ossession?, the 9ismarc1 'rchi%elago, the &ilberts, and Wa1e Island, which they did by mid(-arch 9ut they had done so well that they decided to e/%and their defensive %erimeter north into the 'leutian Islands, east to -idway Island, and south through the ,olomon Islands and southern New &uinea Their first move was by sea, to ta1e ;ort -oresby on the southeastern ti% of New &uinea The 'mericans, using their ability to read the 6a%anese code, had a naval tas1 force on the scene In the ensuing 9attle of the Coral ,ea >-ay D(@?, fought entirely by aircraft carriers, the 6a%anese were forced to abandon their designs on ;ort -oresby See Coral ,ea, 9attle of the

9*c

The 9attle of -idway

' %owerful 6a%anese force, nine battleshi%s and four carriers under 'dmiral Famamoto Isoro1u, the commander in chief of the navy, steamed toward -idway in the first wee1 of 6une 'dmiral Chester W Nimit8, who had ta1en command of the ;acific )leet after ;earl 2arbor, could only muster three carriers and seven heavy cruisers, but he was reading the 6a%anese radio messages Famamoto, the architect of the ;earl 2arbor raid, had %lanned another sur%rise This time, however, it was he who was sur%rised Off -idway, on the morning of 6une *, U , dive(bombers destroyed three of the 6a%anese carriers in one +(minute stri1e The fourth went down later in the day, after its %lanes had battered the U , carrier Yorktown, which san1 two days later See -idway, 9attle of Famamoto ordered a general retreat on 6une + On 6une A(D a secondary 6a%anese force too1 7is1a and 'ttu in the 'leutians, but those were no recom%ense for the defeat at -idway, from which the 6a%anese navy would never recover Their battleshi%s were intact, but the Coral ,ea and -idway had shown carriers to be the true ca%ital shi%s of the war, and four of those were gone

The Third ;hase0 Turn of the Tide

In late December !"*! Roosevelt and Churchill and their chief advisers met in Washington They reaffirmed the strategy of defeating &ermany first, and because it a%%eared that the 9ritish would have all they could do fighting in $uro%e, the war against 6a%an became almost solely a U , res%onsibility They also created the Combined Chiefs of ,taff >CC,?, a to%(level 9ritish('merican military committee seated in Washington, to develo% and e/ecute a common strategy On 6anuary !, !"*<, the United ,tates, the United 7ingdom, the U,,R, and <# other countries signed the Declaration by United Nations in which they %ledged not to ma1e a se%arate %eace The United Nations became the official name for the anti('/is coalition, but the term used more often was the 'llies, ta1en over from World War I

C!

Develo%ment of 'llied ,trategy

's a %ractical matter, the U , could not ta1e much action in $uro%e in early !"*< It had no troo%s there, and it was in the midst of building forces and converting industry at home In North 'frica, the 9ritish a%%eared to be more than holding their own They had relieved Tobru1 on December !=, !"*!, and ta1en 9anghS8T in 3ibya two wee1s later Rommel counterattac1ed in late 6anuary !"*< and drove them bac1 #== 1m >!@+ mi? to al(&a8ala and 9ir 2acheim, but there, well forward of Tobru1 and the $gy%tian border, a lull set in

C!a

$uro%e

The big :uestion in the war was whether the U,,R could survive a second &erman summer offensive, and the Russians were urging the U , and 9ritain to relieve the %ressure on them by starting an offensive in the west &eneral &eorge C -arshall, the U , 'rmy chief of staff, believed the best way to hel% the Russians and bring an early end to the war was to stage a buildu% in $ngland and attac1 across the $nglish Channel into northwestern $uro%e 2e wanted to act in the s%ring of !"*#, or even in !"*< if the U,,R a%%eared about to colla%se The 9ritish did not want involvement elsewhere until North 'frica was settled and did not believe a force strong enough for a cross(channel attac1 could be assembled in $ngland by !"*# Rommel settled the issue In 6une he ca%tured Tobru1 and drove #@= 1m ><#+ mi? into $gy%t, to 'l U'lamayn >$l U'lamein? 'fter that, the 'mericans agreed to shelve the cross(channel attac1 and ready the troo%s en route to $ngland for an invasion of )rench North 'frica

C!b

The ;acific

-eanwhile, des%ite the &ermany(first strategy, the 'mericans were moving toward an active %ursuit of the war against 6a%an The U , Navy saw the ;acific as an arena in which it could %erform more effectively than in the 'tlantic or the -editerranean &eneral Douglas -ac'rthur, who had commanded in the ;hili%%ines and been evacuated to 'ustralia by submarine before the surrender, was the country.s best(1nown military figure and as such too valuable to be left with an inconse:uential mission The 9attle of -idway had sto%%ed the 6a%anese in the central ;acific, but they continued to advance in the southwest ;acific along the ,olomons chain and overland on New &uinea On 6uly <, !"*<, the U , 6oint Chiefs of ,taff >6C,? directed the naval and ground forces in the south and southwest ;acific to halt the 6a%anese, drive them out of the ,olomons and northeastern New &uinea, and eliminate the great base the 6a%anese had established at Rabaul, on New 9ritain in the 9ismarc1 'rchi%elago >now in ;a%ua New &uinea?

C<

The Russian )ront0 ,ummer !"*<

In the most immediately critical area of the war, the U,,R, the initiative had %assed to the &ermans again by summer !"*< The ,oviet successes in the winter had been followed by disasters in the s%ring ,etbac1s south of 3eningrad, near 7har1iv, and in Crimea had cost well more than a half(million men in %risoners alone The &ermans had not sustained such massive losses, but the fighting had been e/%ensive for them too, es%ecially since the ,oviets had three

times the human resources at their dis%osal -oreover, 2itler.s overconfidence had led him into a colossal error 2e had been so sure of victory in !"*! that he had sto%%ed most 1inds of wea%ons and ammunition %roduction for the army and shifted the industries to wor1 for the air force and navy, with which he %ro%osed to finish off the 9ritish 2e had resumed %roduction for the army in 6anuary !"*<, but the flow would not reach the front until late summer ,oviet wea%ons out%ut, on the other hand, after having dro%%ed low in November and December !"*!, had increased steadily since the turn of the year, and the ,oviet industrial base also was larger than the &erman 3oo1ing ahead to the summer, 2itler 1new he could not again mount an all(out, three(%ronged offensive ,ome of the generals tal1ed about waiting a year until the army could be rebuilt, but 2itler was determined to have the victory in !"*< 2e had sufficient troo%s and wea%ons to bring the southern flan1 of the eastern front nearly to full strength, and he believed he could com%el the ,oviet command to sacrifice its main forces trying to defend the coal mines of the Donets 9asin and the oil fields of the Caucasus

C<a

The &erman Drive Toward the Caucasus

The offensive began east of 7har1iv on 6une <@, and in less than four wee1s the armies had ta1en the Donets 9asin and advanced east to the Don River The distances covered were s%ectacular, but the numbers of enemy 1illed or ca%tured were relatively small ,talin and his generals had made the luc1iest mista1e of the war 9elieving the &ermans were going to aim a second, more %owerful, attac1 on -oscow, they had held their reserves bac1 and allowed the armies in the south to retreat 2itler, emboldened by the ease and s%eed of the advance, altered his %lan in the last wee1 of 6uly 2e had originally %ro%osed to drive due east to ,talingrad, sei8e a firm hold on the 5olga River there, and only then send a force south into the Caucasus On 6uly <# he ordered two armies to continue the advance toward ,talingrad and two to stri1e south across the lower Don and ta1e the oil fields at -ai1o%, &ro8nyy, and 9a1u The Russians a%%eared to be heading toward disaster, as the &erman thrust into the Caucasus covered #== 1m >!@+ mi? to -ai1o% by 'ugust " 2itler.s strategy, however, %resented a %roblem0 Two forces moving away from each other could not be sustained e:ually over the badly damaged railroads of the occu%ied territory In the second half of 'ugust, he diverted more su%%lies to the attac1 toward ,talingrad, and the march into the Caucasus slowed Nevertheless, success seemed to be in sight when the ,i/th 'rmy and )ourth ;an8er 'rmy >formerly grou%? closed near the ,talingrad suburbs on ,e%tember #

C<b

The Russian ,tand at ,talingrad

The U,,R reached its low %oint in the war at the end of 6uly !"*< The retreat was almost out of hand, and the &ermans were getting into %osition to stri1e north along the 5olga behind -oscow as

well as into the Caucasus On 6uly <@ ,talin issued his most famous order of the war, BNot a ste% bac1VC While threatening Draconian %unishments for slac1ers and defeatists, he relegated communism to the bac1ground and called on the troo%s to fight a B%atrioticC war for Russia 3i1e 2itler, he had thus far conducted the war as he saw fit In late 'ugust he called on his two best military %rofessionals, Qhu1ov, who had organi8ed the -oscow counteroffensive in December !"*!, and the army chief of the &eneral ,taff, &eneral 'le1sandr - 5asilyevs1y, to deal with the situation at ,talingrad They %ro%osed to wear the enemy down by loc1ing its troo%s in a bloody fight for the city while they assembled the means for a counterattac1

C#

&uadalcanal

The '/is was riding a high tide in midsummer !"*< ,talingrad and the Caucasus oil were seemingly within 2itler.s gras%, and Rommel was within stri1ing distance of the ,ue8 Canal The 6a%anese had occu%ied &uadalcanal at the southern end of the ,olomons chain and were marching on ;ort -oresby Within the ne/t si/ months, however, the '/is had been sto%%ed and turned bac1 in the ,oviet Union, North 'frica, and the southwest ;acific U , -arines landed on &uadalcanal on 'ugust D, !"*< 'gainst a small 6a%anese garrison, the landing was easy 'fterward nothing was easy The 6a%anese res%onded swiftly and violently by sea and by air The outcome hinged on the 6a%anese navy.s ability to bring in reinforcements, which was substantial, and the U , Navy.s ability to 1ee% the marines su%%lied, which was at times in some doubt While the marines battled a determined foe in a debilitating tro%ical climate, between 'ugust <* and November #= the navy fought si/ ma4or engagements in the waters surrounding the island The losses in shi%s and aircraft were heavy on both sides, but the 6a%anese were more seriously hurt because they could not afford to acce%t a war of attrition with the 'mericans Their warshi%s did not come out again after the end of November, and the 'mericans declared the island secure on )ebruary ", !"*#

C*

The 'nglo('merican Offensive in North 'frica

The turnabout in North 'frica began on 'ugust #!, !"*<, when Rommel attac1ed through the southern flan1 of the 9ritish line west of 'l U'lamayn, was sto%%ed at the U'lam al alfS. Ridge, and was thrown bac1 by ,e%tember D The newly a%%ointed 9ritish commander, &eneral 9ernard 3aw -ontgomery, hit the north flan1 on October <# with a methodically %re%ared offensive and, by November +, forced Rommel into a retreat 'merican and 9ritish Troo%s fighting together under &eneral Dwight D $isenhower began landing in -orocco and 'lgeria on November @, the 'mericans at Casablanca and Oran, the 9ritish at 'lgiers The &ermans sent reinforcements into Tunis and occu%ied all of )rance They managed to get the )ifth ;an8er 'rmy under &eneral 6Wrgen von 'rnim on the scene in time to sto% $isenhower in western Tunisia by mid(December Rommel went into the -areth 3ine in southeastern Tunisia in early )ebruary !"*# and launched an attac1 against the 'mericans on )ebruary !* that drove them bac1 @= 1m >+= mi? and out of the vital 7asserine ;ass It was his last success and one he could not e/%loit 2itler recalled him in

-arch, as the 'mericans and 9ritish closed in from the west and south 'fter being cut off from their bases at 9i8erte and Tunis and driven bac1 into %oc1ets on the Ca%e 9on ;eninsula, <D+,=== &ermans and Italians surrendered by -ay !#

C+

The ,oviet 5ictory at ,talingrad

On the eastern front the &ermans. advances to ,talingrad and into the Caucasus had added about !!== 1m >about A@= mi? to their line No &erman troo%s were available to hold that e/tra distance, so 2itler had to use troo%s contributed by his allies Conse:uently, while ,i/th and )ourth ;an8er armies were tied down at ,talingrad in ,e%tember and October !"*<, they were flan1ed on the left and right by Romanian armies 'n Italian and a 2ungarian army were de%loyed farther u%stream on the Don River Trial maneuvers had e/%osed serious wea1nesses in some of the '/is.s armies On the morning of November !", in snow and fog, ,oviet armored s%earheads hit the Romanians west and south of ,talingrad Their %oints met three days later at 7alach on the Don River, encircling the ,i/th 'rmy, about half of the )ourth ;an8er 'rmy, and a number of Romanian units 2itler ordered the ,i/th 'rmy commander, &eneral )riedrich ;aulus, to hold the %oc1et, %romised him air su%%ly, and sent -anstein, by then a field marshal, to organi8e a relief The airlift failed to %rovide the #== tons of su%%lies that ;aulus needed each day, and -anstein.s relief o%eration was halted ++ 1m >#* mi? short of the %oc1et in late December The ,i/th 'rmy was doomed if it did not attem%t a brea1out, which 2itler refused to %ermit The Russians %ushed in on the %oc1et from three sides in 6anuary !"*#, and ;aulus surrendered on 6anuary #! The battle cost &ermany about <==,=== troo%s In the aftermath of ,talingrad, in %art owing to the colla%se of the Italian and 2ungarian armies, the &ermans were forced to retreat from the Caucasus and bac1 a%%ro/imately to the line from which they had started the !"*< summer offensive

CA

The Casablanca Conference

)rom 6anuary !* to <*, !"*#, Roosevelt and Churchill and their staffs met in Casablanca to lay out a strategy for the %eriod after the North 'frican cam%aign The 'merican military chiefs wanted to %roceed to the direct, cross(channel assault on &ermany The 9ritish, elo:uently s%o1en for by Churchill, argued the advantages of gathering in the Bgreat %ri8esC to be had in the -editerranean, in ,icily and Italy for a start Roosevelt su%%orted the 9ritish, and the 'merican military succeeded only >several months later? in getting an agreement that no more troo%s would be %ut into the -editerranean area than were already there, all others being assembled in $ngland for a cross( channel attac1 in !"** Roosevelt gave his military another shoc1 when he announced that nothing short of unconditional surrender would be acce%ted from any of the '/is %owers The %olicy was meant to reassure the Russians, who would have to wait at least another year for a full(fledged second front, but was li1ely also to stiffen '/is resistance

CD

'ir Raids on &ermany

's a %relude to the %ost%oned cross(channel attac1, the 9ritish and 'mericans decided at Casablanca to o%en a strategic air >bombing? offensive against &ermany In this instance they agreed on timing but not on method The 9ritish, as a result of discouraging e/%erience with daylight bombing early in the war, had built their heavy bombers, the 3ancasters and 2alifa/es, for night bombing, which meant area bombing The 'mericans believed their 9(!D )lying )ortresses and 9(<* 3iberators were armed and armored heavily enough and were fitted with sufficiently accurate bombsights to fly by daylight and stri1e %in%oint targets The difference was resolved by letting each nation conduct its own offensive in its own way and calling the result round(the(cloc1 bombing The 9ritish method was e/em%lified by four firebomb raids on 2amburg in late 6uly !"*#, in which much of the city was burned out and +=,=== %eo%le died 'merican losses of %lanes and crews increased shar%ly as the bombers %enetrated dee%er into &ermany 'fter early October !"*#, when stri1es at ball(bearing %lants in ,chweinfurt incurred nearly <+ %ercent losses, the daylight offensive had to be curtailed until long(range fighters became available

C@

The 9attle of 7urs1

9efore the winter fighting on the eastern front ended in -arch !"*#, 2itler 1new he could not manage another summer offensive, and he tal1ed about setting u% an east wall com%arable to the fortified 'tlantic wall he was building along the western $uro%ean coast The long winter.s retreat, however, had shortened the front enough to give him a sur%lus of almost two armies It also left a large westward bulge in the front around the city of 7urs1 To 2itler, the o%%ortunity for one more grand encirclement was too good to let %ass 'fter waiting three months for more new tan1s to come off the assembly lines, 2itler o%ened the battle at 7urs1 on 6uly + with attac1s north and south across the o%en eastern end of the bulge Qhu1ov and 5asilyevs1y had also had their eyes on 7urs1, and they had heavily reinforced the front around it In the war.s greatest tan1 battle, the Russians fought the &ermans nearly to a standstill by 6uly !< 2itler then called off the o%eration because the 'mericans and 9ritish had landed on ,icily, and he needed to transfer divisions to Italy With that, the strategic initiative in the east %assed to the ,oviet forces %ermanently

C"

The Invasion of Italy

Three 'merican, one Canadian, and three 9ritish divisions landed on ,icily on 6uly != They %ushed across the island from beachheads on the south coast in five wee1s, against four Italian and two &erman divisions, and overcame the last '/is resistance on 'ugust !D In the meantime, -ussolini had been stri%%ed of %ower on 6uly <+, and the Italian government had entered into negotiations that resulted in an armistice signed in secret on ,e%tember # and made %ublic on ,e%tember @

On ,e%tember # elements of -ontgomery.s 9ritish $ighth 'rmy crossed the ,trait of -essina from ,icily to the toe of the Italian boot The U , )ifth 'rmy, under &eneral -ar1 W Clar1, staged a landing near ,alerno on ,e%tember "E and by October !<, the 9ritish and 'mericans had a fairly solid line across the %eninsula from the 5olturno River, north of Na%les, to Termoli on the 'driatic coast The Italian surrender brought little military benefit to the 'llies, and by the end of the year, the &ermans sto%%ed them on the &ustav line about !== 1m >about A= mi? south of Rome ' landing at 'n8io on 6anuary <<, !"**, failed to sha1e the &ustav line, which was solidly anchored on the 3iri River and -onte Cassino

C!=

'llied ,trategy 'gainst 6a%an

,trategy in the war with 6a%an evolved by stages during !"*# In the first, the goal was to secure bases on the coast of China >from which 6a%an could be bombed and later invaded? by 9ritish and Chinese drives through 9urma and eastern China and by 'merican thrusts through the islands of the central and southwestern ;acific to Taiwan and China 9y midyear, it was a%%arent that neither the 9ritish nor the Chinese drive was li1ely to materiali8e Thereafter, only the two 'merican thrusts remained Their ob4ectives were still )ormosa and the Chinese coast

C!!

U , 'dvances in the ;acific

In the ;acific, U , troo%s retoo1 'ttu, in the 'leutians, in a hard(fought, #(wee1 battle beginning on -ay <# >The 6a%anese evacuated 7is1a before 'mericans and Canadians landed there in 'ugust ? The main action was in the southwest ;acific There U , and New Qealand troo%s, under 'dmiral William 2alsey, advanced through the ,olomons, ta1ing New &eorgia in 'ugust and a large beachhead on 9ougainville in November 'ustralians and 'mericans under -ac'rthur drove the 6a%anese bac1 along the $ast Coast of New &uinea and too1 3ae and ,alamaua in ,e%tember -ac'rthur.s and 2alsey.s mission, as set by the 6C, in !"*<, had been to ta1e Rabaul, but they discovered in the ,olomons that having command of the air and sea around them was enough to neutrali8e the 6a%anese Island garrisons and render them useless 3andings on Ca%e &loucester, New 9ritain, in December, in the 'dmiralty Islands in )ebruary !"**, and 't $mirau Island in -arch !"** effectively sealed off Rabaul Its !==,===(man garrison could not thereafter be either ade:uately su%%lied or evacuated The central ;acific thrust was slower in getting started The southwest ;acific islands were relatively close togetherE airfields on one could furnish su%%ort for the move to the ne/tE and the 6a%anese navy was wary of ris1ing its shi%s within range of land(based aircraft In the central ;acific, however, the islands were scattered over vast stretches of ocean, and %owerful naval forces were needed to su%%ort the landings, %articularly aircraft carriers, which were not available in sufficient numbers until late !"*# The first central ;acific landings were in the &ilbert Islands, at -a1in and Tarawa in November !"*# 9etio Island in the Tarawa 'toll, !!D @ hectares ><"! acres? of coral sand and concrete and

coconut log bun1ers, cost the <nd -arine Division #=== casualties in three days -ore intensive %reliminary bombardments and larger numbers of am%hibian tractors ca%able of crossing the surrounding reefs made the ta1ing of 7wa4alein and $neweta1 in the -arshall Islands in )ebruary !"** somewhat less e/%ensive

The )ourth ;hase0 'llied 5ictory

'fter the 9attle of 7urs1, the last lingering doubt about the ,oviet forces was whether they could conduct a successful summer offensive It was dis%elled in the first wee1 of 'ugust !"*#, when slashing attac1s hit the &erman line north and west of 7har1iv On 'ugust !< 2itler ordered wor1 started on an east wall to be built along the Narva River and 3a1es ;s1ov and ;ei%us, behind 'rmy &rou% North, and the Desna and Dnie%er rivers, behind 'rmy &rou%s Center and ,outh In the second half of the month, the ,oviet offensive e/%anded south along the Donets River and north into the 'rmy &rou% Center sector On ,e%tember !+ 2itler %ermitted 'rmy &rou% ,outh to retreat to the Dnie%er RiverE otherwise it was li1ely to be destroyed 2e also ordered everything in the area east of the Dnie%er that could be of any use to the enemy to be hauled away, burned, or blown u% This scorched(earth %olicy, as it was called, could only be %artially carried out before the army grou% crossed the river at the end of the month 2enceforth, that %olicy would be a%%lied in all territory surrendered to the Russians 9ehind the river, the &erman troo%s found no trace of an east wall, and they had to contend from the first with five ,oviet bridgeheads The high west ban1 of the river was the best defensive line left in the ,oviet Union, and the ,oviet armies, under Qhu1ov and 5asilyevs1y, fought furiously to %revent the &ermans from gaining a foothold there They e/%anded the bridgeheads, isolated a &erman army in Crimea in October, too1 7yiv on November A, and stayed on the offensive into the winter with hardly a %ause

D!

The TehrSn Conference

't the end of November, Roosevelt and Churchill 4ourneyed to TehrSn for their first meeting with ,talin The %resident and the %rime minister had already a%%roved, under the code name Overlord, a %lan for a cross(channel attac1 Roosevelt wholeheartedly favored e/ecuting Overlord as early in !"** as the weather %ermitted 't TehrSn, Churchill argued for giving %riority to Italy and %ossible new offensives in the 9al1ans or southern )rance, but he was outvoted by Roosevelt and ,talin Overlord was set for -ay !"** 'fter the meeting, the CC, recalled $isenhower from the -editerranean and gave him command of the ,u%reme 2ead:uarters 'llied $/%editionary )orces >,2'$)?, which was to organi8e and carry out Overlord The TehrSn conference mar1ed the high %oint of the $ast(West wartime alliance ,talin came to the meeting as a victorious war leaderE large :uantities of U , lend(lease aid were flowing into the ,oviet Union through -urmans1 and the ;ersian &ulfE and the decision on Overlord satisfied the

long(standing ,oviet demand for a second front 't the same time, strains were develo%ing as the ,oviet armies a%%roached the borders of the smaller eastern $uro%ean states In -ay !"*# the &ermans had %roduced evidence lin1ing the U,,R to the deaths of some !!,=== ;olish officers found buried in mass graves in the 7atyn )orest near ,molens1 ,talin had severed relations with the ;olish e/ile government in 3ondon, and he insisted at TehrSn, as he had before, that the %ostwar ,oviet(;olish boundary would have to be the one established after the ;olish defeat in !"#" 2e also reacted with barely concealed hostility to Churchill.s %ro%osal of a 9ritish('merican thrust into the 9al1ans

D<

&erman ;re%arations for Overlord

2itler e/%ected an invasion of northwestern $uro%e in the s%ring of !"**, and he welcomed it as a chance to win the war If he could throw the 'mericans and 9ritish off the beaches, he reasoned, they would not soon try again 2e could then throw all of his forces, nearly half of which were in the west, against the U,,R In November !"*# he told the commanders on the eastern front that they would get no more reinforcements until after the invasion had been defeated In 6anuary !"** a ,oviet offensive raised the siege of 3eningrad and drove 'rmy &rou% North bac1 to the Narva River(3a1e ;ei%us line There the &ermans found a tenuous refuge in the one segment of the east wall that had been to some e/tent fortified On the south flan1, successive offensives, the last in -arch and '%ril, %ushed the &ermans in the broad stretch between the ;olesXye -arshes >;ri%et -arshes? and the 9lac1 ,ea off of all but a few shreds of ,oviet territory The greater %art of !+=,=== &ermans and Romanians in Crimea died or %assed into ,oviet ca%tivity in -ay after a belated sealift failed to get them out of ,evasto%ol. On the other hand, enough tan1s and wea%ons had been turned out to e:ui% new divisions for the west and re%lace some of those lost in the eastE the air force had *= %ercent more %lanes than at the same time a year earlierE and synthetic oil %roduction reached its wartime %ea1 in '%ril !"**

D#

The Normandy Invasion

On 6une A, !"**, D(Day, the day of invasion for Overlord, the U , )irst 'rmy, under &eneral Omar N 9radley, and the 9ritish ,econd 'rmy, under &eneral -iles C Dem%sey, established beachheads in Normandy >Normandie?, on the )rench channel coast The &erman resistance was strong, and the footholds for 'llied armies were not nearly as good as they had e/%ected Nevertheless, the %owerful counterattac1 with which 2itler had %ro%osed to throw the 'llies off the beaches did not materiali8e, neither on D(Day nor later $normous 'llied air su%eriority over northern )rance made it difficult for Rommel, who was in command on the scene, to move his limited reserves -oreover, 2itler became convinced that the Normandy landings were a feint and the main assault would come north of the ,eine River Conse:uently, he refused to release the divisions he had there and insisted on drawing in reinforcements from more distant areas 9y the end of 6une, $isenhower had @+=,=== men and !+=,=== vehicles ashore in Normandy

D*

The ,oviet Recon:uest of 9elorussia

The &erman eastern front was :uiet during the first three wee1s of 6une !"** 2itler fully e/%ected a ,oviet summer offensive, which he and his military advisers believed would come on the south flan1 ,ince ,talingrad the ,oviets had concentrated their main effort there, and the &ermans thought ,talin would be eager to %ush into the 9al1ans, the historic ob4ect of Russian ambition 'lthough 'rmy &rou% Center was holding 9elorussiaHthe only large %iece of ,oviet territory still in &erman handsHand although signs of a ,oviet buildu% against the army grou% multi%lied in 6une, they did not believe it was in real danger On 6une <<(<#, four ,oviet army grou%s, two controlled by Qhu1ov and two by 5asilyevs1y, hit 'rmy &rou% Center Outnumbered by about ten to one at the %oints of attac1, and under orders from 2itler not to retreat, the army grou% began to disintegrate almost at once 9y 6uly #, when ,oviet s%earheads coming from the northeast and southeast met at -ins1, the 9elorussian ca%ital, 'rmy &rou% Center had lost two(thirds of its divisions 9y the third wee1 of the month, Qhu1ov.s and 5asilyevs1y.s fronts had advanced about #== 1m >about <== mi? The ,oviet command celebrated on 6uly !D with a day(long march by +D,=== &erman %risoners, including !" generals, through the streets of -oscow

D+

The ;lot 'gainst 2itler

' grou% of &erman officers and civilians concluded in 6uly that getting rid of 2itler offered the last remaining chance to end the war before it swe%t onto &erman soil from two directions On 6uly <= they tried to 1ill him by %lacing a bomb in his head:uarters in $ast ;russia The bomb e/%loded, wounding a number of officersHseveral fatallyHbut inflicting only minor in4uries on 2itler 'fterward, the &esta%o hunted down everyone sus%ected of com%licity in the %lot One of the sus%ects was Rommel, who committed suicide 2itler emerged from the assassination attem%t more secure in his %ower than ever before

DA

The 3iberation of )rance

's of 6uly <* the 'mericans and 9ritish were still confined in the Normandy beachhead, which they had e/%anded somewhat to ta1e in ,aint(3Y and Caen 9radley began the brea1out the ne/t day with an attac1 south from ,aint(3Y Thereafter, the front e/%anded ra%idly, and $isenhower regrou%ed his forces -ontgomery too1 over the 9ritish ,econd 'rmy and the Canadian )irst 'rmy 9radley assumed command of a newly activated Twelfth 'rmy &rou% consisting of U , )irst and Third armies under &eneral Courtney 2 2odges and &eneral &eorge , ;atton 'fter the 'mericans had turned east from 'vranches in the first wee1 of 'ugust, a %oc1et develo%ed around the &erman )ifth ;an8er and ,eventh armies west of )alaise The &ermans held out until 'ugust <= but then retreated across the ,eine On 'ugust <+ the 'mericans, in con4unction with &eneral Charles de &aulle.s )ree )rench and Resistance forces, liberated ;aris

-eanwhile, on 'ugust !+, 'merican and )rench forces had landed on the southern coast of )rance east of -arseille and were %ushing north along the valley of the RhYne River They made contact with 9radley.s forces near Di4on in the second wee1 of ,e%tember

DD

;ause in the Western Offensive

9radley and -ontgomery sent their army grou%s north and east across the ,eine on 'ugust <+, the 9ritish going along the coast toward 9elgium, the 'mericans toward the )ranco(&erman border -ontgomery.s troo%s sei8ed 'ntwer% on ,e%tember #, and the first 'merican %atrols crossed the &erman border on ,e%tember !! 9ut the %ursuit was ending The &erman armies shattered in the brea1out were being rebuilt, and 2itler sent as commander )ield -arshal Walter -odel, who had earned a re%utation as the so(called lion of the defense on the eastern front -ontgomery had reached formidable water barriersHthe -euse and lower Rhine riversHand the 'mericans were coming u% against the west wall, which had been built in the !"#=s as the &erman counter%art to the -aginot line 'lthough most of its big guns had been removed, the west wall.s concrete bun1ers and antitan1 barriers would ma1e it tough to crac1 The 'llies. most serious %roblem was that they had outrun their su%%lies &asoline and ammunition in %articular were scarce and were being brought from )rench %orts on the channel coast over as much as @== 1m >+== mi? of war( damaged roads and railroads Until the %ort of 'ntwer% could be cleared and %ut into o%eration, ma4or advances li1e those in 'ugust and early ,e%tember were out of the :uestion

D@

The Warsaw U%rising

The ,oviet offensive had s%read to the flan1s of 'rmy &rou% Center in 6uly On 6uly <" a s%earhead reached the 9altic coast near RTga and severed 'rmy &rou% North.s land contact with the &erman main front ;owerful thrusts %ast 'rmy &rou% Center.s south flan1 reached the line of the WisGa >5istula? River u%stream from Warsaw by the end of the month In Warsaw on 6uly #! the ;olish underground 2ome 'rmy commanded by &eneral Tadeus8 7omorows1i >1nown as &eneral 9or? staged an u%rising The insurgents, who were loyal to the anti(Communist e/ile government in 3ondon, disru%ted the &ermans for several days The ,oviet forces held fast on the east side of the WisGa, however, and ,talin refused to let U , %lanes use ,oviet airfields for ma1ing su%%ly flights for the insurgents 2e did, finally, allow one flight by !!= 9(!Ds, which was made on ,e%tember !@ 9y then it was too lateE the &ermans had the u%%er handE and 7omorows1i surrendered on October < ,talin insisted that his forces could not have crossed into Warsaw because they were too wea1, which was %robably not true On the other hand, the line of the WisGa was as far as the ,oviet armies could go on a broad front without %ausing to re%lenish their su%%lies

D"

The Defeat of &ermany.s 'llies in the $ast

While the ,oviet Union was letting the Warsaw u%rising run its tragic course, it was gathering in a %lentiful harvest of successes elsewhere 'n offensive between the Car%athian -ountains and the

9lac1 ,ea, o%ened on 'ugust <=, resulted in Romania.s as1ing for an armistice three days later 9ulgaria, which had never declared war on the ,oviet Union, surrendered on ,e%tember ", )inland on ,e%tember !" ,oviet troo%s too1 9elgrade on October <= and installed a Communist government under Tito in Fugoslavia In 2ungary, the Russians were at the gates of 9uda%est by late November

D!=

'llied 'dvances in Italy

The Italian cam%aign %assed into the shadow of Overlord in the summer of !"** Clar1.s )ifth 'rmy, com%rising )rench and ;oles as well as 'mericans, too1 -onte Cassino on -ay !@ ' brea1out from the 'n8io beachhead five days later forced the &ermans to abandon the whole &ustav line, and the )ifth 'rmy entered Rome, an o%en city since 6une * The advance went well for some distance north of Rome, but it was bound to lose momentum because U , and )rench divisions would soon be withdrawn for the invasion of southern )rance 'fter ta1ing 'ncona on the east and )lorence on the west coast in the second wee1 of 'ugust, the 'llies were at the &erman &othic line 'n offensive late in the month demolished the &othic line but failed in three months to carry through to the ;o River valley and was sto%%ed for the winter in the mountains

D!!

The 9attle of the ;hili%%ine ,ea

O%erations against 6a%an in the ;acific %ic1ed u% s%eed in !"** In the s%ring, the 6C, %ro4ected advances by -ac'rthur through northwestern New &uinea and into the ;hili%%ines and by Nimit8 across the central ;acific to the -arianas and Caroline Islands The 6a%anese, on their %art, were getting ready for a decisive naval battle east of the ;hili%%ines 'fter ma1ing lea%s along the New &uinea coast to 'ita%e, 2ollandia, and Wa1de Island in '%ril and -ay, -ac'rthur.s troo%s landed on 9ia1 Island on -ay <D 'irfields on 9ia1 would enable U , %lanes to harass the 6a%anese fleet in the ;hili%%ines ' stri1ing force built around the world.s two largest battleshi%s, Yamato and Musashi, was steaming toward 9ia1 on 6une !# when the U , Navy began bombing and shelling ,ai%an in the -arianas The 6a%anese shi%s were then ordered to turn north and 4oin the )irst -obile )leet of 'dmiral O8awa 6isaburo, which was heading out of the ;hili%%ines toward the -arianas On 6une !" and <=, O8awa met U , Tas1 )orce +@, under 'dmiral -arc ' -itscher, in the 9attle of the ;hili%%ine ,ea The outcome was decided in the air and under the sea O8awa had five heavy and four light carriersE -itscher had nine heavy and si/ light carriers On the first day, in what was called the -arianas Tur1ey ,hoot, U , fighters downed <!" of #<A 6a%anese %lanes sent against them While the air battle was going on, U , submarines san1 O8awa.s two largest carriers, one of them his flagshi%E and on the second day, dive(bombers san1 a third big carrier 'fter that, O8awa steered north toward O1inawa with 4ust #+ %lanes left It was the end for 6a%anese carrier aviation -itscher lost <A %lanes, and # of his shi%s suffered minor damage

D!<

,trategic ,hift in the ;acific

U , forces landed on ,ai%an on 6une !+ The 'mericans had %ossession of ,ai%an, Tinian, and &uam by 'ugust !=, giving them the 1ey to a strategy for ending the war The islands could accommodate bases for the new 'merican long(range bombers, the 9(<" ,u%erfortresses, which could reach To1yo and the other main 6a%anese cities at least as well from the islands as they would have been able to from bases in China -oreover, U , naval su%eriority in the ;acific was ra%idly becoming sufficient to sustain an invasion of 6a%an itself across the o%en ocean That invasion, however, would have to wait for the defeat of &ermany and the subse:uent release of ground troo%s from $uro%e for use in the ;acific The regular bombing of 6a%an began in November !"** 'lthough the shift in strategy raised some doubts about the need for the o%erations in the Carolines and ;hili%%ines, they went ahead as %lanned, with landings in the western Carolines at ;eleliu >,e%tember !+?, Ulithi >,e%tember <#?, and Ngulu >October !A? and in the central ;hili%%ines on 3eyte >October <=? The invasion of the ;hili%%ines brought the 6a%anese navy out in force for the last time in the war In the #(day 9attle for 3eyte &ulf >October <#(<+?, the outcome of which was at times more in doubt than the final result would seem to indicate, the 6a%anese lost <A shi%s, including the giant battleshi% Musashi, and the 'mericans lost D shi%s

D!#

The 'ir War in $uro%e

The main action against &ermany during the fall of !"** was in the air $scorted by long(range fighters, %articularly ;(+! -ustangs, U , bombers hit industrial targets by day, while the &erman cities crumbled under 9ritish bombing by night 2itler had res%onded by bombarding $ngland, beginning in 6une, with 5(! flying bombs and in ,e%tember with 5(< roc1etsE but the best launching sites, those in northwestern )rance and in 9elgium, were lost in October The effects of the 'llied strategic bombing were less clear(cut than had been e/%ected The bombing did not destroy civilian morale, and &erman fighter %lane and armored vehicle %roduction reached their wartime %ea1s in the second half of !"** On the other hand, iron and steel out%ut dro%%ed by half between ,e%tember and December, and continued bombing of the synthetic oil %lants, cou%led with loss of the ;loieKti oil fields in Romania, severely limited the fuel that would be available for the tan1s and %lanes coming off the assembly lines The shortening of the fronts on the east and the west and the late year lull in the ground fighting gave 2itler one more chance to create a reserve of about <+ divisions 2e resolved to use them offensively against the 9ritish and 'mericans by cutting across 9elgium to 'ntwer% in an action similar to the swee% through the 'rdennes that had brought the 9ritish and )rench to disaster at Dun1er:ue in -ay !"*=

D!*

The 9attle of the 9ulge

The &erman 'rdennes offensive, soon to be 1nown to the 'llies as the 9attle of the 9ulge >see 9ulge, 9attle of the?, began on December !A The 'mericans were ta1en com%letely by sur%rise They %ut u% a strong resistance, however, and were able to hold the critical road centers of ,aint( 5ith and 9astogne The &erman effort was doomed after December <#, when good flying weather allowed the overwhelming 'llied air su%eriority to ma1e itself felt Nevertheless, it was not until the end of 6anuary that the last of the @=(1m >+=(mi? dee% BbulgeC in the 'llied lines was eliminated The 'llied advance into &ermany was not resumed until )ebruary

D!+

The Falta Conference

9y then the ,oviet armies were on the Odra >Oder? River, A= 1m >#+ mi? east of 9erlin They had smashed the &erman line on the WisGa River and reached the 9altic coast east of Dan8ig >&daZs1? in 6anuary !"*+ and had a tight hold on the Odra by )ebruary # ,talin would meet Roosevelt and Churchill at Falta >see Falta Conference? in Crimea >)ebruary *(!!? with all of ;oland in his %oc1et and with 9erlin and, for all anybody then 1new, most of &ermany as well within his gras% 't Falta, ,talin agreed to enter the war against 6a%an within three months after the &erman surrender in return for territorial concessions in the )ar $ast The 'mericans and 9ritish, as was their custom, disagreed on how to %roceed against &ermany In a meeting at -alta shortly before the Falta conference, -ontgomery and the 9ritish members of the CC, argued for a fast single thrust by -ontgomery.s army grou% across the north &erman %lain to 9erlin To sustain such a thrust, they wanted the bul1 of 'llied su%%lies to go to -ontgomery, which meant the 'merican armies would have to stay on the defensive $isenhower.s %lan, which %revailed, was to give -ontgomery first %riority but also 1ee% the 'merican armies on the move

D!A

Crossing the Rhine

The first stage for all of the 'llied armies was to reach the Rhine River To accom%lish that, they had to brea1 through the west wall in the south and cross the Ruhr >Dutch Roer? River on the north The &ermans had flooded the Ruhr 5alley by o%ening dams 'fter waiting nearly two wee1s for the water to subside, the U , Ninth and )irst armies crossed the Ruhr on )ebruary <# In early -arch, the armies closed u% to the Rhine The bridges were down everywhereH everywhere, that is, e/ce%t at the small city of Remagen, where units of the U , )irst 'rmy ca%tured the 3udendorff railroad bridge on -arch D 9y -arch <*, when -ontgomery sent elements of the 9ritish ,econd 'rmy and the U , Ninth 'rmy across the river, the U , )irst 'rmy was occu%ying a s%rawling bridgehead between 9onn and 7oblen8 On -arch << the U , Third 'rmy had sei8ed a bridgehead south of -ain8 Thus, the whole barrier of the river was bro1en, and $isenhower ordered the armies to stri1e east on a broad front

D!D

'llied Ob4ectives in &ermany

'dvancing at times over @= 1m >over += mi? a day, the U , )irst and Ninth armies closed an encirclement around the industrial heart of &ermany, the Ruhr, on '%ril ! They tra%%ed #<+,=== &erman troo%s in the %oc1et The 9ritish ,econd 'rmy crossed the Weser River, halfway between the Rhine and the $lbe rivers, on '%ril + On '%ril !! the Ninth 'rmy reached the $lbe near -agdeburg and the ne/t day too1 a bridgehead on the east side, thereby %utting itself within stri1ing distance >!<= 1m[D+ mi? of 9erlin The Ninth 'rmy.s arrival on the $lbe raised a :uestion of a Brace for 9erlin C The 9ritish, es%ecially Churchill and -ontgomery, and some 'mericans contended that 9erlin was the most im%ortant ob4ective in &ermany because the world, and the &erman %eo%le es%ecially, would regard the forces that too1 9erlin as the real victors in the war $isenhower, su%%orted by the 6C,, insisted that, militarily, 9erlin was not worth the %ossible cost of ta1ing it, and a 4unction with the Russians could be made 4ust as well farther south in the vicinity of 3ei%8ig and Dresden -oreover, he believed Na8i diehards were going to ta1e refuge in a redoubt in the 9avarian mountains, and he wanted, therefore, to direct the main weight of his 'merican forces into south &ermany The ,oviet front, meanwhile, had remained stationary on the Odra River since )ebruary, which raised another :uestion The %ostwar ,oviet e/%lanation was that their flan1s on the north and south were threatened and had to be cleared The se:uence of events after )ebruary !"*+ indicates that ,talin did not believe the 9ritish and 'mericans could cross &ermany as fast as they did and, conse:uently, assumed he would have am%le time to com%lete his con:uest of eastern $uro%e before heading into central &ermany 'lthough he told $isenhower differently, he obviously did not regard 9erlin as unim%ortant In the first wee1 of '%ril, his armies went into a whirlwind rede%loyment for a 9erlin offensive

D!@

The )inal 9attles in $uro%e

2itler.s last, faint ho%e, strengthened briefly by Roosevelt.s death on '%ril !<, was for a falling out between the Western %owers and the ,oviet Union The $ast(West alliance was, in fact, strained, but the brea1 would not come in time to benefit Na8i &ermany On '%ril !* and !A the U , )ifth and 9ritish $ighth armies launched attac1s that brought them to the ;o River in a wee1 The ,oviet advance toward 9erlin began on '%ril !A The U , ,eventh 'rmy ca%tured NWrnberg, the site of Na8i ;arty rallies in the !"#=s, on '%ril <= )our days later ,oviet armies closed a ring around 9erlin The ne/t day the ,oviet )ifth &uards 'rmy and the U , )irst 'rmy made contact at Torgau on the $lbe River northeast of 3ei%8ig, and &ermany was s%lit into two %arts In the last wee1 of the month, organi8ed resistance against the 'mericans and 9ritish %ractically ceased, but the &erman troo%s facing east battled des%erately to avoid falling into ,oviet ca%tivity

D!"

The &erman ,urrender

2itler decided to await the end in 9erlin, where he could still mani%ulate what was left of the command a%%aratus -ost of his %olitical and military associates chose to leave the ca%ital for

%laces in north and south &ermany li1ely to be out of the ,oviet reach On the afternoon of '%ril #= 2itler committed suicide in his 9erlin bun1er 's his last significant official act, he named &rand 'dmiral 7arl Doenit8 to succeed him as chief of state Doenit8, who had been loyal to 2itler, had no course o%en to him other than surrender 2is re%resentative, &eneral 'lfred 6odl, signed an unconditional surrender of all &erman armed forces at $isenhower.s head:uarters in Reims early on -ay D 9y then the &erman forces in Italy had already surrendered >on -ay <?, as had those in 2olland, north &ermany, and Denmar1 >-ay *? The U , and 9ritish governments declared -ay @ 5($ >5ictory in $uro%e? Day The full unconditional surrender too1 effect at one minute %ast midnight after a second signing in 9erlin with ,oviet %artici%ation

D<=

The Defeat of 6a%an

'lthough 6a%an.s %osition was ho%eless by early !"*+, an early end to the war was not in sight The 6a%anese navy would not be able to come out in force again, but the bul1 of the army was intact and was de%loyed in the home islands and China The 6a%anese gave a foretaste of what was yet in store by resorting to 1ami1a8e >6a%anese, Bdivine windC? attac1s, or suicide air attac1s, during the fighting for 3u8on in the ;hili%%ines On 6anuary *(!#, !"*+, :uic1ly trained 1ami1a8e %ilots flying obsolete %lanes had sun1 !D U , shi%s and damaged += See 7ami1a8e

D<=a

Iwo 6ima and O1inawa

While the final assault on 6a%an awaited reinforcements from $uro%e, the island(ho%%ing a%%roach march continued, first, with a landing on Iwo 6ima on )ebruary !" That small, barren island cost the lives of about A@== U , %ersonnel >including about A=== -arines? before it was secured on -arch !A ,ituated almost halfway between the -arianas and To1yo, the island %layed an im%ortant %art in the air war Its two airfields %rovided landing sites for damaged 9(<"s and enabled fighters to give the bombers cover during their raids on 6a%anese cities On '%ril ! the U , Tenth 'rmy, com%osed of four army and four marine divisions under &eneral ,imon 9 9uc1ner, 6r , landed on O1inawa, +== 1m >#!= mi? south of the southernmost 6a%anese island, 7y\sh\ The 6a%anese did not defend the beaches They %ro%osed to ma1e their stand on the southern ti% of the island, across which they had constructed three strong lines The northern three(fifths of the island were secured in less than two wee1s, the third line in the south could not be breached until 6une !*, and the fighting continued to 6une <!

D<=b

2iroshima and Nagasa1i

The ne/t attac1 was scheduled for 7y\sh\ in November !"*+ 'n easy success seemed unli1ely The 6a%anese had fought %ractically to the last man on Iwo 6ima, and hundreds of soldiers and

civilians had 4um%ed off cliffs at the southern end of O1inawa rather than surrender 7ami1a8e %lanes had sun1 !+ naval vessels and damaged <== off O1inawa The 7y\sh\ landing was never made Throughout the war, the U , government and the 9ritish, believing &ermany was doing the same, had maintained a massive scientific and industrial %ro4ect to develo% an atomic bomb The chief ingredients, fissionable uranium and %lutonium, had not been available in sufficient :uantity before the war in $uro%e ended The first bomb was e/%loded in a test at 'lamogordo, New -e/ico, on 6uly !A, !"*+ Two more bombs had been built, and the %ossibility arose of using them to convince the 6a%anese to surrender ;resident 2arry , Truman decided to allow the bombs to be dro%%ed )or ma/imum %sychological im%act, they were used in :uic1 succession, one over 2iroshima on 'ugust A, the other over Nagasa1i on 'ugust " These cities had not %reviously been bombed, and thus the bombs. damage could be accurately assessed U , estimates %ut the number 1illed or missing as a result of the bomb in 2iroshima at A=,=== to D=,=== and in Nagasa1i at *=,=== 6a%anese estimates gave a combined total of <*=,=== The U,,R declared war on 6a%an on 'ugust @ and invaded -anchuria the ne/t day

D<=c

The 6a%anese ,urrender

On 'ugust !* 6a%an announced its surrender, which was not :uite unconditional because the 'llies had agreed to allow the country to 1ee% its em%eror The formal signing too1 %lace on ,e%tember < in To1yo 9ay aboard the battleshi% Missouri. The 'llied delegation was headed by &eneral -ac'rthur, who became the military governor of occu%ied 6a%an

I5

CO,T O) T2$ W'R

World War II.s basic statistics :ualify it as by far the greatest war in history in terms of human and material resources e/%ended In all, A! countries with ! D billion %eo%le, three(fourths of the world.s %o%ulation, too1 %art ' total of !!= million %ersons were mobili8ed for military service, more than half of those by three countries0 the U,,R ><<(#= million?, &ermany >!D million?, and the United ,tates >!A million? )or the ma4or %artici%ants the largest numbers on duty at any one time were as follows0 U,,R >!<,+==,===?E U , >!<,<*+,===?E &ermany >!=,"#@,===?E 9ritish $m%ire and Commonwealth >@,D<=,===?E 6a%an >D,!"#,===?E and China >+,===,===? -ost statistics on the war are only estimates The war.s vast and chaotic swee% made uniform record 1ee%ing im%ossible ,ome governments lost control of the data, and some resorted to mani%ulating it for %olitical reasons ' rough consensus has been reached on the total cost of the war In terms of money s%ent, it has been %ut at more than P! trillion, which ma1es it more e/%ensive than all other wars combined The human cost, not including between + A million and + " million 6ews 1illed in the 2olocaust >see

2olocaust0 Results of the Holocaust? who were indirect victims of the war, is estimated to have been ++ million deadH<+ million of those military and #= million civilian

'

$conomic ,tatistics

The U , s%ent the most money on the war, an estimated P#*! billion, including P+= billion for lend( lease su%%lies, of which P#! billion went to 9ritain, P!! billion to the ,oviet Union, P+ billion to China, and P# billion to #+ other countries &ermany was ne/t, with P<D< billionE followed by the ,oviet Union, P!"< billionE and then 9ritain, P!<= billionE Italy, P"* billionE and 6a%an, P+A billion $/ce%t for the U , , however, and some of the less militarily active 'llies, the money s%ent does not come close to being the war.s true cost The ,oviet government has calculated that the U,,R lost #= %ercent of its national wealth, while Na8i e/actions and looting were of incalculable amounts in the occu%ied countries The full cost to 6a%an has been estimated at P+A< billion In &ermany, bombing and shelling had %roduced * billion cu m >+ billion cu yd? of rubble

2uman 3osses

The human cost of the war fell heaviest on the U,,R, for which the official total, military and civilian, is given as more than <= million 1illed The 'llied military and civilian losses were ** millionE those of the '/is, !! million The military deaths on both sides in $uro%e numbered !" million and in the war against 6a%an, A million The U , , which had no significant civilian losses, sustained <"<,!#! battle deaths and !!+,!@D deaths from other causes The highest numbers of deaths, military and civilian, were as follows0 U,,R more than !# million military and D million civilianE China more than # million military and more than != million civilianE &ermany # + million and # @ millionE ;oland !<=,=== and + # millionE 6a%an ! D million and #@=,===E Fugoslavia #==,=== and ! # millionE Romania <==,=== and *A+,===E )rance <+=,=== and #A=,===E 9ritish $m%ire and Commonwealth *+<,=== and A=,===E Italy ##=,=== and @=,===E 2ungary !<=,=== and <@=,===E and C8echoslova1ia !=,=== and ##=,=== ;erha%s the most significant casualty over the long term was the world balance of %ower 9ritain, )rance, &ermany, and 6a%an ceased to be great %owers in the traditional military sense, leaving only two, the United ,tates and the ,oviet Union