Manalo v CA Troadio Manalo died intestate and he was succeeded by his wife Pilar and 11 children (petitioners).

8 of them (respondents) filed a petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof before the RTC. This was opposed by their mother along with their 3 siblings. The RTC eventually granted the petition of the 11 children. Before the CA, Pilar et al contend that since there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family, under the Civil Code, the petition must be dismissed. Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They contend that the petition should have been dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Issue

Natcher v CA Graciano Esguerra and his children succeeded his wife. He inherited a parcel of land which he also donated equally to his children. He reserved a specific area for himself. He married herein petitioner Natcher and sold the remaining portion to her. Upon his death, the children filed a complaint before the RTC where they alleged that Natcher acquired a new TCT over the remaining land in the name of Graciano through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery by making it appear that the latter executed a Deed of Sale. The RTC ruled in their favor but also ruled that the deed of sale might still be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of the petitioner being a compulsory heir of the deceased. This was reversed by the CA ruling that the lower court's decision went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. Issue May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs? Held

Whether the CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed. Held No, the CA was correct in upholding the RTC. It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. They contend that the term "proceeding" in Rule 1, Section 2 is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court ("rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding") to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit: ARTICLE 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term "suit" that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Herein petitioners are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

No. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: " . . . a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. "xxx xxx xxx

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact." As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived." Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Heirs of Gabatan v CA, Pacana Pacana filed an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession before the RTC against the heirs of Gabatan averring that she is the sole heir of her mother Hermogena Gabatan, the only child of Juan Gabatan and a certain Laureana. Petitioners counter that Juan Gabatan died single and without any issue and that Juan was survived by them. The RTC ruled in favor of Pacana. This was affirmed by the CA. Issue May the issue of determining the legal heirs be adjudicated in an ordinary action for the recovery of ownership and possession of property? Held Generally, no. But in this case, it was allowed by the Court for the purpose of expediency. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. PortugalBeltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit: It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon. Montaner v Sharia Court Christian heirs argument: The SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT-MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

Issue WON the proceedings before the Sharia Court is an ordinary, special civil action or a special proceeding. (Special Proceeding) Held SC: The underlying assumption in the Christian heirs second argument is that the proceeding before the Shari'a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person. This is error. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari'a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3 (c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact". This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In this kind of proceeding, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent's heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the Muslim heirs seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.'s death and, subsequently, for their muslim daughter to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. The Christian heirs argument that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant while a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact", has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same. Manchester v CA This involves an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. Issue

May the incorrect payment of the docket fees the amount of which is based on the body of the original complaint be a ground for the dismissal of a case even if the same has been amended and the damages sought decreased? Held Yes. In Magaspi v Ramolete: the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious. To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. Sun Insurance v Asuncion Asuncion filed a complaint in the RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by the RTC judge. On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. Pursuant to this, the RTC judge issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.

On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "ReAmended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70. On January 24, 1986, the RTC judge issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the said order of the RTC Judge. This was dismissed by the CA. The main thrust of the petition herein is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground of non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee citing Manchester v CA. Issue Whether a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. Held Yes. . The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any. The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of underassessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void. In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized

docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus, the Court rules as follows: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Tacay v RTC of Tagum Pineda filed an action for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas) of land before the RTC. The prayer of each complaint included a handwritten notation (evidently made by plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the entire phrase read, "5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven." Motions to dismiss were filed for the reason that the complaint violates the mandatory and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the Supreme by failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant and for failure of the complaint to even allege the basic requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute. The RTC judge denied the motion to dismiss but ordered the expunction of the claim for damages ruling that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages "are only one aspect of the cause of action," and (c) because of absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they should be "expunged from the records." These orders are contended by Tacay to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Issue May the case herein be dismissed for the incorrect allegation of damages and consequently the incorrect payment of docket fees? Held No. The action herein is not basically for the recovery of sums of money. It is principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de posesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property in other words, a real action may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the RTC. Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,

except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the MTCs. The rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's jurisdiction. Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, which is avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, cannot be invoked . Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee." The requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. There are actions or proceedings involving real property, in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees). Two situations may arise: 1. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become timebarred. 2. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where as in the case at bar the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims or

damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period. Suson v CA, Odilao Odilao filed a P5.15 million civil suit for damages against Suson with the RTC of Southern Leyte. He paid the appropriate docket fees therein. Suson filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue averring that Odilao resides in Cebu and not in Southern Leyte. The Leyte RTC dismissed the damages suit. Odilao thereafter proceeded to the RTC of Cebu to re-file the same complaint. However, he opted not to pay the docket fees therein on the theory that the fees he paid in the RTC of Southern Leyte may be transferred to the RTC of Cebu. Also, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu advised his counsel to file a formal request with this Court, thru the Court Administrator, for an "authority" to apply the payment for docket fees previously made to the RTC of Southern Leyte to the docket fees to be paid to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. This was approved by the Court Administrator. Suson then filed a motion to dismiss the suit in the Cebu RTC on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. He argued that Odilao "did not pay (even) a single centavo of the P25,000.00 filing fee; hence, the court (RTC of Cebu City, Branch 6) did not acquire jurisdiction over the case." This motion was denied by the RTC and said denial was affirmed by the CA. Issue Is the procedure adopted herein by Odilao transferring the docket fees paid in one RTC to another proper? Held No. In the case at bar, in the strict sense, Odilaos complaint cannot be deemed to have been "re-filed" in the RTC of Cebu City because it was not originally filed in the same court but in the RTC of Southern Leyte (Branch 26). Thus, when his complaint was docketed by the clerk of court of the RTC Cebu City (Branch 6), it became an entirely separate case that was dismissed by the RTC of Leyte due to improper venue. As far the first civil case in the Leyte RTC is concerned, while undoubtedly the order of dismissal is not an adjudication on the merits of the case, the order, nevertheless, is a final order. This means that when Odilao did not appeal therefrom, the order became final and executory for all legal intents and purposes. From a procedural point of view therefore, to "re-file" the case before the same court would be an obvious faux pas. As a remedial measure, the plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed due to improper venue can still file another complaint, but this time in the court of proper venue. Note, however, that the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of improper venue did not stop the running of the prescriptive period within which to file his complaint in the court of proper venue. Theoretically, the plaintiff may decide to file a complaint containing substantially the same allegations and prayer as the previously dismissed complaint, or he may decide to amend the same and pray for a different relief. In this case, the principle remains unchanged, that is, the court (of proper venue) will only acquire jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee thereon. Also, the OCA has neither the power nor the authority to exempt any party not otherwise exempt under the law or under the Rules of Court in the payment of the prescribed docket fees. To now exempt or otherwise authorize Odilao not to pay the prescribed filing fees would not only be in derogation of this principle but also of the general rule in pleadings, practice and procedure that the mistake of counsel binds his client. Still, we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case Odilao did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee. His counsel simply strayed away from the rules to explore the possibility of an extra legal remedy. Since his case has already been docketed in the RTC Branch 6 Cebu City, the procedural remedy of paying the prescribed docket fees is still available to him provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet set in.

Fil-Estate Golf Devt v Navarro Navarro filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages with the RTC against Fil-Estate Golf and several other parties. She alleges to be the owner of the 2 parcels of land contested herein; that through the deceitful manipulations of several persons, her titles were cancelled and new titles were issued in the name of Carmona Realty Devt Corp which are now claimed and developed by Fil-Estate. Fil-Estate moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Navarro did not pay the correct amount of docket fees citing Manchester Devt Corp v CA. The trial court, after holding that the docket fees had been fully paid as certified by its clerk of court, denied the motion to dismiss. This was affirmed by the CA. Issue Was jurisdiction ever acquired by the court even when the plaintiff herein failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees? Held Yes. Although the docket fees paid were insufficient, such insufficiency did not instantly divest the trial courts jurisdiction over the case. The clerk of court should reassess and determine the correct amount and the same must be paid within the appropriate reglementary period. The ruling in Manchester does not apply to cases where insufficient filing fees were paid based on the assessment made by the clerk of court, and there was no intention to defraud the government. What is applicable herein is the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion where it was decided that if the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy, has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. Indubitably, Navarro paid the full amount of docket fees assessed by the clerk of court. Since she paid the docket fees, then the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case. In fact, even though the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically result in the dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that Navarro paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the clerk of court of the RTC where the case is filed. If Fil-Estate believed that the assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the same trial court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the clerk of court of another judicial region. Dadizon v CA The Moccoros purchased a 224 s/m lot from a certain Caneja. To their surprise, they found out that the area has been reduced by 78 s/m; such area being claimed by the Dadizons. The Dadizons relied on the strength of their tax declarations which stated that the area in question was theirs. The Moccoros filed an action with the MTC to recover the 78 s/m parcel of land and to cancel the tax declaration of the Dadizons. The MTC ruled in favor of the Moccoros. On appeal to the RTC, the latter court affirmed the MTCs decision in toto. The Dadizons filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL (instead of a petition for review) with the CA. The Mocorros moved to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal on the ground that the MODE OF APPEAL THEY HAVE ADOPTED was ERRONEOUS. The CA dismissed the appeal. In this petition, the Dadizons claim that the rules should have been liberally construed, thus their appeal should not have been dismissed outright. Issue

May the rules be liberally construed in cases of errors in the mode of appeal? Held No. The error of the Dadizons was inexcusable and inexplicable. The mode of appeal of the decision of the RTC adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They should have filed a petition for review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court has followed a strict policy against misdirected or erroneous appeals since February 27, 1990, when it issued the following instructions and caution in Murillo v. Consul. The Court held therein that appeals to the CA from the RTC are perfected in two ways: a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and b) by petition for review where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss the appeal. If an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the RTC to the CA and in the latter Court, the appellant raises pure issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to the other, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. The dismissal was also unavoidable notwithstanding that the procedural rules might be liberally construed, because the provisions of law and the rules concerning the manner and period of appeal were mandatory and jurisdictional requirements essential to enable the appellate court to take cognizance of the appeal. In Dee Hwa Liong Electronics Corporation v. Papiona: the liberal construction of the Rules authorized by Sec. 6, Rule 1, cannot be made the vehicle by which to ignore the Rules of Court at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. The policy of liberal construction mandated by the Rules of Court may be invoked only in situations in which there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not where its application subverts the essence of the proceeding or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court. The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules of Court is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience. Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. v Judge Sorongon, Valentin Fong Fort Bonifacio Devt (FBDC) contracted with L & M Maxco Specialist Construction (Maxco) wherein the latter would undertake the structural and partial architectural package of a certain project entered into by FBDC. Subsequently, Maxco was sued by its own creditors, one of which was Valentin Fong. In order to get out of the fix with Fong, Maxco assigned all its receivables from its contract with FBDC (representing its retention money from said contract) to Fong as payment; Maxco notified FBDC about said assignment of receivables which were confirmed by FBDC to be existing but not yet due and demandable. Eventually, FBDC notified Fong that the latter could no longer collect any amount from it as Maxco had no more assets to pay the receivables due to

Fong. Fong filed a complaint for a sum of money against FBDC and Maxco in the RTC. He claimed that there were sufficient residual amounts to pay the receivables of Maxco assigned to him at the time he served notice of the assignment. Thus, when it paid out the retention money to other garnishing creditors of Maxco, said payment was to the prejudice and detriment of Fong. FBDC moved for the dismissal of the complaint contending, among other reasons, that Fongs complaint failed to state a cause of action. This was denied by the RTC and the CA. Issue May the complaint herein be dismissed for lack of cause of action? May the complaint be dismissed since the conditions precedent for the complaint have not been complied with? Held 1. No. The complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. An examination of the allegations in Fong's complaint reveals that his cause of action springs not from a violation of the provisions of the Trade Contract, but from the assignment of Maxco's retention money to him and failure of Fort Development to turn over the retention money. The allegations in Fong's Complaint are clear and simple: (1) That Maxco had an outstanding obligation to respondent; (2) Maxco assigned to Fong its retention from Fort Development in payment of the said obligation ; (3) Fort Deveolpment was notified of the assignment; (4) Despite due notice of such assignment, Fort Deveolpment still refused to deliver the amount assigned to respondent, giving preference, instead, to the 2 other creditors of Maxco; (5) At the time Fort Development was notified of the assignment, there were only one other notice of garnishment and there were sufficient residual amounts to satisfy Fong's claim; and (6) uncertain over which one between Maxco and Fort Development he may resort to for payment, Fong named them both as defendants in a separate civil case. What Fong raises as an issue before the RTC is Fort Developments alleged unjustified preference to the claims of the other creditors of Maxco over the retention money. In this case the complaint alleges that: . . . at the time he served notice of assignment to defendant FBDC there was only one notice of garnishment that the latter had received and there were still sufficient residual amounts to pay that assigned by defendant Maxco to the plaintiff. Subsequent notices of garnishment received by defendant FBDC could not adversely affect the amounts already assigned to the plaintiff as they are already his property, no longer that of defendant Maxco. From this statement alone, it is clear that a cause of action is present in the complaint filed a quo. Fong has specifically alleged that the undue preference given to other creditors of Maxco over the retention money by petitioner was to the prejudice of his rights. 2. No. The final error raised by Fort Development that the other judgment creditors as well as the trial court that issued the writ of garnishment and CIAC should have been impleaded as defendants in the case as they were indispensable parties is likewise weak. Their rights are distinct from the rights acquired by the respondent over the portion of the retention money assigned to the latter by Maxco. Their interests are in no way affected by any judgment to be rendered in this case.