Devitt Linguistics What's Wrong With The Right View PDF

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Linguistics: What's Wrong with "The Right View" Author(s): Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), pp. 497-531 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214279 . Accessed: 14/02/2014 20:41
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Philosophical Perspectives, 3 ofMind Philosophy and Action Theory, 1989
LINGUISTICS:WHAT'S WRONG WITH "THE RIGHT VIEW"

Michael Devitt of Maryland University KimSterelny Australian National University
1. Introduction Whatis linguistics about?A simple enough question, you might think, but one thathas generated surprising much controversy, literature, and no veryconvincing answer. Thefocus ofthecontroversy hasbeenonthetransformational approach to syntactic theory, a central subdomain oflinguistics. That willbe ourconcern. Jerry whoshould Fodor, know about suchmatters, saysthat "there twoschools are...really only ofthought on this question" (1981:197). With careful he namesthese"theRight neutrality View"and "the WrongView". The RightView is the standard view of Noam and hisfollowers, Chomsky Fodor.Fodorattributes including the View(pp. 198-9) Wrong to Stephen Stich(1972)and Jerrold Katz TheWrong Viewisa sort ofinstrumentalism. Thetask oflinguists is to construct a grammar thatsimply captures itsdata base, the linguistic intuitions ofspeakers; intuitions aboutgrammaticality, amand so on. Provided biguity, passives, thelinguist getsthings right attheleveloftheintuitive judgments, hehasdoneallthat isrequired. Thetheory isjust an instrument for predicting somesuchjudgments on thebasisofothers. According totheWrong View, then, linguistics is notaboutanything beyond theconcerns ofthosejudgments; it is notaboutanydeeperreality.
(1977).1
498 / Michael Devitt/ Kim Sterelny Relatedto our openingquestionis another:Whatdoes linguistics explains nothing: explain? The WrongView holds that linguistics butitdoes notexintuitive judgments systematizes theory linguistic plain them.The WrongView is thus typicalof instrumentalism. Classical instrumentalismwas motivated by a positivist The WrongView is not. Indeed,it has and semantics. epistemology troubleswiththe It arises from respectablemotivation. a perfectly to see any otheralternative withan inability RightView, together Ifwe are to thatview. We thinkthatthereis anotheralternative. forthe WrongView evaporates. So we then the motivation right, shall not discuss thatview any further. Its main claim is that The RightView is popular and familiar. by each thathas been internalized describesa grammar linguistics real. The speaker; the grammaris, as they say, psychologically ofthis in theinternalization competenceconsists speaker'slinguistic View, (J.A. Fodor 1981: 199).2So, accordingto the Right grammar is simply that competence."Linguistics is about linguistic linguistics class ofsteady thatis concernedwithone specific partofpsychology thatare employedin speakingand states,the cognitivestructures (Chomsky1975b: 160).3 understanding" explain?Accordingto the RightView, it is, Whatdoes linguistics Most ofbehaviour. partoftheexplanation liketherestofpsychology, butitis also relebehaviour, explainslinguistic a grammar obviously, behaviour.To followsovant to the explanationof non-linguistic understand them; forexample,one mustfirst meone's instructions, grammar. internalized the utilizes understanding that betweencompetenceand perforon a distinction insists Chomsky of performanceis concerned with all the mance. The theory and understanding thatbear on theproduction factors psychological with thecompetence not only it concerned So is symbols. oflinguistic but of matter linguistics, the subject thatis, accordingto Chomsky, The interest. and theory attention as memory, also withsuch factors of competence is the core of the theoryof performance. is about? Thoughwe musttake How can we tell what linguistics say it is about, we cannot restcontentwith note of what linguists on it,another. Linguists reflecting is one thing, that.Doinglinguistics We have the goal of theiractivity. abstracted may have incorrectly forourselves.The best reason thatwe can activity to examine their is about x ratherthany thatlinguistics expect to findforthinking and evidence that have guided the conis thatthe considerations
What's WrongWith"The RightView" / 499
is ourthinking thatthetheory oflinguistic theory justify struction viewoflinguistics So weshall looktosee which x but about noty. true theory seemtrue. makeslinguistic View are as follows. The Right ourconclusions Oversimplifying, view is The right is notpartof psychology. linguistics is wrong; View".Our which we willcall "Grandma's another one altogether, becauseofan imare muchmorecomplicated actualconclusions linguists thetransformational arguethat We will conflation. portant linguistic with oneconcerned twodistinct theoretical tasks: conflate competence.4 with linguistic and theother symbols 2. Two Versionsof the RightView ofpsychological that a grammar isan account Viewholds TheRight in theway to be internalized a grammar Butwhatis itfor reality. to thisquestion. Thereare twoanswers thisrequires? all and onlythesentences A grammar is a setofrules generating unlargely is still language anynatural The set for ofa language. thattransformational Let us suppose,optimistically, discovered. ofthesetfor English. Call havediscovered somemembers linguists a describe ofa grammar, "G".Threewayswe might this fragment to G are as follows: relation speaker's English competent by G 1. She behavesas ifshe is governed 2. She is governed by G and forEnglish 3. She knowsthatG is partofthegrammar appliesit.5 1 is notenough for theRight Viewbecause 1 can be trueas the thanG other internalized something ofthespeakerhaving result Viewreas G. The Right output which yields thesame behavioral ofthe The most common 2 or 3. Which? expressions either quires is the describes thatlinguistics 3: the competence View suggest are as they ofthegrammar that tacit therules knowledge speaker's ofG. We or propositional knowledge, are;she hasknowledge-that, oftheRight View.We shallcallit"the this version needa namefor inways that TheRight Viewissometimes Version". presented Crazy knows that thespeaker 2: there isnoimplication seemtorequire only G. The only attitude or hasanyother toward, propositional about, We skill. a cognitive 2 might is knowledge-how, require knowledge oftheRight View. Version" shallcall this"theSensible
/ KimSterelny 500 / Michael Devitt outbya sim1,2 and 3 can be brought between The differences So R isa mechanical for addition. that R isa rule Suppose pleanalogy. ofaddition; answer to problems theright guaranteeing procedure We might Consider, now,a pocketcalculator. it is an algorithm. ways: it in anyofthefollowing describe by R 1*. It behavesas ifit is governed by R 2*. It is governed addition and appliesit. for that R is an algorithm 3*. Itknows aremany 1* might so. There without 2* or3* being be true Clearly, by a ruleother maybe governed waysto add and thecalculator and the notation be in thedecimal R might thanR; forexample, without 2* might be true Next, notation. rule inthebinary governing byR,and itis governed so that so. An object can be built 3* being R. Andif represent R,and yetnotexplicitly haveinternalized thus attitude it does notrepresent R it cannothave any propositional R.Inthecaseofthecalculator, about know toward R. Henceitcannot about R,becauseithasbeen that itdoesnotknow we canbe certain in sucha waythatit couldnotknowaboutanything.6 built 3. The Crazy Versionof the RightView ThequesVersion? believe theCrazy Do transformational linguists no clear and yet,amazingly, tionhas been airedat greatlength like3, assert anything Theydo nottypically has emerged. answer toG isappropriately that thespeaker's relation believe yet keyfigures close). calledknowledge (or something is not thisknowledge favourite way of describing Chomsky's orprinciples knows therules hesaysthat thespeaker tacitly helpful: of"knows therulesor theimport ofherlanguage. Unfortunately, itrequires to think clear.We are inclined is notcrystal principles" mere this: about butthere isroom for doubt perhaps knowledge-that The inclusion of'tacitly' is sufficient. mayseemto knowledge-how we ordinarily takea person's tacit thequestion, for knowledge settle he would butwhich that he has notentertained to be propositions Rontacitly insuitable circumstances. Thus, immediately acknowledge his hasnever crossed don't that rabbits layeggs;thethought knows were laid eggsifthequestion buthe woulddenythatthey mind, thananyonethat knows better everto arise.However, Chomsky
View"/ 501 With "TheRight What's Wrong ofG. So this therules notacknowledge would speaker theordinary Chomsky Further, on occasions by'tacitly'. can'tbe whathe means is knowledge-that knowledge deniesthatthe speaker's explicitly (1969a:86-7;1969b:153-4). so often deepensbecausethetransformationalists The mystery ofG and knowledge did havepropositional as ifthespeaker write as a the knowledge describes Thus Chomsky its consequences. ofbeliefs" (1969a:60-1;see also 1980:225); as "a mental "system is a language (1975a:304).Learning ofa grammar" representation a theory: seen as learning is based on the acquisition It seemsplainthatlanguage a formal point ofviewis a ofwhatfrom child's discovery of his grammar theory-agenerative deep and abstract 1965:58) (Chomsky language. itis (1983:4-10); viewas propositional Chomsky's Fodordescribes byreference capacities...are...explained theviewthat linguistic "your iftheknowledge is not ofyourbeliefs" (p.7).Finally, to thecontent be knowledge-how. And,ifwe assume itmust surely propositional, itisa particularly that complicated tothink description 2,itisplausible denies that it is However,Chomsky piece of knowledge-how. (1969a: 87) or,at least,thatit is knowledge-how knowledge-how (1975a:314-8). component" an "intellectual without on underseemsbent Chomsky (1975b:162-4) Hereandelsewhere and distinction between knowledge-how, the knowledge-that mining AnderYet,as John offacts andcognitive skills. knowledge between to "is fundamental moderncognitive son says, thisdistinction is takento conmemory (1980:223).Thus,long-term psychology" ofinalso imagistic representation sistinthepropositional (perhaps On the otherhand, This is knowledge-that. formation (94-123). which andchessplaying, addition skills likemazerunning, cognitive ofinformation, arenotseenas conmaymakeuseofrepresentations "producbutrather insuchrepresentations, example, in,for sisting are knowledge-how. Theseskills tionsystems" (222-92). thespeaker oftheclaimthat ofthenature We are left uncertain ofG.7 has tacitknowledge one. Is it issueforthesubstantive We set aside the exegetical that knows G ispart speaker tosuppose that theordinary reasonable inproducing this andapplies for knowledge ofthegrammar English not.We think that We think utterances? 3, and and understanding
/ KimSterelny Devitt 502 / Michael implausible. are grossly hencetheCrazyVersion, Verfor theCrazy goodreason a single noone hasproduced First, Vieware onlyones theRight adducedfor sion;theconsiderations 2 not3.8Inthefaceoftwenty are for they Version; for theSensible Version to theCrazy objections overwhelming yearsofapparently do Whenthey a point. conceded have hardly transformationalists they Butmostly obscurities. do so with they tothecriticisms, respond beon thedistinction to insist on as ifitis sheerpedantry continue tweenthetwoversions.9 problem (1967)has raisedthefollowing Harman Gilbert Second, a understanding Version, to that According Version. for theCrazy representation That grammar. its representing languagerequires basic more that isittounderstand What be ina language. itself must is thesameas the basiclanguage themore Ifwe suppose language? Ifwe supcircle. in a vicious we are caught then language original thenits perhaps), language ("Mentalese" itis someother pose that basic more a still Thisrequires also hastobe represented. grammar or an circle Andso on. The onlywayto avoida vicious language. is understood at leastone language is to allowthat infinite regress allowthis notthen Why itsgrammar. without representing directly, theone spoken? language, oftheoriginal 1969a: (1975;see alsoChomsky Fodor particularly Somelinguists, that think They tothis question. havean answer 155-6), 87-8;1969b: inorder tolearna language that for supposing there aregoodreasons we can one already.However, another you have to understand its grammar, without representing thatone directly, understand reto Harman So, theanswer itisinnate. becauseitis notlearned; thesis. innateness quiresa strong oftheCrazy outtheimplausibility Stich (1971,1978)brings Third, unto G with relation thespeaker's by contrasting nicely Version that knows Ifa person knowledge. casesofpropositional problematic him to be awareofp, or at leastto be able to become p, we expect and we expecthimto prompt; aware of it whengivena suitable lacks clearly quite speaker of p. Theordinary expressions understand knows If a of G. most person for andunderstanding this awareness andbeliefs other knowledge should joinupwith that p, hisknowledge itis clearof G has knowledge If a beliefs. speaker more togenerate an example. Consider this in way. integrated ly not inferentially recourses have the to conceptual is a unlikely Without speaker tuition, 'NP-> Det + claimthat simple eventherelatively to understand is a rule, that this knows Ifshetacitly Adj + N' is a ruleofEnglish.
What's With "TheRight Wrong View"/ 503 islargely herknowledge inferentially isolated from herother beliefs. Fourth, Stich's point isstrengthened byan important aspect ofthe transformationalists' views.At itsmostexplicit and extreme, this aspect seestheareaofthemind that employs G,thesentence-parsing area,as modular. Fodoris themainexponent ofmodularity (1983), also speaksfavourably butChomsky oftheidea (1980:40-7). Inthefunctional organization ofthemind, modular systems liebeand thecentral tweentransducers processor. Transducers are the familiar senseorgans which convert incoming stimuli intoneural code. The central is thesiteofhigher mental processor functions; what iswhat we would think ofas thinking. goesonthere ordinarily Modular from transducers systems analyzetherawdata received and pass on some of the results to the central These processor. in a particular are "domain sortof systems specific", specializing forexample,sentencesor faces. They are "innately stimulus; with and"hardwired", "associated and specified" specific, localized, structured neural Fodor1983:36-7). elaborately systems" (J.A. They is nodecision tooperate; arecognitive are"mandatory": there they forStich's reflexes (pp. 52-3).Finally, and mostimportantly point, On theone hand, "there is only they are "autonomous" (pp.36-7). that modular limited central accessto themental representations" thesystems have no systems compute (p. 57). On theother hand, heldelsewhere; are "informationally enaccessto information they that Stich capsulated" (p.64).Hencetheinferential segregation points to. The mereinternalization of G in a modulecannotinvolve the inanypropositional attitudes towards themodule is speaker G,for inaccessible tothecentral which isthesiteofherproposiprocessor no more tional attitudes. Ifthemodularity thesis isright, thespeaker than sheknows theprinciples knows G invirtue ofbeing abletotalk invirtue isright, ofdepth ofbeing abletosee. Ifthethesis perception module that could"know" G is thesentence-parsing theonly thing itself. But is highly andcontroversial. Themodularity thesis speculative If Chomsky is even if it is false,Stich'spointis stillsupported. ithas many ofthe nearright aboutthesentence-parser, anywhere ofa modular He thinks ofitas a relatively properties system. encapto our general cognitive sulated "mentalorgan" inaccessible betG is ina relatively autonomous Thecontrast capacities. system. to G attitudes and her relation ween a speaker'spropositional remains.
504 / Michael / KimSterelny Devitt We conclude that description 3, and hencetheCrazy Version of theRight View, arehighly implausible, perhaps evencrazy. Itistime to consider theSensible Version. 4. The Sensible Versionof the RightView: Criticisms The Sensible oftheRight Version Viewdoes notrequire that the ofthegrammar speaker represents G, a fragment forEnglish that linguists areon their waytodiscovering; sheneedhaveno propositionalattitude to G. It acceptsthatknowledge ofa language is a cognitive skill,and hence may be mere knowledge-how not The Sensible knowledge-that. Version does notrequire description 3, butitdoes require 2. Iflinguistic theory is to be true, G must be itgoverns ofeachspeaker psychologically realinthat thebehavior and is descriptive of hercompetence. We doubteven this.10 Theinternalization ofG requires theinternalization ofallthelevels ofanalysis hypothesized by G: deep structure, intermediate strucThisis whatwe doubt and tures, surface and therules.11 structure, whatwe shallbe discussing inthis section andthenext. We do not ofG are psychologically doubt that someaspects real,inparticular Thenature those aspects that andpoint go into determining meaning. ofthisqualification willbecomeclearer in sections 6 to 8. to claimanything Whyshouldwe supposethatwe are entitled 1? After than description are like other stronger all, grammars Ifthere is onesetofrules that a setofEnglish algorithms. generates andassigns sentences them appropriate meaning-relevant structures, of therewill be many;therewill be a mathematical explosion ofa algorithms. SupposeG' is one ofthosealternative fragments that that as G,why grammar. Given G' hasthesameoutput suppose Theevidence and itis G rather than is psychologically real? G' that that haveguided transformational considerations grammarians prothatitis G. vide insufficient reasonforthinking for aboutlinguistic G was almost (1) The earlyevidence entirely ofwords aboutthe are grammatical; aboutwhich symbols: strings andquesofcertain forms about thestatement ambiguity sentences; are superficially ofsentences that tionforms; aboutthesynonymy that aresuperficialsentences about thedifference between different; notpsychological, andso on. Thisevidence is linguistic, lysimilar; on immediate and so does notseemto be thesortto throw light
What's WrongWith"The RightView" / 505 whatis in thehead; on theprecisenatureofa speaker'scompetence, the mentalstate thatplays the key role in her understanding and production ofsentences.There is no basis in thisevidence forthinking that the speaker has internalized G ratherthan the meaningequivalentG'. At thispoint, a protest is likely from old hands:"Whatyou are referringto as linguistic evidence is really the evidence of the native speaker's intuitions. These intuitions reflecther underlying competence and are psychological. The role thattheyplay as evidence shows thatthe grammar is indeed about competence."The protest raisesdifficult issueswhichwe willtake up later(section9). We can setitaside now because itdoes notaffect ourclaimthatthis evidence, even ifthe expressionof intuitions, gives no reason forpreferring G to G'. (2) Transformationalists seek grammarsthat not only meet the linguistic evidence but are also simple and elegant.'2 So we can assume thatG is simpler and moreelegantthanG'. Butwhyis that a reason forthinking thatG is psychologically real? Suppose thatR is thesimplest and mostelegantalgorithm for addition. On thatbasis alone we are notjustified in ascribing R to any calculator.Perhaps thecalculator is a childwho adds bycounting marbles. Whatis needed beforeascribing R or G to an object is evidence about itsdesign, about how itachieves itseffect ofproducing additions or sentences. In the case of G, what is needed is psycholinguistic evidence. These remarksagainst the bearing of the transformationalists' criteria of simplicity and elegance on psychological realitycan be strengthened. First, the factthatG is moresimpleand elegantthan itsrivalsis rather moreevidenceagainst,thanevidence for, G being partof the grammarour brain is builtto use. If innatenessclaims are right, ourbrains are specifically class ofgramadaptedto a certain mars.StephenJayGould (1980: 19-31)has used examples like the panda's thumb to show thatadaptations are typically not maximally efficient solutions to theproblems engineering theysolve. For,adaptations are ofpre-existing structures and thisconstrains thesolutions possible.Second, as David Lewis has pointedout to us, the factthat G is maximallyefficient and elegant fromthe grammarians' point of view does not entitleus to suppose it is optimalfrom the brain's pointof view.13 (3) A dominantconcern of transformational grammarhas been language acquisition, which should provide psycholinguist
506 / Michael Devitt/ Kim Sterelny evidence.14 However,untilrecently, attention to language acquisition has been more honorific than substantive: Many generativists assert thattheyaim to account forhow childrenmastertheirnative languages,but the vast majority of theiranalyses do not contribute to thataim. (Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981b: 7) Nevertheless, facts about languageacquisition have moreand more been playing a roleintheconstruction oftransformational grammars. real. We mustsee their bearing on theclaimthatG is psychologically A language like Englishis a very complex systemof rules. Yet, learn thissystem accordingto Chomsky and his followers, children quicklyon the basis of meagre and misleadingdata. In particular, of negativedata transformationalists emphasize the unavailability do not occur),and the absence (thatcertainsyntactic constructions There are certainsorts ofsystematic about ambiguity.15 instruction been warned oferrors that do notmakedespite neverhaving children aboutambigucorrect againstthem.Theyend up making judgments evidence about ambiguity itydespitethe patchyand unsystematic in theirdata. Giventhe lack of evidence available to the child,the thatlanguage claimthatitis highly transformationalists implausible uses onlythedevicesofempiricist theories. learning learning Rather, involvesan innatelanguage-acquisition device. theyclaim,learning we can acquire. The systemof This device constrains the grammar is called "universalgrammar". constraints Recent versionsof transformational grammarhave presenteda it is a set of principles veryrichpictureof universalgrammar: that are incomplete ofphrase-structure and transformaschematizations tional rules. They are completed,in learning,by fixingcertain forexample, fixing of "parameters"; the ordering surfacestructure basic constituents. The popular"government and binding" view exthisapproach.16 So transformationalists emplifies claim thatthe only grammarsthat can be learntare completionsof the specified schematizations. How might theseconsiderations support G over G' as an account of psychological fit betterthanG' intoa theory of reality? G might thedecomposition ofG intolearnedparameters languageacquisition: and innately fixedprinciples might yield a more plausibleaccount of language acquisitionthanthe decomposition of G'. For learned parametersto be plausible,they should be simple,and robustly
View"/ 507 "TheRight With What's Wrong principles Forinnate experience. inthechild's linguistic manifested seemtoplaya role be onesthat at least, must, they to be plausible We wouldalso wantto see languages. ofother in theacquisition in a oflanguage thedevelopment from for theprinciples evidence processing. language childand from the alongtheselinesdo helpto restrict that arguments We think Inparticular, reality. psychological for that arecandidates grammars intheir ground are on strong thetransformationalists that we think we Nevertheless, claimsabout the data availableto children.17 thatG is come close to establishing doubtthatthesearguments real. psychologically Since these strong. isnot principles theinnate for theevidence First, we ofall languages, must playa rolein theacquisition principles is that The trouble ofthem. forevidence languages lookto other toprovide depth insufficient havebeenstudied few languages very seemtoagreeon an innate studies where in-depth evidence. Worse, bythe is imposed this agreement risk that there is a high principle, themany innature. Among rather than method ofstudy discovered how evidence, thelinguistic with compatible toG equally alternatives of fortheacquisition to account fortheir ability manyare tested Very few: most are ruled out as candidatesby the English? see (2)above. ofsimplicity; irrelevant consideration psychologically that havebeenstudied all theother languages Andthe samegoesfor was aptestfor each language Ifthelanguage-acquisition in depth. same all with the prima of a wider range grammars, pliedto much we would agreeget real, perhaps tobeing psychologically facie claim we wouldgetno Morelikely, innate ment on different principles. at all. agreement testdepends thatthelanguage-acquisition In sum,to theextent itassumes innate motivated principles, on an appealtoindependently real. are psychologically for other languages that certain grammars as that ofG. is as muchin question reality Buttheir psychological of outthemembers reasonfor What we needis a principled ruling The foreach language. of grammars themathematical explosion Thetheory this reason. doesnot supply oflanguage acquisition theory start detailed must assumpfrom-fairly starts from-indeed, probably that are theend states ofthepsychological aboutthenature tions are ofthose states Andthenature acquisition.'8 oflanguage product whatis in question. precisely
/ KimSterelny Devitt 508 / Michael andprocessing development on language work recent Interesting close butcannot principles, for theinnate someevidence provides havebeen oflanguage development gap.Facts theaboveevidential the is that The worry with theprinciples.'9 to be consistent shown equally with principles other many with wouldbe consistent facts is from processing The evidence to beingconsidered. goodclaims assumponsubstantial Itdepends andiscontroversial. notextensive oftheprocessor.20 ofrulesand thenature tionsabouttheforms do not principles aboutinnate that assumptions We haveclaimed ina grammars ofalternative explosion themathematical deal with the aside,taking we wereto setthat way.Supposethat principled notimto be discovered languages between agreement apparent acquisifrom language thearguments about doubt Oursecond posed. todealwith. explosion havea mathematical we maystill isthat tion into decomposed is one set ofrulesthatcan be plausibly Ifthere there then maybe principles, innate andagreed parameters learned many. of therange restrict certainly learning oflanguage Considerations butthey realgrammar, ofthepsychologically tobe part candidates this ofit.Whatis neededto establish G is part that do notestablish evidence. psycholinguistic direct more much is a roleinperformance, itplays realthen (4) IfG is psychologically We can lookto ofsentences. and understanding in theproduction indeed play does not G' and G that for evidence psycholinguistics evidence the matter: settle could evidence such this role.Inprinciple, we make,therelative of errors thetypes times,21 aboutreaction are sentences in which the order sentences, ease ofunderstanding the active (e.g. to G that according suppose andso on.Thus, learned, (e.g.'Samwasbitten andthepassive 'MaxbitSam')isthebasicform is to G' thereverse according butthat form, byMax')thederived learned are that actives we discovered that thecase. Nowsuppose and remember; are easierto understand that they before passives; would kind ofthis Evidence them. are madewith errors that fewer reality. ofpsychological G overG' as an account favour hasnot sort ofthis evidence psycholinguistic however, Inpractice, by G' hasbeen internalized that G rather theviewthat supported intermediate thedeepstructure, We needtoshowthat thespeaker. ofG,haveall beeninterandtherules structure, surface structures, There ofthis. evidence islittle there that agreed Itisgenerally nalized. levelsandrules thetransformationalist's evenfinding are problems
What's WrongWith"The RightView" / 509 detailsspecifiedby G.22Even Robert at all, let alone the particular Berwick and Amy Weinberg, who defend the psychological of transformational significance grammar, emphasizethe greatdifin getting data to bear on thepsychological ficulty performance realityofgrammars (1984: 35-45).The mostthattheyhope to do is show thefunctional ofthegeneralprinciples ofcurrent plausibility transformationalgrammar. We can sumup thediscussion inthis sectionas follows. To establish thatG is psychologically real, hardpsychological evidence is needed. Yet, as David Lightfoot pointsout, "the overwhelming mass of of grammar"has been crucialevidence bearingon the correctness Thislinguistic data cannotdistinguish linguistic (1982: 28).23 between many grammarsgeneratingthe same sentences with the same meaning-relevant structures. 5. The Sensible Version of the Right View: Responses Whatresponseshave been made to criticisms like ours?We shall startwithone fromDavid Marr. Marr(1982) has used hiswell-known betweenlevels to distinction defendChomsky.Marrdistinguishes threelevels of understanding an information-processing device.The first is thecomputational level: itspecifies whatis computed and why.The second is thealgorithmic level: itspecifies how thecomputation is done. The third is thelevel it specifies ofimplementation: the way the computation is realized between the physically (pp. 22-5). Marrclaims thatthe distinction and the algorithmic levels is "roughly[Chomsky's] computational He thinks distinction betweencompetenceand performance". that ofChomskyhave overlookedthe distinction between levels, critics and have criticized thegrammar as ifitwere at thealgorithmic level The problem when it is actuallyat the computational level (p. 28).24 withthisdefenseis thateverything said at the computational level does stillhave to be trueof the device. So all aspects of the grammardo have to be psychologically real; thespeakerreallymustperform thatcomputational task in all itsdetail.That is preciselywhat is in doubt. It is true,of course,thattheremay be many different out thattask at the algorithmic ways of carrying level, differences whichare not the concern of the grammar.But that is beside the pointof our criticisms.
/ KimSterelny Devitt 510 / Michael out helpsto bring distinction thatMarr's we think Nevertheless, that we think View.Briefly, abouttheRight andwrong isright what and Marr'scomputational conflates grammar transformational 8. thisin section levels.We shalldiscuss algorithmic tocriticisms response havea standard andhisfollowers Chomsky rules aboutgrammatical claim their outthat Theypoint likeours.25 to thebestexbasedon inference hypothesis scientific is a typical andunderstand ofhowwe produce isneeded Anaccount planation. we havebuilt is that ofthis Thebestexplanation sentences. English define suggests ofevidence a variety that samerules us thevery into that we do have to infer So we are entitled sentencehood. English totwo attention go on todraw in.Thegrammarians built rules those to the any inference with itshares which ofthisinference aspects bestexplanation. may oftheinference that theconclusion toargue (i)Itisirrelevant conthehypothesis doesnotprove theevidence Ofcourse be wrong. scienlike anyother bytheevidence itisunderdetermined clusively: exbetter would provide other hypotheses Perhaps hypothesis. tific andis therefore is true ofanyhypothesis Butagainthat planations. we are entitlareproduced other hypotheses Until besidethepoint. ed to acceptthisone. interpret we should hypothesis (ii)Whenwe accepta theoretical underlying reality an area of to describe it purports itrealistically: theview viewis instrumentalism: Thealternative ourobservations. observafor an instrument predicting is simply an hypothesis that an underlynot describe it does observations; ofpast onthebasis tions and is discredited a doctrine as general Instrumentalism ingreality. in parit to linguistics toapply discrimination be unjustified itwould ticular. tobelieve areentitled that they conclude thegrammarians Insum, underlythereality do describe rules really that their grammatical thespeaker's is psychological, Thatreality behaviour. inglinguistic competence. a nice analogy(1980: 189-92).Suppose that offers Chomsky of abouttheinside evidence are unableto getanydirect physicists oftheinside that, a theory cando isconstruct thesun.Thebestthey ofthesun. behaviour wouldexplaintheobserved ifit weretrue, to are entitled butthey ofcourse, maybe wrong Anysuchtheory can come up with. believethebestone they toobject Itispointless observations. these We agreewith general
View"/ 511 What's "TheRight Wrong With be theconclusion ofan inference tothebestexplanation might that realistically. be construed should certainly theconclusion wrong. And, we do strain.) However, realism isthemost virulent known (Sydney inthis parresult views yield thedesired those general notthink that 2 and hencetheSensible tojustify are insufficient ticular case: they Version. to thepsychological theinference is whether The keyquestion inknows howto codify one. Nobody reality ofG is an appropriate on appropriate buttwoconditions tothebestexplanation, ferences be both explanation must The proposed enough. onesare obvious It is no canonofscienceto accept thanitsrivals. good and better norto drawexplanaare worse, a bad explanation becauseothers tionsoutofa hatwhenwe have a rangeofgood ones. grammarversion oftransformational Is G-say a TraceTheoretic we must ofcompetence? Surely on thewayto a goodexplanation mechanisms isknown ofthecomputational be agnostic here. So little thatwe have no idea whether G is even a candidate ofthemind Is G better thanG' ? Again, suspenfor explanation. psychological Whatis thereasonforpreferring is appropriate. sionofjudgment alternatives? G to themany possible asksus to imagine Chomsky Theseremarks can be strengthened. the a theory correctly predicting thatphysicists have constructed wasa good that this Ifthere wasgeneral sun's behaviour. agreement would itstentative endorsement andthebestavailable, then theory in is notyet anything be appropriate. Buttransformational grammar optimistic: about G isindeed supposition Ourearlier likethat position. details about eventherough never hasbeena stable consensus there atwouldn't ofa grammar. We certainly oftheform and structure that wassupported byindirect tribute solar toa theory largely reality andwhich wasrejected pastexperience experts, bymany evidence, within fiveyears. wouldbe abandoned suggested thecondoesnotwarrant Insum, inference tothebestexplanation inaccepreal.We are notjustified that clusion G is psychologically 2. description ting oftheRight Version leavetheSensible Where doesourdiscussion is aboutcompetenceto that version, linguistics View? According ofbehaviour. ispart oftheexplanation an internalized grammar-and 2 wouldleave for Ifthat thelackofjustification werethecase,then Thisis a goodreasonfor thinking itself theory unjustified. linguistic thatit is indeed We think Version is notright.26 thattheSensible
/ KimSterelny 512 / Michael Devitt Butit is notentirely A final verdict must wrong either. notright. and transformaofthetheory ofsymbols, waiton our discussion ofcompetence. ofthat theory with thetheory tionalists' conflation 6. The Conflation of SymbolwithCompetence is about.She whatlinguistics Supposewe wereto ask Grandma we wouldhear Ifwe pressed, wouldbe likely to say: "language". intosentences; about together aboutwordsand theway theyfit andpassives, ambiguity, andso on.Inbrief, nouns andverbs, actives as being andrelations Grandma seeslinguistics about theproperties Wedoubt that we wouldheara word from her oflinguistic symbols. oftheRight View.Thisis a little aboutcompetence; nota glimmer that in for becausehe likes tothink Grandma, Fodor, embarrassing wise.We agreeand onlywish and readyway,is rather herrough tookmorenotice of her. thathe and Chomsky and hisfollowers denywhat The-problem is notthatChomsky theideathat isabout Grandma conflate linguistics they says.Rather, itisabout with theideathat Further, they give competence. symbols priority to thelatter. that Intheopening thework began Structures, pagesofSyntactic describes as follows: transformational linguistics Chomsky grammar, aim in thelinguistic ofa language analysis The fundamental L is to separate are thegrammatical sequenceswhich are of L from theungrammatical which sentences sequences ofL and to study thestructure ofthe notsentences sequences. (1957: 13) grammatical hereis with Much discussion symbols. Thestated concern linguistic that this isindeed theimpression intransformational grammar gives word isabout as ambiguity, theconcern. Thediscussion suchmatters and synonymy. order, the wayofdescribing as we haveseen,thefavoured Nevertheless, classicalwork, taskis quitedifferent. Thus,in another linguistic as some inthesamebreath ofSyntax, almost oftheTheory Aspects remarks likethosequotedabove,Chomsky says: to determine...the The problem forthelinguist...is underlying ofrulesthathas been mastered by thespeakersystem is in a technical theory sense,linguistic hearer...Hence,
What's With Wrong "TheRight View"/ 513 sinceit is concerned mentalistic, with a mental discovering reality underlying actualbehavior. (1965:4) is notwith Heretheconcern symbols, a human product, butwith a ofthehuman characteristic competence, mind. Thisis theRight oftheconflation are tobe found inourrecent Signs discussion of theSensible Version. Wesawthen that transformationalists usetwo different sorts ofevidence in constructing a grammar. Thesebear on twoquite different directly theories. Thelinguistic evidence bears directly on thetheory ofsymbols andthepsycholinguistic evidence bearsdirectly on thetheory ofcompetence. The properties ofsymbols a grammar that concern are syntactic properties. Fullsemantic properties-the properties that determine meaning-include reference. Reference involves word-world conneca/ tions on which grammar castsno light. Similarly, thecompetence a grammar that concerns issyntactic competence. Full semantic competence requires reference isnotfully detergetting right. Reference mined inthehead.So,theconflation byanything that we havebeen is thatofthetheory ofthesyntax ofsymbols describing with the ofsyntactic theory competence.28 Thesetheories arevery different. isa menLinguistic competence talstateofa person that herlinguistic itplays explains behaviour; a keyrolein theproduction ofthatbehaviour. Linguistic symbols are the result of thatbehaviour; of that theyare theproducts behaviour. ofthephysical world: Theyare datable placeable parts intheair,marks sounds on thepage,andso on.Theyare notmental entities at all. A theory oflinguistic ofa partoftheproduction is nota theory oftheproducts, thesymbols Of themselves. symbols thecausalrelation between andsymbol, course, given competence we can expect a theory oftheone tobearon a theory oftheother. 8. Buttherelation Weconsider that relation insection doesnotmake thetwotheories identical. The theory ofsymbols is concerned with theproperties ofsymmake them What isitabout them bolsthat certain goodfor purposes. that leadspeopleto produce and respond to them do?The as they answer isthat what ismeanhavemeaning. Butthen simple symbols Ithasbeendiscovered are part ofthe ing? that syntactic properties answer. we might inwhat makes a certain movebe interested Analogously,
View.27
Devitt / KimSterelny 514 / Michael wouldbe in terms shot.The answer ment ofa ball a good tennis be Or we might and height. ofsuchproperties as speed,direction in whatmakesa certain chessmovegood.The answer interested possiblegame continuations; would be in termsof the myriad and an advantage in each ofthesethemovegiveswhite perhaps, caseswe areconcernthis. Inall ofthese moveguarantees no other thehead". world "outside inthephysical or events ed with objects which is concern haveanother ineach case we might However, "inside the at least, "inside thehead"(or, with something very much movements istheexplanation ofthebehaviour-certain What body"). tennis shots goodsentences, ofhandandarm, perhaps-producing (perhaps, we needa psychological this, orchessmoves? To answer that a theory we needa theory ofcompetence; theory, physiological) chess forexample, howwhite knewthatthatparticular explains, a theory oftheobis different from movewas good.Sucha theory different ofa competence: output bythebehavioural jectsproduced shotsor chessmoves. symbols, tennis oflinguistic from a theory of and thetheory thetheory ofsymbols between The difference themanywaysin can be madevividby considering competence to thetransformaAccording couldbe competent. which a person a grammar. in internalizing consists English competence tionalists, nearenough haveinternalized allEnglish speakers Theygo further: has a uniform structure acrossthe theone grammar; competence so. Many isso,itisnotnecessarily Evenifthis linguistic community. structures they other could agreeonthemeaning-relevant grammars became ofEnglish. SupposethatMartians assignto thesentences one ofthese other inEnglish grammars. byinternalizing competent from to different would have be competence Thetheory ofMartian be the would ofsymbols same, thetheory ofours.Yet thetheory it to Earth, that itwouldstill be English for spoke.Returning they if among a jottothetheory ofsymbols competence notmatter would was entirely idiosyncratic.29 actualEnglish speakers various other with aspects Insum, together linguistic competence, That behaviour. of the speaker's linguistic produces psychology, produces with the externalenvironment, together behaviour, a theory ofcompetence. isnot A theory ofsymbols linguistic symbols. is bewildering. Whydo of thesetwo theories The conflation with this Weshall conclude conflate them? transformationalists paper a tentative 10). diagnosis (section
What's With "TheRight View"/ 515 Wrong 7. Grandma'sView we urgeGrandfrom competence, symbols Having distinguished and exma'sViewofwhatlinguistics is about:itis aboutsymbols rolesin symbols havetheir invirtue ofwhich plains theproperties that is whatitought tobe aboutanddo. cautiously, ourlives;more for about thetheory Weshall Grandma's Viewbysaying more argue to the moreaboutitsrelation ofsyntax and,in thenextsection, inmore are discussed ofcompetence. Someofthesematters theory (1987:partsI-III). detailin ourLanguage and Reality which symbols are good?The purfor (1) What are thepurposes ones.Peohasseen,are communicative everyone poses,as almost information to each other about to communicate ple use symbols to greet, environment. Peopleuse them thehuman andnonhuman andso on.These abuse, intimidate, command, joke, offend, question, is also ourmainmedium Ifourpublic language aresocialpurposes. it is,thenlinguistic haveanother as we think symbols ofthought, butnotsocial,rolein ourlives. important, in virtue We meaning. oftheir servethosepurposes (2) Symbols thatwe think to the contribute mentioned above someproperties weresyntactic, reflecofthemeaning. Thoseproperties explanation fits into the total this In our the concerns of view, syntax paper. ting in the of meanas follows. Thecorenotion explanation explanation itis largely has becausea sentence conditions; ingis that oftruth that ithasitsrole.The sentence's truth conditions certain property in terms is to be explained of its thosetruth conditions of having is to be andthereference ofitsparts. Reference structure syntactic ultimately, bya causal theory but, bya description explained partly links So syntax intoaccount to nonlinguistic reality. theory taking oftruth conditions. has itsplace in theexplanation takes of Grandma's View thatwe are urging (3) The version ofthe tobe about parts tokens, datable, placeable, symbol linguistics from be distinguished This version oftheViewshould world. physical Talk of takeslinguistics to be aboutsymbol types. another which talk ofthose a convenient shorthand for oftokens isoften types just talkoflinguistic amounted Ifthat wereall that to,the types types. of Grandma's View wouldcollapseintothe first. secondversion Katz(1977,1981,1984a),seemsto at leastone linguist, However, Itis aboutPlatonic obabouttypes. takelinguistics tobe irreducibly as this is often tobe. Fodortreats thought jectsjustas mathematics
516 / Michael Devitt / KimSterelny ifithasa fair chanceofbeing theWorst View.Hisobjection, which strikes us as sound, isthat thePlatonic viewmakes linguistics unempirical (1981:205-6). The viewthatlinguistics is abouttokens seemsto havebecome discredited through itsassociation with theanti-theoretical practices ofpre-Chomskian structural linguistics. Clearly, this misguided past should notbe allowed to count against theview.30 Asidefrom that, thereis a surprisingly popularobjection to the view.31 Crudely, linguistics can't be about tokens because there aren't enough ofthem. The grammar for English applies toa potentially infinite number of Yet therecan be onlya finite symbols. number of tokens.So, linguistics can'tbe abouttokens. One might as wellobject a theory that oftigers can'tbe aboutthe beasts that inzoos.Tiger stalk India andexcite interest isopentheory ended.It follows thatifsomething from thetheory led to theexistence ofa tiger token, then that token would be,say,carnivorous. thegrammar forEnglish describes thecharacteristics of Similarly, anything qualifying as a sentence ofEnglish. Itsapplication is not limited to tokens actually produced. Itfollows from thetheory that ifsomething ledtotheexistence ofan English sentence then token, thattokenwouldbe, say,tensed. (4) Indistinguishing thetheory ofsymbols thetheory ofcomfrom Wedo think that we mayseemtohavemadeitmysterious. petence, linguistics, as thetheory ofsymbols, has a certain from autonomy we are physicalists other theories, including psychology. However, and so mustsee thisautonomy as onlyrelative: in some sense, in physical terms. Butthis must be explained linguistics ultimately requirement doesnotremove theautonomy oflinguistics anymore thanit removes thatof,say,biology or economics. itseemsto is a socialscience. Likeall socialsciences, Linguistics the andfacts about be immediately on psychological facts dependent is comsort ofdependency natural environment. The nature ofthis Yeteachsocialscience to describe. plexand hard proceeds largely Andso itshould. undisturbed bythelackofa complete description. makes ofdependency. What Consider someexamples ofthis sort event a pawnor a dollar? makesa physical a physical What object in and events a voteor unlawful? intrinsic to theobjects Nothing enwithin certain it is the psychological question; rather, states, Exactwith andevents. ofpeopleinvolved suchobjects vironments, is hard whatinvolvement, and whatenvironment, ly whatstates,
What'sWrongWith"The RightView" / 517 feelfreeto theorizeabout chess, to say. Yet people quite properly we should feel free to money, elections and the law. Similarly, objects and events. theorizeabout linguistic to considerthe way in whichthe syntactic Itwould be interesting properties that have concernedus in thispaper are dependenton psychologicalfact.We mustleave thatto anotherplace.32
8. Symbolsand Competence
It is timefora verdicton the RightView. To give thiswe must between the two theories first say a briefword on the relationship thatthe transformationalists conflate: the theoryof the syntaxof a competencein the language. language and the theoryof syntactic thatare releThe theory ofsyntaxassignsto sentencesstructures competence The theory ofsyntactic meanings. vantto thesentences' role in the thatplay a psychological assignsto sentencesstructures must and comprehension. The latter structures sentences' production include the former.For, the productionand comprehensionof ofthose sentencesby thecompetent speakerrequiresthematching strucsentenceswiththoughts having the same meaning-relevant sentences is justto have theskillofmatching tures.To be competent and thought thatare, in thisway, alike. thatthetheory ofsyntax assigns structure So, themeaning-relevant the structure to sentencesmustbe thesame as themeaning-relevant But thoughts. competenceassignsto matching theoryof syntactic in more thanthisstructure: the theoryofcompetenceis interested it is interested in how the speaker matchesthe meaning-relevant Thereare manydifferent ofsentencesand thoughts. structures ways These differences structures. of matching involving manydifferent ofcomare irrelevant to thetheory ofsyntaxbutvitalto thetheory processesthat petencebecause ofitsconcernwiththepsychological to performance. competencecontributes betweenthe An earlierexample helpsto bringout thedifference to G the ofsyntaxand the theory of competence.According theory and thepassive(e.g. 'Sam active(e.g. 'Max bitSam') is thebasic form to G' thereverse butaccording was bitten byMax') thederivedform, is the case. Since each sentence is assigned the same meaningat does not matter relevantstructure by G and G', thisdifference all to the theoryof syntax.Yet it is crucial to the theoryof com-
/ KimSterelny Devitt 518 / Michael thatpsycholthissortofquestion It is to settle precisely petence. andthelikeare reaction times, about acquisition, evidence inguistic to meaning. relevance has no immediate Thisevidence sought. and the computational between distinction earlier-mentioned Marr's here.The computational levels (section 5) is helpful algorithmic one from thenature ofthetask;"a mapping theory characterizes ofa example to another" (1982:24). In Marr's kindofinformation intosingle is from pairsof numbers the mapping cash register, right hasto gettheaddition that mapping numbers; and,ofcourse, must taskthat ofthecomputational (p. 22).So thecharacterization theory. involves a pieceofarithmetical oftheregister a theory begin is bethemapping speaker, competent Inthecase ofa syntactically has to mapping and that and sentences; structures tween syntactic ofthecomputational So thecharacterization right. getthemeaning of involves a theory ofcompetence begina theory taskthatmust with transformational Theproblem gramstructure. meaning-relevant ofhow taskto questions thislinguistic maris thatit goes beyond and psycholanalyses this task.Itintroduces thespeaker performs task. Theseanalyses tothelinguistic areirrelevant datathat inguistic we havecomlevel.Theconflation anddatabearon thealgorithmic with thecomputalevel this that of algorithmic of is roughly plained tional level. "is a truecomputational theory MarrclaimsthatChomsky's whatthesyntactic with specifying it "is concerned solely theory": andnotat all with sentence should be, ofan English decomposition be achieved" (1982:28). Butwhat should howthat decomposition It goes way decomposition? in Chomsky's syntactic is involved So it meaning. is necessary to determine that thestructure beyond coma oftaskrequired by thecharacterization goes waybeyond isnot Chomsky Though ofthecompetent speaker. theory putational hispsychological apfor with thealgorithm performance, concerned for with thealgorithm concerned seemsclearly togrammars proach level. thealgorithmic Thereare levelswithin competence. View.The Viewseemed on theRight nowtheverdict Consider independon a dubious theory becauseit madelinguistic wrong ofG (secreality thepsycholinguistic tothebestexplanation: ference to transformawas madeattractive this inference tion5). (Perhaps section oftheories; 6.) conflation tionalists by their seemprobably theory linguistic Viewmakes Incontrast, Grandma's tothe on an inference ofthetheory Itmakes thetruth depend true.
With "TheRight View"/ 519 What's Wrong that is not dubious: thelinguistic evidence warrants bestexplanation ofthelinguistic ofG. We have good reasonto reality acceptance properties thatG have themeaning-relevant believethatsymbols to them. The existence ofalternative grammars likeG' is assigns thesame no problem. G' is meaning-equivalent toG andso assigns as linguistically realas properties. Itis therefore meaning-relevant irrelevant. between G and G' are linguistically G. The differences is is right and Right Itwouldbe niceto saysimply that Grandma thiswouldbe fartoo simple. wrong. However, structure ofthoughts we haveseenthat themeaning-relevant First, must be thesame as that matches with symbols thatcompetence thecharacterization ofthesymbols. Thetheory ofsymbols supplies ofcompetence. levelofthetheory required for thecomputational intheRight View that there issometruth View. implies So,Grandma's evidence theconthat hasgoneinto thepsycholinguistic Second, butnot ofG is directly relevant toa theory ofcompetence struction pracofsymbols. that linguistics, as currently Thisshows toa theory the is partly aboutcompetence notsymbols. To thisextent, ticed, in theRight and Viewhasmade itright belief transformationalists' Grandma's Viewwrong. with is thecasewith Theseremarks areconcerned what linguistics. Whatoughtto be the case? Thereare two taskswhich, though symbols, theother one concerns related, ought to be keptdistinct: on. Bothtasksare,ofcourse, Thatis whatwe insist competence. in arguing taskwe aboutwhich worthwhile and there is no point tocall we suggest that itis natural However, should call"linguistic". which which isabout andthelatter, theformer, language, "linguistic", stateofpeople,"psycholinguistic". Adopis abouta psychological oughtto be about tingthisusage,we concludethatlinguistics to which is largely Grandma's right, ought View, linguistic symbols. be entirely right. oflinguistics priority ourdiscussion hasrevealed a certain Finally, at tennis or ofcompetence overpsycholinguistics. Just as a theory or chess, so oftennis ofthenature chessdepends on a prior grasp at a language ofcompetence also does thepsycholinguistic theory Thisaccords ofthenature ofthelanguage. on a prior grasp depend thecom(1982:27-8)for with thepriority that Marr seemsto imply whatis comleveloverthealgorithmic: understanding putational how it is over understanding putedhas somesortofprecedence computed.33
/ KimSterelny Devitt 520 / Michael Intuitions 9. Linguistic ourarguagainst protest 4) a likely (section We havementioned intuitions oflinguistic account to takeproper we havefailed ment: of transformarole in the practice whichplaysucha prominent that beliefs beliefs: linguistic arespeakers' Theseintuitions tionalists. isambiguous; that another isa sentence; ofwords sequence a certain and so on. Whenwe talkofthe are paraphrases, thattwoothers whatwe are really ofsymbols, thetheory for evidence" "linguistic protheseintuitions The evidence to are theseintuitions. referring 244).Howthen 1975: andGarrett Fodor, (Fodor, videispsychological So, howcan notbe psychological? based on them can thetheory Even ofcompetence? thetheory from distinguished itbe so sharply of G overG' as an account do notsupport our intuitions though toohasty. View seems oftheRight ourrejection reality, psychological is part linguistics View, to theRight according We havesaidthat, rolethat evidential The important ofbehaviour. oftheexplanation to often leadsthem intuitions giveto linguistic transformationalists explains those also, perhaps primarily, claim that linguistics intuitions.34 bya claim be meant that might things different aretwoquite There havethe that speakers the fact One is: evidence. are intuitions that is intuition a psychological of an The having is evidence. intuitions theory. for a psychological be evidence andso would phenomenon is causally competence the speaker's that totheextent Inparticular, theyare indeed intuitions, forher havinglinguistic responsible Andto that ofcompetence. thetheory for evidence psychological does ofcompetence, thetheory with ifidentified linguistics, extent, of intuitions. explainthe having fora psychological can be evidence of an intuition The having to be false.Thus,an is thought theintuition even though theory for tobe evidence intuitions ofreligious can takethehaving atheist a theory of,say,irrationality. or against different is importantly oftheclaim interpretation Thealternative of thecontent that is to suppose Forthealternative inthis respect. theintuibutonly if, Andthat canbe so if, isevidence. theintuitions areevidence intuitions oftrue Thecontents tobe true. tions arelikely speakareabout. strictly Indeed, they a theory ofthephenomena for that are the aboutthem, notourintuitions itisthephenomena, ing, biological be physical evidence, intuitions may Inthis way, evidence.
View" / 521 With "TheRight Wrong What's Theyare psychological orwhatever. economic evidence, evidence, phenomena.35 onlyiftheyare aboutpsychological evidence intuiby linguistic is supported ofsymbols Insofar as thetheory are about Theseintuitions contents. it is supported by their tions, to be true, they are likely that So, to theextent symbols. linguistic They ofsymbols. fora theory contents are indeedevidence their withthe ifidentified evidence. Linguistics, are notpsychological notthehavare about, whatintuitions explains ofsymbols, theory TheRight stands. tasks between Ourdistinction intuitions. ingofthose still be rejected. Viewshould basedon theroleofintuitions.36 objection Thereis a moresubtle but tobe performed, that there aretwotasks Theobjection accepts because is harmless, evenappropriate, their conflation claims that competence. isbyexamining onsymbols light waytothrow theonly thetheory for evidence theonly provide intuitions ourlinguistic For, to see theseintuitions as reflections and itis plausible ofsymbols; voiceofcompetence"). ("the competence ofourunderlying linguistic is excusable because symbols View'sfailure to mention The Right thetheory of from is completely derivative thetheory ofsymbols competence. Wepointed tothis beenconceded objection. hasalready Something the same is not wrong because entirely the View out that Right found in and structure is to be symbol matching meaning-relevant also be a oftheone must ofthestructure So thetheory thought. oftheother. ofthestructure theory with more than is concerned thetheory ofcompetence Ofcourse, other strucwith Itis concerned thoughts. ofmatching this structure tothetheory is irrelevant inmatching. Thisconcern involved tures Accordtheobjection. undermine this doesnot ofsymbols. However, thetheory includes ofcompetence thetheory ingto theobjection, butis widerthanit. ofsymbols of forthetheory claimofepistemic priority It is theobjection's the that theclaim toourposition: that seemsdamaging competence is derivative. Thisclaimis basedon assumptions ofsymbols theory about are theonlyevidence intuitions: aboutlinguistic they (i) that ofcompetence. (ii)thattheyare reflections symbols; tolinguistic andreact Peopleproduce be an exaggeration. (i)must and any aboutsuchphenomena, We can use information symbols. in sociallife, and their we have abouthumans otherinformation aboutsymbols. theorizing
522 / Michael Devitt / KimSterelny (ii)is moredifficult to deal with. Supposethat description 3 were trueofthespeaker: hercompetence consists in tacit propositional knowledge ofthegrammar, as theCrazy Version requires. (ii)would thenseem veryplausible. Ifthespeaker has this knowledge ofthegrammar, itis plausible tosee herintuitions as stemming from theknowledge insomeway. Mostsimply, theintuitions might be seen as a straightforward ininwhich ference from theknowledge, case herintuitions wouldbe thevery bestevidence ofthenature ofhercompetence. However, linguists havegenerally preferred tosee theintuitions as related less to thetacit than this directly knowledge: that knowledge, together with ofintuitions other factors, explain thehaving (J. A. Fodor1981: 200-1). Still, theintuitions would be largely reflections oftheunderlyas (ii)claims. ingcompetence, Sincethey largely reflect knowledge, theyshouldbe true,and hencegood evidenceof the nature of symbols. However,the speaker'scompetence does not consist in tacit knowledge ofthegrammar. So (ii)must be reassessed. itlikely ina sentenceWe think that a speaker's competence resides in or to thecenparsing module, something similarly inaccessible tral processor (section 3).Thecentral processor isthehome ofintuiitis an open Given theinaccessibility ofthesentence-parser, tions. has inproducing theintuitions. Itis question whatrolethemodule that there wouldbe anything closeto theabove certainly unlikely same inference. Themodule not even"speak the straightforward may language" as thecentral processor. What havea roleinproducing elsebutcompetence might linguistic as intuitions? The central is theobvious candidate. Just processor andeconomic intuitions can physical intuitions, biological intuitions, to the appropriate be produced by central-processor responses so also can linguistic intuitions. These linguistic phenomena, are nottobe discovered inward at ourown phenomena bylooking butbylooking outward at thesocialrolethat competence symbols do this do notstart from When playinourlives. linguists now,they for millenscratch. aboutthesematters Peoplehavebeenthinking orotherwise nia.Theresult is folk, ofthis central-processor activity oftheages.The or opinion: thelinguistic wisdom primitive, theory and incomplete, wisdom willbe a good,albeitfallible guideto the nature oflinguistic symbols. theresult ofcentralthat intuitions wereentirely Suppose linguistic
View"/ 523 What's With "TheRight Wrong be reflecTheywould notthen pastandpresent. processor activity, linguistics As a result, and (ii)wouldbe false. tions ofcompetence we have.Furthermore, ourhaving oftheintuitions would not explain prior tothat isepistemically theclaim that thetheory ofcompetence ofsymbols wouldbe groundless. for Whichof our two possiblesourcesis mainlyresponsible to main roleis obviously Thesentence-parser's linguistic intuitions? about do things withlanguagenot to provideus withthoughts itlikely that thesentence-parser Nevertheless, we think language. exthemost basicintuitions-for rolewith does havea significant itis likely ofsimilarity and difference. Similarly, ample, judgments themost rolewith modules havea significant thattheperception itis unlikely that thepercepbasicperceptual intuitions. However, recognition and ofthose intuitions; modules arethesolesource tion on central Itis also unlikely memory. classification depends partly intuithatthesentence-parser is thesole sourceofbasiclinguistic aresenintuitions that a person's linguistic haveargued Many tions., If so theyare sensitive to information sitiveto her context.37 totheextent that Furthermore, inthecentral processor. represented like gramoftheoretical concepts ontheacquisition intuitions depend will central andnoun processing phrase, passive, matical, ambiguous, playa role.38 anyrolein To sustain must havehardly processor (ii),thecentral our Itwouldhaveto be thecase that intuitions. forming linguistic about linguistic by any thinking intuitions are largely uninfluenced and aboutlanguage at home andbyanything we learn phenomena, otherto differ from all would have atschool. phenomena Linguistic usthink. tomake andso on-in failing biological, economic, physical, the between theory Insum, we accept that there isa closerelation we do notacHowever and thetheory ofcompetence. ofsymbols intuitions showsthattheconflation ceptthattheroleoflinguistic is northatthe former of the two theories is appropriate, theory the are notsimply to thelatter. The intuitions prior epistemically are largely so. To the that they ofcompetence; we doubt reflection are not, that are notreflections, extent strictly speaking, they they the of symbols. The evidenceis rather evidenceforthe theory Inanycase,the that giverisetotheintuitions. linguistic phenomena Wesee no reason for thetheory. intuitions arenotthesoleevidence on theRight View. to reviseourverdict
524 / Michael Devitt / KimSterelny 10. Diagnosis of the Conflation A major theme ofthis paperhas been that linguists conflate the ofthesyntactic theory properties ofsymbols with thetheory ofsyntactic do they do this? competence. Why We shallfinish byhazardinga fewguesses. First, equivocation between taking 'knowledge' torefer tothecontent ofknowledge and taking itto refer to thestateofknowledge thetheory ofsymbols mayleadtoa slidefrom tothetheory ofcomThe initialconception of the task is to describea petence.39 L. L iswhat itistheir language L-speakers know; knowledge. So the task istodescribe L-speakers' This knowledge. follows, however, only if'knowledge' to content. The slidecomesifwe movefrom refers that this, andthefact L-speakers' knowledge is their competence in L, to theconclusion thatthetaskis to describe their competence. For thismoveholdsonlyif'knowledge' refers to thestate. Second, thefact that thegrammarians tend tothink ofcompetence as propositional theconflation. knowledge ofsyntax facilitates For, a theory ofcompetence ofthesyntactical wouldthenbe a theory rules known bythespeaker. Andif thespeaker knows that a certain it does apply; ruleappliesto a linguistic symbol of course, then, knowledge implies truth. So,oncethespeaker's hadbeen knowledge there described, wouldbe nothing further to say aboutlinguistic symbols. Third, confusion overthenature and roleoflinguistic intuitions iftheseintuitions We haveseen(section maybe significant. 9) that aretaken tobe reflections evidence ofcompetence andalsotheonly to see that as for thetheory ofsymbols, thenitis plausible theory derivative from thetheory ofcompetence. can'tbe aboutsymFourth, thestrange objection that linguistics bol tokensbecause therearen'tenoughof them(section 7) has be aboutsymbols discredited theidea thatlinguistics can literally isabout atall.Forthat ideaisthen tobe that thought linguistics types. It it couldnotbe empirical. IfitwereaboutsuchPlatonic entities andable then be thought that canbe madeempirical, may linguistics in a language, of sentences to accommodate the infinite number and understo produce itto be aboutourcapacity onlybytaking tandany ofthosesentences. is partly Fifth, thetheory ofsymbols, likeother socialtheories, we have not We think, on psychological facts. dependent though
View"/ 525 "TheRight With Wrong What's in thecase of is particularly striking that this dependency argued, thisdependency Perhaps ofthesymbols. properties thesyntactic of autonomy ofthetheory therelative seeing peoplefrom prevents from psychology. symbols twoarenot. Thenext from ourdiscussion. arederived Thesepoints between it seemsthatit is hardto noticethedifference Sixth, are obviously Yetthey behaviour and linguistic symbols. linguistic of usually movements, Thebehaviour is a series ofbodily different. producintheworld isan object Thesymbol orhands. vocalchords a sound usually with ofthe environment, behaviour thehelp ed bythe that is the oflinguistic behaviour Theexplanation oran inscription. description is a psychological ofcompetence concern ofthetheory is theconthat symbol ofa linguistic ofitscause.The explanation ofits nature. description ofsymbols isa semantic cernofthetheory does butthat is thesymbol, thebehaviour (Insomesignlanguages initqua interest explanatory we havea different thepoint: notalter to distinguish Perhapsthe failure qua behaviour.) symbolfrom that of a theory the conflation from encourages behaviour symbol the latter. that with a explains the former theory explains partly a truthwe have founda place forsyntaxwithin Seventh, difficult to it very Yet is 7). meaning (section theory of conditional think We it Whatdoes explain?40 see whywe needsucha theory. behaviour linguistic we havejustmadebetween that thedistinction this (1987:sec. question is vitalinanswering andlinguistic symbols maylead peopleto 9.4).The absenceofa clearand agreedanswer altogether. missthetaskofexplaining symbols a theory with ofa theory ofsymbols Inconclusion, theconflation of matter aboutthesubject has caused confusion of competence to andought is largely, matter that thesubject We think linguistics. and Grandma is right, Right Oversimplifying, be entirely, symbols. are bothwrong.41 Wrong
Notes see Katz 1984a. mistaken; to Katzis probably 1. The attribution with a systematic thus use 'grammar' persuasion oftheRight 2. Linguists of andas thepossession construction both as thetheorist's ambiguity: 1965:25). (Chomsky speaker each native for that "a psychological interpretation and Lightfoot claim 3. Hornstein andby writers bymodern beenadopted hasoften claims grammatical an interpretasuch 28n). Indeed, (1981c: grammarians" sometraditional
526 / Michael Devitt/ Kim Sterelny tionseemsto havea longhistory; see Saussure 1916:77,90. ofthis paper, ourattention an earlier version 4. After we haddelivered paper, Soames1984a.Thistakesa similar was drawn to an excellent is about. viewto ourson theconflation and on whatlinguistics of instead work (1987:13442),we usedtheverb'follow' 5. In an earlier We havechanged because'following a rule' suggests tomany 'govern'. thevery theruleis represented andso undermines distinction we that are emphasizing. isanalogous toStabler's distinction between descriptions 6. Ourthree-way (1983: theory between levelsof computational three-way distinction 391-2). to thetechnical term 'cognize' 7. In recent Chomsky haspreferred years theinterpretative However, know' 1980:69-70). 'tacitly (1975b:164-5; ina "propositional standing Doescognizing G require difficulty remains. attitude" to G or is it a mereskill? tothis his effect, given 8. Stabler's (1983)arevery persuasive arguments analogy. using thecomputer oftheCrazy Version plausible interpretation and Harman: is that between Chomsky exchange 9. The most revealing 1969b. See also Harman Harman 1969; Chomsky Chomsky 1969a; 1967; 1975a. Chomsky 1972, ofcourse; see, for example, Stich doubters, 10. We are notthefirst Pylyshyn 1972,and Katz 1977. between 11. Berwick andWeinberg callthis theviewthat therelationship embodies itis transparent. a grammar andtheparser that Theyseem, could be lessdirect, theparser tohold that therelationship yet obscurely, wouldstill realizethegrammar (1984:75-82). "Therules 12. Baker naively, as follows: somewhat puts therequirement, thelanguage be as general as possible, do notmake should so that they thanit actually is" (1978:8). appearto be morecomplicated is madeby Berwick and Weinberg 1984:94-5. 13. The same point David 14. We are indebted Mafiaof Norbert Hornstein, to a Maryland that ledto andAmy for andsuggestions Weinberg criticisms Lightfoot of language acquisition. thisdiscussion andLightfoot 1981c; Lightfoot 15. See particularly, Baker1979;Hornstein in press. 15-21; 1981; 1982,especially: of thisapproach; expositions 16. Chomsky 1981aand 1982are detailed and See also Wexler1982;Berwick 1981bis an overview. Chomsky 1986. and Williams Weinberg 1984,chs 1 and 5; Van Reimsdijk what obvious itis notalways 17. Evenheresomecaution is appropriate: "thechild from can be gleaned data.Forexample, mayhaveintona1982: andWanner tional boundaries" accesstomajor (Gleitman phrase 37). 1982:27, 35. 18. See, e.g.,Gleitman and Wanner in press. 19. See, e.g.,Lightfoot is provided ofsubjacency 20. Evidence for theinnate byBerwick principle to 1984:153-71. J.D. Fodor1985is a detailed andWeinberg criticism, 1985is a reply. which Berwick and Weinberg
What's WrongWith"The RightView" / 527 as times in usingreaction outsomeproblems has pointed 21. Pylyshyn in psychology (1980: 116-19). evidence that go mostly evidence basedon thepsycholinguistic 22. Fordiscussions 1978: ofG,see Bresnan reality thepsychological thecase for against 1983: Johnson-Laird 1980:382-3;Lyons1981:259-60; 1-3;Anderson 276-95. See, this. confirms a grammar for ofactual arguments 23. Anexamination 1981c:17-24. and Lightfoot Baker1978:3-27;Hornstein for example, rehisexplicit comesfrom ofChomsky this interpretation for 24. Support or hearer; a speaker for is a model a grammar oftheviewthat jection see, e.g., 1965:9, 139-40. 1980:189-201. 25. See, e.g.,Chomsky unilaterally ...,as is often ofpsychology a branch is truly 26. "Iflinguistics pretenwith thegreatest itis so farthebranch asserted by linguists, et al 1985:5). (Gazdar results" reliable sionsand thefewest andKatz 1966, see Chomsky oftheconflation, examples 27. Forsomeother 1971,ch. 4. of thetheory conflating mistake, makea similar typically 28. Philosophers conditionsoftruth ofsymbols-particularly properties thefull semantic exis themost Dummett competence. offull semantic thetheory with (1975:99). ofunderstanding" is a theory ofmeaning "a theory plicit: view a propositional this mistake bytaking often compound Philosophers and criticisms, Forreferences (cf.theCrazyVersion). ofcompetence Soames1984b. 1981:92-110;1984:205-11; see Devitt point;1977:266. 29. Katzmakesa similar was "insuffito grammars thestructuralist approach that 30. Katzremarks oftokens can be as abstract abstract" (1984a:18).Buta theory ciently as youlike. inconversation. times many with this objection 31. Wehavebeenconfronted in preparation. 32. See Devitt a linguist for andarguably (qualinguist) "itispossible, proper, 33. Compare: a psycholfor possible Butitis hardly matters ofpsychology. toignore et al 1985:5). (Gazdar language" to ignore inguist 1978: 4-5. Baker 1969a: 81-2; Lees 1957:36;Chomsky example, 34. See,for of and"import" the"source" between distinction a similar 35. Katzmakes 1977:258. intuitions; an objection alongtheselinesin Fodorfor to Jerry 36. We are indebted ofthispaper. version to an earlier response Labov 1972:192-201. 37. See, forexample, as simply judgments 38. Cf Baker,who seems to regardall intuitive ofcompetence (1978:4-5). manifestations ofsucha slidesee Baker1978:3. 39. Fora passagesuggestive Churchland 1979,andStich1983. see Leeds1978,Field1978, 40. On this ofthis versions whenearlier received forcomments 41. We are grateful La TrobeUniverofSydney, paperwerereadin 1985at theUniversity ofNewSouth Wales;andin 1986at theUniverandtheUniversity sity Stich. andStephen Cowie toFiona Wearealsoindebted ofMaryland. sity
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