Towards Just International Relations Theory

Hans Morgenthaus Classical Realism and the Problem of Justice

Ian McMurtrie 1110338 Honours Thesis May 7, 2007

Acknowledgements

I would like to offer my sincere thanks and appreciation to the following people for their assistance with this project and throughout my undergraduate career. My advisor and the members of the review board: Professor James Muir Professor Sandra Tomsons Professor Samantha Arnold My friends, family and colleagues: Maria Cristina Laureano John-Paul Knox Melissa Dzwonek Professor Jane Forsey Professor Brian Keenan Melanie Zurba James, Adele and Heather McMurtrie Len McMurtrie

Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would admit to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a dim suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you -- you so remote from the night of first ages -- could comprehend. And why not? The mind of man is capable of anything -- because everything is in it, all the past as well as all the future. What was there after all? Joy, fear, sorrow, devotion, valour, rage -- who can tell? -- but truth -- truth stripped of its cloak of time. Let the fool gape and shudder -- the man knows, and can look on without a winkHe must meet that truth with his own true stuff -with his own in-born strength. Principles won't do. Acquisitions, clothes, pretty rags -- rags that would fly off at the first good shake. No; you want a deliberate belief. An appeal to me in this fiendish row -- is there? Very well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for good or evil mine is the speech that cannot be silenced.

It is a difficult case. What do you think I ought to do -- resist? Eh? I want no more than justice. . . . He wanted no more than justice -- no more than justice. Joseph Conrad Heart of Darkness

For the social world being but a projection of human nature onto the collective plane, being but man writ large, man can understand and maintain control of society no more than he can of himself. Thus the very intimacy of his involvement impedes both understanding and control. - Hans Morgenthau

Introduction
Can there be justice in international affairs? This larger question cannot be addressed here, so we turn to a question that is necessarily prior: can there be just international relations theory? This thesis will seek to show that an understanding of justice is necessary for a theory of international relations to be credible and effective. To do this will require establishing criteria for a just theory, and subsequently to study the major schools of international relations with respect to these criteria. The dominant school of international relations today, realism, began anew in the twentieth century with Hans Morgenthau. Due to the importance of realism, his theory will be the major focus of this work. Hans Morgenthaus theory of classical realism argues against shoehorning the anarchic international condition into moral or legal theories; attempting to do this is ultimately impossible and impractical. Realists claim that politics must be evaluated solely in terms of interest defined as power; importing normative principles from philosophy will only confuse political understanding and prevent peaceful coexistence. This has become known as the realist challenge. 1 This challenge has been a potent foil to international law, international morality, international relations, and the philosophical search for justice.

AM Slaughter Burley has defined the realist challenge as: the defiant skepticism of political realists such as George Kennan, [and] Hans Morgenthau....that international law could ever play more than an epiphenomenal role in the ordering of international life. Much of the theoretical scholarship in both international law and international relations can be understood as either a response to or a refinement of this challenge. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda American Journal of International Law Vol. 87, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 206.
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Hans Morgenthau argues that there is an analogous relationship between human nature and the characteristics of the nation state. He claims that each individual is driven by the desire for power, but because individuals are subject to an overawing sovereign, their desires can be effectively channelled into support for national foreign policy. In contrast, he claims that the state exists in a chaotic international environment without any one entity maintaining a monopoly of coercive force; therefore each state must pursue its national interests with all available power. According to Morgenthaus political realism, the permanent dynamic of power and the necessity of self-interest are the sole universals in international affairs. In this reductive account, concepts such as justice and morality are extirpated because they are not binding in political circumstance.2 In contrast, the idealist school posits values such as equality, liberty, and justice that are necessarily vague and without effect in actual international affairs. Idealists erected international institutions, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, based upon these ineffable principles in order to steer states towards harmonious interaction guided by norms. Idealists believe that reason was the dominant aspect of human nature, and thus human political interact could be shaped according to reasons determined a priori. They operated deductively, positing desirable premises as ideals towards which politics ought to conform. But, Morgenthau argues, that each case of disarmament, collective security, international government, international law, and any
Morgenthau and classical political realism is not strictly mechanistic or fatalistic. He argues strenuously for a moral dimension to realism which will be discussed in Chapter One. Morgenthau believes, as the subtitle for his book suggests, that both power and peace are fundamental aspects of international relations; but that the former ought to be wisely manipulated through realist theory for the sake of the latter.
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instance of normative desire are all attempts to impose vague notions that paper-over the real dispute for power. The idealist tradition continues, and although shaken by the realist challenge, is represented here by the two versions of liberalism. The persistent realist challenge has significant implications for international relations and philosophical theory. It serves as a vital crucible for testing prospective theories and their conformity to political reality. The realist challenge tests prospective theories by requiring that they account for the material requirements of interest defined in terms of power. If a theory fails to do this, then they cannot claim purchase in the real world of international affairs. If, as Hans Morgenthau and the realists claim, any attempt to appeal to international justice to make evaluative claims is at best moot (since justice cannot have meaning in the course of actual political affairs) and at worst dangerous (as national concepts of justice are incorrectly universalized and then conflicting interpretations are resolved with force), then the nations and their populations cannot but be at the whim of national interest. Without justice, those who command the greatest power in international affairs are therefore morally unaccountable, except perhaps to their own national interest of survival.

What is Necessary for a Just International Theory? Given the pessimistic tone of Morgenthaus realism, and continuing international strife, the question at issue here is: can justice play an effective role in international relations? This larger question requires much greater depth than is available here; as such, the scope will be limited to answering a question necessary in order to begin

confronting the larger problem. Specifically, can there be just international relations theory? This project will examine realism and liberalism, two prominent theories of international relations, and compare them in terms of the following criteria for justice. If the theories that guide international statesmen cannot articulate a rational notion of justice, then there is little hope that their prescribed actions can in turn be just. The final question then is: if realism and liberalism are left wanting, are there any competing international relations theories that can be offered in their place? But first it must be established what criteria can be used to asses the merits of an international relations theory with regard to justice. I will posit three conditions that must be met for a theory to be effective in international relations, while remaining just in its evaluations and recommendations. These criteria have been selected to confront and meet the demands of the realist challenge. The criteria, when met, would mandate that a theory be efficacious in application, accurate in evaluation, but also neutral with respect to available power all of which are necessary precursors for just evaluation and action. First, for an international relations theory to be just it must maintain prescriptions for principled judgment. That is, it cannot only state that an action on the international stage is efficient, expedient, prudential or advantageous. It may be all of those things, but the theory must be able to make a statement that, for the sake of justice, an action was right or wrong in a significant moral sense. Any mechanistic theory can describe outcomes as efficient or prudent, but the goal for justice is to provide firm ground for judgment that entails a normative ought statement. That said, morality demands the consideration of pragmatic sensibilities be respected to ensure the basic

material requirements of survival and sustenance are met. But, a theory must be able to moderate pragmatic necessity and normative demands. Neglecting prudence or normative goals does not make for a theory that is just or sound. Realism attempts to collapse morality and prudence, and justice into interest. This is perhaps necessary for realist methodology, but it may not be sufficient for the purposes of international justice. Nor is realism sufficient for the next criterion, that of equality of application. This is similar to, but not identical with, justice as fairness as articulated by John Rawls.3 Equality of application is similar to justice as fairness in the sense of equal application of principle regardless of the power wielded by the actor, but it is divergent in that equal application is not necessarily concerned with the redistribution of resources. Equality of application seeks the transparency of power or privilege in making judgments on the international scene. In other words, if a powerful international actor feels it prudential to conduct a certain act, and a theory condones it as prudential but says nothing more, this theory is not just it must recognize the concept of isonomia.4 Liberal international relations theory seeks to meet this criterion by neutralizing considerations of power in regards to judgment and action. In the sense that it demands that liberal polities behave consistent with liberal principles regardless of relative strength between the participants.

Cf. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 223 251. 4 Isonomia is the Greek term roughly translated as equal political rights. I use this term to distinguish this claim from any legal notions, but to retain the concept of equality of application which is a precursor for justice. Isonomia is a political concept that is prior to law, chosen here in distinction from the later English word isonomy. Cf. Gregory Vlastos, Isonomia, The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 74, No. 4. (1953), pp. 337-366. Where he states: Because equal distribution says too much, as equality before the law says too little. For what is conceived as equally distributed in Isonomia is restricted to Nomos, i.e. to the political domain. (p. 352)
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The third criterion for a just theory is its ability to guide action by providing accurate descriptive and predictive stipulations. Theories that purport to establish a particular theory of justice, but cannot extend their influence to the international sphere, are mute in their ability to prevail in the world of political action. For a theory to be just it must not diverge from actions and evaluations in particular circumstance, as the realists charged against the idealist school. The theory must remain attuned to reality while attempting to guide it towards just actions. A caveat to this notion is that a just theory must not be strictly materially contingent. For example, the condition known as the liberal peace the tendency for liberal states to coexist peacefully and operate external to the competition for power although successful, remains inordinately dependent upon material circumstance. Although the liberal peace may allow justice to exist within its frontiers, it cannot hold for describing actions as just or unjust throughout the entire scope of international relations (i.e. the whole of the world). None of these three strictures, principled moral judgment, equality of application, and concrete behavior guidance, are sufficient on their own to promulgate a just international theory. However, each aspect remains necessary for a theory to be considered just. To a greater or lesser degree, all theories under consideration here have aspects of some of these qualities but none adheres to all of them. Accordingly, we begin the investigation of international relations theory in the next chapter by examining Hans Morgenthaus realism in detail.

Chapter One What is Realism?

Defining a school of thought, its influence and why it ought to be studied philosophically

This section will describe political realism as articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau (1904 1980) in his Politics Among Nations, originally published in 1948. The advent of this new theory of international relations codified an intellectual movement opposed to the traditional idealism common to the study of global politics, law, diplomacy and philosophy. While the publication of Politics Among Nations spurred rapid growth in international relations, debate grew within other disciplines as its implications fundamentally challenged their intellectual assumptions. Although attributed most prominently to Morgenthau, what is now known as classical realism was also articulated in the twentieth century by thinkers such as E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and George Kennan. In their view, political behaviour was increasingly divergent from theory, and sought to reclaim the tradition informed by historical figures such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.5 These modern realists proposed a methodology with the goal of reuniting political theory with political practice. Idealisms carefully constructed theoretical and legal edifices, twice destroyed and rebuilt within Morgenthaus lifetime, were left wanting for new methods to try to prevent or mitigate the effects of future global conflicts. The intellectual challenge presented by Morgenthau

Cf. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 9.
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and his contemporaries, coupled with the material exigencies of global conflict, encouraged future thinkers to develop the realist tradition eventually establishing it as the dominant school of thought for international relations scholars and political actors alike. Realisms influence is such that most international relations scholars are either self-identified or readily identifiable realists.6 For example, in one exhaustive study of the development of the realist paradigm since World War II, almost three quarters of all the phenomena noted, and over 90 percent of the hypotheses tested, were identifiably realist in inspiration.7 Despite academic institutional supremacy, realism remains vital with many different views participating in a lively internal and external debate. Realist thinking in general encompasses a family of related arguments sharing certain common assumptions and premises. Realist theories seek to explain politics as it really is, as opposed to normative theories that offer prescriptions for how politics ought to be.8 The main criticisms against the realist school have been its inability to predict and account for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and explain the existence of a pervasive peace between liberal nations. Despite this criticism, as Stephen Walt argues, there is still a place for a realist approach to[international relations]highlighting the dominant role of major powers, their ability to evade legal constraints when they feel it necessary, and the tendency for customary law to reflect the interests of states rather than any exogenous set of normative standards.9

Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 41. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 41. 8 Stephen Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition. In Political Science: State of the Discipline III. Ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (Norton, 2002), p. 199. 9 Walt, Enduring, 228.
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If one is concerned about the attainment of justice in international relations, then they ought to take the legacy of liberal scholarship seriously. Realism, in any of its variant forms, makes philosophical assumptions and assertions while simultaneously challenging philosophical theory from having effect in reality. Realists deny to philosophers the ability to make judgments that are efficacious in international relations, or even to question the validity of realism. If the realist school of thought determines the academic and political agenda, philosophers must ask if this school is philosophically sound and in accordance with particular theories of justice. Turning to classical realism, I will examine the core tenets in detail, including a discussion of the concepts power and interest, the moral status of realism, and the delimited political sphere. The chapter concludes with an argument for why realism must be studied philosophically.

The Core Tenets of Classical Realism Reacting to two successive world wars, and the failure of legal and political theories to prevent them, Hans Morgenthau infused a new vitality into the scholarship of international relations. These material and intellectual motivations impelled him to formulate a theoretical model to help preserve the post-World War II peace and prevent the next great war. Thus, political realism for Morgenthau is a descriptive and predictive apparatus with real moral underpinnings. The book that sparked this uproar, and the central subject of investigation here, is Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. First published in 1948, it has been reprinted and revised through six editions.

With its publication, Morgenthau generated academic upheaval, and achieved his purpose of presenting an entirely new theory of international politics.10 His choice for a name, realism, attempts to capture the subject matter the real world of political relations but also the standards against which realisms merits are to be gauged.11 As such, political realism claims it must be judged not on a priori principles imported from other academic domains, but by the accuracy of its predictions with respect to the actions and reactions found in actual political conduct. Abstract principles such as justice are deemed practically unrelated to reality and are thus inadmissible in regards to the validity of realism as a methodology. Realism must be judged by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.12 This is not to say that Morgenthau believes that theories of justice, morality, theology, and the like are pedantic or unimportant; it is simply that they are antithetical to good politics. They distract the statesman from his true domain of power and interest towards external spheres that are not able to affect the ongoing dynamic of power politics, thus jeopardizing his states fortunes. Morgenthau argues adamantly against the normative, idealist thinkers and philosophers who have encroached and denatured politics. The idealist school of thought is characterized by Morgenthau as one that,

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace Sixth Edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. (New York: Alfred A Knopf Inc., 1948 1985), p. 3. 11 Morgenthaus fellow realist, and Christian critic, Reinhold Niebuhr states the core of realism to be: the disposition to take all factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to established norms, into account, particularly the factors of self-interest and power. Reinhold Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism In Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner, 1953), p. 119. 12 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.
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believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now. It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature, and blames the failure of the social orderon lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups. It trusts in education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these defects.13

Idealism seeks to rationalize political interaction, not to improve its predictive or descriptive capacity, but to institute reasoned rules as fundamental to political behaviour. In opposition to the idealist school of thought, Morgenthau begins to construct the new vision of realism in the twentieth century. The tradition from which Morgenthau speaks, and which he desires to resuscitate, looks first to the world and understanding that as

imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, [it] is the result of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them. This being inherently a world of opposing interests and conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlements of conflicts. This school, then, sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than the absolute good.14

Accordingly, throughout Politics Among Nations he cites widely from history, invoking wise statesmen and prudential theorists who have embraced the notions of power,
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Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.

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interest, and the balancing of each as the proper theoretical model for an uncertain world. From these two motivations, to argue against idealism and to launch a new theory of politics, Morgenthau describes the six tenets of political realism. These tenets provide the intellectual framework which ought to be used to understand political action, evaluate political options, and guide political decisions in the real world. The tenets will be listed and then elaborated in the discussion following. They are the distilled laws and principles against which all events, evaluations, and decisions will be measured and from which all future derivations of realism take as their touchstone:

1.

Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.

2.

The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.

3.

Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.

4. 5.

Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.

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6.

The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound...the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere.15

The following will discuss these six tenets with particular attention to the notions of interest and its relation to power, the moral status of political realism, and describe the critical notion of the political sphere.

The First Tenet Objective Laws and Human Nature Morgenthaus realism is firmly founded on a specific account of immutable human nature. This provides the foundation for a theory that can, in a fashion similar to but not identical with the scientific method, manipulate the forces present in politics and mold them towards desired ends. These ends are determined by our capacity to understand the regularity of human nature and the laws of politics. With a careful understanding of these features realists will seek to shape policy in a technological manner to balance the system like an engineer would an ongoing, unstable, chemical reaction. Morgenthau charges that idealist political theories place reason as the primary aspect of human nature. Therefore, through education, legal innovations, and institutional fine-tuning they can mould humans and their nature towards desired normative ends. The realist will invert this, and say that reason can only be used as a

15

Principles one to six can be found in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4 13. Emphasis added.

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guide towards the ends that are delimited by the remainder of the tenets of realism. Thus, human nature is permanent, and reason is strictly instrumental. A thoroughgoing realist will take the laws of human nature into consideration not a priori, but only in context of specific acts that demonstrate the nature of a particular foreign policy for a nation. By combining the contingent and the universal the arbitrary historical facts coupled with the laws of human nature the realist is able to project consequences of foreign policy into the future and thereby synthesize objective criteria for a rational theory from the constantly unique events of history.

The Second and Third Tenets A Discussion of Power and Interest Those laws that determine the possible ends of political action are the second principle: the notion of interest defined in terms of power. This for realism is what provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood.16 Interest and power are the theoretical devices that link the permanent with the contingent. These are not merely normative stipulations, but the essential ingredients for a political theory per se the twin pillars of interest and power give direction and regularity to a chaotic world. Although interest defined as power is stipulated as eternal and necessary for any theory, these concepts are imposed as a theoretical stricture, and therefore a realist will assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and the

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Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5.

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evidence of history bears that assumption out.17 This theoretical rigour is the methodological prerequisite on the observer who evaluates, judges and plans policy. These strictures prevent theorists from straying into the unknowable regions that prevent testability, reliability or objectivity. In short, they prevent against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences18 and return politics to reality. By restricting political action to interests attainable given available power in a particular circumstance, conceptual thought is strictly delimited between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.19 For the practitioner, realism asserts that neglect or ignorance of the realities of power and interest have created an international scenario in which the very structure of international relations as reflected in political institutions, diplomatic procedures, and legal arrangements has tended to become at variance with, and in large measure irrelevant to, the reality of international politics.20 Any system in politics or engineering that attempts to proceed contrary to natural law will ultimately end in catastrophe. Therefore, the realist is persuaded thattransformation can be achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5. 19 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7. 20 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 8.
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with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.21 For classical realists, understanding or controlling international order by existing concepts, institutions, or norms is catastrophically flawed. This is the sharpest point in the realist challenge to all disciplines that have contact with the political world. Realists charge that applying universal principles, such as justice or morality, is not amenable in concrete to specific political situations as they contribute nothing but confusion and error. However, the third pillar of the realist framework holds that although interest and power are objective and eternal, they do not maintain any particular definition that is fixed. As such, interest is whatever the actor decides it to be, and power spans a broad spectrum of influential tactics. In an evaluative role, interest is also whatever an external observer deems it appropriate to be for a particular actor.22 While Morgenthau gives interest and power wide range being whatever the actor or evaluator could possibly attribute to them they do not contravene the immaterial strictures that it is claimed justice does. As power and interest are widely drawn, politics for Morgenthau is very tightly constricted and this is how the realist avoids the contradiction between interest and power as immutable, ineffable, yet applicable to objective evaluation. While justice and morality are in some senses the same as power and interest (ineffable, undetermined) they remain proscribed from material evaluation. This is because justice and morality do not have material interests as their goal; they are

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. For example, if the United States desires to evaluate Chinese behaviour, it attributes interests to the Chinese government to the best of their knowledge on the assumption that they will behave in accordance with them.
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directed at other ends such as fairness, equality or notions otherwise indefinable for a realist. Interest, essentially whatever a nation chooses to be its desires, does however impose some rigour upon the person proposing it. Because interest is contextual, it cannot be a stipulated end based upon particular features. In other words, not all interests will have the common feature of x but rather, each instance of interest is disclosed by the usage of the term in specific contexts, satisfying certain criteriaThis conceptual distinction implies that particular attention has to be paid to the reasons supplied in the descriptive meaning; criteria will have to be specified that the reasons must satisfy.23 This imposes rigor upon the observer, and places the burden of proof on those who declare a goal to be in the national interest. Those making a claim of interest are thus compelled to provide evidence. Without evidence, their claims are not amenable to evaluation or concrete action. Without supporting reasons, claims to interest are capricious and dismissed as such. If those who claim to speak for the national interest, or those who interpret the interests of others, can be held to account then this is nothing other than the legitimacy of the public authority, and its resultant ability to make binding decisions, [which] depends crucially upon perceptions that its decisions are in the public interest.24 As all politics for Morgenthau is power politics, the objective of this power is the fulfillment of its own interests. And power is anything that establishes and maintains

F. Kratochwil, On the Notion of "Interest" in International Relations. International Organization Vol. 36, no. 1 (1982), p. 13. 24 Kratochwil, On the Notion of Interest, 9.
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the control of man over man,25 while political power is the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.26 Given the different interests that can be deemed relevant, power can encompass any form of coercion from subtle negotiations to brute force any and all things that shape the thinking of another political actor in the name of self-motivated interest. For this reason, realism ignores motivations, ideologies and the internal organization of a nation state.27 Liberals criticize this billiard ball approach to the nation state enshrined in the realist model.28 However, based on the definition of power that covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards...and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement29 it is neutral between internal organization. Morgenthau holds that the conduits along which power travels constitutional, monarchical, or otherwise are of no moment when evaluated in terms of objectively adjudicated actions. All power exercised is the
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 32. 27 Cf. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 388. The second answer holds, that regardless of their domestic politics or the character of their governments, nations try to pursue their interests in a rational mannerHence, a democratic countryhas to deal with all kinds of governments, even those whose character and policies it morally condemns, and must take as the yardstick for its policies the interests and power of the of the nations concerned. It cannot afford to jeopardize its own interests by indulging its domestic political preferences and moral judgments of other nationsNations have in fact consistently taken this position, since a rational foreign policy is otherwise impossible. 28 First, they [realists] believe that States are the primary actors in the international system, rational unitary actors who are functionally identical. Second, they assume that State preferences, ranging from survival to aggrandizement, are exogeneous and fixed. Third, they assume that the anarchic structure of the international system creates such a degree of either actual conflict or perceived uncertainty that states must constantly assume and prepare for the possibility of war. In this context, outcomes of State interactions are typically zero-sum and thus are determined by relative power. For Realists, power is the currency of the international system. States interact with one another within that system like billiard balls: hard, opaque, unitary actors colliding with one another." AM Slaughter Burley, International Law in a World of Liberal States European Journal of International Law Vol. 6, No. 4 (1995), p. 5. 29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11.
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same, and the constitutional arrangements of the actors wielding power have little effect upon the final evaluation or action. The importance of interest defined as power is not merely an evaluative technique. Morgenthau maintains a concept of justice, not articulated in Politics Among Nations, that is entirely dependent on the centrality of power and interest. His definition of justice is not normative, but dependent upon subjective, self-interested appraisal: For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of themWe are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable pursuing, policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own.30

Through the notions of power and interest realism attempts to resolve the contradictions of justice and self interest, transient and eternal, theory and practice, necessity and principle: the necessity is that of protecting the interests of the group for which one serves as trustee and the principle is that of undifferentiated loyalty to values such as justice and equality.31

The Fourth Tenet The Moral Status of Political Realism Morgenthau, and realists in general, assert that theirs is not a positivist theory. They recognize and follow moral dispositions, and normative principles in their

As quoted in Thomas L. Pangle, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 231. 31 RC Good, The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's Debate with Morgenthau and Kennan, The Journal of Politics Vol. 22, No. 4 (1960), p. 597.
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calculations outside the political sphere. These motivations can inform action within the political sphere, but for correct realist analysis they must be omitted and substituted with power and interest. Rational foreign policy based on the understanding of particular interest and available power constitutes the sole normative metric for judging political decision. This, however, is a normativity of calculation; good policy is one that minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.32 Thus good and moral are collapsed to what is successful or prudent. Although Morgenthau attempted to draw a strict line between morality and politics, the realist is called upon to recognize that political decisions have a necessary moral impact. The corollary is that moral choices and political success make for an ineluctable tension.33 The tension exists between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action.34 But Morgenthau formulates it such that the prudent is nothing but the correct moral action. As such, the rational choice, the moral choice, and the successful choice are not necessarily the same, and may often be in conflict. Although realism is aware of the moral significance, one may need to choose success over morality. Realists do not wish to ignore morality, or have morality dominate politics; rather they embrace the tension and embrace it as unavoidable. This point further disambiguates the differences between interest and justice in realism. The notion of interest, unchanging but contextually determined, is deduced for each

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 10. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 34 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12.
32 33

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situation. However, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.35 The individual and the state may both value freedom (or justice, or equality) and in so doing, the individual has every right to sacrifice their own interests (their life, their possessions) for the sake of any particular principle or ends. In contrast, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.36 The overarching principle of state action is survival, which relies on the collapse of morality into prudent action. Without prudence, there can be no political morality which, in turn would seem to equally eliminate justice, principle, law or any other item that (1) cannot be filtered to a particular time and place (2) or that require a sacrifice of the nations interest in survival. The difference being that ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences.37 Although the moral foundations of realism are centrally important to Morgenthau, ironically, they are most often articulated by its critics rather than subsequent realist scholars.38

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 37 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 38 Cf. Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 19; Michael C Williams, Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics, International Organization Vol. 58, No. 04 (2004); or AJH Murray, The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau, The Review of Politics Vol. 58, no. 1 (1996), p. 83 who states: First, it becomes obvious that Morgenthau was in no way a positivist. His theory does not assert a necessity in international politics which excludes the possibility of freedom or moral responsibility. Second, it becomes clear that, far from ignoring
35 36

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The Fifth Tenet National Morality is not Universal Morality The fifth tenet of political realism is the opposite border to the boundary laid by the fourth. The fifth tenet states that the moral convictions of a nation are not to be held as the universal morals laws to be imposed universally. Thus, if the fourth eliminates importing universal principles, the fifth eliminates particulars from becoming universal. Therefore, political realism seeks to tread between nihilism and absolutism, and it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly.39

The Sixth Tenet The Foundations of a Theory and the Constrained Political Sphere Realists claim that for politics to proceed in a prudent and rational manner it must operate unencumbered. Politics, formulated as an autonomous discipline, prevents judgments external to the political realm from impinging on the realist demand for prudence. Any judgments outside the political sphere may be acknowledged, but ultimately subordinated to power and interest. Morgenthau offers a brief example of the necessity of the autonomous political sphere that illustrates the importance of the sixth tenet. He looks to the French and British responses regarding the growing belligerence of Germany in the 1930s. France and United Kingdom in this period allowed the answer to the legal question, legitimate within its sphere, to determine their political

the moral questions that this raises, Morgenthau regarded them as central to his theory, and made a serious effort to address the problems that they generate. 39 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 13.

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actions. Instead of asking both questions, that of law and that of power, they asked only the question of law; and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue that their very existence might have depended upon.40 This relates to the central question here as to why it is the case that appeals to justice (in this case to the justice of international law) are simply invalid in the face of political power. While Morgenthau expanded the realm of interest and power in the second and third tenet, he contracts politics in the sixth with the purpose of making politics rationally coherent and power and interest dominant. Although power is primary for Morgenthau, the autonomous political sphere provides the ability to discriminating between what forms of power will be admitted as legitimate. The autonomous political sphere will allow legitimate political authority and seek to reject raw power. In fact, a limited conception of politics is part of a sophisticated intellectual strategy seeking to address the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to an undifferentiated sphere of violence, to distinguish legitimate forms of political power, to insulate the political sphere from physical violence, and to discern the social structures that such a strategy requires to be successful.41 Morgenthaus project, although intended to bring power to the fore in political understanding, is not to glorify or legitimize a situation in which the capacity to wield any form of power particularly physical violence is the ultimate arbiter of authority and legitimacy.42 He makes four distinctions among the varieties of power available,

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 14. Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 637. 42 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 634.
40 41

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between power and influence, between power and force, between usable and unusable power, between legitimate and illegitimate power.43 The main point of contention is the difference between legitimate power the exercise of which is sanctioned by moral or legal justification rather than naked power which is simply at the whim of its wielder. Morgenthaus reason for favoring legitimate power is only that it is likely to be more effective than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot be so justified. That is to say, legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power.44 It is for this reason that, despite the moral dimension of realism, it is a valid claim to attest that there is no resourceto prevent the development of a cynical awareness that I may expand at your expense if I have the power to get away with it.45 Although there exists this limited argument against naked power, and there remains the possibility to profit from illegitimate force, it is incorrect to view Politics Among Nations as a re-write of Machiavellis Prince. Morgenthau states his purpose as twofold: The first is to detect and understand the forces that determine political relations among nations, and to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon each other and upon international political relations and institutions.46 Michael Williams argues that Morgenthaus delimited political sphere is the correct means to guide realist policy towards more hopeful outcomes. Williams argues that moving the focus towards interest defined as power implies an ethical dimension; a specific outline
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 33. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 34. 45 Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 615. 46 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 18.
43 44

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for legitimate authority and proper political action. By decrying both vague notions of justice and concrete forms of brutality the narrow conceptual definition of politics is here part of an attempt to distinguish the exercise of legitimate political power and domination, and particularly to insulate this sphere from the intrusion of physical violence and domination.47 With its new limited range, politics becomes the rational realm of legitimate action and authority. Realism imposes a proper procedure on international decision making which includes accepting a right course, but not a proper end. Any theory sanctioning violent, or illegitimate, political authority would corrupt the political sphere and return it to a contest of might. If realism were to sanction power tout court, that would then subordinate the autonomy of the political sphere to interference by irrational actors who can wield the greatest force. This would undermine realism and its goal of bringing reason to politics as arbitrary violence and naked power are antithetical to rational evaluation. Delimiting the political realm is a strategic and prudential move. It invokes the favoured mode of control for a realist the balance of power. By giving politics firm borders, it becomes possible to balance distinct social spheres and interests against one another to limit the reach of politics while also limiting the influence of other spheres on the political.48 This prevents political overreach while simultaneously maintaining political autonomy. The political realm stresses practise, but it is balanced in turn by external principles. When operating within their assigned spheres, normative principles
47 48

Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 649. Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 650.

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can act as a counterweight to prevent practise from operating in a moral vacuum. This method of balancing constrains politics, and provides a mechanistic approach to locating the mean between extremes without imposing arbitrary normative restraints. Also, this method preserves political autonomy, and the realist account of human nature. Returning to the example above, when France and England in the 1930s imprudently neglected the political sphere to act wholly on legal grounds, they neglected the exigencies of the balance of power (both intellectually and materially). They chose principle over practise in a realm where this is strictly prevented by human nature and the laws of politics. The inevitable result was the invasion of France, and the near collapse of Britain in the face of German aggression. This realist conception of the political sphere poses the problem that, distinct social spheres (economic, legal, moral, aesthetic) operating within their specific logics and forms of power49 each have a demarcation that is decided a priori with a backdrop of ends towards which each pursues distinct from any other. To say that these spheres exist and that one of them, politics, is uniquely autonomous along the variable of power and interest is to say that there are areas of influence demarcated metaphysically or by realist fiat. If these disciplinary boundaries are not present in the same way that human nature or the laws of politics are, but are only prudentially asserted, then realist assumptions ought to be open to philosophical criticism. If politics is an autonomous realm by nature, then that is a claim beyond which politics can address. If it is not, and the political sphere is merely a methodological shortcut, then is the argument presented

49

Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 650.

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for the political realm sufficient for it to be immune from principled or philosophical judgment? This question is briefly addressed in the next section, and will recur as the investigation proceeds to see if realism can provide sufficient evidence for its claims. Why Study Realism philosophically? As we have seen, realism maintains many philosophical presuppositions. The political sphere was posited to secure politics as an autonomous discipline, and this zone is designed with the purpose of preventing imprudent action. But is this political sphere philosophically sound in itself? Can politics truly be said to be autonomous? By eschewing philosophical notions, scoping power and interest broadly, and shrinking the political realm, politics is removed from external oversight. These unanswered questions provide an indication why political realism requires philosophical evaluation. Although Morgenthau attempts to be conscientious of justice and morality, they remain secondary. Despite his best intentions, there remains no stricture against the illegitimate domination of the powerful within accurate realist analysis. Thus, realism is at best in an ambiguous position with respect to justice. To examine an alternative, we turn in the next chapter to the idealist response: that of liberal theory.

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Chapter Two
Two Variants of Liberal Justice and Their Incompatibility with Realism

Domestic Liberalism Liberalism has had several decades to respond to the realist challenge and continues to be the strongest non-realist theory of international relations. Two variants of liberalism will be discussed domestic and international. The domestic variant is the one most often discussed by philosophers. Developed by John Rawls, it was originally articulated in the Kantian tradition, but has subsequently been amended into a strictly political notion. Rawlsian theories will be named domestic here because, although they are not attached to any specific nation or group, they do depend upon a well organized society adhering to the rule of law. Domestic liberalism does not extend beyond national barriers, and of itself, does not take account of international relations. But, if one is to take the domestic theories of justice seriously, they must do so with an awareness of international affairs. As realism remains the dominant theory in international relations, one cannot entertain a domestic theory if it can be violated by actors in the international sphere who do not respect the notion of domestic justice. Furthermore, Rawls seeks justice as fairness, while realism denies fairness as an action-guiding principle. Nor does realism recognize well-ordered societies as privileged within international politics. As such, there is a direct conflict between philosophical theory and political practice if one wishes to pursue philosophic justice with any notion that it is related to a world under the influence of power and

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interest. Some scholars have made fledgling attempts to extend Rawls theory into the international arena; but these attempts remain immature and unable to rival either the international liberalism or the dominant realist school.50 Rawlsian domestic justice extends from particular procedural principles. They are the principles of equal access to basic rights and liberties, and that any inequality in society is justified only if it assists those least well off.51 If the two principles of justice are followed, then society can be said to be organized in a just manner. This image of social organization proceeds from individuals as bearers of rights,52 proceeding to mutual advantage within an accepted plurality of beliefs. These principles provide a schema for a political community that will function by eliminating fundamental beliefs such as religion or morality from public debate. The community will retain only discourse that embraces public reason53 and only endorse political action that observes the two principles of justice. This will allow each person to pursue their desires within the community without the interference of irreconcilable comprehensive views that proclaim fundamental truths or ends. This pluralitistic notion of a just community requires the existence of a well-ordered society amenable to the rule of law that has

50 Molly Cochran describes the attempts of authors such as Thomas Pogge and Charles R. Beitz to extend Rawls internationally in: Cosmopolitanism: Rawlsian approaches to international distributive justice, in Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 51 Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 227. 52 Liberalism has been identified with an essential principle the importance of freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), p. 206. 53 I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizensThe basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), p. 766.

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already emerged from a constitutional consensus. In short, justice for Rawls is equality before the form of law which is constructed upon a fair procedure that represents ideals we already intuitively accept.54 However, the world at large is not a well organized society able to recognize persons as rights bearing individuals capable of equal participation. Nor is there a need for global consensus within Rawls theory. The only requirement for justice is an agreement among individuals to form a polity by assenting to a pluralist constitution along principles they already intuitively accept.55 Rawls would have it that these rules can be justified retrospectively with the aid of the original position. In the original position, individual rational choosers are sequestered from any knowledge of position, advantage, or social ends and they must posit procedures that will create the fairest institutions. This may provide a means for justifying decisions made within a society, but extending it beyond borders yields no more than international norms familiar to us all: the equality of nations, self-determination, a right to non-interference, and that treaties are to be kept.56 Rawls political idea of procedural justice that depends on an overlapping consensus of differing views is similar to Morgenthaus political sphere which accepts a plurality of interests among nations. Both postulate a decision procedure based upon a

Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 30. A well-ordered society amenable to Rawlsian justice must meet four criteria: it must maintain a public conception of justice based on generally accepted beliefs (frequently articulated in the rule of law following a constitution), the members of the community recognize themselves and their fellows as free and equal moral agents, the third being a lack of a super-abundance of material goods (scarcity) with a plurality of opinion held by its members, and held within the limits of justice that remains stable in the community is the fourth. Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 31. 56 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 26.
54 55

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notion of human nature. For Morgenthau the individual a self-interested, power-hungry person; for Rawls, however, the person is a person because of their status as citizen. They remain self-interested, rights holding, agents who can becitizens, that isfully cooperating member[s] of society over a complete life.57 The domestic liberal notion of a person-as-citizen is fundamental for a just society, but limits their rights-as-persons to rights-as-citizens. While Rawls maintains persons are the primary unit of political consideration, Morgenthau admits only state actions that are internationally relevant to the balance of power in his political sphere. Rawls argues that if one is to have a concept of justice within constitutional democracies, it cannot through philosophy, but instead must be secured in both political procedure and the acceptance of reasonable pluralism. In this sense, Rawls shifts his notion of justice into a position analogous to Morgenthaus autonomous political sphere and to a form that corresponds to Morgenthaus first and fifth tenets of realism. Because Rawls shifts from a philosophical to a political conception of justice, he attempts to confine it to the bounds outlined by the realist challenge, but without the ability to extend his justice beyond national boundaries. If a domestically liberal state cannot reach beyond its borders and carry with it a concept of justice, then it must adopt a power-oriented foreign policy. Neglecting the strictures of power and interest means risking the well-ordered society necessary for justice to emerge. However, Thomas Pogge a Rawlsian international relations scholar, states that nations are prevented from extending Rawlsian justice due to a lack of a moral

57

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 233.

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reasons. 58 Whereas the classical realist will contend that because of international disorder, and the strictures of power and interest, there can never be moral reasons sufficiently compelling for international organization. Although international institutions exist, and have some influence, for a realist they do not fail because they lack the values of a well-ordered society, but because there cannot be effective values shared internationally. International politics must rely upon material exigencies of interest defined as power to provide guidelines for action. The same characteristic of the state system that gives rise to well-ordered societies, the concept of national sovereignty, is the same one that undermines attempts to institutionalize any shared international values. This is borne out by the consequences of the original position which generates the witnessed norms in international relations that of sovereign equality which in turn breeds power politics. Therefore, there is a contradiction between the desires for international relations coherent with domestic justice, and the demands of the original position when used in interstate relations. In the end, adherents of domestic liberalism must engage in the power politics advocated by realism. Given the moral politics of Morgenthaus realism, liberal states ought to abandon normative principle in international relations to protect their own wellordered societies that are the necessary conditions for Rawlsian justice. They have a moral obligation to behave prudentially when engaging in foreign policy. This is the only judgment of ought that extends from a Rawlsian perspective on the international

Pogges two hypotheses are that the present world order is a modus Vivendi, and that international institutions are largely unsuccessful because they lack shared values integral to well-ordered national societies. Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 42.
58

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scene. It is the ought of prudential action that betrays the primacy of persons, the necessity of just distribution, and decisions blind to power and advantage. This collapse of morality into prudence is the very nature of realist political morality: the primacy of self-preservation to maintain the necessary conditions for liberal justice. The irony of this position is that the just society must be prepared to behave unjustly to preserve its justice-as-fairness against other powers who accept incompatible political goals. If domestic liberals do not adopt a realist foreign policy, they risk losing their own wellordered societies to those who will engage in power politics to the liberals detriment. Although realism eliminates moral judgments from potential decisions in favour of qualifying actions as good or prudent, for a nation to behave morally it ought to behave prudentially or risk its own existence. The only moral judgment that realism offers is to take domestic liberal justice and impose realist international behaviour. Pogge, in an attempt to transcend the realist challenge and the prevailing disunity of sovereign equality, provides a values-based approach to minimize the tumult of power politics. This moral outlook demands that nations accede to the pluralistic acceptance advocated by Rawls political liberalism, only writ large to encompass the community of nations. This would require that societies should accept morally rather than prudentially the continued existence of one another and the values central to their domestic social contracts.59 This is followed by the demand that there ought to be a fair distribution of burdens and resources, and that countries be convinced of, and ascribe to, this moral obligation as action guiding. Pogge maintains that with

59

Pogge as quoted in Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 43.

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the experience of trust and cooperation, commitment to a just scheme based on shared values would deepen and widen.60 However, it is convincingly argued by the realists that nations would not abandon their vital interests to implement obscure moral principles in the way Pogge wishes. By trying to promote an international order based on broad, undefined values he invites their breach by negligent parties with sufficient power. Recalcitrant or negligent actors will exploit the principles that bind all other nations to their own advantage without a mechanism to counter their aspirations. In short, he is not able to overcome the realist challenge. Although domestic liberalism attempts to reintroduce the ought of principled judgment into politics by establishing a theory of justice, when it is extended to international relations it (a) differs very little from the classical realist model of international behaviour due to the original position, and (b) Pogges values-based attempt to extend Rawls internationally fails in the face of realist criticism. Because domestic liberalism is dependent on the well-ordered society, it cannot extend its principles of justice to international relations without relapsing to realism or risk destruction. Therefore it cannot be said to be just based on three criteria outlined above. If the preferred philosophical theory of justice cannot overcome the realist challenge, can we turn to international relations theory in the liberal tradition to provide a just theory? The next section will look to international liberalism and its response to realism.

60

Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 43. Emphasis in original.

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International Liberalism The second variant to be examined is international liberalism represented here by Michael W. Doyle. Writing from the Kantian tradition, his scholarship is aware of the historical development of realist international relations. Despite this, he asserts that Kantian liberal principles have provided a firm anchor of the most successful zone of international peace yet established.61 The expanding liberal peace envisioned by Kant is now claimed by liberal scholars to be a historical fact. This zone is maintained by liberal principles that promote commercial relations, transparency in judicial processes, and a view of humans as rights-bearing individuals; all of which provide points of contact between countries. These interactions undercut power politics among similarly constituted states. For the international liberal, however, the competition of power politics and illiberal behaviour generally predominates between the liberal and nonliberal world. Doyle argues that there are specific values understood in the liberal tradition which have generated rights and institutions.62 The unique principle that underlies these is that humans are moral ends in themselves with associated rights and reciprocal duties. From this comes freedom from arbitrary restraint (embodied in equality before the law), the promotion of capacities and opportunities (or positive freedom), and a third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee

Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), p. 343. 62 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 206.
61

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the other two.63 For international liberals, the individual is prior to the state, and the state is justified only with the informed consent of its constituents. States behaving in foreign affairs are subject to the same considerations as their component individuals; the concept of national sovereignty is therefore akin to the sovereign equality of persons. In other words, the basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory.64

International liberals do not deny that states exist in a realist security dilemma; that they must contend against other states with the mutual desire for power in an anarchic world. However, Doyle claims that the characteristics of liberal political communities have formed a separate peace, and through economic and legal ties, have annexed themselves from the competition of power politics. Unlike domestic liberal theorists who wish a direct moral solution to international problems, Doyle argues that through the continued growth of liberal democracies the political bond of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.65 Therefore it is not merely a moral desire that solidifies peaceful coexistence, but a principled stand extending from the concept of the individual. This notion of persons leads to the construction of institutions and states

Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 207. Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 213. 65 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232.
63 64

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that respect individual rights, and through relations with other similarly constituted polities, a zone of peace and understanding has emerged. This conceptualization of relations contravenes the realist unitary (billiard ball) concept of the state.66 The relations between sub-national components, particularly economic ties, entangle liberal nations at an extra-national level that can prove to be superior to the power relations between states.67 International liberals assert that these multifaceted intra-state relations are the causal factors for the liberal peace. Through these interactions, trust between countries with similar internal structure breeds transparency of intent, an increase of communication, and therefore confidence in the decision mechanisms of foreign states. The chance of misunderstanding therefore decreases, the risk of insecurity minimizes, and relationships between nation states grow friendlier. The realist model fails to appreciate these types of relations, and consequently states in a competitive scenario suffer the chance that an inoffensive exchange may escalate into animosity and taint the remainder their interactions. The liberal democracies are insulated from this due to the extent and variety of commercial exchanges [which] guarantee that a single conflict of interest will not shape an entire relationship. But between liberal and nonliberal societiesa single conflict of interest will define an entire relationship.68 Similarly to realist desires for checks and balances of forces, the interdependence of economic
Cf. Slaughter, World of Liberal States, 5 and Note 28 above. Cf. Slaughter, World of Liberal States, 39. The world of liberal statesis a world of individual selfregulation facilitated by states; of transnational regulation enacted and implemented by disaggregated political institutions - courts, legislatures, executives and administrative agencies - enmeshed in transnational society and interacting in multiple configurations across borders; of double-edged diplomacy and inter-governmental agreements vertically enforced through domestic courts." 68 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 326.
66 67

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relations, for example, will provide a counter-weight for security tensions and international desires for power. So a beneficial economic relation will balance a stressful security relation amongst liberal states. In contrast to domestic liberals, international liberals do not fully accept pluralism as a touchstone of peaceful coexistence. In fact, liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states.69 Doyle cites the United States as paradigm example of how liberal states must reinforce each other and their shared principles in order to affirm the international liberal order. It is claimed that acting with foresight and coherent intentions, after World War II the United States following was prepared and able to take measures70 to maintain liberal society internationally with economic and political aid. However, this is simply another way of saying that the United States had an interest in maintaining a particular form of government in Europe, and had sufficient power to achieve it. Thus the principled liberal stand may be nothing more than prudent realist necessity. If the goal of this investigation is to seek a notion of justice that is pervasive, the liberal peace is circumstantial at best. The international liberal peace is a coalition of prudence dependent on certain material conditions, and not a principled victory. It achieves a unique historical advantage, but not in a way that is fundamentally different than an effective balance of power. For example:
69 70

Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232. Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232.

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If domestic economic collapse on the pattern of the global propagation of depressions in the 1930s were to reoccur, the domestic political foundations of liberalism could fall. Or, if international economic rivalry were to continue to increase, then consequent attempts to weaken economic interdependence (establishing closed trade and currency blocs) would break an important source of liberal accommodation.71

The liberal peace is only a form of muted competition due to material circumstance, and not different-in-kind from realist alliances of coherent interests and their associated reduction in security competition. When circumstances emerge to skew interest or power sufficiently to compel states to diverge from the liberal alliance, realism remerges. Therefore, any international justice present in the liberal peace is not founded upon liberal principles, but the pragmatic circumstances that make cooperation more efficient than competition. The liberal peace is not a negative outcome to be so easily derided, but without recourse to justice beyond material circumstance, we risk falling back into realist power struggles even between liberal states. One can assert principles, and invest in their economic manifestation, but the fact remains that power and the interests towards which it is directed are the underlying mechanisms that sustain liberalism and its peace. If the liberal peace provides a form of just relations within the boundaries of liberal regimes, what are the features of the relations between the liberal and the nonliberal world? Those not party to the liberal peace are not afforded the rights of being ends in themselves; in

71

Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 233.

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liberal practice, some nonliberal statesdo not acquire the right to be free from foreign intervention, nor are they assumed to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of other states.72

The notion of extending the liberal peace is a necessary factor for justice, and one that is desired in order to entrench liberal principles globally. If the United States invokes its power, as it did after World War II to maintain liberal nations, Doyle claims that this ought to be the mandate of all liberal states. They should work to strengthen liberal policies in other countries, and amend the gap that existences in behaviour between liberal and non liberal states. To do this, liberal states should encourage nonliberal states to secure basic human needs, civil rights, and democracy, and to expand the scope and effectiveness of the world market economy.73 These are the liberal principles that, it is claimed, give rise to the material conditions for peace. And this, then, leads to Doyles statement that most distances international liberalism from domestic liberal and from realist theories. He states that unlike the realist approach to foreign policy: powerful and weak, hostile and friendly nonliberal states must be treated according to the same standards. There are no special geopolitical clients, no geopolitical enemies other than those judged to be such by liberal principles.74 This example denotes that liberal policies must apply equally in the sense of isonomia regardless of material power, external relations, and internal composition. It demands that nations have equal treatment from the liberal world; it provides a metric against which good and bad behaviour can be judged morally; it takes a stance that is disinterested with respect to
Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 325. Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 344. 74 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 344.
72 73

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power or interest. That is to say, a nation is not a client, in that its friendship or just treatment is not dependent on what it can deliver to its powerful master, and animosity does not spring from opportunity or geography. Animosity is reserved for those that oppose the individual liberty, autonomous existence of other states and the civil rights, human needs and others that flow from the person, to the state to the international scene. However, this equal treatment does not extend to those other nations who deny liberal principles. The international liberal must then choose between the principled stand to respect the sovereign equality of nations, or confront the illiberal states using coercive means and potentially abridge the populations individual rights. To follow this principled stance requires abandoning the national interest and the balance of power as guidelines to policy. The interests of the United States must be consistent with its principles. We must have no liberal enemies and no unconditional alliances with nonliberal states.75

But simply stating or desiring it does not make it so. If principles do not align with interest or power, then they fail to affect policy and diminish the project that one wishes to follow. Instances such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956 where the United States contributed much liberal rhetorical support, but no material assistance, the result was the suppression of the population and a loss of face for American officials. Because most liberal states were not willing to risk their own interests or test their power against the Soviet Union for the sake of principle, this only weakened the liberal world and their normative desires because they were not coherent with the interest of refraining from

75

Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 345.

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war, and they presented insufficient power to restrain soviet interference.76 Thus, principled politics must be subordinate to power politics in a direct confrontation. Moreover, principled politics tend to weaken themselves in this respect when they are not backed with sufficient material power.

Cf. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 166. Which discusses the combination of bellicose rhetoric and political inaction which will only guarantee failure. Also: As the London Economist observed on 30 august 1952: Unhappily liberation applied to eastern Europe...means either the risk of war or it means nothing... Liberation entails no risk of war only when it means nothing. As quote by Norman A. Graebner, The United States and NATO, 1953 1969, in NATO After Thirty Years eds. Kaplan and Clawson (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1981), p. 37
76

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Chapter Three

Reinhold Niebuhrs Reformed Realism

Having seen the merits and difficulties with prevailing international relations and philosophical theories, is there an alternative that is accurate in evaluation, effective in practice, while also meeting the requirements for justice? Reinhold Niebuhr begins to addresses this question through an understanding of St. Augustines The City of God Against the Pagans. Niebuhr describes a reformed realism that acknowledges Morgenthaus material requirements, but also demands effective non-material goals. For Niebuhr, aspects of human nature that transcend power and interest are necessary to temper the self-destructive qualities of classical realism. This reformed realism will challenge the wisdom of Morgenthaus constrained political sphere, while seeking to extend justice beyond the material contingency of the liberal peace. If he is successful, then there is an avenue for philosophy to inform the material necessity of the political realm without sacrificing realisms precision. By investigating this alternative, philosophers can begin to work from a Niebuhrian standpoint and integrate themselves into debates of international affairs and recommend just action. The realist aspect of Niebuhrs theory begins in his agreement with Morgenthaus derivation of realism from a particular theory of human nature. For Niebuhr the origins of communities are coincidental and prudential, not planned or principled, as people are driven together by common material interest or familial

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relation. The beginnings of a community are not under the influence of justice; the interests and relations come first, and their cohesion is achieved by using power to subdue internal conflicts of interest. But acknowledging power and interest does not exclude principles of justice for Niebuhr. He recognizes Morgenthaus stress on material constraints, but contends that doing so is not fatal to the establishment of justice.77 Because of Niebuhrs Augustinian influence, the two drives of human nature the material drive recognized by realism, and the transcendent interest of morality and justice are reflected in Augustines two cities: the city of man and the city of God. These also represent the two loves, the love of God and the love of self.78 One love, or one drive, cannot be ignored to the expense of the other. Morgenthau seeks to engage and mitigate the love of self through a refined understanding of human nature and political relations, but he fails to understand that two drives cannot be separated. These two drives are not two types of people [who] dwell together but[that] the conflict between love and self-love is in every soul.79 Following Niebuhr, then, we must undertake the study of international relations in a manner that is able to study the whole of human desires, and to take account of the totality of human nature in the political sphere. Following the model of the two cities, philosophers and international relations scholars can work to amend Morgenthaus account of human nature. This change in the

Reinhold Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism in Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner, 1953), p. 127. 78 Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 128. The love of God can be seen also as the secular notion of the love-of-other or the love of principle. This ties in later with the notion of the desire for perfection that for Augustine is Christine, but need not be for our purposes. 79 Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 128.
77

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premise of human nature subsequently requires admitting philosophy, morality, and justice into the political sphere to accommodate the two drives that function in each human. Without philosophy there is no means of articulating a conception of human nature, the actual character of the political sphere, or concepts of justice. The methods of international relations cannot answer these questions; it must turn to philosophy by embracing Niebuhrs corrective turn to the Augustian tradition. But does describing the dual nature of humans, and their two drives, overcome Morgenthaus account of human nature? Will material self-love triumph and vindicate Morgenthau's exclusion of justice and philosophy? Niebuhr responds that humans exist with material necessity, with necessary self-love, and with necessary conflicts of interest. But that these do not wholly determine humans or their political relations. Similar to Morgenthau's ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action,80 there exists a tension for Niebuhr between the universal material requirements of possession, prestige, and power and the transcendent nature of mankind. In other words, persons and their communities can have ends other than those admitted in a strict realist assessment. Morgenthau does not deny the existence of normative ends, but denies their applicability in the political sphere that ultimately sets national behaviour. Niebuhr wishes to recognize Morgenthau for his achievements, but also wants to guard against his failings. Niebuhr desires to prevent realist theory from becoming morally cynical or nihilistic when it assumes that the universal characteristic in human

80

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12.

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behaviour must also be regarded as normative.81 We must not separate our faculties, and use our reason strictly for instrumental ends thereby turning material necessity into normative requirement. It is the risk of enshrining universal political necessity that will in turn obscure the ability to create norms that are superior to political necessity without obscuring its demands.82 In other words, we ought to look for normative solutions when possible, but resolve to be aware of politics when necessary, but not to confuse the one for the other to the detriment of both. To fulfill these criteria, Niebuhr looks to Augustine not to revitalize the idealism that Morgenthau has successfully criticized in other forms but to show that Augustines desire for Christian perfectionism exists to achieve moral purposes without succumbing to the rejection or ignorance of earthly requirements. Both Niebuhr and Augustine underscore the power and persistence of egotism, both individual and collective, and seeks to establish the most tolerable form of peace and justice under conditions set by human sin.83 It is incumbent upon the reformed realist to reflect the impulse of the idealist for the curative aspects of norms, reason, and law. But to do this, they must recognize the reciprocal power drive in humans in turn, the two must be balanced against each other to achieve stability. Because the desire for perfection is equal to the material desire for power, to ignore it

Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 129. To introduce universal norms for the purpose of directing, justifying or judging state behaviour is, the realist argues, either a dangerous irrelevance or the occasion for masking interest behind ideology. Yet in denying the application of any criteria for directing or judging state behaviour other than those derived from state necessity, the realist must end up the cynic...their [Kennan and Morgenthau] views of policy and international politics are replete with norms that serve to direct and judge interest. Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 608. 83 Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 131.
81 82

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could result in the nihilistic realism that conflates natural necessity with normativity. To dismiss the drive for power is equally foolish, and not one of Niebuhrs desires. Niebuhr also anticipates the liberal response to the realist challenge. He argues that success did not lie in the possession of more adequate formulae of justice in some nations than in others.84 Those who had succeeded did so not because a specific universal solution, but because they had developed a sense of justice a moral disposition which followed along with the prudential decisions. This is Niebuhr suggesting something akin to Rawls procedural justice, since the factors in each nation and in each particular issue were too variable to allow for the application of any general rules or formulae of justice. Agreements were easier in fact if too much was not claimed for these formulae.85

Indeed Niebuhr suggests that it is certain principles of justice, as distinguished from formulas or prescriptions, were indeed operative, such as liberty, equality, and loyalty to covenants.86 But he argues these principles are not simply a political instantiation, as Rawls argues. They are the various faces of the love that binds the communities together. This is a result of Niebuhrs human nature that extends beyond Morgenthaus single-sided human nature, and encompasses Rawls claims of justice. Niebuhr asserts that human disposition allows for the consideration of others to emerge in communities without ignoring the vital qualities necessary for justice to exist beyond the borders of

Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 135. Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 135. 86 Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 135.
84 85

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the community that is, love is a part of human nature and not contingent on a constitution. But, no expression of love or the desire for justice either law, or the sense of justice is sufficient to prevent violent confrontation given the permanence of irreconcilable interests. Niebuhr feels that unless the self-interest of nations is qualified by a larger loyalty..., and qualified ultimately by the spirit of justice, the parochial and competing interests of the nations will end either in overt conflict or in the domination of the strongest.87

The corrective to this is that if the collective interest of each nation is not modified by its loyalty to a higher value such as the common civilization of the free nations88 then we can expect conflict to continue without even the thought of searching for means for peace beyond balancing aggression. This is very similar to the international liberal idea of the liberal peace, and it is very similar to the liberal notion that binding nations along common principles will reduce or eliminate conflict. Can this Niebuhrian interpretation succeed given the limitations of liberal ideas stated above? While we have the universality of community and competition in international relations, it is the task of rational actors to engage in judgment and refinement of its outcomes and direct them towards rational outcomes. But beyond the intellectual perfection of the advances in realist theory, we are confronted with a community, and we have the responsibility to perfect it by calculations of justice which define our

87 88

Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 600. Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 135 136.

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mutual responsibilities as exactly as possible.89 This reflects the wisdom of realism, which defines our mutual responsibilities to engage in the most rational evaluation of a given situation, but it also draws upon the Augustinian influence of a higher notion required to subordinate the material demands. Without the recognition of the obligation to the greater community, the study of reality will be self-defeating and narrow, obeying only considerations of power and interest. The formula that Niebuhr establishes corrects the realism of those who are myopically realistic by seeing only their own interests where they are involved with the interests of others But a consistent self-interest on the part of a nation will work against its interests because it will fail to do justice to the broader and longer interests, which are involved with the interests of other nations.90

That is, counseling nations to focus on mutually self-interested desires as the only metric will work counter to its ultimate desires of peace, stability and survival. It will cause nations to pursue their own interest at the expense of others; it will cause nations to judge others as though they would act only with attention to their own interests, and this then encourages the selfish behaviour that undermines cooperation. Adopting classical realism forces a self-oriented approach on your own community, but it also enforces this criterion on others. If one behaves in accordance with their self-determined interests, then other nations must behave likewise or risk having their benevolence or relative weakness exploited. This affirms that Morgenthaus realism is the necessary means of evaluation, but along with this evaluation comes the entrenchment of personal interests as the only guide for action. To mitigate this, a theory
89 90

Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 136. Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 136.

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must recognize the two forces the desire for power and the desire for justice that maintains communities, including the international community.91 This entreaty from Niebuhr demands that we recognize the duty articulated by Morgenthau, such that we do not ignore the national interest and survival. But, to respect those, we must adopt the higher-order desires, such as justice, to correct against the self-defeating self-interest of realism.92

Why Niebuhrs Reformed Realism Approaches Justice Having laid out a corrective to classical realism, is it the case that the Niebuhrian formulation will approach the three criteria for justice? Amending a higher loyalty to realism provides the opportunity to achieve principled judgment that is not entirely derived from prudentiality; through reformed realism there can be judgment beyond political success. If we can link political necessity, endorsed by both Morgenthau and Niebuhr, to the dual facets of human nature, then this will be one of the critical links between political necessity and principle in the formulation of a responsible political ethic, for it moderates the temptation to pretense and hypocrisy. The other link, equally necessary though paradoxically related to the first, is to understand that the norm is not only a judgment against, but the goal of, political life a constant, relevant, directive force.93

The concurrence of self-interest and the general welfare can be approximated only when interest is qualified by a loyalty and a sense of justice that are found beyond interest; and when the component of interest which still remains is acknowledged. Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 601. 92 Thus the loyalty of a leavening portion of a nations citizens to a value transcending national interest will save a realistic nation from defining its interests in such narrow and short range terms as to defeat the real interests of the nation. Niebuhr, Augustines Political Realism, 137. 93 Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 613.
91

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Through Niebuhrs correction, we can work to unify principled judgment, with desired norms, and begin to take action towards enforcing these norms as they are refined in academic and policy discourse. This correction allows discussion of norms and statements of ought to be brought back to the center of political debate as an explicit goal. Reformed realism is able to provide universal application in the sense of isonomia. Because Niebuhrs theory extends from human nature, and comprises both the material and the transcendent, it can be universally upheld. That is, each person, and each nation, has the universal characteristics of self-interestedness, but also the universal duty to transcend it. The criteria of judgment that extend beyond relations of power, the standards of love and justice, are transparent to discrepancies in power. The third qualification for an international theory to be just is that it be prescriptive for behaviour in concrete political circumstance. Certainly, realism succeeds in this criterion. Niebuhrs love is a transcendent value inherent in his human nature, not dependent upon material relation, and can be used to guide action in political circumstance. Because reformed realism seeks to mollify the self-destructive nature of an interest-centered policy, it must guide action if the principle of national survival is to be followed. If interest is the only metric, then it can easily become pernicious. If a theory fails to account for a human nature that necessarily involves the tension between political necessity and idealist demands. This Niebuhrian reform also allows philosophy the entry required to begin questioning the basis of realism and its posited political sphere. It does this by asserting the national interest of survival, and to recognize this demand, philosophy must play a part to mitigate against destructive self-interest by

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positing rational norms like justice. As well, reformed realism can guide policy as norms are joined to judgment and application. Of the theories described, this version of reformed realism provides the most robust basis for establishing a just international theory, and ultimately just international action. This is not an argument to defeat realism. This is an argument to reform realism along philosophic lines to help guide it towards Morgenthaus goal of power tempered to foster international peace. Through the reforms begun by Reinhold Niebuhr in the Augustinian tradition can we hope to do this. These conclusions are an attempt to call attention to the required philosophic scholarship on international relations. We must study the desire for power and the ends it declares in order to understand the international anarchic competition that results. But we must take the next corrective step. To recognize the duty that was for Augustine the perfectionist duty of the Christian, but for Niebuhr, it is the idea of international politics freed from reductive accounts alone freed to seek justice as well as survival. This will serve to remind the realist that the political sphere cannot be autonomous of those philosophical, religious, and ideas that inform and create it. The Niebuhrian approach thus attempts to treat the whole of the person (their material and moral capacities) and the whole of international affairs (the desires for power and the desires for justice) to guide both with a careful understanding of reality while retaining an interest in the transcendent.

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Conclusion
This thesis sought to investigate the status of justice in prevailing international relations theory. For there to be any just action in international affairs, a just theory is a necessary requirement. This required formulating criteria that an international relations theory must meet to be just. A theory must be able to make morally significant judgments, provide equality of application, and guide action in real political experience. Using these criteria two prominent school of international relations thought were examined. This began with examining Hans Morgenthaus realism in detail its historical genesis, its methodological stipulations, and its moral status. It was shown that realism made important strides in revitalizing international relations, but was not sufficient to meet the three criteria of justice. The liberal tradition was then introduced. It has been the idealist response to Morgenthaus realist challenge. It was explored in two categories: the domestic variant of John Rawls political liberalism, and the international liberalism represented by Michael Doyle. This serves to link the philosophical discussions that surround Rawls work with attempts to extend his liberal justice to international relations. These attempts have not able to promote justice internationally using Rawlsian theory; ultimately, Rawlsian domestic justice which must rely on a realist international understanding to maintain its well-ordered status. The second variant of liberalism, which is vigorously pursued in international relations scholarship, upholds justice only in a manner that is materially contingent. Further, it is prone to unjust behaviour in dealings with nations not party to the liberal peace. Liberalism did,

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however, make significant advances in providing for morally significant judgments in international behaviour, but it lacked the ability to guide action beyond realist considerations of power. To conclude, an argument for philosophical justice to reform realist international relations was put forth inspired by the work of Reinhold Niebuhr. His Augustinian reformed realism allowed for the three criteria of just international relations to be met. It maintained the valid assessments of realism by recognizing the love-of-self present in humanity, but offered a corrective in the recognition of our capacity to desire justice in all relations. As a consequence, I argue that international relations must look to philosophy and philosophy must be ready to participate in international relations if the goal of each discipline is a more just world. Hans Morgenthaus classical realism, despite the major advances offered, unavoidably makes philosophical assumptions that cannot be addressed in political discourse alone. As such, philosophy must assert itself into international relations. A theory cannot assume philosophical postulates and simultaneously dismiss philosophical concepts as irrelevant to its conclusions. Thus, through a combination of philosophical questioning, the cogency of realist analysis, and a coherent reform towards justice philosophy can assert its particular qualifications for understanding universal questions such as war, peace and justice and influence international to the benefit of all.

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