ANGTIBAYvCOURTOF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 69Phil 635 LAUREL; February27,1940 FACTS -TherespondentNationalLaborUnion,Inc.prayedfor thevacationofthejudgmentrenderedby themajorityofthis CourtandtheremandingofthecasetotheCourtofIndustrialRelationsforanew trial.

Theunionaversthat: Teodoro'sclaim that there was shortageof leathersolesinANG TIBAY makingitnecessaryforhimtotemporarilylay offthemembersoftheunionisentirelyfalseand unsupportedbytherecordsoftheBureauofCustomsandthe BooksofAccountsofnativedealersinleather;thattheNational Worker'sBrotherhoodofANGTIBAYisacompany oremployeruniondominatedbyTeodoro,theexistenceandfunctionsofwhichareillegal;that theemployerToribioTeodorowasguiltyofunfairlaborpracticefordiscriminatingagainstthe NationalLaborUnion,Inc., andunjustly favoringtheNationalWorkers'Brotherhood; that importantdocuments attachedareinaccessibletotherespondents. ISSUE WON theunionwasdeniedproceduraldueprocessbytheCIR HELD NO. TheCIR,a special courtcreatedunderCA103,is moreanadministrative thanapartof theintegratedjudicial system ofthenation.ItisnotintendedtobeamerereceptiveorganoftheGovernment.Unlikeacourtofj usticewhichis essentiallypassive,actingonly whenitsjurisdictionisinvokedanddecidingonly casesthatarepresented toit bythe partieslitigant,thefunctionoftheCIRismoreactive,affirmativeanddynamic.Itnotonlyexerci sesjudicialorquasi- judicial functions inthe determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions inthe determinationofdisputes betweenemployersandemployeesbutitsfunctionsarefarmorecomprehensiveand expensive.It hasjurisdictionovertheentirePhilippines,toconsider,investigate,decide,andsettleanyque stion, mattercontroversyordisputearisingbetween,and/oraffectingemployersandemployeesor laborers,andregulate therelationsbetween them.Itmayappealto voluntaryarbitrationin the settlementofindustrialdisputes;mayemploy mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture.Thereisinrealityhereaminglingofexecutiveandjudicialfunctions,whichisadep arturefromtherigid doctrineof theseparationof governmentalpowers. TheCIR isnot narrowlyconstrainedbytechnicalrulesof procedure,andtheActrequires it to"actaccording tojustice andequityand substantialmeritsofthecase, withoutregard totechnicalitiesorlegalformsandshallnotbeboundby anytechnicalitiesorlegalformsandshallnotbeboundbyanytechnicalrulesoflegalevidence butmayinformits mindinsuchmannerasitmaydeemjustandequitable."Itshallnotberestrictedtothespecificre liefclaimedor demandsmadeby thepartiestotheindustrialoragriculturaldispute,butmay includeintheaward,orderordecision

anymatterordeterminationwhichmaybedeemednecessaryorexpedientforthepurposeofs ettlingthedisputeor ofpreventingfurtherindustrialoragriculturaldisputes.Andinthelightofthislegislativepolicy, appealstothisCourt havebeenespeciallyregulatedbytherulesrecentlypromulgatedbytherulesrecentlypromu lgatedbythisCourtto carryinto theeffect theavowedlegislativepurpose. Thefact,however,thattheCIRmaybesaidtobefreefromtherigidityofcertainproceduralrequ irementsdoesnot mean thatit can,injustifiable cases beforeit,entirelyignoreordisregard the fundamentalandessentialrequirements ofdueprocessintrialsandinvestigationsofanadministrativecharacter.Thereareprimaryrig htswhichmustbe respectedeveninproceedings of this character: (1)Thefirstoftheserightsistherighttoahearing,whichincludestherightoftheparty interestedor affectedtopresenthisowncaseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.Theliberty andproperty ofthecitizen shallbeprotectedbytherudimentaryrequirements of fairplay. (2)Notonlymustthepartybegivenan opportunitytopresenthis caseandtoadduceevidencetendingto establish the rightswhich heasserts butthetribunalmustconsidertheevidencepresented. (3)Whilethedutytodeliberatedoesnotimposetheobligationtodecideright,itdoesim ply anecessity whichcannotbedisregarded,namely,thatofhavingsomethingtosupportitisanullity, a placewhen directlyattached.Thisprincipleemanatesfromthemorefundamentaliscontrarytothevesti ngofunlimitedpower anywhere.Law is bothagrantandalimitationuponpower. (4)Notonlymusttherebesomeevidencetosupportafindingorconclusion,buttheevid encemustbe substantial.It means such relevantevidence asareasonable mindacceptasadequate to supportaconclusion. Mereuncorroboratedhearsayorrumordoesnot constitutesubstantialevidence. (5)Thedecisionmustberenderedontheevidencepresentedatthehearing,oratleast containedinthe recordand disclosedto the partiesaffected. Onlybyconfiningthe administrativetribunaltothe evidence disclosedtotheparties,canthelatterbeprotectedintheirrighttoknowandmeetthecaseagain stthem.Itshould not,however,detractfromtheirdutyactivelyto seethatthelawisenforced,andforthatpurpose,tousethe authorizedlegalmethodsofsecuringevidenceandinformingitselfoffactsmaterialandrelev anttothecontroversy. Boardsofinquirymaybeappointedforthepurposeofinvestigatinganddeterminingthefactsi nanygivencase,but theirreport anddecisionareonlyadvisory. (6)The CIR oranyofitsjudges,therefore,mustactonitsorhisown independentconsiderationofthelawandfactsofthecontroversy,andnotsimplyacce ptthe viewsofa subordinatein arriving atadecision. (7)TheCIRshould,inall controversial questions,renderitsdecisionin suchamannerthatthepartiesto the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performanceof thisdutyisinseparablefrom theauthorityconferreduponit. -Intherightoftheforegoing fundamentalprinciples,exceptasto theallegedagreementbetween theAngTibay and theNational Worker'sBrotherhood,therecordisbarrenanddoesnotsatisfy thethirstforafactualbasisuponwhich topredicate, inanationalway,aconclusionof law.

Thisresult,however,doesnotnowprecludetheconcessionofanewtrialprayedforthebyresp ondentNational LaborUnion,Inc.Theinterestofjusticewouldbebetterservedifthemovantisgivenopportunit ytopresentatthe hearingthedocumentsreferredtoinhismotionandsuchother evidenceasmayberelevanttothemainissue involved.ThelegislationwhichcreatedtheCIRisnew.Thefailuretograspthefundamentalis sueinvolvedisnot entirelyattributabletothepartiesadverselyaffectedbytheresult.Accordingly,themotionfor anewtrialisgranted, and theentirerecordof thecaseshallberemanded totheCIR.

VINTAMARITIMEVNLRC (Basconcillo) 284SCRA656 PANGANIBAN;January3,1998 NATURE Special civilactionof certiorari FACTS -LeonidesC.BASCONCILLO,filedacomplaintwiththePhilippineOverseasEmployment Administration(POEA) WorkersAssistanceandAdjudicationOfficeforillegaldismissalagainstVintaMaritimeCo.,I nc.andElkanoShip Management,Inc. -Theemployersallegedthathewasdismissedforhisgrossnegligenceandincompetent performanceaschiefengineeroftheM/VBoracay.Theyclaimthathewasgivenfairwarning andenoughopportunitytoexplainhis side,nottomentionallthechancesgiventohimtoimprovehis substandardworkperformancebeforehewas dismissed. -Theemployeedeniedtheallegationsagainsthim;contrary tohisemployersclaim,hewasactuallysurprisedwhen hewastoldofhisdismissal.Thisoccurredafterhehadaverbalaltercation withaBritishnational,regardingthelack ofdisciplineof theFilipino crewundertheengineerssupervision. No inquiryorinvestigation,however, regarding hissupposedincompetenceornegligencewaseverconducted;neitherwasprivateres pondentfurnishedwitha noticeormemorandum regardingthecauseofhis dismissal. -POEAconsideredthecasesubmittedforresolution bymutualagreementofthepartiesafter submissionoftheir respective positionpapers and supporting documents.POEA AdministratorAchacosoruled that private respondentwasillegally dismissed. -Onappeal, the NLRC affirmedthePOEA. ISSUE/S 1. WONtrialisindispensableinadministrativeproceedings 2. WONtheemployee wasillegallydismissed HELD 1.NO Ratio Althoughboundby toobservedueprocess,administrativeagenciesexercisingquasi-

judicialpowersarenonetheless freefrom therigidityofcertainproceduralrequirements. DUEPROCESS-Cardinal PrimaryRights Inlaborcases,thisCourthasconsistentlyheldthatdueprocessdoesnotnecessarilymeanorr equireahearing, butsimplyanopportunityorarighttobeheard. Therequirementsofdueprocess aredeemedtohavebeensatisfiedwhenpartiesaregiventheopportunitytosubmitpositionpa pers.Theholdingofanadversarialtrialisdiscretionary on thelaborarbiterandtheparties cannot demanditas amatterofright. -These rulesequallyapply to cases filedwith thePhilippineOverseasEmploymentAdministration Adjudication Office.Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of dueprocess. ReasoningPetitionersweregiventheir chancetobeheard. Theiranswer,positionpaperand supportingdocuments hadbecomepartsof therecords andwereconsideredbythePOEAandbytheNLRC. 2.YES RatioWherethereisnoshowingofaclear,valid,andlegalcausefortheterminationof employment,thelaw considersthematteracaseofillegaldismissal.Verily,theburdenisontheemployertoproveth atthetermination was foravalidorauthorized cause. -Dueprocess, the secondelement foravaliddismissal, requiresNOTICEandHEARING.Theemployer must furnish the worker with twowrittennoticesbefore termination canbelegally effected:(1)notice whichapprisestheemployee oftheparticularactsoromissionsforwhichhisdismissalissoughtand (2)subsequentnoticewhichinformsthe employeeoftheemployersdecisiontodismisshim. Disposition PetitionisDISMISSED.

UPBOARD OF REGENTSV.CA(AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARETCELINE) G.R.No.134625. MENDOZA;August31,1999 NATURE Petitionforreview FACTS -PrivaterespondentArokiaswamyWilliamMargaretCelineisa citizenofIndiaandholderofaPhilippine visitors visa. sheenrolledinthedoctoralprograminAnthropologyoftheUniversityofthePhilippinesColleg eofSocialSciences andPhilosophy(CSSP)inDiliman,QuezonCity. Aftercompletingtheunitsofcourseworkrequiredinherdoctoralprogram,privateresponden twentonatwo-year leaveofabsencetoworkasTamilProgrammeProduceroftheVaticanRadiointheVaticanan dasGeneralOffice AssistantattheInternationalRighttoLifeFederationinRome.Shereturned tothePhilippinestoworkonher dissertationentitled,"Tamil Influencesin

lawandpractice

Malaysia,Indonesiaand thePhilippines." Dr.RealidadS.Rolda,chairpersonoftheU.P.DepartmentofAnthropology,wrotealettertoDr . MariaSerena Diokno,CSSPAssociateDeanandGraduateProgramDirector,certifyingthatprivaterespon denthadfinishedher dissertationandwasreadyforheroraldefense. She was allowedtogiveanoraldefense. Aftergoingoverprivaterespondentsdissertation,Dr.MedinainformedCSSPDeanConsuel o Joaquin-Pazthat there was a portionin private respondents dissertationthat was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaediaof India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyesarticle entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel,Malabar,andtheIslandofCeylonfortheirCoastingNavigation"intheRoyalAsi aticSocietyofGreat BritainandIrelandJournal. -Nonetheless,private respondent wasallowed to defend her dissertation.Four (4) outof the five (5)panelistsgave privaterespondentapassingmarkforheroraldefensebyaffixing theirsignatures ontheapprovalform. -TheCSSPCollegeFaculty Assembly approvedprivaterespondentsgraduationpendingsubmissionoffinalcopies of herdissertation. -TheUniversity Councilmettoapprove thelistofcandidatesforgraduation forthe second semesterofschoolyear 1992-1993.Thelist, which wasendorsed to theBoardofRegentsforfinalapproval,includedprivaterespondents name. DeanPazsentalettertoDr.MilagrosIbe,ViceChancellorforAcademicAffairs,requestingthe exclusionofprivate respondentsnamefromthelistofcandidatesforgraduation,pendingclarification oftheproblemsregardingher dissertation. -DeanPazsletterdidnotreachtheBoardofRegentsontime,becausethenextday,theBoard approvedthe University Councilsrecommendation for thegraduationofqualified students,includingprivaterespondent.Twodays later,privaterespondentgraduatedwiththedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyinAnthropology. -Dr.Medinaformally chargedprivaterespondentwithplagiarismandrecommendedthatthedoctorategrantedto her be withdrawn. -DeanPaz formedan adhoccommittee toinvestigate theplagiarismchargeagainstprivaterespondent.Meanwhile, sherecommendedtoU.P.DilimanChancellor,Dr.EmerlindaRoman,thatthePh.D. degreeconferredonprivate respondentbewithdrawn. -Inaletter DeanPaz informedprivaterespondentofthechargesagainst her. -TheCSSPCollegeAssembly unanimously approvedtherecommendation towithdrawprivate respondents doctoratedegreeandforwardeditsrecommendationtotheUniversityCouncil.The UniversityCouncil,inturn, approvedandendorsedthesamerecommendationtotheBoardof Regents onAugust 16,1993. -Meanwhile,inaletter,U.P.DilimanChancellorEmerlindaRoman

summonedprivaterespondenttoa meetingonthe samedayandaskedhertosubmit herwrittenexplanation tothechargesagainst her. -Duringthemeeting,ChancellorRomaninformed privaterespondentofthe chargesandprovidedheracopyofthe findingsoftheinvestigating committee. Privaterespondent,on theotherhand,submittedher writtenexplanationina letter. -Another meetingwasheldbetweenChancellorRomanandprivaterespondenttodiscussheranswert o thecharges. Athirdmeetingwasscheduledbutprivaterespondentdidnotattendit,allegingthatthe BoardofRegents had alreadydecided hercasebeforeshecouldbefullyheard. -BOR withdrew degree TCdismissedpetitionformandamusfiledbyArokiaswamy.CAreversedorderingBORtorest ore herdoctoral degree. ISSUE WON Arokiaswamywas denieddueprocess HELD NO. Reasoning Inthiscase,thetrialcourtdismissedprivaterespondentspetitionpreciselyongrounds ofacademic freedombut theCourt of Appeals reversedholdingthatprivaterespondent was denieddueprocess. It said: Itisworthy tonotethatduring theproceedingstakenby theCollegeAssembly culminatinginitsrecommendationto theUniversityCouncil for the withdrawalofpetitionersPh.D.degree,petitioner wasnotgiventhe chance tobeheard untilafterthewithdrawalofthedegreewasconsummated.Petitionerssubsequent letterstotheU.P.President provedunavailing.

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION v.OFFICEOF THEPRESIDENT,GARMENTS&TEXTILEEXPORTBOARD & GLORIOUSSUN FASHION GARMENTSMANUFACTURINGCO.(PHILS.),INC. 187SCRA409 GUTIERREZ,JR.; May23,1991 Nature:Appeal Facts: -GLORIOUSwasfoundguiltyofdollarsaltingandmisdeclarationofimportationsbytheGTEBand,asaresultof which,theexportquotasallocatedtoitwerecancelled.SoonaftertherenditionoftheGTEBde cision,GLORIOUS filedapetitionfor certiorariandprohibition with the Court,contendingthatitsright todueprocessoflawwas violated, and that theGTEBdecisionwas not supportedbysubstantialevidence. -GivingcredencetotheallegationsofrespondentGLORIOUS,theCourtissuedaresolution orderingGTEBto conduct furtherproceedings intheadministrative caseagainstrespondentGLORIOUS. -However, GLORIOUS filedamanifestationofits intentiontowithdraw

thepetitionwhichtheCourtgranted -GLORIOUS filedanothermotiontodismiss withprejudice, whichwasdulynotedbytheCourt inaresolution. Morethan2yearslater,GLORIOUSfiledwiththeGTEBapetitionfortherestitutionofitsexport quotaallocation andrequestedforareconsiderationoftheGTEBdecisiondatedApril27, 1984. -GLORIOUSagainalleged that thechargesagainstit werenot supportedbyevidence. -Moreover,italleged that the GTEB decision canceling itsexportquotas wasrendered asa resultofduress,threats, intimidationandundueinfluenceexercisedbyformerMinisterRobertoV.Ongpinin ordertotransferGLORIOUS' exportquotasto"Marcos crony-owned" corporationsDeSoleilApparel ManufacturingCorporation[DSA]andAIFC. -GLORIOUS furtheralleged thatit was coercedby Mr.RobertoOngpin to withdrawitspetitionandtoenterintojoint ventureagreementspavingthewayforthecreationofDSAandpetitionerAIFCwhichwere allowed toservice GLORIOUS'exportquotasandtouseitsplant facilities, machineries andequipment. -GTEBdeniedthepetitionofGLORIOUS.Anappeal was thentakentotheOfficeof thePresident. Atthispoint,AIFCsoughttointerveneintheproceedingsandfileditsoppositiontoGLORIOUS 'appealclaiming thattheGTEBdecisionhaslongbecome final,andthata favorableactionon theappeal wouldresult inthe forfeiture oftheexportquotas whichwerelegallyallocatedtoit. -The Office of the Presidentruled in favor ofGLORIOUS, finding the proceedingsbefore the GTEB in1984irregular, andremandedthecasetoGTEBforfurtherproceedings. -TheMR of AIFC was subsequentlydenied. Issues: 1. WONtheOFFICEOF THEPRESIDENTCOMMITTED GRAVEABUSEOF DISCRETION and 2.WONthefinaljudgmentconstitutesresjudicataonthegroundthatthefinaljudgmentinwasa judgmentonthe merits. Held: 1. NO.InfindingthatGTEBproceedingswereirregular,theOPdidntcommitGADasGTEBinde edviolatedthe righttodueprocessofGlorious.GTEBfailedtodiscloseevidenceusedbyitin renderingtheresolutionagainst GloriousSun.Thedecisionpennedby DeputyExecutiveSecretaryMagdangalB.Elmaand theresolutionpennedby ActingDeputyExecutiveSecretaryMariano SarmientoIIarenottaintedintheslightestbyanygraveabuseof discretion.Theyoutlineindetailwhytheprivaterespondentwasdenieddueprocesswhenits exportquotaswere cancelledbyGTEBThefindings aresupportedbytherecords. RATIO:Evidence on record mustbefully disclosed to theparties. 2.NO.Thedismissalofthefirstpetitionwasclearlybasedonatechnicalmatterratherthanonthemeri tsofthe petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot, under the circumstances, constituteresjudicata. Reasoning:

-Forajudgment tobeabartoasubsequentcase,the followingrequisites must concur: ...(1)itmustbeafinaljudgment;(2)thecourtwhichresolvedithadjurisdictionoverthesubject matterandthe parties;(3)itmustbeajudgmentonthemerits;and(4)theremustbeidentitybetweenthetwoc ases,astothe parties, subject matterandcauseof action. -Thewellentrenchedprincipleisthat"ajudgmentonthemeritsisonerenderedafteradetermination ofwhichparty isright,asdistinguishedfromajudgmentrendereduponpreliminaryorfinalormerelytechnic alpoint."(Deangv. IAC). -TheprotestationofGloriousSunofnon-disclosureofevidencehadbeeneffectively remediedby thesubsequent accommodationbytheGTEBof itsrequest forcopiesof therelevantdocuments. ThepetitionerclaimsthatthesubsequentdisclosureofthedocumentsbyGTEBtoGloriousS unin1987curedthe defectofnondisclosureofevidencein1984undertheconstitutionalprovisionofdue processenunciatedinthe landmark caseof AngTibayv.CIR andothersubsequentcases. -Thedocumentsusedby theGTEBinits1984decisionandreferred toin the1987decisionasbeing"intact"relates towhattheGTEBlabeledasDocumentsusedbyGTEBand"AdditionalDocuments"which,a searlierdiscussed, wereeithernot disclosedtoAppellant forbeingprivilegedorunmarkedasexhibitsornot presentedinevidence. -Atany rate,the conclusionsofGTEBasto theexcessivenessofAppellant'simportpricesdrewa controvertingstatement fromits own RawMaterialsImportationRegulationDivision, -Findingsofadministrativeagenciesareaccordedrespectand finality,andgenerally shouldnotbedisturbedbythe courts. This generalrule,however,isnot withoutexceptions. Asrecentlyreiterated,itisjurisprudentiallysettledthatabsentaclear,manifestandgraveabu se ofdiscretion amounttowantofjurisdiction,thefindingsoftheadministrativeagencyonmattersfallingwithi nitscompetencewill notbedisturbedbythe courts. Specificallywithrespecttofactualfindings,theyareaccordedrespect,ifnotfinality,because of thespecial knowledgeandexpertisegainedbythesetribunalsfromhandlingthespecific matters fallingundertheirjurisdiction. Suchfactualfindingsmaybedisregardedonlyifthey"arenotsupportedbyevidence;whereth e findingsare initiatedbyfraud,impositionorcollussion;where theprocedureswhichlead tothe factual findingsareirregular;when palpableerrorsarecommitted;orwhengraveabuseofdiscretionarbitrarinesorcapriciousne ssismanifest."(Mapav.Arroyo,175SCRA76[1989]) -In the caseatbar,thepetitioner wasnevergiven the chance topresentitssidebeforeitsexport quotaallocations wererevokedanditsofficerssuspended.Whileitistruethatsuchallocationsasalleged bytheBoardaremere privilegeswhichitcanrevokeandcancelasitmaydeemfit,theseprivilegeshavebeenaccord ed topetitionerfor so long that theyhavebecomeimpressedwithpropertyrightsespeciallysincenotonlydo theseprivilegesdeterminethe

continuedexistenceofthepetitionerwithassetsofoverP80,000,000.00butalsothelivelihoo dofsome700workers whoareemployedbythepetitionerandtheirfamilies. -Finally,AmericanInter-Fashionishardly theproperparty toquestion theMalacaangdecision.Itwasincorporated aftertheincidentsinthiscasehappened.Itwascreatedobviouslytobetherecipientof exportquotasarbitrarily removedfromtherightfulowner.Itwassequesteredprecisely becauseoftheallegationthatitisacrony corporation whichprofitedfromanactofinjusticeinflictedonanotherprivatecorporation. Dispositive:MFRisGRANTED.TheinstantpetitionisDISMISSED.Thequestiondecisiona nd resolutionofthe Officeof thePresidentareherebyAFFIRMED. SeparateOpinion FELICIANO-concurring: IconcurintheresultreachedbytheCourt,thatis,thatpetitionerAmericanInterfashionCorporationhasfailedto showanygraveabuseofdiscretionoractwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofthepu blicrespondent Officeof thePresidentinrenderingits decisioninOPCaseNo.3781dated7September1989.

ISSUES 1. WON theorderof theTC is proper 2. WON Moralis entitledtoacopyof theReport HELD 1. NO. Section3,Rule16,ofthe1997RulesofCivilProceduremandatorilyrequiresthattheresolutio nonamotionto dismissshouldclearlyanddistinctlystatethereasonstherefor. -The challengedOrderof the trialcourtdated23April1997 falls short of therequirements prescribedinRule16.The Ordermerelydiscussedthegeneralconceptofmandamusandthetrialcourtsjurisdictionov erthe rulingsand actions of administrativeagencies without statingthebasis whypetitioners motiontodismiss was beingdenied. Judgesshouldtakepainsincraftingtheirorders,statingthereinclearlyandcomprehensively thereasonsfortheir issuance,whicharenecessaryfor the fullunderstandingoftheaction taken. Where thecourtitselfhasnot statedany basisforitsorder,tobeverystrictinrequiringapriormotionforreconsiderationbeforeresortto highercourtson certiorarimaybehad,wouldbe toexpect too much.Sincethejudgehimselfwasnot preciseand specificinhisorder, a certaindegreeofliberalityinexactingfrom petitioner strict compliancewiththerules was justified. 2. NO. - Mandamusisemployedtocompeltheperformance,whenrefused,ofaministerialduty,this beingitsmain objective.Itdoesnotlietorequireanyonetofulfilladiscretionaryduty.Itisessentialtotheissua nceofawritof mandamusthatpetitioner shouldhaveaclearlegalrighttothe thingdemandedanditmustbe theimperativeduty of therespondent toperform theactrequired. Inherpetitionformandamus,respondentmiserablyfailedtodemonstratethatshehasaclearl egalrighttothe DECSInvestigationCommitteeReportandthatitistheministerialdutyofpetitionerDECSSe cretarytofurnishher withacopythereof. Primarily,respondentdidnotappealtotheCivilServiceCommissiontheDECSresolutiondis missingherfromthe service. Byher failuretodoso,nothingpreventedtheDECSresolutionfrombecomingfinal. -Moreover,thereisnolaworrulewhichimposesalegalduty onpetitionertofurnishrespondentwithacopyofthe investigationreport. Onthecontrary,itwasheldinRuizv.Drilonthatarespondentinanadministrativecaseisnot entitledtobeinformedofthefindingsandrecommendationsofanyinvestigatingcommitteecr eatedtoinquireinto chargesfiledagainsthim. Heisentitledonlytotheadministrativedecisionbasedonsubstantialevidencemadeof record,andareasonableopportunitytomeetthechargesandtheevidence presentedagainstherduringthe hearingsof theinvestigationcommittee. Respondentnodoubthadbeenaccordedtheserights.

PEFIANCOV.MORAL 322SCRA439 BELLOSILLO;Jan 19,2000 NATURE Petitionforreview of decisionofCA FACTS -Sec`of DECS seeks tonullifyCAdecision. -Ex-SecGloriafiledcomplaintagainstMoral,ChiefLibrarianofNationalLibrary fordishonesty,gravemisconduct andconductprejudicialto thebestinterestoftheservice.The complaintchargedrespondentMoralwiththepilferage ofsomehistoricaldocuments. -DoJSpecialProsecutorrepresentedSecGloriaintheadministrativecase. Moralwasrepresentedbyherprivate counsel. SecGloriaissuedresolutionfindingMoralguilty. Shewas ordereddismissed. MoraldidnotappealbutfiledaPetitionforProductionofDECSInvestigationCommitteeRepo rt. Herpetitionwas twicedenied. -Moralinstituted anaction formandamusand injunctionbeforeregular courtsagainstSecGloriaprayingthatshebe furnishedacopyoftheDECSInvestigationCommitteeReportandthat theDECSSecretarybe enjoinedfrom enforcingtheorderof dismissaluntilshereceiveda copyofthesaidreport. SecretaryGloriamovedtodismissthemandamuscaseprincipallyforlackofcauseofaction,b ut thetrialcourt deniedhis motion. Thus,heelevatedthe casetotheCourtof Appeals oncertiorari. CA sustainedTC. -SecGloriafiledinstant petition. SecGloriawasreplacedbySecPefianco.

-More importantly, theDECSresolution is complete in itself for purposesofappeal to the Civil ServiceCommission, thatis,itcontainssufficientfindingsoffactandconclusionoflawuponwhichrespondentsrem ovalfromofficewas grounded. DispositionPetitionis granted.

PEFIANCOV.MORAL 322SCRA439 BELLOSILLO;Jan 19,2000 NATURE Petitionforreview of decisionofCA FACTS -SecPefiancoof DECS seeks tonullifyCAdecision. -Ex-SecGloriafiledcomplaintagainstMoral,ChiefLibrarianofNationalLibrary fordishonesty,gravemisconduct andconductprejudicialto thebestinterestoftheservice.The complaintchargedrespondentMoralwiththepilferage ofsomehistoricaldocuments. -DoJSpecialProsecutorrepresentedSecGloriaintheadministrativecase. Moralwasrepresentedbyherprivate counsel. SecGloriaissuedresolutionfindingMoralguilty. Shewas ordereddismissed. MoraldidnotappealbutfiledaPetitionforProductionofDECSInvestigationCommitteeRepo rt. Herpetitionwas twicedenied. -Moralinstituted anaction formandamusand injunctionbeforeregular courtsagainstSecGloriaprayingthatshebe furnishedacopyoftheDECSInvestigationCommitteeReportandthat theDECSSecretarybe enjoinedfrom enforcingtheorderof dismissaluntilshereceiveda copyofthesaidreport. SecretaryGloriamovedtodismissthemandamuscaseprincipallyforlackofcauseofaction,b ut thetrialcourt deniedhis motion. Thus,heelevatedthe casetotheCourtof Appeals oncertiorari. CA sustainedTC. -SecGloriafiledinstant petition. SecGloriawasreplacedbySecPefianco. ISSUES 1. WON theorderof theTC is proper 2. WON Moralis entitledtoacopyof theReport HELD 1. NO. Section3,Rule16,ofthe1997RulesofCivilProceduremandatorilyrequiresthattheresolutio nonamotionto dismissshouldclearlyanddistinctlystatethereasonstherefor. -The challengedOrderof the trialcourtdated23April1997 falls short of therequirements prescribedinRule16.The Ordermerelydiscussedthegeneralconceptofmandamusandthetrialcourtsjurisdictionov

erthe rulingsand actions of administrativeagencies without statingthebasis whypetitioners motiontodismiss was beingdenied. Judgesshouldtakepainsincraftingtheirorders,statingthereinclearlyandcomprehensively thereasonsfortheir issuance,whicharenecessaryfor the fullunderstandingoftheaction taken. Where thecourtitselfhasnot statedany basisforitsorder,tobeverystrictinrequiringapriormotionforreconsiderationbeforeresortto highercourtson certiorarimaybehad,wouldbe toexpect too much.Sincethejudgehimselfwasnot preciseand specificinhisorder, a certaindegreeofliberalityinexactingfrom petitioner strict compliancewiththerules was justified. 2. NO. - Mandamusisemployedtocompeltheperformance,whenrefused,ofaministerialduty,this beingitsmain objective.Itdoesnotlietorequireanyonetofulfilladiscretionaryduty.Itisessentialtotheissua nceofawritof mandamusthatpetitioner shouldhaveaclearlegalrighttothe thingdemandedanditmustbe theimperativeduty of therespondent toperform theactrequired. Inherpetitionformandamus,respondentmiserablyfailedtodemonstratethatshehasaclearl egalrighttothe DECSInvestigationCommitteeReportandthatitistheministerialdutyofpetitionerDECSSe cretarytofurnishher withacopythereof. Primarily,respondentdidnotappealtotheCivilServiceCommissiontheDECSresolutiondis missingherfromthe service. Byher failuretodoso,nothingpreventedtheDECSresolutionfrombecomingfinal. -Moreover,thereisnolaworrulewhichimposesalegalduty onpetitionertofurnishrespondentwithacopyofthe investigationreport. Onthecontrary,itwasheldinRuizv.Drilonthatarespondentinanadministrativecaseisnot entitledtobeinformedofthefindingsandrecommendationsofanyinvestigatingcommitteecr eatedtoinquireinto chargesfiledagainsthim. Heisentitledonlytotheadministrativedecisionbasedonsubstantialevidencemadeof record,andareasonableopportunitytomeetthechargesandtheevidence presentedagainstherduringthe hearingsof theinvestigationcommittee. Respondentnodoubthadbeenaccordedtheserights. -More importantly, theDECSresolution is complete in itself for purposesofappeal to the Civil ServiceCommission, thatis,itcontainssufficientfindingsoffactandconclusionoflawuponwhichrespondentsrem ovalfromofficewas grounded. Disposition Petitionis granted. Asthe foregoingnarrationoffactsin this case shows,however,variouscommitteeshadbeen formed toinvestigate thecharge thatprivaterespondenthad committedplagiarismand,inall theinvestigationsheld,shewasheardinher defense.Indeed,ifanycriticismmaybemadeoftheuniversityproceedingsbeforeprivateres pondentwasfinally strippedofherdegree,itisthatthereweretoo many committeeandindividualinvestigationsconducted,althoughall resultedina finding thatprivaterespondentcommitteddishonesty insubmittingherdoctoraldissertationonthebasis ofwhichshewas

conferredthePh.D.degree. Indeed,inadministrativeproceedings,theessenceofdueprocessissimplytheopportunity toexplainonessideofa controversy orachanceto seekreconsiderationoftheactionorrulingcomplainedof.Aparty whohasavailedofthe opportunitytopresenthispositioncannot tenablyclaimtohavebeendenieddueprocess. Inthiscase,privaterespondentwasinformedin writingofthe chargesagainstherandafforded opportunitiesto refutethem.Shewasaskedtosubmitherwrittenexplanation,whichsheforwarded. Privaterespondentthenmet with theU.P.chancellorandthemembersoftheZafarallacommitteetodiscusshercase.Inadditio n,shesentseveralletters tothe U.P. authorities explainingherposition. Itisnottenableforprivaterespondenttoarguethatshewasentitledtohaveanaudiencebefore theBoardof Regents.Dueprocessinanadministrativecontextdoesnotrequiretrial-type proceedingssimilartothoseinthe courtsofjustice.ItisnoteworthythattheU.P.Rulesdonot requiretheattendanceofpersonswhosecasesare includedas items ontheagendaoftheBoardof Regents. DispositionPetition formandamus DISMISSED AND HEARING WHEN REQUIRED NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTCO.V COLLECTOR G.R.No.L-19180 BAUTISTAANGELO;October31,1963 NATURE Special civilactionof certiorariwithpreliminaryinjunction FACTS -TheCollectorofCustomssentanoticetoC.F.Sharp&Companyinformingitthatavesselit operateswas apprehendedandfoundtohavecommittedaviolationofthecustomslawsand regulationsandthatitcarriedan unmanifestedcargoconsistingofoneRCAVictorTVset21"inviolationofSection2521oftheT ariffandCustoms Code. -C.F.Sharp&Company,notbeing theagentoroperatorofthe vessel,referred thenotice toA.V.Rocha,theagent andoperatorthereof,whoansweredthenoticestating,amongotherthings,thatthetelevision setreferredtotherein wasnotacargoofthevesseland,therefore,wasnotrequiredby lawtobemanifested.Rochastatedfurther:"Ifthis explanationisnotsufficient,werequestthatthiscasebe setforinvestigationandhearinginordertoenablethe vesseltobeinformedof theevidenceagainstit to sustainthechargeandtopresentevidenceinitsdefense." TheCollectorofCustomsrepliedtoRochastatingthatthetelevisionsetinquestionwasacarg o onboardthe vesselandthathedoesnotfindhisexplanationsatisfactorilyenoughtoexemptthevesselfro mliabilityforviolating Section2521oftheTariffandCustomsCode.Insaidletter,thecollectorimposedafineofP5,0 00.00onthevessel andorderedpaymentthereofwithin48hourswithathreatthathewilldeny clearancetosaidvesselandwillissuea warrantof seizureanddetentionagainst it if thefineisnotpaid. -Petitioner fileda special civilactionofcertiorari withpreliminary injunctionbeforetheCourtofFirstInstance,which

wasgranted. Respondentinterposedpresentappeal. ISSUE WON therequirementsofadministrativedueprocesshavealreadybeen compliedwith HELD NO -Rochawasnotgivenanopportunity toprovethatthetelevision setcomplainedofisnotacargothatneedstobe manifestedasrequiredbySection2521oftheTariffandCustomsCode.Undersaidsection,in orderthatan importedarticleormerchandisemaybeconsideredacargothatshouldbemanifesteditisfirst necessarythatitbe soestablishedforthereasonthatthereareothereffectsthatavessel maycarrythatareexcludedfromthe requirementofthelaw,amongwhicharethepersonaleffectsofthemembersofthecrew.Thef actthatthesetin questionwasclaimedbythecustomsauthorities nottobewithintheexceptiondoesnotautomaticallymakethe vesselliable.Itisstillnecessarythatthevessel,itsowneroroperator,begivenachancetosho wotherwise.Thisis preciselywhatpetitioner Rochahasrequestedinhisletter.Notonlywashedeniedthischance,butrespondent collectorimmediatelyimposeduponthevesselthehugefineofP5,000.00.Thisisadenialofth eelementaryruleof dueprocess. -Trueitisthattheproceedingsbefore theCollectorofCustomsinsofarasthedeterminationofany actorirregularity thatmayinvolveaviolationofanycustomslaworregulationisconcerned,orofanyactarisingu ndertheTariffand CustomsCode,arenotjudicialincharacter,butmerelyadministrative,wheretherulesofproc edurearegenerally disregarded,butevenintheadministrativeproceedingsdueprocessshouldbe observedbecausethatisaright enshrinedinourConstitution.Therighttodueprocessisnotmerelystatutory.Itisaconstitution alright.Thatthis principleapplieswithequalforcetoadministrativeproceedingswaswellelaborateduponbyt hisCourtintheAngTibaycase. DispositionThedecisionappealedfrom is affirmed.

UYVCOA G.R.No.130685 PUNO; March 21,2000 NATURE Special civilactionforcertiorari FACTS PetitionerswereamongtheemployeesoftheProvincialEngineeringOfficewhoweredismis sedbyGov.Paredes, allegedlytoscaledownoperations. PetitionersfiledapetitionforreinstatementtotheMeritSystemsProtectionBoard(MSPB).M SPBfoundthatthe

reductioninworkforcewasnotdoneinaccordancewithcivilservicerulesand regulations,andorderingthe reinstatementofpetitioners.Itheldthatwhilereductioninforceduetolackoffundsisavalidgro undfortermination, employeestobeterminatedmustbedeterminedafterbeingfoundtobetheleastqualified(in terms ofrelative fitness, efficiencyandlengthof service) -MSPBlaterissuedanorderdirectingtheProvincialGovernmentofAgusandelSurpay petitionerstheirback salariesandothermoneybenefits. Atfirst,theGovernordidnotwanttocomplywithsaidorders.ThematterwasbroughtuptotheC SC,wherein indirect contemptproceedings were held. This prompted the Governor to finally comply with the order of reinstatement. Theprovincialtreasureralsopartiallyreleased someof thebackwages. -Buttheproblemsdidnotstop there.Later, theProvincialAdministrator,forandinbehalfofGovernorPlaza,wrotea lettertorespondentCommissiononAudit.ItclaimsthatCOAistheproperauthoritytodetermi nedisbursementas regardsthebackwages.Initsdecision,COAruledthatthepaymentofbackwageshasbecom ethepersonalliability offormerGovernorParedes, it appearingthat theillegaldismissalwasdoneinbadfaith. -Pursuant totherulingofCOA, theprovincialtreasurer stoppedthepaymentof backwages. ISSUE/S 1.WON theCOA,in theexerciseofitspower toaudit,candisallowthepaymentofback wagesofillegally dismissed employeesbytheProvincialGovernmentofAgusandelSurwhichhasbeendecreedpursuan ttoafinaldecisionof theCivilService Commission HELD 1.NO. Reasoning First,COAbaseditsrulingontheMSRBdecision.AcarefulperusalofsaidDecisionwilldisclos ethattheMSPB nevermadeacategoricalfindingoffactthatformerGovernorParedesactedinbadfaithandhe nce,ispersonally liableforthepaymentofpetitioners'backwages.Indeed,theMSPBevenfoundthattherewasl ackoffundswhich wouldhavejustifiedthereductionintheworkforcewereit not fortheproceduralinfirmitiesinitsimplementation (importantaccordingtothesyllabus)Second,thefundamentalrequirementsofprocedurald ue processwere violatedinproceedingsbeforetheCOA.Inthecaseatbar, former GovernorParedeswasnever madeaparty tonor servedanoticeoftheproceedingsbeforetheCOA.Whileadministrativeagenciesexercising quasi-judicialpowers arenothideboundbytechnicalprocedures,nonetheless,theyarenotfreetodisregardthebas icdemandsofdue process.Noticetoenabletheotherpartytobeheardandtopresentevidenceisnotameretech

nicalityoratrivial matterinanyadministrativeproceedingsbutanindispensableingredientofdueprocess.Itw ouldbeunfairforCOA toholdformerGovernorParedespersonally liableforthe claimsofpetitionersamountingto millionsofpesoswithout givinghimanopportunitytobeheardandpresentevidenceinhisdefense.Ourrulingsholdingt hatpublicofficialsare personally liablefordamagesarisingfromillegalactsdoneinbadfaitharepremisedonsaidofficialshavin gbeen suedbothintheirofficialandpersonalcapacities Third,theMSRBdecisionbecamefinalandexecutory.Finaljudgmentsmaynolongerberevi ewedorinanyway modifieddirectlyorindirectlybyahighercourt,notevenbytheSupremeCourt,much lessbyanyotherofficial, branchordepartmentofGovernment DispositionDecisionofCOAset aside

SUNTAYvPEOPLE G.R.No.L-9430 PADILLA,J.;June29,1957 NATURE Petitionforawritofcertiorari FACTS -Dr.AntonioNubla,fatherofAliciaNubla,a minor of16years,filedaverified complaintagainstEmilioSuntay inthe OfficeoftheCityAttorneyofQuezonCity,asfollows:TheaccusedtookAliciaNublafromSt.Pa ul'sCollegesin QuezonCity withlewddesignandtookhertosomewhereneartheU.P.compoundinDiliman,QuezonCity andwas thenabletohavecarnalknowledgeofher.AliciaNublaisaminorof 16years. -Petitionerappliedforandwas grantedapassportbytheDFA.Petitionerleft thePhilippines forSanFranciscowhere heisatpresentenrolledin school.Theoffendedgirl subscribedandswore toa complaintcharging thepetitioner with seductionwhichwasfiledintheCFIofQuezonCityafterpreliminaryinvestigationhadbeenco nducted.Theprivate prosecutorfiledamotionprayingtheCourt toissueanorder"directingsuchgovernmentagenciesasmaybe concerned,particularlytheNBIandtheDFA,forthepurposeofhavingtheaccusedbroughtba cktothePhilippines so thathemaybedealt withinaccordancewithlaw."TheCourt grantedthemotion. -RespondentSecretary cabledtheAmbassadortotheUnitedStatesinstructinghimtoorder theConsulGeneralin SanFrancisco tocancelthepassportissued tothepetitionerand tocompelhim toreturnto thePhilippinestoanswer the criminalcharges against him. The Embassywas likewise directedto make representationwiththe State DepartmentthatEmilioSuntay'spresenceoutsidethePhilippinesisconsidereddetrimental tothebestinterestofthis Government,thathispassporthasbeenwithdrawn, andthatheisnotconsideredunder theprotectionofthe Philippineswhileabroad.However,thisorderwasnotimplementedorcarriedoutinviewofthe commencementof thisproceedingsinorderthattheissuesraisedmaybejudiciallyresolved.Counselforthepetit ionerwrotetothe respondentSecretaryrequesting thattheaction takenbyhimbereconsidered,and filedin the criminal casea motion prayingthattherespondentCourtreconsideritsorder.TherespondentSecretarydeniedcou

nsel'srequestandthe Courtdenied themotionforreconsideration. -Petitioner contendsthatastheorderoftherespondentCourtmay becarriedoutonly "throughthecancellationof hispassport,"thesaidorderisillegalbecause"whileaCourt mayreviewtheactionoftheSecretaryofForeignAffairs incancellingapassportandgrantreliefwhentheSecretary'sdiscretion isabused,thecourtcannot,inthefirst instance, take thediscretionarypowerawayfrom theSecretaryanditself orderapassport tobe cancelled." - Petitioner further contends that while the Secretaryfor Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports,"such discretion cannotbe exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stayabroadisa personallibertywithinthe meaningandprotectionofthe Constitutionandhencehecannot bedeprivedof suchliberty without dueprocessoflaw. ISSUES 1. WONtheorderof therespondentCourt is beyondorinexcess of itsjurisdiction 2. WON petitioneris entitledtohearingbeforehispassport canbecancelled HELD 1.NO Ratio Whenbylawjurisdictionis conferredonacourtorjudicialofficer, allauxiliarywrits, processesandothermeans necessary tocarry itintoeffectmay beemployedby suchcourtorofficer;andiftheproceduretobefollowedinthe exerciseofsuchjurisdictionisnotspecificallypointedout bytheserules,anysuitableprocessor modeofproceeding maybeadoptedwhichappearsmostconformabletothespiritofsaidrules.(Section6,Rule12 4.)Moreover,the respondentCourtdidnotspecifywhatsteptherespondentSecretarymusttaketocompelthe petitionertoreturnto thePhilippinestoanswerthecriminalchargepreferredagainsthim.Inissuingtheorderinque stion,therespondent Secretary wasconvincedthatamiscarriageofjusticewouldresultby hisinactionandasheissueditintheexercise ofhis sounddiscretion,hecannotbeenjoined from carryingitout. 2.NO RatioHearingwouldhavebeenproperandnecessary ifthereason for the withdrawalor cancellationofthepassport werenotclearbutdoubtful.Butwhere theholderofapassportisfacinga criminala chargeinour courtsandleftthe countrytoevadecriminalprosecution,theSecretaryforForeignAffairs,intheexerciseofhisdi scretiontorevokea passportalready issued,cannotbeheld tohaveacted whimsically orcapriciously inwithdrawingand cancelling such passport.Dueprocessdoesnotnecessarilymeanorrequire a hearing. Disposition Petitionis denied DEBISSCHOPVGALANG 8SCRA244 REYES;May31,1963 NATURE Appealfrom anorderof CFI. FACTS

-AmericancitizenGeorgedeBisschop(petitionerappellee)wasallowedtostayinthePhilippinesfor3yearsasa prearrangedemployeeoftheBissmagProduction, Inc.,of whichheispresident andgeneralmanager. HeappliedforextensionofstaywiththeBureauofImmigration.Thiswasdeniedwhen ImmigrationOfficer BenjamindeMesadiscoveredthatBissmagInc.wasagamblingfront,andthatdeBisschopis suspectofevading paymentofhisincometax.InaletterdatedSeptember5,1959,theBoardofCommissionersa dvisedhimtodepart within5days.DeBisschoprequested fora copyofthedecision,butthelegalofficerofBureauofImmigrationreplied thatnoformaldecision,orderorresolutionis promulgatedbytheBoardforreasons of practicabilityandexpediency. Toforestallhisarrestandthefilingofthecorrespondingdeportationproceedings,deBisscho pfiled thepresent case. ISSUES WONCommissionersofimmigrationarerequiredbylawtoconductformalhearingsonall applicationsfor extensionof stayofaliens; 2. WON Commissioners areenjoinedtopromulgatewrittendecisions. HELD 1. NO RatioExtensionofstayofaliensispurelydiscretionaryonthepartofimmigrationauthority. Administrationof immigrationlawsis theprimaryandexclusiveresponsibilityoftheExecutivebranchof thegovernment. Reasoning Courtshavenojurisdictiontoreviewthepurelyadministrativepracticeofimmigrationauthorit iesof notgranting formalhearingsincertaincasesas thecircumstancesmaywarrant, forreasons of practicabilityandexpediency. -Thisisnotaviolationofthedueprocessclause;theletteradvisingBisschoptodepartin5days wasamere formality,andfarfromfinal,becausetherequirementtoleavebeforethestartofthedeportatio nproceedingsisonly anadvicetopartyunless hedeparts voluntarily,theStatewillbecompelledtotakesteps forhisexpulsion. Itisasettledrulethatadayincourtisnotamatterofrightinadministrativeproceedings.AsperJu dgeCooley: dueprocessoflawisnot necessarily judicialprocess;muchoftheprocessbymeans of whichthe Governmentiscarried on,and theorderofsocietymaintained,is purelyexecutiveoradministrative,whichis asmuchdueprocessoflaw,asisjudicialprocess.XxxIncertainproceedingsofadmini strativecharacter,it maybestatedwithoutfearofcontradiction,thattherighttoanoticeandhearingarenot essentialtodue processoflaw. 2. NO Ratio Decisionasemployedin constitutethedecisionof thesaid thelawreferstothenumberofvotesnecessaryto

1.

Board. ReasoningThereisnothinginimmigrationlawwhichprovidesthattheBoardofCommission ers mustrender decisions onpetitioners forextensionof stay. Obiter ProhibitionisnotfavoredbytheCourts.Itwillissueonlyifthereisnootherplain,speedy,andad equateremedy. Theuseofhabeascorpustotestthelegalityofaliensconfinementandproposedexpulsionfro mthePhilippinesis nowasettledpractice.Habeascorpusaffordspromptrelieffromunlawfulimprisonmentofany kind,andunderall circumstances. Theexistenceof habeas corpus willbar theissuanceof awrit of prohibition. DISPOSITIONTheorderappealedfrom is reversed.Thepetitionforprohibitionisdismissed.

POLLUTIONADJUDICATION BOARD V CA(SolarTextileFinishing Corp) 195SCRA112 FELICIANO; March 11,1991 NATURE Petitiontoreview FACTS 22Sept1988:theBoardissuedanexparteOrder,signedbyBoardChairmanFulgencioFacto ran, Jr.,directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharginguntreatedwastewaterdirectlyintoa canalleading totheadjacent Tullahan-TinejerosRiver. -Saidorder,issued pursuant to Sec7 ofP.D.984 and Sec38 ofitsIRR, wasbased on findingsof severalinspections ofSolar'splant: a.inspectionsconductedon5November1986and12November1986by theNationalPollutionControlCommission ("NPCC"),thepredecessorof theBoard;and b. theinspectionconductedon6September1988bytheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNatur al Resources ("DENR"). -Acopy oftheaboveOrder wasreceivedby Solaron26Sept1988.A WritofExecutionissuedbytheBoardwas receivedbySolaron31March1989.Meantime,Solar filedMFR appeal withprayer for stayofexecutionoftheOrder dated22Sept1988. -Actingon thismotion, the BoardissuedanOrderdated24April 1989allowingSolar tooperate temporarily,to enabletheBoard to conductanotherinspectionandevaluationofSolar'swastewater treatmentfacilities.In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluationwithinthirty(30)days. -21April1989:SolarwenttoRTCQConpetitionforcertiorariwithpreliminary injunctionagainsttheBoard.RTC dismissedSolar's petitionupontwo(2)grounds:thatappealandnot certiorarifrom thequestionedOrderof theBoard

aswellastheWritofExecutionwastheproperremedy,andthattheBoard'ssubsequentOrder allowingSolarto operate temporarilyhadrenderedSolar's petitionmootandacademic. SolarwentonappealtotheCA.CAreversedtheOrderofdismissalofTCandremandedtheca setothatcourtfor furtherproceedings.CAalsodeclaredtheWritofExecutionnullandvoid.Atthesametime,the CAsaidthatthe decisionwaswithoutprejudicetowhateveractiontheBoardmaytake relativetotheprojected'inspectionand evaluation'of Solar'swatertreatment facilities. CA,insoruling,heldthatcertiorariwasaproperremedysincetheOrdersoftheBoardmayresu lt ingreatand irreparableinjurytoSolar;andthatwhilethecasemightbemootandacademic,"largerissues" demandedthatthe questionofdueprocess besettled. TheBoardsMFR wasdismissed. Hence, thispetitionforcertiorari. The Boardsargues: thatitsexparteOrderdated22Sept1988andtheWritofExecutionwereissuedinaccordance withlaw(PD984, Sec7(a))andwerenot violativeofdueprocess;and -that theex parteOrderandtheWrit of Executionarenot thepropersubjectsofapetitionforcertiorari. SolarcontendsthatundertheBoard'sownrulesandregulations,anexparteordermayissueo nlyiftheeffluents dischargedposean"immediate threat tolife,public health; safetyor welfare, or toanimalandplantlife."In theinstant case,according toSolar, theinspectionreportsbefore theBoard madeno finding thatSolar'swastewaterdischarged posed suchathreat. ISSUE WON theCAerredinreversingthe Solarhadbeendenieddueprocess bytheBoard.

RTC

ontheground

that

HELD NO. 1 Section7(a)ofP.D.No.984 authorizedtheBoardtoissueexparteceaseanddesistorders(a) wheneverthe wastesdischargedbyanestablishment posean"immediatethreattolife, publichealth, safetyor welfare,or toanimal orplantlife,"or(b)wheneversuchdischarges or wastes exceed"theallowablestandards set bythe[NPCC]." 1

"P.D. 984,Section 7,paragraph(a), provides: (a) PublicHearing...Provided,That whenever theCommission findsprimafacieevidencethatthedischargedsewageorwastes areofimmediatethreattolife,publichealth,safetyorwelfare,ortoanimalorplantlife,orexceedstheallowa blestandardssetby theCommission,theCommissionermayissue anexparteorderdirectingthediscontinuanceofthesameorthetemporary suspensionorcessationofoperationoftheestablishmentorpersongeneratingsuchsewageorwasteswi thoutthenecessityofa priorpublichearing.Thesaidexparteordershallbeimmediatelyexecutoryandshallremaininforceuntilsaidestablishmentor person preventsor abatesthesaidpollutionwithin theallowablestandardsormodified ornullifiedby acompetentcourt.".

ItisnotessentialthattheBoardprovethatan"immediatethreattolife,publichealth,safetyorwe lfare,ortoanimal orplantlife"existsbeforeanexparteceaseanddesistordermaybeissued.ItisenoughiftheBo ardfindsthatthe wastesdischargeddoexceed"theallowablestandardssetbythe[NPCC]." -Sec5oftheEffluentRegulationsof1982 setsout the max permissiblelevelsofphysicaland chemicalsubstances whicheffluentsfromdomesticwastewatertreatmentplantsandindustrialplantsmustnotexc eedwhendischarged intobodiesofwaterclassifiedasClassA,B,C,D,SBandSCin accordancewiththe1978NPCCRulesand Regulations.TullahanTinejerosRiverisclassifiedas inlandwatersClassD(foragriculture,irrigation,livestockwatering, industrialcoolingandprocessing) -Note: the plantunder itspreviousowner,Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, wasissued a Notice ofViolationon20Dec1985directingsametoceaseanddesistfromconductingdyeingoperati onuntilsuchtimethewastetreatment plantisalreadycompletedandoperational.ThenewownerSolarTextileCorporation,afterinf orming theCommission oftheplantacquisition,wassummonedtoahearingheldon13October1986basedontheadv ersefindingsduring theinspection/watersamplingtest conductedon08August 1986. TheinspectionreportsofNovember1986andSeptember1988makeclearthattherewasatle ast primafacie evidencebeforetheBoardthattheeffluentsemanatingfromSolar'splantexceededthe maxallowablelevelsof physicalandchemical substancessetbytheNPCC and thataccordinglythere wasadequatebasissupporting theex parte ceaseanddesist orderissuedbytheBoard. -TheBoardrefrainedfromissuingan exparte ceaseanddesistorderuntilafter theNovember1986 andSeptember 1988re-inspectionswereconductedand theviolationofapplicablestandardswasconfirmed.TheBoardappearsto havebeenremarkablyforbearinginitseffortstoenforcetheapplicablestandardsvis-avisSolar.Solar,ontheother hand,seemedverycasualaboutitscontinueddischargeofuntreated,pollutiveeffluentsintot heTullahan-TinejerosRiver, presumablyloath tospendthemoneynecessarytoput its WastewaterTreatment Plant("WTP") inan operating condition. InTechnologyDevelopers,Inc.v.CA,theSCupheldthesummaryclosureorderedbytheActi ng MayorofSta. Maria,Bulacan,ofapollution-causingestablishment.Intheinstant case,theexparte ceaseanddesistOrderwas issuednotby alocalgovernmentofficialbutby thePollutionAdjudicationBoard,thevery agency oftheGovernment chargedwiththetaskofdeterminingwhethertheeffluentsofaparticular industrialestablishmentcomplywithor violateapplicableanti-pollution statutoryandregulatoryprovisions. -Exparte ceaseanddesistorders arepermittedbylawandregulationsin situationslike thatherepresentedprecisely becausestopping the continuousdischargeofpollutiveanduntreatedeffluentsintotheriversandotherinland waters ofthePhilippinescannotbemadetowaituntilprotractedlitigationovertheultimatecorrectnes sorproprietyofsuch ordershasrunitsfullcourse,includingmultipleandsequentialappealssuchasthosewhichS

olarhastaken,which ofcoursemaytakeseveralyears.Itisaconstitutionalcommonplacethattheordinaryrequire mentsofprocedural dueprocessyieldtothenecessitiesofprotectingvitalpublicinterestslikethosehereinvolved, throughtheexercise ofpolicepower. INDIASvPHILIPPINEIRON MINES,INC. 107PHIL 297 BAUTISTAANGELO;Apr29,1957 NATURE Petitionforreview of adecisionof the CourtofIndustrialRelations FACTS -A complaint was filedbypetitionerallegingthatrespondenthasengagedinunfairlaborpractice Hearingswereconductedbythehearingexaminer,Atty.EmilianoTabigne,atwhichbothparti es,representedby counsel, appeared. Afterthepresentationoftheevidence,thehearingexaminerrenderedhisreportstatingthatth echargeofunfair laborpracticehasnotbeensubstantiatedbytheevidenceandrecommendingitsdismissal.H ealsofoundthatthe dismissalofpetitionerwas forsufficient cause. -Thecourt approvedthehearingexaminer'srecommendationandrenderedthefollowingorder: HearingExaminerMr.Tabignerecommendsthedismissalofthiscaseonthegroundthatthee videncebythe complainantdidnotsupportthechargesofunfairlaborpractice.ThefactsarestatedintheHea ringExaminer's datedMay16,1955. After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient justification for modifying said recommendation, findingsandconclusions,andconsequently,this caseisherebydismissed. SOORDERED. -Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsideration, whichwasdeniedbythecourt enbanc. -Hence thispetitionforreview. -Itis contended that theaforequoted orderruns counterto the Constitution which provides that"Nodecision shallbe renderedbyanycourtofrecordwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandt helawonwhichitis based"(ArticleVIII,section12);and toRule35,Section1,oftheRulesofCourt,whichprovidesthat a courtdecision shallstate"clearly anddistinctly thefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased."And the claimismadeinviewofthe fact thattheorderdoesnotcontaineitheradiscussionoftheevidenceoranyfindingoffactbasedon saidevidence, whichcounselclaims does not meet therequirementsof thelawandthe Constitution. ISSUE WONtheCourtofIndustrialRelationscanissueanorderdismissingacasewithoutstatingthe factsandthelaw support thereof. HELD

YES Theorder,itistrue,doesnotmakeitsowndiscussionoftheevidenceoritsownfindingsoffact,b utsuchisnot necessary ifthecourtissatisfiedwiththereportofitsexaminerorrefereewhichalready containsafulldiscussionof theevidenceandthefindingsoffactbasedthereon.Thesituationdiffers ifthecourtdisagreeswiththereportin whichcaseitshouldstatethereasonsforitsdisagreement.Ifitisinfullaccordwiththereport,itis purposelessto repeatwhat therefereeorexaminerhasalreadyfoundinit. -Suchisthepresent situation. The courtapprovedthereportof thehearingexaminer"afteraperusaloftherecordof thecase."Thispresupposesthatithasexaminedtheevidenceandfoundnojustificationform odifyinghisfindings and conclusions. This is asubstantialcompliancewiththelaw. - When the Court of Industrial Relations refers a case to a commissioner for investigation, report, and recommendation,andatsuchinvestigationthepartiesweredulyrepresentedbycounsel,he ardoratleastgivenan opportunitytobeheard,therequirementofdueprocesshasbeensatisfied,evenifthecourtfail edtosetthereport forhearing,andadecisionon thebasisof suchreport,with theotherevidenceof the case,isadecision which meets therequirementofafairandopenhearing. DispositionTheorderappealedfrom wasaffirmed. SERRANOvPSC 24SCRA867 FERNANDO;Aug 30,1968 NATURE Petitionforreview of adecisionof thePublic ServiceCommission. FACTS -SerranofiledanapplicationwiththePublicServiceCommissionrequestingauthorityto operateataxicab automobileservicewithintheCityofManilaandfromsaidcitytoanyplacein Luzonopentomotorvehicle trafficandviceversa. Fiftyunits of taxicabs were tobeused. -SerranowasapublicservicebusoperatorintheCity ofManilaandwastheholderofseveralcertificatesof publicconvenience. -Hisapplication washeardbyAssociateCommissionerPanganiban.Serrano completedthepresentationofhis evidence,buttheoppositorsandnoevidencewaspresentedtorebuthis claimsastohisqualificationand financialcapacity. ThePublic ServiceCommissiondeniedapplication -Amotionforreconsiderationwas filedanddeniedbythePSC. SerranoallegedthatthePublicServiceCommissionerredinfailingtomakeastatementoffact sastoeach caseregardingthequalificationandfinancialabilityoftheapplicantandtheother factorsconstitutingthe criterionusedasbasisingrantingtheapplication,inwholeorinpart, on theonehand,anddismissingor denying theapplicationon theother. Hereliesonthe constitutionalprovisionthat nodecisionshallberendered byanycourtofrecordwithoutexpressingclearlyanddistinctlythefacts andthelawonwhichitisbased.

ISSUE WON thedenialof thePSC of Serranos petition wascorrect HELD NO Ratio Quasi-judicial tribunals,including thePublic ServiceCommission,should,inall controversialquestions,render itsdecisioninsuchamannerthatthepartiestotheproceedingcanknowthe variousissuesinvolved,andthe reasons forthedecisionsrendered. Reasoning -Theobligationtostateclearly anddistinctly thefactsandthelawonwhichthedecisionisbasedisincumbentona courtofrecord.ThePublicServiceCommissionis nota courtof recordwithinthe meaningof theabove constitutional provision. -ThePSCisnotajudicialtribunal andits functionsarelimited andadministrative innature. ThePSCisnotacourt (citingDagdagvs.PSC and FilipinoBus Co. vs PhilippineRailway ). -Itdoesnotmean,however,thatthenoninclusionoftheadministrativetribunalwithinthescope of theabove constitutional provision justifies the summary disposition of petitioner's application in the manner followed by respondentPublicService Commission. -InAngTibayv.Court,speakingoftheCourtofIndustrialRelations,whichislikewisean administrativetribunal possessed ofquasi-judicial powerslike the PSC,the Court made clear that while it(the CIR) is"free fromtherigidity ofcertainproceduralrequirements,"itdoesnotmean"thatitcan,injusticiable casescomingbeforeit,entirelyignore ordisregardthefundamentalandessentialrequirementofdueprocess. -The failuretorespectsuch cardinalprimaryrightofpetitioner tohavehisapplicationdecidedinsucha manneras to informhim notonlyoftheissuesinvolvedbut thereasonsforthedecision, whichnecessarilywouldlikewiserequirea findingof facts, cannotreceivejudicialapproval. ThedenialofSerranospetitionwasplainandpalpableerror.Thereisaneedthentoremandth emattertothe PublicServiceCommissionsothatitcouldconsidertheevidenceanddischargethefunctionc ommittedtoitbylaw. Onlyafterithasrendereditsdecision setting forththe factson whichitisbaseddoesthepowerofreviewon thepart ofthisCourt comeintoplay. DispositionDecision set aside, caseremandedtoPSC.

AMERICAN TOBACCOCOvTHEDIRECTOR OF PATENTS 67SCRA287 ANTONIO;Oct.14,1975 FACTS: petitionersarechallengingthevalidityofRule168ofthe"RevisedRulesofPracticebeforethe PhilippinePatent OfficeinTrademarkCases"asamended,authorizingtheDirectorofPatentstodesignateany

rankingofficialofsaid officetohear"interpartes"proceedings.SaidRulelikewiseprovidesthat"alljudgmentsdeter miningthe meritsofthe caseshallbepersonallyanddirectlypreparedbytheDirectorandsignedbyhim."Theseproc eedingsrefertothe hearingofopposition to theregistrationofa mark or tradename,interferenceproceedinginstituted forthepurposeof determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellationof registrationof atrade-mark ortradenamependingat thePatent Office. - Under theTrade-markLaw (Republic ActNo.166 ),theDirectorofPatents isvestedwith jurisdictionover opposition,interferenceandcancellationcasesfiledby petitioners.Likewise,theRulesofPracticein Trade-mark Casescontains asimilarprovision, thus: 168.Original jurisdiction over inter partesproceeding .- The Director ofPatents shall have originaljurisdiction overinterpartesproceedings.IntheeventthatthePatentOfficeshouldbeprovided withanExaminerof Interferences, thisExaminer shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases,instead of theDirector.Inthe case thattheExaminerofInterferencestakesovertheoriginaljurisdictionoverinterpartesprocee dings,hisfinal decisionsubjecttoappealtotheDirectorofPatentswithinthreemonthsofthereceiptofnotice ofdecisions. Suchappealsshallbegovernedbysections2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11,12,13,14,15and22ofRule41 oftheRules ofCourtinsofaras saidsectionsareapplicableandappropriate, andtheappealfeeshallbeP25.00. -TheRulesofPracticeinTrade-markCasesweredraftedandpromulgatedby theDirectorofPatentsandapproved bythe thenSecretaryofAgricultureand Commerce. Subsequently,theDirectorofPatents,withtheapprovaloftheSecretaryofAgricultureandCo mmerce,amended theafore-quotedRule168toreadas follows: 168.OriginalJurisdictionover interpartesproceedings.TheDirectorofPatents shallhaveoriginaljurisdiction overinter partesproceedings, [In the event that the PatentOffice isprovided with an Examiner ofInterferences, thisExaminershallthenhavetheoriginaljurisdictionoverthesecases,insteadoftheDirector. Inthecasethat theExaminerofInterferencestakesover theoriginaljurisdictionoverinterpartesproceedings,his finaldecisions shallbesubjecttoappealtotheDirectorofPatentswithinthreemonthsofthereceiptofnoticed ecision.Such appealsshallbegovernedbySections2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11,12,13,14,15,and22ofRule41ofth eRulesof Courtinsofarassaidsectionsareapplicableandappropriate,andtheappealfeeshallbe[P25 .00.]Suchinter partesproceedingsinthePhilippinePatentOfficeunderthisTitleshallbeheardbeforetheDir ectorofPatents, any hearingofficer,or anyrankingofficialdesignatedby theDirector,butall judgmentsdetermining themeritsof the caseshallbepersonallyanddirectly preparedbythe Directorandsignedbyhim . (Emphasis supplied.) -Inaccordance with theamendedRule,theDirectorofPatentsdelegated thehearingofpetitioners' casestohearing officers, specifically, Attys. AmandoMarquez,

TeofiloVelasco, RusticoCasiaand Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein. Petitionersfiledtheirobjectionstotheauthorityofthehearingofficerstoheartheircases, allegingthatthe amendmentoftheRuleisillegalandvoidbecauseunderthelawtheDirectormustpersonallyh earanddecideinter partescases.SaidobjectionswereoverruledbytheDirectorofPatents,hence, thepresentpetition formandamus, to compelTheDirectorofPatents topersonallyhearthe casesofpetitioners, inlieuofthehearingofficers. ISSUE: WONtheamendmentoftheruleisillegaland whomustpersonally hearanddecide interpartescases.

voidasitshouldbe

theDirector

HELD: NO. Thepowerconferreduponanadministrativeagencytowhichtheadministrationofastatuteis entrustedtoissue suchregulationsandordersasmaybedeemednecessaryorproperinorder to carryoutitspurposesandprovisions maybeanadequatesourceofauthoritytodelegateaparticularfunction,unlessbyexpresspr ovisionsoftheActor byimplicationit has beenwithheld. -ThenatureofthepowerandauthorityentrustedtoTheDirectorofPatentssuggeststhatthe aforecitedlaws (RepublicActNo.166,inrelation toRepublicActNo.165) shouldbe construed soastogive theaforesaidofficial the administrative flexibility necessary forthepromptandexpeditiousdischargeofhisdutiesin theadministrationofsaid laws.Assuchofficer,heisrequired,amongothers,to determinethequestionofpriorityinpatentinterference proceedings,decideapplicationsforreinstatementofalapsedpatent,cancellationsofpatent sunderRepublicAct No.165,interpartesproceedingssuchasoppositions,claimsofinterference,cancellationca sesundertheTrademarkLawandothermattersin connectionwith theenforcementoftheaforesaidlaws.Itcouldhardlybeexpected,in viewofthemagnitudeofhisresponsibility,torequirehimtohearpersonallyeachandeverycas e pendinginhis Office.Thiswouldleavehimlittle time toattend tohisotherduties.Theremedy isafar widerrangeofdelegationsto subordinateofficers. -Thus,whilethepowertodecideresidessolely intheadministrativeagency vestedby law,thisdoesnotprecludea delegationofthepowertoholdahearingonthebasisofwhichthedecisionoftheadministrative agencywillbe made. -Therule thatrequiresanadministrative officer to exercisehisown judgmentanddiscretiondoesnotprecludehim fromutilizing,asamatterofpracticaladministrativeprocedure,theaidofsubordinatestoinve stigateandreportto himthefacts,onthebasisofwhichtheofficermakeshisdecisions.Itissufficientthatthejudgm entanddiscretion finally exercisedarethoseoftheofficerauthorizedbylaw.Neitherdoesdueprocessoflawnorthereq uirementsof fairhearingrequirethattheactualtakingoftestimonybebeforethesameofficerwhowillmaket hedecisioninthe case.Aslongasaparty isnotdeprivedofhisrighttopresenthisown caseand

submitevidenceinsupportthereof, and thedecisionis supportedbytheevidenceintherecord, thereis noquestionthat therequirements ofdueprocess andfairtrialarefully met.15Inshort,thereisnoabnegationofresponsibility onthepartoftheofficerconcernedas theactualdecisionremainswithandismadeby 16 saidofficer. Itis,however,requiredthatto"givethesubstanceof a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinationsmust considerandappraisetheevidence whichjustifies them." -Inthecaseatbar,while thehearingofficer may makepreliminary rulingsonthe myriadofquestionsraisedatthe hearingsofthesecases,theultimatedecisiononthemeritsofalltheissuesandquestionsinvol vedis lefttothe DirectorofPatents. Apart from thecircumstancethatthepointinvolvedisproceduralandnot jurisdictional,petitioners havenot showninwhat mannertheyhavebeenprejudicedbytheproceedings. Disposition Petitionisdismissed

NERIAvTHECOMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION G.R.NO.24800 CASTRO; May271968 FACTS OnJuly9,1961thepetitioner,withthreeotherpersons,supposedlyhiswidowedmother(Dolo resNeria)andtwo youngerbrothers(FelixandManuelNeria),arrivedattheManilaInternationalAirport fromHongkongonboarda CathayPacificAirwaysplane.Theimmigrationinspectorattheairport, notsatisfiedwiththepetitioner'stravel documentsandthoseofhis companions uponprimaryinspectionthereof,referred thematterof theiradmissiontothe BoardofSpecialInquiryforinvestigation"todeterminefiliationandpaternitytoaFilipinocitize n".Accordingly,the BoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1conductedahearingonJuly14,1961,atwhichtimethepetitione rofferedoraland documentaryevidence tosupport his claim foradmissionasaFilipino citizenAfterthe conclusionoftheinvestigation, thesaidboardonAugust2,1961deliberatedon thecaseandunanimously votedforpetitioner'sadmission.The boardonthesamedaterendereditsdecision,declaringDoloresNeriaaFilipinocitizen,andth epetitioneraFilipino citizenasheisanillegitimatesonofDolores,andallowinghisadmissionintothePhilippines.T hiswrittendecision was subsequentlysubmitted tothemembersof theBoardof ImmigrationCommissioners. The Immigrationauthorities issuedIdentificationCertificate16306 to thepetitioner,attestingthathe"wasadmittedasacitizenof thePhilippines" perdecisionof theBoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1datedAugust2,1961. -On January24,1962, theSecretaryof JusticeissuedMemorandumOrder9(exh. 7), directingthat [i]tappearing that forthepastseveralyears,theBoardofCommissionersofImmigrationhasnotmet collectivelytodiscussanddeliberateonthecasescomingbeforeit,itisherebyordered thatalldecisionspurporting tohavebeen renderedbytheBoardofCommissionersonAppealfrom,oronreviewmotuproprioof,decisio

nsoftheBoardof SpecialInquiryaresetaside.TheBoardofCommissionersisdirectedtoreview,inaccordanc ewithSection27(b) ofCommonwealthActNo.613,asamended,alldecisionsoftheBoardofSpecialInquiryad mittingentryofaliens intothecountryandgivepreferencetoallcaseswhereentryhasbeenpermittedontheground thattheentrantisa citizenofthePhilippines,followingtheprinciplelaiddowninSection30ofCommonwealthA ct613,asamended, that'theburdenofproofshallbeupon suchalientoestablish thatheisnotsubjecttoexclusion'andtherulingofthis Departmentthat"Citizenshipisastatusofprivilege,powerandhonor ofinestimablevalue.Whendoubtsexistconcerningagrant of it, theyshouldberesolvedinfavorof theGovernmentagainst theclaimant" -Incompliance with the above directive, the Board ofImmigration Commissioners,proceeded toreviewmotuproprio theentireproceedingshadbeforetheBoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1relativetothepetitioner'sc aseandthatofhis supposedrelatives.AhearingofficeroftheBureauofImmigrationwasdirectedtoconductani nvestigationofthe entireproceedingsofandtheevidencepresentedbeforetheBoard ofSpecialInquiryNo.1.Onthebasisofamemorandumofthehearingofficer,thenewBoardof ImmigrationCommissionersfoundthatthepetitionerhadnotsatisfactorilyestablishedhiscl aimforadmissionasaFilipinocitizenand,consequently,reversedthedecisionoftheBoardof SpecialInquiry No.1,andorderedthatthepetitionerbeexcludedfromthePhilippinesasanaliennot properlydocumented foradmissionandbereturned to theportfromwhencehecameor tothe country ofwhichheis anational. Thepetitionermovedforareconsiderationof saiddecision. This motionwas deniedbythenewBoard. -The petitioner filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition prayingthe CourtofFirstInstance ofManila torestrain the CommissionerofImmigrationandtheBoardofImmigrationCommissionersfromarrestinga nd expellinghim,and prohibitthemfromtakinganyfurtherstepsoractionscontrarytothedecision renderedbytheBoardofSpecial InquiryNo.1.Thispetitionwasgivenduecourse,andawritofpreliminaryinjunctionwasissue dasprayedfor.But thispetitionwasdismissed. -OnApril30,1965 thepresentpetition forhabeascorpuswas filed, thepetitioner claiming thatthe respondent's agentspickedhimupatRosarioSt.,Manila,intheeveningofthepreviousApril23onthesuppo sedclaimthathe wasnotproperly documented foradmissionasaFilipinocitizen whenheentered thePhilippines;and thatsince then he"hasbeenunlawfullyandillegallyconfined,restrainedanddeprived ofhislibertyintheBureauofImmigration DetentionStationintheEngineeringIsland,Manila."Onthesamedate,thelowercourtrequire dtherespondentto bringthepetitionerbeforethecourtonMay3,1965at8:30O'clockinthemorning.Theclerkofc ourtissuedthe correspondingwritofhabeas corpusdirecting therespondentto submithisreturn. Thelatter'swrittenreturnofMay6, 1965states,amongother things,thatthepetitionerwasunderlawfulcustody onavalidprocesscommandinghis exclusion fromthePhilippinesandorderinghisreturn to theportwherehe came fromor to the country ofwhichheis anational. OnJune18,1965thelowercourtdismissedthepetitionstatingthatthepetitionerislegallydeta

inedonawarrant issuedbytherespondentCommissionerofImmigration." OnJuly20,1965thelowercourtsetasideitsdecisionof June17,1965,and,onthesamedate,renderedanamendeddecisioncompletelyreversingit sdecisionofJune17,grantedthewritofhabeascorpusandorderedtheimmediatereleaseoft hepetitioner.Thelower courtheldthat"thedecisionrenderedbythenewBoardofCommissionersisnullandvoidforla ckofjurisdiction,andnoadministrativeactionbeingpossiblebecausethequestioninvolvedi n thiscaseispurely alegalquestion,thedoctrineofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies has noapplicationinthiscase."On July22 theclerk of courtissuedthe correspondingwritofhabeascorpus. ISSUE WON thedecisionofthenewBoardofImmigrationCommissionerisnulland void forhavingbeenrenderedwithout orinexcessofits jurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,inviolationof section27(b), Comm. Act613 HELD YES RATIOComm.Act613,asamended,providesinpartthat:[t]he decisionofanytwomembersof theBoard[of SpecialInquiry]shallprevailandshallbefinalunlessreversedonappealbythe BoardofCommissionersas hereafterstated,or,intheabsenceofanappeal,unlessreversedbytheBoardofCommission ers afterareviewbyit, motupropioof theentireproceedings withinoneyear from thepromulgationof saiddecision.... Theresolutionofthisissue,inturn,dependsuponthedeterminationofthedatewhenthedecisi onoftheBoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1waspromulgated,August2,1961whenitwasactuallyre ndered,or September4,1961whenthepetitioner wasactuallynotified thereofanda copyreceivedbyhiscounsel.Thedateofpromulgationisimportant.Itisfromthatdatethatthe oneyearperiodcommencedwithinwhichtheBoardofImmigrationCommissionerscouldreview motupropriotheentireproceedingsof BoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1. -AccordingtotheSolicitorGeneral,thecorrectdateofpromulgationisSeptember4,1961, becauseunderthe ImmigrationRulesandRegulations,thedecisionofaBoardofSpecialInquiry"shallberender 5 edinwriting", and undersection27(b),supra,thewrittendecision"shallbepromulgated";thatthewords"renditi on"(from"rendered") and"promulgation" (from"promulgated") connote two separate and distinctactsrequired to beaccomplishedbythe BoardofSpecialInquiry,forrenditionisthedatewhenajudgesignshisdecisionandfilesitwitht heclerkofcourt, whereaspromulgationis thedatewhen suchdecisionispublished,officiallyannounced,ismadeknown tothepublic, ordeliveredtotheclerkofcourtforfiling,coupledwithnoticetothepartiesortotheircounsel;an dthatinthiscase, renditionwasaccomplishedonAugust2,1961whentheBoardofSpecialInquiry No.1concludeditshearingonthe petitioner'scase,deliberatedthereon,votedforhisadmissionintothePhilippinesandrender editswrittendecision, andpromulgationwasaccomplishedonSeptember4,1961whenthepetitionerwasactually notifiedofthedecision, copyofwhichwasreceivedbyhiscounsel.

-Noamountofhairsplittinginregardtothewords"rendition"and"promulgation"wouldconveydifferent meanings.ThisCourtdefinedpromulgationas"thedeliveryofthedecisiontotheClerkof Courtforfilingandpublication".Theword"promulgate"wasviewedbythemajorityinPeoplev s.Dinglasan(77Phil.764)astheentrymadebytheclerkofajudgment ororderinthebook ofentriesofjudgments madebysaid clerk. Thepetitioner'sargument,atallevents,iswithoutmerit.Section27(b),supra,providesthatpr oceedingsofthe BoardofSpecialInquiryitsappraisalofacaseonthemerits,theresultofitsdeliberation,itsdeci sionandnotice thereoftoanalien,andthetimewhenanappealmaybebrought therefrom "shallbeconductedunderrulesof procedure tobeprescribedbytheCommissionerof Immigration." -Inthiscase,August2,1961wasthedatewhentheBoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1concludedits hearingof petitioner's case(I.C. 61-2312-C),deliberatedonit,and voted forhis admissionasacitizenof thePhilippines.August 2,1961wasalsothedatewhenthedecisioninextensowasrendered.Thatdateandnot September4,1961, therefore,isthedateofpromulgationofthedecisionoftheBoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1,which decisionshould "prevailandshallbefinal...unlessreversedbytheBoardofCommissionersafterareviewbyit, motuproprioofthe 10 entireproceedingswithinoneyearfromthepromulgationofsaiddecision." Computingtheone-yearperiodfrom August2,1961,theBoardofImmigrationCommissionershaduntilAugust2,1962withinwhic hto reviewthe proceedings motuproprio. -The case of the petitioner wasincluded in the agenda of the Board ofImmigration CommissionersforreviewmotupropioforJuly24,1962.ThecasewasreferredtotheImmigra tionhearingofficer,who,onJuly30,1962,submitted hismemorandumto thesaidboard.Thecase was againincludedin theagendaofthe saidboard forAugust2,1962, the dateit was considered submitted for decision. The minutesof the meeting of the Board of Immigration CommissionerspresentedbyitsSecretaryPioNocheandreadinto therecordsofthiscase,however, reveal thatthe petitioner'scasewasactuallyacteduponanddecided,notonAugust2,1962,asthedecisiona ndthewarrantof exclusion wouldtendtoshow, but onAugust8,1962 TheminutesofthemeetingofthenewBoardofCommissionersand,thetestimonyofitsSecret aryshowthatas lateonAugust8,1962,thenewBoardofCommissionerswas,only deliberatingonthecaseofthepetitioner.The admissionoftheSecretary ofthenewBoardofCommissionersthatthecaseofthepetitionerwasnotacteduponon August2,1962,showsthatthealterationofthedateofthedecisionofthenewBoardofCommis sionersfromAugust 8,1962toAugust2,1962wasdeliberate.The factthatthecaseofthepetitionerwassubmittedtothenewBoardof CommissionersforitsresolutiononAugust2,1962,isnoexcuseforantedatingitsdecisionwhich wasactually renderedafterthatdate.OnAugust2,1962,itdidnotreversethedecisionoftheBoardofSpeci alInquiryNo.1, becausehavingactuallydeliberatedonthecaseofthepetitioneronAugust8,1962,itcouldnot haveonAugust2 resolvedtoreversethedecisionof theBoardofSpecialInquiry.

ThealterationofthetruedateofthedecisionofthenewBoardofCommissioners,madeuponin structionofthe respondentCommissionerofImmigration,isrevealing:itshowsthattherespondent Commissionerknewthatthe one-yearperiod wastobecomputed fromAugust 2,1961;itshowsalso thatheknewthatif thedecisionoftheBoard ofSpecialInquiryNo.1hadtobereversed,thenewBoardofCommissionershadtoactnotlater thanAugust2, 1962. AsitwasonAugust8,1962whentheBoardofImmigrationCommissionersasabodydeliberat edonandvotedfor thereversalof thedecisionof theBoardofSpecial InquiryNo.1,thereview motupropriowaseffected6daysbeyond theone-yearperiod fixedbysection27(b), supra.The saiddecisionoftheBoardofImmigrationCommissioners, andthewarrantofexclusionissuedonthestrengthofsuchdecision,aretherefore,ascorrectly foundbythelowercourt,nullandvoid,for"lackofjurisdiction," sincethedecisionoftheBoardofSpecialInquiryNo.1bythattimehadalreadybecome"final." -Therespondentalso contendsthatthepetitioner'spetition forhabeascorpuswasprematurely filed,becausehedid notfirstappealthedecisionoftheBoardofImmigrationCommissionerstotheSecretaryofJus tice,who,bylaw,is vestedwithpowerofcontrolandsupervisionoverthesaidBoard.Wehavealready heldthattheprincipleof exhaustionofadministrativeremediesisinapplicable"wherethequestionindisputeispurely alegalone", orwhere thecontrovertedactis"patently illegal"orwasperformedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofjurisdictionand"nothing ofanadministrativenatureis tobeorcanbedone"thereon. DISPOSITIONDecisionaffirmedfrom affirmed

SICHANGCOvBOARD OF COMMISSIONERSOF IMMIGRATION G.R.No.L-23545 MAKASIAR;Nov7,1979 FACTS SyTe,whosenamewaschangedtoBenitoSichangcowasrecognizedbytheBureauofImmi grationasaFilipino citizenbybirthinanorderdatedFebruary19,1960.SychangcoismarriedtoChengYokHa.Th reesonswereborn inChinaallegedlyoutof theirmarriage, namely,SiBeng,SiSonandSiLuna. - OnAugust 28, 1961arrived in the Philippines andsought admissionclaimingtobethe children of Benito Sichangco.Aninvestigationwasconductedby theBoardofSpecialInquiry No.1oftheBureauofImmigration.After hearing,thesaidBoardrenderedadecisiononSeptember11,1961(Exh.C) admittingtheseminorsintothe Philippinesascitizensthereof,being the childrenofthepetitioner.saiddecision wassubmitted tothe then members oftheBoardofCommissioners who"noted"thedecisionondifferent dates. -OnJanuary 24,1962,thenSecretary ofJustice Jose W.DioknoissuedMemorandumOrderNo.9, whereinhe found"thatfor thepastseveralyears,theBoardofCommissionersofImmigrationhasnotmetcollectively todiscuss anddeliberateonthecasescomingbeforeit,"forwhichreasonhesetaside"alldecisionspurp ortingtohavebeen renderedbytheBoardofCommissionersonappealfrom,oronreviewmotupropioof,decisio nsoftheBoardsof Special Inquiry," and directed the Board of Commissioners "to review in accordance with Section 27(b) of CommonwealthActNo.613,asamended,alldecisionsoftheBoardsofSpecialInquiry admittingentry ofaliensinto thiscountryand give preferencetoallcaseswhereentryhasbeenpermittedonthegroundthattheentrantisa citizenofthePhilippines,following theprinciplelaiddowninSection30ofCommonwealthActNo.613,asamended, that 'theburdenofproof shallbeuponsuchalientoestablishthat heisnot subject toexclusion..." PursuanttoMemorandumOrderNo.9,acommitteeexaminedthepretendedrightofthesaid minorsasalleged children of petitioner to admission, and thereafter forwarded its findings to the Commissioner of Immigration recommendingtheexclusionofsaidminors,therevocationofthe order declaringSyTeorBenitoSichangcoa Filipinocitizen,andthefilingofdeportation proceedings againsthim.Acopyofthisdecisionwasreceivedbythe minorsonOctober26,1962. -BenitoSichangco,inbehalfof theminors SiBeng,SiSonandSiLuna, filedapetitionforprohibitionwithpreliminary injunctiononNovember20,1962beforetheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,toannulthedecis ionoftheBoardof CommissionersofImmigrationexcludingtheabovenamed minors from thePhilippines. CFIdeclaredthatthedecisionoftheBoardofCommissionersdatedSeptember4,1962,rever sing thedecisionof thepreviousBoardofCommissionersdatedSeptember11,1961,tohavebeenrenderedon October26,1962,more thanayearfromthe firstdecision,andthereforeillegalandnullandvoid,andtheinjunctionearlierissuedwasmad

e permanent, withcosts againstrespondentBoard. ISSUE: WON thenoticeof theBOC decisionmustbereceived withinthe1yearperiod HELD NO TheBoardofCommissionersrenderedonSeptember4,1962itsdecisionreversingthatofthe BoardofSpecial InquiryNo,1datedSeptember11, 1961, wellwithin theone-yearperiodrequiredbylaw. -Itistrue thatthecopy ofthedecisionoftheBoardofCommissionersdatedSeptember4,1962 wassentby mailto thepetitioner'sminorchildrenhereinonlyonOctober26,1962,andreceivedbythesaidminor sonthesamedate. Thisfact,however,doesnotworktovitiate saiddecision.AllthattheImmigrationLawrequiresisthatthedecisionof reversaloftheBoardofCommissionersbe promulgatedwithinoneyearfromtherenditionofthedecisionofthe BoardofSpecialInquiry.Noticeofsaiddecisionofreversal may besentevenaftertheoneyearperiodhaselapsed. InthecaseofNeriavs.CommissionerofImmigration(L-24800,May 27,1968,23SCRA807,citingArochavs.Vivo, supra),theSupremeCourtruledthat"theoperativedateoftheCommissioners'actionisthatw hentheresolution(of exclusion)wasnotedandadoptedbythemasaBoard,regardlessofthedatewhenthedecisio ninextensowas prepared,writtenandsigned,"andwithmorereason,asinthiscase,regardlessofthedatewh ensuchdecisionis mailed,"becausethedecisioninextenso mustrelatebacktotheday theresolutiontoexclude wasactually adopted. Necessarilytheextendedopinionhadtobe posteriortothedaywhentheCommissionersvotedandresolvedto reversethefindingsoftheBoardofSpecialInquiry.TheSecretary'scertificateshowsthattheB oardofImmigration CommissionersacteduponnotlessthaneightImmigrationcases(includingthatoftheGatch alians)onJuly 6,1962; andit was of courseimpracticabletoprepareand sign fullyreasoneddecisions inallthesecases." REALTYEXCHANGEVENTURECORPvSENDINO 233SCRA665 KAPUNAN,J.:July5,1994 FACTS: -PrivaterespondentLucinaC.SendinoenteredintoareservationagreementwithRealty Exchange Venture,Inc. (REVI)fora120squaremeterlotinRaymondvilleSubdivisioninSucat,ParanaqueforP307,800.00asitspurc hase price. ShepaidP1,000.00aspartialreservationfeeonJanuary15, 1989 andcompletedpaymentofthisfeeon January20,1989bypayingP4,000.00. OnJuly18,1989,privaterespondentpaidREVIP16,600.00asfulldownpaymentonthepurc haseprice.However, she wasadvisedbyREVI to changeherco-maker, whichsheagreed,asking foranextensionof onemonthtodoso. -Forallegednoncompliancewiththerequirementofsubmissionoftheappropriatedocumentsundertheterm

sof theoriginalagreement, REVI,throughitsVicePresidentforMarketing,informedrespondentofthecancellationof the contractonthe31stof July1989. OnApril20,1990,privaterespondentfiledacomplaintforSpecificPerformanceagainstREVI with theofficeof Appeals,AdjudicationandLegalAffairs(OAALA)oftheHousingandLandUseRegulatoryBo ard(HLURB)asking thatrespondentbeordered:Tocomplyandcontinuewiththesaleofthe houseandlot,Block4,Lot17atthe RaymondvilleSubdivision,SucatRoad,Paranaque,MetroManila; ThispetitionwasamendedonAugust17,1990byimpleadingpetitionersMagdiwangRealty Corporation(MRC) whichappearedtobetheregisteredownerof the subjectlotasperTCT No.76023. OnApril3,1991theHLURB,whoseauthoritytohearanddecidethecomplaintwaschallenge dbyREVIinits answer,rendereditsjudgmentinfavorofprivaterespondentandorderedpetitionerstocontin uewiththesaleofthe houseandlotand topay privaterespondentP5,000asmoraldamages,P5,000asexemplary damagesandP6,000 asattorney'sfeesand costsofthesuit.AnappealfromthisdecisionwastakentotheHLURBOAALAArbiter,which affirmedtheBoard'sdecision. Thedecisionofthe OAALAArbiterwasappealedto theOfficeofthePresident,herein publicrespondent. -OnJanuary7,1993,thepublicrespondentrendereditsdecisiondismissingthepetitioners' appeal. Motionfor reconsiderationofthedecisionwasdeniedbythepublicrespondentonJanuary26,1993.Co nsequently petitioners comebeforethis Court, inthispetition. ISSUE WON theHLURB canact validlyasadivisioncomposedof only3 commissioners HELD Yes. -Undersection5ofE.O.648 whichdefines the powersanddutiesof the commission, theboardis specificallymandatedtoadoptrulesofprocedurefortheconductofitsbusinessandtoperfor msuchfunctionsnecessaryfor theaccomplishmentofitsabovementionedfunctions.Sincenothingintheprovisionsofeither E.O.90orE.O.648 deniesorwithholdsthepowerorauthoritytodelegateadjudicatoryfunctionstoadivision,wec annotseehowthe Board,forthepurposeofeffectivelycarryingoutitsadministrativeresponsibilitiesandquasijudicialpowersasa regulatorybodyshouldbedeniedthepower,asamatterofpracticaladministrativeprocedure ,to constituteits adjudicatoryboardsintovariousdivisions. -Afterall, thepowerconferreduponanadministrativeagencytoissuerulesandregulationsnecessaryt o carryoutits functionshasbeenheld"tobeanadequatesourceofauthoritytodelegateaparticularfunction

,unlessbyexpress provisionoftheActorbyimplicationithasbeenwithheld."Thepracticalnecessityof establishingaprocedure wherebycasesaredecidedbythree(3)Commissionersfurthermoreassumesgreatersignifi cancewhenonenotes that theHLURB,asconstituted,onlyhasfour(4)full timecommissionersandfive(5)part timecommissioners todeal withallthefunctions, administrative,adjudicatory, orotherwise, entrustedtoit. - As the Office of the President noted in its February 26, 1993 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible and very impractical to gather the four (4) full time and five (5) part time commissioners(together)justtodecideacase."Consideringthatitsparttimecommissioners actmerelyinanexofficiocapacity,requiringa majorityoftheBoard tositenbanconeachandevery casebroughtbeforeitwouldresult inanadministrativenightmare.