DIGESTED

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not

narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered. TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are; (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and

submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to

establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which

cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be

substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record

and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)

The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent

consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that

the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

DIGEST

ASPREC V ITCHON 15 SCRA 921, SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966 NATURE Petition for review

FACTS -Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would survey Hernandez lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months after the plans approval. However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had many times been absent, late, sickwhich caused the delay of the proceedings. -Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2) money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered. -Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the orde rs revoking his surveyors certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below -CFI: dismiss with costs

ISSUES 1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the hearing 2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec absented himself from it 3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings valid (other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included)

HELD 1. NO

Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process. Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 2. YES Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it. 3. YES Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body. Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

FULL CASE

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21685 April 30, 1966

CLETO ASPREC, petitioner-appellant, vs. VICTORIANO ITCHON, JOSE SUGUITAN, FELIPE P. CRUZ, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NICANOR G. JORGE, ANTONIO NOBLEJAS,1 and JACINTO HERNANDEZ, respondents-appellees. Tabora and Concon for petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. G. Ibarra and Solicitor C. P. Padua for respondents-appellees. SANCHEZ, J.: The case on hand had its incipiency in an administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct lodged with the Board of Examiners for Surveyors3 by respondent Jacinto Hernandez against petitioner Cleto Asprec. There, Hernandez charged that petitioner undertook to survey Hernandez' lot in Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur; deliver to him a plan approved by the Director of Lands within three months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a certificate of title to the lot thus surveyed within six months after the plan's approval; and that he (Hernandez) paid the consideration agreed upon but that petitioner did not deliver the agreed plan, the lapse of four years notwithstanding. Petitioner Asprec averred compliance by allegedly executing and delivering plan Psu-148774 (Ap-2419) duly approved. But Hernandez' reply asserted that Psu-148774 is the plan of a survey made by Asprec for one Damian Alhambra; that plan Ap-2419 is merely a certified copy of sheet 2 of said plan Psu-148774; and that petitioner's contractual obligation was to deliver to him the plan of an original survey not a mere copy. The Board found for Hernandez and declared; that no actual survey of Hernandez' land was made; but that money was paid on his belief that Asprec really surveyed the land for him; that Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision of October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of registration as a private land surveyor. On December 1, 1959, the Assistant Executive Secretary, by authority of the President of the Philippines, approved the Board's decision. On February 12, 1960, the Board's chairman demanded surrender of said certificate in five days. Petitioner's motion to reconsider of March 16, 1960 was denied by the Office of the President on October 31, 1960. Meanwhile, on March 22, 1960, respondent Jorge directed all offices under the Bureau of Lands to return to petitioner Asprec unacted all surveys executed or corrected by the latter on or after October 27, 1959. Petitioner, charging grave abuse of discretion, came to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur on certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyor's certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below. Upon a stipulations of facts, the Camarines Sur court rendered judgment on August 14, 1962, dismissing the petition, with costs. We are now asked to review said decision. We will now discuss seriatim the questions raised. 1. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that he was denied his day in court.4 Resolution of this problem necessitates a considerate examination of the following that transpired before the Board:

(a) Hearing of March 31, 1958: Petitioner raised the legal point that the complaint was not under oath. The Board directed Hernandez to submit a verified complaint. Hearing was postponed to May 12, 1958. (b) Hearing of May 12, 1958: Upon the averment that the verified complaint sets forth "new facts", petitioner asked for a 10-day period to answer. On June 6, instead of an answer, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to dismiss. (c) Hearing of August 18, 1958. Petitioner prayed that hearing be held in abeyance until the board shall have resolved his motion to dismiss. The hearing was reset for March 11, 1959. (d) Hearing of March 11, 1959: This did not pull through although both parties and their respective attorneys were present, because Asprec's counsel was not feeling well. They all agreed to transfer the hearing to May 11, 1959. (e) Hearing of May 11, 1959: Hernandez and counsel appeared. But petitioner and counsel were absent. The Board was not apprised by petitioner of the cause of his or his counsel's failure to appear. At this juncture, counsel for Hernandez manifested to the Board that "since all evidence available against the respondent has already been submitted he would now rest his case." He then filed with the Board a motion for judgment on the pleadings.5 If the foregoing have any meaning at all, they funnel down to one concrete fact: petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More than this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.6 On top of all, petitioner did not as much as bother to inquire as to what happened on May 11. He bestirred himself only on April 16 the following year. Surely enough, this patent in attention better termed gross negligence will not carry the day for him. Indeed, no reason exists why the other party should be hard put to realize that he will have to undergo further expense and trouble. After all, due process is merely "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."7 2. But petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial could proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye to eye with this view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of the court below, thus: The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Embate vs. Penolio, G.R. No. L-4942.8 Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it. People vs. Angco, 54 Off. Gaz. 5703. 3. Appellant decries the fact that the Board's decision was rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings presented on the date of trial, May 11, 1959. He claims that there was no basis for such decision.

A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized and the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge of a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body.9 With the foregoing legal tenet as guide, let us now examine the facts of this case. There was indeed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. But not without reason. Petitioner admits that he executed the plan, sent it to complainant. But this plan (Ap-2419) is not the plan of an original survey. Because it was merely copied from another plan. Petitioner received compensation 10 on the basis of a plan drawn from a survey, not from a copy. Besides, the plans the original and copied plans were before the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested at the hearing of May 11, 1959 that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decision and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, 11 but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. 12 There was evidence before the Board and the Board had acted thereon. The Board's decision was propped up by facts.1wph1.t 4. A review of the record fails to elicit any representation on the part of petitioner that if the Board's decision and the decision of the Court below be reversed, a different result may be obtained. He does not advance any fact or circumstance which would constitute a substantial defense. He does not even offer a new matter which would tilt the scales of justice in his favor. The net result is that if error of procedure there was, as he claims, such error is reduced to the level of non-prejudicial. It is because of all of these that we now say that a reversal of the judgment below or a new hearing before the Board would be but an empty ceremony. Courts do not demand or, for that matter, suggest the performance of the unnecessary. If only for this alone, there is no cause or reason why the machinery administrative or judicial should be allowed to grind anew. 13 5. Petitioner would want to make a point out of Surveyor's Administrative Order No. 1, dated November 26, 1934 (which implemented Act 3626 as amended by Act No. 3889), section 19 (g) of which provides that "Any surveyor who has been suspended three (3) times shall no longer be authorized to practice surveying in the Philippine Islands". Petitioner now asserts that the Board's decision revoking his license is an illegality. This argument overlooks the express statutory provision contained in Section 10 of Act 3626 as amended by Act 3889 aforesaid, as follows: The Board of Examiners may suspend or revoke the license or certificate as practising surveyor granted to any person in case the same has been convicted by any court of a crime involving moral turpitude, if he has been guilty of immoral and dishonest conduct, if he is mentally incapacitated, or for unprofessional conduct. The decision of the Board shall be rendered after an investigation in which the accused shall be heard, and said accused may appeal to the Department head, whose decision shall be final administratively. This law does not state that the surveyor's license may be revoked, only after the said surveyor has been suspended three times. The plain import of the law is that ample discretion is given the Board to suspend or revoke the license. The Board has elected to revoke. It acted within the law. For, a familiar rule is that in a clash between statute and administrative order issued in pursuance thereof, the former prevails. In the end, we say that the proceedings before the Board were not infused with such unfairness or tainted with so grave an abuse of authority as to call for the exercise by this Court of its corrective powers. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

Respondent Itchon is Chairman and respondents Suguitan and Cruz members of the board of Examiners for Surveyors; Respondent Jorge, formerly Chief Surveyor is Directed of Lands; and respondent Noblejas, the Land Registration Commissioner.
2

Administrative Case No. 86, Jacinto E. Hernandez, complainant vs. Cleto Asprec, respondent, started December 6, 1956.
3

Hereinafter referred to as the Board.

Due process is applicable to administrative proceedings. Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193, citing authorities; 12 Am. Jur. p. 285, citing cases.
5

Decision of the Board, Record, p. 106.

Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 937; Republic vs. Gonzales, G.R. L-17962, April 30, 1965, citing Sandejas vs. Robles, 81 Phil. 421, and Siojo vs. Tecson, 88 Phil. 531; 12 Am. Jur. p. 308, citing Blackmer vs. U.S. 294 U.S. 421, 76 L. ed., 375. See also Collector of Customs vs. Arca, et al., G.R. No. L-21389, July 17, 1964. Surveyor's Administrative Order No. 1 (Section 16, paragraph "g") dated November 26, 1934 also provides that: "The respondent shall be given opportunity to defend himself to produce witnesses in his own behalf, or to be heard by himself or counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice not exceeding ten days the respondent fails to appear without cause satisfactory to the Board, the hearing shall proceed ex parte."
7

Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33 cited in Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, p. 85. See also: Lisenba vs. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 86 L. ed., 166, 180; Galvan vs. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530, 98 L. ed. 911, 921.
8

Embate vs. Penolio, 93 Phil. 782, 784-785, where this Court said: "One contention of the appellant is that the order of the trial court of April 25, 1951 was issued without due process of law, for the reason that the respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard, and the order was issued without any lawful hearing. It is argued that the request of counsel for plaintiff that his motion be heard did not per se authorize the court to hear the case as prayed for. We find no merit in this argument. First, the appellant was given an opportunity to answer, and he did file one. Then the motion to declare him in contempt was set for hearing by the appellee, notice of the same being made in accordance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. It is not necessary that the court itself order the motion to be set for hearing, as a prerequisite therefor, because the notice given by the party was sufficient. As the motion was heard after this notice, and strictly in compliance with the above provisions of the Rules of Court, it can not be said that the hearing was held without due process of law. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."
9

Rule 143, Rules of Court; I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 78-79; Sy Chuan, et al. vs. Galang, et al., G.R. L-9793, December 29, 1958.
10

This was taken by the Board from the decision of Judge Jose P. Narciso in Criminal Case No. 210 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Ragay, Camarines Sur (People vs. Cleto Asprec), which was presented to the Board by counsel for Hernandez, and from the report of Judge Perfecto R. Palacio of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Adm. Case #41 (entitled Leovegildo Cerilla, complainant, vs. Judge Jose P. Narciso, respondent).

11

Section 10, Rule 35, Old Rules of Court (effective July 1, 1940). Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Section 5, Rule 51, Rules of Court; People vs. Francisco, 46 Phil. 403, 404.

12

13

FULL CASE

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964

VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner. Federico S. Arlos and P. H. del Pilar for respondent. CONCEPCION, J.: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission. Upon the filing of the petition and the submission and approval of the corresponding bond, we issued a writ of injunction restraining said respondent from enforcing the order complained of Republic Act No. 316, approved on June 19, 1948, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur. Accordingly, petitioner secured from respondent on May 31, 1950, a certificate of public convenience to render electric light, heat and/or power services in said municipalities and to charge its customers and/or consumers the following rates: FLAT RATE 1 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 25 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 40 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 50 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 60 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 75 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 80 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 1 100 watt bulb per month ............................................................ P2.30 3.00 4.50 5.50 6.50 7.50 8.00 9.00

1 150 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 13.00 1 200 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 17.00 METER RATE

For the first 15 For the first 15 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ For the next 35 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ For the next 50 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ For all over 100 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ Minimum Charge: P6.00 per month for connection of 200 watts or less; plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts. TEMPORARY RATE P0.01 per watt per night. On May 22, 1957, petitioner, acting with respondent's approval, entered into a contract for the purchase of electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, for resale, in the course of the business of said petitioner, to its customers, to whom, in fact, petitioner resold said electric power and energy, in accordance with the above schedule of rates. About five (5) years later, or on January 16, 1962, respondent advised petitioner of a conference to be held on February 12, 1962 for the purpose of revising its authorized rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan Ilocos Sur", charging the following: We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal. Said electric meters were imported from Japan by the Vigan Electric Light Company in behalf of the consumers of electric current from said electric company. The Vigan Electric Light Company has commercialized these privilege which property belong to the people. We also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption.1wph1.t and directing the petitioner to comment on these charges. In reply to said communications, petitioner's counsel wrote to respondent, on February 1, 1962, a letter asking that the conference scheduled for February 12 be postponed to March 12, and another letter stating inter alia: In connection therewith, please be informed that my client, the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., has not had any dealing with the Avegon Co., Inc., relative to the 2,000 electric meter mentioned in the petition. Attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an integral part thereof is a certification to that effect by Avegon Co., Inc. Furthermore, as counsel for Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., I wish to inform this Honorable Commission that the charge that said company installed the electric meters in bad faith and that said meters registered excessive rates could have no valid basis because all of these meters have been inspected checked, tested and sealed by your office. On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a communication form the General Auditing Office notifying him that one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had "been instructed to make an audit and examination of the books and other records of account" of said petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 325 and in accordance with the request of the Public Service Commission contained in its letter dated March 12, P0.40 .30 .25 .20

1962", and directing petitioner to cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the successful accomplishment of his work". Subsequently, respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to produce before the former, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain books of account and financial statements specified in said process. On the date last mentioned petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was not acted upon in said conference of April 10, 1962. However, it was then decided that the next conference be held on April 30, 1962, which was later postponed to May 21, 1962. When petitioner's representatives appeared before respondent, on the date last mentioned, they were advised by the latter that the scheduled conference had been cancelled, that the petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum had been granted, and that, on May 17, 1962, respondent had issued an order, from which we quote: We now have the audit report of the General Auditing Office dated May 4, 1962, covering the operation of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. in Vigan, Bantay and Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1961. We find from the report that the total invested capital of the utility as of December 31, 1961, entitled to return amounted to P118,132.55, and its net operating income for rate purposes of P53,692.34 represents 45.45% of its invested capital; that in order to earn 12% per annum, the utility should have a computed revenue by rates of P182,012.78; and that since it realized an actual revenue by rates of P221,529.17, it had an excess revenue by rates of P39,516.39, which is 17.84% of the actual revenue by rates and 33.45% of the invested capital. In other words, the present rates of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. may be reduced by 17.84%, or in round figure, by 18%. Upon consideration of the foregoing, and finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. WHEREFORE, Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962, to wit: METER RATE 24-HOUR SERVICE For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200 was or less plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts. TEMPORARY LIGHTING P0.01 per watt per night. Minimum Charge: P1.00 Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple of five centavos. The above rates may be revised, modified or altered at anytime for any just cause and/or in the public service. Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, since its Corporate inception in 1948, petitioner it

"never was able to give and never made a single dividend declaration in favor of its stockholders" because its operation from 1949 to 1961 had resulted in an aggregate loss of P113,351.523; that in the conference above mentioned petitioner had called the attention of respondent to the fact that the latter had not furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others"; that respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates; that petitioner objected to said reduction without a hearing, alleging that its rates could be reduced only if proven by evidence validly adduced to be excessive; that petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the reasonableness of its aforementioned rates, and even the fairness of its increase; that petitioner was then assured that it would be furnished a copy of the aforementioned letter-petition and that a hearing would be held, if a reduction of its rates could not be agreed upon; that petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based; that such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process. In its answer respondent admitted some allegations of the complaint and denied other allegations thereof, particularly the conclusions drawn by petitioner. Likewise, respondent alleged that it granted petitioner's motion to quash the aforementioned subpoena duces tecum because the documents therein referred to had already been audited and examined by the General Auditing Office, the report on which was on file with said respondent; that the latter had directed that petitioner be served a copy of said report; and that, although this has not, as yet, been actually done, petitioner could have seen and examined said report had it really wanted to do so. By way of special defenses, respondent, moreover, alleged that the disputed order had been issued under its delegated legislative authority, the exercise of which does not require previous notice and hearing; and that petitioner had not sought a reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. In support of its first special defense respondent maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission is not in point because, unlike the order complained of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions. At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern (Rubi vs. Provincia Board, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370). However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is complete in itself (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil., 328; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil., 1; Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495 Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S., 38; Bowles vs. Willingham, 321 U.S., 503). Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy (People vs. Lim Ho, L12091, January 28, 1960; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952; Philippine Association of Colleges vs. Secretary of Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805; Antamok Gold Fields vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 340; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S., 414; Ammann vs. Mallonce, 332 U.S., 245; U.S. vs. Rock Royal Corp. 307 U.S., 533; Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S., 230). Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not

only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Hence, Congress his not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice Indeed hearing. The pertinent parts thereof provide: SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the limitations and exception mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is use principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. Subject to established limitations and exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously had (a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any individual or joint rates, commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary. The Commission shall approve only those that are just and reasonable and not any that are unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public services and other parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard, ... . (Emphasis supplied.) Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current rates were fixed by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be made, over petitioner's objection, without such notice and hearing, particularly considering that the factual basis of the action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The rule applicable is set forth in the American Jurisprudence the following language:

Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasijudicial, affecting the rights an property of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716; Emphasis supplied.) Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without previous notice and hearing said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void, so that a motion for reconsideration thereof is not an absolute prerequisite to the institution of the present action for certiorari (Ayson vs. Republic. 50 Off. Gaz., 5810). For this reason considering that said order was being made effective on June 1, 1962, or almost immediately after its issuance (on May 17, 1962), we find that petitioner was justified in commencing this proceedings without first filing said motion (Guerrero vs. Carbonell, L-7180, March 15, 1955). WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby made permanent. It is so ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Barrera, J., took no part.

FULL CASE Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION July 31, 1964 G.R. No. L-16487 MANUEL BORJA, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, ET AL., respondents, HON. FLORENCIO MORENO as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications, and BENJAMIN YONZON, respondents-appellants.
Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner-appellee. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants. Makalintal, J.: This is an appeal by respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Benjamin Yonzon from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga dated November 9, 1959 in Civil Case No. 1508 of said Court, which was initiated by a petition of herein appellee, Manuel Borja, for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Borja is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of some 104 hectares in barrio Consuelo, municipality of Macabebe, province of Pampanga. This land, utilized as a fishpond, was acquired by him from Ayala and Company in 1937. On August 15, 1958 an administrative complaint was filed with the office of respondent Secretary by Benigno Musni and others, including then Senator de la Rosa, against a number of landowners, among them petitioner Borja, for abatement of nuisance and demolition of illegally constructed dams, dikes or any other works in the public navigable rivers in Macabebe, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged to have closed the stream called Matlaue supposedly public, which runs through his land. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department of Public Works and Communications, was designated by the Secretary to investigate the charges in the complaint. A copy of the decision, purportedly signed by the Undersecretary, M. B. Bautista, and dated April 3, 1959, was served upon counsel for Borja on June 12, 1959, ordering the latter as follows: to remove the dams and/or dike found across the channel bordering the properties owned by respondent and Maxima Vda. de Blas, and restore the bed to its original condition within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of this decision; otherwise, the removal thereof shall be effected by this office or its duly authorized representative at the expense of the respondent within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period, without prejudice to whatever judicial action that may be instituted against them pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2056. The foregoing decision of respondent Secretary was assailed by petitioner Borja in the latters petition before the court a quo on several grounds; that it was based on erroneous findings of fact; that it was contrary to law; that the investigation constituted a usurpation of judicial power and hence beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Secretary; that the delegation to Benjamin Yonzon of the authority to investigate was illegal and therefore null and void; and that the investigation was conducted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of due process. Respondents raised a

number of defenses in their answer to the petition, and after trial the court rendered the judgment now subject of the present appeal, granting the writs prayed for by petitioner; declaring null and void and of no legal effect all proceedings had by respondents in the administrative investigation, including the decision entered on April 3, 1959; restraining and prohibiting respondent Secretary from enforcing said decision, and declaring the injunction previously issued to be permanent. The issues raised by appellants in this appeal are formulated in the errors assigned in their brief, as follows: I The lower court erred in holding in effect that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power to an administrative official. II The lower court erred in holding that here was no duty on the part of petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. III The lower Court erred in not finding the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications supported by evidence. IV The lower Court erred in holding that the Matlaue river is a private stream. V The lower Court erred in finding that respondent Benjamin Yonzon gravely used his discretion and acted capriciously. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2056 referred to by appellants in their first assignment of error are Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 provides that the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited construction, but authorizes the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to allow the construction of any such works when public interest or safety so requires, or when it is absolutely necessary for the protection of private property. Section 2 provides for due notice and hearing to establish the facts mentioned in Section 1, after which the Secretary, upon an affirmative finding as to their existence, is authorized to order the removal of the works declared as nuisances or prohibited constructions, giving the party concerned a period of not more than 30 days to do so, failing which such removal should be carried out by the Secretary within 10 days after the expiration of the period originally allowed. The same section adds that the investigation to be conducted by the Secretary must be terminated and decided, by him within a period not exceeding 90 days from the time a complaint in writing is filed with him by any interested party apprising him of the existence of the illegal works or constructions. Failure on his part, without justifiable reason, to terminate or decide a case or to effect the removal of the works or constructions within the time limit is considered an offense, for which the corresponding penalty is prescribed. With respect to the first error assigned by appellants, it is not true that the trial court ruled the foregoing provisions unconstitutional. On the contrary, it declined to pass upon the constitutional question on the ground that those provisions do not apply to the facts of the instant case. As far as may be gathered from the courts opinion, the particular fact which removes this case from the purview of Republic Act No. 2056 and which it considered duly established by the evidence is that the Matlaue stream which runs through the land of petitioner-appellee is not a public navigable river but his private property. The implication is that the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to proceed under the provisions of said statute covers only cases where there is no dispute as to the

public navigable character of the river or waterway alleged to be illegally obstructed, but that when this is precisely a basic fact in contention the matter should be left to the courts for determination. To the writer of this opinion the view thus taken by the court a quo and now urged upon us by petitioner-appellee has cogent reasons behind it. There is a certain danger in leaving the adjudication of a claim of private ownership of property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands of an executive official. This danger is demonstrated by the very argument of appellants under their third and fourth assignments of error. They point to the evidence submitted at the administrative investigation and, invoking the substantial evidence rule, assail the lower courts conclusion that the Matlaue stream is privately owned. The said rule, indeed, which has been applied in a number of cases in this jurisdiction, is that if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters within his competence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusions (Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635, 642), the courts are bound to look no further, not even to consider contrary evidence of a preponderant nature. If the decision of the administrative official carries with it, as the premise upon which it rests, a finding that certain property claimed by a private party to be his in fact part of the public domain, it does not seem fair to take that finding as conclusive upon the courts just because it is supported by substantial evidence, although there may be evidence to the contrary which, if properly considered and evaluated, would lead them to a different conclusion. The other members of this Court, however, hold that the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to inquire into and decide the question of the public or private character of a river or stream is incidental to the power conferred upon him by the statute to conduct the necessary investigation and to order the removal of any works which constitute obstructions therein. This authority recognized, the next question posed by appellants is with respect to the correctness of the trial courts finding that the Matlaue stream is privately owned by petitioner-appellee. Under the substantial evidence rule (laying aside for the moment the question of whether or not such evidence may properly be considered at all, in view of the manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted) we find appellants third and fourth assignments of error to be well-taken: there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of respondent Secretary that the Matlaue stream is a public navigable river. This evidence consists of the testimony of two witnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman, and of the result of the ocular inspection conducted by the investigator, appellant Yonzon, as embodied in the report subsequently submitted by him and depicted in a sketch prepared by the assistant engineer of the Pampanga River Control Project. Nevertheless, we do not feel justified in affirming, for purposes of adjudication, the aforesaid conclusion of respondent Secretary, and reversing that of the trial court, for the investigation wherein the evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of the requirements of due process. And it is solely on this ground that the members of this Court are agreed that this decision should be predicated. The administrative complaint was filed with respondent Secretary on August 15, 1958. On October 22, 1958 Yonzon issued a subpoena to Borja ordering him to appear at the hearing of the case on October 24, 1958. That was the first time Borja had notice of the complaint. Acting on his request that the hearing be postponed for at least two weeks, Yonzon deferred it, but only up to October 27, 1958. When that day arrived Attorney Vicente V. Mendoza, a member of the law firm Carlos, Laurea & Associates, in representation of appellee, attended the investigation at Macabebe, Pampanga, but for the sole purpose of delivering to Yonzon appellees motion to quash and dismiss on the grounds that complainants Musni, et al., did not have the capacity to file the complaint and that Republic Act 2056 would be unconstitutional if it should be given retroactive effect. Without acting on the motion Yonzon proceeded with the examination of the two witnesses for the complaints. Attorney Mendoza repeatedly manifested that he was not prepared for the hearing and was not in a position to cross-examine complainants witnesses because the law firm of which he was a member had not had time to confer with appellee on account of the limited time given by Yonzon. Attorney Mendoza, however, sought to reserve his right to cross-examine, but Yonzon ruled that his failure to crossexamine was in effect a waiver of the right. On October 28, 1958 appellant Yonzon, upon a mere oral notice, conducted an ocular inspection of the questioned stream without giving appellee Borja sufficient time to prepare therefor. Furthermore, Yonzon did not limit himself to

inspecting the premises but proceeded to conduct a hearing by questioning the witnesses who had testified the day before. On the next hearing date, October 30, 1958, Attorney Clemente Madarang, Jr., of the law firm representing appellee, was present. He asked for reconsideration of Yonzons ruling that Attorney Mendozas request for reservation to crossexamine amounted to a waiver of the right to do so. Yonzon refused to reconsider. When Attorney Madarang reiterated his request, Yonzon relented and agreed to allow him to cross-examine the witnesses who had previously testified, but without waiting for the transcription of the stenographic notes of the hearing previously had. Attorney Madarang agreed to cross-examine even if only on the notes taken by Attorney Mendoza. But when he was about to do so Yonzon again changed his mind and refused to let him cross-examine. On that same day, Attorney Madarang sought to take the stand as witness for appellee in order to identify certain documents which he had secured for the latter, but Yonzon prevented him from doing so. In addition, during that same hearing Yonzon called to the witness stand a certain engineer Manangan of the Pampanga River Control Project, allegedly as witness for the Government, which was not a party to the case. And then Yonzon denied to Attorney Madarang the right to object to any question propounded to Manangan, even if the same were prejudicial to appellees interest. On November 17, 1958 appellant Yonzon, at the request of appellee, issued a subpoena to Eliseo Panopio to attend the hearing the next day. When Yonzon delivered the subpoena he found out that Panopio was in the province. In spite of Attorney Madarangs insistence that Panopios testimony would not be limited to identifying the latters report (Exhibit S) Yonzon refused to grant continuance, reasoning out that Panopios testimony only corroborate that of Valderrama, who had identified certain documents which were in the custody of his office. The Panopio report, it may be mentioned, was prepared by him in 1931 when, as a surveyor of the Bureau of Public Works, he investigated the different streams and rivers situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and found that Matlaue in particular had been artificially dug, and subsequently increased in width, length and depth by the owner at the time, from whom Borja acquired the land in 1937. On November 18, 1958, Yonzon terminated the hearing without giving counsel for Borja opportunity to present other witnesses and in spite of vigorous objection on his part. Appellant Yonzon clearly abused his discretion in riding roughshod over appellees right to a fair hearing. His acts of (1) proceeding with the hearing without first acting on appellees motion to dismiss; (2) ruling that appellees attempt to reserve his right to cross-examine was a waiver of said right; (3) conducting an ocular inspection motu proprio and interrogating witness during the same; (4) not allowing Attorney Madarang to cross-examine the complainants witnesses during the hearing of October 30, 1958; (5) calling to the witness stand a person who was not a witness for either the complainants or the respondents, and asking him questions to which he refused to entertain any objection from counsel; (6) arbitrarily refusing appellee opportunity to present Eliseo Panopio on the ground that his testimony was merely corroborative, although as it later turned out in court Panopios testimony was important to appellees defense; and (7) terminating the hearing without giving appellee full opportunity to present his other witnesses all these are indicative of the capricious and arbitrary manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted. By way of justification Yonzon repeatedly invoked the ninety-day period prescribed by R.A. 2056 within which an administrative case for abatement of nuisance thereunder must be terminated. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that while the complaint for abatement was filed on August 15, 1958, it was only on October 22, 1958 more than two months later that appellant officials informed appellee thereof and, strangely enough, by means of a subpoena. The latter did not have sufficient time to prepare his defense when appellant Yonzon started rushing the proceedings, evidently to make up for lost time. As it was, even with all that undue haste, the last day of the hearing was still beyond the deadline sought to be met. The decision was dated April 3, 1959, eight months after the complaint was filed; and copy was, served on appellees counsel only on June 12, 1959.

The manner the investigation was conducted was a virtual denial of due process. This is one of the exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case by appeal to the President, if otherwise it was necessary at all before resort to the courts may be had. The judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it sets aside the administrative investigation conducted by respondents-appellants and the decision therein against petitioner-appellee, but not in so far as said judgment declares the Matlaue stream or river the private property of said petitioner-appellee, the question of ownership thereof being left for determination in such other proceeding, administrative or judicial, as respondents-appellants may deem proper to initiate. No pronouncement as to costs.

CASE DIGEST VINTAMARITIMEVNLRC (Basconcillo) 284SCRA656 PANGANIBAN;January3,1998 NATURE Special civilactionof certiorari FACTS -LeonidesC.BASCONCILLO,filedacomplaintwiththePhilippineOverseasEmployment Administration(POEA) WorkersAssistanceandAdjudicationOfficeforillegaldismissalagainstVintaMaritimeCo.,Inc.andElkanoShip Management,Inc. -Theemployersallegedthathewasdismissedforhisgrossnegligenceandincompetent performanceaschiefengineeroftheM/VBoracay.Theyclaimthathewasgivenfairwarningandenoughopportunitytoexplai nhis side,nottomentionallthechancesgiventohimtoimprovehis substandardworkperformancebeforehewas dismissed. -Theemployeedeniedtheallegationsagainsthim;contrary tohisemployersclaim,hewasactuallysurprisedwhen hewastoldofhisdismissal.Thisoccurredafterhehadaverbalaltercation withaBritishnational,regardingthelack ofdisciplineof theFilipino crewundertheengineerssupervision. No inquiryorinvestigation,however, regarding hissupposedincompetenceornegligencewaseverconducted;neitherwasprivaterespondentfurnishedwitha noticeormemorandum regardingthecauseofhis dismissal. -POEAconsideredthecasesubmittedforresolution bymutualagreementofthepartiesafter submissionoftheir respective positionpapers and supporting documents.POEA AdministratorAchacosoruled that private respondentwasillegally dismissed. -Onappeal, the NLRC affirmedthePOEA. ISSUE/S 1. WONtrialisindispensableinadministrativeproceedings 2. WONtheemployee wasillegallydismissed HELD 1.NO Ratio Althoughboundby lawandpractice toobservedueprocess,administrativeagenciesexercisingquasijudicialpowersarenonetheless freefrom therigidityofcertainproceduralrequirements. DUEPROCESS-Cardinal PrimaryRights -Inlaborcases,thisCourthasconsistentlyheldthatdueprocessdoesnotnecessarilymeanorrequireahearing, butsimplyanopportunityorarighttobeheard. Therequirementsofdueprocess aredeemedtohavebeensatisfiedwhenpartiesaregiventheopportunitytosubmitpositionpapers.Theholdingofanadversar ialtrialisdiscretionary on thelaborarbiterandtheparties cannot demanditas amatterofright. -These rulesequallyapply to cases filedwith thePhilippineOverseasEmploymentAdministration Adjudication Office.Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of dueprocess. ReasoningPetitionersweregiventheir chancetobeheard. Theiranswer,positionpaperand supportingdocuments hadbecomepartsof therecords andwereconsideredbythePOEAandbytheNLRC. 2.YES RatioWherethereisnoshowingofaclear,valid,andlegalcausefortheterminationof employment,thelaw considersthematteracaseofillegaldismissal.Verily,theburdenisontheemployertoprovethatthetermination was foravalidorauthorized cause. -Dueprocess, the secondelement foravaliddismissal, requiresNOTICEandHEARING.Theemployer must furnish the worker with twowrittennoticesbefore termination canbelegally effected:(1)notice whichapprisestheemployee oftheparticularactsoromissionsforwhichhisdismissalissoughtand (2)subsequentnoticewhichinformsthe employeeoftheemployersdecisiontodismisshim. Disposition PetitionisDISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR (RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION) 86 SCRA 27; MUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978

NATURE Petition for certiorari

FACTS -In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". -In that year, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which immediately ordered the strikers to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. -While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which resulted in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company. -The Rural Transit Employees Association denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob -During the hearing of Bachrachs petition, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, was presented as the lone witness -After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of crossexamination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. -The employee's association filed a motion praying that: (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. -The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages -Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari

ISSUE WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob

HELD NO Ratio The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Reasoning -CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. -In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. -The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. -Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

FULL CASE

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-26136 October 30, 1978
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or "BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as operator of the RURAL TRANSIT, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents. Flores, Macapagal Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners. Carlos Santiago for private respondent.

MUOZ PALMA, J.: In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc.", now petitioner in this case, was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". In that year the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations for compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as Case No. 22- IPA entitled: Rural Transit Employees Association vs. Bachrach Motor Co., and Bachrach Transportation Co. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR for short) immediately issued an order on August 7, 1958 by which the strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. 1 While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service", dated July 24, 1961. The reasons given for the petition were alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo Jacob resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which occurred on June 9, 1961 resulting in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company. An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees Association whereby it denied the charges and alleged that the June 9, 1961 accident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the service was not justified. The petition of Bachrach docketed as Case No. 22-IPA (11) was heard on January 23, 1963, during which petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and various documents marked as Exhibits "1" to "8-F" inclusive. After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct testimony, with agreement of the parties, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. Sometime on March 8 1965, the employee's association filed a motion praying that:

(a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. 2 In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages from the date of his suspension up to his actual reinstatement. 3 Bachrach's motion for reconsideration 4 having been denied 5, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari on June 15, 1966 which in the Court's Resolution of July 18,1966 was given due course. 6 The following errors are now assigned by petitioner, viz: 7 I The respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner, after ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the record, notwithstanding the fact that the service records of Maximo Jacob, upon the basis of which his dismissal could be justified were admitted by it. II The respondent court erred in not admitting the petitioner's exhibits unqualifiedly and in admitting them "for whatever worth they may have" only to disregard them entirely thereafter on the alleged ground that "the contents of the same were not proven. III The respondent court erred in not ordering the dismissal of Maximo Jacob. IV The respondent court erred in granting the respondent union's counter-petition without reception of evidence, especially after it earlier dismissed the petitioner's petition on the technical ground that Joseph Kaplin was not cross-examined by the respondent union. V The respondent court erred in granting backwages to Maximo Jacob from the date of his suspension up to actual reinstatement without evidence to prove that he has exercised reasonable diligence to secure other employment during the time of his alleged suspension. VI The respondent court erred in not holding that the union has the burden to prove that Maximo Jacob is entitled to backwages. VII

The respondent court erred in not holding that, if at all, Maximo Jacob is only entitled to three months backwages according to the Sta. Cecilia Sawmill case. 1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258) In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, defendant's witness failed to appear at the continuation of hearing during which the witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court denied defendant's motion for postponement and ordered the unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off the record. In sustaining said order, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. (64 SCRA 610, 636- 637; emphasis supplied) Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, was different. There, the witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony and he was ready and available for crossexamination. Motions for postponement of the cross-examination were made however by the adverse counsel from time to time until one day Atty. Morabe succumbed to a fatal heart attack without the cross-examination having been accomplished. On motion of the respondents the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the record. On a petition for certiorari by Savory Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held that by their own actuations, respondents were considered to have impliedly waived and thereupon lost their right to crossexamine the witness, for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant through his own conduct. Petitioner contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva, to Identify the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during the hearing of January 16, 1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the aforesaid documents. 8 However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled to cross-examine the witness on the matters written on Exhibits "1" to "8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against whom they were being presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of the documents; not having done so, petitioner must now suffer the consequences. Exhibits "1" to "8-F" were admitted by respondent court only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them, however, it did not consider said documents, and rightly so, as competent proof of the truthfulness of their contents without the supporting testimony of witness Kaplin. As stated in the order under review

"(N)o other witness was presented by respondent company (now petitioner) to testify on the intrinsic value of those exhibits"; consequently, they are hearsay. Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order. 2. No error was committed when the CIR, without receiving evidence, granted relief to private respondent herein on its counter-petition. At the time Bachrach filed its petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, there was a pending labor dispute in the CIR between the company and the employee's union. The CIR ordered the strikers to return to work. The company in the meantime suspended its driver Maximo Jacob after the alleged June 9, 1961 accident. 10 Considering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the latter's suspension and his reinstatement in the service were but a necessary consequence thereof. For obvious reasons, the relief could be granted without need of evidence. The onus probandi was on the company, now petitioner, to justify the suspension of Jacob and his eventual separation from the service. Having failed to discharge that burden, there were no valid grounds for it to keep its employee away from his work. 3. On the matter of backwages, We agree with petitioner's counsel that the judicial trend is to fix a reasonable period for the payment of backwages, the philosophy being to avoid protracted delay in post-judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings of the worker elsewhere during the period he had not been reinstated to his employment." 11 Following this principle, We hold that payment of backwages for a period of three (3) years is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the case. WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming the order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated March 1, 1966, now under review, with the sole modification that petitioner shall pay its driver Maximo Jacob three (3) years backwages at the rate of the last salary received before he was suspended, without qualification and deduction. With costs against petitioner. Order modified. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ, concur.

CASE DIGEST

UPBOARD OF REGENTSV.CA(AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARETCELINE) G.R.No.134625. MENDOZA;August31,1999

NATURE Petitionforreview FACTS -PrivaterespondentArokiaswamyWilliamMargaretCelineisa citizenofIndiaandholderofaPhilippine visitors visa. sheenrolledinthedoctoralprograminAnthropologyoftheUniversityofthePhilippinesCollegeofSocialSciences andPhilosophy(CSSP)inDiliman,QuezonCity. -Aftercompletingtheunitsofcourseworkrequiredinherdoctoralprogram,privaterespondentwentonatwo-year leaveofabsencetoworkasTamilProgrammeProduceroftheVaticanRadiointheVaticanandasGeneralOffice AssistantattheInternationalRighttoLifeFederationinRome.Shereturned tothePhilippinestoworkonher dissertationentitled,"Tamil Influencesin Malaysia,Indonesiaand thePhilippines." -Dr.RealidadS.Rolda,chairpersonoftheU.P.DepartmentofAnthropology,wrotealettertoDr. MariaSerena Diokno,CSSPAssociateDeanandGraduateProgramDirector,certifyingthatprivaterespondenthadfinishedher dissertationandwasreadyforheroraldefense. She was allowedtogiveanoraldefense. -Aftergoingoverprivaterespondentsdissertation,Dr.MedinainformedCSSPDeanConsuelo Joaquin-Pazthat there was a portionin private respondents dissertationthat was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaediaof India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyesarticle entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel,Malabar,andtheIslandofCeylonfortheirCoastingNavigation"intheRoyalAsiaticSocietyofGreat BritainandIrelandJournal. -Nonetheless,private respondent wasallowed to defend her dissertation.Four (4) outof the five (5)panelistsgave privaterespondentapassingmarkforheroraldefensebyaffixing theirsignatures ontheapprovalform. -TheCSSPCollegeFaculty Assembly approvedprivaterespondentsgraduationpendingsubmissionoffinalcopies of herdissertation. -TheUniversity Councilmettoapprove thelistofcandidatesforgraduation forthe second semesterofschoolyear 1992-1993.Thelist, which wasendorsed to theBoardofRegentsforfinalapproval,includedprivaterespondents name. -DeanPazsentalettertoDr.MilagrosIbe,ViceChancellorforAcademicAffairs,requestingtheexclusionofprivate respondentsnamefromthelistofcandidatesforgraduation,pendingclarification oftheproblemsregardingher dissertation. -DeanPazsletterdidnotreachtheBoardofRegentsontime,becausethenextday,theBoard approvedthe University Councilsrecommendation for thegraduationofqualified students,includingprivaterespondent.Twodays later,privaterespondentgraduatedwiththedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyinAnthropology. -Dr.Medinaformally chargedprivaterespondentwithplagiarismandrecommendedthatthedoctorategrantedtoher be withdrawn. -DeanPaz formedan adhoccommittee toinvestigate theplagiarismchargeagainstprivaterespondent.Meanwhile, sherecommendedtoU.P.DilimanChancellor,Dr.EmerlindaRoman,thatthePh.D. degreeconferredonprivate respondentbewithdrawn. -Inaletter DeanPaz informedprivaterespondentofthechargesagainst her. -TheCSSPCollegeAssembly unanimously approvedtherecommendation towithdrawprivate respondents doctoratedegreeandforwardeditsrecommendationtotheUniversityCouncil.The UniversityCouncil,inturn, approvedandendorsedthesamerecommendationtotheBoardof Regents onAugust 16,1993. -Meanwhile,inaletter,U.P.DilimanChancellorEmerlindaRoman summonedprivaterespondenttoa meetingonthe samedayandaskedhertosubmit herwrittenexplanation tothechargesagainst her. -Duringthemeeting,ChancellorRomaninformed privaterespondentofthe chargesandprovidedheracopyofthe findingsoftheinvestigating committee. Privaterespondent,on theotherhand,submittedher writtenexplanationina letter. -Another meetingwasheldbetweenChancellorRomanandprivaterespondenttodiscussheranswerto thecharges. Athirdmeetingwasscheduledbutprivaterespondentdidnotattendit,allegingthattheBoardofRegents had alreadydecided hercasebeforeshecouldbefullyheard.

-BOR withdrew degree -TCdismissedpetitionformandamusfiledbyArokiaswamy.CAreversedorderingBORtorestore herdoctoral degree. ISSUE WON Arokiaswamywas denieddueprocess HELD NO. Reasoning Inthiscase,thetrialcourtdismissedprivaterespondentspetitionpreciselyongrounds ofacademic freedombut theCourt of Appeals reversedholdingthatprivaterespondent was denieddueprocess. It said: Itisworthy tonotethatduring theproceedingstakenby theCollegeAssembly culminatinginitsrecommendationto theUniversityCouncil for the withdrawalofpetitionersPh.D.degree,petitioner wasnotgiventhe chance tobeheard untilafterthewithdrawalofthedegreewasconsummated.Petitionerssubsequent letterstotheU.P.President provedunavailing.

CASE DIGEST

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. V. CA (SEC. OF AGRI AND NATURAL RESOURCES) G.R. No. L-49711; AQUINO; November 7, 1979

NATURE Petition for review

FACTS -This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper for Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines. -The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should review anew the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows: (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloa, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly located and registered (pp. 224-231, Record on Appeal). (2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as if he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case.

ISSUE WON Gozun correctly reviewed his own decision

HELD NO.

Reasoning Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, provides: "SEC. 61. decision: Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for

"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt. "In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned." (As amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on June 18, 1952). Undoubtedly, the provision of section that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court; secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law). A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review.Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness. Disposition Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources SET ASIDE

FULL CASE Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979 ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO P. NAVA, VIOLA S. NAVA, FEDERICO S. NAVA, PERLA NAVA, HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDRO S. NAVA, PURIFICACION SISON, A. TORDESILLAS, GUIDO ADVINCULA, PEDRO ANGULO and TOMAS MARAMBA, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ, ALEJANDRO MENDEZ, NICANOR MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMO YABUT, ANDRES R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO, CASIMIRO N. EBIDO, ENRIQUE RIVERA, SEVERINO MIVA, ELENITO B. MARTINEZ, LUCAS EDURAIN, FELIMON ENCIO, EMILIO ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA, ERNESTO VALVERDE, PABLO PABILONA, ARMANDO MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and CECILIO OOVILLA, respondents-appellees.
Tordesilla & Advincula for petitioners-appellants. Mariano M. Lozada for private respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.: This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper from Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines. The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should review anew the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows: (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabilona, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly located and registered (pp. 224-231, Record on Appeal). (2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as it he was adjudicating the case for the first

time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims, while, on the other hand, the Martinez and Pabilona groups had validly located the said claims. Hence, he dismissed the appeal from his own decision (pp. 340-341, Record on Appeal). (3) On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors of the sixty-nine mineral claims in question. Impleaded as defendants in the case were the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Mines and the members of the Martinez and Pabilona groups. After hearing, the lower court sustained Secretary Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. It held that the disqualification petition of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the petitioners did not seasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to the petitioners (pp. 386-9, Record on Appeal). (4) The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Sixth Division of that Court (Pascual, Agcaoili and Climaco, JJ.) in its decision dated February 15, 1978 reversed the judgment of the trial court and declared that the petitioners were the rightful locators and possessors of the said sixty-nine mining claims and held as invalid the mining claims overlapping the same. That Division found that the petitioners (Nava group) had discovered minerals and had validly located the said sixty-nine mining claims and that there was no sufficient basis for Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining claims of the Martinez and Pabilona groups were validly located. (5) The defendants, now the private respondents-appellees, filed a motion for reconsideration based principally on the ground that the Court of Appeals should have respected the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the theory that the facts found in administrative decisions cannot be disturbed on appeal to the courts, citing Republic Act No. 4388 which amended section 61 of the Mining Law effective June 19, 1965; Pajo vs. Ago, 108 Phil. 905; Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz 65 O.G. 8473; Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 119 Phil. 169, Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440. The defendants-movants prayed that the appeal be dismissed, meaning that the decisions of the lower court and of Director and Secretary Gozon be affirmed. The petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration. In their opposition, they reiterated the contention in their brief that Secretary Gozon's decision was void and, therefore, the factual findings therein are not binding on the courts. As already stated, the same Sixth Division (composed of Pascula, Agrava and Maco, JJ.) in its second decision of October 13, 1978, set aside its first decision and granted the motion for curiously enough, the first decision was reconsidered not on the ground advanced by the movants-defendants, now the private respondents (Martinez and Pabilona groups), which was that the factual findings of the administrative officials should be upheld, but on the ground raised in petitioners' opposition, namely, that Secretary Gozon's decision was void because he was disqualified to review his own decision as Director of Mines. So, as already noted, the Court of Appeals in its second decision remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozon's decision. This was the prayer of the petitioners in their brief but in their

opposition to the motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the first decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor be maintained. (6) The second decision did not satisfy the parties. They filed motions for reconsideration. The petitioners in their motion reiterated their prayer that the first decision be reinstated. They abandoned their prayer that the case be returned to the Minister of Natural Resources. On the other hand, the private respondents in their motion insisted that the trial court's decision be affirmed on the basis of the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Court of Appeals denied both motions in its resolutions of December 27, 1978 and January 15, 1979. Only the petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals. There is an arresting and noteworthy peculiarity in the present posture of this case now on appeal to this Court (as arresting and noteworthy as the peculiarity that Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines), That twist or peculiarity is that while the petitioners (Nava group) in their appellants' brief in the Court of Appeals prayed that Secretary Gozon's decision, alleged to be biased, be declared void and that the case be returned to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozon's order, in their appellants' brief in this Court, they changed that relief and they now pray that the second decision of the Court of Appeals, referring this case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review, be declared void and that its first decision be affirmed. In contrast, the private respondents, who did not appeal from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, instead of sustaining its holding that this case be referred to the Minister of Natural Resources or instead of defending that second decision, they being appellees, pray for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment sustaining the decisions of Director and Secretary Gozon. The inconsistent positions of the parties, which were induced by the contradictory decisions of the Court of Appeals, constitute the peculiar twist of this case in this Court. We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 13-i, provides: SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision: Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt. In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the said decision or order shag be final and binding upon the parties concerned. (As amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on June 18,1952).* Undoubtedly, the provision of section 61 that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court: secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law). A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his undersecretary to undertake the review. Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. (See Amos Treat & Co. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 306 F. 2nd 260, 267.) WHEREFORE, we set aside the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated August 16, 1963 as affirmed by the trial court as well as the first decision of the Court of Appeals. We affirm its second decision, returning the case to the Minister of Natural Resources, with the directive that petitioners' appeal to the Minister be resolved de novo with the least delay as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 309, "establishing rules and procedures for the speedy disposition or settlement of conflicting mining claims". We reverse the second part of that second decision stating that "thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". That portion is unwarranted because the trial court does not retain any jurisdiction over the case once it is remanded to the Minister of Natural Resources. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Concepcion Jr., J, took no part. Separate Opinions

Barredo, J.: concurring: Concur but wish to add that the reason why the undersecretary could ask is because when the secretary is disqualified, he should be deemed as absent or incapacitated to ask, hence the undersecretary should be correspondingly deemed as the secretary for the purposes of the case in question. Needless to say, the undersecretary should ask in such a way as to avoid any indication that he has been dictated upon actually by the secretary.

# Separate Opinions Barredo, J.: concurring: Concur but wish to add that the reason why the undersecretary could ask is because when the secretary is disqualified, he should be deemed as absent or incapacitated to ask, hence the undersecretary should be correspondingly deemed as the secretary for the purposes of the case in question. Needless to say, the undersecretary should ask in such a way as to avoid any indication that he has been dictated upon actually by the secretary.

#Footnotes * Section 61 was further amended by Republic Act No. 4388, which took effect on June 19, 1965 by changing the "court of competent jurisdiction" to "court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be", and by providing that findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines, when affirmed by the Secretary od Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only 2 questions of law may be raised." As to the existing procedure 'or review, see sections 3, 4 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 309. dated October 10, 1973 which establishes rules and procedures for the speedy disposition or settlement of conflicting mining claims; sections 48 to 50 of the Mineral resources Development Decree of 1974, Presidential Decree No. 463, dated May 17, 1974, regarding protests, adverse claims and appeals, involving the right to possession, lease. exploration or exploitation of any mining claim, and section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1281, dated January 16, 1978, regarding review of the decisions of the Director of Mines in cases involving mining agreements or contracts.

FULL CASE

SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982 FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner, vs. JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as Presidential Executive Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L. VENZON, respondents.
Antonio P. Amistad for petitioner. Artemio E. Valenton for private respondent. Madamba, Deza & Almario Law Offices for respondent . Demegildo Laborte & Lazano Law Offices for respondent public officials.

AQUINO, J.: This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the Medical Research Department in the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST). Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II and directing the appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48. The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not filled up. At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV with an annual compensation of P12,013 per annum. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position. Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with compensation at P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission. Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was made after a thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p. 78, Rollo).

Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal was forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The appeal-protest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission. Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo). The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission." After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36, Rollo). In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court the instant special civil action of certiorari. What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo. In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission, recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo. When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself (p. 35, Rollo). It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.

In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant. We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position. Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the Philippines. She obtained from the Centro Escolar University the degree of Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor of Pharmacy. Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for about twenty-eight (28) years now. As already stated, in January, 1978, she was appointed to the contested Position of Science Research Supervisor II. Her present salary as Science Research Supervisor II, now known as Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per annum after she was given a merit increase by Doctor Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259, Rollo). On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in 1957. She started working in the NIST in 1960. She has been working in that agency for more than twenty-one (21) years. Doctor Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the contested position for more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest should be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and petitioner Anzaldo's promotional appointment to the contested position is declared valid. No costs. SO ORDERED. Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part. De Castro, J., concur in the result.

CASE DIGEST

RIVERA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 240 SCRA 43; VITUG; JAN 4, 1995
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS - Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of Lao and Perez, petitioner was charged by the LBP President with having committed the following offenses: "(1) Dishonesty;

"(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; "(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;

"(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; "(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service." - Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. - Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation. - Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension. After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held Rivera guilty only of committing acts

prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its resolution, the MSPB denied the motion. - Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. The CSC dismissed the appeal of Respondent George Rivera, finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276. - Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions. The SC Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.

ISSUE WON petitioner was denied due process when Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC

HELD YES. - In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewin g officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case." - Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990. cdrep Dispositive Resolution set aside, case remanded to CSC

FULL CASE

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 115147 January 4, 1995 GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.: This petition for certiorari assails the resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of respondent Civil Service Commission ("CSC") relative to an administrative case, entitled "Land Bank of the Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as well as its resolution, dated 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988, by the LBP President with having committed the following offenses: (1) Dishonesty; (2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; (3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws; (4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; (5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 1 Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong.

Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation. Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective 19 February 1988). After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held. 2 In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby modified that respondent-appellant George I. Rivera is considered guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Considering that this is his first offense on record, the penalty of Forced Resignation without separation benefits and gratuities to which he may be otherwise be entitled under the laws is reduced to one (1) year suspension. 3 The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its resolution, 4 promulgated on 08 June 1992, the MSPB denied the motion. Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-1189, 5 the CSC resolved only the appeal of Rivera (rejecting that of the LBP pursuant to the rule laid down by his Court in Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission [215 SCRA 398]). The resolution, in part, read: The Commission is inclined to sustain the original decision of the Land Bank of the Philippines. Committing an act punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) is considered a Grave Misconduct. It is a wanton and/or blatant violation of law. As an officer of the Bank, respondent Rivera should know better that it was illegal and improper for him to accept regular monthly allowances from a private firm which is a client of his Bank. More so, that such act is prohibited and punishable under Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolves to dismiss the appeal of Respondent George Rivera. Moreover, the Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Accordingly, the MSPB decision is hereby set aside. 6 Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276. 7 Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions. On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for

reconsideration with the CSC. The Court, in its resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion, to reinstate the petition and to require respondents to comment thereon. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment, dated 15 September 1994, sided with petitioner and suggested that the CSC be given an opportunity to submit its own comment. CSC did in due time. This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind of prejudicial issue. In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its chairman, had earlier "concurred." 9 Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990. WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No. 94-1276 is SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to respondent Civil Service Commission for the resolution, sans the participation of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, of herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 93-1189. No costs. SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION v.OFFICEOF THEPRESIDENT,GARMENTS&TEXTILEEXPORTBOARD & GLORIOUSSUN FASHION GARMENTSMANUFACTURINGCO.(PHILS.),INC. 187SCRA409 GUTIERREZ,JR.; May23,1991 Nature:Appeal
Facts: -GLORIOUSwasfoundguiltyofdollar-saltingandmisdeclarationofimportationsbytheGTEBand,asaresultof which,theexportquotasallocatedtoitwerecancelled.SoonaftertherenditionoftheGTEBdecision,GLORIOUS filedapetitionfor certiorariandprohibition with the Court,contendingthatitsright todueprocessoflawwas violated, and that theGTEBdecisionwas not supportedbysubstantialevidence. -GivingcredencetotheallegationsofrespondentGLORIOUS,theCourtissuedaresolution orderingGTEBto conduct furtherproceedings intheadministrative caseagainstrespondentGLORIOUS. -However, GLORIOUS filedamanifestationofits intentiontowithdraw thepetitionwhichtheCourtgranted -GLORIOUS filedanothermotiontodismiss withprejudice, whichwasdulynotedbytheCourt inaresolution. -Morethan2yearslater,GLORIOUSfiledwiththeGTEBapetitionfortherestitutionofitsexportquotaallocation andrequestedforareconsiderationoftheGTEBdecisiondatedApril27, 1984. -GLORIOUSagainalleged that thechargesagainstit werenot supportedbyevidence. -Moreover,italleged that the GTEB decision canceling itsexportquotas wasrendered asa resultofduress,threats, intimidationandundueinfluenceexercisedbyformerMinisterRobertoV.Ongpinin ordertotransferGLORIOUS' exportquotasto"Marcos crony-owned" corporationsDeSoleilApparel ManufacturingCorporation[DSA]andAIFC. -GLORIOUS furtheralleged thatit was coercedby Mr.RobertoOngpin to withdrawitspetitionandtoenterintojoint ventureagreementspavingthewayforthecreationofDSAandpetitionerAIFCwhichwere allowed toservice GLORIOUS'exportquotasandtouseitsplant facilities, machineries andequipment. -GTEBdeniedthepetitionofGLORIOUS.Anappeal was thentakentotheOfficeof thePresident. -Atthispoint,AIFCsoughttointerveneintheproceedingsandfileditsoppositiontoGLORIOUS'appealclaiming thattheGTEBdecisionhaslongbecome final,andthata favorableactionon theappeal wouldresult inthe forfeiture oftheexportquotas whichwerelegallyallocatedtoit. -The Office of the Presidentruled in favor ofGLORIOUS, finding the proceedingsbefore the GTEB in1984irregular, andremandedthecasetoGTEBforfurtherproceedings. -TheMR of AIFC was subsequentlydenied. Issues: 1. WONtheOFFICEOF THEPRESIDENTCOMMITTED GRAVEABUSEOF DISCRETION and 2.WONthefinaljudgmentconstitutesresjudicataonthegroundthatthefinaljudgmentinwasajudgmentonthe merits. Held: 1. NO.InfindingthatGTEBproceedingswereirregular,theOPdidntcommitGADasGTEBindeedviolatedthe righttodueprocessofGlorious.GTEBfailedtodiscloseevidenceusedbyitin renderingtheresolutionagainst GloriousSun.Thedecisionpennedby DeputyExecutiveSecretaryMagdangalB.Elmaand theresolutionpennedby ActingDeputyExecutiveSecretaryMariano SarmientoIIarenottaintedintheslightestbyanygraveabuseof discretion.Theyoutlineindetailwhytheprivaterespondentwasdenieddueprocesswhenitsexportquotaswere cancelledbyGTEBThefindings aresupportedbytherecords. RATIO:Evidence on record mustbefully disclosed to theparties. 2.NO.-Thedismissalofthefirstpetitionwasclearlybasedonatechnicalmatterratherthanonthemeritsofthe petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot, under the circumstances, constituteresjudicata. Reasoning: -Forajudgment tobeabartoasubsequentcase,the followingrequisites must concur: ...(1)itmustbeafinaljudgment;(2)thecourtwhichresolvedithadjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandthe parties;(3)itmustbeajudgmentonthemerits;and(4)theremustbeidentitybetweenthetwocases,astothe parties, subject

matterandcauseof action. -Thewell-entrenchedprincipleisthat"ajudgmentonthemeritsisonerenderedafteradetermination ofwhichparty isright,asdistinguishedfromajudgmentrendereduponpreliminaryorfinalormerelytechnicalpoint."(Deangv. IAC). -TheprotestationofGloriousSunofnon-disclosureofevidencehadbeeneffectively remediedby thesubsequent accommodationbytheGTEBof itsrequest forcopiesof therelevantdocuments. -ThepetitionerclaimsthatthesubsequentdisclosureofthedocumentsbyGTEBtoGloriousSunin1987curedthe defectofnon-disclosureofevidencein1984undertheconstitutionalprovisionofdue processenunciatedinthe landmark caseof AngTibayv.CIR andothersubsequentcases. -Thedocumentsusedby theGTEBinits1984decisionandreferred toin the1987decisionasbeing"intact"relates towhattheGTEBlabeledasDocumentsusedbyGTEBand"AdditionalDocuments"which,asearlierdiscussed, wereeithernot disclosedtoAppellant forbeingprivilegedorunmarkedasexhibitsornot presentedinevidence. -Atany rate,the conclusionsofGTEBasto theexcessivenessofAppellant'simportpricesdrewa controvertingstatement fromits own RawMaterialsImportationRegulationDivision, -Findingsofadministrativeagenciesareaccordedrespectand finality,andgenerally shouldnotbedisturbedbythe courts. This generalrule,however,isnot withoutexceptions. -Asrecentlyreiterated,itisjurisprudentiallysettledthatabsentaclear,manifestandgraveabuse ofdiscretion amounttowantofjurisdiction,thefindingsoftheadministrativeagencyonmattersfallingwithinitscompetencewill notbedisturbedbythe courts. - Specificallywithrespecttofactualfindings,theyareaccordedrespect,ifnotfinality,becauseof thespecial knowledgeandexpertisegainedbythesetribunalsfromhandlingthespecific matters fallingundertheirjurisdiction. -Suchfactualfindingsmaybedisregardedonlyifthey"arenotsupportedbyevidence;wherethe findingsare initiatedbyfraud,impositionorcollussion;where theprocedureswhichlead tothe factual findingsareirregular;when palpableerrorsarecommitted;orwhengraveabuseofdiscretionarbitrarinesorcapriciousnessismanifest."(Mapav.Arroyo, 175SCRA76[1989]) -In the caseatbar,thepetitioner wasnevergiven the chance topresentitssidebeforeitsexport quotaallocations wererevokedanditsofficerssuspended.Whileitistruethatsuchallocationsasalleged bytheBoardaremere privilegeswhichitcanrevokeandcancelasitmaydeemfit,theseprivilegeshavebeenaccorded topetitionerfor so long that theyhavebecomeimpressedwithpropertyrightsespeciallysincenotonlydo theseprivilegesdeterminethe continuedexistenceofthepetitionerwithassetsofoverP80,000,000.00butalsothelivelihoodofsome700workers whoareemployedbythepetitionerandtheirfamilies. -Finally,AmericanInter-Fashionishardly theproperparty toquestion theMalacaangdecision.Itwasincorporated aftertheincidentsinthiscasehappened.Itwascreatedobviouslytobetherecipientof exportquotasarbitrarily removedfromtherightfulowner.Itwassequesteredprecisely becauseoftheallegationthatitisacrony corporation whichprofitedfromanactofinjusticeinflictedonanotherprivatecorporation. Dispositive:MFRisGRANTED.TheinstantpetitionisDISMISSED.Thequestiondecisionand resolutionofthe Officeof thePresidentareherebyAFFIRMED. SeparateOpinion FELICIANO-concurring: IconcurintheresultreachedbytheCourt,thatis,thatpetitionerAmericanInter-fashionCorporationhasfailedto showanygraveabuseofdiscretionoractwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofthepublicrespondent thePresidentinrenderingits decisioninOPCaseNo.3781dated7September1989.

Officeof

CASE DIGEST

PEFIANCO V. MORAL 322 SCRA 439; BELLOSILLO; Jan 19, 2000

NATURE Petition for review of decision of CA

FACTS - Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision. - Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents. - DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. - Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied. - Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. - Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. CA sustained TC. - Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco.

ISSUES 1. WON the order of the TC is proper 2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report

HELD 1. NO. - Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. - The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied.

- Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified. 2. NO. - Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. - In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. - Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final. - Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. - More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. Disposition Petition is granted.

CASE DIGEST

NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE G.R. No. 129914; PARDO; May 12, 2000

NATURE Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS - A newspaper published an article saying that Bernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service. - President Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. The Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director General, who ordered the Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges. - Respondent was informed of the article and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit. - Respondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against him were either dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of 7 treasury warrants. CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted to the Chief, PNP, a memorandum confirming respondents allegations. - By command of the Police Deputy Director General, respondent was suspended from the police service for 90 days. Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within 5 days from receipt of the complaint. - Respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars. - The CICS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applicable to administrative proceedings; hence, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer. - The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a resolution recommending for respondent's dismissal from the PNP service. The PNP Inspector General concurred with the recommendation of the Summary Dismissal Officer. - The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service because of heading a payroll syndicate, unexplained assets or wealth, and falsification of public documents (falsified his transcript of records with PUP) - Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, which sustained the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP. - Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975.

- After due proceedings, the CA promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due process requirement of the Constitution.

ISSUE WON the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission, on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed against him

HELD YES, the requirements of due process were sufficiently complied with. Ratio Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Reasoning - Record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process. Disposition Petition GRANTED.

CASE DIGEST

MONTEMAYOR V BUNDALIAN GR No. 149335 PUNO; July 1, 2003

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS - An unverified letter-complaint, was received from LUIS BUNDALIAN by the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California. It accused EDILLO MONTEMAYOR, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth. Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot in California, making a down payment of US$100,000. His in-laws in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property. It accused Montemayor of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects. - Montemayor submitted his counter-affidavit before the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) alleging that the real owner of the property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. They were advised by an immigration lawyer (they wanted to emigrate) that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the US. He claimed that Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of Montemayor and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. He also attached a Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence. - While Montemayor participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents, Bundalian could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. PCAGC repeatedly required Montemayor to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (he did not file his SALN from 1992-1994), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. He ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. - The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, ordered Montemayors dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. His MFR was denied and his app eal to the CA was dismissed.

ISSUES 1. WON Montemayor was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC

HELD

1. NO. Ratio The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Reasoning The PCAGC exerted efforts to notify Bundalian of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. Be that as it may, Montemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. He voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of the Administrative Order issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the CA. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. - The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant did not divest the PCAGC of its authority. Under Section 3 of EO 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. It is not uncommon that a government agency is given wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service. - In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

FULL CASE

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003] EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.
DECISION PUNO, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioners dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth. Petitioners dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that petitioners in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects. Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents: a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the subject property to petitioner and his wife; b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing petitioners sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents and requirements to complete the purchase of the subject property; and, c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled Beatwatch, where it was reported that a low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the U.S. with his family, purchased an expensive house in California, appointed a woman through an SPA to manage the subject property and had hidden and unexplained wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S. Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)1[1] for investigation. Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable condition of government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the U.S. about their possible emigration to the States.

They were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her mortgage contract. Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman.2[2] He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report3[3] of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence. From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. He likewise adduced in evidence the checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California. When the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with copies of petitioners SALN from 1992-1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years. After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following findings: Petitioner purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange rate prevailing in 1993). The sale was evidenced by a Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise found petitioners explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioners counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. It also took against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR despite the undertaking made by his counsel which raised the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioners dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,4[4] ordering petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed.5[5]

Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and, third, whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic. On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein. We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.6[6] In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located.7[7] Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.8[8] Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the nonappearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service. It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.9[9] This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.

On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.10[10] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.11[11] Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.12[12] In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. First, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the alleged internal arrangement petitioner entered into with Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the investigating body nor did she testify before it regarding her ownership of the Burbank property. Second, the checks allegedly issued by Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have no evidentiary weight as Fajardos mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioners non-ownership of the property. Fajardo would naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the latter would naturally course through her the payments for the Burbank property. Third, petitioners own evidence contradict his position. We cannot reconcile petitioners denial of ownership of the property with the loan statement13[13] he adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property. Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed14[14] donating the Burbank property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the property. It is obvious that the Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after a complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the record. Petitioners evidence failed to clarify the issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions.

Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence and due execution of the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of the Burbank property. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove nonownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC. Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.15[15] Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners dismissal from service as the complaint and its supporting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the government service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to reveal. His liability was proved by substantial evidence. CASE DIGEST

SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC 419 SCRA 354 (Sarah)

AUTENCIO V MANARA 449 SCRA 46 PANGANIBAN; January 19, 2005

NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45

FACTS - Manara lodged a complaint against Autencio for dishonesty and misconduct in office. - after hearing, the Office for Legal Services of the City of Cotobato declared Autencio guilty of misconudct in office for allowing irregularities to happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals.

- petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which modified the decision to grave misconduct, and imposed the penalty of dismissal for cause with all its accessories - petitioner, in her motion for reconsideration, alleged that she had waived her right to present her evidence at a formal hearing to submit the case for resolution, only because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that she could be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence. - petitioner elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the CSC resolutions; CA denied reconsideration. ISSUE/S 1. WON petitioner was deprived of substantial due process because she was made to believe that she would be liable for the lesser offense of simple negligence.

HELD 1. NO Reasoning On the formal charge against her, petitioner had received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted Affidavits of personnel in the Assessors Office to support her claim of innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal officer, during which she -- assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured. Settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. It is not the task of this Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. In any event, the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge prepared against her are supported by substantial evidence. Disposition Petition is denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed.

CASE DIGEST GOSS V LOPEZ 419 U.S. 565 WHITE; January 22, 1975

FACTS: -for various reasons, 9 high school students were suspended by their respective school administrators. They mostly participated in demonstrations in their schools. Due to this, school administrators suspended them for ten days. -Ohio law provides for free education to all children between the ages of six and 21. Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he must notify the student's parents within 24 hours and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is expelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision to the Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be permitted to be heard at the board meeting. No such procedure is available for cases of suspension. -The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that he or she had been suspended from public high school in Columbus for up to 10 days without a hearing pursuant to 3313.66, filed an action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 against the Columbus Board of Education and various administrators of the CPSS. The complaint sought a declaration that 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it permitted public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of any kind, in violation of the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth

Amendment. It also sought to enjoin the public school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to 3313.66 and to require them to remove references to the past suspensions from the records of the students in question.

ISSUE WON the Ohio Law is unconstitutional

HELD: YES. -It is true that 3313.66 of the Code permits school principals to suspend students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. All of the schools had their own rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension. -Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system, it has nevertheless done so and has required its children to attend. Those young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. . "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted." - Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education protected by the Due Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss." The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is therefore of no relevance. -in determining WON due process is applicable, the weight of the deprivation is not the determinative factor but that of the nature of the interest at stake. A 10 day educational suspension bears a lot of consequences for students. -when it is determined that due process is applicable, what has to be known then is what process should be due. -in this case, to impose a standard process for suspension of 10 days might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process. -The Court held that a standard should be available only in cases exceeding 10 days.

Dissenting, Powell - The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality of education. Moreover, to the extent that there may be some arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify imposition of a constitutional rule...

CASE DIGEST

MATTHEWS V. ELDRIDGE 424 U.S. 319 POWELL: 1976

FACTS: - Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. - Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical sources, including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After considering these reports and other information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition. - In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough evidence to establish his disability. [n2] The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. This determination was accepted by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate after that month. The notification also advised him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months. - Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing on the issue of his disability.

- The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available remedies. In support of his contention that due process requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, which established a right to an "evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare benefits. The Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. - The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural due process.

ISSUE: WON the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.

HELD: NO, the present procedure in claiming benefits under the Social Security is sufficient to meet the due process requirement Reasoning - The specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. - Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence: "The crucial factor in this context a factor not present in the case of . . . virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." - Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or support from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members, workmen's compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other important programs, both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force . . . ." As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decision-making process. The potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in substantial gainful activity."