CHAPTER 6 HAZARD, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK ANALYSIS

This chapter describes how preimpact conditions act together with event-specific conditions to produce a disasters physical and social impacts. These disaster impacts can be reduced by emergency management interventions. In addition, this chapter discusses how emergency managers can assess the preimpact conditions that produce disaster vulnerability within their communities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of vulnerability dynamics and methods for disseminating hazard/vulnerability data. Introduction A disaster occurs when an e treme event e ceeds a communitys ability to cope with that event. !nderstanding the process by which natural disasters produce community impacts is important for four reasons. "irst, information from this process is needed to identify the preimpact conditions that ma#e communities vulnerable to disaster impacts. $econd, information about the disaster impact process can be used to identify specific segments of each community that will be affected disproportionately %e.g., low income households, ethnic minorities, or specific types of businesses&. Third, information about the disaster impact process can be used to identify the event-specific conditions that determine the level of disaster impact. "ourth, an understanding of disaster impact process allows planners to identify suitable emergency management interventions. The process by which disasters produce community impacts can be e plained in terms of models proposed by 'utter %())*& and +indell and ,rater %-../&. $pecifically, "igure *-( indicates the effects of a disaster are determined by three preimpact conditions0hazard e posure, physical vulnerability, and social vulnerability. There also are three event-specific conditions, hazard event characteristics, improvised disaster responses, and improvised disaster recovery. Two of the event-specific conditions, hazard event characteristics and improvised disaster responses, combine with the preimpact conditions to produce a disasters physical impacts. The physical impacts, in turn, combine with improvised disaster recovery to produce the disasters social impacts. 'ommunities can engage in three types of emergency management interventions to ameliorate disaster impacts. ,hysical impacts can be reduced by hazard mitigation practices and emergency preparedness practices, whereas social impacts can be reduced by recovery preparedness practices. The following sections describe the components of the model in greater detail. $pecifically, the ne t section will describe the three preimpact conditions0hazard e posure, physical vulnerability, and social vulnerability. This section will be followed by sections discussing hazard event characteristics and improvised disaster responses. The fourth section will discuss disasters physical impacts, social impacts, and improvised disaster recovery. The last section will discuss three types of strategic interventions, hazard mitigation practices, emergency preparedness practices, and recovery preparedness practices. Preim !ct Condition" Hazard Exposure 1azard e posure arises from peoples occupancy of geographical areas where they could be affected by specific types of events that threaten their lives or property. "or natural hazards, this e posure is caused by living in geographical areas as specific as floodplains that sometimes e tend only a few feet beyond the floodway or as broad as the 2reat ,lains of the 3idwest where tornadoes can stri#e anywhere over an area of hundreds of thousands of s4uare miles. "or technological hazards, e posure can arise if people move into areas where they could be e posed to e plosions or hazardous materials releases. In principle, hazard e posure can be measured by the probability of occurrence of a given event magnitude,

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but these e ceedance probabilities can be difficult to obtain for hazards about which the historical data are insufficient to reliably estimate the probability of very unusual events. "or e ample, many areas of the !$ have meteorological and hydrological data that are limited to the past (.. years, so the estimation of e treme floods re4uires e trapolation from a limited data series. 3oreover, urbanization of the watersheds causes the boundaries of the (..-year floodplains to change in ways that may be difficult for local emergency managers to anticipate. 6ven more difficult to estimate are the probabilities of events, such as chemical and nuclear reactor accidents, for which data are limited because each facility is essentially uni4ue. In such cases, techni4ues of probabilistic safety analysis are used to model these systems, attach probabilities to the failure of system components, and synthesize probabilities of overall system failure by mathematically combining the probabilities of individual component failure. #i$ure 6%&' 7isaster Impact 3odel.
Pre"impact conditions Emergency management interventions

Ha ard e#posure

Ha ard mitigation practices

Emergency preparedness practices

!ecovery preparedness practices

P%ysical vulnera$ility

P%ysical impacts

Social impacts

Social vulnera$ility

Ha ard event c%aracteristics

&mprovised disaster response

&mprovised disaster recovery

Event"specific conditions Source: Adapted from Lindell and Prater (2003)

The greatest difficulties are encountered in attempting to estimate the probabilities of social hazards such as terrorist attac#s because the occurrence of these events is defined by social system dynamics that cannot presently be modeled in the same way as physical systems. That is, the elements of social systems are difficult to define and measure. 3oreover, the interactions of the system elements have multiple determinants and involve comple lag and feedbac# effects that are not well understood, let alone precisely measured. Indeed, there are significant social and political constraints that limit the collection of data on individuals and groups. These constraints further inhibit the ability of scientists to ma#e specific predictions of social system behavior. Physical Vulnerability Human vulnerability. 1umans are vulnerable to environmental e tremes of temperature, pressure, and chemical e posures that can cause death, in8ury, and illness. "or any hazard agent0water, wind, ionizing radiation, to ic chemicals, infectious agents0there often is variability in the physiological

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response of the affected population. That is, given the same level of e posure, some people will die, others will be severely in8ured, still others slightly in8ured, and the rest will survive unscathed. Typically, the most susceptible to any environmental stressor will be the very young, the very old, and those with wea#ened immune systems. Agricultural vulnerability. +i#e humans, agricultural plants and animals are also vulnerable to environmental e tremes of temperature, pressure, chemicals, radiation, and infectious agents. +i#e humans, there are differences among individuals within each plant and animal population. 1owever, agricultural vulnerability is more comple than human vulnerability because there is a greater number of species to be assessed, each of which has its own characteristic response to each environmental stressor. Structural vulnerability. $tructural vulnerability arises when buildings are constructed using designs and materials that are incapable of resisting e treme stresses %e.g., high wind, hydraulic pressures of water, seismic sha#ing& or that allow hazardous materials to infiltrate into the building. The construction of most buildings is governed by building codes intended to protect the life safety of building occupants from structural collapse0primarily from the dead load of the building material themselves and the live load of the occupants and furnishings0 but do not necessarily provide protection from e treme wind, seismic, or hydraulic loads. :or do they provide an impermeable barrier to the infiltration of to ic air pollutants. Social Vulnerability The social vulnerability perspective %e.g., 'annon, Twigg ; <owell, -../= 'utter, >oruff ; $hirley, -../& represents an important e tension of previous theories of hazard vulnerability %>urton, et al., ()?@&. As a concept, social vulnerability has been defined in terms of peoples Acapacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of a natural hazardB %Cisner, >la#ie, 'anon ; 7avis, -..9, p. ((&. Chereas peoples physical vulnerability refers to their susceptibility to biological changes %i.e., impacts on anatomical structures and physiological functioning&, their social vulnerability refers to their susceptibility to behavioral changes. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these consist of psychological, demographic, economic, and political impacts. The central point of the social vulnerability perspective is that, 8ust as peoples occupancy of hazard prone areas and the physical vulnerability of the structures in which they live and wor# are not randomly distributed, neither is social vulnerability randomly distributed0either geographically or demographically. Thus, 8ust as variations in structural vulnerability can increase or decrease the effect of hazard e posure on physical impacts %property damage and casualties&, so too can variations in social vulnerability. $ocial vulnerability varies across communities and also across households within communities. It is the variability in vulnerability that is li#ely to be of greatest concern to local emergency managers because it re4uires that they identify the areas within their communities having population segments with the highest levels of social vulnerability. E(ent%S eci)ic Condition" Hazard Event Characteristics 1azard impacts often are difficult to characterize because a given hazard agent may initiate a number of different threats. "or e ample, tropical cyclones %also #nown as hurricanes or typhoons& can cause casualties and damage through wind, rain, storm surge, and inland flooding %>ryant, ())(&. Dolcanoes can impact human settlements through ash fall, e plosive eruptions, lava flows, mudflows and floods, and forest fires %,erry ; +indell, ()).= $aarinen ; $ell, ()@5= Carric#, et al., ()@(&. 1owever,

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once these distinct threats have been distinguished from each other, each can be characterized in terms of si significant characteristics. These are the speed of onset, availability of perceptual cues %such as wind, rain, or ground movement&, the intensity, scope, and duration of impact, and the probability of occurrence. The speed of onset and availability of perceptual cues affect the amount of forewarning that affected populations will have to complete emergency response actions %2runtfest, et al., ()?@= +indell, ())9c&. In turn, these attributes determine the e tent of casualties among the population and the degree of damage to structures in the affected area. A hazards impact intensity can generally be defined in terms of the physical materials involved and the energy these materials impart. The physical materials involved in disasters differ in terms of their physical state0gas %or vapor&, li4uid, or solid %or particulate&. In most cases, the hazard from a gas arises from its temperature or pressure. 6 amples include hurricane or tornado wind %recall that the atmosphere is a mi ture of gases&, which is hazardous because of overpressures that can inflict traumatic in8uries directly on people. 1igh wind also is hazardous because it can destroy structures and accelerate debris that can itself cause traumatic in8uries. Alternatively, the hazard from a gas might arise from its to icity, as is the case in some volcanic eruptions. +i4uids also can be hazardous because of their to icity, but the most common li4uid hazard is water. It is hazardous to structures because of the pressure it can e ert and is hazardous to living things when it fills the lungs and prevents respiration. +ava is solid roc# that has been li4uefied by e treme heat and therefore is hazardous to people and structures because of its thermal energy. $olids also can be hazardous if they ta#e the form of particulates such as airborne volcanic ash or floodborne mud. These are particularly significant because they can leave deposits that have impacts of long duration. The scope of impact defines the number of affected social units %e.g., individuals, households, and businesses&. The probability of occurrence %per unit of time& is another important characteristic that affects disaster impacts indirectly because more probable hazards are li#ely to mobilize communities to engage in hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness measures to reduce their vulnerability %,rater ; +indell, -...&. Improvised isaster !esponse 7isaster myths commonly portray disaster victims as dazed, panic#ed, or disorganized but, as will be discussed at greater length in 'hapter @, people actually respond in a generally adaptive manner when disasters stri#e. Adaptive response is often delayed because normalcy bias delays peoples realization that an improbable event is, in fact, occurring to them. "urther delays occur because people have limited information about the situation and, therefore, see# confirmation of any initial indications of an emergency before initiating protective action. In addition, the vast ma8ority of people respond in terms of their customary social units0especially their households and neighborhoods0which usually consumes time in developing social organizations that can cope with the disasters demands. 'ontrary to stereotypes of individual selfishness, disaster victims often devote considerable effort to protecting others persons and property. Accordingly, there is considerable convergence on the disaster impact area, as those in areas nearby move in to offer assistance. Chen e isting organizations seem incapable of meeting the needs of the emergency response, they e pand to ta#e on new members, e tend to ta#e on new tas#s, or new organizations emerge %7ynes, ()?.&. Improvised isaster !ecovery Ence the situation has stabilized to the point that the imminent threat to life and property has abated, disaster-stric#en communities must begin the long process of disaster recovery. Immediate tas#s (5*

in this process include damage assessment, debris clearance, reconstruction of infrastructure %electric power, fuel, water, wastewater, telecommunications, and transportation networ#s&, and reconstruction of buildings in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. Improvised disaster assistance is derived primarily from resources provided by individuals and organizations within the community. The victims themselves might have financial %e.g., savings and insurance& as well as tangible assets %e.g., property& that are undamaged by hazard impact. As one might e pect, low-income victims tend to have lower levels of savings, but they also are more li#ely to be victims of insurance redlining and, thus, have been forced into contracts with insurance companies that go ban#rupt after the disaster. Thus, even those who plan ahead for disaster recovery can find themselves without the financial resources they need %,eacoc# ; 2irard, ())?&. Alternatively, victims can promote their recovery by bringing in additional funds through overtime employment or by freeing up the needed funds by reducing their consumption below preimpact levels. "riends, relatives, neighbors, and cowor#ers can assist recovery through financial and in-#ind contributions, as can community based organizations %'>Es& and local government. In addition, the latter also can provide assistance by means of ta deductions or deferrals. Di"!"ter Im !ct" As noted earlier, disaster impacts comprise physical and social impact. The physical impacts of disasters include casualties %deaths and in8uries& and property damage, and both vary substantially across hazard agents. The physical impacts of a disaster are usually the most obvious, easily measured, and first reported by the news media. $ocial impacts, which include psychosocial, demographic, economic, and political impacts, can develop over a long period of time and can be difficult to assess when they occur. 7espite the difficulty in measuring these social impacts, it is nonetheless important to monitor them, and even to predict them if possible, because they can cause significant problems for the long-term functioning of specific types of households and businesses in an affected community. A better understanding of disasters social impacts can provide a basis for preimpact prediction and the development of contingency plans to prevent adverse conse4uences from occurring. Physical Impacts Casualties. According to :o8i %())?b&, hurricanes produced (* of the *5 greatest disasters of the th -. 'entury %in terms of deaths& and the greatest number of deaths from ()9?-()@. %9)),...&. 6arth4ua#es produced -@ of the greatest disasters and 95.,... deaths, whereas floods produced four of the greatest disasters and ()9,... deaths. Ether significant natural disasters include volcanic eruptions with nine of the greatest disasters and ),... deaths, landslides with four of the greatest disasters and 5,... deaths, and tsunamis with three of the greatest disasters and 5,... deaths. There is significant variation by country, with developing countries in Asia, Africa, and $outh America accounting for the top -. positions in terms of number of deaths from ()**-()).. +ow-income countries suffer appro imately /,... deaths per disaster, whereas the corresponding figure for high-income countries is appro imately 5.. deaths per disaster. 3oreover, these disparities appear to be increasing because the average annual death toll in developed countries declined by at least ?5F between ()*. and ())., but the same time period saw increases of over 9..F in developing countries %>er#e, ())5&. There often are difficulties in determining how many of the deaths and in8uries are Acaused byB a disaster. In some cases it is impossible to determine how many persons are missing and, if so, whether this is due to death or unrecorded relocation. The size of the error in estimates of disaster death tolls can be seen in the fact that for many of the most catastrophic events the number of deaths is rounded to the

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nearest thousand and some even are rounded to the nearest ten thousand %:o8i, ())?b&. 6stimates of in8uries are similarly problematic %see +angness, ())9= ,ee#-Asa, et al., ())@= $hoaf, et al., ())@, regarding conflicting estimates of deaths and in8uries attributable to the :orthridge earth4ua#e&. 6ven when bodies can be counted, there are problems because disaster impact may be only a contributing factor to casualties with pre-e isting health conditions. 3oreover, some casualties are indirect conse4uences of the hazard agent as, for e ample, with casualties caused by structural fires following earth4ua#es %e.g., burns& and destruction of infrastructure %e.g., illnesses from contaminated water supplies&. amage. +osses of structures, animals, and crops also are important measures of physical impacts, and these are rising e ponentially in the !nited $tates %3ileti, ()))&. 1owever, the rate of increase is even greater in developing countries such as India and Genya %>er#e, ())5&. $uch losses usually result from physical damage or destruction of property, but they also can be caused by losses of land use to chemical or radiological contamination or loss of the land itself to subsidence or erosion. 7amage to the built environment can be classified broadly as affecting residential, commercial, industrial, infrastructure, or community services sectors. 3oreover, damage within each of these sectors can be divided into damage to structures and damage to contents. It usually is the case that damage to contents results from collapsing structures %e.g., hurricane winds failing the building envelope and allowing rain to destroy the furniture inside the building&. >ecause collapsing buildings are a ma8or cause of casualties as well, this suggests that strengthening the structure will protect the contents and occupants. 1owever, some hazard agents can damage building contents without affecting the structure itself %e.g., earth4ua#es stri#ing seismically-resistant buildings whose contents are not securely fastened&. Thus, ris# area residents may need to adopt additional hazard ad8ustments to protect contents and occupants even if they already have structural protection. ,erhaps the most significant structural impact of a disaster on a stric#en community is the destruction of households dwellings. $uch an event initiates what can be a very long process of disaster recovery for some population segments. According to Huarantelli %()@-a&, people typically pass through four stages of housing recovery following a disaster. The first stage is emergency shelter, which consists of unplanned and spontaneously sought locations that are intended only to provide protection from the elements, typically open yards and cars after earth4ua#es %>olin ; $tanford, ())(, ())@&. The ne t step is temporary shelter, which includes food preparation and sleeping facilities that usually are sought from friends and relatives or are found in commercial lodging, although Amass careB facilities in school gymnasiums or church auditoriums are acceptable as a last resort. The third step is temporary housing, which allows victims to re-establish household routines in nonpreferred locations or structures. The last step is permanent housing, which re-establishes household routines in preferred locations and structures. 1ouseholds vary in the progression and duration of each type of housing and the transition from one stage to another can be delayed unpredictably, as when it too# nine days for shelter occupancy to pea# after the Chittier :arrows earth4ua#e %>olin, ())/&. ,articularly significant are the problems faced by lower income households, which tend to be headed disproportionately by females and racial/ethnic minorities. $uch households are more li#ely to e perience destruction of their homes because of preimpact locational vulnerability. This is especially true in developing countries such as 2uatemala %,eacoc#, Gillian ; >ates, ()@?&, but also has been reported in the !$ %,eacoc# ; 2irard, ())?&. The homes of these households also are more li#ely to be destroyed because the structures were built according to older, less stringent building codes, used lower 4uality construction materials and methods, and were less well maintained %>olin ; >olton, ()@*&. >ecause lower income households have fewer (5@

resources on which to draw for recovery, they also ta#e longer to transition through the stages of housing, sometimes remaining for e tended periods of time in severely damaged homes %2irard ; ,eacoc#, ())?&. In other cases, they are forced to accept as permanent what originally was intended as temporary housing %,eacoc#, et al., ()@?&. 'onse4uently, there may still be low-income households in temporary sheltering and temporary housing even after high-income households all have relocated to permanent housing %>er#e, et al., ())/= <ubin, $apperstein ; >arbee, ()@5&. As is the case with estimates of casualties, estimates of losses to the built environment are prone to error. 7amage estimates are most accurate when trained damage assessors enter each building to assess the percent of damage to each of the ma8or structural systems %e.g., roof, walls, floors& and the percentage reduction in mar#et valuation due to the damage. 6arly appro imate estimates are obtained by conducting Awindshield surveysB in which trained damage assessors drive through the impact area and estimate the e tent of damage that is visible from the street, or by conducting computer analyses using 1AI!$ %:ational Institute of >uilding $ciences, ())@&. These early appro imate estimates are especially important in ma8or disasters because detailed assessments are not needed in the early stages of disaster recovery and the time re4uired to conduct them on a large number of damaged structures using a limited number of 4ualified inspectors would unnecessarily delay the community recovery process. Ether important physical impacts include damage or contamination to cropland, rangeland, and woodlands. $uch impacts may be well understood for some hazard agents but not others. "or e ample, ashfall from the ()@. 3t. $t. 1elens eruption was initially e pected to devastate crops and livestoc# in downwind areas, but no significant losses materialized %Carric#, et al., ()@(&. There also is concern about damage or contamination to the natural environment %wild lands& because these areas serve valuable functions such as damping the e tremes of river discharge and providing habitat for wildlife. In part, concern arises from the potential for indirect conse4uences such as increased runoff and silting of downstream river beds, but many people also are concerned about the natural environment simply because they value it for its own sa#e. Social Impacts "or many years, research on the social impacts of disasters consisted of an accumulation of case studies, but two research teams conducted comprehensive statistical analyses of e tensive databases to assess the long-term effects of disasters on stric#en communities %"riesma, et al., ()?)= Cright, et al., ()?)&. The more comprehensive Cright, et al. %()?)& study used census data from the ()*. %preimpact& and ()?. %post-impact& censuses to assess the effects of all recorded disasters in the !nited $tates. The authors concurred with earlier findings by "riesma, et al. %()?)& in concluding no long-term social impact of disasters could be detected at the community level. In discussing their findings, the authors ac#nowledged their results were dominated by the types of disasters occurring most fre4uently in the !nited $tates0tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes. 3oreover, most of the disasters they studied had a relatively small scope of impact and thus caused only minimal disruption to their communities even in the short term. "inally, they noted their findings did not preclude the possibility of significant long-term impacts upon lower levels such as the neighborhood, business, and household. :onetheless, their findings called attention to the importance of the impact ratio0the amount of damage divided by the amount of community resources0in understanding disaster impacts. They hypothesized long-term social impacts tend to be minimal in the !$ because most hazard agents have a relatively small scope of impact and tend to stri#e undeveloped areas more fre4uently than intensely developed areas simply because there are more of the former than the latter. Thus, the numerator of the (5)

impact ratio tends to be low and local resources are sufficient to prevent long-term effects from occurring. 6ven when a disaster has a large scope of impact and stri#es a large developed area %causing a large impact ratio in the short term&, state and federal agencies and :2Es %e.g., American <ed 'ross& direct recovery resources to the affected area, thus preventing long-term impacts from occurring. "or e ample, 1urricane Andrew inflicted J-*.5 billion in losses to the 3iami area, but this was only ..9F of the !$ 27, %'harvKriat, -...&. <ecovery problems described in the studies reported in ,eacoc#, 3orrow and 2ladwin %())?& were determined more by organizational impediments than by the lac# of resources. Psychosocial impacts. <esearch reviews conducted over a period of -5 years have concluded that disasters can cause a wide range of negative psychological responses %>olin ()@5= 2errity ; "lynn, ())?= 1outs, 'leary ; 1u, ()@@= ,erry ; +indell, ()?@&. These include psychophysiological effects such as fatigue, gastrointestinal upset, and tics, as well as cognitive signs such as confusion, impaired concentration, and attention deficits. ,sychological impacts include emotional signs such as an iety, depression, and grief. They also include behavioral effects such as sleep and appetite changes, ritualistic behavior, and substance abuse. In most cases, the observed effects are mild and transitory0the result of Anormal people, responding normally, to a very abnormal situationB %2errity ; "lynn ())?, p. (.@&. "ew disaster victims re4uire psychiatric diagnosis and most benefit more from a crisis counseling orientation than from a mental health treatment orientation, especially if their normal social support networ#s of friends, relatives, neighbors, and cowor#ers remain largely intact. 1owever, there are population segments re4uiring special attention and active outreach. These include children, frail elderly, people with pre-e isting mental illness, racial and ethnic minorities, and families of those who have died in the disaster. 6mergency wor#ers also need attention because they often wor# long hours without rest, have witnessed horrific sights, and are members of organizations in which discussion of emotional issues may be regarded as a sign of wea#ness %<ubin, ())(&. 1owever, as 'hapter (( will indicate, there is little evidence of emergency wor#ers needing directive therapies either. The negative psychological impacts described above, which +azarus and "ol#man %()@9& call emotion "ocused coping, generally disrupt the social functioning of only a very small portion of the victim population. Instead, the ma8ority of disaster victims engage in adaptive problem "ocused coping activities to save their own lives and those of their closest associates. "urther, there is an increased incidence in prosocial behaviors such as donating material aid and a decreased incidence of antisocial behaviors such as crime %7rabe#, ()@*= 3ileti, et al., ()?5= $iegel, et al., ()))&. In some cases, people even engage in altruistic behaviors that ris# their own lives to save the lives of others %Tierney, et al., -..(&. There also are psychological impacts with long-term adaptive conse4uences, such as changes in ris# perception %beliefs in the li#elihood of the occurrence a disaster and its personal conse4uences for the individual& and increased hazard intrusiveness %fre4uency of thought and discussion about a hazard&. In turn, these beliefs can affect ris# area residents adoption of household hazard ad8ustments that reduce their vulnerability to future disasters. 1owever, these cognitive impacts of disaster e perience do not appear to be large in aggregate, resulting in modest effects on household hazard ad8ustment %see +indell ; ,erry, -... for a review of the literature on seismic hazard ad8ustment, and +indell ; ,rater -...= +indell ; Chitney, -...= and Chitney, +indell ; :guyen, -..9 for more recent empirical research&. emographic impacts. The demographic impact of a disaster can be assessed by adapting the demographic balancing e#uation, Pa L Pb M $ L N I% L &%, where Pa is the population size after the disaster, Pb is the population size before the disaster, $ is the number of births, is the number of deaths, I% is the number of immigrants, and &% is the number of emigrants %$mith, Tayman ; $wanson, -..(&. (*.

The magnitude of the disaster impact, Pa L Pb, is computed for the population of a specific geographical area and two specific points in time. Ideally, the geographical area would correspond to the disaster impact area, Pb would be immediately before disaster impact, and Pa would be immediately after disaster impact. In practice, population data are available for census divisions %census bloc#, bloc# group, tract, or larger area&, so a 2eographical Information $ystem %2I$& must be used to estimate the impact on the impact area. 3oreover, population data are li#ely to be most readily available from the decennial censuses, so the overall population change and its individual demographic components0births, deaths, immigration, and emigration0are li#ely to be estimated from that source %e.g., Cright, et al., ()?)&. En rare occasions, special surveys have been conducted in the aftermath of disaster %e.g., ,eacoc#, 3orrow ; 2ladwin, ())?&. The limited research available on demographic impacts %"riesma, et al., ()?)= Cright, et al., ()?)& suggests disasters have negligible demographic impacts on American communities' but the highly aggregated level of analysis in these studies does not preclude the possibility of significant impacts at lower levels of aggregation %census tracts, bloc# groups, or bloc#s&. Although it is logically possible that disasters could affect the number of births, it does not seem li#ely that the effect would be large. 3oreover, as noted in the previous section on physical impacts, the number of deaths from disasters in the !nited $tates has been small relative to historical levels %e.g., the *... deaths in the ().. 2alveston hurricane were appro imately (?F of the citys population& or to the levels reported in developing countries. The ma8or demographic impacts of disasters are li#ely to be the %temporary& immigration of construction wor#ers after ma8or disasters and the emigration of population segments that have lost housing. In many cases, the housing-related emigration is also temporary, but there are documented cases in which housing reconstruction has been delayed indefinitely0leading to Aghost townsB %'omerio, ())@&. Ether potential causes of emigration are psychological impacts %belief that the li#elihood of disaster recurrence is unacceptably high&, economic impacts %loss of 8obs or community services&, or political impacts %increased neighborhood or community conflict&. Economic impacts. The property damage caused by disaster impact creates losses in asset values that can be measured by the cost of repair or replacement %'ommittee on Assessing the 'osts of :atural 7isasters, ()))&. 7isaster losses in !nited $tates are initially borne by the affected households, businesses, and local government agencies whose property is damaged or destroyed. 1owever, some of these losses are redistributed during the disaster recovery process. There have been many attempts to estimate the magnitude of direct losses from individual disasters and the annual average losses from particular types of hazards %e.g., 3ileti, ()))&. !nfortunately, these losses are difficult to determine precisely because there is no organization that trac#s all of the relevant data and some data are not recorded at all %'harvKriat, -...= 'ommittee on Assessing the 'osts of :atural 7isasters, ()))&. "or insured property, the insurers record the amount of the deductible and the reimbursed loss, but uninsured losses are not recorded so they must be estimated0often with 4uestionable accuracy. The ultimate economic impact of a disaster depends upon the disposition of the damaged assets. $ome of these assets are not replaced, so their loss causes a reduction in consumption %and, thus, a decrease in the 4uality of life& or a reduction in investment %and, thus, a decrease in economic productivity&. Ether assets are replaced0either through in-#ind donations %e.g., food and clothing& or commercial purchases. In the latter case, the cost of replacement must come from some source of recovery funding, which generally can be characterized as either intertemporal transfers %to the present time from past savings or future loan payments& or interpersonal transfers %from one group to another at a given time&. $ome of the specific mechanisms for financing recovery include obtaining ta deductions or (*(

deferrals, unemployment benefits, loans %paying bac# the principal at low- or no-interest&, grants %re4uiring no return of principal&, insurance payoffs, or additional employment. Ether sources include depleting cash financial assets %e.g., savings accounts&, selling tangible assets, or migrating to an area with available housing, employment, or less ris# %in some cases this is done by the principal wage earner only&. In addition to direct economic losses, there are indirect losses that arise from the interdependence of community subunits. <esearch on the economic impacts of disasters %Alesch, et al., ())/= 7acy ; Gunreuther, ()*)= 7alhamer ; 7$ousa, ())?= 7ur#in, ()@9= 2ordon, et al., ())5= Groll, et al., ())(= +indell ; ,erry, ())@= :igg, ())5= Tierney, ())?a& suggests the relationships among the social units within a community can be described as a state of dynamic e4uilibrium involving a steady flow of resources, especially money. $pecifically, a households lin#ages with the community are defined by the money it must pay for products, services, and infrastructure support. This money is obtained from the wages that employers pay for the households labor. $imilarly, the lin#ages that a business has with the community are defined by the money it provides to its employees, suppliers, and infrastructure in e change for inputs such as labor, materials and services, and electric power, fuel, water/wastewater, telecommunications, and transportation. 'onversely, it provides products or services to customers in e change for the money it uses to pay for its inputs. It also is important to recognize the financial impacts of recovery %in addition to the financial impacts of emergency response& on local government. 'osts must be incurred for tas#s such as damage assessment, emergency demolition, debris removal, infrastructure restoration, and re-planning stric#en areas. In addition to these costs, there are decreased revenues due to loss or deferral of sales ta es, business ta es, property ta es, personal income ta es, and user fees. Political impacts. There is substantial evidence that disaster impacts can cause social activism resulting in political disruption, especially during the seemingly interminable period of disaster recovery. The disaster recovery period is a source of many victim grievances and this creates many opportunities for community conflict, both in the !$ %>olin ()@-, ())/& and abroad %>ates ; ,eacoc# ()@@&. Dictims usually attempt to recreate preimpact housing patterns, but it can be problematic for their neighbors if victims attempt to site mobile homes on their own lots while awaiting the reconstruction of permanent housing. 'onflicts arise because such housing usually is considered to be a blight on the neighborhood and neighbors are afraid the AtemporaryB housing will become permanent. :eighbors also are pitted against each other when developers attempt to buy up damaged or destroyed properties and build multifamily units on lots previously zoned for single family dwellings. $uch rezoning attempts are a ma8or threat to the mar#et value of owner-occupied homes but tend to have less impact on renters because they have less incentive to remain in the neighborhood. There are e ceptions to this generalization because some ethnic groups have very close ties to their neighborhoods, even if they rent rather than own. Attempts to change prevailing patterns of civil governance can arise when individuals sharing a grievance about the handling of the recovery process see# to redress that grievance through collective action. 'onsistent with 7yness %()?.& typology of organizations, e isting community groups with an e plicit political agenda can expand their membership to increase their strength, whereas community groups without an e plicit political agenda can extend their domains to include disaster-related grievances. Alternatively, new groups can emerge to influence local, state, or federal government agencies and legislators to ta#e actions that they support and to terminate actions that they disapprove. Indeed, such was the case for +atinos in Catsonville, 'alifornia following the +oma ,rieta earth4ua#e (*-

%Tierney, et al., -..(&. !sually, community action groups pressure government to provide additional resources for recovering from disaster impact, but may oppose candidates re-elections or even see# to recall some politicians from office %Elson ; 7rury, ())?= ,rater ; +indell, -...= $hefner, ()))&. The point here is not that disasters produce political behavior that is different from that encountered in normal life. <ather, disaster impacts might only produce a different set of victims and grievances and, therefore, a minor variation on the prevailing political agenda %3orrow ; ,eacoc#, ())?&. Emer$enc* +!n!$ement Inter(ention" As "igure *-( indicates, there are three types of preimpact interventions that can effect reductions in disaster impacts. 1azard mitigation and emergency preparedness practices directly reduce a disasters physical impacts %casualties and damage& and indirectly reduce its social impacts, whereas recovery preparedness practices directly reduce a disasters social impacts. Improvised disaster response actions also directly affect disasters physical impacts but, by their very nature, are li#ely to be much less effective than planned interventions. $imilarly, improvised recovery assistance directly affects disasters social impacts but is li#ely to be less effective than systematic recovery preparedness practices. "igure *-( includes the four AphasesB of emergency management0mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery0but ma#es it clear there is a comple relationship between them. In reality, these AphasesB might better be called functions, since they are neither discrete nor temporally se4uential. +ater chapters will address hazard mitigation %'hapter ?&, emergency preparedness %'hapter )&, emergency response %'hapter (.&, and disaster recovery %'hapter ((& in greater detail. 1owever, this section will provide a brief description of each of these functions and their interrelationships. Hazard %itigation Practices Ene way to reduce the physical impacts of disasters is to adopt hazard mitigation practices. These can be defined as preimpact actions that protect passively against casualties and damage at the time of hazard impact %as opposed to an active emergency response&. 1azard mitigation includes hazard source control, community protection wor#s, land use practices, building construction practices, and building contents protection. 1azard source control acts directly on the hazard agent to reduce its magnitude or duration. "or e ample, patching a hole in a lea#ing tan# truc# prevents a gas from being released. 'ommunity protection wor#s, which limit the impact of a hazard agent on an entire community, include dams and levees that protect against floodwater and sea walls that protect against storm surge. +and use practices reduce hazard vulnerability by avoiding construction in areas that are susceptible to hazard impact. The use of the term land use practices instead of land use regulations is deliberate. +andowners can adopt sustainable practices whether or not they are re4uired to do so. Thus, government agencies can encourage the adoption of appropriate land use practices by providing incentives to encourage development in safe locations, establishing sanctions to prevent development in hazardous locations, or engaging in ris# communication to inform landowners about the ris#s and benefits of development in locations throughout the community. 1azard mitigation can also be achieved through building construction practices that ma#e individual structures less vulnerable to natural hazards. 1ere too, the use of the term building construction practices rather than building codes is deliberate because building owners can adopt hazard resistant designs and construction materials in the absence of government intervention. 7isaster resistant construction practices include elevating structures out of flood plains, designing structures to respond more effectively to lateral stresses, and providing window shutters to protect against wind pressure and

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debris impacts. 2overnment agencies can encourage the adoption of appropriate building construction practices by providing incentives to encourage appropriate designs and materials, establishing code re4uirements for hazard resistant building designs and materials, or informing building owners about the ris#s and benefits of different building designs and materials. "inally, hazard mitigation can be achieved by contents protection strategies such as elevating appliances above the base flood elevation or bolting them to walls to resist seismic forces. Emergency Preparedness Practices Another way to reduce a disasters physical impacts is to adopt emergency preparedness practices, which are preimpact actions that provide the human and material resources needed to support active responses at the time of hazard impact %+indell ; ,erry, -...&. The first step in emergency preparedness is to use community hazard/vulnerability analysis %1DA& to identify the emergency response demands that must be met by performing four basic emergency response functions0emergency assessment, hazard operations, population protection, and incident management %+indell ; ,erry, ())-, ())*b&. Emergency assessment consists of actions that define the potential scope of the disaster impacts %e.g., pro8ecting hurricane wind speed& whereas hazard operations consists of short-term actions to protect property through e pedient hazard mitigation actions initiated during an emergency %e.g., sandbagging around structures&. Population protection actions protect people from impact %e.g., warning and evacuation& and incident management actions activate and coordinate the emergency response %e.g., communication among responding agencies&. The ne t step is to determine which community organization will be responsible for accomplishing each function %"ederal 6mergency 3anagement Agency, ())*b&. Ence functional responsibilities have been assigned, each organization must develop procedures for accomplishing those functions. "inally, the organizations must ac4uire response resources %personnel, facilities, and e4uipment& to implement their plans and they need to maintain preparedness for emergency response through continued planning, training, drills, and e ercises %7aines, ())(&. !ecovery Preparedness Practices Oust as emergency preparedness practices are preimpact actions intended to develop the human and material resources needed to support an active emergency response, recovery preparedness practices are preimpact actions that are intended to develop the financial and material resources needed to support a prompt and effective disaster recovery. "irst of all, households and businesses need to prepare for disaster recovery by purchasing hazard insurance because this will provide the money they need to rebuild damaged structures and replace destroyed contents. 1owever, hazard insurance varies significantly in its availability and cost0flood, hurricane, and earth4ua#e insurance being particularly problematic %Gunreuther ; <oth, ())@&. 3oreover, some ethnic groups cannot afford the rates of high 4uality insurance companies or are denied coverage altogether %,eacoc# ; 2irard, ())?&. In addition, the governments of hazard prone communities need to prepare for actions including impact assessment, debris management, infrastructure restoration, housing recovery, economic recovery, and lin#age to hazard mitigation. It seems to be commonly thought that the development of disaster recovery operations plans %<E,s& can be delayed until after disaster stri#es, but practitioners and researchers agree that community disaster recovery is faster and more effective when it is based on a plan that has been developed prior to disaster impact %2eis, ())*= Elson, Elson ; 2awrons#i, ())@= $chwab, et al., ())@= Cilson, ())(= Cu ; +indell, -..9&. There are si important features of a preimpact <E,. "irst, it should define a disaster recovery organization. $econd, it should identify the location of temporary housing because resolving this issue (*9

can cause conflicts that delay consideration of longer-term issues of permanent housing and distract policyma#ers altogether from hazard mitigation %>olin ; Trainer, ()?@= >olin, ()@-&. Third, the plan should indicate how to accomplish essential tas#s such as damage assessment, condemnation, debris removal and disposal, rezoning, infrastructure restoration, temporary repair permits, development moratoria, and permit processing because all of these tas#s must be addressed before the reconstruction of permanent housing can begin %$chwab, et al., ())@&. "ourth, preimpact recovery plans also should address the licensing and monitoring of contractors and retail price controls to ensure victims are not e ploited and also should address the 8urisdictions administrative powers and resources, especially the level of staffing that is available. It is almost inevitable that local government will have insufficient staff to perform critical recovery tas#s such as damage assessment and building permit processing, so arrangements should be made to borrow staff from other 8urisdictions %via pre-e isting 3emoranda of Agreement& and to use trained volunteers such as local engineers, architects, and planners. "ifth, these plans also need to address the ways in which recovery tas#s will be implemented at historical sites %$pennemann ; +oo#, ())@&. "inally, preimpact recovery plans should recognize the recovery period as a uni4ue time to enact policies for hazard mitigation and ma#e provision for incorporating this ob8ective into the recovery planning process. Conductin$ Communit* H!,!rd-Vu.ner!/i.it* An!.*"e" The model described in the previous pages provides a framewor# for understanding how hazard agent characteristics produce physical and social impacts that can be ameliorated by emergency management interventions. The ne t section will describe how local emergency managers can use this framewor# to guide assessments of their communities e posure to specific hazards and vulnerability to physical and social impacts. Although this section focuses on ho( to conduct hazard/vulnerability analyses %1DAs&, it is important to remember (ho should be involved in the process. The 1DAs provides critical information for the communitys hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and recovery preparedness practices so it should involve a wide range of the communitys emergency management sta#eholders %,earce, -../&. This is an important reason for the +63' to conduct the community 1DA through the +63's 1azard/Dulnerability Analysis subcommittee. %apping )atural Hazard Exposure $tates and local 8urisdictions across the country vary in their e posure to the hazards described in 'hapter 5. 'onse4uently, an important ob8ective for a local emergency manager is to identify the hazards that his or her community should set as priorities for its emergency management program. There are many useful sources of information about the regional incidence of these hazards, one of which is the set of maps contained in the "ederal 6mergency 3anagement Agencys %())?& %ulti Hazard Identi"ication and !is* Assessment. This source has an e tensive set of maps describing e posure to natural hazards and also addresses some technological hazards. The maps of natural hazard e posures contained in %ulti Hazard Identi"ication and !is* Assessment can be supplemented by visiting the Ceb sites of "63A %www.fema.gov&, the !$ 2eological $urvey %www.usgs.gov&, and the :ational Ceather $ervice %www.nws.noaa.gov&. These maps provide a good start toward assessing the potential impacts of disasters, but they have three limitations. "irst, many of these large scale maps are designed to compare the relative ris# of broad geographical areas %i.e., regions of the country&. This information enables local emergency managers to identify the hazards that could stri#e their 8urisdictions, but it does not provide enough resolution to tell them which areas (ithin their 8urisdictions are most li#ely to be struc# by a

(*5

disaster. "or e ample, a coastal county might be e posed to hurricanes but, as 'hapter 5 indicated, only part of the 8urisdiction is li#ely to e perience significant damage. 'onse4uently, smaller scale maps are needed to assess e posure of different areas to storm surge, inland flooding, and high wind. $econd, these maps vary from one hazard to another in terms of whether they define ris# areas in terms of event magnitudes or in terms of recurrence intervals. "or e ample, hurricane ris# area maps identify areas that are e pected to be affected by 'ategory (-5 hurricanes. 1owever, these maps provide no information about the probability that each of these different hurricane intensities would occur. >y contrast, !$ 2eological $urvey earth4ua#e hazard maps plot the pea# ground acceleration %,2A& with a -F probability of e ceedance in 5. years. Thus, these maps provide useful information about the areas in which buildings are most li#ely to collapse and some indication li#elihood of a disaster. 1owever, as will be e plained in the section on physical vulnerability, trained engineers would be needed to use this 4uantitative information to assess the probabilities of building failure. Third, these maps are insufficient for local 1DAs because local emergency managers also need to assess the relative ris# of different hazards for a given geographical area. That is, emergency managers need to #now whether their 8urisdictions are at ris# for certain hazards, but they also need to #now what is the li#elihood of a flood in comparison to a tornado, an earth4ua#e, or a to ic chemical release. As a result of these limitations, local emergency managers must often settle for 4ualitative comparisons of the relative ris# of different hazards. That is, they must typically categorize the probability of disaster impact as high, medium, or low %"ederal 6mergency 3anagement Agency, ())*b&. $uch categorization provides only a Arough screenB for determining which hazards re4uire the most attention, but this limitation is often more apparent than real because many hazards impose similar demands on the community, especially during the emergency response phase. $pecifically, the e4uipment and methods used for emergency assessment and hazard operations might differ among the meteorological, hydrological, geophysical, and hazardous materials hazards, but the e4uipment and methods used for population protection and incident management will be 4uite similar. 'onse4uently, differences in hazard probability are often unimportant because preparedness for one provides preparedness for many, if not all, other hazards. :onetheless, many mitigation measures are hazardspecific, so an understanding of the relative ris# from different hazards can provide valuable guidance in determining which investments are most li#ely to reduce a communitys vulnerability. %apping Hazmat Exposures Incidents involving fires, e plosions, or chemical releases can be initiated by internal %accident or sabotage& or e ternal %geophysical, meteorological, or hydrological events, or terrorist attac#s& causes. The types of hazards that can occur at a chemical facility, their initiating events, their conse4uences, and their li#elihoods of occurrence can be assessed using hazard analysis %1uebner, et al., -...&. This process begins by identifying dangerous chemicals %i.e., those that are threats because of their flammability, reactivity, or to icity&, their locations, and the 4uantities stored at those locations. Ence the chemical inventory has been developed, this information can be used to assess the threats these chemicals pose to the facility, its wor#ers, its neighbors, and the environment. In the case of 6 tremely 1azardous $ubstances %61$s& defined under $A<A Title III, Vulnerable +ones %DIs& can be computed using data on the chemicals to icity, its 4uantity available for release, the type of spill %li4uid or gaseous&, the postulated release duration %e.g., (. minutes&, assumed meteorological conditions %wind speed and atmospheric stability&, and terrain %urban or rural&. Available methods include manual computations %!$ 6nvironmental ,rotection Agency, ()@?&, A,&HA %"ederal 6mergency 3anagement Agency, no date, a, (**

see information about CA%E& at www.epa.gov/ceppo/cameo&, or !%P-Comp at yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/ rmp-comp.htm&. Ence the radii of the DIs for the different chemicals have been computed, these can be overlaid onto a map with the release point in the center of the circle and the radius drawn around it %see "igure *--&. 6mergency managers also should wor# with their +6,'s to identify the highway, rail, water, and air routes though which hazardous materials are transported. Ence these routes have been identified, the number of tan# truc#s, railroad tan#cars, and barges carrying each type of hazardous material can be counted in a commodity "lo( study. Information about hazardous materials transportation can be found on the !$ 7ET Ceb site %hazmat.dot.gov& and specific guidance for commodity flow studies is found at hazmat.dot.gov/hmep/guidePflowPsurveys.pdf. Ence the chemicals being transported have been identified, analysts can use the same procedures that were used for fi ed site facilities. As "igure *-indicates, this will lead to the construction of rectangular DIs surrounding the transportation routes. The facility and transportation route DIs can then be e amined to identify areas of residential, commercial, and industrial land use %see +indell, ())5, for an analysis of hazardous waste transportation to an incinerator&. #i$ure 6%0' Dulnerable Iones around fi ed-site facility and transportation route.

(o)n of *uc+ley Highway 101 High(ay 010

,i#ed site facility

Hazmat Inc.

Ha mat transportation route

,acility -ulnera$le .one

(ransportation route -ulnera$le .one

Source: Adapted from Lindell (200')

If DIs for the transportation routes have not been prepared before an incident occurs, the )orth American Emergency !esponse .uideboo* %hazmat.dot.gov/ohmform.htmQerg& can be used to appro imate them. This document contains a table listing the principal chemicals commonly found in transportation, each chemicals identification number, and the emergency response guide that should be used to provide technical assistance in responding to a spill. In addition, the table identifies the most dangerous chemicals and directs emergency responders to a Table of Initial Isolation and ,rotective Action 7istances that should be used to determine where protective action %either evacuation or shelter inplace& should be implemented. 6mergency managers should understand that the Emergency !esponse .uideboo* classifies releases only as small or large, so use of the procedures in the /echnical .uidance

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"or Hazards Analysis or more advanced methods identified in the Handboo* o" Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures is preferred to the table in the Emergency !esponse .uideboo*. A special case of hazmat e posures arises in connection with nuclear power plants. The :<' conducted e tensive analyses to define the emergency planning zones %6,Is& that should be designated around these facilities. The :<'s analyses led to the establishment of a (. mile radius plume inhalation EP+ in which state and local authorities should be prepared for people to evacuate or shelter in-place to avoid inhalation e posure and direct radiation from a radioactive plume %!$ :uclear <egulatory 'ommission, ()?@&. In addition, there is a 5. mile radius ingestion path(ay EP+ in which authorities should prepare to monitor water, mil#, and food %especially leafy green vegetables& for contamination. %apping Exposure to Secondary Hazards 6mergency managers should recall that some disaster impacts can initiate others. As noted in 'hapter 5, earth4ua#es can cause surface faulting, ground failure, landslides, fires, dam failures, and hazardous materials releases in addition to the e pected structural failures caused by ground sha#ing. Ene method of identifying areas e posed to multiple hazards is to use a 2I$ to overlay the areas sub8ect to these different hazards. This is accomplished by entering all of the data on primary and secondary hazard e posures and special facilities into a 2I$ that creates separate layers for fault lines= areas prone to the highest levels of ground sha#ing, subsidence, and landsliding= hazardous facility Dulnerable Iones= and locations of sensitive facilities. :e t, these layers are intersected to produce composite maps displaying the areas sub8ect to multiple hazards. "inally, the layers identifying the locations of residential, commercial, and industrial areas, and sensitive facilities are overlaid to produce the final maps. The most common secondary hazards of the events described in 'hapter 5 are listed in Table *-(. T!/.e 6%&. $econdary 1azards.
Primary Ha ard Severe storms E#treme summer )eat%er (ornadoes Hurricane )ind 0ildfires ,loods Storm surge (sunamis -olcanic eruptions Eart%1ua+es Landslides Secondary Ha ards ,loods/ tornadoes/ landslides 0ildfires (o#ic c%emical or radiological materials releases (o#ic c%emical or radiological materials releases Landslides (on %illsides in later rains) (o#ic c%emical or radiological materials releases (o#ic c%emical or radiological materials releases (o#ic c%emical or radiological materials releases ,loods/ )ildfires/ tsunamis ,ires/ floods (dam failures)/ tsunami/ landslides/ to#ic c%emical or radiological materials releases (sunami

A""e""in$ P1*"ic!. Vu.ner!/i.it* Information on hazard e posure needs to be supplemented with information on physical vulnerability of structures and people. This ma#es it necessary to identify the types of structures and populations that are located in the areas e posed to environmental hazards. Structural Vulnerability to 2ind' Seismic' and 2ater 3orces $tructures can be vulnerable to environmental hazards because of inade4uate designs, inade4uate construction materials, or both. Elder homes have been constructed under earlier building codes and most neighborhoods are relatively homogeneous with respect to age, so identifying older neighborhoods in hazard-prone areas will help set priorities of emergency management interventions. "or e ample, many

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areas of the country have homes, built during the early part of the -. th 'entury using unreinforced masonry %bric# walls constructed without steel reinforcing rods&, that are especially vulnerable to earth4ua#es. $imilarly, older homes are usually less weathertight, so they are much more prone to infiltration of hazardous materials. There are three ma8or issues in assessing structural vulnerability. "irst is the 4uestion of whether the structure has the strength or resilience to withstand environmental forces such as wind, seismicity, or water. In this case, the concern is about the impact on the structure itself and, conse4uently, the loss of function and the time and cost of rebuilding. The second issue concerns the ability of the structure to protect the contents. This issue is distinct from the first one because in earth4ua#es, for e ample, buildings that survive ground sha#ing without damage can transmit the motion to light fi tures, cabinets, and furniture0possibly damaging these items. The third issue concerns the ability of the structure to protect the occupants. This is especially important in connection with hazardous materials because they can infiltrate into a structure and #ill the occupants without damaging the building. Ence the areas at ris# from environmental hazards have been identified, emergency managers should identify the types of residential, commercial, and industrial land uses located within them. It is particularly important to determine if there are any facilities within each DI that have highly vulnerable populations. A list of such facilities is listed in Table *-- and important characteristics of the facility users are listed in Table *-/. These characteristics ma#e it much more problematic to evacuate facility occupants than households %Dogt, ())(&. In addition, it is important to identify the location of critical infrastructure facilities %see Table *-9&. T!/.e 6%0' "acilities Cith 1ighly Dulnerable ,opulations.
HEAL(H !ELA(E2 Hospitals 3ursing %omes Half)ay %ouses (drug/ alco%ol/ mental retardation) 4ental institutions PE3AL 5ails Prisons 2etention camps !eformatories ASSE4*L6 7 A(HLE(&8 Auditoriums (%eaters E#%i$ition %alls 9ymnasiums At%letic stadiums or fields A4:SE4E3( 7 !E8!EA(&;3 *eac%es 8amp<conference centers Amusement par+s<fairgrounds<race courses 8ampgrounds<!ecreational -e%icle par+s Par+s<la+es<rivers 9olf courses S+i resorts 8ommunity recreation centers !EL&9&;:S 8%urc%es<synagogues Evangelical group centers H&9H 2E3S&(6 !ES&2E3(&AL Hotels<motels Apartment<condominium comple#es 4o$ile %ome par+s 2ormitories (college/ military) 8onvents<monasteries (!A3SP;!(A(&;3 !ivers<la+es 2am loc+s<toll $oot%s ,erry<railroad<$us terminals 8;44E!8&AL S%opping centers 8entral $usiness districts 8ommercial<industrial par+s E2:8A(&;3AL 2ay care centers Presc%ools<+indergartens Elementary<secondary sc%ools -ocational<$usiness<specialty sc%ools 8olleges<universities

(*)

Source: Lindell and Perry (=>>2)?

Ef course, the assessment of structural vulnerability usually involves all three issues. "or riverine flooding and hurricane storm surge, structures0especially concrete structures with well-anchored foundations0resist battering waves to protect the structure and provide the height to escape the rising water that could threaten contents and occupants. In other cases, it is the strength of construction in resisting wind loads %tornadoes and hurricanes&, blast forces %e plosions and volcanic eruptions& and ground sha#ing %earth4ua#es& that protects the structure, contents, and occupants. "or chemical, radiological, and volcanic ash threats, it is the tightness of construction in preventing the infiltration of outside %contaminated& air into the structure that is the important protective feature. "inally, in the case of e posure to a cloud of radioactive material, the construction material can provide shielding from penetrating radiation and from surface contamination. T!/.e 6%2' 'haracteristics of $pecial "acility !sers.
Special 8onsiderations Am$ulatory !e1uire close supervision 3onam$ulatory !e1uire life support Permanent residence of ,acility residents users !esidents of t%e impact area/ $ut not of t%e facility (e?g?/ prison guards) (ransients Periods of use 2ays of )ee+<%ours of day Special events :ser density 8oncentrated 2ispersed S%eltering in place Hig%ly effective 4oderately effective 4inimally or not effective (ransportation support 0ould use o)n ve%icles !e1uire $uses or ot%er %ig% occupancy ve%icles !e1uire am$ulances Source: Lindell and Perry (=>>2)? 8%aracteristics ;f :sers 4o$ility of users

In high wind %including tornadoes and hurricanes& and e plosions %usually technological in origin, but also including some volcanic eruptions&, a substantial increase in air pressure can cause structures to collapse. $uch structural failures are caused by deficiencies in either design or materials, or both %American Institute of Architects, ())5= Institute for >usiness and 1ome $afety, ())?&. 3orti"ied homes %see www.ibhs.org& provide for installation of connections and braces to reinforce roofs and gable-end walls against wind attac#. In addition to positive pressure on upwind walls, high wind creates negative pressure, or suction, as it is forced to flow up and over the roof. This suction is greatest in flat roofs, intermediate in gable-end roofs %which slope in two directions&, and least in hipped roofs %which slope in four directions&. $uction tends to lift the roof from the walls unless resisted by ade4uate connections to the walls0which in turn, must have ade4uate connections to the foundation. Ade4uate designs and materials also provide protection to building openings such as windows and doors, thus preventing the wind from pressurizing the interior and adding to the stress on roof and walls. The need for window and sliding glass door shutters is widely recognized because the shutters resist the direct pressure of the wind and the impact of flying debris. 1owever, door reinforcement is also important0 especially for double-wide %two-car& garage doors that are highly susceptible to failure because their great width allows the wind to deflect them inward and pull the rollers out of their trac#s.

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T!/.e 6%3' Infrastructure "acilities.

,acility (ype 0ater Se)er Electric po)er Li1uid (e?g?/ oil) and gas (e?g? natural gas) fuels (elecommunications E#amples Pumping stations and pipelines Pumping stations and pipelines 9enerating stations and po)er lines Pumping stations and pipelines *roadcast studios/ transmission to)ers 8ellular telep%one to)ers (elep%one s)itc%ing centers and telep%one lines *us<truc+ terminals and roads !ail yards and rail lines Sea and inland marine ports Airports Police and fire stations Am$ulance garages Hospitals

(ransportation

Pu$lic safety and %ealt%

$imilar observations apply to earth4ua#es= building damage typically results from the lateral pressures %ground sha#ing, surface faulting, and soil failure& e erted against a structure that was designed principally to resist the vertical loads resulting from the weight of the occupants, furniture, upper stories, and roof %American Institute of Architects, ())-&. <igid structures such as unreinforced masonry are e tremely vulnerable, whereas wood frame dwellings are much safer. In the latter case, there might be rigid portions of a structure, such as bric# chimneys, that separate from the rest of the structure and collapse into the living area. In addition, glass from bro#en windows, falling pictures and mirrors, the toppling of unsecured furniture, and other flying debris are safety hazards. "or hurricanes, structures on the open coast must be of sufficiently sturdy construction that they can resist the direct impact of storm surf as well as the force of e tremely high winds. 1owever, both riverine flooding and hurricane storm surge also re4uire the structure to have foundations anchored well enough to resist scouring by water currents that can undermine building foundations and cause structural collapse. Additional protection can be provided by e pedient floodproofing that uses waterproof construction materials, sealing of crac#s, provision of valves on sewer lines, steel bul#heads for lower-level openings, and sump pumps to e8ect seepage %!$ Effice of 6mergency ,reparedness, ()?-&. As with hurricane surge and riverine flooding, volcanic mudflows and floods present the challenge of maintaining the integrity of buildings and their foundation. 1owever, flooding generated by volcanic eruption commonly contains a substantial volume of roc# and ash, resulting in mudflows that have substantial carrying power %1ays, ()@(&. 3oreover, as was found during the eruption of 3t. $t. 1elens, silt buildup can significantly raise the bed of the river channel %,erry ; +indell, ()).&. Tsunami impact poses an even greater threat than inland flooding, surge from hurricanes and coastal storms, or volcanic mudflows. As noted in 'hapter 5, these seismic sea waves can threaten areas as much as (.. feet above sea level, so destruction is highly li#ely for most structures located very near the shoreline. 1owever, properly designed steel-reinforced concrete structures located a short distance inland are li#ely to survive even the largest tsunamis. Human Vulnerability to Inhalation Exposure In the case of radiological or to ic materials, the principal public health hazard arises from inhalation of airborne materials that have an adverse health effect %!$ 6nvironmental ,rotection Agency,

(?(

()@?&. Inhalation e posures can also result from the dispersion of airborne debris such as ash and gas from volcanic eruptions. Ideally, an enclosed space will provide a barrier if it can be closed tightly enough to #eep out the hazardous material and has enough o ygen to sustain those within it until the danger has passed. !nfortunately, most structures are lea#y, allowing contaminated air to infiltrate even when the doors and windows are closed. The rate of air e change increases with the amount of lea#age area, the wind speed, and the temperature differential between the indoor and outdoor air. The rate at which indoor and outdoor air are e changed is commonly measured in air changes per hour %A'1&. 1owever, emergency managers will find it more useful to thin# of air e change in terms of turnover time, which the reciprocal of the air e change rate, or t > M (/A'1, where A'1 is the number of air changes per hour. As Cilson %()@?& emphasizes, an infiltration rate of (.. A'1 does not imply that all the clean air will be gone in one hour. <ather, the proportion of contaminated air gradually rises until at the end of (.. t> hours, */F of the original air has been replaced by contaminated air, while )5F of the original air has been replaced by the end of /.. t > hours. Thus, for the case of (.. A'1, it will ta#e over three hours %not 8ust one hour& for the indoor air to become almost completely contaminated. This result is e tremely important because it indicates that in-place sheltering is more effective than most people might infer from the apparent implication of the number of air changes per hour. The reason for the difference between the apparent result and the correct result can best be illustrated by e amining the difference between the apparent, but incorrect, mechanism of air e change and the actual mechanism. It would only ta#e one hour to replace the clean air %the incorrect result& if the contaminated air somehow Apushed outB the clean air, but this is not what happens. <ather, the contaminated air that infiltrates into the structure mi es with the clean air rather than Apushing it outB. 'learly, e filtration of a mi ture of clean air and contaminated air will ta#e longer to e haust the clean air in a structure than will e filtration of %Apushing outB& clean air alone. 'onse4uently, sheltering in-place is at least three times as effective in reducing inhalation e posure as it first appears to be. Chile this time lag effect is important, it is not the only mechanism by which sheltering in-place can reduce adverse health effects. It is also important to recognize the impact of a damping effect in reducing the fluctuations in plume concentrations. As was discussed in the previous section, these fluctuations arise from irregularities in meteorological conditions and local terrain. Ene way of measuring pea# concentration is by estimating the value that is e ceeded appro imately (F of the time. Cilson %()@?& reports that in the outdoor %contaminated& air, such (F pea# concentrations are 9..F as large as the mean concentration. "or indoor air, the e4uivalent pea# concentration is only 5.F larger than the mean. As he notes, even when the indoor concentration %(.. parts per million RppmS, for e ample& has risen after si hours to match the outdoor concentration, the indoor pea#s would be e pected to be appro imately (5. ppm when the outdoor pea#s would be 9.. ppm. This is, of course, of considerable significance when pea# concentrations are the principal health threats. As Cilson %()@?, ()@)& and others have observed, a ma8or problem in assessing the effectiveness of sheltering in-place is uncertainty about whether indoor air concentrations will remain sufficiently low for a sufficiently long period of time. This can be answered definitively only if there is information about the hazardous material being released %especially the identity of the material released, and the rate and duration of the release&, the meteorological data needed for a computerized plume dispersion model %wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability&, and the air e change rates for the structures in the hazard impact area. 7ata on the release and the meteorological conditions will not be available until an incident occurs, but data on the efficacy of sheltering in-place can be collected in advance. "irst, <ogers, (?-

et al. %()).& report that energy conservation research has shown air e change in most !$ dwellings ranges from ..5 to (.5 A'1. $econd, Cilson %()@)& reports that the most important factor affecting lea#age area is the presence of a vapor barrier in the walls and ceiling of a structure, a feature that is most common in houses built in cold climates after ()*.. Thus, emergency managers could estimate the effectiveness of sheltering in-place by obtaining access to local data on the age of the housing stoc# within different neighborhoods within their 8urisdiction. "inally, the fact that so much of the research and data on infiltration of hazardous materials has been developed from studies of energy conservation suggests that emergency planners consult with their local utilities to determine what information is available regarding the air e change rates of different types of structures %e.g., residences, schools, and commercial buildings& in their communities. $pecial facilities, especially those such as hospitals that have low mobility residents, should be e amined individually to assess their air e change rates. Human Vulnerability to !adiological %aterials Although both to ic and radiological materials present an inhalation hazard, a plume of radioactive material released from a nuclear power plant or during a transportation accident also can cause harm by means of e ternal gamma radiation from the cloud and from ground contamination. 7ense building materials such concrete, bric#, and stone provide shielding from e ternal gamma radiation and, thus, can provide a basis for in-place sheltering during radiological emergencies. The effectiveness of structures made from different types of building materials has been e amined in studies by >urson and ,rofio %()??&, Anno and 7ore %()?@a= ()?@b&, Aldrich, 6ricson and Oohnson %()?@&, and Aldrich, et al. %()@-&. These studies calculated the dose reduction factors %the ratio of the dose received while sheltering to the unprotected dose& for three e posure routesT e ternal gamma radiation from the cloud, e ternal gamma radiation from ground contamination, and inhalation of radioactive materials infiltrating into the structure. >urson and ,rofio %()??& found that sheltering in a wood frame dwelling provides little more protection from cloud and ground e posure than does AshelteringB in a vehicle while evacuating. $heltering on the ground floor of a masonry home with no basement or in the basement of a wood frame home gave considerably higher levels of protectionT about 5.F of the unprotected e posure to the cloud and less than -.F of the unprotected e posure to ground. As one might e pect, the basement of a masonry house was even more effectiveT 9.F of the cloud e posure and 5F of the ground e posure. A large office building was the most effective shelter of all, reducing cloud e posure to about -.F and ground e posure to (F. The importance of the construction materials is underscored by >urson and ,rofioUs %()??& wor# indicating it is the cloud e posure that produces most of the whole body radiation dose received by those sheltering in a home. Infiltration into the structure would account for only about 5F of the gamma radiation dose. Anno and 7ore %()?@a& calculated cloud dose reduction factors for single family dwellings and large structures %e.g., office buildings, multistory apartment comple es&. They considered ..(-5 to / A'1 to define the range of infiltration rates for single family dwellings and other structures that could be used as temporary public shelters. "or single family dwellings, whole body dose reduction factors for low air e change rates %..(-5 A'1& were calculated to be ..9.-..// compared to ..9/ for more representative air change rates %/ A'1&. "or large structures, whole body dose reduction factors for low air change rates were calculated to be ...@ compared to ..(?-..(( for the more representative air change rates. These investigators also estimated thyroid %inhalation& dose reduction factors to be about ...5 to ...( for low air change rates and from ..-5 to ..(. for more representative air change rates for either single family dwellings or large structures. (?/

3ore recent analyses by the :<' provide an indication of vulnerability to radiological materials releases. The results of these analyses can be seen in "igure *-/, which displays the relative effectiveness of continuing normal activity, sheltering in a home basement or large building, or evacuating before or after plume arrival at three distances from the plant. According to this figure, which is adapted from 3cGenna %-...&, even a late evacuation is better than home shelter, large building shelter is better than late evacuation, and early evacuation is best of all. Thus, those who are within five miles of a nuclear power plant have high vulnerability if they remain in their homes during a release. Enly large building shelter provides as much safety as early evacuation. #i$ure 6%2'
=

6ffectiveness of ,rotective Actions in a :uclear ,ower ,lant 6mergency.

Pro$a$ility of e#ceeding 200 rem (2 Sv)

0?> 0?D 0?C 0?' 0?A 0?@ 0?3 0?2 0?= 0 = mi (=?' +m) 3 mi (A +m) A mi (D +m)

= 3ormal activity 2 Home $asement s%elter 3 Large $uilding s%elter Source: Adapted from 4cBenna (2000)?

@ Evacuation = %our $efore plume arrival A Evacuation after plume arrival

Assessing Agricultural and ,ivestoc* Vulnerability Assessing the physical vulnerability of crops and livestoc# is a tas# that is rarely considered to be the responsibility of emergency managers. Ene reason for giving minimal emphasis to the agricultural sector is that it accounts for a relatively small part of the total vulnerability in many 8urisdictions. In those cases where the agricultural sector is a significant part of the local economy, emergency managers should consult agricultural e perts such as those from the !$ 7epartment of Agriculture because, as noted earlier, there is substantial variation among animal and plant species in their susceptibility to e treme environmental conditions. "or e ample, fruit orchards can be devastated by wind speeds that have no impact whatsoever on rangeland. 3oreover, the damage to many crops depends on the stage in growth cycle0with some crops having minimal susceptibility to wind damage until 8ust before harvest. A""e""in$ !nd +! in$ Soci!. Vu.ner!/i.it* In contrast to physical vulnerability, which arises from the potential for environmental e tremes to create adverse physiological changes, social vulnerability arises from the potential for these e treme

(?9

events to cause changes in peoples behavior. ,eople can vary in their potential for in8ury to themselves and their families. They also vary in the potential for destruction of their homes and wor#places, as well as the destruction of the transportation systems and locations for shopping and recreation they use in their daily activities. The discussion below emphasizes census data but it also is important to e amine other archival sources such as school records, immigration services, local aging agency, special needs registries, property ta records, facilities locations %6narson, et al., -../&. In addition, consult local social service providers %government and :2E& and churches to identify vulnerable populations. Assessing Psychosocial Vulnerability Ene important component of psychological vulnerability is personal fragility0that is, a lac# of emotion4"ocused coping s#ills. Another component of psychological vulnerability is rigidity0that is, a lac# of problem4"ocused coping s#ills defined by an inability to develop adaptive strategies for responding to altered conditions. Ezer and Ceisss %-..9& summary of research on post-traumatic stress disorder %,T$7& concluded the four categories of ,T$7 predictors were A persons pre-e isting characteristics %e.g., intelligence, previous psychological trauma&, The severity of the personal impact of the disaster, ,sychological processes immediately after the impact, and +ife stress and social support after the traumatic event.

Huite obviously, only the first of these categories can measure psychological vulnerability that e ists before a disaster stri#es and none of the variables in this category is routinely available through secondary sources such as 'ensus data. >ecause direct measures of the incidence of ,T$7 predictors %e.g., through community surveys& are prohibitively e pensive, psychological vulnerability must be measured indirectly, as discussed in a later section. A ma8or concern is social isolation. Thus, vulnerability is also measured by the infre4uency and superficiality of social contacts with peers such as #in %e tended family&, neighbors, and cowor#ers. <outine measures of social vulnerability are rarely available through surveys conducted using representative samples of community members. 1owever, there are pro y variables that have statistically significant0although admittedly small0correlations with social isolation. $uitable pro y variables that are routinely available through 'ensus files include age, income, and ethnicity. $pecifically, increasing age is associated with reduced levels of community participation %involvement in voluntary associations& and immersion in #in and friendship networ#s %,erry, ()@5= ,erry, et al., ()@(&. >y contrast, socioeconomic status is positively associated with participation in community organizations %Alvirez ; >ean, ()?*= Tomeh, ()?/& and minority ethnicity is positively associated with immersion in #in and friendship networ#s %$taples, ()?*= Cil#inson, ()))&. Accordingly, the use of age, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity as pro y measures of psychosocial vulnerability will also be discussed below. Assessing emographic Vulnerability Dulnerability to demographic changes follows from the demographic balancing e4uation discussed earlier. !ntil -..5, recent trends in disaster casualties had indicated the number of deaths would be relatively small for any :orth American disaster. It is unli#ely that 1urricane Gatrina mar#s a reversal of that trend because :ew Erleans is the only ma8or coastal city with a significant portion of its land area %and, thus, its population& below sea level. In most disasters, it is the number of in-migrants and out-migrants cause significant changes in its demographic composition. Ence again, census data can be used to provide indicators such as age, income, homeownership, and ethnicity. Elder, more affluent homeowners are li#ely to have high levels of community bondedness %Turner, et al., ()@*& and see# (?5

permanent housing in the community even if their homes have been destroyed. $imilarly, ethnic minorities have tightly integrated #in networ#s that ma#e them stay. 1owever, even otherwise stable communities are li#ely to e perience short term changes in their demographic composition if there are few rental vacancies after a disaster. This is because a local housing shortages would re4uire residents to move farther away for temporary housing. $imilarly, a communitys demographic composition is li#ely to change if local businesses have high levels of physical vulnerability to disaster impacts %ma#ing them li#ely to shut down for e tended periods&. A declining local economy will ma#e them financially vulnerable and, thus, more li#ely to cease operations altogether. Assessing Economic Vulnerability It is obvious that wealth is a ma8or component of economic vulnerability, but the assets comprising wealth vary in their vulnerability to disasters. Tangible assets such as buildings, e4uipment, furniture, and vehicles that are located in the disaster impact area are more vulnerable than financial assets such as ban# accounts, stoc#s, and bonds that are recorded electronically. 1ouseholds and businesses both have tangible and financial assets, so both are vulnerable to the loss of their tangible assets and both have financial assets that can be used to support disaster recovery. Ef course, there are substantial variations among households in their assets and the same is true for businesses. Ene noteworthy difference between households and businesses is that the latter also have operational vulnerability arising from dependency upon those who supply its inputs %suppliers and labor& as well as those who purchase its outputs %distributors and customers&. 6vidence of businesses operational vulnerability to input disruptions can be seen in data provided by :igg %())5&, who reported that business managers median estimate of the amount of time that they could continue to operate without infrastructure was . hours for electric power, 9 hours for telephones, 9@ hours for water/sewer, and (-. hours for fuel. If this infrastructure support is unavailable for time periods longer than these, then businesses must suspend operations even if they have suffered no damage to their structures or contents. 3easures of household wealth are not available, but data on household income are available in census files. Available census data on businesses are more limited in their relevance to economic vulnerability. The 'ensus >ureaus Ceb site %censtats.census.gov& provides II, code-level data on the number of businesses in each economic sector, bro#en down by number of employees. These data can be overlaid onto ris# areas for different hazards such as 5..-year floodplains, hurricane surge zones, or earth4ua#e seismic zones to develop estimates of the communitys economic vulnerability to disaster impact. Assessing Political Vulnerability As will be discussed later, political impacts of disasters often arise from conflicts over the management of the emergency response and disaster recovery. Accordingly, political vulnerability arises from inade4uate emergency management interventions0which create situations that pit one group of sta#eholders against another0and inade4uate mechanisms for managing this conflict when it does arise. The ade4uacy of emergency management interventions to reduce hazard vulnerability will be addressed in 'hapters )-(-, but the ade4uacy of mechanisms for managing conflict is a crucial part of civil governance. In particular, government agencies that are believed to lac# legitimacy, e pertise, and ade4uate information for ma#ing decisions about the allocation of public resources will prove vulnerable in the aftermath of disaster. As is the case with psychological, demographic, and economic vulnerability, there currently are no direct measures of political vulnerability that are readily available for use by

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emergency managers. 'onse4uently, the use of age, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity as pro y measures of political vulnerability will also be discussed in the ne t section. Predicting Household Vulnerability As noted earlier in this chapter, it is important to recognize that social vulnerability is not randomly distributed either demographically or geographically. In particular, the social vulnerability arising from a lac# of psychological resilience, social networ# integration, economic assets, and political power vary across demographic groups. $ome of these components of social vulnerability can be predicted by demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education, income, and ethnicity. 3oreover, these demographic groups tend to be distributed relatively systematically across the landscape of each community. 6ven though there might not be sharp geographic lines of demarcation between the locations of different demographic groups within a community, there are variations in the concentration of these groups in different neighborhoods. Thus, 2I$s can be used to conduct disaggregated %e.g., census tract-level& spatial analyses to identify the demographic segments most li#ely to be vulnerable to disaster impacts. The demographic predictors %e.g., gender, age, education, income, and ethnicity& of social vulnerability are fre4uently also associated with hazard e posure because the population segments with the fewest psychological, social, economic, and political resources often disproportionately occupy the most hazardous geographical areas. $imilarly, demographic predictors of social vulnerability are often associated with structural vulnerability because those same population segments disproportionately occupy the oldest, most poorly maintained buildings. Thus, those who are most socially vulnerable are also li#ely to e perience the greatest physical impacts such as casualties and property loss. >ecause emergency managers rarely have access to direct measures of social vulnerability, geographic analyses of social vulnerability are conducted on 'ensus data, preferably at the lowest possible level of aggregation %e.g., bloc#-group or tract&. <ecent research has shown these aggregated indicators of social vulnerability are strongly correlated, so it is advisable to use either a composite measure of social vulnerability or a subset of these indicators. Table *-5 lists a sample set of social vulnerability indicators recently used in analyses of social vulnerability to the impacts of earth4ua#es in $helby 'ounty %3emphis&, Tennessee %,rater, et al., -..9&. >ased on the recognition, described above, that hazard e posure, structural vulnerability, and social vulnerability tend to be related, ,rater and her colleagues advocated identifying vulnerability hotspots0the geographic areas occupied by demographic segments that are most vulnerable to disaster impacts. These vulnerability hotspots can be identified by using a 2I$ to either overlay or mathematically combine data on hazard e posure %e.g., ground motion and ground failure from earth4ua#es&, structural vulnerability %e.g., due to dilapidated housing&, and lifeline vulnerability %e.g., due to old and poorly maintained water, sewer, natural gas, electric power, and telephone lines and streets, viaducts, and bridges&. This concept of vulnerability hotspot analysis is illustrated in "igure *-9, below. Vu.ner!/i.it* D*n!mic" A ma8or challenge for emergency managers is to understand the processes by which communities increase or decrease their hazard e posure, physical vulnerability, and social vulnerability. According to economic theory, e cessive hazard e posure and structural vulnerability arise from systemic comple ities that can be characterized as mar*et "ailures such as inade4uate information, barriers to mar#et entry and e it, and capital flow restrictions %Gunreuther, ())@= +indell, et al., ())?&. An ideal pattern of economic

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development would be one in which ris# area occupants purchase property on the basis of ade4uate information about hazard e posure and structural vulnerability. 3oreover, they would locate only where it was economically advantageous in the long term as well as in the short term, and would diversify their assets over other locations and other forms of financial %e.g., savings accounts, insurance, stoc#s/bonds& and social %e.g., e tended family& recovery assistance. "inally, ris# area occupants would adopt hazard ad8ustments to limit their losses if a disaster were to stri#e. These ad8ustments would include hazard mitigation %e.g., land use practices and building construction practices&, emergency preparedness practices %e.g., detection and warning systems&, and recovery preparedness practices %e.g., diversified investments and hazard insurance& to avoid casualties and property damage. T!/.e 6%4. Indicators of $ocial Dulnerability.
-ulnera$le 9roups ,emale %eaded %ouse%olds Elderly Lo) income<%ig% poverty !enters -ulnera$ility &ndicators Percent female %eaded %ouse%olds Percent individuals over 'A Percent of elderly %ouse%olds Percent of %ouse%olds $elo) poverty level Percent of %ouse%olds $elo) H:2 standards Percent of %ouse%olds residing in rental %ousing Percent of %ouse%olds residing in rental %ousing $y type of d)elling units Percent of individual from *lac+/ Hispanic/ and ot%er minorities Percent of non"Englis% spea+ers Percent of population in selected age groupings Percent of %ouse%olds )it% dependency ratios a$ove a specified level Areas )it% com$ined social vulnera$ilities

Et%nic<racial<language minorities 8%ildren<yout% Social vulnera$ility %ot spot analysis

Actual patterns of development are significantly different from the ideal. In many cases, there is migration to hazard-prone areas because of beneficial land uses for agriculture, transportation, and recreation %i.e., people are Apulled inB, >olin ; >olton, ()@*&. This is compounded by a lac# of accountability for investment decisions. 7evelopers are at ris# for only a short period of time before they pass an investment on to others %homeowners, insurers, mortgage holders& who will ultimately e perience the disaster impact. $uch transactions can occur because many ris# area residents are new arrivals who are unaware of the hazard. 6ven long-term residents of ris# areas sometimes have little or no information about hazards and ad8ustments to those hazards because such information is suppressed by those with a ma8or sta#e in the communitys economic development %3eltsner, ()?)&. 6ven when there is local #nowledge about hazards, there often is a lac# of hazard intrusiveness because events that are not recent or fre4uent tend not to be thought about or discussed %+indell ; ,rater, -...&. 3oreover, many people ignore low probability events, thin# of them as occurring far in the future, or have an optimistic bias that the negative conse4uences of these events will not happen to them %Ceinstein, ()@.&. In particular, politicians tend to ignore conse4uences that they e pect to occur only after their term of office is over, so only fre4uent, recent, or ma8or impacts lead to increased adoption of community-wide hazard ad8ustments such as land use controls or more stringent building codes. 6ven then, the (indo( o" opportunity for the adoption of these ad8ustments is open only temporarily %>ir#land, ())?= ,rater ; +indell, -...&.

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#i$ure 6%3'

7isaster Impact Dulnerability Assessment 3odel.

Hig% %a ard e#posure

Hig% structural and lifeline vulnera$ility

Hig% social and governmental vulnera$ility

Area )it% %ig%est potential for social impacts: Social vulnera$ility E%otspotsF

Source: Prater/ et al? (200@)

Increased hazard e posure also is caused by displacement from safer areas due to population pressures %i.e., people are Apushed inB&. Chen this occurs, the demographic distribution of ris# tends to be ine4uitable because geographical locations often are systematically related to their residents demographic characteristics0especially their %lac# of& economic and political power to decrease hazard vulnerability. This pattern is very common in developing countries such as >razil, where "avelas are located in flood plains and on landslide-prone slopes because the residents cannot afford to purchase homes in safer areas. There also are problems in the adoption of effective hazard ad8ustments. Ene of these arises from households and businesses concentration of hazard e posure %i.e., having physical and financial assets located only in the ris# area&. 7iversification is an effective way of avoiding concentration of hazard vulnerability, but low-income households and small businesses often have so few physical or financial assets that they cannot afford to locate some of them in safer areas. 1azard insurance is problematic because it tends to suffer from adverse selection, which means that only those who are at the greatest ris# are li#ely to purchase it %Gunreuther, ())@&. 3oreover, the actions of one party can sometimes increase the vulnerability of another. In floodplains, upstream development cuts down trees and replaces it with hardscape, thus increasing the speed of rainfall runoff and downstream flooding. Technological protection wor#s such as dams and levees can offset such increases in hazard e posure, but many ris# area occupants overestimate the effectiveness of such hazard ad8ustments %1arding ; ,ar#er, ()?9&. This can cause further development of floodplains and, thus, increased hazard e posure that e ceeds the ris# reduction provided by the ad8ustment that was adopted. Conductin$ HVA 5it1 HAZUS%+H 1AI!$-31 %1AIards !$-3ulti 1azard& is a computer program that models potential losses from earth4ua#es, floods, and hurricane winds. 1AI!$-31 uses 2I$ software to analyze and display data on estimated structural damage and economic loss estimates for buildings and infrastructure. It also provides estimates of the casualties resulting from earth4ua#es. 1AI!$-31 can be used to conduct analyses in support of hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and recovery preparedness planning.

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In addition, 1AI!$-31 can be used to conduct rapid analyses in support of postimpact emergency response and disaster recovery operations. 1AI!$-31 supports three levels of analysis. A +evel ( analysis uses national average data to produce appro imate results. Accordingly, a +evel ( analysis is best considered to be an initial screen that identifies the communities at highest ris#. A +evel - analysis ta#es refined data and hazard maps provided by the user to produce more accurate estimates. Input for a +evel - analysis is obtained from local emergency managers, urban and regional planners, and 2I$ professionals. A +evel / analysis uses community-specific parameters to produce the most accurate loss estimates. Input for a +evel / analysis is obtained from structural and geotechnical engineers, as well as other technical e perts to e amine threats such as dam brea#s and tsunamis. 7ata input to 1AI!$-31 is supported by the Inventory 'ollection Tool %In'A$T&, a >uilding Inventory Tool %>IT&, and "lood Information Tool %"IT&. In'A$T is a database that is designed to support the management of local building data needed for +evel - and +evel / analyses. >IT supports the importation of building data from large files %e.g., over (..,... records from a ta assessor data file&. "IT allows users to transform flood data to the 1AI!$ flood models re4uired format. 1AI!$-31 has separate models for earth4ua#es, floods, and hurricane winds. The earth4ua#e model accounts for ground motion and ground failure= the flood model accounts for flood fre4uency, depth, and discharge velocity. The hurricane model accounts for wind pressure, missile damage, and rain. 7irect damage can be calculated for the general building stoc#, essential facilities, high potential loss facilities, transportation facilities, and lifelines. Induced damage can be estimated for fire following, hazmat release, and debris generation. 7irect losses can be estimated for the cost of repair, income loss, crop damage, casualties, shelter needs, and recovery needs. Indirect losses include supply shortages, sales declines, opportunity costs, and economic losses. These impact modules are most complete for earth4ua#e %only the crop loss module is unavailable& and floods %only the fire following and casualties modules are unavailable&. The hurricane model has the fewest features %direct damage to the general building stoc#, essential facilities and high potential loss facilities, induced damage from hazmat release, debris generation, direct losses from cost of repair/replacement, shelter needs, and recovery needs&. 1AI!$-31 can be used in multihazard analyses that provide average annualized loss and probabilistic results from the three hazard models %earth4ua#e, flood, and wind&. 1AI!$-31 can also lin# to e ternal models for blast, radiological, chemical, and biological hazards. "urther information about 1AI!$-31 is available from the 1AI!$ <esource 'enter located at www.fema.gov/hazus. This source includes data on 1AI!$-31 hardware and software re4uirements, manuals, case studies, and contacts for membership in users groups. T1e Communit* Vu.ner!/i.it* A""e""ment Too. The :EAA 'oastal $ervices 'enter also provides guidance on conducting community vulnerability assessment on their website www.csc.noaa.gov/products/nchaz/startup.htm. "irst, the hazard identi"ication module as#s the user to list the communitys hazards and rate each of them on a (-5 scale in terms of its fre4uency and area impact %these scores are added together& and potential damage magnitude %this score is multiplied by the sum of the previous two factors& to produce a total score for each hazard. $econd, the hazard analysis module recommends using ris# maps to identify areas within the users 8urisdiction that vary in their degree of ris# from each hazard and to rate each of these areas on a (5 scale in terms of its ris#. Third, the critical "acilities analysis module prompts the user to identify the

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communitys critical facilities and develop an inventory listing each facilitys type, name, address, and other important information. This module concludes by identifying facilities located in the highest ris# areas %which were identified in the hazard analysis module&. "ourth, the societal analysis module is designed to identify neighborhoods re4uiring special consideration because they are high in social vulnerability %refer to Table *-5 for sample criteria&. This module continues with an analysis of the neighborhoods located in the highest ris# areas %which were identified in the hazard analysis module&. The module concludes with an inventory of the special consideration/high ris# locations listing the neighborhood name, location, and other important information such as the number of households and the nature of their needs. "ifth, the economic analysis module identifies the principal economic sectors in the community and their geographic locations. This module continues with an analysis of the identification of the businesses that are located in the highest ris# areas %which were identified in the hazard analysis module&. The module concludes with an inventory of economic sector/high ris# locations listing the economic sector name, location, and other important information such as the number of businesses, individual businesses having the most employees, and the nature of these businesses vulnerabilities %e.g., the length of time they can operate without infrastructure&. $i th, the environmental analysis module prompts users to identify locations of secondary hazards %e.g., hazardous materials& and #ey environmental resources %e.g., wetlands&. This module continues with an analysis of the identification of the secondary hazards and #ey environmental resources that are located in the highest ris# areas %identified in the hazard analysis module&. The module concludes with an inventory of locations at which secondary hazards located in the primary hazard areas could affect #ey environmental resources by their pro imity. The module concludes with an inventory of secondary hazard sites and their addition to the critical facilities list. $eventh, the mitigation opportunities analysis identifies undeveloped land in high hazard areas to support development of mitigation strategies focused on new development. It also encourages review of the communitys status in the :ational "lood Insurance ,rogram %:"I,&. The 'oastal $ervices 'enter Ceb site also contains an overview of +I7A< %+Ight 7etection And <anging& beach mapping to obtain highly accurate elevation data. It also describes a damage assessment tool for rapid postimpact that allows personnel to retrieve parcel data in a 2I$ database and integrate it with "63A damage assessment forms. "inally, the Ceb site also e plains how remote sensing can be used to provide broad area views of the impact area after a disaster stri#es. An!.*,in$ !nd Di""emin!tin$ H!,!rd-Vu.ner!/i.it* D!t! The widespread availability of powerful des#top computers provides an important method for conducting hazard/vulnerability analyses in identifying areas at ris# %7ash, ())?= 2riffith, ()@*= >er#e, +arsen and <uch, ()@9& and pro8ecting the damages resulting from a ma8or incident %"rench, ()@*= 1aney, ()@*= $cawthorne, ()@*&. To accomplish these tas#s, emergency managers can use software such as 2I$ %6nvironmental $ystems <esearch Institute, -...&, 'A36E %:ational $afety 'ouncil, ())5&, A+E1A %"63A, no date, a&, and 1AI!$ %:ational Institute for >uilding $ciences, ())@&. In addition, des#top computers provide emergency managers with a powerful tool for obtaining hazard/vulnerability data from the Ceb sites of many government agencies, university research centers, private sector organizations, and :2Es. In particular, the Internet has become an important means of obtaining the data needed for conducting 1DAs and disseminating their results0a technological development that is important for three reasons. "irst, federal and state agencies have generated many hazard analysis documents, maps, and databases that already are in digital form and are available to put

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onto Ceb sites. $econd, $63A Ceb sites can be lin#ed electronically to other organizations Ceb sites, thus allowing users to immediately access additional hazard analysis information that might otherwise ta#e months to obtain if they were to re4uest it in paper copy. Third, hazard analyses disseminated over the Internet can be updated fre4uently and, by avoiding the printing costs associated with hundreds of paper copies, can be disseminated less e pensively. Analyzing Hazard5Vulnerability ata 7espite the great promise of computers in analyzing and disseminating hazard/ vulnerability data, there is little documentation of the e tent to which these tools are actually being used. $ome indication of the degree to which progress remains to be made can be seen in +indell and ,errys %-..(& data from +6,' 'hairs in Illinois, Indiana, and 3ichigan indicating that only 5)F of the +6,'s had calculated DIs around their communities hazmat facilities. Ef those who had calculated DIs, only /*F had used computer models such as 'A36E %:ational $afety 'ouncil, ())5& or A<'1I6 %"ederal 6mergency 3anagement Agency, no date, a& to perform the analyses. Thus, only a small fraction of the +6,'s used computer-based methods to calculate DIs. In addition, there were differences among types of computer use, with some +6,'s using computerized databases more e tensively for the management of data on chemical hazards %i.e., chemical inventories at local plants& and community emergency response resources than did other 8urisdictions. Thus, these data, though very limited in scope, indicate local emergency management agencies have a long way to go in using emergency management information technology to its fullest advantage. SE%A issemination o" Hazard5Vulnerability ata Via 2eb Sites A recent e amination of $63As Ceb sites revealed that most $63As provide some hazard analysis information %1wang, et al., -..(&. The most commonly addressed hazards on $63A Ceb sites were hurricane, earth4ua#e, flood, fire, tornado, hazardous material, storm, terrorism, drought, and radiological material %see Table *-*&. This list includes some of the most significant hazards, as indicated by the fact that of the 9*@ ,residential 7isaster 7eclarations between Oanuary, ())- and $eptember ())), (?- were for storms, (?. for floods, 5@ were for tornadoes, /? were for hurricanes, (? were for blizzards, 5 each were for fires and earth4ua#es, and 9 were for landslides. 1owever, many states that are vulnerable to these hazards failed to address them and there are other hazards that were not addressed on $63As Ceb sites that also should receive attention. T!/.e 6%6. 1azard Agents and their "re4uency of 3ention on $63A Ceb $ites
Ha ard Agent Hurricane Eart%1ua+e ,lood ,ire (ornado Ha ardous material Storm (errorism 2roug%t !adiological material 9eneral -olcano Source: H)ang/ et al? (200=)? !ecords A0 @0 33 2> 2> 2C 22 =A =@ =3 > D Percent =A?'G =2?AG =0?3G >?0G >?0G D?@G '?>G @?CG @?@G @?0G 2?DG 2?AG Ha ard Agent Heat Structure failure (sunami Landslide E#plosion Avalanc%e Erosion *lig%t ,ree e 4eteor Pollution (otal !ecords D ' @ 3 3 2 2 = = = = 32= Percent 2?AG =?>G =?2G 0?>G 0?>G 0?'G 0?'G 0?3G 0?3G 0?3G 0?3G =00?00

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This study also identified (?9 lin#ages from $63A Ceb sites to secondary sources. Table *-? shows the Ceb sites for "63A %-@ lin#s&, :ational Eceanographic and Atmospheric Administration %(@ lin#s& and !$ 2eological $urvey %(/ lin#s& received the largest number of lin#s. Another () sites received between two and five lin#s from $63A Ceb sites and 8ust over 9.F of the secondary sources identified in the study received lin#s from only a single $63A web site. Ta#en together, the data from Tables *-* and *-? indicate that there is a very erratic pattern to the dissemination of hazard analysis information on $63A Ceb sites. T!/.e 6%6' ,ercentage of all +in#s Accounted for by 6ach $econdary $ource.
Secondary Source Source: H)ang/ et al? (200=)? ,ederal Emergency 4anagement Administration 3ational ;ceanograp%ic and Atmosp%eric Administration :S 9eological Survey American !ed 8ross :S 2epartment of Healt% and Human Services :S ,orest Service 0eat%er :nderground 8enters for 2isease 8ontrol and Prevention/ 2epartment of (ransportation Environmental Protection Agency ,lorida 2ivision of ,orestry &nstitute of 9lo$al Environment and Society 3ational 2roug%t 4itigation 8enter 3ational ,ire Protection Association 3e) England States Emergency 8onsortium 3ort% 8arolina Emergency 4anagement Agency :S 3uclear !egulatory 8ommission ;+la%oma 4esonet)or+ Stormdisplay?com (ornado ProHect :niversity of &llinois 2ept? of Atmosp%eric Sciences 0eat%er 8%annel (otal 0e$ Address (:!L) )))?fema?gov )))?noaa?gov )))?usgs?gov )))?redcross?org )))?%%s?gov )))?fs?fed?us )))?)underground?com )))?cdc?gov %a mat?dot?gov )))?epa?gov fl"dof?com grads?iges?org droug%t?unl?edu )))?nfpa?org )))?nesec?org )))?dem?dcc?state?nc?us )))?nrc?gov )))?mesonet?ou?edu )))?stormdisplay?com )))?tornadoproHect?com )))?atmos?uiuc?edu )))?)eat%er?com Percent ='?0> =0?3@ C?@C 2?DC =?C2 =?C2 =?C2 =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A =?=A A>?20

'uriously, there was not a very strong correspondence between states hazard e posure and their $63A Ceb sites dissemination of information about those hazards. $pecifically, analysis of si highly probable or highly damaging hazards %storm, flood, tornado, hurricane, earth4ua#e, and landslide& shows substantial variation across states and hazards in the degree to which hazard analysis information on $63A Ceb sites corresponded to those states hazard vulnerability and recent disaster e perience. Table *-@ indicates most $63As failed even to address many common hazard agents on their Ceb sites and less common hazards such as tsunami, structure failures, landslides, and avalanche are generally neglected even though they also have the potential for significant impacts. $ome plausible e planations for the inade4uate coverage of these hazard agents in $63A Ceb sites are addressed below. Some E%As may lac* the resources to deliver in"ormation through the Internet. 1wang and his colleagues %-..(& found two $63As had no Ceb sites, but this is li#ely to be a problem affecting other 63As as well because 7rabe# %())(d& found insufficient technical staff, as well as hardware and (@/

software limitations, are impediments to emergency management agency adoption of emergency management information technology. 7rabe#s findings are consistent with the data from 1wang, et al %-..(&, which indicate $63As with little or no hazard information on their Ceb sites tend to be those from rural states with small budgets. Thus, they have few financial resources for purchasing computer hardware and software and either hiring computer support staff or contracting with outside organizations for Ceb site development. Ene possible way of overcoming the problem of staff limitations would be for national- or state-level professional organizations such as :63A or IA63 to establish basic guidance for the development and maintenance of hazard analysis Ceb sites. The availability of hazard analysis information on $63A Ceb sites could be significantly improved if one of these professional organizations were to establish a list of 4ualified contractors that could wor# with the states to upgrade their Ceb sites. A longer-term solution would be for universities offering programs in emergency management to emphasize emergency management information technology within their curricula so that state and local agencies would have a pool of applicants who are technically 4ualified in this area. T!/.e 6%7. <elationship between 1azard 6 posure and Ceb $ite <ecords.
Ha ard 3um$er of e#posed states 3um$er of states )it% maHor disaster declarations 3um$er of states )it% %a ard analysis records =A =D =C =2 =' = 8orrelation of e#posure )it% %a ard analysis records "0?=2 0?03 0?22 0?A3II 0?3DI "0?=2 8orrelation of disasters )it% %a ard analysis records "0?0@ "0?0D 0?=C 0?DAII 0?=' "0?03

Storm 2D @C ,lood 2A @' (ornado 23 2@ Hurricane =3 =C Eart%1ua+e =' 2 Landslide 22 3 Source: Lindell/ et al? (2002)? *p J ?0AK II p J ?0=

Some E%As may thin* a hazard analysis 2eb site is unnecessary because people already *no( about most common hazards such as storms and "loods. This rationale is entirely inappropriate because people fre4uently have inaccurate beliefs about hazards, mis8udge their personal vulnerability, and lac# information about methods of protecting themselves %+indell ; ,erry, -...= +indell ; >arnes, ()@*= $lovic, et al., ()?9= Chitney, et al., -..9&. Indeed, it is precisely because local emergency managers and the public lac# accurate hazard information that federal agencies such as "63A and !$2$ disseminate this information. Some E%As may not believe that the Internet is an e""ective method o" disseminating hazard analysis in"ormation. There is some validity to this belief because Internet access, though e tensive, is far from universal for local emergency managers and the public. :onetheless, Internet access is rapidly becoming more widespread and the number of people who can be reached by this communications medium is becoming increasingly large. This is especially true among younger population segments that have spent their entire lives using computers. 3oreover, cost4e""ectiveness is a ma8or incentive for 63As to increase their use of the Internet. 63As bear essentially no reproduction or distribution costs because users pay their Internet $ervice ,roviders for access to the Ceb site and there is a cost of printing only if the users decide hard copy is needed. "inally, electronic dissemination is advantageous for local emergency managers because they can Acut and pasteB portions of the hazard analysis information from the $63A Ceb site into their own local hazard/vulnerability analyses.

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Some E%As may provide little hazard in"ormation on their 2eb sites because they already distribute this in"ormation through other media. This rationale has some validity because, for e ample, many states that are vulnerable to hurricanes distribute brochures containing maps of ris# areas and hurricane survival tips. 1owever, this e planation ignores the fact that hazard analysis information developed for distribution through other channels can be adapted 4uite readily and ine pensively to a Ceb site. $imilarly, hazard analysis information received from other sources %e.g., <ed 'ross disaster preparedness brochures& is becoming available on those organizations Ceb sites and 63As only need to establish a lin# to that information. A cost-effective method for disseminating hazard analysis information would be to provide detailed information on the state Ceb site and publicize the address of this Ceb site through other media such as one-page maps and leaflets, newspaper articles, and radio and television public service announcement. E%As might overloo* hazard agents (ith (hich they have little or no recent disaster experience. This does not appear to be the case because more commonly e perienced hazards such as storms receive less attention than more dramatic agents such as hurricanes and earth4ua#es. The problem seems to be that 63As simply are not providing enough hazard information themselves, or lin#ing to others who do provide that information. Conclusions. 3ost 63As are underutilizing an important channel for delivering hazard analysis information to local emergency managers and the public. As mentioned earlier, it is li#ely that the demand for Ceb-based hazard information will increase over the time. According to "63A %www.fema.gov&, Internet users visited "63As hurricane-related Ceb sites more than (.-5 million times in the wee# after 1urricane >ertha hit the !$ in ())*. <ecognized authorities, such as emergency management agencies and ma8or research centers, need to play an important role in disseminating hazardrelated information %"ischer, ())@&. $63A Ceb sites can play an important role in meeting this need by helping local emergency planners collect needed information rapidly and easily= +63A Ceb sites can add value by providing information that is specific to their 8urisdictions. In both cases, 63A Ceb sites can help local residents recognize their e posure to natural and technological hazards. This can motivate them to adopt hazard ad8ustments that would reduce their vulnerability to these threats. In the course of e amining $63A Ceb sites, 1wang, et al. %-..(& observed a number of recurring deficiencies. $ome of these related to the content of the hazard analysis information, while other deficiencies arose from the way in which the Ceb pages were structured. Table *-) lists (@ recommendations for improving the presentation of hazard analysis information on 63A Ceb sites. These recommendations are specifically directed toward improving the usability of those portions of a Ceb site accessed by the public, but do not address many of the general issues of Ceb site design that are covered in great detail elsewhere %e.g., :ielsen, -...&. ,ocal 6tilization o" Hazard Analysis 2eb Sites In addition to #nowing what is on $63A Ceb sites, it is important to be aware of the sources local emergency managers use to obtain their hazard analysis information and the e tent to which local government agencies utilize different emergency management information technology applications. A recent survey of Te as emergency managers and land use planners found over one-third of the responding local government agencies use few sources of hazard analysis information and that nearly one-third use no hazard analysis information at all %+indell, et al., -..-&. Ef those who do use hazard analysis information, two-thirds of the materials used are printed documents and only one-third of the materials

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used were obtained from the Internet. The relative importance of different Ceb sites can be seen in Table *-(., which shows respondents ratings of the e tent to which they used each agencys Ceb site. T!/.e 6%8.
!ecogni e t%at your 0e$ site )ill $e considered an aut%oritative source $y users/ )%ic% means t%at you %ave a responsi$ility for ensuring t%e accuracy of t%e information you provide? !ecogni e t%at a 0e$ site transmits information directly to t%e pu$lic )it%out passing t%roug% t%e usual print (ne)spapers and maga ines) and electronic (television and radio) ne)s media? (%is reduces message distortion/ $ut re1uires a %ig% standard of clarity and organi ation? 8oordinate t%e information provided t%roug% your 0e$ site )it% t%e guidelines in t%e !ed 8rossLs Talking about Disaster: Guide for Standard Messages ()))?redcross?org<disaster<safety<guide?%tml)? (%is guideMa Hoint effort of t%e !ed 8ross/ ,E4A/ 3ational 0eat%er Service/ and ot%er organi ationsMis designed to standardi e disaster information provided $y aut%oritative sources so t%ey do not issue conflicting messages? Address all significant %a ards to )%ic% your Hurisdiction is vulnera$le/ $ut also provide information a$out t%e li+eli%ood of maHor events so t%at people can Hudge )%ic% ones deserve t%e greatest priority? 2isplay t%is information on maps to s%o) )%ere t%ese %a ards are most li+ely to occur? Provide non"tec%nical e#planations of t%e p%ysical aspects of %a ards (e?g?/ %o) %urricanes form and %o) )ind/ rain/ and surge $e%avior affects t%e $uilt environment) to %elp people understand )%at )ill %appen and )%y it )ill %appen? Provide information a$out %a ard impacts so users can understand %o) a disaster )ill affect t%eir communities? &mportant information a$out %a ard impact includes t%e speed of onset/ scope and duration of impact/ and t%e magnitude of different types of conse1uences suc% as casualties (deat%s and inHuries)/ property damage/ and economic impacts (disruption to industrial/ commercial/ agricultural/ and governmental activity)? Provide information t%at personalizes t%e potential conse1uences for t%e vie)ers? (%ese include t%e cumulative pro$a$ility of $eing affected during t%e different periods of time t%at a person )ould live in a ris+ area (e?g?/ =0/ 20/ and 30 year intervals)? Provide a 0e$ site inde# or ta$le of contents to %elp users find needed information 1uic+ly and effectively? &f your 0e$ site is very large/ provide a searc% engine for locating topics of interest? Provide lin+s to ot%er emergency"related information suc% as situation reports a$out current incidents and information availa$le from ot%er local/ state and federal emergency"related organi ations? Provide information a$out %a ard adHustmentsMactions people can ta+e to protect t%emselves/ t%eir families/ and t%eir property from environmental %a ards? E#plain %o) effective t%ese actions are in protecting persons and property/ )%et%er t%ey are useful for ot%er purposes/ %o) muc% t%ey cost/ )%at +no)ledge/ s+ills/ tools/ and ot%er resources t%ey re1uire? 2escri$e t%e specific steps re1uired to perform any unfamiliar actions? ;rgani e any lin+s to ot%er 0e$ sites $y referring t%e user to t%e page t%at addresses a specific topic/ not to an organi ationLs %ome page? ,or e#ample/ nonspecific lin+s to ,E4A and !ed 8ross %ome pages are of little %elp $ecause t%ese sites contain t%ousands of pages of information? Beep te#t clear and succinct? :se suita$ly large and legi$le fonts and simple color design sc%emes so t%e information is easy to read? Provide enoug% figures and pictures to e#plain t%e te#t and maintain interest/ $ut avoid overuse of pictorial materials $ecause t%is can cause t%e information to do)nload so slo)ly t%at users $ecome frustrated and a$andon t%eir information searc%? Ensure your 0e$ site is compliant )it% t%e Americans )it% 2isa$ilities Act/ )%ic% re1uires pictures and grap%s to $e descri$ed in )ords and t%at your site $e naviga$le )it%out a mouse? 4a+e it easy for vie)ers to do)nload information $y attac%ing documents in P2, or maHor )ord processor (e?g?/ 0ord PerfectN or 4S"0ordN) format? &nclude contact information )it% postal and e"mail addresses/ telep%one num$ers/ and fa# num$ers of persons from )%om users can o$tain additional information or to )%om t%ey can offer suggestions? Pu$lici e your 0e$ site $y see+ing cross"lin+s )it% ne)s media 0e$ sites/ $y notifying ot%er state and local organi ations/ and listing t%e 0e$ site :!L on %a ard a)areness materials suc% as %urricane maps/ refrigerator magnets/ or preparedness c%ec+lists? -erify t%at your server can %andle elevated demand for information during an emergency? Ensure t%at %ig% demand )ill not degrade t%e functionality of %ost organi ationLs internal emergency management information system or of any emergency management information net)or+ residing on t%at server?

<ecommendations for 1azard Analysis Ceb $ites.

These data indicate "63A, $63As, and 6,A are the most popular sources of hazard analysis information, but the sources differ in the ways that they are used. The respondents used slightly more print than electronic resources from 6,A and noticeably more print than electronic resources from "63A. 1owever, the preference is reversed for the other federal agencies0:EAA/:C$, and !$2$0 that are accessed only in electronic form. Ene plausible e planation for this pattern of results is that "63A disseminates a large volume of hazard analysis information in print and targets much of this information for state and local government agencies. In addition, "63A has an e tensive Ceb site that (@*

contains information on all phases of emergency management and also real-time emergency and disaster information. >y contrast, :EAA and :C$ tend to be better #nown among local government agencies for real-time weather and flood forecasts than for long-term hazard analysis information. These uses, obviously, would tend to promote electronic rather than print access. T!/.e 6%&9' 3ean 6 tent of Internet $ite Access by +ocal 2overnment Agencies.
0e$ site ,ederal Emergency 4anagement Agency 3at? ;cean? and Atmos? Admin? State 2ivision of Emergency 4anagement State 2epartment of Healt% :S Environmental Protection Agency State 3at? !es? and 8ons? 8omm? Emer? 4grs? 0eat%er &nformation 3et)or+ :S 2epartment of (ransportation 3ational Hurricane 8enter American !ed 8ross Source: H)ang/ et al? (200=)? E#tent of use 2?>0 2?>2 2?D@ 2?'= 2?AC 2?AA 2?23 2?20 2?0C =?>C 0e$ site :S 9eological Survey &nt? Assn? of Emergency 4anagers :S 2epartment of Agriculture Emer? Plan? &nfo? E#c%ange *ureau of t%e 8ensus 3at? Emer? 4gmt Assn? State 2epartment of Agriculture Salvation Army Small *usiness Administration :S 3uclear !egulatory 8ommission E#tent of use =?>= =?D> =?D' =?DA =?D3 =?C@ =?'D =?AC =?@= =?2C

>y contrast, !$2$ tends to be better #nown among local government agencies for long-term hazard analysis information than for real-time forecasts. This might seem to favor print over electronic access, but !$2$ is not as active as "63A in disseminating its reports to local government agencies. 'onse4uently, its reports tend to be rather difficult to access in print, but much of the essential information is available on the agencys Ceb site. 2iven the increasing popularity of the Internet, with its advantages of low cost dissemination and ease of fre4uent updates, it would seem advisable for federal and state agencies to increase their reliance on the Internet to disseminate hazard analysis information. 1owever, the data from this survey indicate that hazard analysis information should not be distributed e clusively through electronic channels because there is a significant portion of the audience for this information that still uses print media. "urther research is needed to determine whether local government agencies prefer to use paper documents even though they could 8ust as easily access them electronically= whether they lac# reliable hardware, software, or trained personnel to access these documents on the Internet= or whether the information on the Internet is too poorly organized for them to ma#e effective use of it. Ether data from +indell, et al. %-..-& reveal a hierarchy of computer applications ranging from the most popular, word processing, to the least popular, hazard modeling %Table *-((&. 3oreover, these computer applications can be divided into three categories. The most fre4uently used applications are word processing, email, Internet connection, databases, and spreadsheets. The second category is graphics, des#top publishing, pro8ect accounting, presentation graphics, and statistical analysis. The least fre4uently used applications are 2I$ and mapping, 'A36E, Ceb page design, and hazard modeling. Interestingly, agencies become increasingly involved with all members of one computer application type as soon as they begin to use one member of that type. "or e ample, agencies do not appear to use applications in 'ategory / until after they have begun to use 'ategories ( and - e tensively. This finding is consistent with the notion of Atraining transferB %"ord ; $chmitt, -...& in which the mastery of less difficult technologies provides the basis for learning how to use more comple technologies. This suggests state emergency management agencies can increase the utilization of more

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comple computer applications such as 2I$ and hazard modeling by first ensuring that local government agencies have mastered more basic applications such as databases and spreadsheets. In addition, the statistically significant differences between local emergency managers and land use planners in the utilization of 2I$, mapping, and Ceb site design suggest emergency managers should be encouraged to see# partnerships with land use planners to obtain the products of these technologies. Indeed, the fact that land use planners have consistently greater e perience with all forms of information technology suggests that such partnerships could be beneficial in many ways. T!/.e 6%&&. "re4uency of 'omputer Application !se by 6mergency 3anagement 'oordinators and +and !se ,lanners.
Emergency 4anagement 8oordinators @?23 @?0A 3?C0 3?A' 3?@@ 2?D3 2?C@ 2?@> 2?2A 2?2@ =?>D =?>' =?CC =?CA Land :se Planners @?DA A?00 @?@2 @?3A @?2C @?0D 3?20 3?0@ 3?@' 2?D= 3?A@ =?>C 2?@' =?CA Statistical Significance ;f 2ifference tD> O 2?3=/ p J ?0A t>0 O 3?=@/ p J ?0= tDD O 2?=0/ p J ?0A tDD O 2?@=/ p J ?0A tDD O 2?AD/ p J ?0A tDD O 3?'=/ p J ?00= tDD O =?2A/ ns tDA O =?@'/ ns tDD O 3?D=/ p J ?00= tDC O =?C'/ ns tD' O @?=C/ p J ?00= tD> O 0?2C/ ns tDD O 2?3>/ p J ?0A tD' O 0?00/ ns

(ype ;f 8omputer Application =? 0ord processing 2? Email 3? &nternet connection @? 2ata$ases A? Spreads%eets '? 9rap%ics C? 2es+top pu$lis%ing D? ProHect accounting >? Presentation =0? Statistical analysis ==? 9&S and mapping =2? 8A4E; =3? 0e$page design =@? Ha ard modeling Source: Lindell/ et al? (2002)?

In summary, these data suggest that federal and state agencies should provide increasing amounts of hazard analysis information on their Ceb sites, but that the transition from print to electronic media should not e ceed the ability of local government agencies to access the Internet. This is particularly li#ely to be a problem for smaller and poorer 8urisdictions %Huarantelli, ())?& 3oreover, federal and state agencies should consider facilitating local emergency managers access to hazard analysis information by utilizing the computer applications with which their target audience is most familiar. At present, these are databases, spreadsheets, and Internet connections to agency Ceb sites. +ocal emergency managers are more li#ely to ma#e use of sophisticated hazard modeling applications such as A+E1A %"ederal 6mergency 3anagement Agency, no date, a& and 1AI!$ %:ational Institute of >uilding $ciences. ())@& if they have successfully mastered more basic computer applications or if they have partnered with land use planners in their communities who have mastered the advanced computer applications. A""e""in$ Ri": A ma8or problem in applying the methods of 1DA is ris# and uncertainty. "63As %())?& %ulti4 Hazard Identi"ication and !is* Analysis, together with information from state and federal agency Ceb sites, can be used to identify the hazard agents to which a community is e posed. This is a good start, but it seems insufficient. +ogic suggests that an emergency manager should consider the probability of a disaster rather than 8ust the possibility that it could occur. After all, an event that has a 5.F chance of occurrence should be given more attention than one that has only a (F chance of occurrence.

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!nfortunately, there are many difficulties in analyzing ris# %"rosdic#, ())?&. The desired probabilities fre4uently have not been calculated %e.g., the probability of a hazardous materials transportation accident in a given 8urisdiction&, are highly uncertain %e.g., the probability of a 'ategory 5 hurricane stri#e is difficult to estimate because the (5. year historical record is too short&, are unreliable %e.g., the true probability of a ma8or flood is often higher than its nominal value because upstream development is increasing the probabilities to an un#nown e tent&, or are not available for disclosure even if they have been calculated %e.g., the probability of a release from a to ic chemical plant is information the owner wont share, in part for security reasons&. 3oreover, "igure *-( indicates that even if one #new the probability of an event, there is significant uncertainty about the magnitude of its physical impacts. That is, #nowledge that there is a -.F probability of a hurricane stri#e in the coming year is of limited use because different hurricane categories have substantially different impacts and, indeed, disaster impacts can vary significantly within hurricane categories. In general, the number of casualties from a hurricane depends not only on storm characteristics %including forward movement speed and trac# stability&, but also on the size and distribution of the population at ris# %which is greater on holiday wee#ends than midwee# during the fall& and authorities ability to evacuate the ris# area. $imilarly, the amount of damage to structures depends not only on the wind speed and surge depth %which can be estimated from a hurricanes $affir-$impson category&, but also on the amount of inland flooding %which is unrelated to its $affir-$impson category&. "or e ample, Tropical $torm Allison had a devastating impact on 1ouston because it stalled over the city and rained for days even though it never reached hurricane wind speed. "inally, "igure *-( indicates that even if one #new the probability of an events physical impacts, there is significant uncertainty about the magnitude of its social impacts. $ome communities recover rapidly from disaster impact whereas others 0sometimes ones with less damage and fewer casualties0never recover. In summary, local emergency managers cannot currently obtain precise information about their communities hazard vulnerability and such information is unli#ely to be available in the near future. This might seem to be a very pessimistic view of the usefulness of 1DAs but, in fact, it is not. <ather, it simply recognizes the current limitations in the state of 1DA technology and %4uite probably& inherent limitations in the resources local emergency managers can devote to this activity. 1owever, it is important to recognize that emergency managers can still do their 8obs effectively even if they lac# e tremely precise 1DA data. This is because managers in general, and emergency managers in particular, only need enough information to ma#e decisions about the allocation of the resources under their control or to 8ustify obtaining more resources to do their 8obs better. Thus, emergency managers need enough 1DA data to decide how to allocate their e isting resources to different emergency management activities such as hazard mitigation, emergency response preparedness, and disaster recovery preparedness. Indeed, 1DA data alone would be insufficient to ma#e these resource allocation decisions because different hazard agents to which a community is e posed impose similar demands. 'onse4uently, investments in those emergency management activities have payoffs for many different hazards. "or e ample, all hazards re4uire a capability for incident management actions such as establishing coordination among organizations that are normally independent of each other and most hazards re4uire a capability for population protection actions such as evacuating local residents. Thus, investments in the communitys capability for evacuation might reduce vulnerability more than investments in hazard mitigation activities %which generally affect vulnerability to only a single hazard&.

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If so, the 1DA only needs to be specific enough for emergency managers to persuade themselves that the allocation of resources among emergency management activities is appropriate. 6mergency managers also need 1DA data to lobby for increased budget allocations to emergency management rather than to other community activities such as education, health care, and transportation. In this case, the 1DA should be specific enough for emergency managers to successfully persuade other sta#eholders that an increase in the emergency management budget will benefit the community more than allocating that money to some other activity. This is not a trivial problem because, as noted in previous chapters, emergency managers must lobby for money to solve "uture problems, which is inherently more difficult than lobbying for money to solve current problems. In summary, emergency managers need to allocate 8ust enough time and money to 1DA to achieve the precision needed to achieve their budget allocation and budget augmentation ob8ectives. C!"e Stud*; Hurric!ne HVA )or t1e Te<!" =u.) Co!"t "or many years, the Te as A;3 !niversity 1azard <eduction ; <ecovery 'enter conducted hurricane 1DAs for the Te as 2overnors 7ivision of 6mergency 3anagement. The results of these 1DAs have been published in the form of hurricane storm atlases %%Te as 2overnors 7ivision of 6mergency 3anagement, -..9&, contingency planning guides %Te as 2overnors 7ivision of 6mergency 3anagement, -..-a, -..-b&, and evacuation maps. These hurricane 1DAs include the analyses of hazard e posure and physical vulnerability described in previous sections of this chapter. 6ach hurricane 1DA begins with data generated by the :ational 1urricane 'enters $ea, +a#e, and Everland $urges from 1urricanes %$+E$10 Oelesnians#i, 'hen ; $haeffer, ())-& model. $+E$1 uses data on coastal topography and bathymetry %the topography of the sea floor& and storm parameters %$affir-$impson 'ategory, forward movement speed, and storm trac#& as input to a comple computer model of hurricane behavior. $+E$1 output comprises tables of surge height over time for a series of locations spaced appro imately e4uidistantly along the coast. The data in these tables represent average surge heights over a large number of simulated hurricane scenarios within those storm parameters. Analysts import the $+E$1 output data into a 2I$ that already contains data on coastal topography, political boundaries, physical features %e.g., rivers and la#es&, census data, and facility locations. The $+E$1 data are first overlaid onto the topographical data layer to compute surge depths. This calculation subtracts the ground elevation %in feet above sea level& from the surge height %also in feet above sea level& to compute surge depth %in feet above the grounds surface&. 'omputation of the surge depth data allows the analyst to create a map that identifies the e pected surge inundation boundary and plot surge depth contours. As will be discussed below, these maps allow emergency managers to identify populations and facilities at ris# from surge flooding. The storm surge data are also used to generate hydrographs that plot the hourly surge heights %from -9 hours before to (- hours after landfall& at #ey coastal locations for hurricanes of varying $affir-$impson category, forward movement speed, and trac# direction. This information allows local officials to identify locations where early flooding is li#ely to interrupt evacuations. The analysts also used Gaplan and 7e3arias %())5& Inland Cind 7ecay 3odel to generate contours of the one-minute sustained surface wind speeds at different distances from the coastline %+indell, ,rater ; Ihang, -..(&. These sustained surface wind speed contours, which are mapped as a function of hurricane category and forward movement speed, are translated into e pected pea# gusts by

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applying wind gusting factors. These maps allow emergency managers to identify populations and facilities at ris# from wind damage. Ence the surge and wind contours have been generated, they are used to define e posure zones that vary in their threat to facilities that provide essential services or #ey care services. $uch facilities include those performing communications, power generation, water/sewer treatment, transportation, public health and safety, and postdisaster sheltering functions. In addition, the e posure zones are used to identify facilities about which there are special concerns, especially industrial and hazardous materials facilities. 6ach facility is located on a map and its position indicated by a facility code %indicating its function&. In addition, analysts prepare a table listing each of the facilities, its location defined by an alpha-numeric code %e.g., 1*& indicating its location on the map grid, its latitude and longitude, its elevation, and the lowest hurricane category at which it is li#ely to be affected by surge flooding, waves over / feet, surge over * feet, or dangerous winds. Ether data are collected on highway capacity, population size and distribution, and coastal residents evacuation e pectations %+indell, et al., -..(& and integrated within an evacuation time estimation model %+indell ; ,rater, -..5= +indell, ,rater, ,erry ; Cu, -..-& to produce evacuation time estimates for different hurricane categories %+indell, ,rater ; Cu, -..-&. "inally, data are collected on inland counties evacuation guidance and transportation support for hurricane evacuees %,rater ; +indell, -..-&. All of these data can be used to estimate the level of damage and casualties that would be e pected from hurricanes. "or further information, see the Te as 2overnors 7ivision of 6mergency 3anagement Ceb site %www.t dps.state.t .us/dem/pages/planning.htm&.

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