CANON 10

ORBIT V. WCC The Court administers a reprimand to counsels for petitioner for not having pleaded and instead having suppressed from their statement of the case and of the questions of law involved in the petition material facts found in the respondent commission's decision sought to be appealed from, which show the petition's lack of merit. On June 13, 1974, Messrs. Sergio D. Vendero and Renerio R. Bartonico as counsel for petitioner filed the petition at bar for review of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission's decision and resolution directing petitioner to pay respondent-claimant (as grandchild-dependent of the deceased driver-employee) inter alia the principal sum of P4,360.00 as compensation and burial expenses. In their "summary statement of the matters involved," counsel claimed that the "questions of law involved" were:

In denying the petition for lack of merit, the Court accordingly in its resolution of June 28, 1974 required counsel to show cause why they "should not be disciplinary dealt with for suppressing from (their) statement of the case and questions of law involved in the petition the material facts found in the Workmen's Compensation Commission's decision 'that the amount of P5,000.00 claimed to be the compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo by the respondent (herein petitioner) is the proceeds of the insurance procured by the deceased with premiums paid from the daily income of the late Ramon Crespo' (at pages 3-4, WCC decision, Annex B, petition) and that the claim was an uncontroverted claim (at pages 4-5, idem) with the apparent intent of misleading the Court as to the merits of the petition.'" Counsel promptly filed their "explanation and apology" on July 11, 1974. They pleaded haste and time pressure (as indeed they filed the petition at bar within the original tenday reglementary period) and "begged forgiveness and promised to be more cautious and discreet in so filing a pleading with this Honorable Court or with any court, body or commission for that matter." They further sought to explain that "(T)hat matter of Payment of P5,000.00 being 'the

1. It was an error not to consider the payment of P5,000.00 in Philippine currency as full and complete payment of the compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo. 2. It was an error to disregard the express and obvious statement in Exhibit 1 of such payment. Counsel further contended that "in this particular case, the petitioner voluntarily paid the amount of P5,000.00 in cash as evidenced by Exhibit 1. Certainly, the Workmen's Compensation Commission or any government agency for that matter cannot say that voluntary payment and the evidence of such payment violate the provisions of Act 3428 simply because the same did not pass through its office," and that "(T)here can be no other conclusion but that the entire case hinges on the question of whether or not the payment of P5,000.00 in cash as evidenced by Exhibit 1 (Settlement and Release of Claim) is in full and complete compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Law. This matter is certainly a question of law." Upon consideration of the allegations of the petition and verifying the ratio decidendi of respondent commission's decision about which the petition was silent, the court found that material facts bearing on the petition's lack of merit had been suppressed.

proceeds of the insurance procured by the deceased with premiums paid from the daily income of the late Ramon Crespo' (at pages 3-4 WCC decision, Annex 'B') and the failure to controvert the claim were never touched and argued against in said petition because first, a copy of the decision was already attached to the petition forming part thereof; secondly, if the petition were given due course, the entire records of the case would be elevated to the Honorable court for evaluation; ...." While the Court is disposed under the circumstances to be lenient and to dispose of the grave transgressions of counsel with a reprimand and warning, the Court deems this a timely occasion to remind counsel in particular and practitioners in general that timepressure provides no justification for the suppression of material and vital facts which bear on the merit or lack of merit of a petition. The Court has time and again 1 stressed that members of the bar owe fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and that they must show faithful adherence to the provisions of Rule 7, section 5 that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" with the admonition therein that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."

The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is required so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided leaving the courts free to devote their time and attention to meritorious and truly contentious cases. In this, the attorney plays a major role of advising his client to refrain from seeking further appellate review and action in plainly untenable cases. Counsel's proffered excuse for their suppression of the material facts that the receipt signed by the deceased employee's heirs was in payment of the deceased's insurance (not compensation) and that respondent was entitled to the compensation award as the claim was uncontroverted, to wit, that a copy of respondent commission's decision was attached to the petition, manifestly violates the requirement of Rule 43, section 2 2 that "the petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the ground relied on for the petition ..." and that "the question raised must be distinctly set forth in the petition." Rule 8, section 1 lays down the fundamental rule on pleadings that "Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." 3 Hence, the Court has always stressed the long-standing fundamental doctrine of Caete vs. Wislizenus 4 that exhibits or annexes attached to a complaint or petition do not take the place of allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action (of the complaint or petition) which the pleader is under obligation to plead concisely and specifically as if his pleading had no annexes, under pain of peremptory dismissal of his complaint or petition. Justice Moreland thus succintly explained the rationale for this basic rule: "(A) court is not obliged, in order to know what the plaintiff's cause of action is, to search through a list of exhibits, more or less lengthy, and select what the court presumes the pleader intended to allege. The complaint itself must contain all of the facts necessary to establish plaintiff's cause of action so that when the court reads it can see upon the face of the complaint itself whether or not a cause of action is stated. If the pleader desires to refer to any motion or order or other proceeding and to make it a part of his complaint he must set out in the complaint itself the nature of the proceeding and the substance thereof in such a way as to show its relationship to and its effect upon the cause of action." It is plainly evident by the same token that material facts established in the annexes attached to the complaint or petition which disprove or are contrary to the very allegations of the pleader should not be suppressed in the pleader's statement of his case and of the issues involved but must be specifically averred so that the Court may

have before it a full and complete picture of the questions raised in the light of all the material facts fully found to have been established at the trial or hearing. ACCORDINGLY, the Court administers a reprimand to Attys. Sergio D. Vendero and Renerio R. Bartonico with the warning that a repetition of the same or other violations of their attorney's oath will be severely death with. Let copies of this resolution be entered in their personal record and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

CHAN KIAN V. ANGSIN

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Manila, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving a pure question of law. The appellate court's resolution of certification of September 19, 1967 gives the following backgrounder on the facts of the case: . Plaintiff's complaint before the CFI of Manila alleges, among other things, that on July 23, 1962, he entered into an agreement with defendant whereby, for and in consideration of the purchase price of P300.00 per drum, or a total of P120,000.00 which he received from defendant on the same date, he sold to defendant, for delivery on August 23, 1962, 400 drums of monosodium glutamate and that on August 23, 1962, he was ready to deliver the 400 drums of monosodium glutamate but defendant refused to accept delivery and insisted on the return of the P120,000.00 because the price of the said merchandise had already fallen in the local market, hence said complaint prays that defendant be ordered to receive from plaintiff 400 drums of monosodium glutamate, with damages. Arising from the same transaction is Criminal Case No. 67752, People vs. Chan Kian (herein plaintiff) before the same court, wherein herein defendant is the complainant, who accuses herein plaintiff with estafa involving the same 400 drums of monosodium glutamate and the sum of P120,000.00. On defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, which was opposed by plaintiff, and in view of the pendency of both criminal and civil cases between the same parties and over the same subject matter, the lower court ruled that the trial of the criminal case should take precedence over the civil case, "not only because the procedure provided for the prosecution of offenses is more adequate than civil procedure, but because the judgment which may be rendered in the criminal action may dispose of the civil action." The lower court also opined that giving preference to the criminal case would avoid multiplicity of suits and the possibility of a conflict of decision on the same issues, for it would be anomalous if the civil case is decided in favor of plaintiff and thereafter he gets convicted in the criminal case. Concluding that "only if the criminal case is tried first and the accused is acquitted would it be proper for him to continue with this civil case," the lower court finally said that this ruling is in accordance with Paragraph (c)of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court providing that "after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted." The appellate court then recited plaintiff-appellant's grounds of appeal: Appealing the order of dismissal to this Court, plaintiff contends "That the lower court erred in giving due course to the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellee" on the following grounds: . (1) (2) That the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 107, Section 1, have no That civil case No. 52247 is a prejudicial question to the resolution of Criminal Case application in the case at bar; . No. 67752; .

(3)

That assuming arguendo that the provisions of Rule 107 is applicable, the proper

remedy is not Motion to Dismiss. After the submittal in September and October, 1963, of the parties' briefs, the appellate court found no question of fact and that "the only issue is the correctness of the order of dismissal which is one of law," 1 and ordered the elevation of the record to this Court. Since the present case involved only plaintiff-appellant's appeal from the lower court's dismissal order of his civil case No. 52247 for specific performance, and the parties made no reference to what had transpired meanwhile to the criminal case for estafa, No. 67752 against plaintiff as accused pending before another branch, Branch XVIII of the same lower court presided by Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., 2 the Court resolved to send for the records of the criminal case. The Court's examination, motu proprio, of the record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has shown that the principal issue raised on appeal by herein plaintiff-appellant that the lower court erred in issuing the order dismissing his civil complaint against the complainant in the criminal case on its ruling that the trial of the criminal case should take precedence over the civil case, has become moot and academic. This is so because in the meantime long before this case was certified to this Court by the appellate court on September 19, 1967, the trial of the criminal case had proceeded and terminated with a judgment of conviction rendered on July 9, 1964 by Judge Kapunan of Branch XVIII, which in turn was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals as per its decision of June 18, 1965. The record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 thus shows the following sequence of events: 1. Judge Kapunan had denied a similar motion on the part of the accused (herein plaintiff) to suspend the criminal proceedings, ruling in his order on February 2, 1963 that the civil case did not present a prejudicial question, besides citing Judge Arca's prior order of January 28, 1963 dismissing the civil case. 3 2. The accused (herein plaintiff) questioned Judge Kapunan's order by seeking an injunction from the Court of Appeals in a case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 31915-R, entitled "Chan Kian, petitioner vs. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Arsenio Angsin, respondents." The appellate court, through its special fifth division, promulgated on July 13, 1963 its decision ruling that "respondent judge correctly denied petitioner's motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 67752 of the Court of First Instance of Manila" 4 and final judgment was entered on September 10, 1963. 5 3. The criminal case thus proceeded to trial and on July 10, 1964, Judge Kapunan promulgated his decision dated July 9, 1964 finding the accused (therein plaintiff) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing him to serve an indeterminate penalty ranging from not less than ten (10) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as minimum, to not more than fourteen (14) years, five (5) months and

eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P120,000.00 and to pay the costs. 6 4. On appeal, the appellate court, through its special first division approved the Solicitor-General's recommendation for acquittal and reversed Judge Kapunan's judgment of conviction and instead acquitted the accused (plaintiff herein of the charge against him, per its decision of June 18, 1965 7 and final entry of the said judgments was made on June 29, 1965. 8 The majority of the division held "that the transaction between complainant Arsenio Ang Sin and appellant Chan Kian that led to the execution of Exhibit A was one of purchase and sale with advance payment of the purchase price of P120,000.00 for 400 drums of "Vetsin". There was, therefore, no obligation on the part of appellant to return the said amount to the complainant. Furthermore, we find that appellant was ready and willing to deliver the 400 drums of "Vetsin" as agreed upon and hence he did not, under the circumstances of this case, incur any criminal liability." Enriquez, J. as a minority disagreed with the majority's holding on the nature of the transaction but nevertheless held that "(U)nder the facts therefore neither misappropriation nor conversion has been shown. The absence of such essential element precludes the existence of criminal liability" and likewise voted for the acquittal of the accused. And they were also unanimous that the drop in the price of the monosodium glutamate was the reason for complainant's failure to take delivery thereof on the agreed deadline and for the precipitate filing of the criminal complaint on the day immediately following thereafter. None of the above developments of record in the criminal case has been brought to the attention of the appellate court or of this Court in the present appeal by the attorneys for the parties, except for the mention in appellee's brief of the appellate court's decision denying plaintiff's petition for a writ enjoining Judge Kapunan from proceeding with the criminal case, supra. 9 The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as officers of the courts, but faithfully complied with their duty to deal with the courts in truth and candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate court the above developments, all by June, 1965, which have made the principal issue at bar moot and academic, 11 this case would then have been disposed of and need not have been certified to this Court, and the time needed by it to devote to the prompt disposition of meritorious cases need not have been thus dissipated. 12 At any rate, it is clear that the civil case filed by plaintiff-appellant should merely have been suspended, not dismissed although without prejudice, by the lower court under the Rule invoked by it. 13 Appellee concedes as much, stating that the dismissal without prejudice is in effect a suspension pending the outcome of the criminal case. Now that the criminal case has already been resolved, the lower court's dismissal of the civil case should be set aside and the case accordingly remanded to it.

On March 12, 1969, the Court, upon motion of plaintiff-appellant, issued its Resolution authorizing plaintiff "to sell at the best price obtainable, under the supervision of the Clerk of this Court or his representative, the 400 drums of monosodium glutamate subject of this case, now stored in the bodega of the General Packing Corporation, and to deposit with this Court the proceeds of such sale, after deducting the storage fees and other necessary expenses." As per report of the Clerk of Court, this Resolution has not been implemented to date, due according to plaintiff's explanation of December 9, 1971, to the very low price being offered for the article. With the present disposition of this case, this matter has become moot, without prejudice to plaintiff's refiling his motion anew with the lower court. ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for proper trial and disposition on the merits. With costs against defendant-appellee. PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK VS. KING The rule on service of summons in this jurisdiction is too well-known. In civil cases, the service of summons on a defendant is made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. 1 Such service of summons may be made at the defendant's dwelling house or residence or at his office or regular place of business. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself. However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 2 It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service maybe resorted to. The impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. 3 The application of the foregoing rules is the issue in this petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No. 03386 entitled "Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings

Bank vs. Mercantile Financing Corporation, et al." dated January 27, 1987, and its resolution dated April 22, 1987. 4

100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983 100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983

The facts are undisputed. Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5 which provides as follows: Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors or trustees who willfully 100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984. 2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claim against the 100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983

and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati, Metro Manila, which is the stated office address of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot Jr. who acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May 11, 1983. On May 24, 1983, the law firm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion for extension of time to file a responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss. The said motion was signed by Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones as counsel for the defendants. The motion was granted in an order dated May 26, 1983 giving the defendants an extension of twenty (20) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the responsive pleading and/or motion to dismiss. On June 13, 1983, said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of the action for a period of sixty (60) days on the ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of the case between the parties. The motion was denied. On June 27, 1983, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file an answer. This motion was granted in an order dated June 29, 1983. On July 14, 1983, the parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. It reads as follows: 1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, then account with the plaintiff

defendants. 3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by the defendants

provided that in case the latter fail to pay, jointly and severally, two or more successive monthly installments, the plaintiff is entitled to secure from the Court a writ of execution for the collection of the unpaid account of the defendants. 6 On July 18, 1983, a decision was rendered by the trial court approving the said Compromise Agreement and enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and conditions embodied therein. Partial payments were made under the compromise judgment. Upon failure of private respondent to make the other payments, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The trial court granted the motion on December 16, 1983. On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification" thereby seeking a correction of the compromise judgment on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. On January 17, 1984, said counsel filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" attaching thereto a copy of the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC of July 6,1983 showing that he was the attorney-in-fact of MFC only, and praying for the correction of the judgment, accordingly. The motion for clarification was denied on January 20,1984. On January 24, 1984, the Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set aside the decision dated July 18,1983, the Compromise Agreement and the writ of execution dated December 21, 1983 on the ground that there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the corporation was not their address as they were no longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were not served copies of the decision of the court; that they learned about the same only when it was being executed; and that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction. On January 26,1984, private respondent Domingo F. Li filed a petition for relief from judgment with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction alleging therein

as of June 15, 1983, in the sum of P707,500.01 with 20% interest per annum as follows: P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983 100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983 100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983

that there was no service of summons upon him and that Atty. Aragones was not authorized to represent him or to enter into the Compromise Agreement. After an opposition to said motion was filed by the petitioner, the lower court denied the same in its order dated April 6, 1984. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by the private respondents were also denied on May 4,1984. Thus, private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, reiterating that there was no service of summons upon each of them as service of summons was made at the address of the firm with which they had severed connections; that the counsel of record of MFC has no authority to represent them in the case and in the Compromise Agreement; that they have not ratified the same by a partial payment of the compromise judgment; and that they were no longer connected with MFC at the time they were sued. In due time, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on January 27, 1987, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: In view of the foregoing, the other errors assigned by the appellants need not be resolved: Wherefore: (1) the decision dated July 18, 1983 approving the compromise agreement rendered by

(B)

THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY IGNORED THE BASIC QUESTION

OF WHETHER (a) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K. LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 25,1984, and (b)'THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION' FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KENG SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON AND JOSE FERRER, JR., WERE FILED OUT OF TIME. (C) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE SUED AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF

MFC WERE PROPERLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS. The petition is devoid of merit. Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in that summons must be served personally on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them. The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons was effected. The office address of the corporation as indicated in the complaint does not appear to be the office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the corporation then. Personal service of summons should have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private respondents were no longer connected. Such substituted service is not valid. There was no compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and a failure to effect the same before substituted service could be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons. It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC and private respondents, sought an extension of time to file an answer or a responsive pleading, and a

the lower court as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto as against appellants Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon, Jose Ferrer, Jr., and Domingo Li are hereby SET ASIDE; and (2) the case is remanded to the court of origin which is hereby ordered to direct proper

service of summons on the aforesaid individual appellants at their respective correct addresses and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law. SO ORDERED. 7 A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by petitioner was denied by the appellate court on April 22, 1987. Hence, the instant petition predicated on the following grounds: (A) THAT THE CASE AT BAR (a) PERTAINS TO (AN) APPEAL FROM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT

suspension of the proceedings pending a possible settlement of the case; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise Agreement in behalf of MFC and private respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis of which a compromise judgment was rendered; that said judgment was partially complied with but upon default in the payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought from and granted by the trial court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informed the court that he committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of private respondents when it was only MFC which hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly authorized to appear in behalf of the defendants, his voluntary appearance in their behalf by the filing of the aforementioned pleadings and the

DATED APRIL 6,1984, DENYING (i) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT' FILED JANUARY 25, 1984, AND (ii) MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KING SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON and JOSE FERRER, JR. and (b) DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY APPEAL FROM TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19,1983 APPROVING THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

Compromise Agreement would constitute a waiver of the defect in the service of summons. However, the lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of said counsel was in behalf of said corporation only and not in behalf of the private respondents. Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of the private respondents without their authority, the same is null and void in so far as they are concerned. By the same token, the compromise judgment is also null and void as to private respondents. The ruling of the lower court that the motion to set aside the judgment and the petition for relief from judgment were filed beyond the reglementary period is untenable. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 8 One last word, Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the performance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He represented himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the Compromise Agreement he submitted. It was only after the writ of execution of the compromise judgment was being enforced that he perked up by saying that he committed an oversight and that he was not authorized by the private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in the Compromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a transgression of this imperative. Counsel should be made to account before his peers. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative investigation, report and recommendation on Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floor of the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

CHAVEZ VS. VIOLA

In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990
1

In his Answer, addressed to this Court, complainant Teodoro I.

10

respondent alleged that the Application for Original Registration of Title was

originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro, and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance therein, respondent filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title; that he believed his clients had the right to apply for the registration of the land; and that assuming his clients did not in fact have any such right, the court where the Application for Original Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this complaint for disbarment was filed prematurely. Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer.
11

Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other appropriate penalty upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola, a member of the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice. The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their counsel in connection with Civil Case No. 3330M
2

filed sometime in 1966 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan against
3

Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the complaint, respondent alleged, on behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease Applications Nos. V-1284 and 2807 covering portions of public land situated in Barrio Baluarte, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, and that lease contracts
4

In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss said Motion, he alleged further alleged: . . . Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty. Montesclaro when he took over, even went to the extent of verifying from the Bureau of Lands if the application was proper. The Legal Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent that it was. He was informed that judicial application for registration is one of the methods of acquiring such lands, said lands being alienable and disposable. There are, however, other means of obtaining the said lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro) chose the present action for land registration. Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the original lawyer when said counsel withdrew his appearance. Your respondent, hence, was in good faith when he took over the land registration case, subject matter of this present administrative investigation. The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion to Dismiss to the Solicitor General. In a Report
13 12

the complaint for disbarment. In

had been executed in

for the second time

that he was not the original lawyer who filed

their favor by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent prayed in the complaint that his clients (the Alvendias) be declared bona fide lessees of the land in controversy . . . .
5

the application in the land registration case, but a certain Atty. Montesclaro. Respondent

In an Order dated 2 October 1969,

the CFI dismissed the complaint filed

in Civil Case No. 3330-M for non-appearance of the Alvendias. On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which provides: SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of the foreshore fronting the

Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan . . . is hereby withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be called the Bulacan Fishing Reservation.
7

It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was part of the communal fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470. On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias, Amended Application for Original Registration of Title
8

in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 3711-M with the then CFI
9

of Bulacan praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2

be registered in the name

of the spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the Amended Application that the applicant Alvendias were the owners of the land, they having acquired the same from one Teresita Vistan by sale sometime in 1929. It is petitioners contention that respondent, in filing the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M stating that his clients were the owners of the property applied for despite his full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere lessees of the land in controversy as so described in the complaint respondent had filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M, had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the Bar.

dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated that:

In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his clients, i.e., the Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of the land in question. However, respondent does not deny that he prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the Alvendias are the owners of the land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to why his submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his allegations in the complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-M that the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the same property. It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in the land registration case. As proven by complaint, respondent has willingly aided and consented

in the filing and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the bar.
14

Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
15

One of those requirements is the

observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
16

In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he really believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their rights. Respondents excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the complainant that those excuses do not exculpate the respondent. It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyers oath and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness (now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to the law itself. WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this

NUENO V. SANTOS

These proceedings present for consideration the question of what action, if any, should be taken against Attorney Pascual Santos for malpractice. Judge Anacleto Diaz of the Court of First Instance was made a special investigation of conditions in the city government of Manila. In the course of the investigation a complaint was filed by Jose Topacio Nueno, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, against Pascual Santos, another member of municipal board, it being alleged that the latter had interested himself in prohibited games. Santos was required to answer the charges which he did by denying them. Hearings were had on the said charges and the testimony of a number of witnesses was taken. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Diaz made a report to the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, in which he recommended the removal of the respondent from his office of member of the municipal board, and that all the papers connected with the charge that the respondent had openly been running a club for gambling purposes, such as the Circulo Nationalista Consolidado Club and had directly taken part in said games, be transmitted to the Supreme Court for action, "it being evident that the respondent, as a member of the Bar, violated his oath of office by deceiving the court and consenting a falsehood to be committed, as it was in fact committed, in the case referred to, viz.: Criminal case No. E-87890, Municipal Court of Manila, entitled P.P.I. vs. Iigo Hernandez." On receipt of the report of Judge Diaz against Attorney Santos, this court ordered it referred to the Attorney-General for investigation, report, and recommendation. In the latter office Attorney Santos was furnished with a copy of the report and was given five days within which to state in writing whether or not he desires to present evidence, in addition to that already adduced in the investigation conducted by Judge Diaz, and to state why his disbarment should not be recommended to the Supreme Court in view of the findings of Judge Diaz. The respondent eventually filed an answer denying the charge and requesting that he be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense.

At the commencement of the investigation in the office of the AttorneyGeneral, a question was raised as to the exact charged, and it finally seems to have been agreed that the respondent stood charged on but one count, namely, that he, as counsel for Iigo Hernandez who was charged with a violation of an ordinance for having willfully and unlawfully encouraged, tolerated and permitted to be played a game of chance and hazard commonly known as "monte", wherein money and other things of value were played for at No. 18 Soler Street, Manila, Criminal case No. E-87890 of the municipal court of Manila, entered a plea of guilty for said Hernandez although he knew that the latter was a mere waiter in said house and did not encourage, tolerate, or permit a game of "monte" to be played in said house. it seems further to have been agreed that additional evidence could be received limited to that charge. At any rate, the respondent called Iigo Hernandez as his witness and testified in his own behalf. It was only at conclusion of the hearing that counsel for respondent protested against the evidence which had been received by Judge Diaz being taken into account against him. The report of the Solicitor-General concludes with the recommendation that disciplinary action be taken against the respondent. In a memorandum filed with the court the respondent has protested against the irregularity of the investigation and has asked for exoneration. The way the proceedings have been handled leads us to believe that the respondent was fully informed of the specific charge against him, and that it was not improper to consider the evidence taken by Judge Diaz, and in conjunction with the additional evidence received by the Solicitor-General, to make findings thereon. We further believe that there is no escaping the conclusion that the respondent attorney consented to the doing of a falsehood and deceived the court when he had an accused plead guilty to an offense which he had not committed. The background of the administrative investigation showing the respondent's connection with prohibited games, under circumstances of the case, can only be taken into consideration in so far as it relates to the precise charge laid against him.

There was a clear violation of the lawyer's oath that he would do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. From one standpoint, the facts merit our dealing sternly with the respondent for having violated his oath of office. On the other hand, in favor of the respondent are the circumstances that the charge is strictly circumscribed to the improper action taken by him in one case; that political considerations induced the filing of the charges against him before Judge Diaz, and that the matter involved was not new but had occurred approximately two years before the investigation was begun. The facts, are, therefore, different from those found in the case of In re De Lara ( [1914], 27 Phil., 176), where the attorney was disbarred, and in the cases In re Terrell ( [1903], 2 Phil., 266), and Piatt vs. Abordo ( [1933], No 1781), 1 where the attorneys were each suspended for a term of one year. A brief period of suspension will serve to indicate our disapprobation of the deceit practiced by the respondent on the court and will be fair to the respondent.lawphi1.net It is the order of the court that effective as of October 16, 1933, the respondent Pascual Santos be suspended from the practice of Law for a period of three months.

CANTORNE V. DUCUSIN This disbarment proceeding was instituted at the instance of Engracia Cantorne, who originally filed her charges in the office of the City Fiscal of Manila. This officer, on November 24, 1926, forwarded to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the complainant's written statement alleged to be corroborated by the affidavit of Valentina Dajuela and the statement of Attorney Fernando C. Villarosa, the latter being at the time a law clerk in said office.

There can be no doubt that the aforementioned facts constitute malpractice and that same ought to be severely condemned and the respondent corrected by disciplinary action. As the evidence clearly shows the respondent attorney not only represented both parties (complaining witness and defendant) in that criminal action, but also obstructed and tried to frustrate the administration of justice in concealing the former when said cause was called for trial and in urging that the information be dismissed for lack of evidence for the prosecution. In re Hamilton, 24 Phil., 100, 110, this court said:

After the respondent attorney had filed his answer the Attorney-General, to whom the matter was referred for investigation and recommendation, conducted the required investigation and upon receiving the evidence presented by both parties finally submitted his report, dated March 21, 1932. To this the respondent filed his answer. The matter was heard in banc on July 23, 1932 and submitted thereafter for decision. In re Soriano, record No. 550, this court held: The Attorney-General after reviewing exhaustively the whole evidence of record found the following facts proven: (1) While he was counsel for the accused Petrona Basmayor in the criminal case filed against her by Engracia Cantorne, he made said Cantorne believe that he could act for her in fixing up her case in such a way that his client Basmayor would pay her P25 for the shawl she had lost; (2) that he frustrated the administration of justice by instructing Cantorne not to appear in the hearing of the case in which she was the complainant evidently for the purpose of having the case against his client dismissed on the ground of non-appearance of the offended party; and (3) by making the complainant believe that he was doing everything to help her in her case while he was also serving as lawyer of the accused whose interests were entirely opposed to those of the complainant, and on account of such assurances of his aid, the complainant out of gratitude spent money in entertaining him several times in her house. Therefore, Attorney Eugenio Ducusin is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years and it is so ordered. While the doctrine laid down in the above mentioned cases is clearly applicable to the facts under consideration, still we believe that the respondent herein deserves more severe disciplinary measure, for the evidence shows conclusively that he violated his obligations to the court and to his client and furthermore obstructed the administration of justice thus disregarding the fundamental ethics of his profession. An attorney-at-law is in this jurisdiction as elsewhere, an officer of the court, with an obligation to the courts and the public no less significant than his obligation to his clients. An attempt to obstruct, pervert, or impede the administration of justice, or to evade the fair operation of the law, is a ground for suspension or disbarment. After a very careful examination of the whole record we have regretfully reached the conclusion that the facts before us show a flagrant and willful violation on the part of defendant of his professional obligations, and a reckless disregard of the fundamental ethics of his profession.

COMELEC V. NOYNAY
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years. The antecedents are not disputed. In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases. Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Alien, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows: a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada

of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage. Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance

committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of

not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years. The two motions 4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, 5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses. On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is "adopting" the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent "are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence." In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.

Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan. b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben

Magluyoan. c) only; d) only. In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows: [I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. We resolved to give due course to the petition. Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as follows: Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases. Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals 7 that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be. Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; 8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 9 as amended. Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception. As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is "imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years" and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows: the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does nut service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception. It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, 11 to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. 12 Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioner's Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration 13 he filed, with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated: As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held: A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours) Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states: 16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,"

conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act. No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA. Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus: With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the power to