WHICH MODEL OF BIOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY FOR LANGUAGE?

THE CASE OF WHAT DARWIN GOT WRONG

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to discuss some of the conceptual consequences of the arguments put forward in What Darwin got Wrong, for a broader theory of the biolinguistic approach. The book offers arguments against New Synthesis approaches to Evolutionary Theory, which are particularly germane to biolinguistic matters. One main contention is that only approaches to evolutionary facts that capture the organism internal !laws of form" observed across living organisms can be theoretically and empirically adequate. #pproaches that only focus on organism e$ternal principles cannot reach this goal. %owever, the book does not investigate whether this contention applies to linguistic matters as well. This issue is addressed in the paper, and it is argued that organism internal properties, which can be captured via the formal notion of !&onservativity", must be found in language as well. Therefore, it is argued that only those linguistic theories that capture these properties, be they about syntactic, semantic or acquisition matters alike, can be considered as biolinguistically plausible.

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'erry (odor and )assimo *iattelli *almarini+s ,oint effort, What Darwin got wrong, presents a criticism of neo darwinist approaches to Evolutionary Theory. This criticism is based on the !New Synthesis" model, classic and contemporary alike -)ayr, ./012 3awkins, ./40, ./502 among others6. (odor and *iattelli *almarini7s -henceforth8 !the authors"6 two main arguments against the New Synthesis -henceforth8 NS6 and its applications, as proposed in the book, can be informally summed up as follows. (irst, NS offers an e$planatory model that works like Skinner7s theory of operant conditioning -Skinner, ./946. Since operant conditioning is inadequate as an e$planatory tool, the NS model is equally inadequate to

account the data it purports to account. Second, the NS model is logically flawed8 it aims to e$plain data by resorting to principles that are claimed not to be part of the model -artificial selection6. So, no putative !recalibration" of the model is possible, in order to amend these theoretical flaws. # new evolutionary framework is called for, the authors of the book claim. One problem is that (odor : *iattelli *almarini -;<<56 does not sketch a fully defined alternative model. %owever, he authors suggest that the Evo-Devo model of evolution offers a much more precise and reliable account of these processes -!Evolutionary 3evelopmental" model8 &arroll ;<<92 =aubichler : )aienschein ;<<42 a.o.6. #t its core, Evo 3evo is a field of biology that studies how developmental principles permit to trace a common genealogy for genetically related organisms. This approach places a great emphasis on how organism internal, developmental principles such as cell growth and morphogenesis can in turn define the !evolutionary space" of morphological traits of living organisms -%all, ;<<<2 *rum : >rush, ;<<12 a.o.6. %ence, such an approach lends itself to a view of evolution as the result of how organism internal processes can shape, even !re arrange" the genetic material -or genotype6 of organisms, to possibly result in novel !forms"- or phenotypes6. (or this reason, the authors argue, Evo 3evo offers an empirically more adequate rendition of evolutionary theory than the NS model, at least in its most !radical" versions of NS. &onversely, since the NS in its more radical instances attempts to reduce, perhaps e$plain away organism internal principles as the result of e$ternal forces, it carries no empirical weight. The book received several negative reviews, some of them using damning tones about these two key arguments and their import for biological research. )any reviewers critici?ed the book+s arguments as an ill tempered and poorly informed attempt to !dismantle" one of the most influential paradigms in scientific research, evolutionary theory -3ennett, .//96. (or the most part, these reviews have dismissed the authors7 arguments as a futile philosophical e$ercise. # general claim is that the book is based on a poor understanding of finer grained

aspects of modern evolutionary theory including, among others, a mis interpretation of Evo 3evo as mutually e$clusive with NS models. %ence, its invitation to drop old models of Evolutionary Theory for new ones is un,ustified ->lock : @itcher ;<.<2 *igliucci ;<.<2 a.o.6. %owever, several other reviewers treated these arguments with a more neutral stance -Okasha ;<.<2 *apineau ;<.<2 Sober ;<.<2 a.o.6, others even with a positive one -%ornstein, ;<.<6. These reviewers concede that the authors do not take such an e$treme stance, as the authors e$plicitly state -(odor : *iattelli *almarini, ;<<58 ch.46. These reviewers also note the the authors highlighted several problems that the NS model faces, when applied to fields other than biology. An particular, they note that the the authors+ arguments do outline actual e$planatory flaws in frameworks such as evolutionary psychology, in particular in its applications to language. # general criticism leveled at evolutionary psychology accounts is as follows. Evolutionary psychology accounts of cognitive phenomena have a tendency to reduce phenomena as diverse as social taboos, moral choices, decision making processes, partner selection and several others to genetically driven processes -Tooby : &osmides, .//;2 Tooby, &osmides : >arrett, ;<<12 >uss, ;<<42 a.o.6. An doing so, they place a great emphasis on the evolutionary advantages that certain psychological and social traits can have, in a given environment -e.g. altruism2 >uss, ;<<42 a.o.6. An doing so, they display an e$planatory dependency on the environment that may vastly reduce the e$planatory import of the theory -*lotkin, ;<<B2 Cichardson, ;<<42 a.o.6. #s these neutral reviewers concede, then, the authors+ arguments may be quite appropriate, when, and only when turned against these more !heterodo$" applications. Dhile the authors+ arguments seem to offer a strong case against evolutionary psychology, their relevance to for linguistic problems. seems less clear. An particular, although the authors seem to offer
.

De follow 3i Sciullo : >oeck$ -;<..6, and contend that non minimalist strands of research on language and

language acquisition fall within the field of >io linguistics -e.g. Tomasello, ;<<12 Eoldberg, ;<<06. De agree, however, that these strands are quite far from the ones we would like to pursue here. De will discuss in some

relatively precise arguments on how a biologically plausible theory of language could be defined, it is not clear how one could use these arguments to e$press such a theory. Two questions seem particularly stringent. # first open question is which strands of the biolinguistic approach, broadly conceived, are consistent with the authors+ main argument. # second, consequent open question is which parts of the minimalist program, which we will suggest as being the main strand of >io linguistics to be consistent with the authors+ arguments, can offer an optimal level of !conceptual fitness" with these arguments. Our goal in this paper is to answer these two questions. %ence, we want to verify whether the authors7 arguments can also give us an important insight on which !parts" of the >io linguistic #pproach and, more specifically, of the minimalist program are consistent with the author7s arguments. Therefore, in answering the first question we aim to show that the authors+ arguments are a more appropriate account of bio linguistic matters than the NS ones. #t the same time, we also aim to show that their arguments are more appropriate than the evolutionary psychology ones, although necessarily antithetic to them. An answering the second question, we aim to show that only certain approaches within the minimalist program are compatible with the authors+ arguments. De aim to answer to these two questions via a two step plan. (irst, we wish to discuss which strands of >io linguistic #pproach are consistent with the arguments presented in (odor : *iattelli *almarini -;<<56. Second, we focus on the minimalist program, and discuss which strands of this program are better suited to satisfy the arguments at stake. De warn the reader that we take a broad perspective to what counts as part of this *rogram, as we will also discuss semantic and psycholinguistic matters that are not usually discussed in the litersture. %owever, we will e$plicitly spell out what we take to be their connection to minimalist matters. De will mostly argue that, if we take these arguments seriously, then these arguments
detail whether these proposals also !fall prey" to the authors7 arguments, too.

offer us powerful theoretical tools for answering our two questions. The remainder of the paper is geared towards reaching these goals, accordingly.

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The goal of this section is two fold. The first goal is to offer a brief summary of the authors+ arguments, and their import for the biolinguistic approach -section ;...6. The second goal is to discuss the import of the argument for three dimensions of linguistic analysis8 synta$, semantics and language acquisition. De start with synta$ -section ;.;.6, proceed with semantics -section ;.1.6, and conclude with acquisition -section ;.B.6.

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The goal of this section is to offer a brief summary of the arguments offered in the book. The first argument offered in the book can be summed up as follows. The NS model is not a valid theory of evolution, because it is inconsistent with recent and not so recent discoveries in biology. The analysis of the Evo 3evo research program offered by the authors suggests that evolutionary processes are the result of rules of !well formedness" on the combination of genes, the organism internal laws of form that govern the growth and development of organisms. Af the authors+ analysis of these findings is correct, then we should take into account the importance of genome and its structure, when proposing plausible evolutionary models. #ccording to this view, then, evolution is first and foremost an endogenous or organism internal process, on which organism external processes -e.g. NS6 can intervene on the results of this internal process. Evolution is also a process in which emergent properties play a key role. >oth the combination of genetic material into more

comple$ units, and the possible permutations of this material into different structures may result into phenotypical variation. So, we should e$pect that such operations should have a linguistic counterpart that applies onto linguistic structures -e.g. sentences6, as well. The second argument can be summed up as follows. NS is usually defined as a process that can select life forms for their fitness with respect to the environment, as if it were akin to artificial selection. %owever, if NS can evaluate and select life forms with respect to their fitness in an environment, then it acts much like a rational, agent based process, which is precisely what NS should not be like. NS appears to be inconsistent, since it encompasses two opposing principles that work at the same time8 random selection and non random, !select for" or agentive selection. #s the authors discuss at length, if the environment acts as an agentive like principle of selection, then by definition it cannot also be a random, !mindless" process at the same time. So, NS based theories of evolution are inconsistent, and cannot e$plain the data they purport to e$plain. The authors+ view of Evo 3evo is far from uncontroversial, and tends to create a tension between the internal, developmental properties of an organism and the e$ternal influences that can play a role on these processes -(odor : *iattelli *almarini, ;<<58 ch.46. Other approaches suggest that e$ternalist, neo darwinist oriented perspectives and Evo 3evo approaches can represent two complementary, but integrated aspects of a broader theory of evolution -Tooby, &osmides : >arrett, ;<<16;. %owever, such approaches do stress the importance of putative principles of internal organi?ation for biological and psychological processes, including language. An doing so, they do share in some part the view, with (odor : *iattelli *almarini
;

De note that these approaches propose to reconcile Evo 3evo and NS as two sides of the same overarching evolutionary process. This reconciliation is possible if and only one drops one assumption of NS8 that only e$ternal principles of organi?ation determine the biological properties of organi?ation. To our understanding, this is a !variant" of NS which drops the select for principle, with its various consequences. Dhether this assumption effectively leads to a distinct model of Synthesis than the one the authors critici?e, is a matter than we leave aside.

-;<<56, that organism e$ternal processes can operate on internal outputs, although in a more dynamic, cyclic way -cf. %all ;<<<6. So, we maintain that these two approaches to Evo 3evo as well as heir import for linguistic matters are quite distinct. De observe, though, that both approaches suggest that the !flow" of selection goes from internal to e$ternal principles. Therefore, such a flow is opposed to that proposed by the NS model, which seems to go in the opposite direction -e$ternal to internal6. >ased on this discussion, we can propose the these two arguments of the following consequences, for our bio linguistic discussion. The first argument has one important bio linguistic consequence. Af organism internal factors drive the evolutionary process and language evolution is part of these processes, then these factors should guide language evolution, too. Organism internal factors should also play a key role in !synchronic" phenomena, both at a micro -e.g. language processing and production6 and macro scale -language acquisition and impairment6. Af the driving forces of organism internal processes are laws of form, controlled by speciali?ed genes, then principles e$plicitly representing these laws of form should be at work in language, too. %ence, linguistic theories should assume that linguistic outputs -e.g. sentences6 must adhere to principles of well formedness, taken to be purely internal principles of organi?ation. E$ternal principles of selection, then, should operate on such well formed outputs, rather than take the function of organism internal principles, and determine which are well formed outputs. &onversely, if the first argument is false and organism internal principles do not actually drive the evolutionary process, including language evolution, then organism e$ternal principles should drive linguistic phenomena. An such a case, then, the NS would offer an empirically adequate account. The second argument also has an important bio linguistic consequence. Af organism e$ternal factors play a role only after organism internal ones have guided evolutionary or developmental processes, then such organism e$ternal factors should not be the only

theoretical kernel of a biologically plausible theory of language. Therefore, the second argument strongly suggests that a biologically plausible theory of language must principally be an internalist theory of language first and foremost, and not ,ust an externalist theory -#soulin ;<<42 Sle?ak ;<</2 =Fndal : Narita, ;<.<6. #lthough e$ternalist considerations may still play a role, they would do so insofar as they apply onto the output of internally driven accounts of language. &onversely, if language can be accounted as purely environment based principle, then the authors+ arguments will turn out to be unfounded, and the NS arguments would be accurate. #n e$ternalist account for language would empirically adequate. These two consequences, when combined together, entail that the organi?ational principles found at a biological level must also be found at linguistic level. Af language is an e$pression of human biology, then language must have its own !version" of the principles that govern human biology. De consider this assumption an instance of biological conservativity, for the following reason. That is, language as a !part" of our genetic endowment must follow the principles governing our !whole" genetic endowment. To make this point formally e$plicit, we !e$apt" the standard notion of conservativity for generali?ed quantifiers, found in nodel theoretic semantics, into our broader discussion. &onservativity is formally defined as ->arwise : &ooper, ./5.2 %eim : @rat?er, .//58 ch.;2 a.o.68

-.6 D(A,B !D(A,A"B

An words, if a set theoretic relation between sets A and B holds, then it must hold between the first set and the more restrictive intersection of both sets -i.e. A"B6. # biological application can be formulated as follows. Af a biological property A -having wings6 is related to a property B -being a pig6, then it must hold for the combination of these two properties, if this combination does not define an empty property set. Since wings are incompatible with

being a pig, the set of pigs with wings -i.e. A"B6 is empty. De are not aware if the authors had in mind this definition, too, but we think that possible conceptual divergences are negligible. Af these arguments are on the right track, then their import for linguistic theories can, and perhaps must be evaluated with respect to their ability to be consistent with the authors7 arguments, #ua biological principles applied to the sub domain of language. The reason is as follows. =et us assume that linguistic properties are a part of biological properties. Then, we represent the set of linguistic properties as $, and that of biological properties as B%. De take that one specific type of relation, the sub-set relation !", can represent the parthood relation between these sets -i.e. we have $B%6. # logical consequence of this assumption is all the properties that apply to the set B%, including conservativity, monotonically apply to each of its sub sets, hence they identify possible restrictions of this set -=andman, .//.8 ch. ;6. An other words, A suggest that conservativity in language is a consequence of language being part of our cognitive, and hence biological faculties, which in turn have the conservativity property1. # less formal and more intuitive approach to this assumption is as follows. De e$pect that a biologically plausible theory of language must also be an internalist theory, which also implements a language specific notion of conservativity. The reason is simple8 if language is an e$pression of our internal biology, and our biology has the conservative property, then language must have the conservative property. An this regard, the authors+ arguments seem to surprisingly converge with theories apparently distant from their position, such as embodied cognition -=akoff : 'ohnson, .///2 Evans ;<.<6. A do wish to claim that such conceptual convergence would be unproblematic or free from controversy, but merely observe that this conceptual result nevertheless originates from different theoretical assumptions. A do not
1

This suggestion entails that conservativity should be seen as a !third factor" property of language, i.e. a property not specific to language -&homsky, ;<<96. This aspect is not crucial, to our argument, but it suggests that other third factor e$planations can shed more light on the biological plausibility of models of language -Tro?ke, >ader and (ra?ier, ;<.16.

discuss this aspect more in detail, as it would lead us too far afield. Dhat matters for us, then, is that if this assumption about biological conservativity and its e$tension is not correct, then we would e$pect that the NS model, instead, can give an accurate account of linguistic phenomena. Af linguistic properties do not depend on -i.e. are not part of6 our biological properties, they should share any features as well. The ne$t sections discuss this hypothesis, and its validity, in detail.

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The goal of this section is to discuss which syntactic theories meet the requirements for biological plausibility that the authors present, and that A discussed in the previous section. Since A take a broad perspective to the >iological #pproach to language, A will discuss a broad set of theories, including e$ternalist ones. A start from those theories that could be labeled as having an -organism 6e$ternal perspective to sentence structure. )ost, if not all of these theories contend that there are no language specific principles by which distinct constituents are combined together by internal auto organi?ational properties. Some e$amples include construction or usage based

grammars -Eoldberg .//9, ;<<02 &roft, ;<<.2 Tomasello, ;<<12 a.o.62 or the simpler synta$ model -e.g. &ulicover : 'ackendoff ;<<96. &onstruction grammars, for instance, assume that !grammar" is the result of the artificial selection of an e$ternal process, the communicative intentions of speakers. &ertain proposals e$plicitly argue that grammars can be inherited as cultural artifacts, via the selection process that !society", as a certain type of environment, places on them -Sterelny, ;<<12 and references therein6. The specific problems with these theories can be stated as follows. The strong conceptual isomorphism between NS and the first group of theories suggests

that these theories also appear to be logically inconsistent. These accounts focus on e$ternal factors such as !pragmatic principles", very broadly construed and defined. So, they seem to lack mechanisms that account for why one can distinguish between well formed and ill formed sentences, one case being syntactic islands -Eolderg, ;<<08 ch.46. An other words, these theories cannot account for the ungrammaticality of e$amples such as -;6 -168

-;6 GDho what thinks that )ario ateH -16 Dho thinks that )ario ate whatH

One counter argument could be that some pragmatic principles could rule out the sentence in -;6 but not that in -16, at least on putative grounds. One may assume that some native speakers found problematic, during some phase of evolution and from a communicative point of view, to have two sequenced wh words in sentence initial position. De leave aside the question on why such a principle should be found in English but not 'apanese, or other languages in which these structures are perfectly grammatical -%ornstein, Nunes : Erohmann, ;<<08 ch.92 and references therein6. One obvious problem with this account is that native speakers would need to select -16, rather than -;6, for an e$ternal purpose such as some stylistic, culturally received standard of word order. The acceptable syntactic structures observed in a language would stem from language e$ternal principles of selection. (urthermore, such accounts would not e$plain, at least not straightforwardly, why speakers would re,ect ungrammatical sentences. E$ternalist, NS based accounts of language seem to fail at accounting basic linguistic patterns that are predicted on internalist accounts. Therefore, both the first and the second argument seem to rule out construction based accounts, as biologically plausible accounts of language, let alone display a form of conservativity in their analysis.

De now turn our attention to those theories that do take an internalist perspective to syntactic matters. De start from non minimalist theories, which to an e$tent do not place a great emphasis on biological or evolutionary plausibility -if any6, at least in our understanding. E$amples of such theories that we briefly discuss are %*SE -%ead *hrase Erammar8 Sag, Dasow : >ender ;<<12 a.o.62 and =(E -=e$ical (unctional Erammar8 >resnan, ;<<.2 a.o.6. # common thread or fil rouge that connects these theories with )inimalism is that they both take syntactic structures to be the result of the combination, or &erge of basic =e$ical Atems -words or signs in %*SE6. These combinatory processes can, in turn, define or license grammatical and syntactic relations among constituents, as in =(E -!c structure" and !f structure", respectively6. Eiven these basic definitions of how the syntactic structure of sentences can emerge from more basic processes of sentence generation, both approaches seem conceptually consistent with the authors7 arguments, as they take an inherently internalist stance. The well formedness of sentences is analy?ed as a purely linguistic matter, so these theories aim to account for and predict linguistic data without any appeal whatsoever to e$ternal factors, in the sense discussed here B. (urthermore, syntactic structures are treated as the result of a combinatoric process that merges le$ical items together, as if they were strands of !le$ical genomic code". %owever, these theories present certain e$planatory gaps when certain types of syntactic phenomena are discussed, as they assume that sentence structures are !mono stratal". Syntactic structures come in a prepackaged order of functional heads and structures, and no !permutation" principles can be found at work in the generation of sentences. One peculiar

>oth %*SE and =(E on one side, and )inimalist theories on the other side suggest that certain phenomena are

!e$ternal" with respect to syntax, as a distinct module of language. The reason is that these phenomena can only be e$plained when one looks at the relation between synta$ and morphology, as in the case of agreement patterns. (rom our perspective, these !interface" phenomena are within an internalist perspective to language.

consequence of this approach is that these theories face non trivial problems in accounting simple forms of inversion or fronting, such as locative inversion in -B6 -968

-B6 >ehind the car, the boys were playing cricket -96 Anto the room a unicorn came

The e$amples in -B6 -96 involve a *repositional *hrase that is moved -or copied6 into sentence initial position, as a topic or as a sub,ect respectively -den 3ikken, ;<<08 ch..2 a.o.6. >oth cases are problematic for these theories, as they do not contemplate any operations that allow syntactic structures to !diverge" from a canonical order. )ore accurately, these theories do not contemplate that syntactic processes can re arrange sentence structures, although they must preserve the properties of the re arranged structures, in doing so. One apparently far reaching consequence of this assumption is that these approaches seem to lack a permutation principle that is pervasive in other biological domains and structures, as the authors suggest. >iological laws of form do not simply define how structures, biological and linguistic alike, are organi?ed -or !ordered"6, but also how they can be re organi?ed, without losing any of their properties as a result. Sentence structures can be re arranged and permuted, and new structures can be obtained via this process of permutation, in a manner entirely parallel to genomic !strings". %owever, in %*SE and =(E this permutation process is not e$plicitly represented, if not via comple$ rules of non local inde$ation -e.g. the !slash" operator in %*SE6. So, these approaches seem on the right track, from a biological plausibility point of view, but also seem to partly miss some e$pected key property., that of permutation. Once we move within the minimalist program, we need to make similar distinctions, given the =akatosian nature of this program9. # certain tension e$ists between approaches that
9

Anformally, a !scientific program" is a research agenda that includes several approaches to a common domain of

inquiry, according to =akatos+ classical analysis -=akatos ./456. These approaches may vary in consistent

define themselves as a substantial departure from its predecessor framework, the 'rinciples and 'arameters (heory, and those approaches that consider it a natural evolution of *rinciples and *arameters Theory -e.g. >alari : =oren?o, ;<</2 >Inite? >urraco : =onga ;<.<2 %ornstein ;<</2 respectively6. #s >Inite? >urraco : =onga -;<.<6 observe, one central tenet of *rinciples and *arameters Theory is that the language faculty can be thought as a reali?ation of a rich genetic program. The differences between languages amount to the setting of !switches" or parameters. Jariation, specifically cross linguistic variation, may be seen as the result of fi$ing these parameters, and thus may be sub,ect to e$ternal pressures and contingencies -e.g. &homsky ./5.8 ch..6. So, proposals based on this theory take a static, but bi dimensional view to syntactic structures, with some important departures from a purely !sequential" approach. One framework that follows this tack is the cartographic approach -&inque, .///2 Shlonsky, ;<.<, a.o.6. This approach places a quite strong emphasis on the rigidity of syntactic structures, since it assumes that syntactic structure come in a fi$ed order, the )unctional *E+uence -(SEK6. An some incarnations, this approach is not limited to syntactic matters alone, but probes down to !atomic" morphological structures, hence assuming that linear order is pervasive in the grammar -as assumed in nano-syntax, e.g. Starke ;<</6. Therefore, syntactic structures may involve very long !sequences" of functional heads, down to the smallest morphological bits. One obvious conceptual problem with this perspective is the following. &artographic approaches reduce the role of &erge as a structure building operation to a bare minimum. #ccording to the (SEK assumption, syntactic units are merged in a pre defined way -Shlonsky ;<.<2 a.o.6. So, the role of )erge in the generation of sentences is reduced to its
amounts with respect to the principles they adopt, and in some instance they may only share certain core principles. These approaches may otherwise adopt quite different if not downright conflicting principles2 the data will ad,udicate which approach is on the right track.

basic combinatoric property. #lthough most variants of the cartographic approach assume that the related operation &ove can permute syntactic elements, the range of this operation is sub,ect to rather specific constraints. Dhen movement occurs, syntactic units move to !higher" positions in the clausal spine that attract the features of the moved constituents. E$amples -;6 -96 would thus involve the operation &ove, which would permute the target whelements and *repositional *hrases to a !non canonical" position. Therefore, *rinciples and *arameters approaches fall in what we could perhaps call a !bi dimensional space" of biological comple$ity. Dhile they assume that operations of permutation are possible, they also assume that these operations range over a fi$ed sequence of linguistic units. This aspect places these proposals within a gray theoretical space, since they include certain conceptual !remnants" of the *rinciples and *arameters approach, most notably the !sequencing" of building units. %owever, versions of cartography and nano synta$ seem to overcome this problem, if only in via rather fine grained theories of movement -Svenonius, ;<<42 a.o.6. So, they seem to converge to a fully biologically plausible model of synta$, if only via a set of comple$ principles of permutation. Several other approaches take a different stance, in which combinatorial processes take a central role. The approaches are e$plicitly centered around &erge, the central syntactic process that builds up larger units recursively. E$amples include frameworks that are

different one another, but all take the centrality as a starting point for syntactic derivations. E$amples include the !le$ical synta$" of %ale : @eyser -;<<;62 introductory works such as %ornstein, Nunes and : Erohmann -;<<062 but also the !combinatorial categorial grammar" of Steedman -;<<<, ;<.;6. These approaches attempt to model how sentences !emerge", via the interaction of basic linguistic atoms and precise !sentence folding" operations. So, these approaches contend that the e$amples in -;6 -96 can be seen as the result of the iterated application of )erge and )ove, often considered as a variant of )erge. These operations

apply to sets of le$ical items -e.g. into, the, room, etc.6, of which the output is a sentence such as -96. These approaches do not postulate any other organi?ing principles than the rules of sentence formation applied to le$ical items, taken as !building blocks" of sentences, and derive the well formedness of these sentences as a result of these combinatoric principles. An doing so, such approaches indirectly meet the goals of bio logical adequacy we discussed so far, as they place emphasis on -sentence6 structure building as a simple, !blind" process that generates regular -syntactic6 forms. #s matters stand, then, formal theories both within and outside the minimalist program offer an internalist approach to syntactic matters. %ence, they can be seen as biologically plausible theories that are consistent with the authors7 arguments. Eiven this consistency, they do not incur in the empirical problems that constructionLusage based grammars incur. %owever, these internalist theories form a conceptual cline, in which only a certain sub set of )inimalist proposals seem to fully meet criteria of biological plausibility that the authors+ arguments outline. Dhile %*SE and =(E seem to only include a combinatoric principle -)erge6 in their theoretical apparatus, the cartographic approach only a permuting principle -)ove6, other approaches seem to include both -e.g. categorial grammars6. De leave aside a more fine grained analysis of these differences, and turn to semantic matters.

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The goal of this section is to discuss biologically plausible theories of semantics that are consistent with the syntactic considerations we have offered in the previous section. #gain, given our broad perspective on the >iological #pproach, we will cover several such theories. #ny considerations about the psychological and biological plausibility of semantic theories touch a rather thorny issue. Cecent analyses in the literature observe that standard

!philosophical" approaches take an e$ternalist position to meaning -#soulin ;<<42 *ietroski ;<<9, ;<<52 %in?en ;<<0, ;<<42 =Fhndal : Narita ;<.<2 Sle?ak ;<</2 a.o.6. E$ternalist approaches, in this specific conte$t of discussion, are those approaches that focus on how a semantics for natural language should define truth conditions that pertain to facts in the world. &onte$t or society bound conceptions of meaning and the interpretive process are the norm -e.g. )ontague ./412 3ummett ./502 &resswell ./598 ch.;2 Stalnaker .///2 a.o.6. These works assume that meanings are social constructs that arise from the interaction among individuals. #ccording to this general approach, then, the !environment" taken as a broadly construed concept plays a crucial role, in the interpretation of sentences, and the identification of their meanings. Other e$ternalist approaches to meaning take an even more e$plicitly !evolutionary" stance to the emergence of meaning. Dithin the philosophical tradition, certain proposals clearly connect meanings, hence semantics, to evolutionary processes of cultural inheritance. E$amples include 3awkins7 !memes" -3awkins ./40, ./502 >lackmore .///62 )illikan7s !biosemantics" -)illikan ./5/, ;<<B62 and other varieties -3ennett .//98 ch. .52 Sterelny ;<<12 a.o.6. Eiven these basic assumptions, these approaches to semantics face several philosophical and, most importantly, empirical problems -=Fhndal : Narita, ;<</2 a.o.6. Several basic patterns of natural language interpretation appear mysterious, if one considers them as driven by the need to be evaluated with respect to e$ternal conte$t. >asic semantic properties of le$ical items and sentences -e.g. antonymy, synonymy, polarity, implicatures6, appear too hard a challenge, for stimulus driven accounts. Some very basic e$amples that fall outside the e$planatory power of such theories are our e$amples in -;6 -96, but the following e$amples also offer a challenge8

-06 )ario has sold the Jespa to =uigi

-46 =uigi has bought the Jespa from )ario -56 )ario went to the pub -/6 )ario is at the pub

E$amples -06 -46 display an antonymous relation that holds between the Jerbs buy and sell. These sentences can be true in the same e$ternal conte$t, as the same individuals -)ario and =uigi6 may be involved in the same event of commercial e$change. %owever, these sentences describe the same e$ternal event under two different !internal" points of view. Coughly, )ario7s point of view is e$pressed in -06, while =uigi7s point of view is e$pressed in -46. Note, furthermore, that the prepositions to and from also contribute to capture this distinction in points of view, in a basically compositional way. So, e$ternalist approaches would face a problematic challenge in modeling the notion of !perspective" that underpins antonym relations when defined over verbs and prepositions. *ossibly, they would also face this challenge with other parts of speech as well. # similar challenge would also emerge from e$amples -56 -/6, amply discussed in the literature on events at least since *arsons -.//<6. Antuitively, once the event of going to the pub described by the sentence in -46 is over, )ario ends up being at the pub, as a consequence. The relation that holds between the two sentences is one of entailment, since the interpretation of one sentence -i.e. -/66 is a logical consequence of the interpretation of a another sentence -i.e. -566. One possible e$ternalist analysis is that speakers could infer that the two sentences describe related sets of events, taken as describing e$tra linguistic scenarios -)illikan, ;<<B2 a.o.6. Speakers could accept these sentences as being !true" with respect to e$tra linguistic factors. Af we observe that )ario has gone to the pub in some earlier moment, we can conclude that )ario is at the pub as a consequence of this event of motion. Therefore, speakers can access their logical relations as part of their ability to reason with past and

current -observed6 events. One obvious problem with this inferential approach is that speakers can accept such entailments even if no e$tra linguistic conte$t is offered. The prepositions to and at denote certain possible spatial relations that hold among individuals, irrespective of their actual reali?ation in an e$tra linguistic conte$t. That is, they represent logicalLle$ical relations as relations of interpreted terms with respect to a model of Discourse. # model of 3iscourse, by definition, is distinct from the ob,ect-s6 it purports to model, whether it be a given conte$t or a fully spelled out model of the environment -=andman, .//.8 ch.; 12 %in?en, ;<<42 a.o.6. Therefore, if one takes an internalist stance to semantic relations, then one should not necessarily assume that these logicalLle$ical relations can but need not to represent e$ternal factors. # similar reasoning can be applied to several, if not all -spatial6 prepositions in English, again as discussed in the literature, and can be e$tended to other parts of speech as well -*arsons, .//<2 (ong, .//42 Mwarts, ;<<92 a.o.6. So, their le$ical relation guides the entailment relation that holds between the sentences they partake in, as well as speakers7 intuitions about these sentences. )ore in general, these approaches would probably encounter a challenge from any le$ical relation, as a relation representing the internal properties of a model of 3iscourse, and the le$icon it purports to represent0 -*ietroski, ;<<52 =Fhndal : Narita ;<</2 on this topic6. >ut before focusing on whether we can actually find Aiternalist approaches to this notion of a model of 3iscourse, we make some interim conclusions on the biological plausibility of these aforementioned approaches. (rom a philosophical point of view, the authors7 arguments offer a severe challenge to these e$ternalist approaches to semantics. 3escriptive, pre theoretical proposals such as 3awkins7 memes are ultimately e$tensions of OT, evolutionary psychology or a combination of both.
6

This problem emerges regardless of what perspective we take on the precise nature of the =e$icon, so we will be

silent on this specific theoretical matter.

(or these reasons, they both fail to meet the requirements for biological plausibility that the authors7 argument outline. #s e$tensions of OT, they will never be able to offer correct e$planations of semantic data, but rather false or, at most, empty ones. *hilosophical perspectives on semantics are so close to standard OTLevolutionary accounts, that they may as well as be considered the authors7 ideal targets of criticism. An other words, the systematic reliance of e$ternal factors and a NS like account that these theories employ provides the chief obstacle to a correct analysis of data, for these theories. Dhile the import for these e$ternalist approaches to semantics should be clear, a different picture emerges once we move within the domain of linguistic approaches to semantics. An this domain, model theoretic semantics have been employed by scholars with quite different perspectives. &lassical and modern model theoretic perspectives place a strong emphasis on semantic derivations and processes. %owever, these perspectives tacitly consider model theoretic semantics as attempting to model facts in the world, rather than mental representations thereof. Some modern variants known as !dynamic semantics" e$plicitly consider the process of interpretation as a way to modify what information we share, in the e$tra linguistic -e$ternal6 conte$t -Eroenendi,k : Stockhof .//.2 Stalnaker .///2 a.o.6. &onsequently, the model of 3iscourse that emerges from these theories is an e$ternal one, in that it models our use of meanings of utterances in conte$t. So, these theories also fall a within the range of both arguments, as being inherently e$ternalist. Not all semantic theories, however, take this perspective on models, so some distinctions are necessary. )odel theoretic semantics can be approached as the result of evaluating syntactic structures and their interpretation against a model of 3iscourse. This intermediate syntactic step can be skipped8 words and sentences are interpreted directly, against a model. The first approach usually has the (regean property of compositionality, while the second usually lacks it. Since we are assuming that a biologically grounded faculty

of language coincides with derivational processes, we also think that non compositional theories miss an important generali?ation. =et us assume that sentences are the end result of syntactic processes merging together basic le$ical units. Then, the interpretation of these sentences against a mental model of 3iscourse can only be the result of combining together the single interpretations in a coherent structure. (urthermore, if semantic relations among sentences can be defined, then these relations must reflect the semantic relations among the words and phrases they include in their structures. The interpretation of sentences such as -06 -/6, and their relations of entailment and antonymy must emerge as the compositional result of combining Atems such as to and from, or buy and sell together. E$tra linguistic factors should play no relevant role, in an analysis of these processes. Several theories, being non compositional in nature, fail to meet this requirement. E$amples of such theories are the )ental )odels theory -'ohnson =aird ./51, .//;62 &onceptual Semantics -'ackendoff ./51, .//<62 &ognitive Semantics -Talmy ;<<<2 Evans, ;<.<6. Other non compositional theories can also be included, such as certain incarnations of 3iscourse Cepresentation Theory -3CT8 Eeurts .///2 a.o.6, or approaches to synta$ and semantics centered on optimality theory -e.g. @ager .///6. Dithout an e$plicit level of syntactic generation, we cannot have a level of semantic evaluation, as no account of how we obtain structures is offered. A are not sure whether these theories fall prey to the authors7 arguments or sit in a theoretical gray ?one. %owever, A think that their perspective is not entirely germane to the authors7 arguments, for the reasons we listed so far. Dithout a principled account of how words7 meanings interact, their semantic relations can only be postulated, rather than e$plained in an accurate way. Several other theories, however, attempt to spell out compositional and model theoretic approaches -%eim : @rat?er .//52 &hierchia : )c&onnell Einnet ;<<<2 a.o.6. # distinct case must be made for semantic theories which may be implemented with )inimalist

approaches, other than the cartographic ones. (or instance, *ietroski -;<<9, ;<<56 appears to offer such a theory, since *ietroski7s proposal e$plicitly aims to integrate a -variant of6 event semantics with minimalist oriented syntactic assumptions. %owever, one might also integrate the minimalist program with theories that allow fle$ible syntactic assumptions. De think that canonical versions of 3CT can be such theories, given their syntactic neutrality -see e.g. @amp, van Eenabith : Ceyle ;<<96. Other avenues of research that share this perspective are also possible. &ategorial approaches such as Steedman -;<<<, ;<.;6 derive semantic interpretations from syntactic structures in an isomorphic -one to one6 fashion, a principle known as the ,urry--oward isomorphism. So, they propose a compositional, transparent relation between synta$ and semantics, one which is ma$imally e$plicit in how one computes meanings of sentences from the meanings of words. # similar proposal is made in #ndrews -;<<B6, which discusses the possibility of e$plicitly defining a model theoretic semantics approach with a strictly mentalist, internalist perspective. The core difference with other proposals is that =(E is taken as the -implicit6 syntactic framework of choice. De leave open on whether this latter choice crucially determines the biological feasibility of #ndrews7 proposal. %owever, we think that #ndrews7 proposal also captures an important generali?ation, that insofar as a theory aims to model the meaning and relations among words as part of a mental le$icon in a compositional manner, then a semantic theory can be consistent with the authors7 arguments. An doing so, as we discussed so far, a semantic theory is also able to e$plain basic semantic data, since they offer evidence that internal properties of language play a key role. #n important point that we must discuss as a distinct topic is the following. #s all of these model theoretic theories include language specific -one would say8 meaning specific6 definitions of conservativity, they appear to e$plicitly capture this consistency in their apparatus. At is true that standard model theoretic approaches to semantics implement a notion

of conservativity that was originally devised to capture the semantic properties of Eenerali?ed Kuantifiers ->arwise : &ooper, ./5.2 onwards6. Our e$aptation of this notion may be a useful conceptual tool, but not necessarily a correct one. An this regard, it seems a bit of a stretch to suggest a direct logical connection between the properties of the Kuantified Noun *hrase every man, and the wing less nature of pigs. %owever, semantic conservativity is defined as a property that restricts the properties of Eenerali?ed Kuantifiers in their interaction with other parts of speech. (urthermore, the Eenerali?ed Kuantifier approach can be e$tended, with minor provisos, to adverbs and other parts of speech that can denote relations among events ->ach, 'elinek, @rat?er : *artee, .//9, a.o.6. Therefore, its conceptual import for our discussion turns out to be quite vast, empirically speaking. The e$amples in -.<6 -..6 allow us to clarify this point in detail8

-.<6 -..6

Every man walks in the park )ario always walks in the park

&onservativity predicts that the interpretation of -.<6 can be roughly paraphrased as8 every man in the domain of discourse is a man who also walks in the park. At also predicts for -..6, although a slightly different level of representation, that every event in which )ario walks is also an event in which )ario walks in the park. >oth determiner and adverbial quantification obey to the same underlying principle, conservativity. An other words, conservativity predicts that Kuantifiers and other le$ical items must combine according to certain properties and principles of consistency. At also predicts that le$ical items that fail to en,oy this property will render sentences ungrammatical, or structurally ill formed. *erhaps such =e$ical Atems can be freely conceived and used in different types of e$ternal conte$ts, but their e$istence is based on the !design" of speakers, rather than on the natural properties of language -&rain :

*ietroski, ;<<.2 a.o.6. Once we take into consideration the fact that, at a certain level of understanding, quantification is a pervasive phenomenon in natural languages, one fact should become obvious. The internal organi?ation of a mental model of 3iscourse plays a much more vital role in possible meanings, than any environmental constraints, as it offers a more immediate constraint on what can be interpretable sentences. So, if we can spell out a semantics for natural language sentences, that is transparently mapped from their syntactic structures and that also en,oys the conservativity property, then we can make rather e$plicit claims about the biological consistency of our theories. Our grammars must produce well formed and interpretable sentences, before these sentences can be even evaluated with respect to an e$tra linguistic conte$t. #pproaches that do not take into consideration this basic fact about Semantic interpretation would simply fail to be consistent with the authors7 main argument, as they would lack a language specific form of conservativity. &onsequently, they would fail in being able to account for a pervasive phenomenon of natural language semantics, a rather unwelcome result4. #n open question that emerges from this discussion is whether we could define an integrated and biologically plausible theory of synta$, semantics and their interface. %owever, we think that conservativity gives us an important clue on how this interface should be defined. Af one combines a biologically plausible synta$ with a biologically plausible semantics, then the result should indeed yield a biologically plausible synta$ Semantics interface. Eiven the considerations we made in the previous section, this biologically plausible, integrated approach should take the form of an internalist grammar. De take an

An several minimalist approaches, a systematic distinction is made between interpretable and un interpretable

features, a distinction which is used to account for agreement phenomena in a variety of syntactic conte$t -%ornstein et al. ;<<08 ch. 4 /2 a.o.6. De leave aside a discussion on how these notions are related to the model theoretic ones, as we think that solving such a comple$ theoretical problem would lead us too far afield from our topic of discussion.

internalist grammar to be one that builds sentences as mental ob,ects that, in turn, denote -structured6 mental representations, or !meanings", which stand in certain internal -le$ical6 relations -e.g. entailment6. *erhaps, in such a scenario these semantic relations could be interpreted as further dimension of linguistic organi?ation, to an e$tent ancillary to the dimensions of synta$. De leave aside a more thorough discussion of these comple$ matters, and focus on more empirically oriented topics. (or this reason, we turn our attention to acquisition matters.

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The goal of this section is to discuss theories of language acquisition that meet the authors7 arguments for biological plausibility. There is an ample consensus that acquisition problems, #ua psychological problems, represent a clear case in which psycho and bio logical factors must play a vital role in linguistic e$planations -Nang, ;<<;2 Tomasello, ;<<12 a.o.6. So, we think that our choice is quite germane for our discussion on the biological plausibility of linguistic theories. Af the syntactic and semantic considerations offered in the previous sections are correct, then the arguments put forward by the authors appear to be particularly relevant for e$perimental approaches to linguistic data. This entails that the validity of language acquisition theories can be also evaluated with respect to their ability to appropriately match biologically plausible theories of synta$. Therefore, acquisition matters can be discussed from a similar point of view to that we applied to syntactic theories. Dithin this field, we can make a broad distinction between theories that can be more or less reduced to evolutionary psychology theories, and those that are closer -or within6 the minimalist program. (or instance, construction based models of language acquisition contend that the acquisition

process consists, to a large e$tent, in the child selecting which syntactic constructions are present in a language. #ccording to these theories, then, a child acquires a language via the directed, guided input of adults surrounding him. Such models often e$plicitly define their hypotheses about language acquisition processes as being conceptually isomorphic to NS -Tomasello, ;<<12 Eoldberg, ;<<02 a.o.6. &onsequently, the logical and empirical fallacies appearing in NS are a problem for these theories of language acquisition, too. These conceptual problems can be found, although in different forms, in acquisition theories that share the same dearth of !dimensional comple$ity". (or instance, in generative approaches to language acquisition, the *rinciples and *arameters view of syntactic structures is considered the norm. &onsequently, the child+s task of acquiring a language roughly coincides with the task of discovering the !correct" parameter settings in her language, on a !%ead by %ead" basis -Euasti ;<<;2 a.o.6. This approach is indirectly consistent with the authors+ arguments, since these works offer a view of language acquisition which may be said to !bi dimensional". Af one takes in consideration that the !%ead by %ead" model of acquisition acts as a counterpart of the cartographic approach, then one can easily reali?e that his model falls within the same conceptual !gray space" of &artography. *art of the structural comple$ity that a child should !discover" about a target language is, in a sense, under represented in this model. An particular, it is not clear whether a child would actually acquire )erge as a syntactic principle, since the acquisition task would in part reduce to two more basic processes. One would be acquiring a fi$ed word order for sentences, the other would be mapping such order to the one found in the target language, via movement operations -cf. =onga : =oren?o ;<<56. The general problem that seems to emerge from this discussion is the following. Af we take a biological perspective to language acquisition in children, then the authors7 arguments can apply to the acquisition problem as well. This means that a biologically plausible theory

of language acquisition cannot be a theory that hinges on e$ternal factors driving acquisition. Of course, children require the e$ternal input of other speakers, so that their mental grammar can -and must6 store this information, to !grow" over developmental time. %owever, this process of !internali?ation" of these e$ternal inputs is likely to be guided by the specific properties that also govern adult like language production and comprehension. Theories of language acquisition such as &rain : Thornton -.///6 or Nang -;<<;6 seem to provide an approach which is very close to these assumptions, hence germane to the authors7 arguments. The key intuition is that in these theories of language acquisition, a child acts as a !conservative" learner. The child starts with the ability to access basic properties of grammar, which allow the child to understand the underlying sentence structure of utterances, and their possible interpretation in a -mental6 model of 3iscourse. New sentences and possible interpretations, according to these models of acquisition, must be consistent with the structural properties that a child can access from grammar. So, a child can only acquire new sentences, e.g. -;6 -..6, as long as they can be parsed as the result of precise syntactic processes, which in turn result in corresponding semantic interpretations. Dhile this process can be sub,ect to constant updates and !recalibrations", such dynamic processes result in e$panding the child7s grammar and model of 3iscourse in a structured, internally principled way. Other approaches, as the authors suggest, would simply lead to models of acquisition that cannot account for basic acquisition data across languages. One important aspect of this discussion is the following. An making this con,ecture about plausible models of language acquisition, we assume that conservativity plays a role in this !dimension" of language as well. Our argument is as follows. Af the result of the acquisition process is a biologically plausible and internal grammar, as the one we assume for adults, then this result must come from a process which is also biologically plausible. Eiven that we take the authors7 arguments as our guide, a biologically plausible acquisition process is a process

that preserves the internal organi?ation of grammar, while allowing grammar to build up a !bigger" set of le$ical items. This process should also build up grammatical relations among these items -e.g. whether they are syntactic or semantic6 that a child learns when he learns a language. Af one takes seriously the authors7 argument for acquisition matters as well, then would e$pect that the structural properties of grammar -#ua a biological structure6 remain the same, although the !si?e" of the grammar grows over time. Such principles are deeply embedded in all the theories based on minimalist assumptions that we reviewed so far, although they seem to be the main guiding principle in &rain : Thornton -.///6 and Nang -;<<;6. Other theories such as usage based models of acquisition, instead, fall squarely within the conceptual pitfall of being !empty" e$planatory accounts, given their reliance on e$ternal principles of acquisition. >efore moving to the conclusions, we briefly sum up and discuss our analysis of the authors7 arguments, and their import for >#. At may come as no surprise that the authors+ arguments offer a criticism that can be e$tended to several linguistic theories which are indirectly incompatible with the biolinguistic approach. The authors7 arguments can also offer a relatively precise account on why these theories are likely to be !false" or, at most, !empty". At should also come as no surprise that these arguments do not bear relevance only to syntactic aspects but to semantic and acquisition aspects as well, since these arguments outline the problematic nature of any theory -linguistic or not6 that fails to account for the dynamic, derivational nature of linguistic processes. %owever, it is an open but not so clear question whether their arguments support the whole spectrum of minimalist approaches, or are perhaps consistent only with a certain sub set of proposals that are part of the minimalist logical space. A shall briefly discuss this topic in the remainder of this section. #gain, as the authors observe, the view they offer in the book about the Evo 3evo program does not necessarily represent the received wisdom regarding the theoretical import

of this theory. Cather different accounts e$ist, and may be considered the ma,ority view in the field -Tooby, &osmides : >arrett ;<<12 for discussion6. %owever, if the authors7 argument and, consequently, our analysis are on the right track, then only a certain type of minimalist approaches to synta$ semantics and their psycho and bio logical assumptions are on the right track. #pproaches that are not entirely consistent with the authors+ arguments encounter empirical problems that are easily accounted for, in accounts that are consistent with these arguments. #t least for language, the ma,ority view seems mistaken. #lthough we leave open on which specific theoretical proposals this internalist approach is made of, its core properties should be now clear. #n integrated minimalist approach that aims at being consistent with the authors7 arguments #ua accurate assumptions about biological data, must model language as a very precise internal system. So, it must capture in a precise way the general !laws of form", as they are instantiated in language. Other models, in particular e$ternalist ones, will not be equally empirically adequate, both at a linguistic and biological level. De now turn to the more general conclusions of this paper.

C"!c)$s%"!s

'erry (odor commented after the book+s publication that he would have been placed on the (>A+s witness protection program, since What Darwin .ot Wrong would have likely caused deeply negative reactions. #fter all, 3arwin+s !dangerous idea", although in a rather e$treme interpretation, is considered as the solution to possibly one big problem of Science, how life evolved -3ennett .//92 ch..6. %owever, when this criticism is applied to bio linguistic inquiries, it turns out to be relatively uncontroversial and motivated. #s we discussed in this paper, it may actually offer quite powerful insights on why New Synthesis based theories of language and other mental processes, such as evolutionary psychology, but also offer precise

constraints as to which theoretical approach, within >iological #pproach theori?ing, appears to have a sounder biological plausibility. Overall, What Darwin .ot Wrong presents two arguments which seem to be very important for the biolinguistic approach and one of its specific incarnations, the minimalist program. These two arguments enrich the debate on what constitutes desiderata for a biologically sound approach to language. An doing so, What Darwin .ot Wrong appears useful in stressing out the importance of formulating bio linguistic theories that are at the same time empirically adequate and theoretically sound, since such theories need to be entirely naturalistic. An doing so, the book spells out a very precise logical and empirical space in which linguistic, and more precisely minimalist theories must move, in order to be biologically plausible. At is of course an open question on whether a specific form of minimalism can be easily defined, within this conceptual space. %owever, if the authors are correct in their assessment, a theory that is defined within this space will be a theory that meets a much sought, and yet elusive bio and logical validity. %ence, it will be a theory worth pursuing in detail.

R(+(r(!c(s

#ndrews, #very. -;<<B6. &odel-(heoretic *emantics as *tructural *emantics . )s., #ustralian National Oniversity. #vailable online at8

http8LLarts.anu.edu.auLlinguisticsL*eopleL#very#ndrewsL*apersLmtr.pdf #soulin, Eran. -;<<46. Dhy E$ternalism is not *art of &ognitive Science. An An 3anielle S. )cNamara : Ereg Trafton -Eds.6 'roceedings of the /0th Annual ,onference of the ,ognitive *ciences *ociety, 441 445. >ach, Emmon, Eloise 'elinek, #ngelika @rat?er, and >arbara %. *artee, eds. -.//96.

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