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Doctrine of Transformation vs.

Doctrine of Incorporation:

The Doctrine of Transformation is based upon the perception of two distinct systems of
law operating separately, and maintains that before any rule or principle of international law can have any effect within the domestic jurisdiction, it must be expressly and specifically 'transformed' into municipal law by the use of the appropriate constitutional machinery. This doctrine grew from the procedure whereby international agreements are rendered operative in municipal law by the device of ratification by the sovereign and the idea has developed from this that any rule of international law must be transformed, or specifically adopted, to be valid within the internal legal order. Whereas, the Doctrine of Incorporation holds that international law is part of the municipal law automatically without the necessity for the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure. CHAPTER 4 CASES: Ichong vs. Hernandez: Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Facts: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it

applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. The treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 90 PHIL 70 September 26, 1951 FACTS: This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court of July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Thereafter the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel documents Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948 after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made." Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not Boris Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation.

RULING: The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1);; that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing , GR No. 65366, October 25, 1983 Facts : Petitioner retired Justice J.B.L Reyes on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally starting from the Luneta Park (public park) to the gates of the United States Embassy. There was an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken to ensure a peaceful march and rally. It turned out that the permit was denied by the respondent Mayor. Petitioner was unaware of such denial as it was sent through an ordinary mail. The reason of refusing the permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit. To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people are expected to attend. Mayor suggested, however, that a permit may be issued for the rally if it will be held in Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed areas where the safety of the participants and general public may be assured. The Mayor also posed the applicability of Ordinance No.7925 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding and staging of rallies or demonstration within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery in this case the US Embassy. However, there was no proof that the US Embassy was indeed 500 feet away. Issue:

Whether or not the denial of permit to rally by the respondent Mayor is valid. Held: Even if it can be shown that such condition existed (500 feet away), it does not follow that the respondent could legally act the way he did. Such denial can still be challenged as to the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention which calls for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission. But, the denial of permit to rally in front of the US Embassy is only justified in the presence of clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy. This is binding on the Philippines to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against intrusion or damage and prevent any disturbance of peace or impairment of its dignity. To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage or disturbance of peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the US Embassy - but there was none. Respondent official was ordered to grant the permit.

AGUSTIN vs EDU 88 SCRA 195 FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional? HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and

devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance,between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails. Gonzales vs. Hechanova: Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements Facts: Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni Facts: Petitioner, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces, was charged before a military commission set by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Said executive order also established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Petitioner contended that E.O. No. 68 was illegal and unconstitutional because he cannot be tried fro violation of international conventions, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Furthermore, he alleged that the participation of two American lawyers in the prosecution was violative of our national sovereignty. Issue: Whether the Philippine Government has the jurisdiction to try and convict Kuroda for violating prohibited acts of the war. Ruling: Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional because Article II, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution explicitly provides that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of nation. In promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President of the Philippine exercised his power as commander-in-chief of all armed forces. Moreover, it was in adherence with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which form part of our Constitution. With regards to the contention about the participation of two American lawyers, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States and thus, we were equally bound together with the US and Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. Tanada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18 May 2, 1997

Facts: On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate ratifying such WTO Agreement.The present petition was filed assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Section 19, Article II of the Constitution,

providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII thereof, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement, thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court must give due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

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