0-500AD The Babylonian Talmud is the compilation of ancient law and tradition set down during the first

five centuries A.D. which serves as the basis of Jewish religious criminal and civil law. !ne problem discussed in the Talmud is the so called marriage contract problem" a man has three wives whose marriage contracts specify that in the case of this death they receive #00 $00 and %00 respectively. The Talmud gives apparently contradictory recommendations. &here the man dies leaving an estate of only #00 the Talmud recommends e'ual division. (owever if the estate is worth %00 it recommends proportional division )50 #00 #50* while for an estate of $00 its recommendation of )50 +5 +5* is a complete mystery. This particular ,ishna has baffled Talmudic scholars for two millennia. -n #./5 it was recognised that the Talmud anticipates the modern theory of cooperative games. 0ach solution corresponds to the nucleolus of an appropriately defined game. #+#% -n a letter dated #% 1ovember #+#% James &aldegrave provided the first 2nown minima3 mi3ed strategy solution to a two-person game. &aldegrave wrote the letter about a two-person version of the card game le (er to 4ierre-5emond de ,ontmort who in turn wrote to 1icolas Bernoulli including in his letter a discussion of the &aldegrave solution. &aldegrave6s solution is a minima3 mi3ed strategy e'uilibrium but he made no e3tension of his result to other games and e3pressed concern that a mi3ed strategy 7does not seem to be in the usual rules of play7 of games of chance #/%/ 4ublication of Augustin 8ournot6s 5esearches into the ,athematical 4rinciples of the Theory of &ealth. -n chapter + !n the 8ompetition of 4roducers 8ournot discusses the special case of duopoly and utilises a solution concept that is a restricted version of the 1ash e'uilibrium #/+# -n the first edition of his boo2 The Descent of ,an and 9election in 5elation to 9e3 8harles Darwin gives the first )implicitly* game theoretic argument in evolutionary biology. Darwin argued that natural section will act to e'uali:e the se3 ratio. -f for e3ample births of females are less common than males then a newborn female will have better mating prospects than a newborn male and therefore can e3pect to have more offspring. Thus parents genetically disposed to produce females tend to have more than the average numbers of grandchildren and thus the genes for femaleproducing tendencies spread and female births become commoner. As the #"# se3 ratio is approached the advantage associated with producing females dies away. The same reasoning holds if males are substituted for females throughout. Therefore #"# is the e'uilibrium ratio. #//# 4ublication of ;rancis <sidro 0dgeworth6s ,athematical 4sychics" An 0ssay on the Application of ,athematics to the ,oral 9ciences. 0dgeworth proposed the contract curve as a solution to the problem of determining the outcome of trading between individuals. -n a world of two commodities and two types of consumers he demonstrated that the contract curve shrin2s to the set of competitive e'uilibria as the number of consumers of each type becomes infinite. The concept of the core is a generalisation of 0dgeworth6s contract curve. #.#% The first 6theorem6 of game theory asserts that in chess either white can force a win or blac2 can force a win or both sides can force at least a draw. This 6theorem6 was published by 0rnst =ermelo in his paper >ber eine Anwendung der ,engenlehre auf

die Theorie des 9chachspiels and hence is referred to as =ermelo6s Theorem. =ermelo6s results were e3tended and generalised in two papers by Denes ?onig and @as:lo ?almar. The ?almar paper contains the first proof of =ermelo6s theorem since =ermelo6s own paper did not give one. An 0nglish translation of the =ermelo paper along with a discussion its significance and its relationship to the wor2 of ?onig and ?almar is contained in =ermelo and the 0arly (istory of Aame Theory by >. 9chwalbe and 4. &al2er. #.$#-$+ 0mile Borel published four notes on strategic games and an erratum to one of them. Borel gave the first modern formulation of a mi3ed strategy along with finding the minima3 solution for two-person games with three or five possible strategies. -nitially he maintained that games with more possible strategies would not have minima3 solutions but by #.$+ he considered this an open 'uestion as he had been unable to find a countere3ample. #.$/ John von 1eumann proved the minima3 theorem in his article =ur Theorie der Aesellschaftsspiele. -t states that every two- person :ero-sum game with finitely many pure strategies for each player is determined ie" when mi3ed strategies are admitted this variety of game has precisely one individually rational payoff vector. The proof ma2es involved use of some topology and of functional calculus. This paper also introduced the e3tensive form of a game. #.%0 4ublication of ;. =euthen6s boo2 4roblems of ,onopoly and 0conomic &arfare. -n chapter -B he proposed a solution to the bargaining problem which (arsanyi later showed is e'uivalent to 1ash6s bargaining solution. #.%C 5.A. ;isher independently discovers &aldegrave6s solution to the card game le (er. ;isher reported his wor2 in the paper 5andomisation and an !ld 0nigma of 8ard 4lay. #.%/ Bille gives the first elementary but still partially topological proof of the minima3 theorem. Bon 1eumann and ,orgenstern6s )#.CC* proof of the theorem is a revised and more elementary version of Bille6s proof. #.CC Theory of Aames and 0conomic Behavior by John von 1eumann and !s2ar ,orgenstern is published. As well as e3pounding two-person :ero sum theory this boo2 is the seminal wor2 in areas of game theory such as the notion of a cooperative game with transferable utility )T>* its coalitional form and its von 1eumann,orgenstern stable sets. -t was also the account of a3iomatic utility theory given here that led to its wide spread adoption within economics. #.C5 (erbert 9imon writes the first review of von 1eumann-,orgenstern. #.CD The first entirely algebraic proof of the minima3 theorem is due to @. (. @oomis6s !n a Theorem of von 1eumann paper. #.50 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames - (. &. ?uhn and A. &. Tuc2er eds. published. #.50 -n January #.50 ,elvin Dresher and ,errill ;lood carry out at the 5and 8orporation the e3periment which introduced the game now 2nown as the 4risoner6s Dilemma. The

famous story associated with this game is due to A. &. Tuc2er A Two-4erson Dilemma )memo 9tanford >niversity*. (oward 5aiffa independently conducted unpublished e3periments with the 4risoner6s Dilemma. #.50 John ,cDonald6s 9trategy in 4o2er Business and &ar published. This was the first introduction to game theory for the general reader. #.50-5% -n four papers between #.50 and #.5% John 1ash made seminal contributions to both non-cooperative game theory and to bargaining theory. -n two papers 0'uilibrium 4oints in 1- 4erson Aames )#.50* and 1on-cooperative Aames )#.5#* 1ash proved the e3istence of a strategic e'uilibrium for non-cooperative games-the 1ash e'uilibrium-and proposed the 71ash program7 in which he suggested approaching the study of cooperative games via their reduction to non-cooperative form. -n his two papers on bargaining theory The Bargaining 4roblem )#.50* and Two-4erson 8ooperative Aames )#.5%* he founded a3iomatic bargaining theory proved the e3istence of the 1ash bargaining solution and provided the first e3ecution of the 1ash program. #.5# Aeorge &. Brown described and discussed a simple iterative method for appro3imating solutions of discrete :ero-sum games in his paper -terative 9olutions of Aames by ;ictitious 4lay. #.5$ The first te3tboo2 on game theory was John 8harles 8. ,c?insey -ntroduction to the Theory of Aames. #.5$ ,errill ;lood6s report )5and 8orporation research memorandum 9ome 03perimental Aames 5,-+/. June* on the #.50 DresherE;lood e3periments appears. #.5$ The ;ord ;oundation and the >niversity of ,ichigan sponsor a seminar on the 7Design of 03periments in Decision 4rocesses7 in 9anta ,onica. This was the first e3perimental economicsEe3perimental game theory conference #.5$-5% The notion of the 8ore as a general solution concept was developed by @. 9. 9hapley )5and 8orporation research memorandum 1otes on the 1-4erson Aame ---" 9ome Bariants of the von-1eumann-,orgenstern Definition of 9olution 5,- /#+ #.5$* and D. B. Aillies )9ome Theorems on 1-4erson Aames 4h.D. thesis Department of ,athematics 4rinceton >niversity #.5%*. The core is the set of allocations that cannot be improved upon by any coalition. #.5% @loyd 9hapley in his paper A Balue for 1-4erson Aames characterised by a set of a3ioms a solution concept that associates with each coalitional game v a uni'ue outcome v. This solution in now 2nown as the 9hapley Balue. #.5% @loyd 9hapley6s paper 9tochastic Aames showed that for the strictly competitive case with future payoff discounted at a fi3ed rate such games are determined and that they have optimal strategies that depend only on the game being played not on the history or even on the date ie" the strategies are stationary. #.5% 03tensive form games allow the modeller to specify the e3act order in which players have to ma2e their decisions and to formulate the assumptions about the information

possessed by the players in all stages of the game. (. &. ?uhn6s paper 03tensive Aames and the 4roblem of -nformation includes the formulation of e3tensive form games which is currently used and also some basic theorems pertaining to this class of games. #.5% 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames -- (. &. ?uhn and A. &. Tuc2er eds. published. #.5C !ne of the earliest applications of game theory to political science is @. 9. 9hapley and ,. 9hubi2 with their paper A ,ethod for 0valuating the Distribution of 4ower in a 8ommittee 9ystem. They use the 9hapley value to determine the power of the members of the >1 9ecurity 8ouncil. #.5C-55 Differential Aames were developed by 5ufus -saacs in the early #.50s. They grew out of the problem of forming and solving military pursuit games. The first publications in the area were 5and 8orporation research memoranda by -saacs 5,-#%.# )%0 1ovember #.5C* 5,-#%.. )%0 1ovember #.5C* 5,-#C## )$# December #.5C* and 5,-#C/D )$5 ,arch #.55* all entitled in part Differential Aames. #.55 !ne of the first applications of game theory to philosophy is 5. B. Braithwaite6s Theory of Aames as a Tool for the ,oral 4hilosopher. #.5+ Aames and Decisions" -ntroduction and 8ritical 9urvey by 5obert Duncan @uce and (oward 5aiffa published. #.5+ 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames --- ,. A. Dresher A. &. Tuc2er and 4. &olfe eds. published. #.5. The notion of a 9trong 0'uilibrium was introduced by 5. J. Aumann in the paper Acceptable 4oints in Aeneral 8ooperative 1-4erson Aames. #.5. The relationship between 0dgeworth6s idea of the contract curve and the core was pointed out by ,artin 9hubi2 in his paper 0dgeworth ,ar2et Aames. !ne limitation with this paper is that 9hubi2 wor2ed within the confines of T> games whereas 0dgeworth6s idea is more appropriately modelled as an 1T> game. #.5. 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames -B A. &. Tuc2er and 5. D. @uce eds. published. #.5. 4ublication of ,artin 9hubi26s 9trategy and ,ar2et 9tructure" 8ompetition !ligopoly and the Theory of Aames. This was one of the first boo2s to ta2e an e3plicitly non-cooperative game theoretic approach to modelling oligopoly. -t also contains an early statement of the ;ol2 Theorem. @ate 506s 1ear the end of this decade came the first studies of repeated games. The main result to appear at this time was the ;ol2 Theorem. This states that the e'uilibrium outcomes in an infinitely repeated game coincide with the feasible and strongly individually rational outcomes of the one-shot game on which it is based. Authorship of the theorem is obscure. #.D0

The development of 1T> )non-transferable utility* games made cooperative game theory more widely applicable. Bon 1eumann and ,orgenstern stable sets were investigated in the 1T> conte3t in the Aumann and 4eleg paper Bon 1eumann and ,orgenstern 9olutions to 8ooperative Aames &ithout 9ide 4ayments. #.D0 4ublication of Thomas 8. 9chelling6s The 9trategy of 8onflict. -t is in this boo2 that 9chelling introduced the idea of a focal-point effect. #.D# The first e3plicit application to evolutionary biology was by 5. 8. @ewontin in 0volution and the Theory of Aames. #.D# The 8ore was e3tended to 1T> games by 5. J. Aumann in his paper The 8ore of a 8ooperative Aame &ithout 9ide 4ayments. #.D$ -n their paper 8ollege Admissions and the 9tability of ,arriage D. Aale and @. 9hapley as2ed whether it is possible to match m women with m men so that there is no pair consisting of a woman and a man who prefer each other to the partners with whom they are currently matched. Aame theoretically the 'uestion is does the appropriately defined 1T> coalitional game have a non-empty coreF Aale and 9hapley proved not only non-emptiness but also provided an algorithm for finding a point in it. #.D$ !ne of the first applications of game theory to cost allocation is ,artin 9hubi26s paper -ncentives Decentrali:ed 8ontrol the Assignment of Joint 8osts and -nternal 4ricing. -n this paper 9hubi2 argued that the 9hapley value could be used to provide a means of devising incentive-compatible cost assignments and internal pricing in a firm with decentralised decision ma2ing. #.D$ An early use of game theory in insurance is ?arl Borch6s paper Application of Aame Theory to 9ome 4roblems in Automobile -nsurance. The article indicates how game theory can be applied to determine premiums for different classes of insurance when re'uired total premium for all classes is given. Borch suggests that the 9hapley value will give reasonable premiums for all classes of ris2. #.D% !. 1. Bondareva established that for a T> game its core is non-empty iff it is balanced. The reference which is in 5ussian translates as 9ome Applications of @inear 4rogramming ,ethods to the Theory of 8ooperative Aames. #.D% -n their paper A @imit Theorem on the 8ore of an 0conomy A. Debreu and (. 9carf generalised 0dgeworth in the conte3t of a 1T> game by allowing an arbitrary number of commodities and an arbitrary but finite number of types of traders. #.DC 5obert J. Aumann further e3tended 0dgeworth by assuming that the agents constitute a )non-atomic* continuum in his paper ,ar2ets with a 8ontinuum of Traders. #.DC The idea of the Bargaining 9et was introduced and discussed in the paper by 5. J. Aumann and ,. ,aschler The Bargaining 9et for 8ooperative Aames. The bargaining set includes the core but unli2e it is never empty for T> games. #.DC

8arlton 0. @em2e and J.T. (owson Jr. describe an algorithm for finding a 1ash e'uilibrium in a bimatri3 game thereby giving a constructive proof of the e3istence of an e'uilibrium point in their paper 0'uilibrium 4oints in Bimatri3 Aames. The paper also shows that e3cept for degenerate situations the number of e'uilibria in a bimatri3 game is odd. #.D5 4ublication of 5ufus -saacs6s Differential Aames" A ,athematical Theory with Applications to &arfare and 4ursuit 8ontrol and !ptimi:ation. #.D5 5. 9elten 9pieltheoretische Behandlung eines !ligopolmodells mit 1achfragetraegheit. -n this article 9elten introduced the idea of refinements of the 1ash e'uilibrium with the concept of )subgame* perfect e'uilibria. #.D5 The concept of the ?ernel is due to ,. Davis and ,. ,aschler The ?ernel of a 8ooperative Aame. The 2ernel is always included in the bargaining set but is often much smaller. #.DD -nfinitely repeated games with incomplete information were born in a paper by 5. J. Aumann and ,. ,aschler Aame-Theoretic Aspects of Aradual Disarmament. #.DD -n his paper A Aeneral Theory of 5ational Behavior in Aame 9ituations John (arsanyi gave the now most commonly used definition to distinguish between cooperative and non-cooperative games. A game is cooperative if commitments--agreements promises threats--are fully binding and enforceable. -t is non-cooperative if commitments are not enforceable. #.D+ @loyd 9hapley independently of !.1. Bondareva showed that the core of a T> game is non-empty iff it is balanced in his paper !n Balanced 9ets and 8ores. #.D+ -n the articleThe 8ore of a 1-4erson Aame (. 0. 9carf e3tended the notion of balancedness to 1T> games then showed that every balanced 1T> game has a nonempty core. #.D+-D/ -n a series of three papers Aames with -ncomplete -nformation 4layed by 6Bayesian6 4layers 4arts - -- and --- John (arsanyi constructed the theory of games of incomplete information. This laid the theoretical groundwor2 for information economics that has become one of the maGor themes of economics and game theory. #.D/ The long-standing 'uestion as to whether stable sets always e3ist was answered in the negative by &illiam @ucas in his paper A Aame with no 9olution. #.D. David 9chmeidler introduced the 1ucleolus in this paper The 1ucleolus of a 8haracteristic Aame. The 1ucleolus always e3ists is uni'ue is a member of the ?ernel and for any non- empty core is always in it. #.D. 9hapley defined a value for 1T> games in his article >tility 8omparison and the Theory of Aames. #.D.

;or a coalitional game to be a mar2et game it is necessary that it and all its subgames have non-empty cores ie" that the game be totally balanced. -n ,ar2et Aames @. 9. 9hapley and ,artin 9hubi2 prove that this necessary condition is also sufficient. #.+$ -nternational Journal of Aame Theory was founded by !s2ar ,orgenstern. #.+$ The concept of an 0volutionarily 9table 9trategy )099* was introduced to evolutionary game theory by John ,aynard 9mith in an essay Aame Theory and The 0volution of ;ighting. The 099 concept has since found increasing use within the economics )and biologyH* literature. #.+% -n the traditional view of strategy randomi:ation the players use a randomising device to decide on their actions. John (arsanyi was the first to brea2 away from this view with his paper Aames with 5andomly Disturbed 4ayoffs" A 1ew 5ationale for ,i3ed 9trategy 0'uilibrium 4oints. ;or (arsanyi nobody really randomises. The appearance of randomisation is due to the payoffs not being e3actly 2nown to allI each player who 2nows his own payoff e3actly has a uni'ue optimal action against his estimate of what the others will do. #.+% The maGor impetus for the use of the 099 concept was the publication of J. ,aynard 9mith and A. 4rice6s paper The @ogic of Animal 8onflict. #.+% The revelation principle can be traced bac2 to Aibbard6s paper ,anipulation of Boting 9chemes" A Aeneral 5esult #.+C 4ublication of 5. J. Aumann and @. 9. 9hapley6s boo2 Balues of 1on-Atomic Aames. -t deals with values for large games in which all the players are individually insignificant )non-atomic games*. #.+C 5. J. Aumann proposed the concept of a correlated e'uilibrium in his paper 9ubGectivity and 8orrelation in 5andomi:ed 9trategies. #.+5 The introduction of trembling hand perfect e'uilibria occurred in the paper 5ee3amination of the 4erfectness 8oncept for 0'uilibrium 4oints in 03tensive Aames by 5einhard 9elten. This paper was the true catalyst for the 6refinement industry6 that has developed around the 1ash e'uilibrium. #.+5 0. ?alai and ,. 9morodins2y in their article !ther 9olutions to 1ash6s Bargaining 4roblem replace 1ash6s independence of irrelevant alternatives a3iom with a monotonicity a3iom. The resulting solution is 2nown as the ?alai-9morodins2y solution. #.+5 -n his paper 8ross-9ubsidi:ation" 4ricing in 4ublic 0nterprises A. ;aulhaber shows that the set of subsidy-free prices are those prices for which the resulting revenue )ri J pi'i for given demand levels 'i* vector lies in the core of the cost allocation game. #.+D An event is common 2nowledge among a set of agents if all 2now it and all 2now that they all 2now it and so on ad infinitum. Although the idea first appeared in the wor2 of the philosopher D. ?. @ewis in the late #.D0s it was not until its formalisation in

5obert Aumann6s Agreeing to Disagree that game theorists and economists came to fully appreciate its importance. #.++ 9. 8. @ittlechild and A. ;. Thompson are among the first to apply the nucleolus to the problem of cost allocation with their article Aircraft @anding ;ees" A Aame Theory Approach. They use the nucleolus along with the core and 9hapley value to calculate fair and efficient landing and ta2e-off fees for Birmingham airport. #./# 0lon ?ohlberg introduced the idea of forward induction in a conference paper 9ome 4roblems with the 8oncept of 4erfect 0'uilibria. #./# 5. J. Aumann published a 9urvey of 5epeated Aames. This survey firstly proposed the idea of applying the notion of an automaton to describe a player in a repeated game. A second idea from the survey is to study the interactive behaviour of bounded players by studying a game with appropriately restricted set of strategies. These ideas have given birth to a large and growing literature. #./$ David ,. ?reps and 5obert &ilson e3tend the idea of a subgame perfect e'uilibrium to subgames in the e3tensive form that begin at information sets with imperfect information. They call this e3tended idea of e'uilibrium se'uential. -t is detailed in their paper 9e'uential 0'uilibria. #./$ A. 5ubinstein considered a non-cooperative approach to bargaining in his paper 4erfect 0'uilibrium in a Bargaining ,odel. (e considered an alternating-offer game were offers are made se'uentially until one is accepted. There is no bound on the number of offers that can be made but there is a cost to delay for each player. 5ubinstein showed that the subgame perfect e'uilibrium is uni'ue when each player6s cost of time is given by some discount factor delta. #./$ 4ublication of 0volution and the Theory of Aames by John ,aynard 9mith. #./C ;ollowing the wor2 of Aale and 9hapley A. 0. 5oth applied the core to the problem of the assignment of interns to hospitals. -n his paper The 0volution of the @abour ,ar2et for ,edical -nterns and 5esidents" A 8ase 9tudy in Aame Theory he found that American hospitals developed in #.50 a method of assignment that is a point in the core. #./C The idea of a rationali:ability was introduced in two papersI B. D. Bernheim 5ationali:able 9trategic Behavior and D. A. 4earce 5ationali:able 9trategic Behavior and the 4roblem of 4erfection. #./C 4ublication of The 0volution of 8ooperation by 5obert A3elrod. #./5 ;or a Bayesian game the 'uestion arises as to whether or not it is possible to construct a situation for which there is no sets of types large enough to contain all the private information that players are supposed to have. -n their paper ;ormulation of Bayesian Analysis for Aames with -ncomplete -nformation J.-;. ,ertens and 9. =amir show that it is not possible to do so. #./5-/D

;ollowing Aumann the theory of automata is now being used to formulate the idea of bounded rationality in repeated games. Two of the first articles to ta2e this approach were A. 1eyman6s #./5 paper Bounded 8omple3ity Justifies 8ooperation in the ;initely 5epeated 4risoner6s Dilemma and A. 5ubinstein6s #./D article ;inite Automata 4lay the 5epeated 4risoner6s Dilemma. #./D -n their paper !n the 9trategic 9tability of 0'uilibria 0lon ?ohlberg and Jean-;rancois ,ertens deal with the problem of he refinement of 1ash e'uilibria in the normal form rather than the e3tensive form of a game as with the 9elten and ?reps and &ilson papers. This paper is also one of the first published discussions of the idea of forward induction. #.// John 8. (arsanyi and 5einhard 9elten produced the first general theory of selecting between e'uilibria in their boo2 A Aeneral Theory of 0'uilibrium 9election in Aames. They provide criteria for selecting one particular e'uilibrium point for any noncooperative or cooperative game. #.// &ith their paper The Bayesian ;oundations of 9olution 8oncepts of Aames Tan and &erlang are among the first to formally discuss the assumptions about a player6s 2nowledge that lie behind the concepts of 1ash e'uilibria and rationali:ability. #.// !ne interpretation of the 1ash e'uilibrium is to thin2 of it as an accepted )learned* 6standard of behaviour6 which governs the interaction of various agents in repetitions of similar situations. The problem then arises of how agents learn the e'uilibrium. !ne of the earliest wor2s to attac2 the learning problem was Drew ;udenberg and David ?reps6s A Theory of @earning 03perimentation and 0'uilibria ),-T and 9tanford Araduate 9chool of Business unpublished* which uses an learning process similar to Brown6s fictitious play e3cept that player occasionally e3periment by choosing strategies at random in the conte3t of iterated e3tensive form games. 0volutionary game models are also commonly utilised within the learning literature. #./. The Gournal Aames and 0conomic Behavior founded. #..0 The first graduate level microeconomics te3tboo2 to fully integrate game theory into the standard microeconomic material was David ,. ?rep6s A 8ourse in ,icroeconomic Theory. #..0 -n the article 0'uilibrium without -ndependence Bincent 8rawford discusses mi3ed strategy 1ash e'uilibrium when the players preferences do not satisfy the assumptions necessary to be represented by e3pected utility functions. #..# An early published discussion of the idea of a 4erfect Bayesian 0'uilibrium is the paper by D. ;udenberg and J. Tirole 4erfect Bayesian 0'uilibrium and 9e'uential 0'uilibrium. #..$ 4ublication of the (andboo2 of Aame Theory with 0conomic Applications Bolume # edited by 5obert J. Aumann and 9ergiu (art. #..C

Aame Theory and the @aw by Douglas A. Baird 5obert (. Aertner and 5andal 8. 4ic2er is one of the first boo2s in law and economics to ta2e an e3plicitly game theoretic approach to the subGect. #..C 4ublication of the (andboo2 of Aame Theory with 0conomic Applications Bolume $ edited by 5obert J. Aumann and 9ergiu (art. #..C The 9veriges 5i2sban2 )Ban2 of 9weden* 4ri:e in 0conomic 9ciences in ,emory of Alfred 1obel was award to John 1ash John 8. (arsanyi and 5einhard 9elten 7for their pioneering analysis of e'uilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games7. $005 The 9veriges 5i2sban2 )Ban2 of 9weden* 4ri:e in 0conomic 9ciences in ,emory of Alfred 1obel was award to 5obert J. Aumann and Thomas 8. 9chelling 7for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis7.

Bibliography and Notes

0 - 500AD The Talmud results are from Aumann 5. J. and ,. ,aschler )#./5* Aame Theoretic Analysis of a Ban2ruptcy 4roblem from the Talmud Journal of 0conomic Theory %D #.5-$#%. #+#% !n &aldegrave see ?uhn (. &. )#.D/* 4reface to &aldegrave6s 8omments" 03cerpt from ,ontmort6s @etter to 1icholas Bernoulli pp. %-D in 4recursors in ,athematical 0conomics" An Anthology )9eries of 5eprints of 9carce &or2s on 4olitical 0conomy #.* )&. J. Baumol and 9. ,. Aoldfeld eds.* @ondon" @ondon 9chool of 0conomics and 4olitical 9cience and &aldegrave6s 8omments" 03cerpt from ,ontmort6s @etter to 1icholas Bernoulli pp. +-. in 4recursors in ,athematical 0conomics" An Anthology )9eries of 5eprints of 9carce &or2s on 4olitical 0conomy #.* )&. J. Baumol and 9. ,. Aoldfeld eds.* @ondon" @ondon 9chool of 0conomics and 4olitical 9cience #.D/. #/%/ 8ournot Augustin A. )#/%/* 5echerches sur les 4rincipes ,athemati'uesde la Theorie des 5ichesses. 4aris" (achette. )0nglish translation" 5esearches into the ,athematical 4rinciples of the Theory of &ealth. 1ew <or2" ,acmillan #/.+. )5eprinted 1ew <or2" Augustus ,. ?elley #.+#**. #/+# Darwin 8. )#/+#* The Descent of ,an and 9election in 5elation to 9e3. @ondon" John ,urray. This theory of the evolution of the se3 ratio is normally attributed to 5. A. ;isher )The Aenetical Theory of 1atural 9election. !3ford" 8larendon 4ress #.%0*. Before presenting the theory ;isher 'uotes a paragraph from the second )#/+C* edition of Darwin6s Descent of ,an in which Darwin cannot see how a #"# se3 ratio could be the result of natural section. ;isher appears not to have noticed that the paragraph he 'uotes comes from a section which replaces the section in the first edition which contains the essence of ;isher6s own theory. The fact that Darwin had anticipated ;isher by some D0 years was first noted by ,ichael Bulmer in his #..C boo2 Theoretical 0volutionary 0cology. 9underland ,A" 9inauer Associates 4ublishers. 9ee chapter #0 pages $0+ - $0/. This fact is also discussed in an unpublished paper by ,artin !sborneI Darwin ;isher and a Theory of the 0volution of the 9e3 5atio. 9ee martin G. osborne6s recent research #0

#//# 0dgeworth ;rancis <sidro )#//#* ,athematical 4sychics" An 0ssay on the Application of ,athematics to the ,oral 9ciences. @ondon" ?egan 4aul. )5eprinted 1ew <or2" Augustus ,. ?elley #.D+*. #.#% =ermelo 0. )#.#%* >ber eine Anwendung der ,engenlehre auf die Theorie des 9chachspiels pp. 50#-50C in 4roceedings of the ;ifth -nternational 8ongress of ,athematicians Bolume -- )0. &. (obson and A. 0. (. @ove eds.* 8ambridge" 8ambridge >niversity 4ress. The reference for the ?onig paper is ?onig Denes )#.$+* >ber eine 9chlussweise aus dem 0ndlichen ins >nendliche Acta 9ci. ,ath. 9:eged % #$#-#%0 while the ?almar reference is ?almar @as:lo )#.$/E$.* =ur Theorie der abstra2ten 9piele Acta 9ci. ,ath. 9:eged C D5-/5. The 0nglish translation of =ermelo6s paper and discussion of all three papers is in 9chwalbe >. and 4. &al2er )$00#* =ermelo and the 0arly (istory of Aame Theory Aames and 0conomic Behavior v%C no# #$%-%+. #.$#-$+ This follows Dimand 5obert &. and ,ary Ann Dimand )#..$* The 0arly (istory of the Theory of Aames from &aldegrave to Borel pp. #5-$+ in Toward a (istory of Aame Theory )Annual 9upplement to Bolume $C (istory of 4olitical 0conomy* )0. 5oy &eintraub ed.* Durham" Du2e >niversity 4ress. ;rechet ,aurice )#.5%* 0mile Borel -nitiator of the Theory of 4sychological games and its Application 0conometrica $# .5-.D credits Borel with seven notes on game theory between #.$# and #.$+. The ;rechet seven are" )#* @a theorie du Geu et les e'uations integrales a noyan symetri'ue gauche 8omptes 5endus Academie des 9ciences Bol. #+% #.$# pp. #%0C-#%0/. )$* 9ur les Geu3 ou interviennent l6hasard et l6habilete des Goueurs Association ;rancaise pour l6Advancement des 9ciences #.$% pp. +.-/5. )%* 9ur les Geu3 ou interviennent l6hasard et l6habilete des Goueurs Theorie des 4robabilites. 4aris" @ibrairie 9cientifi'ue J. (ermann )#.$C* pp. $0C-$$C. )C* >n theoreme sur les systemes de formes lineaires a determinant symetri'ue gauche 8omptes 5endus Academie des 9ciences Bol. #/% #.$D pp. .$5-.$+ avec erratum p. ..D . )5* Algebre et calcul des probabilites 8omptes 5endus Academie des 9ciences Bol. #/C #.$+ pp. 5$-5%. )D* Traite du calcul des probabilites et de ses applications Applications des Geu3 de hasard. 4aris" Aauthier-Billars Bol. -B #.%/ ;ascicule $ #$$ pp. )+* Jeu3 ou la psychologie Goue un role fondamental see )D* pp. +#-/+. Dimand and Dimand note that )D* and )+* are dated #.%/ and so are outside the #.$##.$+ time frame while article )$* has the same title as the chapter from the boo2 )%*. Three of Borel6s notes were translated and published in 0conometrica $#)#.5%*. )#* was published as Theory of 4lay and -ntegral 0'uations with 92ew 9ymmetric ?ernels pp. .#-#00. )%* was published as !n Aames that involve 8hance and the 92ill of the 4layers pp. #0#-##5. )5* was published as !n 9ystems of @inear ;orms of 92ew 9ymmetric Determinant and the Aeneral Theory of 4lay pp. ##D-##+. #.$/ von 1eumann J. )#.$/* =ur Theorie der Aesellschaftsspiele ,athematische Annalen #00 $.5-%$0. )Translated as 7!n the Theory of Aames of 9trategy7 pp.#%-C$ in 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -B )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies C0* )A. &. Tuc2er and 5. D. @uce eds.* 4rinceton >niversity 4ress 4rinceton #.5.*. #.%0 =euthen ;. )#.%0* 4roblems of ,onopoly and 0conomic &arfare. @ondon" Aeorge 5outledge and 9ons. The mathematical e'uivalence of =euthen6s and 1ash6s solutions was shown by (arsanyi J. 8. )#.5D* Approaches to the Bargaining 4roblem Before

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and After the Theory of Aames" A 8ritical Discussion of =euthen6s (ic2s6 and 1ash6s Theories 0conometrica $C #CC-#5+. #.%C ;isher 5. A. )#.%C* 5andomisation and an !ld 0nigma of 8ard 4lay ,athematical Aa:ette #/ $.C-$.+. #.%/ Bille Jean )#.%/* 1ote sur la theorie generale des Geu3 ou intervient l6habilite des Gouers pp. #05-##% in Applications au3 Geu3 de hasard Tome -B ;ascicule -- of Traite du calcul des probabilities et de ses applications )0mile Borel* 4aris" AauthierBillars. #.CC von 1eumann J. and !. ,orgenstern )#.CC* Theory of Aames and 0conomic Behavior. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.C5 9imon (. A. )#.C5* 5eview of the Theory of Aames and 0conomic Behavior by J. von 1eumann and !. ,orgenstern American Journal of 9ociology $+ 55/-5D0. #.CD @oomis @. (. )#.CD* !n a Theorem of von 1eumann 4roceedings of the 1ational Academy of 9ciences of the >nited 9tates of America %$ $#%-$#5. #.50 ?uhn (. &. and A. &. Tuc2er eds. )#.50* 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume - )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies $C*. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.50 4ublication of Tuc2er6s )#.50* memo occurred in #./0 under the title !n Jargon" The 4risoner6s Dilemma >,A4 Journal # #0#. #.50 ,cDonald John )#.50* 9trategy in 4o2er Business and &ar. 1ew <or2" 1orton. This boo2 based on two articles ,cDonald wrote for ;ortune maga:ine. The first 4o2er An American Aame ),arch #.C/* and the second A Theory of 9trategy )June #.C.*. #.50-#.5% 1ash J. ;. )#.50* 0'uilibrium 4oints in 1-4erson Aames 4roceedings of the 1ational Academy of 9ciences of the >nited 9tates of America %D C/-C.. 1ash J. ;. )#.5#* 1on-8ooperative Aames Annals of ,athematics 5C $/D-$.5. 1ash J. ;. )#.50* The Bargaining 4roblem 0conometrica #/ #55-#D$. 1ash J. ;. )#.5%* Two 4erson 8ooperative Aames 0conometrica $# #$/-#C0. #.5# Brown A. &. )#.5#* -terative 9olution of Aames by ;ictitious 4lay pp. %+C-%+D in Activity Analysis of 4roduction and Allocation )T. 8. ?oopmans ed.* 1ew <or2" &iley. #.5$ ,c?insey John 8harles 8. )#.5$* -ntroduction to the Theory of Aames. 1ew <or2" ,cAraw-(ill Boo2 8o. #.5$ ;lood6s #.5$ 5and memorandum was published in ;lood ,. A. )#.5/* 9ome 03perimental Aames ,anagement 9cience 5 5-$D. #.5$ 9ome of the e3perimental papers from the conference appear in Thrall 5. ,. 8. (. 8oombs and 5. 8. Davis eds. )#.5C* Decision 4rocesses. 1ew <or2" &iley. #.5$-5%

#$

Aillies published version of the core concept appears in his paper Aillies D. B. )#.5.* 9olutions to Aeneral 1on-=ero-9um Aames pp. C+-/5 in 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -B )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies C0* )A. &. Tuc2er and 5. D. @uce eds.* 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5% 9hapley @. 9. )#.5%* A Balue for n-4erson Aames pp. %0+-%#+ in 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -- )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies $/* )(. &. ?uhn and A. &. Tuc2er eds.* 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5% 9hapley @. 9. )#.5%* 9tochastic Aames 4roceedings of the 1ational Academy of 9ciences of the >nited 9tates of America %. #0.5-##00. #.5% ?uhn (. &. )#.5%* 03tensive Aames and the 4roblem of -nformation pp. #.%-$#D in 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -- )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies $/* )(. &. ?uhn ans A. &. Tuc2er eds.* 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5% ?uhn (. &. and A. &. Tuc2er eds. )#.5%* 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -- )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies $/*. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5C 9hapley @. 9. and ,. 9hubi2 )#.5C* A ,ethod for 0valuating The Distribution of 4ower in a 8ommittee 9ystem American 4olitical 9cience 5eview C/ +/+-+.$. #.55 Braithwaite 5. B. )#.55* Theory of Aames as a Tool for the ,oral 4hilosopher. 8ambridge" 8ambridge >niversity 4ress. #.5+ @uce 5. Duncan and (oward 5aiffa )#.5+* Aames and Decisions" -ntroduction and 8ritical 9urvey. 1ew <or2" &iley. )5eprinted 1ew <or2" Dover #./.*. #.5+ Dresher ,elvin A. &. Tuc2er and 4. &olfe eds. )#.5+* 8ontributions to theTheory of Aames Bolume --- )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies %.*. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5. Aumann 5. J. )#.5.* Acceptable 4oints in Aeneral 8ooperative 1-4erson Aames pp. $/+-%$C in 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -B )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies C0* )A. &. Tuc2er and 5. D. @uce eds.* 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5. 9hubi2 ,. )#.5.* 0dgeworth ,ar2et Aames pp. $D+-$+/ in 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -B )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies C0* )A. &. Tuc2er and 5. D. @uce eds.* 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5. Tuc2er A. &. and 5. D. @uce eds. )#.5.* 8ontributions to the Theory of Aames Bolume -B )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies C0*. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.5. 9hubi2 ,. )#.5.* 9trategy and ,ar2et 9tructure" 8ompetition !ligopoly and the Theory of Aames. 1ew <or2" &iley. #.D0

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Aumann 5. J. and B. 4eleg )#.D0* Bon 1eumann-,orgenstern 9olutions to 8ooperative Aames without 9ide 4ayments Bulletin of the American ,athematical 9ociety DD #+%-#+.. #.D0 9chelling T. 8. )#.D0* The 9trategy of 8onflict. 8ambridge ,ass." (arvard >niversity 4ress. #.D# @ewontin 5. 8. )#.D#* 0volution and the Theory of Aames Journal of Theoretical Biology # %/$-C0%. #.D# Aumann 5. J. )#.D#* The 8ore of a 8ooperative Aame &ithout 9ide 4ayments Transactions of the American ,athematical 9ociety ./ 5%.-55$. #.D$ Aale D. and @. 9. 9hapley )#.D$* 8ollege Admissions and the 9tability of ,arriage American ,athematics ,onthly D. .-#5. #.D$ 9hubi2 ,. )#.D$* -ncentives Decentrali:ed 8ontrol the Assignment of Joint 8osts and -nternal 4ricing ,anagement 9cience / %$5-%C%. #.D$ Borch ?arl )#.D$* Application of Aame Theory to 9ome 4roblems in Automobile -nsurance The Astin Bulletin $ )part $* $0/-$$#. #.D% Debreu A. and (. 9carf )#.D%* A @imit Theorem on the 8ore of an 0conomy -nternational 0conomic 5eview C $%5-$CD. #.DC Aumann 5. J. )#.DC* ,ar2ets with a 8ontinuum of Traders 0conometrica %$ %.-50. #.DC Aumann 5. J. and ,. ,aschler )#.DC* The Bargaining 9et for 8ooperative Aames pp. CC%-C+D in Advances in Aame Theory )Annals of ,athematics 9tudies 5$* ),. Dresher @. 9. 9hapley and A. &. Tuc2er eds.* 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.DC @em2e 8arlton 0. and J. T. (owson Jr. )#.DC* 0'uilibrium 4oints of Bimatri3 Aames 9ociety for -ndustrial and Applied ,athematics Journal of Applied ,athematics #$ C#%-C$%. #.D5 -saacs 5ufus )#.D5* Differential Aames" A ,athematical Theory with Applications to &arfare and 4ursuit 8ontrol and !ptimi:ation. 1ew <or2" &iley. #.D5 9elten 5. )#.D5* 9pieltheoretische Behandlung eines !ligopolmodells mit 1achfragetragheit =eitschrift fur die gesamte 9taatswissenschaft #$# %0#-%$C and DD+-D/.. #.D5 Davis ,. and ,. ,aschler )#.D5* The ?ernel of a 8ooperative Aame 1aval 5esearch @ogistics Kuarterly #$ $$%-$5.. #.DD Aumann 5. J. and ,. ,aschler )#.DD* Aame-Theoretic Aspects of Aradual Disarmament 8hapter B in 5eport to the >.9. Arms 8ontrol and Disarmament Agency 9T-/0. 4rinceton" ,athematica. #.DD

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(arsanyi J. 8. )#.DD* A Aeneral Theory of 5ational Behavior in Aame 9ituations 0conometrica %C D#%-D%C. #.D+ 9hapley @. 9. )#.D+* !n Balanced 9ets and 8ores 1aval 5esearch @ogistics Kuarterly #C C5%-CD0. #.D+ 9carf (. 0. )#.D+* The 8ore of a 1-4erson Aame 0conometrica %5 50-D.. #.D+-D/ (arsanyi J. 8. )#.D+-/* Aames with -ncomplete -nformation 4layed by 6Bayesian6 4layers 4arts - -- and --- ,anagement 9cience #C #5.-#/$ %$0-%%C and C/D-50$. #.D/ @ucas &. ;. )#.D/* A Aame with 1o 9olution Bulletin of the American ,athematical 9ociety +C $%+-$%.. #.D. 9chmeidler D. )#.D.* The 1ucleolus of a 8haracteristic ;unction Aame 9ociety for -ndustrial and Applied ,athematics Journal of Applied ,athematics #+ ##D%-##+0. #.D. 9hapley @. 9. )#.D.* >tility 8omparison and the Theory of Aames pp. $5#-$D% in @a Decision 4aris" 0ditions du 8entre 1ational de la 5echerche 9cientifi'ue. )5eprinted on pp. %0+-%#. of The 9hapley Balue )Alvin 0. 5oth ed.* 8ambridge" 8ambridge >niversity 4ress #.//*. #.D. 9hapley @. 9. and ,. 9hubi2 )#.D.* !n ,ar2et Aames Journal of 0conomic Theory # .-$5. #.+$ ,aynard 9mith John )#.+$* Aame Theory and the 0volution of ;ighting pp./-$/ in !n 0volution )John ,aynard 9mith* 0dinburgh" 0dinburgh >niversity 4ress. #.+% (arsanyi J. 8. )#.+%* Aames with 5andomly Distured 4ayoffs" A 1ew 5ationale for ,i3ed 9trategy 0'uilibrium 4oints -nternational Journal of Aame Theory $ #-$%. #.+% ,aynard 9mith John and A. A. 4rice )#.+%* The @ogic of Animal 8onflict 1ature $CD #5-#/. #.+% Aibbard A. )#.+%* ,anipulation of Boting 9chemes" A Aeneral 5esult 0conometrica C# 5/+-D0#. #.+C Aumann 5. J. and @. 9. 9hapley )#.+C* Balues of 1on-Atomic Aames. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #.+C Aumann 5. J. )#.+C* 9ubGectivity and 8orrelation in 5andomi:ed 9trategies Journal of ,athematical 0conomics # D+-.D. #.+5 9elten 5. )#.+5* 5ee3amination of the 4erfectness 8oncept for 0'uilibrium 4oints in 03tensive Aames -nternational Journal of Aame Theory C $5-55. #.+5 ?alai 0. and ,. 9morodins2y )#.+5* !ther 9olutions to 1ash6s Bargaining 4roblem 0conometrica C% 5#%-5#/. #.+5

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;aulhaber A. )#.+5* 8ross-9ubsidi:ation" 4ricing in 4ublic 0nterprises American 0conomic 5eview D5 .DD-.++. #.+D @ewis D. ?. )#.D.* 8onvention" A 4hilosophical 9tudy. 8ambridge ,ass." (arvard >niversity 4ress. #.+D Aumann 5. J. )#.+D* Agreeing to Disagree Annals of 9tatistics C #$%D-#$%.. #.++ @ittlechild 9. 8. and A. ;. Thompson )#.++* Aircraft @anding ;ees" A Aame Theory Approach Bell Journal of 0conomics / #/D-$0C. #./# ?ohlberg 0lon )#./#* 9ome 4roblems with the 8oncept of 4erfect 0'uilibria 5apporteurs6 5eport of the 1B05 8onference on the Theory of Aeneral 0conomic 0'uilibrium by ?arl Dun: and 1irvi2ar 9ing >niversity of 8aliforna Ber2eley. #./# Aumann 5. J. )#./#* 9urvey of 5epeated Aames pp.##-C$ in 0ssays in Aame Theory and ,athematical 0conomics in (onor of !s2ar ,orgenstern )5. J. Aumann et al* =urich" Bibliographisches -nstitut. )This paper is a slightly revised and updated version of a paper originally presented as bac2ground material for a one-day wor2shop on repeated games that too2 place at the -nstitute for ,athematical 9tudies in the 9ocial 9ciences )9tanford >niversity* summer seminar on mathematical economics on #0 August #.+/.* )A slightly revised and updated version of the #./# version is reprinted as 5epeated Aames on pp. $0.-$C$ of -ssues in 8ontemporary ,icroeconomics and &elfare )Aeorge 5 ;eiwel ed.* @ondon" ,acmillan.* #./$ ?reps D. ,. and 5. B. &ison )#./$* 9e'uential 0'uilibria 0conometrica 50 /D%/.C. #./$ 5ubinstein A. )#./$* 4erfect 0'uilibrium in a Bargaining ,odel 0conometrica 50 .+-#0.. #./$ ,aynard 9mith John )#./$* 0volution and the Theory of Aames. 8ambridge" 8ambridge >niversity 4ress. #./C 5oth A. 0. )#./C* The 0volution of the @abor ,ar2et for ,edical -nterns and 5esidents" A 8ase 9tudy in Aame Theory Journal of 4olitical 0conomy .$ ..#-#0#D. #./C Bernheim B. D. )#./C* 5ationali:able 9trategic Behavior 0conometrica 5$ #00+#0$/. #./C 4earce D. A. )#./C* 5ationali:able 9trategic Behavior and the 4roblem of 4erfection 0conometrica 5$ #0$.-#050. #./C A3elrod 5. )#./C* The 0volution of 8ooperation. 1ew <or2" Basic Boo2s. #./5 ,ertens J.-;. and 9. =amir )#./5* ;ormulation of Bayesian Analysis for Aames with -ncomplete -nformation -nternational Journal of Aames Theory #C #-$.. #./5-/D 1eyman A. )#./5* Bounded 8omple3ity Jusifies 8ooperation in the ;initely 5epeated 4risoner6s Dilemma 0conomic @etters #. $$+-$$..

#D

#./5-/D 5ubinstein A. )#./D* ;inite Automata 4lay the 5epeated 4risoner6s Dilemma Journal of 0conomic Theory %. /%-.D. #./D ?ohlberg 0. and J.-;. ,ertens )#./D* !n the 9trategic 9tability of 0'uilibria 0conometrica 5C #00%-#0%+. #.// (arsanyi J. 8. and 5. 9elten )#.//* A Aeneral Theory of 0'uilibrium 9election in Aames. 8ambridge ,ass." ,-T 4ress. #.// Tan T. and 9. &erlang )#.//* The Bayesian ;oundations of 9olution 8oncepts of Aames Journal of 0conomic Theory C5 %+0-%.#. #..0 ?reps D. ,. )#..0* A 8ourse in ,icroeconomic Theory. 4rinceton" 4rinceton >niversity 4ress. #..0 8rawford B. 4. )#..0* 0'uilibrium without -ndependence Journal of 0conomic Theory 50 #$+-#5C. #..# ;udenberg D. and J. Tirole )#..#* 4erfect Bayesian 0'uilibrium and 9e'uential 0'uilibrium Journal of 0conomic Theory 5% $%D-$D0. #..$ Aumann 5. J. and 9. (art eds. )#..$* (andboo2 of Aame Theory with 0conomic Applications Bolume #. Amsterdam" 1orth-(olland. #..C Baird Douglas A. 5obert (. Aertner and 5andal 8. 4ic2er )#..C* Aame Theory and the @aw. 8ambridge ,ass." (arvard >niversity 4ress. #..C Aumann 5. J. and 9. (art eds. )#..C* (andboo2 of Aame Theory with 0conomic Applications Bolume $. Amsterdam" 1orth-(olland.

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