Political Law Cases [Rulings] 2008-2010 PIL

G.R. No. 175888; February 11, 2009; SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, RAUL GONZALEZ; EDUARDO ERMITA; RONALDO PUNO; SERGIO APOSTOL; L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH
1. Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 Consti states: Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US. Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate. Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines. To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution. The [1987 consti] provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

2. In Bayan vs Zamora: the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. 3. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.

4. RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
. joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution. The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.

5. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. 6. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon 7. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

8. Applying, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA: ..The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance. 9. VFA is a self-executing Agreement (Medellin vs Texas).. because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial. 10. VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.

G.R. No. 152318 ; April 16, 2009 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ) HANS PETER PAULENZ and ANNE NICOLAY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement called Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE which was designed to "enable Philippine familiesespecially poor onesto maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality." Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors. The dispute culminated in a signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of GTZ. The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response.

In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter, all similarly worded except for their respective addressees. She informed private respondents that they could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately. Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible. Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust." HELD: NO. This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is "an implementing agency." The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the Federal Republic of Germany," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Immunity from Suit. GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters decision been a patent nullity. Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could have translated into a patent nullity.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

G.R. No. 177597 ; July 16, 2008 BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA vs. COMELEC & G.R. No. 178628 PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC
Facts: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006. On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City. Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Issues: 1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional. 2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. Held: 1. 1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: o First, the creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. o Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. o Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied. However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities. According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution: Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member. Thus, ONLY CONGRESS CAN CREATE PROVINCES AND CITIES BECAUSE THE CREATION OF PROVINCES AND CITIES NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE CREATION OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS, A POWER ONLY CONGRESS CAN EXERCISE UNDER SEC. 5, ART.VI OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SEC.3 OF THE ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION. 2. Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers

through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)]. An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law. The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.) It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

ELECTION LAWS
Leah Nazareno et al vs City of Dumaguete et al; G.R. No. 181559; October 2, 2009
1. The CSC has the authority to establish rules to promote efficiency in the civil service The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments: Section 9: Powers and functions of the Commission The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:
(b) Prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Decree x x x (c) Promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration in the government; (h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the armed forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications; (Emphasis supplied)

Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, also provides: Section 12: Powers and Functions The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
(2) prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws; (3) promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration in the government; (4) take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of Service beyond retirement age; (5) inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local government units, and other instrumentalities of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations. (emphasis supplied)

2. the above-cited statutory provisions authorize the Commission to "prescribe, amend, and enforce" rules to cover the civil service. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out in the statutes, to wit: to promote "economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration." 3. It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of "mass appointments" by defeated local government officials prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a "midnight appointment," proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election. 4. It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on appointments before and after the elections. Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials. 5. Not all Mass Appointments are Prohibited CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all "mass appointments." However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not totally proscribe the local chief executive from making any appointments immediately before and after elections. The same Resolution provides that the validity of an appointment issued immediately before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive is to be determined on the basis of the nature, character, and merit of the individual appointment and the particular circumstances surrounding the same. x x x [e]ach appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has struck down "midnight" appointments.

Roque vs Comelec; 9/10/09

Facts: This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic). In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Supreme Court asking that the contract award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was made in violation of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and electronic transmission of the election returns. Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the September 10, 2009 Decision on the following issues or grounds: 1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there will be failure of automated elections; 2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic; 3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in case the PCOS machines fail; 4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review; 5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436; 6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities that will assure 100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of the 2010 elections; and 7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelecs bidding rules. Note: (This digest would only deal with the procedural aspect of the MR. Only those issues or grounds wherein the Court made a ruling re: procedure would be discussed here.)

Issue: Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious? Ruling:

No.

Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the arguments earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired reconsideration. Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will be automated failure of elections"; "there is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical nightmaresand the lack of contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot testmake an automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections." Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment. Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis--vis the possibility of Comelec going manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16, 2009.

Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their comment, described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelecs contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the same respondents added, put a misleading spin to the Melo pronouncements by reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to make reference to his succeeding statements to arrive at a clearer and true picture.

Private respondents observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be deliberately attached to innocent views or even occasional crude comments by the simple expediency of lifting them out of context from any publication.

Petitioners posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should PCOS machines fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and back-up plans that would be implemented in case the PCOS machines falter during the 2010 elections. The overall fallback strategy and options to

address even the worst-case scenariothe wholesale breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved unitshave been discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need not belabor them again.

While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in the decision sought to be reconsideredand this should not be an obstacle for a reconsiderationthe hard reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.

Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue, invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban in Loong v. Comelec, where he made the following observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the basic features of the automated election system," and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual election x x x are inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the proper appreciation and reading of the ballots used in the automated system." Without delving on its wisdom and validity, the view of Justice Panganiban thus cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere expression of the individual view of a member of the Court or other collegial adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the conclusion held by the majority.

And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court invalidate the automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by Smartmatic during the bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been used in elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently, petitioners assert that the system certified as having been used in New York was the Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.

Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new factual dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters, the Court cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private respondents have even questioned the reliability of the website24 whence petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former, citing the same website, state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the Dominions PCOS machines.

Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on review. Basic considerations of fair play

impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas without these facilities." This argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.

Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010 elections.29 This arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant components of the automation project.

The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot expect the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

G.R. No. 169435 ; February 27, 2008; MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE vs MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE
1. AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them. 2. Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do. 3. Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos

before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA. Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

4. Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory plebiscite requirement for the creation of a local government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite. At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.

G.R. No. 170626; March 3, 2008 ; THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS et al. vs. PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ
Facts:
1. Martinez, the incumbent Punong Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya, was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by the petitioner through the filing of a complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner then filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The SB placed Martinez under preventive suspension for 60 days. It then rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. The Decision was conveyed to Municipal Mayor Bagasao for its implementation. He issued a Memorandum, stating that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed. Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, questioning the validity of the Decision. Petitioner claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayanfinds that a penalty of removal is warranted.

2. 3.

4. 5.

Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office.

Ruling: No, the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so. Ratio: 1. 2. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the intent to confine to the courts jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc nullified Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 which granted to the disciplining authority the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against partisan activity. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to remove from office a local chief executive, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from partisanship. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the RTC. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the elective official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court. Other political law matters discussed in the ruling: The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.) The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of the right to discipline

3.

4.

5.

6.

local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. Petitioner questions the Decision dated 20 October 2005 of the trial court for allowing the petition filed before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, indeed, the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez from office, then Martinez should have sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Nonobservance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 12) in quo warranto proceedings. As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial.

. where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body.

G.R. No. 166809; April 22, 2008; ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE vs. LYN B. MACALINGAY et al
Facts: Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR Region 1. Macalingay et al were Ereces subordinates. Macalingay et al were complaining that Erece had continuously denied them from using the company vehicle. That Erece had been receiving his Representation and Transportation Allowance yet he prioritizes himself in the use of the vehicle. The issue reached the CSc proper which found Erece guilty as charged. Erece contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to crossexamine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC over his objection. Macalingay et al then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits. Erece submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure, still Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to crossexamine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right. ISSUE: Whether or not Erece had been denied due process. HELD: 1. The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to crossexamine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. 2. Judicial Due Process vs Administrative Due Process Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due

process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . . 3. The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. . . .

G.R. No. 168766; May 22, 2008; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs HENRY A. SOJOR
FACTS: In 1991, Pres. Aquino appointed Henry Sojor as university president of Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC). Because of RA 8292 requiring the creation of a Board of Trustees, such was created and they elected Sojor still as president. He served a 4 -year term and was re-elected for a 2nd term, 20022006. In 2004, CVPC was converted to Negros Oriental State University (NORSU). Meanwhile, there were 3 administrative complaints filed against Sojor with the CSC. The first one was for dishonesty and grave misconduct because he signed the release of salary differentials for a certain employees despite absence of a required salary adjustment form, etc. The 2nd was a complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents because he allegedly allowed the antedating and falsification of the adjustment payroll, to the prejudice of the instructors and professors who have pending requests for adjustment of their ranks. The 3rd one is a complaint for nepotism, for allegedly appointing his half-sister as casual clerk. Sojor filed a motion to dismiss the first 2 complaints. He claims that the CSC has no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee and that since he as part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of govt, he was under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President. He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him; that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and removal of presidential appointees. However, the CSC-Regional Office denied his motion to dismiss, which he appealed to the CSC proper. Sojor basically argues that since the BOT is under CHED, who is under the OP, then disciplinary jurisdiction is only on the OP, not CSC. CSC denied the motion to dismiss, preventively suspended him and held that it had jurisdiction. It is said that it wasnt the President that appointed him, but it was the Board of Trustees/Regents. Hence, Sojor, being a president of a state college is within the CSCs jurisdiction. CSC further holds that it has concurrent jurisdiction with the schools BOT, over cases against officials and employees of the university. Since the three (3) complaints against Sojor were filed with the CSC and not with the CVPC, hen the former already acquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion of the latter

agency. Upon appeal to the CA, it directed CSC to cease and desist from further conducting investigation over Sojor, and it held that CSC has no jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative cases against Sojor. HELD/RATIO: Yes, CSC has jurisdiction. 1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. (Career are those who qualify after civil service exams while non-career are those who need not qualify through taking of the usual examselective officials and their staff, secretaries and officials of cabinet rank appointed by the president, members of commissions and boards, contractual personnel for specific jobs and emergency/seasonal personnel). 2. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. It is true that the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. In this case the CSC and the BOR of the university has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. 3. All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC. 4. .. though Sojor was reappointed as the president of the school pending administrative charges, this did not amount to condonation of his alleged acts because that applies only to elective officials, not appointive ones.

G.R. No. 122846; January 20, 2009; WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC. Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State. Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional. The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; must not be unfair or oppressive; must not be partial or discriminatory; must not prohibit but may regulate trade; must be general and consistent with public policy; and must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare, Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that

must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. DOCTRINE OF STANDING & OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30 Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

RESEARCH (NOT PART OF THE CASE) :OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE Overbreadth doctrine is a principle of judicial review that a law is invalid if it punishes constitutionally protected speech or conduct along with speech or conduct that the government may limit to further a compelling government interest. A statute that is broadly written which deters free expression can be struck down on its face because of its chilling effect even if it also prohibits acts that may legitimately be forbidden. If a statute is overbroad, the court may be able to save the statute by striking only the section that is overbroad. If the court cannot sever the statute and save the constitutional provisions, it may invalidate the entire statute. One can file a case in behalf of 3rd party; requisites: o Litigant suffered injury in fact o Litigant has close relation to 3rd party o Hindrance of 3rd party to protect his interest The overbreadth doctrine is closely related to the vagueness doctrine. Both doctrines are often simultaneously invoked to mount "facial" challenges to statutes violating free speech.

G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009; ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA et al & G.R. No. 165636 April 29, 2009; ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MTRCB et al
Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan): Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!] Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB. RULING: 1. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. 2. A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. 3. Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following: Section 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties: c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for

being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to: vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead; (d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television; k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.) 4. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television." 5. Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory. 6. Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.

7. .Clearly, the power to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB 8. At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing 9. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without

discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. 10. There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group.

G.R. No. 177531; September 10, 2009; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. FATIMA A. MACUD
1. Civil Service Commission;jurisdiction. The CSC is the constitutional body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. In the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special laws such as R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. This Court has also previously held in Civil Service Commission v. Albao that the CSC has the authority to directly institute proceedings to discipline a government employee in order to protect the integrity of the civil service.

G.R. No. 181559; October 2, 2009; Nazareno vs City of Dumaguete

1. Civil Service Commission; powers. The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments 2. Mass appointments. It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on mass appointments before and after the elections. Appointments are banned prior to the elections to

ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials. Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all mass appointments. However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.

G.R. No. 167569 ; September 4, 2009

Section 37.

xxxx

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:

1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 498 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.99

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.100 Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.101

Office of the SolGen vs Ayala Land;9/18/09

G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009 THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner, vs. AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.

The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has expropriated the land for parking. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the States policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.

As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and its waiver of liability.

Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court against DPWH and local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX of Implementing Rules and Regulations of National Building Code is unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has the legal right to lease parking spaces; and 3) National Building Code IRR is ineffective as it was not published for 3 consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.

OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.

The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper since all the requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be considered as unlawful taking of property right without just compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces free of charge.

OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge. On the otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA, contending that: 1) RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to declare IRR ineffective for not having been published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in dismissing the OSGs petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing as it is not a real party-in-interest.

CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies and that an administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a legal one and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; 2) the validity of National Building Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since the courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and 3) Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only intended to control the occupancy of areas and structures, and in the absence of provision of law, respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of charge.

As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.

Issues:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.

2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid exercise of the police power of State.

Held:

1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSGs petition:

Sec 803 of National Building Code.

Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the use, area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.

RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space requirements shall be observed: 1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures: 1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking requirements). xxxx 1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area

SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the aim of safeguarding life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control. Adequate parking spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of freecharge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control partially or, as in this case, absolutely the imposition of such fees.

The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term parking fees cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same

The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an allencompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.

Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid exercise of the police power of State.

It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just compensation.

d.n.samonte 3/3/14