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The Problem of Punishment in Socratic Philosophy Author(s): Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 30, No. 4, Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies (December 1997), pp. 95-107 Published by: De Gruyter Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913827 . Accessed: 22/08/2011 04:32
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and NicholasD. Smith ThomasC. Brickhouse

in TheProblem ofPunishment Socratic Philosophy

that anintellectualis for isnotorious Socrates1 is,onewhobelieves being tobe good what believe of because do what does that they they everyone itis nevergood or Becausehe also believesthat them. for orbeneficial do so involall Whodo wrong then to do wrong, for beneficial anyone that is actually in a act all for in some sense, way wrongdoers untarily that would one want. what to expect Accordingly, really they contrary in Socratic would be no roomat all forpunishment there philosophy, ofinstruction. someform meansimply we really unless by'punishment' seems Socrates ofplacesin Plato'searlydialogues, Butin a number merits whoseeducational somepunishments, that to think are,at best, for are entirely (Cri51b5;H unclear, whipping examples, appropriate: andperhaps 480c8-dl Ma 292b4-ll;Grg (Cri51b5; 524c5), imprisonment and death even banishment fines 480d2), 480dl-2), (Grg 480dl), (Grg Grg characterizes Socrates and 9al-3,9c2-4).2 480d2-3, probably Euthphr (Grg

nameinPlato's the character we meanonly inthis 1 By'Socrates' early bythat paper, dialogues. have ofpunishment discussions onPlato's whohavewritten those that 2 Itis curious toexplain satisfied seems for this tosayabout solittle Mackenzie, example, problem. conditionas functioning we find themore 'simple through punishments puzzling fit orfailtofit howthis toldbyMackenzie might ing'(see,e.g.,187).We arenever notices Saunders ofmotivation. orSocrates' intellectualism with Socratic conception inthe Socratic a failure itissimply that butaccepts the 'Clearly philosophy: problem, is nonsense' this (166).

D. Smith and Nicholas C. Brickhouse 96 Thomas

weretobe as evils- atleastifthey ofthese forms ofpunishment many is also for well-known inflicted YetSocrates uponhim(seeAp37b5-e2). harmor evilfor harmfor evil that one ought neverto return claiming Cri49a4-cll; Grg479c8-e9, 37b2-5; 29b7-9, 37a5-6, RepI, (Ap25c5-6a7, the useofsuch Ifsuchpenalties areevils, howcanheadvocate 335b2-e5). in arenotalwaysevils,itwould seemthat, Evenifthey punishments? thewrongwouldhavetoeducate tobe proper order they punishments, betweenthe to be a tension doer in some way. Thereappears,then, and theforms of in theApology, for so evident intellectualism example, elsewhere endorses. Socrates punishment inSocratic ofpunishment In this we seektosolvetheproblem paper, all will show that of the kinds of Our punishments philosophy. argument function whenrightly aneducational cananddo serve Socrates endorses function can be an educational where such construed, moreover, applied, inthe with Socratic intellectualism. ina waythat is compatible However, Socrates' viewofhow pleasure final ofthepaperwe showthat section sometimes be inflicted even that motivation affects requires punishment Theburden ofthefinal function. no direct educative whenitserves part ofnon-educative ofthepaperis toshowhowSocrates' acceptance punwith hisintellectualism. insuchcasesis consistent ishment I Socratic Intellectualism with Poluswhether Socrates discusses oftheGorgias, In themiddle part is best,is truly he thinks who can do whatever or not the tyrant, we Socrates and Polus agreethat As theargument unfolds, powerful. what and so never think is best for what we us, pursue alwayspursue whatis goodfor is desire for us us. Becauseall desire isbad for we think all is the that it follows however, 468a5-b6), product wrongdoing (Grg thepossibility does notaccept Thisis whySocrates ofa cognitive failure. bad orharmful as something thedoingofwhatonerecognizes ofakrasia, tooneself.3 we do wrong, offalsebelief: mustbe a product then, Wrongdoing, in fact, for what we do is that whenwe do,by believing good us,when, badfor was we were what that itis not.Ifwe supposed actually doing

and Smith Thefollowing in Brickhouse at length 3 Thisissueis discussed (85-102). inmore there. detail whatwe present summarizes

TheProblem in Socratic ofPunishment Philosophy 97

us (as itis,according toSocrates, whenitiswrong orevil), then we would is a goodjudge that notdo it.Butnoteveryone whatthey are doingis realizesthatall evilis bad forthosewho do it. evil,and noteveryone Therecan be two different forms ofmisapprehension in wrongdoing, orevil,thinking therefore: that itwas right (1) one coulddo thewrong orgood,or(2) onecoulddo thewrong orevil,falsely that the supposing or evil would benefit the In the first the case, wrong wrongdoer. plainly bestcorrective wouldbe toshowthewrongdoer that whathe orshehas donereally is wrong orevil.Suchpersons needthesort ofmoraleducationbywhich could become better of and wrong. We they judges right that havearguedelsewhere thebestwaytodo this wouldbe tolead the 'examinedlife',as Socratesexhorts his jurorsto do in the Apology In the the second best corrective would be to showthe case, (38a5-6).4 how and it is that is injurious to the wrongdoer why wrongdoing as Socrates does with in Polus the for So, both wrongdoer, just Gorgias. ofthepossible sorts ofignorance and error, which aretheroot causesof all evil,thebestcorrective wouldappeartobe tosubject thewrongdoer toSocratic orsomething likeit. examination,
II Punishment,Wrong,and Harm

Socrates' does notentail of intellectualism, byitself, anyspecific theory is with the view that Intellectualism, itself, punishment. by compatible correction of the wrongdoer is not the only- or even the main But a Socratic of punishment can be purposeof punishment. theory inferred from hisconviction that itis wrong evertoharm even anyone, inreturn for harms donetoone (Ap25c5-6a7, Cri 29b7-9, 37a5-6, 37b2-5; From it this that follows it is not 49a4-cll;Grg 479c8-e9, Rep1,335b2-e5). toaccept ofpunishment that is harmful tothe opentoSocrates anyform one punished.5 from the cannot be then, Protecting society wrongdoer, a sufficient excusefordoingsomething to thewrongdoer thatwould

4 See Brickhouse andSmith (18-23). 5 Socrates' in theCrito, statement 'that[ifone failsto persuade thecity], one must do whatever one'scity and country demands7 (51b9-cl), everywhere mayseemto be a counter-example to thisclaims, for theLaws recognize that can makea they mistake ofcourse, itisnotthe intent ofthe Lawstoharm the that But, (51e9). person andthis is all that Socrates thinks onemust never do. they punish,

and Nicholas D. Smith C. Brickhouse 98 Thomas

whichforms of punishment harmhim or her.But exactly does this ruleout? prohibition we shall have to look morecarefully at To answerthisquestion, harm. Itisnowwell-known that ofwhatconstitutes Socrates' conception - one who connects theconception of Socrates was an eudaimonist In an earlier (happiness). studyofSocrates' goodnesswitheudaimonia that that we showed Socrates believed theonly absolute ethical thought,6 that that the was sufficient for is good is, onlygood happiness, good is conducive to vice and evil That which Socrates activity, activity. becauseitpromotes as evilandharmful wretchedness, precisely regards in Butthespecific which Socrates contheopposite ofhappiness. way that of the receivesof theselinkages implies many things normally when vice or be as can, employed by ignorance, actually garded goods The good looks of theconfidence artist or therobust evilsor harms. It wouldbe better areexamples. tobe ugly, health ofthethief forthem Of it be far or disabled. would better for them course, poor, physically ifsome Butitwouldnonethelessnotcount as a harm toaspire tovirtue. that and diminished their to carry frustrated outtheir ability suffering them.7 befell wrongdoings toseewhy whatmight as a wrong Wearenowina position wellcount or harmforone personwould notbe a wrongor harmforanother: orbanishment, wouldtakeaway which suchas imprisonment penalties wouldbe wrong orexpression, for one'sfreedom ofmovement example, because his actionsaim at whatis good for and harmful to Socrates Athenians. Thisis whyhe sayssuchpunishments andhisfellow himself To one who perpewouldbe eviland harmful (tohim)in theApology. - notonly and loss would be beneficial the trates evil,however, right of become victims the otherwise for thosewho might evils, prevented have done the evil deeds. but also forthosewho would otherwise that we inflict and banishment uponthewickedarenot Imprisonment them. are not harms to they onlynotwrongs,

andSmith 6 See Brickhouse (103-36). viewofpunishoftheSocratic 7 We agree, with then, analysis only partofVlastos' is nota form of thatrightful thinks ment. We agreethatSocrates punishment Socratheir because Socrates for But, equivalence, accepts wrong. wrong returning harm harm. ofreturning for isnota matter that tesalsobelieves rightful punishment See Vlastos (179-99, esp.186-7).

in Socratic TheProblem ofPunishment Philosophy 99

and MoralCorrection III Punishment view ofpunishment is as yetincomplete. ofSocrates' Our explanation that for Whatwe have said works only punishments serveas a kindof from further evils. thewrongdoer whichprevents restraint, pursuing - forexample, forms of punishment also endorsescertain Socrates - whosepurposeis surely notsimply to restrain thewrongwhipping of painful, doer. How, then,could Socratesendorsesuch a variety and even fatal as catastrophes justpunishments? disabling, alienating, One possibleanswerto thishas been offered (albeitin a rather a number of scholars whobelievethat and indirect way)by incomplete in of human ocPlato's an important theory psychology development withPolus,Plato'sSocrates In thediscussion theGorgias.8 curswithin desireforbenefit of motivation: (and, onlyone form acknowledges butit is sometimes aversion to the harm); presumably, corresponding a withCallicles, claimedthatby thetimewe findSocrates speaking - one whichis indeof motivation and independent form distinct - is introduced, desirefor of thedesireforbenefit namely, pendent aversion topain).9 (and thecorresponding pleasure a change in theconception ofmotivawe find Thosewho arguethat with Polusand theonewith Callicles thediscussion tion between might totheproblem ofpunishment conception applythemoresophisticated forms ofpunishment that Socrates would regard painful by supposing indebecause theywork on the wrongdoer's as effective precisely of pendentdesireforpleasure.In thisview, the work theseforms for is to'chasten' thewrongdoer's appetite pleasperforms punishment itunder thecontrol oftherational motivational element. urebybringing theviewthat theGorgias contains we haveargued Elsewhere, against ofhumanmotivation at leastpartly on the two incompatible theories a it that if there is shift from Socratic comes intellectualism, away ground if from Plato.10 But even Plato did a without clear introduce any signal

and 317);Irwin noteon 507b, 8 See Cornford 222,and (1977), 123-4; (306-7, (1979), Kahn(89-90); Mackenzie (161-62). 9 Inthis Plato hiswaytowards even more the view, is,intheGorgias, working complex of theRepublic and Phaedrus, whichprovidethree distinct forms of psychology motivation: therational, thethumotic orspirited, and theappetitive. andSmith 10 See Brickhouse (97-101).

and NicholasD. Smith 100 Thomas C. Brickhouse

with itwillnothelp inthediscussion newtheory ofmotivation Callicles, Socrates' endorsement ofvarious us tosolvethe ofpunishment. problem inwhich within contexts thealleged occurs punishments argumentative Recallthat most has notyetbeenintroduced. newtheory ofmotivation that Socrates refers topunishments oftheproblematic passagesinwhich within thediscussion with occur tohisintellectualism appearill-suited at Gorgias 480c8-d3. Polus,especially (at Theyalso appearin theCrito (at 9al-3 and 51b5),theHippias Major(at 292b4-ll),and theEuthyphro his theory of Ifwe mustresort to theview thatPlatochanged 9c2-4). to varioussorts of in orderto explainall ofthereferences motivation, in of will to move the shift the motivation we have theory punishments, withPolus,and also toinclude theCrito, now toinclude thediscussion we even the and supposethat Hippias Major, Euthyphro) perhaps might But it in had been there all is the moresophisticated along. theory articulates the view that all with that Socrates Polus explicitly argument at whatis goodfor us (Grg is desire for desire So,apparently, 468a5-b6). no forms of motivation that in the there are leastatthis point argument, than benefit.11 aimat anything other IV Correction Beliefs and Faulty in thelatter someclaimto find Sincethenew motivational part theory we thedifficulty we are addressing, would notresolve oftheGorgias that how couldSocrates mustreturn to ourproblem: punishsuppose towrongdoers when as corrections couldserve ments suchas whipping for a distinct in motivational no his to be there theory appears place the aversionto pain and when,by the lightsof his intellectualism, one? has tobe a cognitive relevant correction tobe committed allowsfor Socratic intellectualism Ofcourse, wrongs an agentmight failto calculate In particular, fora variety ofreasons. harm is so that the some the of action, resulting correctly consequences inso far as is appropriate education In casessuchas these, unintended.

in theGorgias, ofpunishment Mackenzie's account 11 Thispoint nullifies effectively within the inthe theories which Gorgias. psychological change alleged appealstothe enSocrates' notices or Mackenzie never note 2, above.) (See apparent questions inthe with PolusatGrg discussion ofpunishment ofwhipping as a form dorsement locorum toherbook. andthis 480c8-d3, passagedoesnotevenappearintheindex

in Socratic 101 TheProblem ofPunishment Philosophy

notpunsomelackofunderstanding. results from theharm Education, where theagent meansofcorrection alsoseemstheappropriate ishment, an exampleofdoing is actually supposesthatthewrongdoing falsely has in mindwhen,in the Thissortofcase thatSocrates what'sright. he ridicules the follyof Meletus' in the Apology, cross-examination ofthelaw tobring it is not the business As Socrates saysthere, position. but,instead,to providethemwith people to courtforsuch errors, inprivate and admonishment instruction (Ap26al-4). inwhich the causeofwrongdoing, Butthere isyet another wrongdoer butthis and harm some other or intend to does others, wrong plainly thatby doingso, he will achievesome is in thinking timethe error such an Whatwould lead anyoneto commit advantageforhimself. if Socrates' we are to the error error? here, preserve simple Presumably, mustlie in how suchpersons and intellectualism, motivational theory do notthink consists ofwhatbenefit wouldconceive in,for plainly they The is onlyto be achievedthrough that benefit morally good actions. moralgoodnessfrom other comes from error here,then, separating or outtheother goods as trumping supposedgoods,and regarding is the Socrates is This moral making precisely point goodness. weighing whenhe says in theprotreptic (278e3-81e5) passagein theEuthydemus so manyofother noneofthethings that he regards people taketo be and honor to have wealth, pleasure, anyintrinsic goods health, valueoftheir own. that is onlyonething that is goodinitself: there Socrates is convinced benefits its possessor;these virtue(281d2-el).12 Only thisinvariably otherso-calledgoods benefit onlythosewho are alreadygood, and harm the Because all desireis desireforbenefit, it wicked. actually have benefit as their aim.In other follows thatall wrongdoers words, whotake orhonor, orpleasure tobe more wealth, important wrongdoers that than moral goodnessmistakenly wealth,or suppose ill-gotten willbenefit them. orpleasure honor, Iftheconnection thewrongdoer makesbetween and its wrongdoing benefits for thewrongdoer weresevered, he wouldno longer perceived be attracted towrongdoing. Givenhisownconception ofbenefit, then, ifhe weretobecomeconvinced that a givensort ofwrongdoing would

12 Fora discussion ofthis anditsimportant see Brickhouse and point, consequences, Smith (103-36).

D. Smith and Nicholas 102 Thomas C. Brickhouse

that ofwrongsort himjusttheopposite ofwhathe was seeking, bring to him.As such,we can be attractive doing,at least,would no longer and fines orpropnow see whywhipping, banishment, imprisonment, todo to toSocrates as appropriate couldcount confiscations things erty in so faras thewrongdoer benefit Suchpenalties certain wrongdoers. makesbetween thewrongdoer connection theychangethecognitive corrections Such and benefit. are, incomplete admittedly, wrongdoing - surely, ifthewrongdoer came to hold theright it would be better consists view ofwhatbenefit in,and theessential place virtue general be clear that But it should now within that precisely conception. occupies in his about a shift beliefs favorable thewrongdoer because undergoes thewrongdoer's acts will producebenefit, whatparticular improvein the ment, producedby the pain of the whip,can be understood Socratic intellectualist requires. philosophy way and Cure V Punishment no longer believeswrongdoing thatthewrongdoer To theextent profor made better is the videshimwith off, benefit, clearly wrongdoer any acts.But to engagein wrongful he lacksanymotivation to thatextent ofpain that theinfliction thinks be theonlyreasonSocrates thiscannot there is a straightforthewrongdoer. is a goodfor as a punishment First, Socrates In theGorgias, is notcured. sucha person wardsensein which than more much does that effective seemsto think merely punishment will findviciousactivity thatthewrongdoer increasethelikelihood reviews withPolus,Socrates Attheend ofhisdiscussion unprofitable. and 'Then of value the crafts we medicine, justice: money-making, why and frees us from medicine us from frees illness, poverty, money-making also and from us frees (478a8-bl, intemperance injustice' justice{dike) thewrongmakes He then 479dl-2). whypunishment goesontoexplain thanhe wouldbe werehe to escapepunishment: off doerbetter 'Was, of the from the release not (dikn then, didonai) greatest evil? punishment abouta cure and more us andmakes ittempers ... for brings just, justice evil' the for (478d4-7). (iatrik) ofthe toholdthewrong continues As longas thecriminal conception of the in vice is to reluctance his upon strength contingent engage good, and his beliefthatfuture received thelinkbetweenthepunishment situWe can easilyimagine in punishment. will result viciousactions - e.g.,therobber for histhievery who has beenbeatenseverely ations hewillnot tothink occasion ona particular reason butwhohasexcellent

in Socratic TheProblem 103 ofPunishment Philosophy

givena misguided getcaught- in whichit would onlybe rational, torevert to criminal for the of the punished previously good, conception that would show that this of One course, only argue, wrongdoing. might and that had itbeen severe was notsufficiently theoriginal punishment inwhich itwould think hewas ina situation wouldnever so,thecriminal that to do wrong.But thisis possibleonlyif we think be beneficial that is an irrational fear of instill can always getting caught punishment insomeaccounts Thismaybe a possibility therobber. sufficient todeter butnotin Socrates'. ofhuman motivation, we would couldcure thewrongdoer, Before we askhowpunishment that is thinks to askwhySocrates do wellfirst wrongdoing alwaysbad thinks that allvicemanifests Ifwe areright, Socrates for thewrongdoer. As we have seen, in thepursuit of thewrongsortofpleasures. itself the viciouspersontakessuch to Socrates'intellectualism, according thinks that them he willbe for he to be beneficial, byhaving pleasures and disease between vice off.Socrates'frequent better comparisons and illness inflames the that as that he thinks body keepsit just suggest it the soul and from so vice infects from well, keeps performfunctioning andmanaging of'governing 1,353elO-ll).For well,'(Rep ingitsfunction sortsof in part,in a falsebeliefthatcertain vice consists, Socrates, a disastrous belief be be Such to may formed pursued. pleasures ought But if toacquirethe to advice of the people. coming wrong bylistening a matter oftaking thewrong ofcharacter wereonly worst sort peopletoo in reason to as he does the would have no Socrates say, Gorgias, seriously, becomes'ingrained' We can that vice,unlesstreated, (aniaton [480b2]). ifwe think thenotion ofa belief however, becoming ingrained, explain ofsomepleasures tohavethepower(a) that takes theexperience Socrates tothink that ofthat sort aregoodand (b) to tocausetheagent pleasures rational abouttheagent'sgood. or even to prevent, hinder, thinking thinks ofharmful as likeintoxicants. Becauseof(b),Socrates pleasures Ifthis thedanger oflistening toCallicles is very for he may is right, real, onetobelieve that a life ofviolent is wellpersuade pleasures good.And itis evenworseto acton Callicles' becauseof(a), as we would expect, ofthemost violent adviceand topartake pleasures. Ifpunishment is actually tocureonewhohasbecomeconvinced that violent are themost then the must first beneficial, pleasures wrongdoer be freed from theintoxicating that control has overhim.Socrapleasure tesmight wellsupposethat the infliction ofpainfor anactofwrongdoing has precisely that effect. thepain ofthewhip,for Thus,after suffering the thief is more able to consider whether is example, soberly stealing courseforher to take.Of course,herewe mustask why thebetter

and NicholasD. Smith 104 Thomas C. Brickhouse

thethief think thisas a 'cure', for Socrates wouldcount surely maystill and that from future thefts circumstances be that shewillprofit might ofhow severe, areworth the future suchthat punishments, regardless gain. medicine and physical trainIfwe recall between Socrates' analogies with and criminal on the one hand, justice, respectively, legislation ing, we cansee that Socrates doesnothaveto on theother 517e3ff.), (see Grg mustmakethewrongdoer into supposethatthe'cure'ofpunishment To do whonever couldorwouldperform someone this, injustice again. ButSocrates virtuous. wouldhavetomakethewrongdoer punishment assiduous of hasseennoevidence that eventhemost pursuit philosophithat. cal inquiry, as he conceives it,can achieve that 'cures'thewrongdoer In ourview,Socrates thinks punishment notby replacing thewrong conand 'rids'thewrongdoer ofinjustice, or evenby replacing the ofthegood withanother conception, ception thatit is wrong, but rather withan withthebelief wrongconception whatthegood is. Ifso, whenSocrates to question says that openness is should 'cure',he does not mean thatthe wrongdoer punishment all future There is indemnified somehow nothing against wrongdoing. that wouldprevent the ofthepainofpunishment abouttheexperience think that someone to he to and thief from by beingpersuaded listening the even after shouldengagein crimeagain.Moreover, punishment, someespecially be surethat hewillnotexperience cannever wrongdoer and revert to hisunrebe violent by it, pleasure by chance, captivated thepainofpaying thepenalty flective life ofvice.Butunlesshe suffers that the to think, he willcontinue for his crimes, mindlessly, pleasures benefits he canpossess.If arethegreatest he steals for thesakeofwhich in ofpunishment thisis correct, by seeinghow to solve theproblem about ofthefirst we learnsomething Socratic importance philosophy, false belief abouthowto ofvice.Viceis notmerely Socrates' conception notentirely is itself abouthow to livethat belief live;itis false opento reason. betweenthe We can now see why Socrates distinguishes sharply a life ofvicious that concluded whohasmistakenly pleasure-seekperson and a thosepleasures, ing is good but who has not yetexperienced violent has who and, thus, mindlessly pleasures experienced person, thinks by Socratic may yetbe improved theyare good. The former basisofwhat onthe another conclusion for he mayyetreach discussion, for needspunishment, Thelatter, reasonable. seemsmost however, only her from will free of a act for the of wrongdoing pain punishment specific notevenSocrates that this account from Italsofollows control. pleasure's

TheProblem in Socratic 105 ofPunishment Philosophy

overviolent from shouldhe,through is immune pleasures beingtaken an especially ormisfortune, intoxisomemistake happentoexperience in is wiser than others because he Socrates realizes part pleasure. cating thatsuchpleasuresare to be avoided.Buteven this'humanwisdom' on themind pleasure'seffect giveshimno specialpowerto overcome it. oncethemindhas experienced between one who has merely concluded thata lifeof The distinction is and one who has viciouspleasure seeking good actually experienced aboutSocrates' tellsus something violent pleasures important concepthesoul ofanyone who merely tionofvice.To be sure, believes violent is in his about the is good belief danger: given false pleasure good,itis withthesubsequent thathe willpursueviolent result pleasure, likely aboutthegood.Neverthethat he willno longer be capableofreflecting he actually he values,sucha person is less,until samplesthepleasures ruled is not still of vicious. The reason, and, hence, by capable being yet on theother soul oftheviciousperson, suffers theharm hand,already ofreasoning abouthowbesttolive,a harm ofbeingincapable towhich aboutthegoodis,as yet, theperson with mere false belief liable. merely the vicious to see she should punishment mayhelp why Corporal person Butbecausecorporal notpursueviolent pleasure. punishment actually itremoves theharm that frees thesoulfrom constitutes pleasure's grasp, viceand so can truly be said tocurethewrongdoer. it not follow from thefact that aimatcuring punishments Finally, does that theonepunished can alwaysdo so. Pleasures they mayvaryinthe effect have on thesoulsofthosewho experience them. Moreover, they ifleft that somesoulsmayfind the holdthat hasover untreated, pleasure Ifso,that them so strong that increasing grows strong. grip maybecome noamount ofpunishment canrelease thesoul.Suchpersons aredoomed toremain that convinced thewrong sort ofpleasure is good; mindlessly no amount ofpaincanmakethem their conviction. question We arenow in a position to see why, in thegreat at theend of myth theGorgias, Socrates states that can be ineither punishment appropriate oftwoways:
Punishment makeseveryone, whenhe has beenpunished rightly by become better and from orbe madean example tothe another, it, profit in order that whenothers see thesufferings which he endures others, in become better. Those who have committed remediable will, fear, aretheonesbenefited and pay thepenalty wrongs bygodsand men. it is and that achievetheir Nevertheless, through pain suffering they in both here and Hades. For there is no other benefit, way tobe ridof

106 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith Butfor those whohavedonethemost extreme and, injustice. wrongs, as a consequence, become from these aremade. irremediable, examples no longerprofit, sincetheyare irremediable, but Theythemselves others who see them for their the and profit enduring wrongs greatest mostpainfuland mostfearful all time.(Grg suffering throughout 525bl-c6)

- for There is tragedy here theonly benefit ofproper some, punishment must to and not to the himself.13 Evengodscannot others, go wrongdoer whathas beenruined correct bythemostegregious wrongs. for fallsfarshort ofwhatwe then, Proper punishment wrongdoers, conceive as an ideal. Those be made but better, might punished may much ofwhat madethem to with remain with them. gowrong begin may In endorsing Socrates did notimagine that such 'corrections', punitive corrections wereidealsolutions to theproblem ofwrongdoing. Buthis dimviewofevenhisownpowers ofcorrection, which aimedfor higher left with no better thanthose the goals, him, realistically, clearly option statelegally His about the human to provided. pessimism capacity be madegood,however, was notworsened orconfused a by contradictory thegoalsand methods ofcriminal corrections. Punposition regarding a for not for the coherence of his ishment, was, Socrates, views, problem buta necessary feature ofthehuman condition. Itwas an instrument for the remediation ofevils, which could become could ruinous, though they inall likelihood, be wholly eliminated. never,

ofpunishment ofSocrates' 13 Thisfeature goesunnoticed byMackenzie, conception to remove his [sc. thewrongdoer's] who wrongly claimsthat'some attempts - willturn - suchas deterrent since outtobe ineffective, punishments disposition misseshow it is thatdeterrent he cannot helpwhathe does/ (146).Mackenzie ofmotivation, within Socrates' canbe effective, precisely conception punishments beliefs about the connections relevant the potential wrongdoer's by changing later attributes the andthebenefits desire. Mackenzie actions between certain they inthepsychological ofthis deterrent changes theory aspect passagetothealleged 2 and 11,above.) inthediscussion with Callicles. introduced (Seenotes

in Socratic TheProblem 107 ofPunishment Philosophy

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