What are Concepts?

Hans-Johann Glock

Summary: The article argues that a reasonably unied

account of the established use of `concept' and its cognates can be provided by a cognitivist approach. Such an approach starts out from the role the ascription of concepts plays in characterizing certain cognitive operations and abilities, yet without treating concepts as symbolic representations or particulars in the minds of individuals. In particular, it explores the idea that concepts are rules or principles of classication and inference. At the end I argue that a cognitivist account can deal not just with the role of concepts in cognition, but also with the idea that they are components of propositions.

This article aims to elucidate the established use or uses of the term `concept', and those of its equivalents and cognates. This established use includes everyday uses: like some related terms with a philosophical provenance  notably `idea'  but unlike others  notably `universal'  `concept' is widely employed in everyday parlance.

1 But it also comprises the established uses

of these terms in special disciplines like the history of ideas, psychology, logic and philosophy. Within these disciplines, one encounters numerous theoretical judgements or prejudices about concepts, for instance that they contrast with intuitions (Kant), are tied to language (rationalist tradition), are unsaturated entities (Frege), are compositional

Quotidian contexts are particularly signicant for the German

gri, since the humdrum verb begreifen

pervasiveness of

Be-

covers all types of compre-

hension. In a lecture, the late Michael Dummett once illustrated the

Begri

by relating how struck he was on his rst

visit to Germany when reading a sign at a railway station mentioning `Gepckstcke, die unter den Begri pieces of luggage which fall under the concept

Koer fallen' suitcase.

 that is,

Hans-Johann Glock

(Fodor), must be amenable to naturalization (most philosophers and cognitive scientists in the USA), are socially constituted (most other North-American academics in the humanities), etc. However, my account seeks to respect not such specic theories about concepts, but rather fruitful uses of `concept' and its cognates. It is salutatory to remember that even in specialised disciplines the use of `concept' is rarely entirely stipulative or unconnected to the everyday use, since these disciplines purport to explain cognitive and semantic phenomena describable in terms of concepts in ordinary discourse. Philosophers and logicians talk of comparative (x is heavier than y ), quantitative (x weighs 20kg), individual (the author of Atemschaukel ), logical (negation, implication), spatial and temporal concepts, including the concepts of space and of time. My initial focus here will be on those concepts that have tended to occupy centre stage, namely predicative concepts. These are concepts that correspond to general terms of a particular kind, namely to the verbs, adjectives or count-nouns that feature in one-place predicates like `x runs', `x is radioactive' and `x is a tool'. But I shall also consider the question whether suggested denitions of concepts capture other types of concepts. It is relatively uncontroversial that predicative concepts are involved when rational creatures entertain thoughts like (1) Dogs bark. The nature of this involvement remains controversial, ho-

wever. In the history of philosophy, one can distinguish three fundamental approaches to concepts. According to subjectivist conceptions, concepts are mental phenomena, particular entities or goings-on in the mind or in the head of individuals. According to objectivist conceptions, concepts exist independently of human minds, as self-subsistent abstract entities. Finally, there is an intermediate position, which may be termed cognitivist. It agrees with objectivism in denying that concepts are mental particulars, while at the same time maintaining, with subjectivism, that

What are Concepts?

they have an ineliminable mental or cognitive dimension. One version of cognitivism is intersubjectivism. It holds that concepts exist independently of individual rational subjects, but insists that they are constituted by intersubjective linguistic practices. Another version brackets the question of existence, yet holds that what concepts are  their essence, if you wish  can be explained only by reference to the operations and capacities of rational subjects. This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can be given a fairly uniform explanation through a `cognitivist' account of this second, less committal kind, one that accepts that concepts may exist independently of individual subjects or even linguistic communities, yet nonetheless invokes mental achievements and capacities. I shall argue that (many) of the established ways of using `concept' can be explained by looking at the relationship between the concept of a concept and cognitive notions like ability, way of thinking and rule. In particular, I shall present a case for holding that a cognitivist explanation can account not just for the connection between concepts and human thinking and speaking but also for the idea that they are components of thoughts (propositions). If we are to situate concepts within the subjective/objective spectrum, it is useful to distinguish at least ve philosophical questions that can be raised about them:

Denition question: What are concepts? Individuation question: How are concepts individuated? Possession question: What is it to have a concept? Function question: What is the role of concepts in cognition?
Once we keep apart these four questions, one further question arises: Priority Question: Which of these questions  denition, individuation, possession or function  is the most fundamental? I have criticized prominent objectivist denitions of concepts elsewhere (2010b: 312-5), and shall take their failure for granted here. Instead, I shall start by arguing against subjectivist ans-

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Hans-Johann Glock

wers to the denition question. These arguments point in the direction of a cognitivist approach. Yet the most straightforward cognitivist denition, which identies concepts and abilities, will also be found wanting. On the other hand it will transpire that the cognitivist tradition gives the right response to the possession question, and that this response does not entail untenable answers to the individuation question. This result will also suggest that cognitivism is right in according priority to the possession question.

1 Concepts and general terms

In many everyday contexts, `concept' means roughly: general

term with a meaning.

2 This denition also ts the role of `con-

cept' in logic in so far as concepts have an extension and are components of sentences (see below). Yet it does not capture crucial uses in philosophy, logic and psychology. In psychology, in particular, concepts are invoked to account for cognitive processes that are not verbalised. And this chimes with common sense. We do not express all of our thoughts in words-  and thank goodness for that. Equally, we sometimes say that p when we think that q. A lingualist might reply that in such cases we talk to ourselves in foro interno, and that thinking is a kind of internal monologue (as Plato had suggested in Thaetetus : 189e). But Wittgenstein and Ryle ought to have taught us that speaking to oneself in the

This is more felicitous than concept of a

predicates

with a meaning, since the

latter are supposed to involve the copula or its equivalents. The

dog

corresponds to the general term `dog' rather than

the predicate `x is a dog'. A moot question which I shall not take up here is whether the latter is more closely aligned to the concept or property of if a term is understood as a symbol, part of an established language; but it is required if a general term is understood as mere sign which has been accorded a syntactic role but no specic meaning (something represented by a predicate-letter in an uninterpreted formal language).

being a dog. The addition `with a meaning' is superuous

What are Concepts?

11

imagination is no more sucient or necessary for thinking than having mental images (see Glock 1997). Now, one might grant this point, yet insist that genuinely concep-

tual thought must issue in `judgements', something in which the

subject consciously and explicitly applies a general term, whether it be in overt or inner speech. This gambit would imply, however, that human cognition involves much less conceptual thought than commonly assumed; and it is not forced on us by the meaning of concept in psychology or ordinary parlance (see Prior 1953: ch. XI). Furthermore, the retreat to silent predication rules out ab

initio the possibility of concept-possession by non-linguistic creatures, which is at least contentious (see Glock 2010a). Even if these qualms could be waived, moreover, silent predication would not solve another problem. Talking to oneself in the imagination is a process involving specic languages. By contrast, in philosophy, logic and psychology concepts are standardly supposed to cut across dierent languages, whether they be natural languages or interpreted formal calculi. According to psychologists, it is the concept of a dog rather than general terms like `dog' or `chien' that is involved in thinking (1). And a logical concept like that of negation is expressed equally by logical particles from dierent languages: `not', `nicht', `ne pas', `~', etc. In such contexts, `concept' is more closely aligned with `idea' than with `word' or `term', which signify lexical items from specic languages. Now, there is a venerable tradition which would allow us to extend the denition of concepts as general terms to non-verbalised cognitive processes and cognitive processes of non-linguistic creatures, and which also lifts the restriction to particular languages. This tradition postulates a mental language that is shared by all creatures capable of conceptual thought, a universal mental symbolism that underlies all specic languages. Concepts, the story goes, are nothing other than the words of this language of thought, a language that is thought by individuals rather than spoken by linguistic communities. This is a version of subjectivism. It goes back at least to Occam, and it ts Kant's claim

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Hans-Johann Glock

that a concept is a `predicate of a possible judgement' (Critique

of Pure Reason : A 69/B 94). Its most explicit and prominent version, however, is Fodor's `representational theory of mind'. This position will now be criticized.

2 Are concepts mental particulars or mental representations?

According to Fodor, so-called propositional attitudes like belief and desire are mental states, and they `are constituted by relations to mental representations', namely `thoughts' (Fodor 2003: 141, 10). Concepts are `the constituents of thoughts' (Fodor 1998: 25). They constitute a kind of `mental representation' and hence a `kind of mental particular'. As mental particulars, they are `objects in the mind' or `in the head' of individuals; they are `concrete' rather than abstract; and they have causes and eects in the physical world (Fodor 1998: 3, 7-8, 22; Fodor 2003: 13 and note). As mental representations, they have `representational content'. They contribute to the content of our propositional attitudes, to what we believe, desire, etc. They do so by determining the conditions under which our beliefs are true and our desires satised. Any form of subjectivism faces a Fregean objection: concepts cannot be phenomena in the minds or heads of individuals, since they can be shared between dierent subjects. Now, `sharing' and its cognates are used in a variety of ways. One paradigm is that of

dividing an object into parts, which themselves are not shared,

as in sharing a banana. But there is another, equally basic, paradigm which does not imply division and extends well beyond material objects. Dierent people can share bicycles, predilections, insurance companies, heads of states, the credit for an invention, beliefs, etc. It is in this sense that concepts are shareable. Two individuals A and B can both have the same concept F, which means that it is possible that both A and B have mastered and employ F. Shareability is a feature of the concept of a concept in both everyday life and in disciplines like psychology and the history of ideas.

What are Concepts?

13

One central use we make of `concept' and terms that are equivalent in the relevant contexts (like `conception', `idea' or `notion') is in claims about dierent individuals or even groups of individuals either sharing a concept, or failing to do so. For instance, dierent political and religious traditions may or may not share the same concept of freedom or of guilt. Such claims are equally central to intellectual history, e.g. when it comes to comparing the Greek concept of eudaimonia with our concept of happiness. Fodor accepts shareability as a `non-negotiable condition', that concepts are `the sorts of things that lots of people can, and do, share' (Fodor 1998: 28). The obvious diculty is that mental particulars contrast with concepts in that they are modes of individual minds or heads, and hence private to their owners. Fodor thinks, however, that he can easily overcome this diculty by introducing a distinction between type and token. Fodor's `language of thought hypothesis' treats mental representations as symbols of a `language of thought' or `Mentalese'. Thoughts, the larger wholes formed by concepts, are the sentences of Mentalese, physical tokens of computational types. When we engage in conceptual thought, Mother Nature inscribes the words of a computer programme into our brains. And concepts are nothing other than the token-words of Mentalese, i.e. computationally identied patterns of neural rings. Consider the scenario in which Anne and Sarah both believe that dogs bark and (improbably) utter `Dogs bark' in close succession. In that case we have two tokens of a single type-sentence `Dogs bark', and two tokens of a single type-word `bark'. Similarly, according to Fodor, in Anne's brain there occurs one neural token-sentence, and in Sarah's brain there occurs another neural token-sentence. Yet Anne and Sarah both believe the same thing, namely that dogs bark, since both tokens instantiate the same Mentalese type-sentence DOGS BARK. Finally, they share the concept DOG, because both have tokens of one and the same Mentalese type-word. This position can account for shareability. It does so at a price, however. The type/token distinction implies abandoning the

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Hans-Johann Glock

claim that concepts themselves are particulars. After all, Anne and Sarah do not have a Mentalese token-word in common, what they have in common is that their distinct token-words are of the same type. What can be shared between dierent individuals are representation-types; and these types, as Fodor duly acknowledges, are `abstracta' rather than mental particulars (see 1998: 20-1, 28). To be more precise, types are repeatable universals and hence abstract. Conversely, what can qualify as mental particulars are representation-tokens; and these tokens are conned to each individual rather than shareable. This leaves Fodor's position in tatters. On the one hand, the non-negotiable constraint on concepts, namely that they be shareable, is satised only by the

abstract types which are neither particulars (mental, physical or

otherwise) nor concrete. On the other hand, his central claim, namely that concepts are concrete particulars, applies only to the

tokens which are not shareable. If one persistently keeps apart

types and tokens, one is forced to abandon the subjectivist credo that concepts are mental particulars that can enter into causal relations. Concepts themselves  the things that can be shared by dierent individuals  are not particulars. As far as shareability is concerned, concepts might yet be mental

representations, namely of the type- rather than token-variety.

This is in line with Fodor's contention that `concepts are [Mentalese] symbols' (Fodor 1998: 28). But at the same time he is driven to the claim that concepts are something that `mental representations . . . express', namely `word meanings' (Fodor 1998: 2; Fodor 2003: 13). Accordingly, he is committed to the inconsistent claim that concepts are both mental words and the meanings of those very same words. This inconsistency is no coincidence. Instead, it is connected to a fundamental aw in the language of thought hypothesis and a general problem with the idea that concepts or thoughts are representations. Following Peirce's theory of signs (1933), one can distinguish between dierent types of representation:

 

Icons resemble what they represent Symbols are related to what they represent by convention

What are Concepts?

15

Indices are connected to what they `represent' by causal dependencies or by other natural relations such as spatial or temporal proximity.

Thus realist paintings are icons of what they represent. Linguistic expressions, with the possible exception of onomatopoetic ones, are symbols of what they represent. The word `dog', for example, is connected to the animals not through any kind of resemblance, but through an arbitrary convention. Smoke, nally, is an index of re, because it is a causal result of re. Given this distinction, one might deliver the following brief verdict on the idea of a neurophysiological language of thought: a) Patterns of neural rings are indices of external phenomena, but only for suitably informed with neurophysiological measuring equipment, not for ordinary subjects of thought; b) they might be icons (but in fact not); c) they cannot be symbols. That neural rings are causal results of external events and causal preconditions of perception is agreed on all sides. The extent to which there is, for example, a spatial resemblance between the objects of perception and the neural activities that underlie perception, is a matter for empirical investigation. For the most part, no such iconic relation has been observed. Although experiments like those of Hubel and Wiesel show that particular neurons are involved in seeing lines of a particular orientation, there is no iconic similarity between the lines and the pattern of ring neurons. Finally, neural rings cannot be symbols because there is no one who uses them to represent somehing in a conventional way (a point to which I shall return). Accordingly, there can be no mental symbols and hence no language of thought. What about the more general idea that concepts are representations? According to an orthodoxy shared by Fodor, concepts must be shareable because they are components of what people believe, of shareable thoughts or `propositional contents'. But as their components, concepts can no more be representations or signs than propositions themselves  they are what is represented, the

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Hans-Johann Glock

content of thinking, not what represents, i.e. what expresses these contents (Glock 2009 elaborates these objectioins to Fodor). This lesson is in line with the common sense view that concepts are expressed by signs such as predicates or logical operators. It also follows from a more basic feature of the notion of representation. Bona de representations, at least of an iconic or symbolic kind, require a medium. That is to say, they have representational properties by virtue of having non-representational properties. For instance, Rembrandt's self-portrait in the National Gallery of Scotland represents a particular individual on account of more basic properties, roughly the way in which it arranges colours and shapes (see Hyman 2006). Similarly, the sign-token `Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn' signies that same individual on account of its typographic properties, which are subject to the kind of conventions characteristic of symbols. The idea that thoughts and concepts are (mental, computational or neural) representations is incompatible with this dening feature of representations. With apologies to Marshall McLuhan, thoughts  and by implication concepts  are all message and no medium! Or, with rather fewer apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein, thought is not a linguistic symbol requiring interpretation; it is itself `the last interpretation' (1958: 34). But couldn't one respond that concepts and propositions qua sign-types of Mentalese do occur in a medium, namely a medium of neural rings? The latter represent propositional or conceptual contents on account of their non-representational physiological or physical properties. According to Fodor, for instance, these representations have certain syntactic properties  properties determining the way they are processed  on account of their physiological qualities, and they have certain semantic properties, properties determining what they represent, on account of their causal relations to the environment. At this juncture, the epistemic or cognitive dimension of representations comes into play. The non-representational properties of representations must be accessible to the subject of representa-

What are Concepts?

17

tion. After all, a representation R is not just a sign of something

 an object O, but a sign for someone  a subject of representation S  someone to whom X is represented through R (again, the point was epitomized by Peirce, in his famous semiotic triangle). Yet neural tokens of computational types are entirely and in principle inaccessible to the subject; they are `deeply unconscious', to use Searle's (1997) critical label. By the same token, they cannot be used by S intentionally or, a fortiori, with the specic intent to represent something. Nor can the subject employ them according to rules, as required for symbolic representation. A possible response: neural signs are used by sub-personal sub-

jects, e.g. by the brain, its parts, or functionally dened modules.

But this invites the charge of a `homunculus' or `mereological fallacy' (Kenny 1984: ch. 9; Bennett/Hacker 2003). This is the fallacy of explaining mental attributes of an animal or subject  in our case the capacity for conceptual thought  by postulating sub-personal subjects  homunculi  with the same or similar mental capacities  in this case the capacity for the intentional employment of signs. The explanation is fallacious because these capacities can only be attributed to the animal or subject S as a whole, and not  save metaphorically  to its parts, whether they be organs like S 's brain or capacities like S 's mind. Furthermore, even if it made sense to credit sub-personal instances with symbolic understanding, this would only push back the problem. One then needs to explain the representational capacities of these postulated homunculi, which engenders a regress. Yet surely, to anyone except die-hard behaviourists the very existence of cognitive phenomena shows that there are mental representations! Doesn't thought require some kind of representation? The answer is yes, but only if `representation' is divested from the standard connection with a medium and understood in a mi-

Fodor himself does not fall back on this response. He grants that `

nobody ever

interprets mental representations' (2008: 16). Yet this

concession removes any license for holding that these representations are symbolic, and hence for speaking about a

language

of thought.

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Hans-Johann Glock

nimalist sense. On that understanding, our thoughts are representations, simply because they have what are nowadays called semantic properties:

  

a proposition that p is true or false a singular representation a refers or fails to refer to an object x a concept F applies or doesn't apply to an object x

However, representations in this minimalist sense cannot explain thought. For to represent (that p or x or F s or things being F ) in this sense simply is to think (to think that p, about x, about

F s, or about things being F ).

uninformative claims like:

4 Representationalism is reduced to

to think that a is F is to represent a as being F, and to think of F s qua F s is to represent F s, etc. A non-representationalist (`cognitivist') approach at least holds the promise of a genuine explanation of what thought amounts to: what it is to think that p or about F s as F s is spelled out in terms of the possession of certain cognitive abilities.

Austere representationalists such as Husserl (1900), have disassociated the idea of representation from any specic connotations, notably from the link with a particular medium whether it be mental images or words crossing one's mind, neural rings or computational symbols. But such positions once more face the task of explaining what having a representation amounts to. In Husserl's case, for example, we seem to be left with the idea that it is `just like' mental picturing, only without mental images. But that simply boils down to saying that having a representation of (an) (an)

F,

is to think about

which means that the explanation of thought has moved

in a circle. A logical relation, thinking about (an)

F, has rst been

construed as a pictorial one, and has then been robbed of the pictorial aspects which alone can give it any substance (Tugendhat 1976: 62-3, 276-7).

What are Concepts?

19

3 Concepts and abilities

The most popular and straightforward cognitivist answer to the denition question identies concepts with abilities. Thus, in response to the question `Are concepts entities or are they dispositions?' Price states in no uncertain terms: `a concept is not an entity [. . . ] but a disposition or capacity' (1953: 320, 348). In the same vein Geach pronounces that concepts `are capacities exercised in acts of judgement' (1957: 7, see also 13; Saporiti 2010). The idea that concepts are abilities is also espoused by Millikan from a very dierent, naturalistic perspective (2000: ch. 4). This proposal respects several features of established use. First, properties are objective, something possessed by things of all kinds. By contrast, concepts are something possessed by rational subjects capable of classifying things according to their properties. This is simply a crucial aspect of the cognitive dimension of concepts stressed by cognitivism. Secondly, the identication of concepts and capacities does not fall foul of the constraint that concepts must be shareable. As Geach points out, it does not entail that `it is improper to speak of two people as having the same concept ', since dierent individuals can possess the same mental capacities (1957: 14). Thirdly, concepts and abilities alike can be acquired, applied and lost, and some of them may be innate. Finally, to possess a concept is to possess a certain kind of mental ability, capacity or disposition. In what follows, I refrain from deciding which of these types of potentiality is the most appropriate general category (see Glock 2010b: section 5). Barring that issue, identifying concept-possession with an ability, capacity or disposition of some kind is inevitable. That concept-possession is an ability of some kind is accepted, willy-nilly, even by Fodor, who purports to contradict cognitivism (a.k.a. `pragmatism') on this issue (2003: 19). The real bone of contention between representationalists like Fodor and those cognitivists that can properly be called `concept pragmatists' in a wide sense  e.g. Wittgenstein, Ryle, Travis and  concerns the question of whether conceptpossession is simply the ability to represent the property of being

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Hans-Johann Glock

F or F s as F s, or whether it should be explained as the ability to

classify things into those which are F s and those which aren't, or to draw inferences from thoughts about F s. Concepts are involved not just in occurrent thoughts or beliefs, but also in long-standing or dispositional beliefs. Consequently, the possession of concepts must be at least as stable as the possession of dispositional beliefs. Put in Aristotelian terms, concept-possession must be a potentiality of some kind, since it combines two features. On the one hand, it is enduring rather than episodic. On the other hand, it is something which manifests itself in certain episodes, notably of overt or silent classication and inference. In addition to respecting features of the established concept of a concept, dening concepts as abilities has advantages when it comes to explaining both the phylo- and the ontogenesis of conceptual thought and of language. Of course, the denition itself does not provide such a genetic explanation. But it claries how we might be able to give a genetic account that avoids vicious regress and circularity and thereby the paradoxical denial that an explanation is impossible in principle. In particular, the ability approach is congenial to the following claims that facilitate a genetic explanation of conceptual thought: i. there are preconceptual forms of cognition, conation and intentional action; ii. these dier from the conceptual forms through the absence of certain advanced cognitive abilities. iii. abilities can be possessed in varying degrees, and they can be acquired through a gradual process.

4 The individuation of concepts and abilities

Its attractions notwithstanding, the identication of concepts with abilities faces the objection that it implies an untenable answer to the individuation question. Thus Fodor has alleged that concepts are more nely individuated than abilities. For instance, `creature with a kidney' and `creature with a heart' apply to all and only the same things, but they express dierent concepts.

What are Concepts?

21

Furthermore, `equilateral triangle' and `equiangular triangle' apply necessarily to the same things, yet they still express dierent concepts. In current jargon, concepts are not just `intensional' but `hyperintensional'. Now, an ability is individuated by reference to its exercise. But, Fodor maintains, the same sorting and inferential performances can manifest the possession of dierent concepts. Conning ourselves to the ability to sort or discriminate, sorting equilateral triangles from all other gures is also sorting equiangular triangles from all other gures (Glock 2003: 256, 1436). It seems to follow that concepts cannot be individuated by the exercise of an ability, and hence that they cannot be individuated by reference to abilities. In eect, Fodor's objection runs as follows: P1 Abilities are individuated by their exercise (ability to ability to

i

ing

ing).

P2 In all possible situations, one and the same sorting activity can manifest dierent concepts. C: Concepts cannot be individuated through the abilities which constitute their possession. The argument is valid. Yet P2 is false: sorting triangles according to lengths is not the same activity as sorting triangles according to angles, even though the results are the same. The dierence in the two activities can be displayed by linguistic creatures, who can justify their sorting along dierent lines. It can even be manifested in non-linguistic behaviour. A creature that sorts on account of comparing or measuring lengths applies equilateral triangle, a creature that sorts on account of measuring angles applies equian-

gular triangle. These are dierent activities, manifesting dierent

abilities and thereby the possession of dierent concepts. And it is obvious that one can have one of these abilities or concepts without having the other. Indeed, most children actually learn how to measure lengths before learning how to measure angles. But individuation also poses another challenge to identifying concepts with abilities. Many cognitivists grant that there is no precise way of individuating abilities. Thus Travis (2000) grants that

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Hans-Johann Glock

linking concepts to abilities may not be much help in individuating concepts, since it is not clear how abilities are to be counted. That concession needs to be put in perspective, however. Like Travis, Geach (1957: 15) accepts that it is absurd to ask how many abilities are exercised in a judgement. Yet he also insists, rightly, that we can still distinguish between such abilities. More generally, one must distinguish between the possibility of enumerating and the possibility individuating entities of a particular kind (see Strawson 1997: ch. 1; Glock 2003: 4752). And this general lesson applies equally to abilities. Still a problem remains. It is prima facie plausible to hold that we are able not only to distinguish the concept of a dog from that of barking, but also to specify that precisely two concepts are involved in judging that dogs bark. So concepts and abilities seem to come apart on the issue of enumerability. This verdict can be contested, however, on the grounds that it does not compare like with like. The claim that the number of concepts involved in (1) is determinate is only even remotely plausible if we conne ourselves to predicative concepts (otherwise we have to add at least one quantitative concept that corresponds to the plural in English; alternatively, if we analyse (1) with the help of Fregean logic, we need to add the logical concepts of universal quantication and of material implication). But the very same consideration applies to abilities. It is just as plausible to insist that precisely two pre-

dicative abilities are involved in judging that (1)  namely that of

thinking about dogs and that of thinking about things that bark  as it is to maintain that precisely two predicative concepts are involved in (1).

5 Dierences between concepts and abilities

The stumbling block for identifying concepts with abilities is not individuation. It is rather that there are other respects in which the established use of `concept' diers from that of `ability', not least as regards the role or function of concepts. First, one thing we do with concepts is to dene or explain them.

What are Concepts?

23

But to dene or explain a concept is not to dene or explain a capacity. Normally, to explain an ability is to explain its causal preconditions (causal explanation), whereas to explain a concept is to explain its content (semantic explanation). Furthermore, even when we dene an ability (i.e. explain its content), we specify what it is an ability to do; as just mentioned, abilities are individuated through their exercise. By contrast, to explain a predicative concept is to specify the conditions that an object must satisfy to fall under it. Secondly, and relatedly, concepts can be instantiated or satised by things; conversely, things instantiate, satisfy or fall under concepts. These things cannot be said of abilities, or at least not in the same sense. Thirdly, and once more relatedly, concepts have an extension (the set of objects which fall under them) and an intension (the features which qualify objects for falling under them); yet this cannot be said of abilities. Insofar as the ability linked to possessing the concept F has an extension, it is not the range of things that are F, but either the range of subjects that possess

F, or the range of situations in which these possessors can apply

or withhold F. Fourthly, a concept can occur in a proposition or statement, but an ability cannot. Of course, abilities can occur in propositions in the sense of being mentioned in them, as in (2) The ability to lie convincingly is a great asset in banking. But it seems that concepts occur in propositions in yet

another and more pervasive way, not just as topics or referents, something the proposition is about, but as components. The concept of being sweet occurs in the proposition that (3) Sugar is sweet even though no ability occurs in it.

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Hans-Johann Glock

6 Tools
At this point it behoves us to return to the issue of concept possession, since it provides the strongest argument in favour of the identication. It starts out from (I) to possess a concept is to possess a certain mental ability. Next, it glosses (I) as (I') to possess a concept = to possess a certain mental ability It then invokes the additional premise (II) to possess x = to possess y

x = y

in order to reach the conclusion that (III) a concept = a certain mental ability. But this reasoning is problematic. First, it is unclear whether (I) is indeed an identity statement, as the paraphrase (I') assumes. Often statements of the form `to

is to

'

merely

express a generality statement of the form `For all x, if x F s then

x G s)'. The latter need not even be reversible (as in `to be a

Cretan is to be a liar'). Next, to be reversible, (I) and (I') would have to specify a particular mental ability which is equivalent to concept possession. This is far from trivial, as we shall see. And even if this feat has been achieved, it will be insucient to establish an identity. It will only mean that everyone who possesses a concept also possesses this specic mental ability, and vice versa. Furthermore, it remains an open question whether (I) should not instead be glossed as: I* S has the concept F

S has the ability of operating with F.

What are Concepts?

25

To be sure, someone who identies concepts with abilities will resist that paraphrase and insist that the ability with which possessing the concept F is to be identied must be explained without mentioning the concept F, an entity with which the subject operates. But it is an alternative that her arguments do not rule out. That alternative is based on the following line of thought. If having a concept is an ability, it is an ability to operate with concepts. In that case, however, the concept itself cannot be identical with the ability. Rather, it is something employed in the exercise of that ability. A cognitivist conception which picks up this cue is the popular idea that concepts are a kind of cognitive or linguistic tool. Concepts are things employed in the exercise of conceptual abilities, just as tools are things employed in the exercise of manual (technical) abilities. Unfortunately, it is far from clear what kind of tool concepts might be. Worse still, the analogy is misleading to begin with. The idea that concepts are akin to tools in that they are objects (concrete, mental or abstract) with which we operate in conceptual thought amounts to a reication. There is a dierence between the possession of a tool and the possession of the ability to employ the tool  as I keep discovering to my cost when trying to operate our electric drill. This distinction cannot be drawn in the case of concepts. To possess a concept is ipso facto to possess the ability to use the concept.

I now turn to two proposals that avoid the pitfall of treating objects as if they were bona de objects.

7 Ways of thinking
First, the Neo-Fregean proposal that concepts are senses or `modes of presentation' (Peacocke 1992; Knne 2005). Unfortunately, the latter is merely a catch-phrase, and one Frege himself never explained adequately, least of all with respect to concepts, which

facto

In this respect, concepts resemble skills. To possess a skill is to possess the ability to apply the skill.

ipso

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he regarded as referents rather than senses of predicates. But we can put some esh on it by treating concepts as ways of thin-

king about objects, though not in the adverbial sense of thinking

about them hard or longingly. More specically, concepts are ways of thinking about or conceiving of objects as possessing certain

properties, without themselves being properties. To render that

suggestion viable, we need to avoid literal interpretations of the Fregean idea that a sense is a `mode of presenting a referent'. Strictly speaking, there can be no way of presenting a referent unless there is a referent or extension. In the case of concepts, this would rule out uninstantiated concepts, which is absurd. On my construal, therefore, ways of thinking about objects are directed not just at those objects which possess the relevant properties, but at all objects of which the relevant properties can be predicated either truly or falsely. To put it dierently, a concept is a way of thinking of objects from a suitable range as possessing or lacking certain properties. This reintroduces the idea of classication. Finally, we can operationalize the idea of ways of thinking, thereby further spelling out its cognitive dimension. The concept expressed by a predicate is determined by the features to which the subject refers in deciding whether a given object falls under the concept, or would decide, if the question arose.

Neo-Fregeanism does justice to the cognitive dimension in several respects. First, its answer to the possession question runs: A subject S possesses the concept F i S is capable of thinking of an object as being an F. Secondly, the Neo-Fregean answer to the denition question has it that concepts are `representational abstract entities' (Knne 2007: 346-7). Qua modes of presentation they are not linguistic symbols  predicates of a language of thought  but things expressed by symbols. Yet they in turn are ways of thinking about objects or of objects as having properties. Concepts are at the same time representanda of the predicates of public languages and representantia of properties. And they are subjective not in

For a more elaborate discussion of Neo-Fregeanism, see Glock 2011.

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the sense of being inside the minds or brains of individuals, but only in a sense related to the function question: it is essential to concepts that they play a role in cognitive acts and operations. Hurdles remain nonetheless when it comes to expatiating upon the idea of thinking of an object as possessing certain properties. For one thing, to accommodate even all employments of predica-

tive concepts Neo-Fregeans are driven to statements like

one thinks of something as F if one judges, that it is F, when one hopes that it is F, when one wonders, whether it is F, etc.  for all propositional attitudes and acts. (Knne 2007: 343) Alas, when I wonder whether Susan is well, I do not, normally, think of her as being well. Accordingly, `thinking of something as

F ' cannot have its normal sense here, and hence cannot be used
to explain the Neo-Fregean notion of `way of thinking'. One might respond that `thinking of something as F ' has a technical sense here; it is something one does when one judges that x is F, hopes that x is F, wonders whether it is F, etc. But this would once more take us back to square one, namely the cognitive phenomena that concepts were supposed to explain. For another, `thinking of objects as possessing certain properties' does not t all types of concept or conceptual thought. It directly captures predicative concepts and classication. And perhaps the idea can be extended to comparative, quantitative, spatial and temporal concepts, and to individual concepts, provided that the latter are welcomed as bona de concepts in the rst place. But it does not capture logical concepts and inference. To possess the concept of negation is not a `mode of presenting' or a `way of thinking' about a putative logical object negation, or the property of being negated, or even of negated propositions or a proposition as negated. Instead, it is a way of operating with negation, e.g. in negating propositions and drawing inferences.

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8 Techniques and rules

A nal cognitivist approach promises both more specicity and greater generality. It also has the advantage of acknowledging that a concept is something employed in conceptual thought without reifying it. A concept is not an object, properly speaking, the story goes, but a technique. Thus Wittgenstein maintained that `a concept is a technique of using a word', or `the technique of our use of an expression: as it were, the railway network that we have built for it' (1988: 50 and 2000: MS 163: 56v). To master or possess a technique is to master or possess an ability. Yet techniques are not themselves abilities, but something which the possessor of an ability uses in exercising the ability. There is a dierence, for instance, between the ability to skin a rabbit and the various techniques one might employ to this end. Wittgenstein regarded concepts as linguistic techniques. But his idea can be given a Kantian twist, in order to avoid the potentially problematic implication that concepts are the prerogative of linguistic creatures. One can tie concepts instead to thought or understanding rather than language. Concepts are techniques not just for using words, but for mental operations or mental acts which may or may not be expressed in language. The capacity for such mental operations may presuppose possession of language, yet it can denitely be exercised by a subject that does not engage in either overt or silent speech at the time (see also section 1 above). But what kind of mental operation? Here we face the question of what function or functions concepts are supposed to full. The most popular candidate, and the one that has preoccupied us so far, is classication. Often classication is in turn spelled out as an operation of discrimination, of sorting things into those that do and those that do not fall under the concept. This elaboration invites an objection, however. There is at least one concept that cannot be used to discriminate between those things that fall under it and those that do not, namely the concept of identity (Knne 2007: 344). It makes no sense to sort things into those that are and those that are not identical with themselves. One

What are Concepts?

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way of avoiding this problem is to gloss classication not as sorting, but as recognizing. In so far as identity is a bona de relation at all, it makes sense to recognize that it is one in which each thing stands to itself. A second response is to cast our net more widely. There is a second basic function standardly and plausibly ascribed to concepts, namely inference. This obviously accommodates the concept of identity, which has a distinctive role in inference. In any event, acknowledging inference as a basic function of concepts in addition to classication is imperative in order to account for logical concepts. As we have seen, these defy the labels `mode of presentation' or `way of thinking about', and by the same token they should not be lumbered articially with the function of classifying things. At the same time logical concepts are obviously at least as amenable to being treated as cognitive techniques as predicative concepts. Accordingly, the proposal currently under consideration is this: a concept is not identical with the capacity to classify or infer, but only with the technique employed by someone who exercises the ability to classify or infer. Next, the term `technique' needs to be made more specic. What matters as far as concepts are concerned  whether they be predicative or logical  are the rules or principles that guide conceptual thought. Concepts, the proposal now runs, are rules or principles of classication and/or inference. Even this modied proposal is threatened by category mismatches. It does not seem that to dene a concept is to dene a principle or rule. Rather, the principle or rule features in the denition. On the other hand, perhaps this is just a vagary of the current use of `denition' in English, without further conceptual import. There is no linguistic infelicity in maintaining that to explain a concept is to explain a principle or rule for performing certain mental or linguistic operations.

7 At the same

One might further remonstrate that, strictly speaking, it is terms rather than concepts that are dened. After all, concepts are supposed to be located at the level of meaning rather than that of symbols.

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time one would at the very least feel queasy about violating or acting in accordance with a concept. But note that one can do violence to a concept, by misapplying it or stretching it beyond breaking-point. Finally, while rules apply to subjects or agents under their `jurisdiction', concepts apply to objects that satisfy their dening criteria. Another qualm would be that principles can be true or false, whereas concepts cannot. Prima facie, at least, rules escape this diculty. Even if they are expressed by sentences in the indicative mood, it is arguable that their `truth' amounts to nothing other than a particular prescription being actually in force. The question remains, however, what form these principles or rules should take. Here we seem to be facing a dilemma. One apparent option is that these rules are standards for the employment of concepts. They might, for instance, take the form of the rules Bennett extracts from Kant (Bennett 1966: 145): (IV) You may apply concept F to x i x is . . . But on this proposal, the concept

itself

would

not

be

identical with the rule after all. It would rather be a predicate the use of which is governed by the rule. A second option is that the rule species another activity, e.g. (V) You may treat x in way W i x is . . . . In that case the danger is that we are stuck with two unpalatable options. One is that W is a place-holder for practical activities which may presuppose concept-possession, but which someone who has mastered the concept need not be able to
But the matter is not straightforward. While one cannot dene the meaning of an expression, one can certainly explain it. The crucial point is that in all three cases  terms, concepts, meanings  one ultimately species and demonstrates rules or principles for certain cognitive or linguistic operations.

What are Concepts?

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engage in; the other is that W is a place-holder for conceptualization, which would render the account unexplanatory. Fortunately, this dilemma is more apparent than real. The second horn can be avoided by noting that the form which a conceptual rule takes depends on the kind of concept or conceptual operation at issue. It is at least plausible to hold that those cognitive operations which are genuinely conceptual revolve around classication on the one hand, inference on the other. If one is hard up for a generic label, one can say that conceptual capacities are those involved in judgement (see also Glock 2010a). Thirdly, the operations governed by rules of classication and inference are clearly cognitive rather than practical in nature, which avoids the rst horn of the dilemma. This leaves one nal question: is there a substantive common denominator between classication and inference, one that goes beyond both being advanced cognitive operations? The answer may well be negative. It is not even clear that classication and inference always go together. Admittedly, even formal inference depending on logical concepts presuppose judgements involving predicative concepts and hence classication. But it is less clear that classication requires inference of either the formal or the material kind. There is at least a case to be made that the behavioural capacities of some non-linguistic creatures amount to classication rather than mere discrimination of stimuli, yet without crossing the threshold of inference (see Newen and Bartels 2007; Carey 2009; Glock 2010a).

9 The proposition problem

We now need to attend to a problem facing all cognitivist accounts. Concepts are treated as the components from which propositions are built, especially in logic and philosophy. At least

prima facie, however, neither abilities, nor ways of thinking, nor

rules of classication and inference occur in normal propositions; at best, they occur in those propositions which are, respectively, about abilities, ways of thinking or rules, i.e. explicitly mention

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or refer to them. There are two ways of responding to this `proposition problem'. I shall argue that in combination, these responses promise to resolve this diculty, which would otherwise seem intractable. If Strawson (1959: Part II) is to be trusted, a universal such as a property can enter a proposition not just in the direct sense that the sentence expressing the proposition contains a word or phrase referring to the property of being F, but also in the less direct sense that the sentence contains a word or phrase signifying it. By a similar token, such a sentence would contain a general term expressing the concept F, even though it does not refer to it. What is more, one can extend this courtesy to any otherwise plausible

explanans of `concept'. Sticking to the rule proposal, this would

mean that the predicate in (3) expresses a rule for classiying substances into those that possess the property of being sweet and those that don't. Crucial to this construal is that standard propositions, and by implication our common or garden thoughts, are not about concepts. That insight goes back at least as far as Aquinas. Ideas (species ) are `not what is thought of (id quod intelligitur ) but that by which thinking takes place (id quo intelligitur )' (Kenny 1980: 71). It is also accepted by Price, who identies concepts with capacities: The concept is not before the mind as an object of inspection. It is at work in the mind, but not as one inspectable content among others . . . It shows itself not as a detectable item of mental furniture, but rather as a guiding force, determining the direction which the series of presented particulars [mental images or words] takes . . . ' (Price 1953: 342). Finally, it is congenial to the Neo-Fregeanism propounded by Knne. In the spirit of Strawson, Knne distinguishes between application, connotes and expression: the general term `dog' applies to all and only dogs, connotes the property of being a dog, and expresses the concept of being a dog (2005: 254 and fn. 31,

What are Concepts?

33

263; see also his 2003: 4). Some such distinction is prerequisite for capturing the dierent semantic properties or dimensions of general terms. Nonetheless the StrawsonKnne solution to the proposition problem immediately faces two challenges. First, can't the courtesy of being allowed to enter into a proposition indirectly be extended from ways of thinking to all otherwise plausible candidates for being concepts, notably abilities or rules? Secondly, why should one accept that any of these candidates feature in all propositions, however indirectly? The answer to the rst question is straightforward in so far as we stick to the relationship between concepts and general terms. It is perfectly commonplace to speak of words as expressing concepts. And there is no violent infelicity in speaking of general terms as expressing ways of thinking. The same goes for rules of classication and/or inference. Perhaps one of these notions  `ways of thinking' or `rule'  comes closer to capturing the ordinary meaning of `concept', yet it is not on account of the possibility of being expressed by general terms. By contrast, it is at best misleading to speak of general terms as expressing an ability. Conceptual abilities are possessed by cognitive subjects, and they are expressed by  in the sense of being manifested in  the mental activities  notably the judgements and inferences  of such subjects. And we might say that those activities manifest concepts indirectly, keeping this relation apart from the expression of concepts by general terms. The notion of a conceptual ability points to the

subject of conceptual thought and to the activity (in a suitably

loose sense of the term) of conceptual thinking. By contrast, it is out of place when it comes to the content of conceptual thought, which is precisely what the idea of concepts as components of propositions points to. What we still need is a way of reconciling the mental or cognitive dimension of concepts with the objective dimension suggested by their occurrence in propositions.

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10 Propositions and concepts as logical constructions

This takes us straight to the second challenge. The Strawson Knne response at best removes an obstacle to claiming that concepts can be ways of thinking and yet appear in propositions. But what positive reasons do we have for accepting that ways of thinking appear in propositions, let alone as components of propositions? The answer, I submit, is that both propositions and their components are logical constructions out of the practices and abilities of concept-exercising creatures. Elsewhere (2010b; 2011) I have tried to substantiate this answer. In the present context I conne myself to indicating some of the critical steps that need to be taken. They involve attacking an orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind and language epitomized by the ubiquitous label `propositional attitude'. According to this orthodoxy, intentional verbs like `believe', `know', `desire', `intend' signify relations between a subject and a proposition, which is in turn composed of concepts. More specically, this orthodoxy involves three distinct elements: a relational model: an intentional state is a relation between a subject and a content, something the intentional state is directed at; propositionalism: these contents are propositions a building-block model: propositions are (abstract) wholes which have (abstract) parts  concepts. All three elements must be rejected. First, propositionalism is

ab initio unsuitable for intentional states like craving x or intending to

(Glock 2010a: 13-4). Next, even `thatish' intentional

verbs like `believe/know/desire that p ' are not standardly directed at propositions (see White 1972). Thirdly, the relational model which treats believing or desiring that p as a relation to a

bona de object amounts to a reication. Finally, and relatedly, the building block model, according to which propositions are complex abstract entities composed of concepts as their proper

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parts, is misguided. It transposes the part/whole relation from the spatial and temporal sphere to a sphere  that of abstract entities  to which, ex hypothesis, neither spatial nor temporal notions apply. What seems to give sense to talk of parts and wholes in the case of propositions or thoughts is the fact that the linguistic expressions of thoughts  namely sentences  have components  namely words (see Kenny 1989: 1267). What is said or thought has genuine components to the extent to which its linguistic expression has components (which may, for instance, be explained when A is called upon to state and explain what she believes). My approach is top-down in one respect and bottom-up in another (for the distinction see Dretske 2000: 80-83). On the one hand, in the spirit of a moderate contextualism, it regards the components of sentences and intentional contents as abstractions from entire sentences or `propositions'. On the other hand, this semantic top-down approach is favoured, among other things, by a bottom-up perspective on the nature and genesis of thought and language. To describe more primitive capacities and communicative practices, we do not need to identify conceptual components but can start, in a holophrastic or holodoxastic mode with whole sentences or beliefs, respectively. The imperative for parsing arises only when we reach a more complex phenomena, in particular those which need to be described in terms of classication and inference. Even if these phenomena are not conned to creatures with language, in describing them we employ the apparatus of fully articulated sentences and their components. Although propositions are not themselves linguistic entities, they are akin to what Prior (1971: ch. 2) called logical constructions from linguistic phenomena, namely from the that-clauses by which we report and refer to what subjects say or think. The criteria of identity for propositions make essential reference to linguistic acts (sayings or utterances). There are propositions no one has ever uttered or thought of. But what distinguishes two such propositions is evident from the declarative sentences which express them. Although our criteria of identity for propositions are

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not the same as our criteria of identity for sentences, we can only identify the former because we can identify the latter. Although there are dierent linguistic expressions for the most important truth discovered by Newton and the most important truth discovered by Einstein, what distinguishes these two truths is evident from their expressions  `F = ma ' and `E = mc '. If the relational model, propositionalism and the building-block model are jettisoned, cognitivism can oer a satisfactory solution to the proposition problem. In what sense, then, can rules of classication and inference occur in propositions? The answer is, very roughly: in the sense that S can only think that a is F in a fully conceptual sense if S has the capacity to classify or recognize objects as being F and draw inferences from this fact. Propositions are what is or can be said or thought. Concepts are rules or principles that enable a subject to say or think such things, ways in which subjects do or could conceive of properties. To talk of propositions and concepts is not just a faon de parler, and propositions and concepts are not just `make-believe entities' (to use what is indeed a currently fashionable faon de parler ). Rather, they are logical constructions in a non-reductive sense. It may prove impossible to paraphrase concepts away. We may need to refer to them in order to describe the highly evolved cognitive and/or linguistic abilities of certain creatures. At the same time, the nature, individuation and function of concepts ceases to be mysterious once we attend to the abilities that enable and necessitate the ascription of concepts to a subject. In that respect, at least, the possession question does indeed enjoy priority over the others (see Glock 2010c: 315-9). It is only possible to state what propositions and concepts are in terms which implicitly refer to what subjects can say or do; and we identify propositions and concepts by grouping or classifying actual or potential token-expressions according to what they say or mean. On this basis we may at least hope to reconcile two apparently incompatible features of the established use of `con-

What are Concepts?

37

cept', the cognitive dimension of concepts and their appearance in propositions.

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I wish to thank David Dolby and Frank Esken for helpful comments. This material has also proted from discussions in Bielefeld, Oldenburg, Osnabrck and Stuttgart, for which I am grateful. Finally, thanks are due to the organisers of the `Predication and the Unity of the Proposition' conference at the Vienna University of Economics, at which I delivered a keynote lecture under the current title, and to the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg Delmenhorst for supporting this work through a fellowship.

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Chair of Theoretical Philosophy II Institute of Philosophy University of Zurich Zrichbergstrasse 43 CH-8044 Zrich Switzerland glock@philos.uzh.ch