POLITICAL LAW CASES 2010 -2012 ADMIN LAW & PUBLIC OFFICERS

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA et al; G.R. No. 184740; February 11, 2010
sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants. Facts: On October 4, 2006, President Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of DOTC, vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista wasdesignated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-inCharge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concernedcitizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on thePresident, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies andassistants to hold any other office or employment.On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista wasappointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumedher duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.

Judicial review; requisites. the courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

The question on standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports

Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment.

SAMSON vs. RESTRIVERA G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. FACTS:
Petitioner is the department head of the Population Commission with office atthe Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite. Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latters land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent

to cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondents land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of title over the latters land. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over a case involving aprivate dealing by a government employee or where the act complained of is notrelated to the performance of official duty? HELD: YES. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them. Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987

Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of anypublic official or employee when such act or omission appears to be ILLEGAL, UNJUST, OR IMPROPER.
Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Actof 1989, the jurisdiction of

the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure.
Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but

NOT LIMITED, TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS WHICH ARE UNFAIR OR IRREGULAR. Thus, even if the
complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

PEOPLE V. LUIS J. MORALES GR 166355 MAY 30, 2011

Facts:
Luis Morales, the acting president of Expocorp at the time relevant to the case, was charged by the Ombudsmans Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau. He was charged of unlawfully selling a Mercedes benz issued to him without the requisite public bidding nor approval of the Board of Directors of Expo Corporation and thereafter failed to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned vehicle to the account of Expo Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of the Corporation and the public interest as well. Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged. He alleged that Expocorp is a private corporation and that he is not a public employee or official. He added that Expocorp is not a government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not created

by a special law, it did not have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorps capital stock is owned by private individuals. Sandiganbayan ruled that ruled that the position of a president of a government-owned or controlled corporation clearly falls within its jurisdiction. However, before Morales could be held accountable as Expocorps president, it must first be established that Expocorp is a government -owned or controlled corporation. Sandiganbayan ruled, citing Laurel v Desierto, that Expocorp is a private corporation; that it was not created by a special law nor did it have an original charter. It was organized under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. According to the Sandiganbayan, Expocorp could not derive its public character from the fact that it was organized by the NCC. Hence, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On this basis, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the information against Morales. Issues: a. Whether or not Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of performing the executive functions of the National Centennial Commission and the sovereign functions of the government, and should be considered as a public office. falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandigangayan.

b. Whether or not petitioner, as president of Expocorp, should rightfully be considered as a "public officer",

Ruling: Petition is denied. Expocorp is a private corporation as found by the Sandiganbayan. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation. A governmentowned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. Under Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Sandiganbayan shall exercise jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. But since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, Morales, as Expocorps president who now stands charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in this capacity, is beyond the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

MACALINTAL VS. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - G.R. NO. 191618 NOVEMBER 23, 2010
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutio nal. Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or VicePresident under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not PET is constitutional; Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power. Held: Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities. Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that

the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to ERADICATE CORRUPTION, PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT, AND ENSURE THAT ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS LEAD JUST AND MODEST LIVES. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations.

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers. The Court rejected respondents contention that he was deprived of his right to due process when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainants assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint OR based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause

other rulings I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan. The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILLCORPORATION vs.CA and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION (G.R. No. 180462 February 9,2011)FACTS:
In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar due to theeffects of El Nio and La Nia phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stablesugar prices, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999 (EO 87),facilitating sugar importation by the private sector.Section 2 of EO 87 created a Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction to determine proceduresfor sugar importation as well as for collection and remittance of conversion fee.Under Section 3 of EO 87, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to conversion fee to beremitted by respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to the Bureau of Treasury.On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding Rulesproviding guidelines for sugar importation. Under the Bidding Rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if theimported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee isforfeited in favor of the SRA.The SRA forthwith authorized the importation of 300,000 metric tons of sugar, to be made inthree tranches.The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication of the invitation to bid.Several sugar importers submitted sealed bid tenders. Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar MillCorporation (Sugar Mill) and South Pacific Sugar Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged aswinning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tranches.Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee amountingto P14,340,000.00, while Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee amountingto P28,599,000.00.As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only 10% of theirsugar import allocation. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining sugar import allocationblaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations sought immediate reimbursementof the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion fee would be forfeited pursuant toparagraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules. The SRA also notified the sugar corporations that theauthority to reconsider their request for reimbursement was vested with the Committee on SugarConversion/Auction.The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in the RegionalTrial Court.In its notice of appearance, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay of the SRAs legal department to assist the OSG in this case.

The RTC ruled in favor of the sugar corporations and held that paragraph G.1 of the BiddingRules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation.It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which merelycancelled the sugar importation.On 5 January 2007, the OSG received its copy of the RTC Decision. On 24 January 2007, thedeputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy of the Decision and filed anotice of appeal on 7 February 2007.The sugar corporations moved to expunge the notice of appeal on the ground that only the OSG,as the principal counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be made. The sugar corporationsstressed that a lawyer deputized by the OSG has no authority to decide whether an appeal shouldbe made.The OSG filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG pointed out that in its notice of appearance, it authorized SRA counsel Atty. Labay to assist the OSG in thiscase.The RTC granted the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG then moved forreconsideration however it was denied.A motion for execution was granted by the RTC.Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seekingto set aside the orders issued by the RTC as well as the writ of execution.The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a notice of appeal. The appellate court thus directed the RTC to give due course to the appeal that Atty.Labay timely filed. RULING: The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal. Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency established pursuant to Executive Order No.18, Series of 1986, in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the servicesof lawyers. In National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation this Court ruled that the deputization by the OSG of NAPOCOR counsels in cases involving the NAPOCOR included the authority to file a notice of appeal. The Court explained that the OSG could have withdrawn the appeal if it believed that the appeal would not advance the governments cause. The Court held that even if the deputized NAPOCOR counsel had no authority to file a notice of appeal, the defect was cured by the OSGs subsequent manifestation that the deputized NAPOCOR counsel had authority to file a notice of appeal.In the present case, records show that both the OSG and the deputized SRA counsel were servedcopies of the RTC decision subject of the appeal. Thus, what applies is National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation. Applying here the doctrine laid down in the saidcase, deputized SRA counsel Atty. Labay is, without a doubt, authorized to file a notice of appeal. Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured whenthe OSG subsequently filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. As the OSG explained, its reservation to "approve the withdrawal of the case, the non-appeal, or otheractions which appear to compromise the

interest of the government" was meant to protect theinterest of the government in case the deputized SRA counsel acted in any manner prejudicial togovernment. Obviously, what required the approval of the OSG was the non-appeal, not theappeal, of a decision adverse to government.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Nieto A. Racho; G.R. No. 185685 31, 2011
The Court finds merit in the petition.

January

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.36 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record
From the records, it is undisputed that Racho admitted the bank accounts, but explained that the deposits reflected therein were not entirely his. Racho proffered that some of the money came from his brothers and nephew as part of their contribution to the business that they had planned to put up. He presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), dated January 28, 1993, and Joint Affidavit of his siblings that echoed his explanation. In the appreciation of the said documents, the Ombudsman and the CA took opposing views. The Ombudsman did not give weight to the SPA due to some questionable entries therein. The CA, on the other hand, recognized the fact that Racho never denied the existence of the bank accounts and accepted his explanation. Accordingly, the CA decreed that although Racho was remiss in fully declaring the said

bank deposits in his SALN, the intent to make a false statement, as would constitute dishonesty, was clearly absent. The pivotal issue in this case, however, is whether or not Rachos non-disclosure of the bank deposits in his SALN constitutes dishonesty.

The Court views it in the affirmative. Section 7 and Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 301938 explain the nature and importance of accomplishing a true, detailed and sworn SALN, thus:
Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office, and thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of said calendar year. Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a nonofficial character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed.

Xxxx Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. "Unexplained" matter normally results from "non-disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

Complimentary to the above-mentioned provisions, Section 2 of R.A. 137941 states that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." By mandate of law, every public official or government employee is required to make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters. Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired money or property manifestly disproportionate to his salary or his other lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have illegally acquired it. Xxxx what the law seeks to curtail is "acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is "explained wealth" which the law does not penalize. In this case, Racho not only failed to disclose his bank accounts containing substantial deposits but he also failed to satisfactorily explain the accumulation of his wealth or even identify the sources of such accumulated wealth. The documents that Racho presented, like those purportedly showing that his brothers and nephew were financially capable of sending or contributing large amounts of money for their business, do not prove that they did contribute or remit money for their supposed joint business venture. Equally, the SPA that was supposedly issued by Vieto, Dido and Henry Racho in favor of Racho on January 28, 1993 to show their business plans, contained a glaringly inconsistent statement that belies the authenticity of the document Definitely, a document that was allegedly executed in 1993 could not contain a statement referring to a future date "registered by the DTI last April 30, 1999." This certainly renders the intrinsic and extrinsic value of the SPA questionable. Thus, the SPA and Joint Affidavits which should explain the sources of Rachos wealth are dubious and merit no consideration. Dishonesty begins when an individual intentionally makes a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon ones ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.53 Section 52 (A)(1), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service treats dishonesty as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. Indeed, an honest public servant will have no difficulty in gathering, collating and presenting evidence that will prove his credibility, but a dishonest one will only provide shallow excuses in his explanations.

It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employees income or other sources of income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty because when a public officer takes an oath or office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA et al; G.R. No. 180050; April 12, 2011
FACTS:When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers. Hence, Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOID. Respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."

Constitutional Law Locus Standi. For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution is denied with finality. Indeed, according to the

Supreme Court, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the Resolution ordering finality be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught.

Moot and academic Principle; Exception. The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Local Government Code Local Government; Requisites for creation of province. The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. However, there is an exemption provided in the Local Government Code in terms of the land area requirement. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC, if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme Court found no reason why this exemption should not apply also to provinces. In fact, the Supreme Court observed that considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. The Court thus upheld the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO LAUGA; G.R. No. 186228; March 15, 2010
FACTS: Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with some neighbors. At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victims brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave the house. While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, victim recounted to her brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to control himself. The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement

Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan" the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman xxx may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, SC had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP." Also, xxx pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community. This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government

unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a staterelated function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

VICTORINO B. ALDABA et al vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; G.R No. 188078; January 25, 2010
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress. RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution The Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a population of at least 250,000." The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional. Requisites (certification): (1) certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). (2) certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. (3) intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. In the case at bar: (1) it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. (2) It was the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO who issued the certification, he was unauthorized to do so (3) the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

BUKLOD NANG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC V RAMOS AND SONS, INC.; 645SCRA40; GR 131481, March 16, 2011
Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Zoning ;Zoning Classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of eminent domain. Zoning Classification is an exercise by the local government police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; By virtue of a zoning ordinace, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character of the property and the structures thereon would completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality. Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only the rubber-stamping by the local legislature of the current use of the land.

Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration
As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.

Same; Same; Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing court , as may it be raised at any stage.
There are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court may also consider an issue not properly raised during trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy. Buklod, however, did not allege, much less argue, that its case falls under any of these exceptions.

Constitutional Law; Social Justice; Never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law

It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, the court is called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for the justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law. Vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.

FACTS:
The subject of the controversy involves several parcels of unirrigated land, a part of the 372-hectare land owned by the respondent (EMRASON). It was acquired in 1965 for the purpose of developing into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes". The Municipal Council of Dasmar, Cavite, acting in pursuance of the Local Autonomy Act, enacted an ordinance providing subdivision regulation and penalties for violation thereof. In 1972, EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and development its 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision. The Municipal Council approved the said application through the issuance of a resolution. Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property development. However, the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay due to the fact that the property in question was mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation. On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution. During the Aquino administration, DAR was tasked with to acquire additional lands from the nearby areas as part of its conversion project. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the property of EMRASON. The DAR Secretary sent out 4 notices of acquisition to EMRASON which the latter protested. EMRASON filed with the DARAB separate petitions to nullify the first 3 sets of the notices and was then referred to the Office of the Regional Director. The issue therein was to determine whether or not the subject property is covered by the CARP and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition. DAR conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property. The Legal Division of DAR rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions , observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The DOJ Opinion adverted to clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP. The DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the DAR Secretary assailing that the Legal Divisions decision ran c ontrary to the department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them the balance of 39 hectares x x x". DAR Secretary Garilao issued an order affirming the Notices of Acquisition and directing the OAR field officials to pursue the coverage under RA 6657 of the properties of EMRASON.

EMRASON to the Office of the President but such was dismissed stating that EMRASONs property has remained AGRICULTURAL in classification and therefore falls within the coverage of the CARP for its failure to comply with the requirements of the Municipal Ordinance, Admin Order 152 and Certification of the HSRC and HLURB. The matter was brought before the CA where the latter issued a TRO (TRO enjoining the DAR Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary from implementing the their decision and resolution until further orders from the court. CA later on granted EMRASONs writ of preliminary injunction. While the DAR Secretary filed for MfR, DAR already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable; that the writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved; and that the Petition for Review of EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a petition for certiorari before SC. CA allowed the intervention of Buklod because the latter's participation was "not being in any way prejudicial to the interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal complexion of the case." The appellate court, however, affirmed the propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON. CA ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.

ISSUES: (The main issue of the case is WON the subject property could be placed under the CARP but for Constitutional Law purposes ---- >) WON the Zoning Ordinance and the Resolution approving the reclassification of the land issued by the Municipality of Dasmarinas is in accordance with the powers of such LGU. RULING: SC affirms the decision of the CA, in favor of EMRASON

The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 a precursor of the Local Government Code of 1991, provided; SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances . Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or

regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning. (Emphases supplied.)

The Municipal Council of Dasmarinas approved Ordinance No. 1 which laid down the general subdivision regulations for the municipality; and Resolution No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, which approved the application for subdivision of the subject property.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 or the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision.

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion; Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use. Under the present Local Government Code, the authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily
resides in the sanggunian of the city or municipality. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character of the property and the structures thereon would completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality. Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only the rubber-stamping by the local legislature of the current use of the land. the regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an exercise of police power.

NAPOCOR VS TUAZON GR 193023

FACTS: Napocors transmission line traversed on respondents property. Respondents demands that they be paid full value of their land as just compensation. NAPOCOR argues that it shall only pay easement fee pursuant to section 3-a(b) its charter, R.A. 6395, which prescribes a formula for easement fee.

(In this case, instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right of way agreement with Mr. Tuazon which included the payment for damages on improvements, easement tower and occupancy fees and, additional damaged improvements provided under RA 6395. Respondents thereafter filed a case to demand just compensation but this was dismissed by the RTC based on the motion of NAPOCOR stating that the respondents were already rendered full satisfaction of their claims. CA, however, reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the demolition of the land as well as the installation of the transmission lines constitutes taking under the power of eminent domain. Thus, respondents should be entitled to just compensation. CA also ruled that NAPOCOR cannot hide under the mantle of RA 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of the respondents/appellants since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.) ISSUE: WON the installation of the transmission lines is a form of taking under the power of eminent domain and does not establish a right-of-way easement & WON the determination of just compensation is a judicial function RULING Petition of NAPOCOR is devoid of merit. The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. The formula provided in NAPOCORS charter is not binding on the court. It is only a guide. Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The failure of the respondents predecessor -in-interest (Mr. Tuazon) to oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. This cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents right to just compensation Private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as just compensation. SC remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation

SYLLABUS: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Just Compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines. in holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said: granting arguendo that the petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition

of such an easement fails within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the SC sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Same; Same; Courts pronouncement in Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession remains doctrinal and should be applied the application of Gutierrez to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are comparable. The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez -- that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied.

Same; Same; Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts we have held in numerous cases that section 3-A (b) is not conclusive upon the courts. In NAPOCOR vs Maria Bagui, et al, we categorically held: Moreover, Section 4A(b) of RA No. 6395, is not binding on the court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

Same; Same; the determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government the determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. This judicial function has constitutional raison detre; Art. III of the Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA (654 S 559 , JULY 27, 2011)
RE: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA Agrarian Reform Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), is essentially a JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH IS VESTED IN THE RTC acting

as Special Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to be file within the 15-day period stated in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. --- To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and to the bar, that the BETTER RULE is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to be files within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in record with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g. one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property. There exists no compelling reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for the determination of just compensation. --- Petitioner clearly slept on its rights by not filing the petition in the SAC within the prescribed 15-day period or a reasonable time after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Even assuming there was already a consummated sale with respect to the 151.1419 hectares and LBPs valuation thereof had been fully paid to the respondent, the amount already paid by LBP shall be deducted from the total compensation as determined by the PARAD. Notably, LBP exhibited lack of interest in the discharge of its statutory functions as it failed to actively participate in the summary administrative proceeding despite due notice of the hearings. Clearly, there exists no compelling reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for determination of just compensation. Remedial Law; Judgments; Finality of Judgments; A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it may be by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land; Exceptions --- The only exceptions to the general rule on the finality of judgments are: nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and

 whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors.

New Sun Valley vs Sangguniang Barangay GR 156686 July 7, 2011

Facts: The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096 entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), opposed the ordinance and filed a Petition[5] for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City. NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would: (1) "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes"; (2) that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places"; (3) and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision. The maintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was controlled and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in question. Issue: Whether or not the homeowners association has a right to the protection of the law that would entitle it to injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 (they can prevent the sangguniang barangay from opening the roads to the public) Ruling: the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets - have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Paraaque since the year 1964 Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of Paraaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. homeowners association was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic

The barangay resolution had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.

Other rulings:
(1) Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. (1) We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held: (2) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.68 (3) It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque. (4) the local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides: Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

City of Pasig v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185023 dated August 24, 2011
Facts: The Payanig properties are parcels of land located in Pasig City, which were surrendered to the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) by Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (MPLDC) through Jose Campos as ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos. The Pasig City Treasurer assessed MPLDC for real property taxes (RPT) when it failed to pay the same and declared the properties delinquent. At a public auction where there was no bidder, Pasig City bought the properties and issued a certificate of sale in its name. The Republic, through

PCGG, argued that the same was exempt from real property tax, the properties being now owned by the Republic. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the auction sale and directed Pasig City to re-compute real property taxes based only on the lots being leased. The Payanig properties though owned by the government are not properties of public dominion exempt from taxes and from auction sale because they are not intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads. Neither are they intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. MPLDC leased portions of the properties to different business establishments. Hence, the portions of the properties not leased to taxable entities are exempt from real estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax

National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
NPC Charter; prescription. The SC ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 (the NPC Charter) is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and action for damages; distinction. An action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from an action for damages. o The former, also known as inverse condemnation, is intended to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. o On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results in damage to

another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. The two actions are different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value. The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning it from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. Reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is warranted.

Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals. In this case, the CA upheld the RTCs granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of Php30,000.00/month from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent. However, the SC found that the granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated. Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals and in its place prescribed interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC.

Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking. There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.

Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. In this case, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and interests because the subterranean intervention prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage. This was considered by the SC as compensable taking. NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land.

CITY OF MANILA VS. TE

FACTS: City of Manila instituted a complaint for expropriation against herein respondent. The latter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ordinance 7951 (an expropriation measure enacted on February 3, 1998 by the city council authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets) was an invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation and that it did not comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Furthermore, respondent is qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of RA 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned. Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC. Petitioners appeal to CA but to no avail. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss by the respondent is improper. HELD: Yes, it was improper. The present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides: If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading. Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondents motion to dismiss and required her to submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period. Petition was granted. The dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court. {Important notes}

Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expan ded definition of public use or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of eminent domain.

ELECTION LAWS
ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR; G.R. No. 170365; February 2, 2010
Facts: The Comelec en banc ruled a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7a, Lanao del Sur on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was disrupted by a commotion, was untimely suspended and never resumed. The Comelec decision, consequently nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner dibaratun as winner. Petitioner Dibaratun contended that Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for acting on herein respondents petition even if such petition was filed out of time

COMELEC; failure of elections. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may declare failure of elections. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended before the hour fixed by law due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct. The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court. Petitioners allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not present in this case, as public respondent issued the COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on the evidence on record and the law on the matter. Paredes: 3 instances of failure of elections: 2 conditions before COMELEC can file petition: (1) No voting took place on the date fixed by the law or (2) Even there was voting, there was failure of elections& vote cast did not affect the result of election.

 There is no prescriptive period to file petition for failure of election

Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.
Constitutional Law COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidates election and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

Election Law Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing Petition.
1.
Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625 .

2. The SC explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. 1. A petition to cancel a candidates COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. 2. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. 3. As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.
In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification.

The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules

of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a candidates qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the prescribed period of fil ing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding age, residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated by the COMELEC allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the candidates non-compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 was simply to remedy a perceived procedural gap though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case, had already rejected such justification. It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentation. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied. At the same time, it cannot be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions or protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called "procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.

A petition to cancel a candidates COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC which provid es: SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Underlining supplied.)

A petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the same Code which states: SEC. 68. Disqualifications. -- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;

(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 refer to election campaign or political activity outside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds (Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit: "(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 "(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz: Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election." The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. Clearly, the only instance where a petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be filed before election is when the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC.

. It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A

minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes intended for the disqualified candidate should not be considered null and void, as it would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The second placer is just that, a second placer he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. The exception to the second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following: 1. the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and 2. the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
These facts warranting the exception to the rule are not present in the case at bar. As noted by Commissioner Velasco, the date of promulgation of the resolution declaring Gonzalez disqualified to be a candidate in the May 10, 2010 was not a previously fixed date as required by Section 663 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 as the records do not show that the parties were given prior notice thereof. In fact, Gonzalez through his counsel received a copy of the May 8, 2010 Resolution only on May 11, 2010, one day after the elections.

Ashary M. Alauya, Clerk of Court, Sharia District Court, Marawi City v. Judge Casan Ali M. Limbona, Sharia Circuit Court, Lanao del Sur, A.M. No. SCC -98-4, March 22, 2011.
Judges; Election Law; Partisan Political Activity; Words and Phrases; The act of a judge in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial post violated not only the law, but also the constitutional mandate that no officer of employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign; The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. -- We find the OCAs recommendation to be well-founded. Judge Limbona committed grave offenses which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the Judiciary. When he was appointed as a Judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a CoC as a party-list representative in the My 1998 eletions without giving up his post, Judge Limbona violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that no officer or EE in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbonas signature on the CoC unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the CoC for the May 1998 elections, thus negating his claim that his signature were forged. The filing of a CoC is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. Grave Misconduct; A judge who continued to perform his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post is guilty of grave misconduct in office --- While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbonas political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the bench.

 We cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. We find relevant the OCAs observation on the point: Judge Limbonas concealment of his direct participation in the 1998 elections while remaining in the Judiciarys payroll and his vain attempt to mislead the Court by his claim of forgery, are patent acts of dishonesty rendering him unfit to remain in the Judiciary.

CAYETANO V. COMELEC AND TINGA G.R. NO. 193846. APRIL 12, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration; COMELEC; "Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc .Under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration. SCs jurisdiction to review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC; Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution OF A DIVISION OF THE COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the COURT CAN ONLY REVIEW VIA CERTIORARI A DECISION, ORDER, OR RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution. Certiorari against COMELEC; When Allowed; Final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc; Repol went directly to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, as follows: o Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Xxx We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)

Certiorari against COMELEC; When Not Allowed; Exceptions; The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is the Kho case.

Certiorari against COMELEC; Finally, certiorari will not lie in this case. As stated in Soriano, "the general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari." In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari. True, the aforestated rule admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same. Unfortunately for petitioner, none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance. Finally, certiorari will not lie in this case. Certiorari against COMELEC; The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Although it is not the duty of the Court to point petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the appropriate remedy which she should have taken, we refer her to the cue found in Soriano, i.e., "[t]he aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc." In addition, the protest filed by private respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain pending before the COMELEC, which should afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances. Thereafter, the COMELEC should decide these cases with dispatch.
FACTS: In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO and private respondent DANTE O. TINGA were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner thereof on May 12, 2010, receiving a total of 95,865 votes as against the 93,445 votes received by private respondent. Private respondent DANTE O. TINGA filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC and listed election frauds and irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner, which translated to the latters ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City and that in truth private respondent is the actual winner. Petitioner filed her Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim stating the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof. COMELEC held a preliminary conference and issued an Order granting private respondent a period within which to file the appropriate responsive pleading to the Answer of petitioner. The COMELEC issued the assailed Preliminary Conference Order finding the protest filed by private respondent and counter-protest filed by petitioner to be sufficient in form and substance. Effectively, the COMELEC denied petitioners affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and substa nce of the protest filed by private respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Preliminary Conference Order relative to the denial of her affirmative defenses. Private respondent filed a Comment and Opposition. Consequently, the COMELEC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari positing the singular issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content. Not unexpectedly, private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner and raises the procedural infirmity in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, pursuant to the leading case of Repol v. COMELEC. Private respondent likewise counters that the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion. Adamantly, petitioner insists that the case at bar differs from Repol since the herein assailed Orders constituted a final order of the COMELEC (Second Division).

ONG VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [GR NO. 184219, JANUARY 30, 2012]
Doctrine:

Temporary appointments are made if only to prevent hiatus in the government's rendition of public service. However, a temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment's notice. As to those with eligibilities, their rights to security of tenure pertain to ranks but not to the positions to which they were appointed. Facts: Petitioner Samuel Ong, as a career employee in the NBI , was appointed as Director III co-terminus with the appointing authority and would end effectively at midnight on June 30, 2004, unless a new appointment would be issued in his favor by the President consistent with her new tenure effective July 1, 2004; and until then, he shall only hold his position in a de facto/ hold over status. On Dec. 1, 2004, the President appointed respondent Victor Bessat as Director III replacing the petitioner. Ong filed a quo warranto before the CA but was denied. Issue: Whether petitioner has been removed from his position as NBI Director III Held: No. Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was co-terminus with the appointing authority. His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.

ALFAIS T. MUNDER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ATTY. TAGO R. SARI; G.R. No. 194076 October 19, 2011
The Comelec has the constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."16 It has the power to create its own rules and regulations, a power it exercised on 11 November 2009 in promulgating Resolution No. 8696, or the "Rules on Disqualification of Cases filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections." Section 4 thereof provides for the procedure to be followed in filing the following petitions: 1) Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy; 2) Petition to Declare a Nuisance Candidate, and 3) petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the Election Code and petition to disqualify for lack of qualifications or for possessing some grounds for disqualification. Munder alleges that Sarips petition with the Comelec should be considered as one to deny due course to or to cancel a CoC, and not for disqualification. One of the important differences between the two petitions is their prescriptive periods. For a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, the period to file is within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than 25 days from the filing thereof. On the other hand, a petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed at any day after the last day of filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. It has been argued by Munder, who was earlier sustained by the Comelec Second Division, that the petition for disqualification should be treated as a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, which had already prescribed.

We agree with Munder as to the nature of the petition filed by Sarip. The main ground of the said petition is that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that he was a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, when in fact he was not. This ground is appropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. For a petition for disqualification, the law expressly enumerates the grounds in Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 as amended, and which was replicated in Section 4(b) of Comelec Resolution No. 8696. The grounds stated by respondent in his Petition for Disqualification that Munder was not qualified to run for not being a registered voter therein was not included in the enumeration of the grounds for disqualification. The grounds in Section 68 may be categorized into two. First, those comprising "prohibited" acts of candidates; and second, the fact of their permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate according to the law. It may be true that in 2003, Munder, who was still a minor, registered himself as a voter and misrepresented that he was already of legal age. Even if it was deliberate, we cannot review his past political acts in this petition. Neither can the Comelec review those acts in an inappropriate remedy. In so doing, it committed grave abuse of discretion, and the act resulting therefrom must be nullified.

AMORA VS. COMELEC

Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. To oppose Amora, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) fielded Olaivar for the mayoralty post. Respondent Olandria was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the same municipality. Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Granada, instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed. On his part, Amora insists that the Petition for Disqualification filed by Olandria is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course since the purported ground for disqualification simply refers to the defective notarization of the COC. Amora is adamant that Section 73 of the OEC pertains to the substantive qualifications of a candidate or the lack thereof as grounds for disqualification, specifically, the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials under the Local Government Code (LGC) and the OEC. Thus, Olandrias petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period of twenty-five (25) days from the date of the filing of the disputed COC. Moreover, Amora maintains that his COC is properly notarized and not defective, and the presentation of his CTC to the notary public to whom he was personally known sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath.

The 2nd Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora. Pending MR, Amora won the elections but his MR was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. HELD: No, it is not a ground for disqualification because it is not one among those enumerated in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus election Code and Section 40 of the LGC. A petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein. The records reveal that [petitioner] submitted to this Commission a sworn affidavit executed by Notary Public Granada, who notarized [petitioners] COC, affirming in his affidavit that he personally knows [petitioner]. [Respondent], on the other hand, presented no evidence to counter Granadas declarations. Hence, Granada[s] affidavit, which narrates in detail his personal relation with [petitioner], should be deemed sufficient. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., ET.AL. VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

The Antecedents On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW),

and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President. Petitioners raised the following grounds: 1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars constitutional right to equal protection; 2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and 3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication. In its Comment, respondent argues that: 1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard; 2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee; 3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole; 4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld; 5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort; 6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior; 7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively pertains to Congress; 8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and]

9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14 The Issues 1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition; 2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort; 3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to equal protection; 4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity. Ruling: Indispensable Party In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigals interest. The nature of Senator Madrigals interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her participation. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled: x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions

which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. As regards respondents invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers." The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee on the Whole Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also reorganized. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges." However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate. Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court.

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. Prior Publication Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Commitee of the Whole. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity. Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective. The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.

However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35 Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

These incidents arose from our Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to restore and maintain the PGBI to its situation prior to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8679, pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari that PGBI filed to challenge this Comelec Resolution. Our Status Quo Order, in short, directly ordered the Comelec to include PGBI in the list of candidates under the party-list system in the May 10, 2010 elections pending the final determination of PGBIs qualification to be voted upon as a party-list organization. In its Comment to Comelecs Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation,9 PGBI essentially alleged that the Comelec posited seemingly misleading and innocuous reasons in seeking reconsideration. In our Resolution of April 29, 2010,12 we granted PGBIs petition and, accordingly, annulled the assailed Comelec Resolutions in SPP No. 09-004 (MP)13 which delisted PGBI from the roster of duly registered national, regional and sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. We declared at the same time that PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the May 10, 2010 elections. Despite the Status Quo Order and the Resolution, however, PGBI was never included in the ballot as one of the accredited party-list groups or organizations eligible for election under the party-list system. Hence, PGBI was never voted upon as a partylist candidate in the May 10, 2010 elections.

Issue: Whether the petitioner, Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), should be declared to have participated in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010, in light of the Comelecs failure to obey our Status Quo Order and our subsequent Resolution granting PGBIs petition to annul its delisting from the roster of accredited party-list groups or organizations.

Held/Syllabus: Election Law; commission on Elections: Based on the recited antecedent facts, it cannot be disputed that the Comelec did not comply with our Status Quo Order; it simply pleaded insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications as reasons for its avoidance of our Order. It essentially posited that compliance with our Status Quo Order was rendered impossible by the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections.However, we find this explanation unacceptable, given the Comelecs own self-imposed deadline of February 4, 2010 for the correction of errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the published list of participating party-list groups and organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections.The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec had determined that changes in the official ballot could still be made at any time prior to the deadline. In the context of the cases then pending involving the registration of party-list organizations, the deadline was a clear signal from the Comelec that the cases would have to be resolved before the deadline; otherwise, the Comelec could not be held

liable for their non-inclusion.We fully read and respected the Comelecs signal, fully aware that we have to balance the interests the Comelec has to protect, with PGBIs intent to be voted as a party-list organization. Thus, on February 2, 2010, we issued our Status Quo Order after a preliminary but judicious evaluation of the merits of PGBIs motion for reconsideration, only to receive the Comelecs response on February 3, 2010 manifesting that it could no longer change the ballots because of the nature of an automated election.In an exercise as important as an election, the Comelec cannot make a declaration and impose a deadline, and, thereafter, expect everyone to accept its excuses when it backtracks on its announced declaration. The Comelec knew very well that there were still cases pending for judicial determination that could have been decided before the deadline was set. Party-list System: Although we have recognized the validity of the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections in Roque, Jr. v. Comelec,23 we stress that automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process. An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the right of free choice of the electorates on who shall govern them; the party-list system, in the words of Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Comelec,24 affords them this choice, as it gives the marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in governance. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Comelec took this freedom of choice away and effectively disenfranchised the members of the sector that PGBI sought to represent when it did not include PGBI in the list of qualified parties vying for a seat under the party-list system of representation. This is a consideration no less weighty than the automation of the election and cannot be simply disregarded on mere generalized allegations of automation difficulties. In the present case, special circumstances exist which call for our leniency and compel us to impose the penalty of severe reprimand instead of of imprisonment and/or fine under Section 7, of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as we have ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party. We emphasize that although automation is a special circumstance that should be considered in the present incidental matter, however, its effect on the Comelecs noncompliance is merely to mitigate, not to totally exculpate, the Comelec from liability for its failure to comply with our Status Quo Order. In other words, even if we grant that automation might have posed some difficulty in including a new party in the party-list listing, the Comelec still failed to prove to our satisfaction that the PGBIs inclusion was technically impossible and could not have been done even if the Comelec had wanted to. Thus, at the most, we can give the Comelec the benefit of the doubt to the extent of recognizing its excuse as a mitigating factor. We partly agree with the Comelec that we cannot recognize PGBI to be a party-list organization fully qualified to run under the party-list system in the coming 2013 party-list elections. The question of full and total qualification is not ripe for judicial determination as this is not before us for resolution. Participation in a previous election and the level of votes in favor of a participating organization are not the only qualification issues that can arise in a party-list election, and we cannot assume that PGBI shall meet all other legal standards to qualify as a party-list organization in the 2013 elections.

But separate from the question of PGBIs overall qualification is the narrower question of its participation in the May 10, 2010 elections an issue that is subsumed by the issues in the main certiorari case. As shown above, PGBI intended to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections but it was not able to do so because the Comelec did not contrary to our express directive include it in the list of party-list organizations to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010 elections. As it was the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in the May 10, 2010 party-list elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited partylist groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list despite our directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed to have participated in the May 10, 2010 elections, and cannot be disqualified for non-participation or for failure to garner the votes required under Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941. To conclude otherwise is to effectively recognize the ineffectiveness of our Status Quo Order, of our April 29, 2010 Decision, and of this Court.

Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010.
COMELEC; firearms ban. The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714. The Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in this case. The Election Firearms Ban under RA 7166 When a statute defines the particular words and phrases it uses, the legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense; otherwise put, where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by construction, be given a different meaning; the legislature, in adopting a specific definition, is deemed to have restricted the meaning of the word within the terms of the definition.6 Significantly, RA 7166 did not provide a statutory definition of the term "firearms." The absence of this statutory definition leads to the question of what the term "firearms" under RA 7166 exactly contemplates? Various rules of statutory construction may be used to consider this query. First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.7 Second, a word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or

restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense.8 Third, a word of general signification employed in a statute should be construed, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as well. This rule of construction, known as progressive interpretation, extends by construction the application of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into existence subsequent to its passage, and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory.9 Fourth, as a general rule, words that have or have been used in a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words; the presumption is that the language used in a statute, which has a technical or well-known legal meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature.10 The Authority to Categorize Air Rifles and Airsoft Guns Pursuant to the cited EO 712, the President, then exercising legislative powers and authority, delegated to the Chief of the Constabulary [now the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)], the authority to determine whether certain air rifles/guns can be treated as toys or firearms.15 Under this same authority, then PNP Chief Avelino Razon issued PNP Circular No. 11 on December 4, 2007. PNP Circular No. 11 requires that airsoft guns and rifles be given the same treatment as firearms and air rifles with respect to licensing, manufacture, possession and transport limitations. In effect, this is the PNP Chiefs determination, by regulation, that air soft guns and rifles are not simply considered toys beyond administrative regulation but, on the contrary, are considered as weapons subject to regulation. Based on this Circular, they are included under the term "firearms" within the contemplation of RA 7166, and are therefore appropriate subjects of COMELEC Resolution No. 8714 issued pursuant to this law

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, .G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
Facts:

vs.

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other

officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the VicePresident, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional Held: No To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain." In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. ============== Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.

Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
COMELEC jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

Electoral Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11, 2010.
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET); jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

d.n.samonte

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