Law on Public Officers

G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 152161 CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC. Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006

Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively: House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;"1 Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."2 A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate3 and sixteen (16) members of the House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report,5 signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.6 In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees7 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.10 On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other members were given a copy thereof.11 After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular.12

On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000. Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001." President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001. The Petitioners Case The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:"14 Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy. The Respondents Arguments For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law. The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials. They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity. The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without

expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth. According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006. Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court. The Courts Ruling Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar. The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters. Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."16 However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of "overarching significance to our society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).

The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.20 Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23 Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25 Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos: ... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand.27 Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.29 It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.30 And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.31 Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the petitions. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32 At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides: Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly. The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides: SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.33 To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.34 The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof: Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.35 The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.36 The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.37

The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly instructive: SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify. So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? Thats all. Because I believe ... THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, Im very comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean, its one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies. THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Yes. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a very touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what youre ...? THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im happy that there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all comfortable with it. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos. REP. MARCOS: Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that

indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one. Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices because ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this. Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ... REP. MARCOS: I think we just change the Section 1, the short title. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ... REP. MARCOS: What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal... REP. PADILLA: Mr. Chairman, why dont we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code?" THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Why dont we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?" REP. PICHAY: Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun. REP. MARCOS: The Fair Election. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): O, Fair Election Act. REP. MACARAMBON: Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election practices? REP. PICHAY: Fair election practices? REP. MACARAMBON: Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala nang practices nga. REP. PICHAY: Wala nang practices. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): It shall be cited as Fair Election Act. (Informal discussions) REP. PICHAY: Approve na iyan.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act." The rest wala nang problema ano? VOICES: Wala na. REP. MACARAMBON: Wala na iyong practices? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh. O, wala na? We will clean up. REP. MARCOS: Title? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): The short title, "This Act ..." THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Youre back to your No. 21 already. REP. MARCOS: The full title, the same? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." Thats the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act."38 The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.39 It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed

limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved. Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution43 The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.44 The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.45 Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure47 while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48 Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are

strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.49 By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In this Case Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus: a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House during its session on February 5, 2001; b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000; c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor without copies thereof being furnished the members; d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House; e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members; f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened on November 23, 2000; g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit: ... However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"

h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made; i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure;" and j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly: Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president and vicepresident shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy.50 The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases51 reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure." The Effectivity Clause Is Defective Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule: ... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.55 Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has been shown in this case. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990 RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent. Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.: In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986: MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BINAMIRA You are hereby designated General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority, effective immediately. By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. (Sgd.) JOSE ANTONIO GONZALES Minister of Tourism and Chairman, P.T.A. Board

Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date. On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager. This approval was given by the President on the same date. 1 Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira's demurrer led to an unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on Human Rights. But that is another matter that does not concern us here. What does is that on January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho the following memorandum, 2copy furnished Binamira: 4 January 1990 MEMORANDUM TO: Hon. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.. Secretary of Tourism It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity. Please be guided accordingly. (Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO cc: Mr. Ramon P. Binamira Philippine Tourism Authority Manila Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent. The issue presented in this case is starkly simple. Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows: SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)

It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. 3 When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, 4 as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. 5 It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. 6
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. 7

Indeed, even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be validly exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter, as an extension or "projection" of the personality of the President, made irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in question. The petitioner's conclusion that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is based only on half the doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel stated that doctrine clearly in the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 8where he described the relationship
of the President of the Philippines and the members of the Cabinet as follows:

... all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is

required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business," which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not 'disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also happened in the case at bar. The argument that the designation made by Minister Gonzales was approved by President Aquino through her approval of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA is not persuasive. It must be remembered that Binamira was included therein as Vice- Chairman only because of his designation as PTA General Manager by Minister Gonzales. Such designation being merely provisional, it could be recalled at will, as in fact it was recalled by the President herself, through the memorandum she addressed to Secretary Garrucho on January 4, 1990. With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
itc-asl

The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.: Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit. By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987. This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution. The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of

other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5 The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos: In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6 It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that xxx xxx xxx

(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. (4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. xxx xxx xxx (7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ... Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides thatSection 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices. Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows: Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied]. The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. ThusMr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later. Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning. xxx xxx xxx On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels. xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.) In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:

MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera. MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26. MR. FOZ: That is correct.

MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion? MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the executive department, and to require further confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to political influence. MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the office. MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors. xxx xxx xxx MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the President? MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of Commissioner de Castro? MR. FOZ: Yes. MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the Committee? xxx xxx xxx MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter should be submitted to the body for a vote. MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.

Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . . THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendments is approved. xxx xxx xxx MR. ROMULO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. xxx xxx xxx MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION? FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague. MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions. FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I proposed.

FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed amendment? MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION"? MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee. FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things. THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept? MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman. MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification made by Commissioner Bernas. THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide. xxx xxx xxx THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied). It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII readingHe (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied) with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned

in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentenceRather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences. As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service. But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof. Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].

and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence. The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof ...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied]. The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ... In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of

par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows: 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head. Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows: Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus

entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991 LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D. MENZON, petitioner, vs. LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR, LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA in his capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte and Head of SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and Leyte Provincial Treasurer FLORENCIO LUNA,respondents. Zozimo G. Alegre for petitioner. The Provincial Attorney for respondents. RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court dated August 28, 1990 which initially denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governor of Leyte, Aurelio D. Menzon. In the August 28 resolution, the Court stated that Mr. Menzon cannot successfully assert the right to be recognized as Acting Vice-Governor and, therefore, his designation was invalid. In this motion, the primary issue is the right to emoluments while actually discharging the duties of the office. The facts of the case are as follows: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo on March 29, 1988. On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

In his reply letter dated June 22, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. As a result of the foregoing communications between Tente U. Quintero and Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The pertinent portion of the resolution reads: WHEREAS, the circumstances obtaining at present in the Office of the ViceGovernor is that there is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in said office. The Honorable Leopoldo E. Petilla assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor after he took his oath of office to said position. WHEREAS, it is the duty of the members of the Board not only to take cognizance of the aforesaid official communication of the Undersecretary, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., but also to uphold the law. WHEREAS, on motion of the Honorable Macario R. Esmas, Jr., duly seconded by the Honorable Rogelio L. Granados and the Honorable Renato M. Rances. RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved not to recognize Honorable Aurelio D. Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. (Rollo, p. 27) The petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting LDP Regional Counsel, Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarification from Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. regarding the June 22, 1989 opinion. On July 12, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar replied and explained his opinion. The pertinent portion of the letter reads: This has reference to your letter dated July 10, 1989, requesting for clarification of our letter to Provincial Administrator Tente U. Quintero dated June 22, 1989, which states in substance, that "there is no succession provided for in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the vice-governor and that the designation of a temporary vice-governor is not necessary. We hold the view that the designation extended by the Secretary of Local Government in favor of one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members of Leyte to temporarily discharge the powers and duties of the vice-governor during the pendency of the electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor, does not contradict the stand we have on the matter. The fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member was temporarily designated to perform the functions of the vice-governor could not be considered that the Sangguniang member succeeds to the office of the latter, for it is basic that designation is merely an imposition of additional duties to be performed by the designee in addition to the official functions attached to his office. Furthermore, the necessity of designating an official to temporarily perform the functions of a particular public office, would depend on the discretion of the appointing authority and the prevailing circumstances in a given area and by taking into consideration the best interest of public service.

On the basis of the foregoing and considering that the law is silent in case of temporary vacancy, in the Office of the Vice-Governor, it is our view that the peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte, where the electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls for the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governor temporarily. (Rollo, p. 31) In view, of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar, the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, Region 8, Resurreccion Salvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting the latter that Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly. The letter states: In view thereof, please correct previous actions made by your office and those of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which may have tended to discredit the validity of Atty. Aurelio Menzon's designation as acting vice-governor, including the payment of his salary as Acting Vice-Governor, if he was deprived of such. (Rollo, p. 32) On August 3, 1989, the Regional Director wrote another letter to Acting-Governor Petilla, reiterating his earlier request. Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petition sought the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May 16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting ViceGovernor. On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D. Menzon. On September 6, 1990, respondent Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of our resolution. The motion prayed that this Court uphold the petitioner's right to receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Governor while he was acting as such. The petitioner interposes the following reason for the allowance of the motion for reconsideration: THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE EMOLUMENTS FOR HIS SERVICES RENDERED AS DESIGNATED ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD FAITH. SIMPLE JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

The controversy basically revolves around two issues: 1) Whether or not there was a vacancy?; and 2) Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments? The respondents argue that there exists no vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor which requires the appointment of the petitioner. They further allege that if indeed there was a need to appoint an acting Vice-Governor, the power to appoint is net vested in the Secretary of Local Government. Absent any provision in the Local Government Code on the mode of succession in case of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor, they claim that this constitutes an internal problem of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and was thus for it solely to resolve. The arguments are of doubtful validity. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. (see Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326, cited in Mechem. A Treatise on the Law on Public Offices and Officers, at p. 61) Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the ViceGovernor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Petilla, notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority. Disposing the issue of vacancy, we come to the second issue of whether or not the Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate the petitioner. We hold in the affirmative. The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections. The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible

that to leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code. Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting ViceGovernor. It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government. In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the province of Leyte, is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in this case where for about two years there was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of the province of Leyte, the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor to free the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial problems and to serve as the buffer in case something might happen to the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened to acting Governor Petilla during the two-year period. The contingency of having simultaneous vacancies in both offices cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations. The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent vacancy, viz:

Section 49: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan . . . member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . . By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor. And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the ViceGovernor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting ViceGovernor of the province of Leyte. (See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 [1974]) WHEREFORE, the COURT hereby GRANTS the motion for reconsideration. The additional compensation which the petitioner has received, in the amount exceeding the salary authorized by law for the position of Senior Board Member, shall be considered as payment for the actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999 PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents.

PUNO, J.: Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court 1 granting his petition
for quo warrantowhich ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.

Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988. 2 On March 1, 1988, he was
appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.

On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III. In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads: Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for all government benefits due [him]. Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureau of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza." Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made. On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258. 3 The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a
decision was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto.

Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996. 4 On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. 5 Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the order of the trial court. 6 On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. 7 Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner claims that: The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position. 8 The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court.Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. 9 In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. 10 The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal 11 against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated. 12 The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 13

Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. 14 If the court
finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. 15 If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found. When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; (2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; (3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. 16 The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of the court and on the relief sought. 17 In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the following relief: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled thereto. Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for. 18 In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that: WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this petition for quo warranto by: 1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and 2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other monetary benefits appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until reinstated. 19 The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were withheld until reinstated." The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest. 20 Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. 21 A judgment in quo warranto does not
bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized

to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. 22 In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.

Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's decision. 23 Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto. 24 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41801 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997 BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. 1 Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 2

Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED. 3 On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. 4 On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case. 5 On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that: The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a government corporation without an original charter but organized/created under the Corporation Code. Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters. (emphasis supplied) From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987. WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed. 6 On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC. 7 On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual. He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering that the period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission promulgated on April 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that: It appears . . . complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil Service Commission on January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on April 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on January 17, 1985 which

enjoined the complainant to go to the Civil Service Commission which in fact, complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was suspended with the filing of the complaint with the said Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent for failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but due to, in the words of the complainant, a "legal knot" that has to be untangled. 8 Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed on March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated. 9 On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10 The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence, Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations . . . . The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided: The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 11 that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special
law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1]) In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, 12 we had the
occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place

at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.

We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. 13 Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, the former
corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v . National Housing Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 15 Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel
are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a simple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemna in the interest of justice. WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.