LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs. MORENO DUMAPIS et.al. G.R. 163210 August 13 200!

"ACTS# Petitioner is a domestic juridical entity engaged in mining to which the respondents are employed. All three were assigned at the highgrade area where most of the ores mined are considered of high grade content. On September 15 !""" at !#"" p.m. $wayne %hambers &%hambers' who was then acting as Assistant (esident )anager of the )ine went underground to conduct a routinary inspection of the wor*ers and the wor*ing conditions therein. +owe,er reali-ing that highgrading# was being committed he reported the incident to the security in,estigation office. After in,estigating the Security .n,estigators Paul Pespes /r. and 0elimon (ingor e1ecuted a /oint Affida,it which pro,ides that M$. D%a&'e C(a)*e$s sa% a'+ su$,$-se+ seve$al u'-+e't-.-e+ )-'e$s including their super,isor and Stat-/'a$& Gua$+ Ceasa$-/' Da)/sl/g committing +ighgrading acti,ities and that Se0u$-t& Gua$+ Ceasa$-/' Da)/sl/g (/'estl& 0/'.esse+ (-s +-$e0t ,a$t-0-,at-/' then claimed that he was allegedly con,inced by )r. /oel 2umatin one of the miners assigned to cooperate with them to commit +ighgrading. Also M$. Pa*l/ Dagu-/ the shiftboss also ,/s-t-vel& 0/'.-$)e+ t(e 1-g(g$a+-'g a0t-v-t&. 0urthermore we also learned from the 0/'.ess-/' /. M$. Ma2-)/ Ma+a/ that its was messrs. /oel 2umatin and 3rent Suyam who too* their issued roc* drilling machine then drilled holes and blasted the same with the ass-sta'0e /. 4homas 2arcia /ohn 5itoyan 3enedict Arocod Samsom $amian $aniel 0egsar and "$a'0-s0/ L-aga/. Petitioner found the respondents guilty and dismissed them from employment. %onse6uently respondents together with the nine other miners filed a %omplaint

for illegal dismissal but the 7abor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lac* of merit. 4he miners appealed the decision of the 7A to the 8ational 7abor (elations %ommission which rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of respondents as illegal but affirming the dismissal of the nine other complainant miners. Petitioner9s motion for reconsideration was denied for lac* of merit by the 87(%. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under (ule :5 of the (ules of %ourt with the %A but the %A affirmed the decision of the 87(% and denied petitioner9s )otion for (econsideration. ISSUE# ;hether or not the 87(% and %A is correct in finding the dismissal of respondents illegal and in considering the /oint Affida,it of the Security .n,estigators as hearsay and therefore inadmissible. 1ELD# 4he 87(% and %A is 8O4 <84.(<7= %O((<%4 in concluding that the /oint Affida,it of Security .n,estigators Paul $. Pespes /r. and 0elimon (ingor is hearsay and thus inadmissible. ;+.7< .4 .S 4(>< 4+A4 their narration of factual e,ents was not based on their personal *nowledge but on disclosures made by %hambers and $aguio thereby falling s6uarely within Section ?: (ule 1?" of the (ules of %ourt which pro,ides that ;itness can testify only to those facts which he *nows of his personal *nowledge that is which are deri,ed from his own perception e1cept as otherwise pro,ided in these rules. +O;<@<( 4+< %O>(4 +<7$ 4+A4 administrati,e bodies li*e the 87(% are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. .ndeed the (e,ised (ules of %ourt and pre,ailing jurisprudence may be gi,en only stringent application i.e. by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. 4+>S the %A and the 87(% erred in ruling that the /oint Affida,it is inadmissible for being hearsay. 4he /oint Affida,it of the Security .n,estigators is admissible for what it is an in,estigation report.

0urthermore the %ourt clarified that the admissibility of e,idence should not be confused with its probati,e ,alue. Admissibility refers to the 6uestion of whether certain pieces of e,idence are to be considered at all while probati,e ,alue refers to the 6uestion of whether the admitted e,idence pro,es an issue. 4hus a particular item of e,idence may be admissible but its e,identiary weight depends on judicial e,aluation within the guidelines pro,ided by the rules of e,idence. )eanwhile it is true that administrati,e or 6uasiAjudicial bodies li*e the 87(% are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental e,identiary rules. 4he e,idence presented must at least ha,e a modicum of admissibility for it to ha,e probati,e ,alue. 8ot only must there be some e,idence to support a finding or conclusion but the e,idence must be substantial. Substantial e,idence is more than a mere scintilla. .t means such rele,ant e,idence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade6uate to support a conclusion. 4hus e,en though technical rules of e,idence are not strictly complied with before the 7A and the 87(% their decision must be based on e,idence that must at the ,ery least be substantial. Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines it was re,ealed that the facts alleged therein by the Security .n,estigators are not of their own personal *nowledge. 4hey simply referred to the facts allegedly relayed to them by %hambers $amoslog $aguio and )adao. 4he %ourt is con,inced that the /oint Affida,it being sourced from %hambers $amoslog $aguio and )adao has no probati,e ,alue to support e,idence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. %hambers and $aguio did not identify the miners in,ol,ed in the act of highgrading. .n addition $amoslog9s first and second sworn statements did not implicate respondents and )adao recanted his statement

implicating respondent 7iagao. As earlier discussed the sworn statements and joint affida,its of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the ,eracity of the statements in the /oint Affida,it. Pe/,le vs. Tu'+ag [G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000] Quisumbing, J. "a0ts# 0or automatic re,iew is the judgment of the (egional 4rial %ourt of )andaue %ity 3ranch !B in %riminal %ases 8os.$>A:1B: and $>A:!"? finding appellant 4omas 4undag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice. .n its judgment the court below ga,e credence to complainant9s ,ersion of what accused did to her. 4he e,idence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that pri,ate complainant )ary Ann 4undag is a 1? year old girl who does not *now how to read and write and has an .C of D:E which is a ,ery low general mental ability and was li,ing with her father the herein accused at 2ala1y %ompound )andaue %ity. Appellant9s claim that the complainant9s charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court which found him twice guilty of rape. .n the present case appellant assails his double con,iction simply contending that# 4+< 4(.A7 %O>(4 +AS %O)).44<$ A8 <((O( .88O4 A3SO7@.82 4+< A%%>S<$AAPP<77A84 O0 4+< %(.)<S %+A(2<$ .8 4+<.80O()A4.O8S $<SP.4< 4+< P(<S<8%< O0 (<ASO8A37< $O>34 4O<F%>7PA4< +.) O0 4+< SA)<. Issue# ;hether or not the court correctly too* judicial notice of the ,ictimGs age without proper hearing Rul-'g# 8o. /udicial notice is the cogni-ance of certain facts which judges may properly ta*e and act on without proof because they already *now them. >nder the (ules of %ourt judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of (ule 1!H of the (ules of %ourt pro,ides when court shall ta*e mandatory judicial

notice of facts.S<%. !. /udicial notice when discretionary. A A court may ta*e judicial notice of matters which are of public *nowledge or are capable of un6uestionable demonstration or ought to be *nown to judges because of their judicial functions. 4hus it can be considered of public *nowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. 4he offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate e.g. inside a house where there are occupants a fi,e &5' meter room with fi,e&5' people inside or e,en in the same room which the ,ictim is sharing with the accused9s sister. 4he %ourt has li*ewise ta*en judicial notice of the 0ilipina9s inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and ,irtue.S<%. ?. /udicial notice when hearing necessary. A $uring the trial the court on its own initiati,e or on re6uest of a party may announce its intention to ta*e judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial and before judgment or on appeal the proper court on its own initiati,e or on re6uest of a party may ta*e judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisi,e of a material issue in the case. .n this case judicial notice of the age of the ,ictim is improper despite the defense counsel9s admission thereof acceding to the prosecution9s motion. As re6uired by Section? of (ule 1!H as to any other matters such as age a hearing is re6uired before courts can ta*e judicial notice of such fact. 2enerally the age of the ,ictim may be pro,en by the birth or baptismal certificate of the ,ictim or in the absence thereof upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed by other documentary or oral e,idence sufficient for the purpose. 4he award of e1emplary damages separately is also in order but on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of the ,ictim a fact

duly pro,ed during trial we find that the alternati,e circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggra,ating circumstance. >nder Article !!?" of the 8ew %i,il %ode e1emplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggra,ating circumstances. +ence we find an award of e1emplary damages in the amount ofP!5 """."" proper. 8ote that generally in rape cases imposing the death penalty the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggra,ating circumstance in ,iew of the amendments introduced by (.A. 8os. D:5H and B?5?. 4he fatherAdaughter relationship has been treated by %ongress in the nature of a special circumstance which ma*es the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. +owe,er in this case the special 6ualifying circumstance of relationship was pro,ed but not the minority of the ,ictim ta*ing the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. +ence relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggra,ating circumstance in this instance so that e1emplary damages are called for. .n rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters e1emplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with per,erse tendency or aberrant se1ual beha,ior from se1ually abusing their own daughters.

G.R. N/. 13!341

O0t/*e$ 10 2002

PEOPLE O" T1E P1ILIPPINES plaintiffAappellee ,s. MANUEL PRUNA & RAMIRE5 /$ ERMAN PRUNA & RAMIRE56 accusedAappellant. DA7IDE 8R. !.J. "a0ts# On /anuary ? 1HH5 while ?Ayear old 7i-etteArabelle 2on-ales was defecating at their neighbor9s bac*yard )anuel 3oy Pruna the accusedAappellant called him

and placed her on his lap. Pruna was then under the bridge sniffing rugby and drin*ing alcohol with some of friends. Pruna later on brought 7i-ette to a grassy area and raped her. +e was later on arrested. 8otwithstanding her minority 7i-ette was brought to the witness stand. 0inding the same credible the (4% con,ictedPrunaof 6ualified rape and sentenced him to death. Issues# 1. ;O8 7i-ette is a competent and credible witness considering that she was only ? when she was raped and 5 during trial. !. ;hat are the guidelines in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a 6ualifying circumstanceI 1el+# 1. =<S. 4he general rule is thatwhen a witness ta*es a stand it is presumed that he9s competent. 4he burden is upon the party objecting the competency to establish the ground of incompetency. Sec. !1 (ule 1?" (ules on <,idence pro,ides thatchildren whose mental maturity rendersthem incapable of percei,ing the facts respecting that which they were e1amined are dis6ualified to be witnesses. +owe,er no precise minimum age is fi1ed. 4he test of competency is intelligence not age. As long as the child can percei,e and ma*e *nown his perception to other and that he9s capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is e1amined then he is competent to testify. A child9s capacity to recei,e correct impressions during the incident to comprehend obligation of an oath and relate to those facts truthfully to the court at the time he9s offered as a witness should be considered. A child should understand the punishment which may result from false swearing.

.n the case at bar Pruna failed to discharge the burden of pro,ing 7i-ette9s mental immaturity. 4he (4% held that 7i-ette had the capacity of obser,ation recollection and communication and that she could discern the conse6uence of telling a lie. 4hat two years had lapsed since the time of the incident is immaterial considering that it is a most natural reaction for ,ictims of criminal ,iolence to ha,e a lasting impression of how the crime was committed and the identity of the aggressor. !. 4he best e,idence to pro,e the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of li,e birth of such party. .n the absence of a certificate of li,e birth similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the ,ictim would suffice to pro,e age. .f the certificate of li,e birth or authentic document is shown to ha,e been lost or destroyed or otherwise una,ailable the testimony if clear and credible of the ,ictim9s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is 6ualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the e1act age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section J" (ule 1?" of the (ules on <,idence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances# a. .f the ,ictim is alleged to be below ? years of age and what is sought to be pro,ed is that she is less than D years oldK b. .f the ,ictim is alleged to be below D years of age and what is sought to be pro,ed is that she is less than 1! years oldK c. .f the ,ictim is alleged to be below 1! years of age and what is sought

to be pro,ed is that she is less than 1B years old. .n the absence of a certificate of li,e birth authentic document or the testimony of the ,ictim9s mother or relati,es concerning the ,ictim9s age the complainant9s testimony will suffice pro,ided that it is e1pressly and clearly admitted by the accused.DB .t is the prosecution that has the burden of pro,ing the age of the offended party. 4he failure of the accused to object to the testimonial e,idence regarding age shall not be ta*en against him.

re6uisites# &1' the matter must be one of common and general *nowledgeK &!' it must be well and authoritati,ely settled and not doubtful or uncertainK and &?' it must be *nown to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 4he pro,incial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially *nown is that of notoriety. +ence it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts e,idenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 4o say that a court will ta*e judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of e,idence will be dispensed with if *nowledge of the fact can be otherwise ac6uired. 4his is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 3ut judicial notice is not judicial *nowledge. 4he mere personal *nowledge of the judge is not the judicial *nowledge of the court and he is not authori-ed to ma*e his indi,idual *nowledge of a fact not generally or professionally *nown the basis of his action. /udicial cogni-ance is ta*en only of those matters which are LcommonlyL *nown. 4hings of Lcommon *nowledge L of which courts ta*e judicial notice may be matters coming to the *nowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary e1periences of life or they may be matters which are generally accepted by man*ind as true and are capable of ready and un6uestioned demonstration. 4hus facts which are uni,ersally *nown and which may be found in encyclopedias dictionaries or other publications are judicially noticed pro,ided they are of such uni,ersal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common *nowledge of e,ery person.

STATE PROSECUTOR 7S. MURO "ACTS# State prosecutors )ariano $ee and 4acAan filed a complaint against /udge )uro with ignorance of the law gra,e misconduct and ,iolation of (ule !."1 ?."1 and ?."! of the %ode of /udicial %onduct after )uro issued an order dismissing 11 cases against .melda )arcos for ,iolation of %entral 3an* 0oreign <1change (estrictions in relation to the penal pro,isions of Sec. ?J of (A !:5. /udge )uro issued said order on the basis of newspaper reports concerning the announcement of the President of lifting all foreign e1change restrictions and that such announcement depri,ed him of jurisdiction which warrants the dismissal of the 11 cases. Prosecutors contend that /udge )uro ta*ing judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public *nowledge a mere newspaper account as basis for his order is highly irregular erroneous and misplaced. ISSUE# ;O8 /udge )uro was correct in ta*ing judicial notice on the ground of public *nowledge 1ELD# 8O. 2enerally spea*ing matters of judicial notice ha,e three material

(espondent judge in the guise of e1ercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes e,en referred to as hearsay e,idence twice remo,ed too* judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign e1change controls a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common *nowledge or of general notoriety. ;orse he too* cogni-ance of an administrati,e regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. /urisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be ta*en of a statute before it becomes effecti,e. 4he reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence still ine1istent cannot be of common *nowledge capable of ready and un6uestionable demonstration which is one of the re6uirements before a court can ta*e judicial notice of a fact. <,idently it was impossible for respondent judge and it was definitely not proper for him to ha,e ta*en cogni-ance of %3 %ircular 8o. 1?5? when the same was not yet in force at the time the impro,ident order of dismissal was issued.

>pon their arri,al in the Philippines the spouses Ado proceeded to 73%9s %ustomer Ser,ice $epartment to ta*e deli,ery of the bo1es from 0uragganan. )yrna )endo-a an employee of 73% suggested that <uberto a,ail of the custom duty e1emptions for his pac*ages and entrust his passport to her for submission to the %ustoms Office. +e was concerned that his passport might get lost. +owe,er after being assured that his passport together with his bo1es would be forwarded to him he ac6uiesced. +e turned o,er his passport to 73% for which he was issued a receipt.MDN <uberto9s bo1es were deli,ered to him via the 73%AOrmoc %ity 3ranch on different dates. +e in6uired about his passport but the Ormoc %ity 73% )anager told him that his passport was not in their office. +e ad,ised <uberto to wait for a few days as it might arri,e on a later date. <uberto made se,eral followAups to no a,ail.M11N 4he passport of <uberto could not be located. <uberto was not able to return to 3ahrain and report bac* for wor*. On September !! 1HHD <uberto filed a %omplaintM1JN for damages against 73% <1press .nc. and 73% .nternational .nc. with the (4% of 8a,al 3iliran. 4he complaint alleged that because of the loss of <uberto9s passport through the gross negligence of the defendants he failed to report bac* for wor* in 3ahrain. 4he spouses Ado prayed that damages for <uberto9s unearned income be awarded to them. 4o pro,e their claim for actual damages spouses Ado offered in e,idence a certification from <uberto9s employer which reads# 4O ;+O) .4 )A= %O8%<(8# 4his is to certify that )r. <uberto Ado holder of Passport 8umber 7 ":DBH! was wor*ing as a )echanic at our )arine ;or*shop. +e left 3ahrain on "B."B.1HH5 to )anila on holiday for the period of three

L9C vs. S,/uses A+/ G.R. N/. 161460 "ACTS# <uberto Ado was an o,erseas contract wor*er employed as a mechanic in the )arine ;or*shop of Al )eroouge 2roup in 3ahrain.M!N +e was the holder of Passport 8o. 7":DBH!.AlA)ulla %argo O Pac*ing &A)%P' of )anama 3ahrain was an agent of 73% .nternational .nc. and 73% <1press .nc. ;hen his twoAyear contract of employment e1pired <uberto together with his wife Sisinia decided to ta*e a threeA month ,acation to the Philippines. 4hey secured a reAentry ,isa to 3ahrain. 3efore flying to the Philippines on August B 1HH5 <uberto transported fi,e &5' bo1es MJN with himself as the consignee of the pac*ages

months. +e was getting the basic salary of 3$ !B".""" &4wo hundred O <ighty' only monthly. +e was holding the return ,isa for coming bac* to after ha,ing his lea,e. )r. <uberto Ado could not return bac* to 3ahrain MasN his passport was misplaceMdN in )anila. =our9s &sic' Sincerely Praful @. 3irje &)anager'M1BN Issue# ;hether or not the e,idence presented is in ,iolation of the 3est <,idence (ule 1el+# 4he %ourt agrees with the petitioners9 contention that the respondents failed to adduce preponderant e,idence to pro,e that upon his return to 3ahrain he would be automatically employed by his former employer for a period of two years and that he will be gi,en the same job with the same compensation as pro,ided for in his e1pired employment contract..t is wellAsettled in our jurisdiction that actual or compensatory damages is not presumed but must be duly pro,ed with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation conjecture or guesswor* as to the fact and amount of damages but must depend upon competent proof that they ha,e suffered and on e,idence of the actual amount thereof. M!HN .ndeed the party alleging a fact has the burden of pro,ing it and a mere allegation is not e,idence.M?"N .n this case the only e,idence adduced by the respondents to pro,e that <uberto had been granted a twoAyear reAentry ,isa and that upon his return to 3ahrain he would be automatically gi,en a twoAyear employment contract is <uberto9s own testimony and his employer9s certification. 4hus <uberto9s twoAyear contract of employment had already e1pired before lea,ing 3ahrain for his threeAmonth ,acation in the Philippines. ;hether or not respondent <uberto9s employer would

automatically employ him upon his return to 3ahrain after his sojourn in the Philippines would depend entirely upon his employer. 4he respondents failed to adduce any e,idence that <uberto9s employer would gi,e him his former position under the same terms and conditions stipulated in his pre,ious employment contract. <uberto e,en failed to pro,e by preponderant e,idence other than his selfAser,ing testimony that the reAentry ,isa issued to him was at his employer9s behest with an assurance that upon his return to 3ahrain he would automatically be reAemployed. 4he respondents could ,ery well ha,e secured an underta*ing or an authenticated certification from <uberto9s employer that upon his return to 3ahrain he would be automatically employed for a period of two years under the same terms and conditions of the first contract. ;hile they adduced in e,idence a certification from <uberto9s employer that he had been issued a reAentry ,isa there was no underta*ing to automatically reAemploy respondent <uberto for another two years upon his return to 3ahrain for a monthly salary of !B" 3ahrain $inars. 4he %A thus erred in affirming the award of actual or compensatory damages ofPJB" """."" to the respondent spouses.

C/'s/l-+ate+ 9a': a'+ T$ust C/$,/$at-/' vs Del M/'te M/t/$ ;/$:s I'0. <GR. 13333!= "ACTS# Petitioner %onsolidated 3an* filed a complaint for reco,ery of sum of money against respondents $el )onte )otor ;or*s &$el )onte' and 8arciso )orales and spouse in order to bind the conjugal partnership of the latter. Petitioner %onsolidated 3an* domestic ban*ing and trust corporation e1tended a loan &P1)' e,idenced by a promissory note e1ecuted by respondents. (espondents defaulted on their payments which already became due and demandable. Oral and written demands were made but to no a,ail. (espondent corporation filed its manifestation specifically denying the allegations together

with its affirmati,e defenses. 7i*ewise respondent )orales filed his manifestation specifically denying liability on the promissory note claiming that the system of separation of property go,erns and not the conjugal partnership of gains and ma*ing special and affirmati,e defenses. $uring the formal offer of e,idence the original copy of the promissory note &<1hibit A' could no longer be found. 4hus petitioner sought the admission of the duplicate original copy of the same as e,idence <1hibit <. 4he court initially admitted the e,idence. 7ater both respondents claimed that <1hibit < was immaterial irrele,ant not properly identified and hearsay e,idence and some mar*ings found in the original promissory note were not contained in <1hibit <. $espite such arguments they still failed to insist that the due e1ecution and genuineness of the promissory note were not established. 4he (4% dismissed the complaint of petitioner without gi,ing the latter opportunity to pro,e that the original promissory note was deli,ered to respondent corporation. %A affirmed (4% decision. ISSUE# ;P8 the 3est <,idence (ule is applicable. 1ELD# 8o. 3oth the court a 6uo and %A erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegation in petitioner9s complaint in the manner specifically re6uired by the rules. .n effect respondents admitted the genuineness and due e1ecution of the subject promissory note and recogni-ed their obligation to petitioner. 4he respondents ne,er disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note. 4hus as far as the parties are concerned the wording or content of said note is clear and lea,es no room for disagreement. .n the respondents9 pleadings the defenses were the alleged lac* of consideration and that respondent )orales did not sign the note in his personal capacity.

.n addition the 3est <,idence (ule admits of e1ception one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession of the ad,erse party. .n the case at bar the petitioner would ha,e established that the original of the promissory note was in the possession of respondents. 4hus the e1ception of the 3est <,idence (ule is applicable in this case. As stated earlier respondents failed to deny specifically the e1ecution of the promissory note. 4hus their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and e1ecution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. ;hen the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due e1ecution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint the plaintiff need not pro,e that fact as it is considered the original of said note. 4herefore %A decision re,ersed and set aside. (espondents are obligated to petitioner in the amount of P1) and !?E interest per annum.

NATIONAL PO;ER CORPORATION vs 1ON. RAMON G. CODILLA 8R. G.R. N/. 1403>1 A,$-l 3 2004 "ACTS# )P@ $ibena ;in a ,essel of foreign registry owned and operated by pri,ate respondent 3angpai Shipping %o. allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner9s Power 3arge !"H which was then moored at the %ebu .nternational Port. 4hus on !: April 1HH: petitioner filed before the %ebu (4% a complaint for damages against pri,ate respondent 3angpai Shipping %o. for the alleged damages caused on petitioner9s power barges. 4hereafter petitioner filed an Amended %omplaint impleading herein pri,ate respondent ;allem Shipping .nc. as additional defendant contending that the latter is a ship agent of 3angpai Shipping

%o. Petitioner after adducing e,idence during the trial of the case filed a formal offer of e,idence before the lower court consisting of <1hibits LAL to L@L together with the subAmar*ed portions thereof. %onse6uently pri,ate respondents 3angpai Shipping %o. and ;allem Shipping .nc. filed their respecti,e objections to petitioner9s formal offer of e,idence. Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and e1cluding from the records petitioner9s <1hibits. According to the court a quo# 4he %ourt finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to stri*e out filed respecti,ely by the defendants. 4he record shows that the plaintiff has been gi,en e,ery opportunity to present the originals of the Fero1 or photocopies of the documents it offered. .t ne,er produced the originals. 4he %A affirmed the lower court9s ruling. Aggrie,ed by the afore6uoted decision petitioner filed the instant petition. 4he focal point of this entire contro,ersy is petitioner9s obstinate contention that the photocopies it offered as formal e,idence before the trial court are the functional e6ui,alent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the (ules on <lectronic <,idence. Petitioner insists that contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court the photocopies it presented as documentary e,idence actually constitute electronic e,idence based on its own premise that an Lelectronic documentL as defined under Section 1&h' (ule ! of the (ules on <lectronic <,idence is not limited to information that is recei,ed recorded retrie,ed or produced electronically. (ather petitioner maintains that an Lelectronic documentL can also refer to other modes of written e1pression that is produced electronically such as photocopies as included in the section9s catchAall pro,iso# Lany printAout or output readable by sight or other meansL.

ISSUE# ;hether or not the photo copies offered are functional e6ui,alent of their original following the (ules on <lectronic <,idenceI RULING# An Lelectronic documentL refers to information or the representation of information data figures symbols or other models of written e1pression described or howe,er represented by which a right is established or an obligation e1tinguished or by which a fact may be pro,ed and affirmed which is recei,ed recorded transmitted stored processed retrie,ed or produced electronically.5 .t includes digitally signed documents and any printout readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.: 4he rules use the word LinformationL to define an electronic document recei,ed recorded transmitted stored processed retrie,ed or produced electronically. 4his would suggest that an electronic document is rele,ant only in terms of the information contained therein similar to any other document which is presented in e,idence as proof of its contents.D +owe,er what differentiates an electronic document from a paperAbased document is the manner by which the information is processedK clearly the information contained in an electronic document is recei,ed recorded transmitted stored processed retrie,ed or produced electronically. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will re,eal that not all of the contents therein such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents may be recorded or produced electronically. 3y no stretch of the imagination can a person9s signature affi1ed manually be considered as information electronically recei,ed recorded transmitted stored processed retrie,ed or produced. +ence the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic

process then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the (ules on <lectronic <,idence is ob,iously an erroneous if not preposterous interpretation of the law. +a,ing thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents it is conse6uential that the same may not be considered as the functional e6ui,alent of their original as decreed in the law. 4he trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they ,iolate the best e,idence rule and are therefore of no probati,e ,alue being incompetent pieces of e,idence. 3efore the onset of liberal rules of disco,ery and modern techni6ue of electronic copying the best e,idence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. 3ut the modern justification for the rule has e1panded from the pre,ention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. 4he importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations the fallibility of the human memory as reliable e,idence of the terms and the ha-ards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best e,idence rule. Petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judge9s denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary e,idence and conse6uently the denial of its prayer to be gi,en another opportunity to present the originals of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary e,idence in case the same has been lost.

an .nformation charging petitioner @icente del (osario y 8icolas with ,iolation of P. $. 8o. 1B:: 4he police recei,ed a report that accusedA appellant @icente del (osario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report PPSr. .nsp. /erito Adi6ue of the P8P %riminal .n,estigation 2roup at %amp Oli,as Pampanga in6uired from the P8P 0irearms and <1plosi,e $i,ision whether or not the report was true. PPSr. .nsp. <dwin %. (o6ue of the P8P 0irearms and <1plosi,es $i,ision issued a certification &<1hibit 7' stating that per records in his office the appellant is not a licensedPregistered firearm holder of any *ind and caliber. Armed with the said certification PPSr. .nsp. Adi6ue applied for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of appellant. A search warrant was issued by /udge 2il 0ernande- Sr. of the (egional 4rial %ourt of Cue-on %ity 3ranch !1D authori-ing the search of the residence of appellant at 3arangay 4igbe 8or-agaray 3ulacan. A team led by PPSr. .nsp. Adi6ue went to 8or-agaray to ser,e the warrant. 3efore proceeding to the residence of the appellant the police officers re6uested 3arangay %hairman (ogelio de Sil,a and 3arangay %ouncilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. >pon arri,al at the house of appellant the police officers introduced themsel,es to the wife of appellant. ;hen the appellant came out PPSr. .nsp. Adi6ue informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authori-ed to search his house. After appellant ga,e his permission the police officers conducted a search of the house. 4he search yielded the following items# &a' a caliber .J5 pistol with Serial 8o.

7ICENTE DEL ROSARIO & NICOLAS "etitioner #s. PEOPLE O" T1E P1ILIPPINES res"on$ent. "ACTS# Assistant Pro,incial Prosecutor <ufracio S. )ar6ue- of 3ulacan filed with the (egional 4rial %ourt 3ulacan )alolos

D"?DH! with fi,e maga-ines of caliber .J5 found at the master9s bedroomK &b' fi,e maga-ines of 5.5: )A1: rifle and two radios found in the room of appellant9s daughterK and &c' a caliber .!! re,ol,er with Serial 8o. JB:D? containing B pieces of li,e ammunition found in the *itchen of the house. ;hen as*ed about his license to possess the firearms the appellant failed to produce any. 4his prompted the police officers to sei-e the subject firearms. SPO! )arion )onte-on one of the searching officers prepared three separate in,entories of the sei-ed items 4he in,entories were signed by PPSr. .nsp. Adi6ue the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. 4hereafter SPO! )onte-on prepared a certification of orderly search &<1hibit .' which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search. Appellant assails the manner in which the search was carried out claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without as*ing permission. 0urthermore he claimed that the barangay officials arri,ed only after the police already had finished the search. 4he trial court rendered a judgment of con,iction. Petitioner appealed to the %ourt of Appeals assailing the decision for being contrary to facts and the law. 4he %ourt of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed with the %ourt of Appeals a motion for reconsideration andPor new trial. 4he %ourt of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lac* of merit. ISSUES#

"-$st# whether petitioner had a license for the .J5 caliber %olt pistol and ammunition sei-ed in his bedroomK and Se0/'+# whether the .!! caliber re,ol,er sei-ed in a drawer at the *itchen of his house a maga-ine for 5.5: mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two !Away radios found in his daughter9s bedroom were planted by the police or were illegally sei-ed. 1ELD# Se0/'+ -ssue. 4he sei-ure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal. ;ith respect to the .!! caliber re,ol,er with Serial 8o. JB:D? that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the *itchen of petitioner9s house suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioner9s house. Section ! Article ... of the %onstitution lays down the general rule that a search and sei-ure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant absent which such search and sei-ure becomes Qunreasonable9 within the meaning of said constitutional pro,ision. Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following re6uisites for a search warrant9s ,alidity the absence of e,en one will cause its downright nullification# &1' it must be issued upon probable causeK &!' the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other personK &?' in the determination of probable cause the judge must e1amine under oath or affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produceK and &J' the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be sei-ed. Sei-ure is limited to those items particularly described in a ,alid search

warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall sei-e. <,idence sei-ed on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and sei-ure is tainted and e1cluded for being the pro,erbial fruit of a poisonous tree. .n the language of the fundamental law it shall be inadmissible in e,idence for any purpose in any proceeding .n this case the firearm was not found inad,ertently and in plain ,iew. .t was found as a result of a meticulous search in the *itchen of petitioner9s house. 4his firearm to emphasi-e was not mentioned in the search warrant. +ence the sei-ure was illegal. 4he sei-ure without the re6uisite search warrant was in plain ,iolation of the law and the %onstitution. 4rue that as an e1ception the police may sei-e without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter inad,ertently found in plain ,iew. +owe,er MtNhe sei-ure of e,idence in Qplain ,iew9 applies only where the police officer is not searching for e,idence against the accused but inad,ertently comes across an incriminating object. Specifically sei-ure of e,idence in plain ,iew is justified when there is# &a' a prior ,alid intrusion based on the ,alid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official dutiesK &b' the e,idence was inad,ertently disco,ered by the police who had the right to be where they areK &c' the e,idence must be immediately apparent and &d' plain ,iew justified mere sei-ure of e,idence without further search

+ence the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. 4he prosecution was not able to pro,e that the firearm was in the effecti,e possession or control of the petitioner without a license. .n illegal possession of firearms the possessor must *now of the e1istence of the subject firearm in his possession or control. .n People ,. de 2racia we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of con,icting a person under P. $. 8o. 1B:: thus# 1 1 1 Q.n the present case a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. ;hile mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to con,ict a person for illegal possession of a firearm it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.9 1 1 1 1 +ence the *ind of possession punishable under P. $. 8o. 1B:: is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructi,ely with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. 4hat is the meaning of animus possidendi. .n the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability. 4he same is true with respect to the 5.5: cal. maga-ine found in the bedroom of petitioner9s daughter. 4he sei-ure was in,alid and the sei-ed items were inadmissible in e,idence. As e1plained in People ,. $oria the plain ,iew doctrine applies when the following re6uisites concur# &1' the law enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear ,iew of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusionK &!' said officer inad,ertently comes across &or sees in plain ,iew' a piece of incriminating e,idenceK and &?' it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be e,idence of a

crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to sei-ure. ;ith particular reference to the two !Away radios that the raiding policemen also sei-ed in the bedroom of petitioner9s daughter there was absolutely no reason for the sei-ure. 4he radios were not contraband per se. 4he 8ational 4elecommunications %ommission may license twoAway radios at its discretion. 4he burden is on the prosecution to show that the twoAway radios were not licensed. 4he 8ational 4elecommunication %ommission is the sole agency authori-ed to sei-e unlicensed twoAway radios. )ore importantly admittedly the twoAway radios were not mentioned in the search warrant. ;e condemn the sei-ure as illegal and a plain ,iolation of a citi-en9s right. ;orse the petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the twoAway radios. %onse6uently the confiscation of the two !A way radios was clearly illegal. 4he possession of such radios is not e,en included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms &,iolation of P. $. 8o. 1B:: as amended' alleged in the .nformation.

G.R. N/. 123>06 Ma$0( 24 1>>! PEOPLE O" T1E P1ILIPPINES ,la-'t-..? a,,ellee vs. RO;ENA 1ERMOSO 9ENEDICTUS a00use+?a,,ella't. DA7IDE 8R. 8.# "ACTS# 4he accusedAappellant was charged with thecrime of illegal recruitment under Article ?B in relation to Articles ?J and ?H of the 7abor %ode of the Philippines the abo,eA named accused a nonAlicensee or nonA holder of authority from the $epartment of

7abor and <mployment to recruit andPor place wor*ers under local or o,erseas employment did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously with false pretenses underta*e illegal recruitment acti,ities placement or deployment for a fee of 8apoleon dela %ru- <rnesto@as6ue<,angeline )agpayo %risanta @as6ue<,elyn de $ios and )ercy )agpayo for o,erseas employment to 4aiwan. >pon arraignment the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. At the trial on the merits the prosecution presented as witnesses the complaining ,ictims 8apoleon de la %ru%risanta @as6ue- <,elyn de $ios )ercy )agpayo and <,angeline )agpayo as well as 3arangay %aptain <merlito %alara. 4he defense had only the appellant as its witness. ;hen appellant failed to send complainants to 4aiwan on the promised date complainants together with appellant went to the 3arangay +all and in front of the 3arangay %aptain appellant signed a document &<1hs. L%L and L1L' and promised to return the money to them. %omplainants signed a )ag*a*asamang Salaysay &<1hs. L3L to L3A!L' and filed a complaint before the 0iscalGs office &4S8 August 11 1HHJ p. ?'. .n support of their complaint they submitted a certification from the PO<A dated /uly !1 1HHJ &<1h. LAL' to the effect that appellant in her personal capacity was neither licensed nor authori-ed to recruit wor*ers for o,erseas employment. >pon the other hand the appellant denied ha,ing recruited the complainants. She claimed that she had only borrowed money from them. .n support of her claim she presented the LAffida,it of $esistanceL e1ecuted by the complainants when she and her sister had paid them her Ldebt.L 4he trial court ga,e full credit to the ,ersion of the prosecution and found unmeritorious appellantGs defense. .t noted that in appellantGs statement before 3arangay %aptain. 4here was nothing in said statement that showed that such money was a debt. As to the Affida,it of $esistance the trial court rejected the same for it was signed by the complainants after all of them testified in court and were paid by the appellant. 4he trial court

li*ewise obser,ed that the appellant had failed to refute the statement in the certification issued by the PO<A that she was not licensed to recruit wor*ers for o,erseas employment and that she had e,en admitted in open court that she was not licensed to do so. ISSUE# ;hether or not the petitioner9s shall be held liable for illegal recruitment in a large scale e,en despite the failure of the prosecution to pro,e her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING# =es. 4he Affida,it of $esistance did not e1pressly repudiate their testimony in court on the recruitment acti,ities of the appellant. .n fact the appellant admitted that the complaining witnesses e1ecuted it after she had paid them bac* the amounts they had gi,en her. 4he affida,it was more of an afterthought arising from personal consideration of pity. ;e ha,e said before that courts should not attach persuasi,e ,alue to affida,its of desistance especially when e1ecuted as an afterthought. )oreo,er it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly ta*en before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had gi,en them later on changed their mind for one reason or another for such rule would ma*e solemn trial a moc*ery and place the in,estigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 4he challenge against the PO<A certification &<1h. LAL' that the appellant was neither licensed nor authori-ed to recruit wor*ers for o,erseas employment must li*ewise fail. 4he trial court correctly ruled that the said certification is a public document issued by a public officer in the performance of an official dutyK hence it is a prima facie e,idence of the facts therein stated pursuant to Section !? of (ule 1?! of the (ules of %ourt. .n any e,ent as said court noted the appellant admitted in open court that she was not licensed or authori-ed to recruit wor*ers.

RA"AEL S. ORTA@ES ,et-t-/'e$ vs. T1E COURT O" APPEALS OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES $es,/'+e'ts. G.R. N/. 104342 8a'ua$& 23 1>>4 "RANCISCO J. "ACTS# Pri,ate respondents sold to petitioner two &!' parcels of registered land in Cue-on %ity for a consideration of P?5 """."" and P!" """."" respecti,ely. Pri,ate respondents recei,ed the payments for the abo,eAmentioned lots but failed to deli,er the titles to petitioner. On April H 1HH" the latter demanded from the former the deli,ery of said titles. Pri,ate respondents howe,er refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person and petitionerGs ac6uisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Offshoot petitioner sued pri,ate respondents for specific performance before the (4%. .n their answer with counterclaim pri,ate respondents merely alleged the e1istence of the following oral conditions which were ne,er reflected in the deeds of sale# ?.?.! 4itle to the other property &4%4 8o. !J?!D?' remains with the defendants &pri,ate respondents' until plaintiff &petitioner' shows proof that all the following re6uirements ha,e been met# &i' Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to ?HB s6. m.K &ii' Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the appro,ed plan for the segregationK &iii' Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendantsG lot to segregate his right of wayK

&i,' Plaintiff will pay the capital gains ta1 and all other e1penses that may be incurred by reason of sale. . . $uring trial pri,ate respondent Oscar .nocentes a former judge orally testified that the sale was subject to the abo,e conditions although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. $espite petitionerGs timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol e,idence rule the lower court nonetheless admitted them and e,entually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal the %ourt of Appeals &%A' affirmed the court a quo. +ence this petition. ISSUE# ;O8 the oral conditions were barred by the parol e,idence rule 1ELD# =es. 4he parol e,idence herein introduced is inadmissible. 0irst pri,ate respondentsG oral testimony on the alleged conditions coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case depending e1clusi,ely on human memory is not as reliable as written or documentary e,idence. Spo*en words could be notoriously unreliable unli*e a written contract which spea*s of a uniform language. 4hus under the general rule in Section H of (ule 1?" of the (ules of %ourt when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing as in this case it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no e,idence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. %onsidering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth whate,er is not found in said instruments must ha,e been wai,ed and abandoned by the parties. <1amining the deeds of sale we cannot e,en ma*e an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract it is the law between the parties. Secondly to buttress their argument pri,ate respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co.vs. Garcia Plantation where the %ourt ruled that a condition precedent to a

contract may be established by parol e,idence. +owe,er the material facts of that case are different from this case. .n the former the contract sought to be enforced 15 e1pressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditionsA precedent which were pro,en through parol e,idence. ;hereas the deeds of sale in this case made no reference to any preA conditions or other agreement. .n fact the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms. 4hird the parol e,idence herein sought to be introduced would ,ary contradict or defeat the operation of a ,alid instrument hence contrary to the rule that# 4he parol e,idence rule forbids any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that at or before the signing of the document other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. 1D Although parol e,idence is admissible to e1plain the meaning of a contract Lit cannot ser,e the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mista*e. 8o such fraud or mista*e e1ists in this case. 0ourth we disagree with pri,ate respondentsG argument that their parol e,idence is admissible under the e1ceptions pro,ided by the (ules specifically the alleged failure of the agreement to e1press the true intent of the parties. Such e1ception obtains only in the following instance# M;Nhere the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. .n such a case e1trinsic e,idence of the subject matter of the contract of the relations of the parties to each other and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be recei,ed to enable the court to ma*e a proper interpretation of the instrument. .n this case the deeds of sale are clear without any ambiguity mista*e or

imperfection much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof. 0ifth we are not persuaded by pri,ate respondentsG contention that they Lput in issue by the pleadingsL the failure of the written agreement to e1press the true intent of the parties. (ecord shows that pri,ate respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer &petitioner' and the seller &pri,ate respondents'. Such issue must be Ls6uarely presented.L Pri,ate respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four &J' conditions which they tried to pro,e during trial by parol e,idence. Ob,iously this cannot be done because they did not plead any of the e1ceptions mentioned in the parol e,idence rule. 4heir case is co,ered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement. %onsidering that pri,ate respondent Oscar .nocentes is a lawyer &and former judge' he was Lsupposed to be steeped in legal *nowledge and practicesL and was Le1pected to *now the conse6uencesL of his signing a deed of absolute sale. +ad he gi,en an iotaGs attention to scrutini-e the deeds he would ha,e incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional.

ban*ing acti,ities and perform functions in the Philippines.

trust

Petitioner I'vest/$Bs "-'a'0e C/$,/$at-/' which did business under the name and style of 08%3 0inance was an affiliate company of petitioner %itiban* specifically handling money mar*et placements for its clients. .t is now by ,irtue of a merger doing business as part of its successorAinA interest 3P. %ard 0inance %orporation. On B August 1HB5 respondent filed a %omplaint against petitioners before the (egional 4rial %ourt &(4%' of )a*ati %ity. (espondent claimed to ha,e substantial deposits and money mar*et placements with the petitioners as well as money mar*et placements with the Ayala .n,estment and $e,elopment %orporation &A.$%' the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondentGs accounts with petitioner %itiban*. (espondent alleged that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money mar*et placements despite her repeated demands thus compelling respondent to file %i,il %ase against petitioners for LAccounting Sum of )oney and $amages.L (espondent e,entually filed an Amended %omplaint on H October 1HB5 to include additional claims to deposits and money mar*et placements inad,ertently left out from her original %omplaint. .n their joint Answer and Answer to Amended %omplaint filed on 1! September 1HB5 and : 8o,ember 1HB5 respecti,ely petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits and money mar*et placements with them including dollar accounts in the %itiban* branch in 2ene,a Swit-erland &%itiban*A2ene,a'. Petitioners further alleged that the respondent later obtained se,eral loans from petitioner %itiban* for which she e1ecuted Promissory 8otes &P8s' and secured by &a' a $eclaration of Pledge of

CITI9ANA N.A. <"/$)e$l& "-$st Nat-/'al C-t& 9a':= a'+ IN7ESTORSB "INANCE CORPORATION +/-'g *us-'ess u'+e$ t(e 'a)e a'+ st&le /. "NC9 "-'a'0e ,et-t-/'e$s vs. MODESTA R. SA9ENIANO $es,/'+e't. G.R. N/. 1C6132 O0t/*e$ 12 2006

"ACTS# Petitioner C-t-*a': N.A. &formerly *nown as the 0irst 8ational %ity 3an*' is a ban*ing corporation duly authori-ed and e1isting under the laws of the >nited States of America and licensed to do commercial

her dollar accounts in %itiban*A2ene,a and &b' $eeds of Assignment of her money mar*et placements with petitioner 08%3 0inance. ;hen respondent failed to pay her loans despite repeated demands by petitioner %itiban* the latter e1ercised its right to offAset or compensate respondentGs outstanding loans with her deposits and money mar*et placements pursuant to the $eclaration of Pledge and the $eeds of Assignment e1ecuted by respondent in its fa,or. Petitioner %itiban* supposedly informed respondent Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation through letters dated !B September 1HDH and ?1 October 1HDH. Petitioners were therefore surprised when si1 years later in 1HB5 respondent and her counsel made repeated re6uests for the withdrawal of respondentGs deposits and money mar*et placements with petitioner %itiban* including her dollar accounts with %itiban*A2ene,a and her money mar*et placements with petitioner 08%3 0inance. 4hus petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the %omplaint and for the award of actual moral and e1emplary damages and attorneyGs fees. (espondent denied that it was her signature on the $eclaration of Pledge. She claimed that the signature was a forgery. (espondent made se,eral attempts to ha,e the original copy of the pledge produced before the (4% so as to ha,e it e1amined by e1perts. =et despite se,eral Orders by the (4% petitioner %itiban* failed to comply with the production of the original $eclaration of Pledge. .t is admitted that %itiban*A2ene,a had possession of the original copy of the pledge. ;hen the parties failed to reach a compromise during the preAtrial hearing trial proper ensued and the parties proceeded with the presentation of their respecti,e e,idence. 4en years after the filing of the %omplaint on B August 1HB5 a $ecision was finally rendered on !J August 1HH5 by the fourth /udge who handled the said case /udge )anuel $. @ictorio holding Petitioner9s off set as illegal null

and ,oid and was ordered to return the amounts to respondentK while respondent was also ordered to pay its loans with petitioner. ISSUE# ;O8 it was correct for the court to admit as e,idence photocopies and microfilm copies of the P8s )%s and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the e1istence of respondentGs loans. 1ELD# 3est e,idence rule 4his %ourt disagrees in the pronouncement made by the %ourt of Appeals summarily dismissing the documentary e,idence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the best e,idence rule. .n general the best e,idence rule re6uires that the highest a,ailable degree of proof must be produced. Accordingly for documentary e,idence the contents of a document are best pro,ed by the production of the document itself to the e1clusion of any secondary or substitutionary e,idence. 4he best e,idence rule has been made part of the re,ised (ules of %ourt (ule 1?" Section ? which reads R S<%. ?. Original document must be produced; exceptions. R ;hen the subject of in6uiry is the contents of a document no e,idence shall be admissible other than the original document itself e1cept in the following cases# &a' ;hen the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offerorK &b' ;hen the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the e,idence is offered and

the latter fails to produce it after reasonable noticeK &c' ;hen the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be e1amined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the wholeK and &d' ;hen the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. As the aforeA6uoted pro,ision states the best e,idence rule applies only when the subject of the in6uiry is the contents of the document. 4he scope of the rule is more e1tensi,ely e1plained thus R 3ut e,en with respect to documentary e,idence the best e,idence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the in6uiry. ;here the issue is only as to whether such document was actually e1ecuted or e1ists or on the circumstances rele,ant to or surrounding its e1ecution the best e,idence rule does not apply and testimonial e,idence is admissible & !oran, op. cit., pp. "#$##; % !artin, op. cit., p. "&'. Any other substitutionary e,idence is li*ewise admissible without need for accounting for the original. 4hus when a document is presented to pro,e its e1istence or condition it is offered not as documentary but as real e,idence. Parol e,idence of the fact of e1ecution of the documents is allowed &'ernae(, et al. vs.

!cGrat), etc., et al., *+ P)il # '. 1 11 115 4his %ourt did not ,iolate the best e,idence rule when it considered and weighed in e,idence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the P8s )%s and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the e1istence of respondentGs loans. 4he terms or contents of these documents were ne,er the point of contention in the Petition at bar. .t was respondentGs position that the P8s in the first set &with the e1ception of P8 8o. ?J5?J' ne,er e1isted while the P8s in the second set &again e1cluding P8 8o. ?J5?J' were merely e1ecuted to co,er simulated loan transactions. As for the )%s representing the proceeds of the loans the respondent either denied receipt of certain )%s or admitted receipt of the other )%s but for another purpose. (espondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representati,es to )r. 4an of petitioner %itiban* ac*nowledging the loans e1cept that she claimed that these letters were just meant to *eep up the ruse of the simulated loans. 4hus respondent 6uestioned the documents as to their e1istence or e1ecution or when the former is admitted as to the purpose for which the documents were e1ecuted matters which are undoubtedly e1ternal to the documents and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof. Alternati,ely e,en if it is granted that the best e,idence rule should apply to the e,idence presented by petitioners regarding the e1istence of respondentGs loans it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the following e1ceptions under (ule 1?" Section 5 of the re,ised (ules of %ourt R S<%. 5. ,)en t)e original document is unavailable. R ;hen the original document has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court the offeror upon proof of its e1ecution or e1istence and the cause of its una,ailability without

bad faith on his part may pro,e its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. 4he e1ecution or e1istence of the original copies of the documents was established through the testimonies of witnesses such as )r. 4an before whom most of the documents were personally e1ecuted by respondent. 4he original P8s also went through the whole loan boo*ing system of petitioner %itiban* R from the account officer in its )ar*eting $epartment to the preA processor to the signature ,erifier bac* to the preAprocessor then to the processor for boo*ing.11D 4he original P8s were seen by )s.$ondoyano the processor who recorded them in the 2eneral 7edger. )r.Pujeda personally saw the original )%s pro,ing respondentGs receipt of the proceeds of her loans from petitioner %itiban* when he helped Attys. %leofe and 0ernande- the ban*Gs legal counsels to reconstruct the records of respondentGs loans. 4he original )%s were presented to Atty. %leofe who used the same during the preliminary in,estigation of the case sometime in years 1HB:A1HBD. 4he original )%s were subse6uently turned o,er to the %ontrol and .n,estigation $i,ision of petitioner %itiban*.11B .t was only petitioner 08%3 0inance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the P8s when it mo,ed to a new office. %itiban* did not ma*e a similar contentionK instead it e1plained that the original copies of the P8s were returned to the borrower upon li6uidation of the loan either through payment or rollAo,er. Petitioner %itiban* proffered the e1cuse that they were still loo*ing for the documents in their storage or warehouse to e1plain the delay and difficulty in the retrie,al thereof but not their absence or loss. 4he original documents in this case such as the )%s and letters were destroyed and thus una,ailable for presentation before the (4% only on D October 1HBD when a fire bro*e out on the

Dth floor of the office building of petitioner %itiban*. 4here is no showing that the fire was intentionally set. 4he fire destroyed rele,ant documents not just of the present case but also of other cases since the Dth floor housed the %ontrol and .n,estigation $i,ision in charge of *eeping the necessary documents for cases in which petitioner %itiban* was in,ol,ed. 4he foregoing would ha,e been sufficient to allow the presentation of photocopies or microfilm copies of the P8s )%s and letters by the petitioners as secondary e,idence to establish the e1istence of respondentGs loans as an e1ception to the best e,idence rule.