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Richard L. W.

Clarke LITS2306 Notes 09A

QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA (c. 90 CE) Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria. Trans. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1920-1922. (See selections, Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed. Vincent Leitch, et al. New York: Norton, 2001. 157-171.) Book 1: Elementary Education (Prior to Rhetoric) 1.1 Elementary Education 1.2 Public vs. Private Education 1.3 Capacity and Treatment of Students 1.4 Grammar 1.5 Purity of Language and Vices of Diction 1.6 Origin and Usage of Words 1.7 Spelling 1.8 Reading, Authors to be Read 1.9 Composition 1.10 Studies Adjunct to Rhetoric 1.11 Lessons from the Theatre: Delivery, Gesture, Recitation, Gymnastics 1.12 Studying Multiple Subjects Simultaneously Book 2: the Nature and Rudiments of Rhetoric 2.1 Rhetoric vis-a-vis Grammar 2.2 Choice of Teacher; The Teacher - Pupil Relationship 2.3 Inferior Teachers 2.4 Progymnasmata (Elementary Rhetorical Exercises) 2.5 Rhetorical Analysis of Literary Authors 2.6 Declamation - Amount of Guidance for; Imitation 2.7 Declamation and Memorization 2.8 Customizing Methods to Pupil's Abilities 2.9 Students to Treat Teachers as Parents 2.10 Themes for Declamation to have Verisimilitude 2.11 Necessity of Rhetorical Instruction 2.12 Untrained Speakers - Pro and Con 2.13 Need for Adapting of Rules 2.14 "Rhetoric" and "Oratory" Considered 2.15 Definitions of Oratory 2.16 The Value of Oratory Attacked and Defended 2.17 The Art, Morality, and Truth of Oratory 2.18 Rhetoric as a Practical Art 2.19 Nature and Art 2.20 Is Rhetoric a Virtue? 2.21 The Subject of Rhetoric. Oratory vs. Philosophy; An Orator's Broad Knowledge. Book 3: Invention: Kinds of Oratory 3.1 Greek and Roman Writers on Rhetoric 3.2 Origin of Oratory 3.3 Divisions and Order of the Art of Rhetoric

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3.4 Views on the Number of Kinds of Oratory 3.5 Things vs. Words; Questions; Definitions of a Cause 3.6 Stasis Theory (the Status of a Case) 3.7 Panegyric 3.8 Deliberative Oratory 3.9 Forensic Oratory; Parts of a Forensic Speech 3.10 The Nature of the Cause 3.11 The Question, Mode of Defence, Point for Decision, Foundation of the Case, etc. Book 4: Arrangement: the Parts of Speech 4.1 Parts of a Speech: the Introduction (Exordium) 4.2 Parts of a Speech: the Statement of Facts (Narratio) 4.3 Digressions 4.4 Propositions Preparatory to Proof 4.5 Parts of a Speech: Partition (Partitio) Book 5: Arrangement and Proofs 5.1 Parts of a Speech: Artificial and Unartificial Proofs 5.2 Previous Decisions 5.3 Public Opinion 5.4 Evidence from Torture 5.5 Refutation of Documents 5.6 Taking Oaths: Pro and Con 5.7 Evidence: Documentary, Oral, Witnesses, Supernatural 5.8 Artificial Proofs 5.9 Signs, Circumstantial Evidence, Prognostics 5.10 Arguments 5.11 Examples and Instances 5.12 Arguments, cont'd 5.13 Parts of a Speech: Refutation and Proof 5.14 Enthymeme, Epicheireme, and Syllogism Book 6: Arrangement, Pathos, Judgement 6.1 Parts of a Speech: Conclusion (Peroration) 6.2 The Judge's Temperament; Pathos, Ethos 6.3 Wit and Humor

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6.4 Altercatio or Debate 6.5 Judgment and Sagacity Book 7: Arrangement, Laws, Reasoning 7.1 Arrangement 7.2 Conjecture 7.3 Definition 7.4 Quality 7.5 Points of Law 7.6 Letter of the Law / Intention 7.7 Contradictory Laws 7.8 Syllogism 7.9 Ambiguity 7.10 Status of a Case; Limits of Rules Book 8: Eloquence: Style, Words, Tropes 8.1 Style 8.2 Clarity (perspicuitas) 8.3 Ornament: Merits and Faults 8.4 Amplification and Diminution 8.5 The Value of General Reflections in Oratory Here, Quintilian states his intention to discuss tropes, or modes (301), as the most distinguished Roman rhetoricians call them (301), the rules for the use of which are discussed by both rhetoricians and teachers of literature (301). Quintilian states his intention to discuss them now in connexion with the ornaments of oratory (301), rather than when he dealt earlier with literary education (301). 8.6 Tropes Here, Quintilian begins by defining a trope as the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another (301). It is a subject that has given rise to interminable disputes among the teachers of literature, who have quarrelled no less violently with the philosophers than among themselves over the problem of the genera and species into which tropes may be divided, their number and their correct classification (301). Quintilian proposes to ignore such quibbles as in no wise concern the training of an orator (301) and instead to discuss those tropes which are most necessary and meet with most general acceptance (301). He contents himself with pointing out that some tropes are employed to help out our meaning and others to adorn our style (301) that some arise from words used properly and others from words used metaphorically (301), and that the changes involved concern not merely individual words, but also our thoughts and the structure of our sentences (301). He believes that those writers are mistaken who have held that tropes necessarily involved the substitution of word for word(301), notwithstanding the fact that the tropes employed to express our meaning involve ornament as well (303), although the converse is not the case, since there are some

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which are intended solely for the purpose of embellishment (303). Quintilian begins with the commonest and by far the most beautiful of tropes, namely, metaphor, the Greek term for our translatio (303). It is a natural turn of speech that is often employed unconsciously or by uneducated persons (303). It is, however, also so attractive and elegant that however distinguished the language in which it is embedded it shines forth with a light that is all its own (303). When correctly and appropriately applied, it is quite impossible for its effect to be commonplace, mean or unpleasing (303). It adds to the copiousness of language by the interchange of words and by borrowing (303): a noun or a verb is transferred from the place to which it belongs to another where there is either no literal term or the transferred is better than the literal (303). We use metaphors either because it is necessary or to make our meaning clearer or . . . to produce a decorative effect (303). When it accomplishes none of these outcomes, it is merely out of place (303). Quintilian then proceeds to give examples of A) a necessary metaphor (303): when they call a vinebud gemma, a gem (what other terms is there which they could use?), or speak of the crops being thirsty or the fruit suffering (303), or when we speak of a hard or rough man, there being no literal term for these temperaments (303); B) metaphors used to make meaning clearer: when we say that a man is kindled to anger or on fire with greed or that he has fallen into error, we do so to enhance our meaning (303305). None of these things can be more literally described in its own words than in those which we import from elsewhere (305); and C) purely ornamental metaphor[s] (305) such as brilliance of style, splendour of birth, tempestuous public assemblies, thunderbolts of eloquence (305), etc. Quintilian contends that [o]n the whole metaphor is a shorter form of simile (305). Moreover, in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish to describe, whereas in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing. It is a comparison when I say of him, He is a lion, it is a metaphor when I say of him, He is a lion (305). Quintilian identifies four classes (305) (each of which would a genus [307]) of metaphor: A) when we substitute one living thing for another (305) as when Livy says that Scipio was continually barked at by Cato (305); B) when inanimate things (305) are substituted for inanimate (305) (e.g. Virgil writes gave his fleet the rein [305]), or inanimate may be substituted for animate (307) (e.g Did the Argive bulwark fall by sword or fate? [307]), or animate for inanimate (307) (e.g. The shepherd sits unknowing on the height / listening the roar from some far mountain brow [307]). Above all, Quintilian stresses, effects of extraordinary sublimity are produced when the theme is exalted by a bold and almost hazardous metaphor and inanimate objects are given life and action, as in the phrase Araxes flood that scorns a bridge (307). Sometimes the effect is doubled, as in Virgils And with venom arm the steel. For both to arm the steel and to arm with venom are metaphors (307). These four kinds of metaphor are further subdivided into a number of species, such as transference from rational beings to rational and from irrational to irrational and the reverse, in which the method is the same (307), and, finally, from the whole to its parts and from the parts to the whole (307). While the temperate and timely use of metaphor (307) constitutes a real adornment to style (309), frequent use serves merely to obscure our language and weary our audience (309). Moreover, if we introduce them in one continuous series, our language will become allegorical and enigmatic (309). Also, certain metaphors fail from meanness (309) (e.g. There is a rocky wart upon the mountains brow [309]), or they may even be coarse (309) (e.g. You have lanced the boils of the state [309]). It is vital also to avoid grossness in metaphor (309) (e.g. Glaucia, the excrement fo the senate-

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house [309]). Similarly, a metaphor must not be too great for its subject, or, as is more frequently the case, too little, and that it must not be inappropriate (309). Likewise, excess in the use of metaphor is also a fault, more especially if they are of the same species (309). Some metaphors may be harsh (309) or far-fetched (309), such as the snows of the head (309). However, the worst errors . . . originate in (311) the use even in prose [of] any metaphors . . . allowed to poets (311) and in spite of the fact that the latter aim solely at pleasing their readers and compelled in many cases to employ metaphor by sheer metrical necessity (311). Moreover, citing the authority of previous usage (e.g. the fact that it was Homer who used phrases like the shepherd of the people [311] or Virgil who said that winged creatures swim through the air [311] to describe the flight of bees [311]) is not enough to make them admissible in pleading (311) in court. This is because metaphor should always either occupy a place already vacant, or if it fills the room of something else, should be more impressive than that which it displaces (311). The foregoing, Quintilian argues, applies with even greater force to synecdoche (311). Where metaphor is designed to move the feelings, give special distinction to things and place them vividly before the eye (311), synecdoche has the power to give variety to our language by making us realise many things from one, the whole from a part, the genus from a species, things which follow from things which have preceded (311). Some examples of synecdoche are appropriate and others not, for while in prose it is perfectly correct to use mucro, the point, for the whole sword, and tectum, roof, for a whole house, we may not employ puppis, stern, to describe a ship, nor abies, fir, to describe planks (311). Similarly, while ferrum, the steel may be used to indicate a sword, quadrupes cannot be used in the sense of horse (311-313). Synecdoche is most freely employed in prose (313) where numbers are concerned (313) (e.g. Livys The Roman won the day [313] when he means that the Romans were victorious [313]). This trope is not only a rhetorical ornament, but is frequently employed in everyday speech (313). Also, some use synecdoche when something is assumed which has not actually been expressed, since one word is then discovered from other words (313), or when one thing may be suggested by another, as in the line Behold, the steers / Bring back the plough suspended from the yoke, from which we infer the approach of night (313). Quintilian then turns his attention to metonymy, which consists in the substitution of one name for another (313) (also called hypallage by the rhetoricians [313]). These devices are employed to indicate an invention by substituting the name of the inventor, or a possession by substituting the name of the possessor (313-315) (e.g. Horaces Neptune admitted to the land / Protects the fleets from blasts of Aquilo [315]). Quintilian believes that it is important to enquire to what extent tropes of this kind should be employed by the orator. For though we often hear Vulcan used for fire and to say vario Marte pugnatum est for they fought with varying success is elegant and idiomatic, while Venus is a more decent expression than coitus, it would be too bold for the severe style demanded in the courts to speak of Liber and Ceres when we mean bread and wine. (315) It is similarly permissible to substitute that which contains for that which is contained (315) (e.g. Civilised cities [315]), the converse procedure would rarely be ventured on by any save a poet (315). It is more permissible to describe what is possessed by reference to its possessor, as, for example, to say of a man whose estate is being squandered, the man is being eaten up (315), or when we speak of Virgil when we mean Virgils poems (315). Metonymy sometimes indicates cause by effect (317) (e.g.

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in poetry, Virgils There pale diseases dwell and sad old age [317] or when the orator speaks of headlong anger, cheerful youth or slothful ease [317]). Quintilian suddenly returns to a type of trope (317) which has some kinship with synecdoche (317): the use of the plural for the singular (317) as when I speak of a mans looks instead of his look (317) or when I call a gilded roof a golden roof, because gilding forms only part of the roof (317). The aim in so doing is not to enable one thing to be inferred from many (for the sense is clear enough) (317) but merely to vary the form of the word (317). Other tropes defined here include: C Antonomasia, which substitutes something else for a proper name . . . by the substitution of an epithet as equivalent to the name which it replaces (317), or by indicating the most striking characteristics of an individual (317), or from acts clearly indicating the individual (319); C Onomatopoeia, that is to say, the creation of a word . . . adapted . . . to suit the sensation . . . expressed (319), such as mugitus, lowing, sibilus, a hiss, and murmur (319). C Catachresis (of which abuse is a correct translation) (321), that is, the practice of adapting the nearest available term to describe something for which no actual term exists (321) (e.g. Flasks are called acetabula [i.e. vinegar flasks] no matter what they contain [321]; C Metalepsis or transumption, which provides a transition from one trope to another (323). It is in the nature of metalepsus to form a kind of intermediate step between the term transferred and the thing itself to which it is transferred, having no meaning in itself, but merely providing a transition (323). The remaining tropes are employed solely to adorn and enhance our style without any reference to the meaning (323). Hence, C the epithet, of which the correct translation is appositum (323); C allegory, which is translated in Latin by inversio (327) which either presents one thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to the meaning of the words (327), the first is generally conveyed by a series of metaphors (327), while the latter involves an element of irony, or, as our rhetoricians call it, illusio (333); C Periphrasis, that is, a circuitous mode of speech (335) by which we use a number of words to describe something for which one, or at any rate only a few words of description would suffice (335) and often of special service when it conceals something which would be indecent (335) (e.g. Sallusts To meet the demands of nature [335]); C Hyperbaton (335), the rearrangement of normal syntactical order, which is often demanded by the structure of the sentence and the claims of elegance, and is consequently counted among the ornaments of style (335). For our language would often be harsh, rough, limp or disjointed, if the words were always arranged in their natural order and attached each to each just as they occur, despite the fact that there is no real bond of union. Consequently some words require to be postponed, others to be anticipated, each being set in its appropriate place. For we are like those who build a wall of unhewn stone: we cannot hew or polish our words in order to make them fit more compactly, and so we must take them as they are and choose suitable positions for them. Further it is impossible to make our prose rhythmical except

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by artistic alterations in the order of words. (337) Hyperbole (339) which means an elegant straining of the truth (339) which may be employed differently for exaggeration or attenuation (339). Book 9: Eloquence: Figures of Thought and Speech

9.1 Figures of Thought and Speech Having spoken of tropes in Book 8, Quintilian now turns his attention to figures (349), a topic closely connected with the preceding (349) to the point where the resemblance between the two is so close that it is not easy to distinguish between them (349). Many thinkers have conflated the two because tropes are thought to derive their name from having a certain form or from the fact they affect alterations in language (a view which has led to their being styled motions) (349), it must be admitted that both these features are found in figures as well (349). The employment (349) of figures is the same (349) in that they add force and charm to our matter (349). Moreover, although certain kinds differ (349), they retain a general resemblance (since both involve a departure from the simple and straightforward method fo expression coupled with a certain rhetorical excellence) (349). Tropes and figures are sometimes distinguished by the narrowest possible dividing line (349) resulting in the fact that for some irony is both a figure of thought (349) and a trope, while periphrasis, hyperbaton and onomatopoeia have been ranked by distinguished authors as figures of speech rather than tropes (349). Quintilian makes clear that where the term tropes is applied to the transference of expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to embellishment of style (351). As grammarians put it, a trope represents the transference of words and phrases from the place which is strictly theirs to another to which they do not properly belong (351). By contrast, a figure is the term employed when we give our language a conformation other than the obvious and ordinary (351). For this reason, the substitution of one word for another is placed among tropes (351) including metaphor, metonymy, antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdoche, catachresis, allegory, hyperbole, onomatopoeia, and periphrasis a figure does not necessarily involve any alteration either of the order or the strict sense of words (351). It does not matter too much by which name either is called . . . since the meaning of things is not altered by a change of name (353) for just as men remain the same, even though they adopt a new name, so these artifices will produce exactly the same effect, whether they are styled tropes or figures, since their value lies not in their names, but in their effect (353). It is accordingly best to adopt the generally accepted terms and to understand the actual thing, by whatever name it is called (353). However, we should note that trope and figure are often combined in the expression of the same thought (353). There is a considerable difference of opinion . . . as to the meaning of the name, the number of genera and the nature and number of the species into which figures may be divided (353). The term figure is used in two senses (353): first, it is applied to any form in which thought is expressed (353) in much the same way that bodies . . . must have some shape (353). Hence, the Latin verbs cursitare and lectitare are said to have the same figure, that is to say, they are identical in formation (355), i.e. similar forms of declension. In the second and special sense, in which it is called a schema, it means a rational change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form (353) in much the same way that sitting, lying down on something or looking back (353) may be said to change the shape of the body. A schema is that which is poetically or rhetorically altered from the simple and obvious method of expression (355).

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For some, all figures are concerned with words (357) for the reason that a change of words causes a corresponding change in the sense (357). Others assert that figures are concerned only with the sense, on the ground that words are adapted to things (357). However, Quintilian points out that the same things are often put in different ways and the sense remains unaltered though the words are changed (357). Moreover, a figure of thought may include several figures of speech (357) for the former lies in the conception, the latter in the expression of our thought (357). However, Quintilian subscribes to the consensus that there are two classes of figure, namely figures of thought, that is of the mind, feeling or conceptions (357) and figures of speech, that is of words, diction, expression, language or style (357). Hence, like language itself, figures are necessarily concerned with thought and with words (357). Because we conceive ideas before we express them (359), Quintilian intends to deal firstly with figures of thought. It may appear that proof is infinitesimally affected by the figures employed (359), but it remains true that figures of thought lend credibility to our arguments and steal their way secretly into the minds of the judges (359). The reason for this is that, just as in swordplay it is easy to see, parry, and ward off direct blows and simple and straightforward thrusts, while wide-strokes and feints are less easy to observe (359) and it is the task of the skilful swordsman . . . to give the impression that his design is quite other than it actually is (359), indirection is similarly conducive to success in oratory. Moreover, there is no more effective method of exciting the emotions than an apt use of figures. For if the expression of brow, eyes and hands has a powerful effect in stirring the passions, how much more effective must be the aspect of our style itself when composed to produce the result at which we aim (359). Above all, figures serve to commend what we say to those that hear us, whether we seek to win approval for our character as pleaders, or to win favour for the cause which we plead, to relieve monotony by variation of our language, or to indicate our meaning in the safest or most seemly way (359). Quintilian seeks to point out that the number (361) of figures is far from being as great as some authorities make out (361). He rejects the view that there are as many types of figure as there are kinds of emotion (361) not because emotions are not qualities of the mind (361) but because a figure is not simply the expression of anything you choose (361): the expression in words of anger, grief, pity, fear, confidence or contempt is not a figure (361) per se. Many are able to point out the special figures employed in expressing anger, in entreating for mercy, or appealing to pity, but it does not follow that expressions of anger, appeals to pity or entreaties for mercy are in themselves figures (361). Cicero may equate all ornaments of oratory (361) with figures (361) but he does not hold that all forms of expression are to be regarded as figures (361), nor does he restrict the term merely to those expressions whose form varies from ordinary use (361). Rather, he regards as figurative all those expressions which are especially striking and most effective in stirring the emotions of the audience (361). 9.2 Figures of Thought (Detail) At one point in this chapter, Quintilian turns his attention to irony (400) which he refuses to equate with dissimulation (400) as many do. In terms of its genus (401), irony which functions as a trope does not differ (401) from irony which functions as a figure since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said (401). It is at the level of species (401) that the difference becomes apparent: the trope is franker in its meaning and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it (401) for the context as a rule is perfectly clear (401). In the figurative form of irony, the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise

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being apparent rather than confessed (401). For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflict with the language and the tone of the voice adopted (401). Sometimes a mans whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who . . . assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others (401). Just as continued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropes develops into this figure (401). However, certain kinds of this figure . . . have no connexion with tropes (401) such as irony based on negation (401) Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by acts of force, of certain inheritances (402) or when we conde to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess (402) or when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents (402). 9.3 Figures of Speech (Detail) 9.4 Apt Use of Structure, Rhythm, Metrical Feet Book 10: Training Eloquence: Reading, Composition, Speaking 10.1 Reading Curriculum 10.2 Imitation 10.3 Writing 10.4 Correction 10.5 Composition Exercises: Translation, Paraphrase, Theses, Commonplaces, Declamations 10.6 Thought and Premeditation 10.7 Extemporaneous Speaking Book 11: Kairos, Memory, Delivery 11.1 Respecting kairos When Speaking 11.2 Memory 11.3 Delivery, Gesture, Dress Book 12: the Character of an Orator: Duties, Studies, Etc. 12.1 The Great Orator as Good Man 12.2 Strengthening Character; Philosophical Study 12.3 The Study of Civil Law 12.4 Orator Prepared with Examples and Precedents 12.5 Firmness; Presence of Mind; Cultivating Natural Advantages 12.6 The Orator's Age 12.7 Causes to be Undertaken; Remuneration 12.8 Careful Study of the Case

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10

12.9 Not Aiming for Applause; Restraining Invective; Preparation Through Writing and Extemporaneous Speaking 12.10 Styles of Oratory 12.11 Retirement from Speaking; Successful Training of an Orator