J Indian Philos (2014) 42:115126 DOI 10.

1007/s10781-013-9213-4

Utpaladevas Lost Vivti on the varapratyabhijkrik

Raffaele Torella

Published online: 5 December 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The recent discovery of a fragmentary manuscript of Utpaladevas long PK) and Vtti commentary (Vivti or k) on his own varapratyabhij-krik (I enables us to assess the role of this work as the real centre of gravity of the aiva tradition chose instead a Pratyabhijn philosophy as a whole, though the later S Abhinavaguptas Vimarin as the standard text. This brilliant, and more compact and accessible, text was copied and copied again during the centuries and became popular in south India too, where a number of manuscripts in the principal southern scripts are still available. The success of a particular commentary is very often the indirect cause of the decline of the others, which are less and less read and, consequently, copied, until their complete or almost complete loss. Of the lengthy and difcult Vivti by Utpaladevacorresponding to the extent of 8,000 lokas (hence the traditional denomination of Aashasr)the fragmentary rad manuscript PK I.3.6 through I.5.3. Although the that has come to light covers only the section I portion of the recovered text is comparatively short (33 folios), it proves to be a particularly important in the economy of Pratyabhijn philosophy due to the crucial points being dealt with there at great length, always in a hard-fought debate with the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism.

In principle, I like the Felicitation Volumes, particularly for the personal involment they presuppose and also for the connected gentle pushing they exercise on the lazy contributors (like me). However, a major shortcoming is to be found in their irregular circulation, which makes the reach of the scholarly world somewhat problematic. The aim of the present paper is to present to a wider audience a synopsis of the main contents of the ve articles that I have devoted to the edition and translation of the only extant fragment of this important text, which have come out precisely in recent Felicitation Volumes. R. Torella (&) ` di Roma, via Principe Amedeo 182b, Istituto Italiano di Studi Orientali, Sapienza Universita 00185 Rome, Italy e-mail: raffaele.torella@fastwebnet.it

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a Keywords Pratyabhijn Utpaladeva Abhinavagupta Apoha Anupalabdhi Svasavedana Digna ga Dharmak rti PK) and the Utpaladeva is said to have composed the varapratyabhij-krik (I 1 concise Vtti at the same time, and later on to have devoted an analytic commentary to the complex Krik-Vtti, called Vivti (or k), in which he discussed possible alternative views and rejected them, also making occasionally quite long digressions on particular subjects. As is well known, the Vivti was in turn commented on by Abhinavagupta in one of his masterworks, the dense and demanding varPVV), covering more than 1,100 pages. The only apratyabhij-vivtivimarin (I mention of an extant fragmentary manuscript of the Vivti occured in K.Ch. Pandeys pioneering book on Abhinavagupta (Pandey 1963, pp. 6970). Though the original manuscript was apparently lost, a transcript from it by Prof. Pandeys own hand was found among the papers left by the learned scholar upon his demise and kept by his widow on behalf of the Abhinavagupta Institute. During my visits to Lucknow, some 20 years ago, Mrs. Lila Pandey and the Trustees of the Institute were so kind as to show me the notebook with the transcript, but did not allow me to copy or photograph it, except for a small portion, which I edited and translated in Torella (1988). My efforts in the later years to secure the entire transcript were totally unsuccessful. By now, that transcript is to be considered denitively lost. The chance that sometimes helps scholars in their research, counteracting the hindrances due to human unhelpfulness, drove me in 1998 to the Indian National Archives in Delhi in search of the manuscripts used by the pandits of the Srinagar Research Department for the editions of the Kashmir Series. I was interested in those manuscripts because of the important marginal notes that some of them contained, where I assumed to nd quotations from lost Kashmiri works. When a I met with a S rada manuscript, entitled Pratyabhijvivti I began looking through it with the same skepticism as I had looked in the past through manuscripts with the same title all over India (in all cases, the title had simply been the outcome of a careless cataloguing). The codex belonged to a small fund of manuscripts that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, concerned about the current political situation, had transmitted to the National Archives in 1948. Very soon, instead, I realized that what I had in front of me was precisely the original of Pandeys transcript, as carefully described by him on the very rst page of his notebook. Once the transcript had been unretrievably lost, the original had come to light again. PK I.3.6 through The thirty-three folios of the manuscript cover the full text of I I.5.3 along with Utpaladevas Vtti and Vivti, plus Abhinavaguptas Vimarin PV). Although the portion of the recovered text is comparatively short,2 it proves (I a philosophy since some to be particularly important for the study of Pratyabhijn very crucial points are dealt with there at great length. Among them, we nd the nature of cognition, its being self-aware, the impossibility for a cognition to become the object of another cognition, the necessity that the various cognitions rest on a
1 2

PVV I, p. 16.67 paramrthata aikyam anayor ekaklaktatvt. I

The Vivti is sometimes mentioned as Aashasr, that is, corresponding to 8,000 lokas; according to another tradition referred to in Pandey (1963, p. 163), the extent would be 6,000 lokas.

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single substratum for a connection between cognitions to be possible, the necessity that cognition and its object share the same essential nature, that is, light; other important topics are apoha, anupalabdhi, yogipratyaka. Starting from 2007, I published ve articles in which I presented the critical edition of the text along with a profusely annotated English translation (Torella 2007a, b, c, d, 2012).3 Since the coming forth of these studies, the central role of Utpaladevas long commentary on his own varapratyabhij-krik for the development of aiva a Pratyabhijn philosophy has become clearer and clearer, though the later S philosophic tradition chose instead Abhinavaguptas varapratyabhij-vimarin as the standard text. This brilliant, and more compact and accessible, text was copied and copied again during the centuries and became popular in south India too, where a number of manuscripts in the principal southern scripts are still available. The fortune of a particular commentary is very often the indirect cause of the decline of the others, which are less and less read and, consequently, copied, until their complete or almost complete loss. One could mention, among others, the particularly exemplar case of the Yuktidpik on the Skhyakrik. a The topics of Pratyabhijn philosophy that I will present here are seen through the lenses of the Vivti. Utpaladeva, referring to an enigmatic statement in the Bhagavadgt (XV.15b),4 had identied three powers (akti) in the Lord: Cognition, Memory and Exclusion. The aim of his close inquiry into each of them is to show that cognition, memory and exclusion, which constitute the very basis of the knowledge process in human mind, are indirectly also a proof of the coinciding of the individual subject with universal consciousness. None of these phenomena can be really explained and their complex functioning accounted for satisfactorily in merely mechanic terms, as rst of all the Buddhists do. The individual subject can cognize, remember and exclude only if it is conceived of as inscribed within an iva. eternal and, at the same time, dynamic universal I-ness, i.e. S Utpaladeva starts by making some preliminary remarks on the Buddhist conception of non-perception (anupalabdhi), and, less extensively, of exclusion (apoha) as the very core of conceptual thought. If one accepts the self-contained nature of cognitions (as the Buddhist does), it hardly becomes possible to account for neither of them. On seeing an empty surface we shall not be allowed to say that there is no jar, since the cognition of a certain object will not be able to give rise, at the same time, to alternative cognitions later to be excluded. Yet, the world of human knowledge, language and practical activity has among its pillars precisely the possibility of taking something for absent, or of building mental images through the exclusion of what is other. Then, granted that the Buddhist description of how the single cognition works in isolation is considered as basically correct, what is needed is the capacity of the single cognitions to communicate with each other, to enter into a net. Such a net cannot be provided but by the single and iva nature unitary consciousness on which all of them are rooted. In a word: by the S which permeates reality, constituting its ultimate ground.
3

These articles have started a hunt for more fragments from the Vivti, which has already produced , forthcoming). interesting results (see Kawajiri, forthcoming; Ratie matta smtir jnam apohana ca.

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The Buddhists5 account for the establishment of the absence of a jar in a certain place by saying that the cognition of the empty place, while being aware of itself as opposed to the cognition of the place with a jar, is also aware of the place as devoid of the jar. In fact, if a jar were on that place, then also the jar would be manifested within the cognition of the place, since both the jar and the place share the same capacity [of being perceived]. This can be maintained, they go on, because particulars belonging to the same class (that is, visible particulars) are grasped by one and the same cognition (here a visual cognition), and consequently the cognition of the place should, in the case of a jar being there, have also contained the manifestation of the jar; but in the case at issue it was not so.6 Utpaladeva points out that here we are dealing with two distinct and separate cognitions, bound to remain such7: by any means cannot one include or exclude the other, unless one intends to explain the establishment of the absence in terms of inference,8 which is not the case with Buddhists (see Torella 2002, p. 143, fn. 17). These and other arguments are taken into account in the Vivti. In sum: Each cognition sheds light on itself alone, or, in other words, each cognition has its own self-awareness, which can by no means act as the common basis where two distinct cognitions may meet. No single cognition, Utpaladeva concludes, not even the perceptual cognition, can establish the absence of something by itself alone.9 The only way to ll the gap between cognitions and, by doing so, to give a reasonable explanation of the establishment of absences, which is so common in everyday life, is to accept their resting on a single consciousness.10 Instead of a multiplicity of irrelate svasavedanas each corresponding to a single cognition, Utpaladeva posits the one supreme consciousness principle as the common svasavedana of all cognitions, which in this way derive from it the capacity of entering into relation with each other. The starting point for the discussion of the exclusion (apoha) issuethe third ivas powersis clearly stated in Abhinavaguptas I PVV: why on the appearing of S

The Buddhist position Utpaladeva is referring to is clearly formulated in Dharmottaras Nyyabinduk p. 101.1314 yadaikajnasasargivastvantaropalambha | ekendriyajnagrhya locandipraidhnbhimukha vastudvayam anyonypekam ekajnasasargi kathyate.
5 6 Vivti kevalapradee hi ghao yadi syt, tat tatra pradeajne tulyayogyatrpatvt so pi praketa tath ca saghaapradeajnam etat syt, na kevalapradeajnam; ata kevalapradeajna svtmna saghaapradeajnaviparta savedayamna pradeam api ghaarahita savedayate iti ghabhvasiddhi pradee syt (Torella 2007a, p. 478.69). 7 Vivti yvat kevalapradeajnena yadi nma svtm saghaapradeajnaviparta saviditas tato dvityam arthntarabhta saghaapradeajna svaprakarpa nsti katha sidhyet (Torella 2007a, p. 478.1012). 8 Vivti tad evam iyannyynusarad numniky eva ghabhvasiddhi syt, na prtyak (Torella 2007a, p. 479.6).

Vivti jnnam aindriyaknm apy anyonya sahabhvapthagbhvaprako na syd ity arthnm api sadasattniyamanicayo na syt (Torella 2007a, p. 480.35).
9 10 Vivti tad evam ekntarmukhasvasavedanarpacittattvtmatvirnti vin [] (Torella 2007a, p. 480.5); tasmd em ekacittattvavirntirpam anusandhnam avaybhyupagantavyam (Torella 2007a, p. 480.6).

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of a certain particular object should one gure out something different destined later to be excluded?11 Abhinavagupta is not satised with Dharmak rtis answer, elaborated at length in the Sva rtha numa napariccheda and svavtti: the correct knowledge of the svalakaa is continually menaced by erroneous superimpositions (samropa), caused e.g. by misleading similaritiessuch as the brightness equally found in mother-of-pearl and in silverwhich makes the knower mistake the former for the latter. The doubt, which projects alternative forms to be negated, would arise precisely because the knower is aware that many superimpositions are in principle possible; so a denite ascertainment becomes possible only after hypothetical mistaken forms are preliminarily rejected. Then Abhinavagupta takes an karanandana (292.18ff), who in the Apohasiddhi into account the position of S recognizes prasaga (anyathprasaga the mere possibility that a thing be different from itself ?) as the cause of doubt. Both samropa and prasaga are for Abhinavagupta equally untenable, since, whether they derive from a beginningless nescience or other causes, they ultimately lead to a regressus ad innitum. In the Vivti (Torella 2007a, p. 480.1121), Utpaladeva puts forward his own version of how apoha works, taking for granted that apoha is indeed the pivot of all conceptual thought. His view, evidently nourished with Buddhist ideas, is centred on the plurality of causal efciencies found in any object,12 which he substitutes for the plurality of wrong assumptions (vikalpa, samropa), with respect to which Abhinava will clearly explicitate the fault of anavasth, already implicit in Utpalas argument. But, more importantly, the Vivti makes an additional remark. On the ma ya plane, in which alone vikalpa is at work, the objects should be at their highest level of differentiation: then, how can their cognition evoke other objects, aiva theology. The vara-tattva level, too?13 Utpaladevas answer is rooted in the S at which all the manifested world is still enclosed in the I (sarvam idam aham), remains so to speak in the background even in the ma ya world, marked by a fulledged differentiation. This is especially true for the cognition process, in which even the fully differentiated object ends up owing into consciousness and being absorbed into it; moreover, as is often repeated, if the object were not essentially light, it could not shine at all in knowledge. This latent basic undifferentiation of the object (from other objects and from the self) is, according to Utpaladeva, what nally renders the process of apoha possible, the potential openness of the object (and the subject) being the very ground for the doubt about it.14 On this premise aivas, who take it as a particular akti alone, the Buddhist apoha is accepted by the S of the Lord, guring side by side with jnaakti. If Utpaladevas close investigation of the three powers starts with memory, by infringing the above stated order, it is [b]ecause in a very clear manner memory can

11 12

PVV I, p. 292.9 nanu svalakae vabhte kuto tadrpam akyate yad apohyate. I

Vivti akyamnatattadarthakriykritattatpratipakanirkriy vin na tena vyavahartum ala pratipattra iti (Torella 2007a, p. 480.1920).
13 Vivti padrthntarasamparkarahite py arthe pratiniyatapraktv avabhte vividhrthakriykriy api (Torella 2007a, p. 480.1718). 14

Vivti vargabhta ivnyonytmatay (Torella 2007a, p. 480.1819).

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serve as a logical reason for the establishment of the identity of the self with the Lord.15 The starting point of the examination of memory is the classical denition of memory given in Yogastra I.11: Memory is the non-extinction of the object formerly perceived (anubhtaviaysampramoa smti). The sustained analysis of Utpaladevas Vivti16 singles out a few crucial points contained in such an apparently simple process: How is it possible to attribute temporal differentiation to a cognizer that is permanent in his essential nature? What is the relationship between the cognitive act of the original perception and the cognitive act of the subsequent memory? How can the latter bring the aiva and his former to light again without objectifying it? On this point, in fact, the S principal opponent, the Buddhist epistemologist, are in full agreement: a cognition is self-luminous and cannot be the object of another cognition. The prima facie Buddhist explanation which is the target of Utpaladevas criticism is far from being satisfactory: saying that the perception produces a saskra, which in turn will produce the phenomenon of memory, only accounts for the fact that the subsequent memory has a certain objective content allegedly similar to that of the original perception, though strictly speaking, since memory has no direct access to the former perception (cannot know it), this very similarity cannot even be established.17 Furthermore, this view leaves out the subjective component represented by the fact that the object has been coloured by the previous perception, or, to be more precise, by its having been already perceived in a certain past moment.18 Memory, in fact, is indeed the memory of the past object, but also of the past perception of it. Instead, as Abhinavagupta says, what the saskra is able to convey (or resurrect) is neither the original perception nor the object insofar as it was cognized by such past perception.19 This presupposes a living organism at work, a dynamic and unitary consciousness able to freely move between different moments of time. It is the I that ensures the possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at different times, thus resolving the apparent inconsistency

15 Vivti smter eva tvat suspaam vartmasiddhihetutay prathama sambhavam ha (Torella 2007b, p. 544.34). 16 Text in Torella (2007b, pp. 544549.2; 2007c, pp. 479482.4). The examination of memory runs from (2006). IPK I.2.3 to III.4.8. On memory in the IPV, see Ratie 17 IPK I.3.2cd [] saskrajatve tu tattulyatva na tadgati (cf. Torella 2002, pp. 99100). 18 This position might be attributed to a nirkravdin, but for sure not to a skravdin, like Digna ga or Dharmak rti. Digna ga uses the argument of memory, seen as necessarily including the awareness of the temporal distance of the object previously perceived and the awareness of the previous perception of the object, as a proof of the twofold nature of cognition and of its being self-aware (svavtti on Pramasamuccaya I.11ab viayajnatajjnaviet tu dvirpat: p. 4.24 na cottarottari jnni prvaviprakaviaybhsni syu, p. 5.23 yasmc cnubhavottarakla viaya iva jne pi smtir utpadyate, tasmd asti dvirpat jnasya svasavedyat ca). For a thorough analysis of the crucial passages on these topics in Pramasamuccaya I and svavtti, see recently Kellner (2011). Such stratication of previous perceptions that is found in a memory act could not be satisfactorily explained by those who, like the nirkravdins, deny cognition the characters of dvairpya and svasavedana; in u the same vein, Kuma rila (lokavrttika, s da 112cd114ab) does not conceive of an accumulation nyava of forms [in cognition], but only of a difference in objects (cf. Hattori 1968, p. 109). 19 IPV I p. 97.58 saskrt para saviyatmtra smter siddham, na tu anubhavaviayatvam, npi asya viayasya prvnubhavaviayktatvam.

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between a (present) vimara and a (past) anubhava.20 The one and same svasavedana of both cognitions creates that necessary bridge between them which the Buddhist epistemologist fails to account for.21 Then Utpaladeva gives voice to a hypothetical opponent who nds the a explanation proposed by the Pratyabhijn too awkward and distant from common sense: it would be much simpler to speak of a cognition (present memory) that a cognizes another cognition (the past perception). However, the Pratyabhijn cannot accept such an interpretation, nor can the Buddhists, unless they question one of the keystones of their respective philosophies: cognitions can never become the object of other cognitions as they are only cognizable through introspective selfawareness (svasavedana).22 The opponent, not expressly named but certainly representing the realistic brahmanical schools, replies that it is common knowledge that at least one case of objectication of cognitions does exist, namely, the case of the yogin who penetrates the thought of others, that is, the cognitive and emotional content of their minds.23 In order to nd an answer to this objection, Utpaladeva feels as a primary task to dene as accurately as possible the expression svasavit self-awareness (on the part of all cognitions) through singling out three levels of meaning (Abhinavagupta even adds a fourth one of his own). In the main, he is in full agreement with Dharmak rti, who had taken svasavedana (or tmasavedana) as one of the four varieties of perception.24 Any cognition, says Utpaladeva, has as its essential nature self-awareness (svavit), which can be taken in three different,
Vivti smtikriypy asyaivaiaivntasthitnubhtaprvrthavimarecchopakram bahi sa iti tatprvakloparaktnubhtabhvvamaranvasn (Torella 2007b, p. 545.911). Cf. Torella (2002, pp. 106107, fn. 12). 21 IPVV II, p. 17.2223 anubhavasmtyor eka svasavedanarpam ekaviayatopalambht. What Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta implicitly say is that not even the Buddhist skravdins view of cognition as twofold and self-aware, however acceptable in itself, is able to satisfactorily account for the phenomenon of memory, since it is not well supported by the whole of the Buddhist philosophical framework. If we cling to this, saying that the former anubhava shines in the present memory only amounts to saying that the self-contained memory cognition knows the self-contained anubhava cognition, which goes against the basic principle of svasavedyat of all cognitions. Even admitting that a purely intellectual cognition (citta) may be the object of another (or anothers) cognition, the emotional resonances of such cognition (caitta) are bound to remain strictly conned in the subjective sphere (cf. Moriyama 2010, p. 271), hence the need for establishing the svasavedyat principle for all cognitions (in fact, also the various feelings and emotions are viewed as cognitions: Pramavrttika III.448cd sukhadukhbhildibhed buddhaya eva t). 22 IPVV II, p. 43.1213 saugatn tvat svasavedanam eva jnasya vapu, tad eva katha vedyat. Though basically agreeing with Kellners objection to translating svasavedana by introspection (Kellner 2011, p. 215), I think that it would not be out of place to underline the special kind of cognition that after all svasavedana isit is vivid as only pratyaka can be, but it does not depend on sensory faculties; it cognizes something without making it into an object; the phrases svasavedanasiddha, svasavedya, etc. often convey the meaning of something whose presence and certainty are inwardly felt and are not in need to be proved by pramas.
20 23 24

Vivti yogin parapramtbodha paratvenaivedantay prakate (Torella 2007c, p. 482.12).

Nyyabindu I.7 tat [pratyaka] caturvidham; I.10 sarvacittacaittnm tmasavedanam the selfawareness of the mind and the mental events in their entirety; cf. also Pramavinicaya I, p. 20.9. Also Digna ga had apparently listed svasavitti as a variety of pratyaka in Pramasamuccaya I.6c mnasa crthargdisvasavittir akalpik, a denition however not exempt from problematic aspects (cf. Hattori 1968, pp. 27, 9294; Franco 1993; Yao 2004). To the concept(s) of svasavedana a special issue of the Journal of Indian Philosophy has recently been devoted, with several important contributions.

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and complementary, senses: svasyaiva savit, svaiva savit, svasya savit eva ca (Abhinavagupta adds: sv savit eva).25 None of them would stand, if the objectiability of cognition were accepted. Once we have ascertained that this is indeed the distinctive mark of any cognition, it remains to be seen whether this may be a feature of yogic perception, too. Even if we were hypothetically willing to admitsays Utpaladeva with his usual tersenessthat a cognition might become the object of another cognition, things would hardly change. In fact, the relationship of the subject and object of cognition (viaya-viayin), which would thus obtain, should, in the case at issue, necessarily pass through the achievement of identication between the two cognitions and their respective subjects, since all cognitions and subjects share the same essential nature. However, if a valid cognitive process is based on the attainment of conformity (srpya) between the apprehended object (grhya) part and the apprehending subject (or cognition) (grhaka) part, such a conformity is incompatible with the essentially unity of the two cognitions.26 Utpaladevas discourse is based on the full acceptation of the epistemological scheme provided by Digna ga: the twofold aspect of cognition (see above). The apprehending cognition part assumes the form of the apprehended object part; the cognitive process consists precisely in the conformity or likeness (srpya) between the two (svasavedana being a property of both of them). It is an undeniable fact, concludes Utpaladeva, that the yogin can have access to other minds, but this takes place insofar as he has attained identication with the supreme self, and, consequently, has overcome the distinction among the various limited subjects. On this plane, the cognitions of the others end up being ones own cognitions, and, as such, are known through self-awareness.27 At the end of this argument, tmavda is nally established, but to Utpaladeva this is not sufcient. It is true that in this manner cognitions are endowed with a permanent self acting as their ultimate substratum, but the idle selfe.g. of Nya ya esikawould prove incapable of moving freely through cognitions, now and Vais by uniting them, now by separating them, or, as in the case at issue (the phenomenon of memory), by retrieving an object and its perception from the past and making them shine again in the present without cancelling their original nature, but also without reproducing them mechanically.28 The object recovered by memory is not the same object as in the original perception, but an object coloured by it. For that to take place, the dynamism, the sovereignty (aivarya) of the I of the aivas is needed. S One of the central points dealt with at length in the Vivti fragment is the inquiry into the relationship between the perceiving subject (grhaka) and the perceived object (grhya), on the one hand, and between the perceiving subjectthat is, the
25 26

Text in Torella (2007c, p. 482.2324).

Vivti jnayos tu dvayor viayaviayior ekabodhamtralakaatvd abheda eveti na srpyam lambanrtho nayor, api tv aikyam eva (Torella 2007c, p. 483.910).
27 Vivti vstavena tu bodhaiktman pramtr pramtrantaraikypattir eva param[read: par] tmavedakatva sarvajasya (Torella 2007c, p. 483.2122). 28 Vivti tmana ca aikyamtrepy audsnyn ananubhavasmaradiaktimattvd aivarya na syd, etac cokta vakyate ca (Torella 2007c, p. 484.2325).

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empirical subject acting in the ma ya worldand the subject in the absolute sense, iva or supreme Consciousness, the Knower (paramrthapramt) identied with S on the other. The very fact that the Sanskrit language presents the perceiving subject and the perceived object as a dvandva compound (see the concluding krik of the fourth hnika, where memory is examined29) points to their mutual dependence, anyonypek in Utpaladevas words.30 This means, in Abhinavaguptas further PVV II, p. 58.1112), that they are assumed to be linked by a reciprocal remarks (I union, a two-directional one (itaretarayoga), and consequently the grammatical principle of sahavivak intention to express simultaneously applies to them: the perceiving subject at the same time points at, or expresses, the perceived object, and vice versa, the ultimate reason for this being the fact that each of them is at the same time itself and the other (cf. Torella 1987, pp. 155157). According to the Vivti, this must be understood also in a subtler way: the subject-ness of the ma yic individual is mixed with a more or less conspicuous dose of object-ness, and the object-ness of the body is mixed with a certain dose of subject-ness. The status of cognizable object (vedyat) pertaining to the body is not the same as the jars, where the vedyat is full-edged and the extreme level of insentience has been reached. However, the vedyat of the body or the vital breath cannot be compared with the vedyat of the universe with respect to the level of subjectivity called vara, since to the latter things appear as non-separate from one another and each thing appears as made of everything.31 Nor can the level of subjectivity of the empirical perceiver be comparable with that of vara where the whole mass of cognizable objects is so to speak covered (sacchdita) by the I.32 By highlighting such a multiplicity of levels both in subjectivity and objectivity, Utpaladeva aims at undermining the belief that they may have an intrinsically denite nature. Instead, they are more like two communicating vessels. In order to explicitate what krik I.4.8cd states (The two elements divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the [highest] cognizer), the Vivti says: They are woven into any cognizer who performs the act of reective awareness.33 So, will they be comparable to two gems woven into a thread, says Abhinavagupta giving voice to a hypothetical PVV II, p. 58.20)? No; in fact, the Vivti adds immediately after the opponent (I above statement: They are indeed made of the cognizer (tanmayv eva). The critical point for the object is when the knower cognizes it, i.e. makes it shine, manifests it (prakayati). Ka r. I.5.2cd (The light is not differentiated [from the object]: being light constitutes the very essence of the object) is to be understood as an allusion to the Bha tta M ma msaka thesis, which is diametrically opposed to Utpaladevas position and indirectly helps him formulate his own in a
29 30 31

I.4.8c grhyagrhakat; Vtti thereon, anubhvynubhvakau. Vivti grhako grhya ca anyonypekv avabhta (Torella 2007d, p. 932.4).

Vivti grhyasvabhvam api ca tad dehdi na tadn ghadivedanvasara iva prodbhtavedyabhvam avabhsate ham iti prathand varasya iva vastujtam | kevalam varasya tad anyonypthagbhtam evaikaika vivtmarpam avabhsate | atra tu prdi sarvato bhinnam eva na tu vivarpatm rayat [] (Torella 2007d, p. 932.1215).
32

Vivti vedakatpi cevaravedakaty sacchditeavedyarer anyaiva (Torella 2007d, p. 933.4 Vivti sarvatra parmati pramtari protau (Torella 2007d, p. 932.23).

5).
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straightforward way. According to Kuma rila, when an object is cognized, what in fact happens is that an additional quality being manifest occurs in it, from whose presence a previous cognitive act is inferred. On the contrary, according to Utpaladeva, the object cannot receive such light from outside: only what is essentially light can shine, light must already be the very self (tman) of the object,34 its own form (Vtti: svarpabhta). The very being of the object, the Vivti goes on, consists in its becoming manifest.35 Light, in its essence, is the knower itself: it is the contact with the knowers light that, so to speak, kindles the latent, inner luminous nature of the object. Thus, if it is true that both subject and object are essentially light, we are not allowed to say that the light-knower is the light-object, but only the other way round. To explicitate this concept, Utpaladeva makes a rare exception to his usual dislike for quotations: for the second time, in the Vivti he cites a passage from the Bhagavadgt (now, VII.12d [b]ut I am not in them, [whereas] they are in Me).36 When in the ma yic world the object shines as differentiated, this holds only with regard to the empirical subject and never from the light taken in the absolute sense, since in this case the object could not shine at all.37 Likewise, the subject, regardless of the level of subjectivity he may be identied with, never loses his contact with absolute light/consciousnesss[t]hat immaculate consciousness which, though different from the presumptive identication with the thickest veil represented by the body, is however intimately present in all levels of subjectivity (body, puryaaka, etc.), just like the autumnal sun is PVV II, p. 24.1315). [only provisionally] obscured by clouds (I To sum up: Utpaladevas nal aim is to establish a single cosmic consciousness, iva, as the common background of all reality and, particularly, of all human i.e. S aiva truth experiences. He pursues this intention not by apodictically stating the S for example, by resorting to the authority of revealed textsbut by critically examining diametrically opposed doctrines, i.e. those of the Buddhist prama philosophers. In doing so, he recognizes the leading position of the Buddhist philosophy in the Kashmir of his day and at the same time shows that he is not afraid of challenging the great cultural prestige of the Buddhist doctrines. Moreover, in many cases he makes use, as far as possible, of their arguments to preliminarily build up and then rene his own positions. This way of carrying out the duel with the prama philosophers reminds one of the attitude often found in oriental martial arts. Instead of directly attacking his adversary, Utpaladeva seeks to exploit the adversarys intellectual ability to nally turn it back upon him. The main technique a on which Utpaladevas argumentation is based is the one well known in s stric debate as prasagaviparyaya (see Iwata 1993). The Buddhist ideas are not rejected at the outset, but are rather apparently accepted and then pushed to their extreme consequences. As a result, the Buddhist opponent is nally confronted with two
34 35 36

PK I.5.2cd na ca prako bhinna syd tmrthasya prakat. I Vivti prakamnattmik satt (Torella 2007d, p. 934.10).

Vivti ata eva prakasya vedytmatnupapatter na tv aha tev iti gtsktam (Torella 2007d, p. 936.89).
37 Vivti na tv anavacchinnt paramrthaprakd aprakanaprasagt (Torella 2007d, p. 936.18 19).

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alternatives: either to abandon his own specic theses or, if he is still convinced of aiva them (and, interestingly, this is the case not only for the Buddhist, but for the S philosopher himself), to change the perspective from which they are to be viewed. aiva framework precisely In other words, he should accept the overall theoretical S to safeguard his own Buddhist ideas. a The philosophy of Pratyabhijn is built upon two main cornerstones, both of them due to Utpaladeva: the above mentioned attitude to the Buddhist prama philosophers, made of a subtle interplay of attraction and rejection, and the acceptance of the legacy of Bhartrhari, which had been so openly despised by Utpaladevas guru Soma nanda (Torella 2009; Nemec 2011, pp. 5967). Now that it is possible to look, however partially, into the Vivti, where these two aspects stand up and are dealt with in a greatly elaborate way, we are no longer allowed to consider Utpaladeva a mere predecessor of Abhinavagupta and that the latter is the a great master of the Pratyabhijn , but we must rather take Utpaladeva, particularly with his varapratyabhij-Vivti, as the real centre of gravity of the system, and Abhinavagupta mainly as his brilliant commentator.

Bibliography

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Translations and Studies

Franco, E. (1993). Did Digna ga accept four types of perception? Journal of Indian Philosophy, 21, 205 299.

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Hattori, M. (1968). Dignga. On perception, being the Pratyakapariccheda of Digngas Pramasamuccaya. Harvard oriental series no. 47. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Iwata, T. (1993). Prasaga und Prasagaviparyaya bei Dharmakrti und seine Kommentatoren. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 31, Wien. umer Kawajiri, Y. (forthcoming). New fragments of the varapratyabhij-k. In R. Torella & B. Ba (Eds.). Kellner, B. (2011). Self-awareness (svasavedana) in Digna gas Prama nasamuccaya and -vrtti. A close reading. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38, 203231. Moriyama, Sh. (2010). On self-awareness in the Sautra ntika epistemology. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38, 261277. Nemec, J. (2011). The ubiquitous iva: Somnandas ivadi and his tantric interlocutors. New York: Oxford University Press. Pandey, K. C. (1963). Abhinavagupta. An historical and philosophical study (2nd ed.). Varanasi: Chowkhamba. , I. (2006). La me moire et le Soi dans lvarapratyabhijvimarin dAbhinavagupta. Indo-Iranian Ratie Journal, 49, 39103. , I. (forthcoming). Some hitherto unknown fragments of Utpaladevas Vivrti (I): On the Buddhist Ratie umer (Eds.). controversy over the existence of other conscious streams. In R. Torella & B. Ba Torella, R. (1987). Examples of the inuence of Sanskrit grammar on Indian philosophy. East and West, 37, 151164. Torella, R. (1988). A fragment of Utpaladevas varapratyabhij-vivti. East and West, 38, 137174. Torella, R. (2002). The varapratyabhijkrik of Utpaladeva with the authors Vrtti. Critical edition and annotated translation. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (I ed. Serie Orientale Roma LXXI. Roma: IsMEO, 1994). Torella, R. (2007a). Studies in Utpaladevas varapratyabhij-vivti. Part I. Apoha and anupalabdhi in a aiva garb. In K. Preisendanz (Ed.), Expanding and merging horizons. Contributions to South Asian S and cross-cultural studies in commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass (pp. 473490). Vienna: sterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. O Torella, R. (2007b). Studies in Utpaladevas varapratyabhij-vivti. Part II. What is memory? In K. Klaus & J.-U. Hartmann (Eds.), Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift fr Michael Hahn zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Schlern berreicht (pp. 539563). Wien. Torella, R. (2007c). Studies in Utpaladevas varapratyabhij-vivti. Part III. Can a cognition become the object of another cognition? In D. Goodall & A. Padoux (Eds.), Mlanges tantriques la ry: Institut franc mmoire dHlne Brunner (pp. 475484). Pondiche ais de Pondicherry. Torella, R. (2007d). Studies in Utpaladevas varapratyabhij-vivrti. Part IV. Light of the subject Light of the object. In B. Kellner et al. (Eds.), Pramakrti. Papers dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 70.12 (pp. 925939). Wien. Torella, R. (2009). From an adversary to the main ally: The place of Bhartrhari in the Kashmirian aiva dvaita. In M. Chaturvedi (Ed.), Bharthari: Language, thought and reality (proceedings of the S international seminar on Bharthari, December 1214, 2003), Delhi (pp. 343354). Torella, R. (2012). Studies in Utpaladevas varapratyabhij-vivti. Part V: Self-awareness and yogic perception. In F. Voegeli et al. (Eds.), Devadattyam. Johannes Bronkhorst felicitation volume. Worlds of South and Inner Asia 5 (pp. 275300). Bern: Peter Lang. umer, B. (Eds.). (forthcoming). Proceedings of the international workshop on Torella, R., & Ba Utpaladeva, philosopher of recognition. Indian Institute for Advanced Study, Shimla (August 2010), New Delhi. Yao, Z. (2004). Digna ga and four types of perception. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32, 5779.

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