Citizenship 1. To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to? Explain, and give illustrative case.

Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on ay !", !#$% in &apier Terrace, 'roome, (estern )ustralia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a *ilipino citizen and native of +aet, ,amarines &orte, and Theresa ar-uez, an )ustralian. .istorically, this was a year before the !#$/ ,onstitution too0 into effect and at that time, what served as the ,onstitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the 1nited 2tates governed the country. These were the Philippine 'ill of 3uly !, !#45 and the Philippine )utonomy )ct of )ugust 5#, !#!", also 0nown as the 3ones Law. )mong others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine 6slands. 7 7 7 1nder both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were 2panish sub8ects on )pril !!, !9## and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent:s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on 3anuary /, !9;# in +aet, ,amarines &orte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of 'irths. Thus, under the Philippine 'ill of !#45 and the 3ones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. 'y virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo:s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is li0ewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the !#$/ Philippine ,onstitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the ac-uisition of Philippine citizenship 7 7 7. 2o also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subse-uently retained under the !#;$ and !#9; ,onstitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a *ilipino citizen, having been born to a *ilipino father. The fact of her being born in )ustralia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. 6f )ustralia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim )ustralian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$% 2. What are the ways o ac!uiring citizenship? "iscuss. Held: There are two ways of ac-uiring citizenship< =!> by birth, and =5> by naturalization. These ways of ac-uiring citizenship correspond to the two 0inds of citizens< the natural?born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. ) person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural?born citizen thereof. )s defined in the 7 7 7 ,onstitution, natural?born citizens @are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac-uire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.A Bn the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become *ilipino citizens through naturalization, generally under ,ommonwealth )ct &o. %;$, otherwise 0nown as the Revised &aturalization Law, which repealed the former &aturalization Law =)ct &o. 5#5;>, and by Republic )ct &o. /$4. (An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% #. To $e naturalized, what %ust an applicant prove? When and what are the conditions $e ore the decision granting Philippine citizenship $eco%es executory? Held: To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the -ualifications and none of the dis-ualifications provided by law to become a *ilipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes e7ecutory only after two =5> years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has =!> not left the PhilippinesC =5> has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or professionC =$> has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rulesC or =%> committed any act pre8udicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies

&'ection 1, (.). *#+,. (An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% -. What !uali ications %ust $e possessed $y an applicant or naturalization? Held: 2ection 5, )ct %;$ provides the following -ualifications< =a> .e must be not less than 5! years of age on the day of the hearing of the petitionC =b> .e must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten yearsC =c> .e must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine ,onstitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is livingC =d> .e must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some 0nown lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupationC =e> .e must be able to spea0 and write Dnglish or 2panish and any of the principal languagesC and =f> .e must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the 'ureau of Private 2chools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines re-uired of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. (An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% *. What are the dis!uali ications under 'ection -, )ct -.#, in an application or naturalization? Held: 2ection %, )ct %;$, provides the following dis-ualifications< =a> .e must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governmentsC =b> .e must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideasC =c> .e must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamyC =d> .e must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitudeC =e> .e must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseasesC =f> .e must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines =or not less than si7 months before filing his application>, mingled socially with the *ilipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the *ilipinosC =g> .e must not be a citizen or sub8ect of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such warC =h> .e must not be a citizen or sub8ect of a foreign country whose laws do not grant *ilipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or sub8ects thereof. (An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% /. 0an a legiti%ate child $orn under the 11#* 0onstitution o a 2ilipino %other and an alien ather validly elect Philippine citizenship ourteen &1-, years a ter he has reached the age o %ajority? Held: 1nder )rticle 6E, 2ection !=$> of the !#$/ ,onstitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a *ilipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of ma8ority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. ,.). &o. "5/ which was enacted pursuant to 2ection !=$>, )rticle 6E of the !#$/ ,onstitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to ma0e a valid election of Philippine citizenship. .owever, the !#$/ ,onstitution and ,.). &o. "5/ did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The !#$/ ,harter only provides that the election should be made @upon reaching the age of ma8ority.A The age of ma8ority then commenced upon reaching twenty?one =5!> years. 6n the opinions of the 2ecretary of 3ustice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this ,ourt prior to the effectivity of the !#$/ ,onstitution. 6n these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the +epartment of 2tate of the 1nited 2tates Fovernment to the effect that the election should be made within a @reasonable timeA after attaining the age of

ma8ority. The phrase @reasonable timeA has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three =$> years from reaching the age of ma8ority. The span of fourteen =!%> years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of ma8ority until he finally e7pressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the re-uirement of electing @upon reaching the age of ma8ority.A Philippine citizenship can never be treated li0e a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. Bne who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. )s such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. (Re2 A11l"ca&"'n 3'! A4#"ss"'n &' &5e 5"l"11"ne Ba!, V"cen&e 6. C5"ng, Ba! Ma&&e! ,'. 9-4, Oc&. -, -999, En Banc [0a1unan$% .. 3ow %ay Philippine citizenship $e renounced? 4s the application or an alien certi icate o registration, and the possession o oreign passport, tanta%ount to acts o renunciation o Philippine citizenship? Held: Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a *ilipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent:s application for an alien ,ertificate of Registration =),R> and 6mmigrant ,ertificate of Residence =6,R>, on 2eptember !#, !#99, and the issuance to her of an )ustralian passport on arch $, !#99. G77 6n order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be e7press. Petitioner:s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her )ustralian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of )znar v. 056E7E0 &18* '0() .+# 9111+:, and in the more recent case of 6ercado v. 6anzano and 056E7E0 &;.(. <o. 1#*+8#, #+. '0() /#+, 6ay 2/, 1111,. 6n the case of )znar, the ,ourt ruled that the mere fact that he is an )merican did not mean that he is no longer a *ilipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. )nd, in 6ercado v. 6anzano and 056E7E0, it was held that the fact that respondent anzano was registered as an )merican citizen in the 'ureau of 6mmigration and +eportation and was holding an )merican passport on )pril 55, !##;, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice?mayor of a0ati, were 8ust assertions of his )merican nationality before the termination of his )merican citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an )ustralian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of *ilipino citizenship. *or renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be e7press. )s held by this ,ourt in the aforecited case of )znar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an e7press renunciation or repudiation of one:s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an )ustralian passport, as in the case of 6ercado v. 6anzano, were mere acts of assertion of her )ustralian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship H she was an )ustralian and a *ilipino, as well. oreover, under ,ommonwealth )ct "$, the fact that a child of *ilipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one:s Philippine citizenship. 2ince private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner:s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$% 8. 3ow %ay 2ilipino citizens who lost their citizenship reac!uire the sa%e? Answer: *ilipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may 7 7 7 reac-uire the same in the manner provided by law. ,ommonwealth )ct &o. "$ enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reac-uired by a former citizen< =!> by naturalization, =5> by repatriation, and =$> by direct act of ,ongress . (7!"val4' v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727, 8une 2., -999, En Banc [ angan":an$; An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% 1. "istinguish naturalization ro% repatriation.

Held: &aturalization is a mode for both ac-uisition and reac-uisition of Philippine citizenship. )s a mode of initially ac-uiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by ,ommonwealth )ct &o. %;$, as amended. Bn the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reac-uiring Philippine citizenship is governed by ,ommonwealth )ct &o. "$ &)n )ct Providing or the Ways in Which Philippine 0itizenship 6ay =e 7ost or (eac!uired 911#/:,. 1nder this law, a former *ilipino citizen who wishes to reac-uire Philippine citizenship must possess certain -ualifications and none of the dis-ualifications mentioned in 2ection % of ,.). %;$. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to< =!> desertion of the armed forces &'ection -, 0.). <o. /#,> =5> service in the armed forces of the allied forces in (orld (ar 66 &'ection 1, (epu$lic )ct <o. 1/* 911*#:,> =$> service in the )rmed *orces of the 1nited 2tates at any other time &'ec. 1, (epu$lic )ct <o. 2/#+ 911/+:,> =%> marriage of a *ilipino woman to an alien &'ec. 1, (epu$lic )ct <o. 81.1 9111*:,> and =/> political and economic necessity &4$id,. )s distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the ta0ing of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local ,ivil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. 6n )ngat v. (epu$lic &#1- '0() -#8 91111:,, we held< IPJarenthetically, under these statutes =referring to R) &os. #"/ and 5"$4>, the person desiring to reac-uire Philippine citizenship would not even be re-uired to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to ta0e an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. oreover, repatriation results in the recovery o the original nationality. This means that a naturalized *ilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized *ilipino citizen. Bn the other hand, if he was originally a natural?born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural?born *ilipino. (An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% 1+. Who %ay validly avail o repatriation under (.). <o. 81.1? Held: R.). &o. 9!;!, which has lapsed into law on Bctober 5$, !##/, is an act providing for the repatriation =a> of *ilipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and =b> of natural?born *ilipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. (+e!a!4' Anga& v. Re1u:l"c, +.R. ,'. -32244, Se1&. -4, -999 [V"&ug$% 11. =e ore what agency should application or repatriation under (.) 81.1 $e iled? Held: 1nder 2ection ! of P.+. &o. ;5/, dated 3une /, !#;/, amending ,.). &o. "$, an application for repatriation could be filed with the 'pecial 0o%%ittee on <aturalization chaired by the 2olicitor Feneral with the 1ndersecretary of *oreign )ffairs and the +irector of the &ational 6ntelligence ,oordinating )gency as the other members. )lthough the agency was deactivated by virtue of President ,orazon ,. )-uino:s emorandum of arch 5;, !#9;, it was not, however, abrogated. The ,ommittee was reactivated on 3une 9, !##/ . .ence, the application should be filed with said )gency, not with the Regional Trial ,ourt. (+e!a!4' Anga& v. Re1u:l"c, +.R. ,'. -32244, Se1&. -4, -999 [V"&ug$% 12. 6ay a natural?$orn 2ilipino who $eca%e an )%erican citizen still $e considered a natural? $orn 2ilipino upon his reac!uisition o Philippine citizenship and, there ore, !uali ied to run or 0ongress%an? Held: Repatriation results in the recovery o the original nationality. This means that a naturalized *ilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized *ilipino citizen. Bn the other hand, if he was originally a natural?born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural?born *ilipino. 6n respondent ,ruz:s case, he lost his *ilipino citizenship when he rendered service in the )rmed *orces of the 1nited 2tates. .owever, he subse-uently reac-uired Philippine citizenship under R.). &o. 5"$4, which provides< 2ection !. )ny person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the )rmed *orces of the 1nited 2tates, or after

separation from the )rmed *orces of the 1nited 2tates, ac-uired 1nited 2tates citizenship, may reac-uire Philippine citizenship by ta0ing an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local ,ivil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. .aving thus ta0en the re-uired oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the ,ivil Registry of angatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent ,ruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural?born citizen, a status which he ac-uired at birth as the son of a *ilipino father . 6t bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status $e ore he lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner:s contention that respondent ,ruz is no longer a natural?born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. ITJhe term @natural?born citizenA was first defined in )rticle 666, 2ection % of the !#;$ ,onstitution as follows< 2ection %. ) natural?born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac-uire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Two re-uisites must concur for a person to be considered as such< =!> a person must be a *ilipino citizen from birth and =5> he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship. 1nder the !#;$ ,onstitution definition, there were two categories of *ilipino citizens which were not considered natural?born< =!> those who were naturalized and =5> those born before 3anuary !;, !#;$ &the date o e ectivity o the 11.# 0onstitution, , of *ilipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of ma8ority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those @naturalized citizensA were not considered natural?born obviously because they were not *ilipinos at birth and had to perform an act to ac-uire Philippine citizenship. Those born of *ilipino mothers before the effectivity of the !#;$ ,onstitution were li0ewise not considered natural?born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. The present ,onstitution, however, now considers those born of *ilipino mothers before the effectivity of the !#;$ ,onstitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the ma8ority age as natural?born. )fter defining who are natural?born citizens, 2ection 5 of )rticle 6E adds a sentence< @Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph =$>, 2ection ! hereof shall be deemed natural?born citizens.A ,onse-uently, only naturalized *ilipinos are considered not natural?born citizens. 6t is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present ,onstitution that there are only two classes of citizens< =!> those who are natural?born and =5> those who are naturalized in accordance with law. ) citizen who is not a naturalized *ilipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural?born *ilipino. &oteworthy is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subse-uently reac-uire it. The reason therefore is clear< as to such persons, they would either be natural?born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reac-uisition thereof. )s respondent ,ruz was not re-uired by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reac-uire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural?born *ilipino. )s such, he possessed all the necessary -ualifications to be elected as member of the .ouse of Representatives. (An&'n"' Bengs'n ((( v. )RE*, +.R. ,'. -42.40, Ma/ 7, 200-, En Banc [0a1unan$% 1#. "istinguish dual citizenship ro% dual allegiance. Held: +ual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. *or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. 2uch a person, ipso acto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. +ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. (hile dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual:s volition. (Me!ca4' v. Man<an', 307 SCRA 930, Ma/ 29, -999, En Banc [Men4'<a$%

1-. What is the %ain concern o 'ection *, )rticle 4@, 118. 0onstitution, on citizenship? 0onse!uently, are persons with %ere dual citizenship dis!uali ied to run or elective local positions under 'ection -+&d, o the 7ocal ;overn%ent 0ode? Held: 6n including 2ection / in )rticle 6E on citizenship, the concern of the ,onstitutional ,ommission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. .ence, the phrase @dual citizenshipA in R.). &o. ;!"4, 2ection %4=d> =Local Fovernment ,ode> must be understood as referring to @dual allegiance.A ,onse-uently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this dis-ualification. 1nli0e those with dual allegiance, who must, 7 7 7, be sub8ect to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable conse-uence of conflicting laws of different states. 'y electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. 6t may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. (Me!ca4' v. Man<an', +.R. ,'. -350.3, 307 SCRA 930, Ma/ 29, -999 [Men4'<a$% 1*. 0ite instances when a citizen o the Philippines %ay possess dual citizenship considering the citizenship clause &)rticle 4@, o the 0onstitution. Held: !> Those born of *ilipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soliC 5> Those born in the Philippines of *ilipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father:s country such children are citizens of that countryC $> Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter:s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. (Me!ca4' v. Man<an', +.R. ,'. -350.3, 307 SCRA 930, Ma/ 29, -999 [Men4'<a$% 1/. "oes res judicata apply in cases hinging on the issue o citizenship? Held: Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in 8udicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res 8udicata in any subse-uent proceeding challenging the sameC citing the case of 6oy Aa 7i% Aao v. 0o%%issioner o 4%%igration &-1 '0() 212 911.1:,. .e insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. .owever, in the case of =urca v. (epu$lic &*1 '0() 2-8 911.#:,, an e7ception to this general rule was recognized. The ,ourt ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present< !> a person:s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a partyC 5> the 2olicitor Feneral or his authorized representative too0 active part in the resolution thereof, and $> the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this ,ourt. )lthough the general rule was set forth in the case of 6oy Aa 7i% Aao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. 6t elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to ma0e the effort easier or simpler. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$% B. THE BILL OF RIGHTS The Due Pr !ess Cl"use 1.. "iscuss the "ue Process 0lause. "istinguish su$stantive due process ro% procedural due process.

Held: 2ection ! of the 'ill of Rights lays down what is 0nown as the Kdue process clauseK of the ,onstitution. 6n order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. (hen one spea0s of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. 6n essence, procedural due process Krefers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,K while substantive due process Kre-uires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and 8ust.K (C'!'na v. =n"&e4 )a!:'! "l'&s Ass'c"a&"'n '3 &5e 5"ls., 2.3 SCRA 3-, 6ec. -2, -997 [R'#e!'$% 18. (espondents Bnited 3ar$or Pilots )ssociation o the Philippines argue that due process was not o$served in the adoption o PP)?)5 <o. +-?12 which provides thatC D&a,ll existing regular appoint%ents which have $een previously issued $y the =ureau o 0usto%s or the PP) shall re%ain valid up to #1 "ece%$er 1112 only,E and D&a,ll appoint%ents to har$or pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, hence orth, $e only or a ter% o one &1, year ro% date o e ectivity su$ject to renewal or cancellation $y the Philippine Ports )uthority a ter conduct o a rigid evaluation o per or%ance,E allegedly $ecause no hearing was conducted where$y Drelevant govern%ent agenciesE and the har$or pilots the%selves could ventilate their views. They also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise o har$or pilotage $y pilots has $eco%e vested and can only $e Dwithdrawn or shortenedE $y o$serving the constitutional %andate o due process o law. Held: They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. *ortunately, the ,ourt has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of 7u%i!ued v. 3on. Exevea &;.(. <o. 11.*/*, <ove%$er 18, 111.,, where it declared that @=a>s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. oreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to see0 reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.A 6n the case at bar, respondents -uestioned PP)?)B &o. 4%?#5 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, failed to persuade. G 7 7 &either does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. )s a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental re-uirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body e7ercises its -uasi?8udicial function. 6n the performance of its e7ecutive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the re-uirements of notice and hearing. 1pon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and e7clusive right to the e7ercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be @withdrawn or shortenedA by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. 6t is here where PP)?)B &o. 4%?#5 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. Pilotage, 8ust li0e other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is @the granting of license especially to practice a profession.A 6t is also @the system of granting licenses =as for professional practice> in accordance with established standards.A ) license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. 'efore harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by ta0ing, not one but ive e7aminations, each followed by actual training and practice. G 7 7 Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of ;4 years. This is a vested right. 1nder the terms of PP)? )B &o. 4%?#5, @IaJll e7isting regular appointments which have been previously issued by the 'ureau of ,ustoms or the PP) shall remain valid up to $! +ecember !##5 only,A and @=a>ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one =!> year from date of effectivity sub8ect to renewal or cancellation by the )uthority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.A

6t is readily apparent that PP)?)B &o. 4%?#5 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to en8oy their profession before their compulsory retirement. 6n the past, they en8oyed a measure of security 0nowing that after passing five e7aminations and undergoing years of on?the?8ob training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revo0ed by the PP) for mental or physical unfitness. 1nder the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Eeteran pilots and neophytes ali0e are suddenly confronted with one?year terms which ipso acto e7pire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a @rigid evaluation of performanceA which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. .ence, the use of the term @renewal.A 6t is this pre? evaluation cancellation which primarily ma0es PP)?)B &o. 4%?#5 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. 6n a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. (C'!'na v. =n"&e4 )a!:'! "l'&s Ass'c"a&"'n '3 &5e 5"ls., 2.3 SCRA 3-, 6ece#:e! -2, -997 [R'#e!'$% 11. "oes the due process clause enco%pass the right to $e assisted $y counsel during an ad%inistrative in!uiry? Held: The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 6t is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invo0ed or re8ected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative in-uiry. 6n the case at bar, petitioners invo0e the right o an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumi-ued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee 7 7 7 was for the sole purpose of determining if he could be held ad%inistratively lia$le under the law for the complaints filed against him. 7 7 7 )s such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. G 7 7 (hile investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be a0in to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under e7isting laws, a party in an administrative in-uiry %ay or %ay not $e assisted $y counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondentLs capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 6n an administrative proceeding 7 7 7 a respondent 7 7 7 has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. 7 7 7 Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such in-uiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless re-uired by the ,onstitution or the law. G 7 7. (Lu#">ue4 v. E?evea, 2.2 SCRA -25, ,'v. -., -997 [R'#e!'$% 2+. "oes an extraditee have the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage o an extradition proceeding? Held: ,onsidering that in the case at bar, the e7tradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of pre8udice he will allegedly suffer is wea0, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner 2ecretary of 3ustice. G 7 7 4n tilting the $alance in avor o the interests o the 'tate, the 0ourt stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and $readth o the extradition proceedings. Procedural due process re-uires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. 2tated otherwise, a prior deter%ination should $e %ade as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will $e Fconde%ned to su er grievous loss.F (e have e7plained why an e7traditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the e7tradition process. )s aforesaid, P.+. &o. !4"# which implements the RP?12 D7tradition Treaty affords an e7traditee su icient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is iled in court. The ti%e for the e7traditee to 0now the basis of the re-uest for his e7tradition is %erely %oved to the filing in court of the formal petition for e7tradition. The e7traditeeLs right to 0now is %o%entarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the e7tradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the 2tate to prevent escape of potential e7traditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the re-uest for his e7tradition. &o less compelling at that stage of the e7tradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the 8udgment of a co?e-ual branch of the government, the D7ecutive, which has been endowed by our ,onstitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. &eedless to state, this balance of interests is not a static $ut a

%oving $alance which can be ad8usted as the e7tradition process moves from the administrative stage to the 8udicial stage and to the e7ecution stage depending on factors that will come into play. 6n sum, we rule that the te%porary hold on private respondentLs privilege of notice and hearing is a so t restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of unda%ental airness should he decide to resist the re-uest for his e7tradition to the 1nited 2tates. There is no denial o due process as long as unda%ental airness is assured a party. (Sec!e&a!/ '3 8us&"ce v. )'n. Ral15 C. Lan&"'n, +.R. ,'. -39495, Oc&. -7, 2000, En Banc [ un'$% The E#u"l Pr te!ti n Cl"use 21. Explain and discuss the e!ual protection o the law clause. Held: !. The e-ual protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the re-uirements of 8ustice and fair play. 6t has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in )rticle 666, 2ec. !, of the ,onstitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. )rbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. 'ut if the particular act assailed parta0es of an unwarranted partiality or pre8udice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the e-ual protection clause. )ccording to a long line of decisions, e-ual protection simply re-uires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated ali0e, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2imilar sub8ects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and un8ustly discriminate against others. The e-ual protection clause does not re-uire the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in une-ual protection, as where, for e7ample, a law prohibiting mature boo0s to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. (hat the clause re-uires is e-uality among e-uals as determined according to a valid classification. 'y classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars . ( 5"l"11"ne 8u4ges Ass'c"a&"'n v. !a4', 227 SCRA 703, 7--@7-2, ,'v. --, -993, En Banc [C!u<$% 5. The e-ual protection clause e7ists to prevent undue favor or privilege. 6t is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on ine-uality. Recognizing the e7istence of real difference among men, the e-ual protection clause does not demand absolute e-uality. 6t merely re-uires that all persons shall be treated ali0e, under li0e circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced . Thus, the e-ual protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications 7 7 7. 6f the classification is based on real and substantial differencesC is germane to the purpose of the lawC applies to all members of the same classC and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the ,onstitutionLs e-ual protection guarantee. ) distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose 7 7 7 is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. ()"#agan v. e'1le, 237 SCRA 53., Oc&. 7, -994, En Banc [0a1unan$% 22. 0ongress enacted (.). <o. 8181 which provides, in 'ection -- thereo , that F<o Election 5 icer shall hold o ice in a particular city or %unicipality or %ore than our &-, years. )ny election o icer who, either at the ti%e o the approval o this )ct or su$se!uent thereto, has served or at least our &-, years in a particular city or %unicipality shall auto%atically $e reassigned $y the 0o%%ission to a new station outside the original congressional district.F Petitioners, who are 0ity and 6unicipal Election 5 icers, theorize that 'ection -- o () 8181 is violative o the Fe!ual protection clauseF o the 118. 0onstitution $ecause it singles out the 0ity and 6unicipal Election 5 icers o the 056E7E0 as prohi$ited ro% holding o ice in the sa%e city or %unicipality or %ore than our &-, years. They %aintain that there is no su$stantial distinction $etween the% and other 056E7E0 o icials, and there ore, there is no valid classi ication to justi y the o$jective o the provision o law under attacG. (esolve. Held: The ,ourt is not persuaded by petitionersL arguments. The Ke-ual protection clauseK of the !#9; ,onstitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions< !> 5> $> %> The classification must rest on substantial distinctionC The classification must be germane to the purpose of the lawC The classification must not be limited to e7isting conditions onlyC and The classification must apply e-ually to all members of the same class.

)fter a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under 2ection %% of R) 9!9# satisfies the aforestated re-uirements. The singling out of election officers in order to Kensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignmentK does not violate the e-ual protection clause of the ,onstitution. 6n 7utz v. )raneta &18 Phil. 1-8, 1*# 911**:,, it was held that Kthe legislature is not re-uired by the ,onstitution to adhere to a policy of Lall or noneLK. This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. 6t may be true that all other officers of ,B DLD, referred to by petitioners are e7posed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. .owever, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by brea0ing an important lin0 in the chain of corruption than by brea0ing up each and every lin0 thereof. Eerily, under 2ection $=n> of R) 9!9#, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the ,B DLD, in a city or municipality. 6t is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large?scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. (Ag!"1"n' A. 6e +u<#an, 8!., e& al. v. COMELEC (+.R. ,'. -29--., 8ul/ -9, 2000, en Banc [ u!"s"#a$% 2#. )re there su$stantial distinctions $etween print %edia and $roadcast %edia to justi y the re!uire%ent or the latter to give ree airti%e to $e used $y the 0o%elec to in or% the pu$lic o !uali ications and progra% o govern%ent o candidates and political parties during the ca%paign period? "iscuss. Held: There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media which 8ustify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. 'ecause of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast fre-uencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar 8ustification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. 6n the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that the government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of print media. To re-uire radio and television broadcast industry to provide free airtime for the ,omelec Time is a fair e7change for what the industry gets. *rom another point of view, the 2, has also held that because of the uni-ue and pervasive influence of the broadcast media, @InJecessarily 7 7 7 the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.A (*ELEBA , (nc. v. COMELEC, 2.9 SCRA 337, A1!"l 2-, -99. [Men4'<a$% 2-. "oes the death penalty law &(.). <o. ./*1, violate the e!ual protection clause considering that, in e ect, it punishes only people who are poor, uneducated, and jo$less? Held: R.). &o. ;"/# specifically provides that @ITJhe death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed 7 7 7 when the victim is a religious or a child below seven =;> years old.A )pparently, the death penalty law ma0es no distinction. 6t applies to all persons and to all classes of persons H rich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or non?religious. &o particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be e7clusively imposed. The law punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below seven years of age. Thus, the perpetration of rape against a /?year old girl does not absolve or e7empt an accused from the imposition of the death penalty by the fact that he is poor, uneducated, 8obless, and lac0s catechetical instruction. To hold otherwise will not eliminate but promote ine-ualities. 6n 0ecilleville (ealty and 'ervice 0orporation v. 0), 2.8 '0() 811 9111.:,, the 2, clarified that compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. ( e'1le v. 8"##/ M"Aan' / *a#'!a, +.R. ,'. -29--2, 8ul/ 23, -999, En Banc [ e! Cu!"a#$% 2*. The 4nternational 'chool )lliance o Educators &4')E, !uestioned the point?o ?hire classi ication e%ployed $y 4nternational 'chool, 4nc. to justi y distinction in salary rates $etween oreign?hires and local?hires, i.e., salary rates o oreign?hires are higher $y 2*H than their local counterparts, as discri%inatory and, there ore, violates the e!ual protection clause. The 4nternational 'chool contended that this is necessary in order to entice oreign? hires to leave their do%icile and worG here. (esolve.

Held: That public policy abhors ine-uality and discrimination is beyond contention. Bur ,onstitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. G 7 7 6nternational law, which springs from general principles of law , li0ewise proscribes discrimination 7 7 7. The 1niversal +eclaration of .uman Rights, the 6nternational ,ovenant on Dconomic, 2ocial and ,ultural Rights, the 6nternational ,onvention on the Dlimination of )ll *orms of Racial +iscrimination, the ,onvention against +iscrimination in Dducation, the ,onvention =&o. !!!> ,oncerning +iscrimination in Respect of Dmployment and Bccupation ? all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and 8ustice. The Philippines, through its ,onstitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. I6Jt would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the 2tate, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure e-ual employment opportunities, closes its eyes to une-ual and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment 7 7 7. +iscrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor ,ode. )rticle !$/, for e7ample, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for wor0 of e-ual value. )rticle 5%9 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. G 7 7 The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this 8urisdiction the long honored legal truism of KD-ual pay for e-ual wor0.K Persons who wor0 with substantially e-ual -ualifications, s0ill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the 2chool =6nternational 2chool, 6nc.>, its Kinternational characterK notwithstanding. The 2chool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local?hires perform wor0 e-ual to that of foreign?hires. The ,ourt finds this argument a little cavalier. 6f an employer accords employees the same position and ran0, the presumption is that these employees perform e-ual wor0. This presumption is borne by logic and human e7perience. 6f the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to e7plain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to in8ury. The employer has discriminated against that employeeC it is for the employer to e7plain why the employee is treated unfairly. The employer in this case failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign?hires perform 5/M more efficiently or effectively than the local?hires. 'oth groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar wor0ing conditions. The 2chool cannot invo0e the need to entice foreign?hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of e-ual wor0 for e-ual pay. G77 (hile we recognize the need of the 2chool to attract foreign?hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the pre8udice of local?hires. The local?hires perform the same services as foreign?hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. *or the same reason, the Kdislocation factorK and the foreign?hiresL limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign?hires are ade-uately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not en8oyed by local?hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, ta7es and home leave travel allowances. The ,onstitution en8oins the 2tate to Kprotect the rights of wor0ers and promote their welfareK, Kto afford labor full protection.K The 2tate, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital . These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good . 2hould such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to stri0e down these stipulations. 6n this case, we find the point?of?hire classification employed by respondent 2chool to 8ustify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign?hires and local?hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign?hires and local?hires. The practice of the 2chool of according higher salaries to foreign?hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this ,ourt. ((n&e!na&"'nal Sc5''l All"ance '3 E4uca&'!s ((SAE% v. )'n. Le'na!4' A. Bu"su#:"ng, +.R. ,'. -2..45, 8une -, 2000, -s& 6"v. [0a1unan$%

2/. )ccused?appellant (o%eo ;. Ialosjos iled a %otion $e ore the 0ourt asGing that he $e allowed to ully discharge the duties o a 0ongress%an, including attendance at legislative sessions and co%%ittee %eetings despite his having $een convicted in the irst instance o a non?$aila$le o ense. "oes $eing an elective o icial result in a su$stantial distinction that allows di erent treat%ent? 4s $eing a 0ongress%an a su$stantial di erentiation which re%oves the accused?appellant as a prisoner ro% the sa%e class as all persons validly con ined under law? Held: 6n the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a -uestion of constitutional e-ual protection. G77 The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an e7cuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the @mandate of the peopleA are multifarious. The accused?appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ran0s highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused?appellant is only one of 5/4 members of the .ouse of Representatives, not to mention the 5% members of the 2enate, charged with the duties of legislation. ,ongress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. +epending on the e7igency of Fovernment that has to be addressed, the President or the 2upreme ,ourt can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its e7ercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. ) doctor with uni-ue s0ills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. )n elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. ) police officer must maintain peace and order. &ever had the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. ) strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals . The ,ourt cannot validate badges of ine-uality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may 8ustify e7ercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded . (e, therefore, find that election to the position of ,ongressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. G77 6t can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual:s status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often than0less 8ob of preserving the security in a potentially e7plosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepare inmates for re?entry into the social mainstream. &ecessarily, both these demands re-uire the curtailment and elimination of certain rights . Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused?appellant:s claim that re?election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the 2tate. ( e'1le v. 8al'sA's, 324 SCRA 9.9, 7e:. 3, 2000, En Banc [Cna!es@ San&"ag'$% The Ri$ht "$"inst %nre"s n"&le Se"r!hes "nd Seizures 2.. "iscuss the constitutional re!uire%ent that a judge, in issuing a warrant o arrest, %ust deter%ine pro$a$le cause Dpersonally.E "istinguish deter%ination o pro$a$le cause $y the prosecutor and deter%ination o pro$a$le cause $y the judge. Held: 6t must be stressed that the !#9; ,onstitution re-uires the 8udge to determine probable cause @personally,A a re-uirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial 8udges than that imposed under previous ,onstitutions. 6n 'oliven v. 6aGasiar, this ,ourt pronounced<

@(hat the ,onstitution underscores is the e7clusive and personal responsibility of the issuing 8udge to satisfy himself of the e7istence of probable cause. 6n satisfying himself of the e7istence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the 8udge is not re-uired to personally e7amine the complainant and his witnesses. *ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall< =!> personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the e7istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrestC or =5> if in the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal:s report and re-uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e7istence of probable cause.A 3o v. People &4$id., summarizes e7isting 8urisprudence on the matter as follows< @Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more< 2irst, as held in 4nting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the 8udge. (hether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The 8udge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of 8ustice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct ob8ectives. 'econd, since their ob8ectives are different, the 8udge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to 8ustify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Bbviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor:s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. .owever, the 8udge must decide independently. .ence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor:s $are report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the e7istence =or none7istence> of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the e7istence or none7istence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the 8udge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the .is .onor to ma0e his personal and separate 8udicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. 7astly, it is not re-uired that the co%plete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and e7amined by the 8udge. (e do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to e7amine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. (hat is re-uired, rather, is that the 8udge must have su icient supporting documents =such as the complaint, affidavits, counter?affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any> upon which to ma0e his independent 8udgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the e7istence of probable cause. The point is< he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor:s recommendation, as Respondent ,ourt did in this case. )lthough the prosecutor en8oys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the ,onstitution, we repeat, commands the 8udge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This ,ourt has consistently held that a 8udge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.A &0itations o%itted, 6n the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the -uestioned warrant as there was @no reason for =him> to doubt the validity of the certification made by the )ssistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to e7ist as against those charged in the information filed.A The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause e7ists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor:s findings and recommendations. .e adopted the 8udgment of the prosecutor regarding the e7istence of probable cause as his own. (A:4ula v. +u"an", 329 SCRA -, 7e:. -., 2000, 3!4 6"v. [+'n<aga@Re/es$% 28. 4n an application or search warrant, the application was acco%panied $y a sGetch o the co%pound at *1/ 'an Iose de la 6ontana 't., 6a$olo, 0e$u 0ity, indicating the 2?storey residential house o private respondent with a large DJE enclosed in a s!uare. Within the

sa%e co%pound are residences o other people, worGshops, o ices, actories and warehouse. The search warrant issued, however, %erely indicated the address o the co%pound which is *1/ 'an Iose de la 6ontana 't., 6a$olo, 0e$u 0ity. "id this satis y the constitutional re!uire%ent under 'ection 2, )rticle 444 that the place to $e searched %ust $e particularly descri$ed? Held: This ,ourt has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is easi$le. 6n the present case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant was accompanied by a s0etch of the compound at /!" 2an 3ose de la ontana 2t., abolo, ,ebu ,ity. The s0etch indicated the 5?storey residential house of private respondent with a large KGK enclosed in a s-uare. (ithin the same compound are residences of other people, wor0shops, offices, factories and warehouse. (ith this s0etch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with su icient particularity so as to segregate it ro% the other $uildings or structures inside the sa%e co%pound. 'ut the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is /!" 2an 3ose de la ontana 2t., abolo, ,ebu ,ity. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inade-uacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the -uestioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional re-uirement. ( e'1le v. Es&!a4a, 299 SCRA 3.3, 400, [Ma!&"ne<$% 21. 0an the place to $e searched, as set out in the warrant, $e a%pli ied or %odi ied $y the o icersK own personal Gnowledge o the pre%ises, or the evidence they adduce in support o their application or the warrant? Held: 2uch a change is proscribed by the ,onstitution which re-uires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. 6t would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. 6t would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers e7ecuting a search warrant that discretion which the ,onstitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the 3udge, and only in the warrant itselfC it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. 6t is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched H although not that specified in the warrant H is e7actly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. (hat is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. ( e'1le v. C'u!& '3 A11eals, 29- SCRA 400, 8une 29, -99. [,a!vasa$% #+. What is Dsearch incidental to a law ul arrestE? "iscuss. Held: (hile a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may e7tend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. 6n a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is -uestioned in a large ma8ority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a prete7t for conducting a search. 6n this instance, the law re-uires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made H the process cannot be reversed. &6alacat v. 0ourt o )ppeals, 28# '0() 1*1, 1.* 9111.:, ( e'1le v. C5ua )' San, 30. SCRA 432, 8une -7, -999, En Banc [6av"4e, 8!., C.8.$% #1. What is the Dplain viewE doctrine? What are its re!uisites? "iscuss. Held: !. Bb8ects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are sub8ect to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The @plain viewA doctrine applies when the following re-uisites concur< =a> the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior 8ustification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular areaC =b> the discovery of the evidence in plain view

is inadvertentC =c> it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise sub8ect to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully ma0e an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. 6n the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The ob8ect must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. 6t is clear that an ob8ect is in plain view if the ob8ect itself is plainly e7posed to sight. The difficulty arises when the ob8ect is inside a closed container. (here the ob8ect seized was inside a closed pac0age, the ob8ect itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. .owever, if the pac0age proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. 6n other words, if the pac0age is such that an e7perienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. 6t must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise sub8ect to seizure. ( e'1le v. 6'!"a, 30- SCRA 99., 8an. 22, -999, En Banc [ un', 8.$% 5. *or the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present< a> a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official dutiesC b> the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they areC and c> the evidence must be immediately apparentC and d> plain view 8ustified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 6n the instant case, recall that PB5 'alut testified that they first located the mari8uana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. .ence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant:s premises. &ote further that the police team was dispatched to appellant:s Gaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in @plain viewA applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating ob8ect . ,learly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. (e also note the testimony of 2PB5 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to @loo0 around the areaA before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized mari8uana plants were not @immediately apparentA and @further searchA was needed. 6n sum, the mari8uana plants in -uestion were not in @plain viewA or @open to eye and hand.A The @plain viewA doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply. &or can we sustain the trial court:s conclusion that 8ust because the mari8uana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invo0e the protection afforded by the ,harter against unreasonable searches by agents of the 2tate. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one:s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to @the right of personal securityA of the individual. G 7 7, what is sought to be protected against the 2tate:s unlawful intrusion are persons, not places . To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The 'ill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom. ( e'1le v. A:e Val4e<, +.R. ,'. -29299, Se1&. 25, 2000, En Banc [Bu"su#:"ng$% $. ,onsidering its factual milieu, this case falls s-uarely under the plain view doctrine. G 7 7. (hen 2pencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of PB5 Faviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buy?bust team were 8ustified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Bnce inside the house, the police officers cornered 2pencer and recovered the buy? bust money from him. They also caught appellant in lagrante delicto repac0ing the mari8uana bric0s which were in full view on top of a table. G 7 7. .ence, appellant:s subse-uent arrest was li0ewise lawful, coming as it is within the purview of 2ection /=a> of Rule !!$ of the !#9/ Rules on ,riminal Procedure 7 7 7. 2ection /=a> is commonly referred to as the rule on in lagrante delicto arrests. .ere two elements must concur< =!> the person to be arrested must e7ecute an overt act indicating that he has 8ust committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crimeC and =5> such overt

act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer . Thus, when appellant was seen repac0ing the mari8uana, the police officers were not only authorized but also duty?bound to arrest him even without a warrant. ( e'1le v. Ela#1a!', 329 SCRA 404, 4-4@4-5, Ma!c5 3-, 2000, 2n4 6"v. [Bu"su#:"ng$% #2. What is a Dstop?and? risGE search? Held: !. 6n the landmar0 case of Terry v. 5hio &2+ 7 Ed 2d 881> 88 ' 0t 18/8, #12 B' 1, 1++, Iune 1+, 11/8,, a stop?and?fris0 was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon=s>< @7 7 7 =(>here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his e7perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and ma0e reasonable in-uiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others: safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 2uch a search is a reasonable search under the *ourth )mendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were ta0en.A &3errera, ) 3and$ooG on )rrest, 'earch and 'eizure and 0ustodial 4nvestigation, 111* ed., p. 18*> and Terry v. 5hio, supra, p. 111, 6n allowing such a search, the 1nited 2tates 2upreme ,ourt held that the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to ma0e an actual arrest.

6n admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop?and?fris0, the 12 2upreme ,ourt held that what 8ustified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in ta0ing steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could une7pectedly and fatally be used against him.

6t did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance 8udicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, e7cused only by e7igent circumstances. (Manal"l" v. CA, 2.0 SCRA 400, Oc&. 9, -997 [ angan":an$%

5. (e now proceed to the 8ustification for and allowable scope of a @stop?and?fris0A as a @limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,A as laid down in Terry, thus< (e merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his e7perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and ma0es reasonable in-uiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others: safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 2uch a search is a reasonable search under the *ourth )mendment &Terry, at 111. 4n act, the 0ourt noted that the Lsole justi icationK or a stop?and? risG was

the Lprotection o the police o icer and others near$yK> while the scope o the search conducted in the case was li%ited to patting down the outer clothing o petitioner and his co%panions, the police o icer did not place his hands in their pocGets nor under the outer sur ace o their gar%ents until he had elt weapons, and then he %erely reached or and re%oved the guns. This did not constitute a general exploratory search, 4d., Bther notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not re-uired to conduct a @stop?and?fris0,A it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a @stop?and? fris0.A ) genuine reason must e7ist, in light of the police officer:s e7perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him . *inally, a @stop?and?fris0A serves a two?fold interest< =!> the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable causeC and =5> the more pressing interest of safety and self?preservation which permit the police officer to ta0e steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could une7pectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. (Malaca& v. C'u!& '3 A11eals, 2.3 SCRA -59, 6ec. -2, -997 [6av"4e$%

##. )re searches at checGpoints valid? "iscuss. Held: )ccused?appellants assail the manner by which the chec0point in -uestion was conducted. They contend that the chec0point manned by elements of the a0ati Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. (e ta0e 8udicial notice of the e7istence of the ,B DLD, resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to 2ection /5=c> in relation to 2ection 5"=-> of the Bmnibus Dlection ,ode ='atas Pambansa 'lg. 99!>. The national and local elections in !##/ were held on 9 ay, the second onday of the month. The incident, which happened on / )pril !##/, was well within the election period. This ,ourt has ruled that not all chec0points are illegal. Those which are warranted by the e7igencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed . *or, admittedly, routine chec0points do intrude, to a certain e7tent, on motorists: right to @free passage without interruption,A but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle:s occupants are re-uired to answer a brief -uestion or two. *or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants sub8ected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine chec0s cannot be regarded as violative of an individual:s right against unreasonable search. 6n fact, these routine chec0s, when conducted in a fi7ed area, are even less intrusive. The chec0point herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the ,B DLD,. The ,B DLD, would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. 6t would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would 0now that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PB$ 2uba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted 8ust to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. )t best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car:s doors or sub8ecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. (e see no need for chec0points to be announced 7 7 7. &ot only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Dven so, badges of legitimacy of chec0points may still be inferred from their fi7ed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated. ( e'1le v. =sana, 323 SCRA 754, 8an. 2., 2000, - s& 6"v. [6av"4e, C8$%

#-. "o the ordinary rights against unreasona$le searches and seizures apply to searches conducted at the airport pursuant to routine airport security procedures?

Held: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by e7posure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lac0 of sub8ective e7pectation of privacy, which e7pectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 2uch recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. (ith increased concern over airplane hi8ac0ing and terrorism has come increased security at the nation:s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectorsC their carry?on baggage as well as chec0ed luggage are routinely sub8ected to 7?ray scans. 2hould these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious ob8ects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the ob8ects are. There is little -uestion that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy e7pectations associated with airline travel. 6ndeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tic0ets that they are sub8ect to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be sub8ect to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The pac0s of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused?appellant herein. ,orollarily, her subse-uent arrest, although li0ewise without warrant, was 8ustified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of @shabuA in her person in lagrante delicto. ( e'1le v. Le"la 8'5ns'n, +.R. ,'. -3...-, 6ec. -., 2000, 2 n4 6"v. [Men4'<a$% #*. 6ay the constitutional protection against unreasona$le searches and seizures $e extended to acts co%%itted $y private individuals? Held: )s held in People v. 6arti &11# '0() *. 91111:,, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of oneLs person from interference by government and it cannot be e7tended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. ( e'1le v. Men4'<a, 30- SCRA 99, 8an. -., -999, -s& 6"v. [Mel'$% #/. 'hould the seized drugs which are phar%aceutically correct $ut not properly docu%ented su$ject o an illegal search $ecause the applicant D ailed to allege in the application or search warrant that the su$ject drugs or which she was applying or search warrant were either aGe, %is$randed, adulterated, or unregistered,E $e returned to the owner? Held: (ith the 2tateLs obligation to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them &)rticle 44, 'ection 1*, 118. 0onstitution,, in order to develop a healthy and alert citizenry &)rticle J4@, 'ection 1191:,, it became mandatory for the government to supervise and control the proliferation of drugs in the mar0et. The constitutional mandate that Kthe 2tate shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to ma0e essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable costK &)rticle J444, 'ection 11, cannot be neglected. This is why Kthe 2tate shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system.K &)rticle J444, 'ection 12, The '*)+ is the government agency vested by law to ma0e a mandatory and authoritative determination of the true therapeutic effect of drugs because it involves technical s0ill which is within its special competence. The health of the citizenry should never be compromised. To the layman, medicine is a cure that may lead to better health. 6f the seized /5 bo7es of drugs are pharmaceutically correct but not properly documented, they should be promptly disposed of in the manner provided by law in order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use the drugs underground. Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court that the applicant Kfailed to allege in the application for search warrant that the sub8ect drugs for which she was applying for search warrant were either fa0e, misbranded, adulterated, or unregisteredK in order to obtain the return of the drugs. The policy of the law enunciated in R.). &o. 954$ is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen. *oremost among these consumers is the government itself which procures medicines and distributes them to the local communities through direct assistance to the local health centers or through outreach and charity programs. Bnly with the proper government sanctions can medicines and drugs circulate the mar0et. (e cannot afford to ta0e any ris0, for the life and health of the citizenry are as precious as the e7istence of the 2tate. ( e'1le v. 8u4ge Es&!ella *. Es&!a4a, +.R ,'. -2449-, 8une 29, 2000, S1cl. 2 n4 6"v. [Cna!es@ San&"ag'$% #.. "o (egional Trial 0ourts have co%petence to pass upon the validity or regularity o seizure and or eiture proceedings conducted $y the =ureau o 0usto%s and to enjoin or otherwise inter ere with these proceedings?

Held: 6n Iao v. 0ourt o )ppeals &2-1 '0() #*, -2?-# 9111*:,, this ,ourt, reiterating its rulings 7 7 7 said< There is no -uestion that Regional Trial ,ourts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the 'ureau of ,ustoms and to en8oin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The ,ollector of ,ustoms sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all -uestions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial ,ourts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. 6t is li0ewise well?settled that the provisions of the Tariff and ,ustoms ,ode and that of Republic )ct &o. !!5/, as amended, otherwise 0nown as @)n )ct ,reating the ,ourt of Ta7 )ppeals,A specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal ob8ections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the ,ollector of ,ustoms are appealable to the ,ommissioner of ,ustoms, whose decision, in turn, is sub8ect to the e7clusive appellate 8urisdiction of the ,ourt of Ta7 )ppeals and from there to the ,ourt of )ppeals. The rule that Regional Trial ,ourts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government:s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon ,ustoms, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and e7port duties due the 2tate, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform. Dven if the seizure by the ,ollector of ,ustoms were illegal, 7 7 7 we have said that such act does not deprive the 'ureau of ,ustoms of 8urisdiction thereon. Respondents cite the statement of the ,ourt of )ppeals that regular courts still retain 8urisdiction @where, as in this case, for lac0 of probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under ,ustoms 8urisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings.A They overloo0 the fact, however, that under the law, the -uestion of whether probable cause e7ists for the seizure of the sub8ect sac0s of rice is not for the Regional Trial ,ourt to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may e7ercise the power to effect customs: searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings . )s the ,ourt held in Ponce Enrile v. @inuya &#. '0() #81, #88?#81 911.1:, reiterated in Iao v. 0ourt o )ppeals, supra and 6ison v. <atividad, 21# '0() .#- 91112:,< The governmental agency concerned, the 'ureau of ,ustoms, is vested with e7clusive authority. Dven if it be assumed that in the e7ercise of such e7clusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such 8urisdiction. 6t does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the ,ollector of ,ustoms is not final. )n appeal lies to the ,ommissioner of ,ustoms and thereafter to the ,ourt of Ta7 )ppeals. 6t may even reach this ,ourt through the appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation o the legal issues raised is thus indicated. 0ertainly a court o irst instance is not therein included. 4t is devoid o jurisdiction. (Bu!eau '3 Cus&'#s v. Oga!"', 329 SCRA 2.9, 299@29., Ma!c5 30, 2000, 2 n4 6"v. [Men4'<a$% The Pri'"!( ) C **uni!"ti ns "nd C rresp nden!e #8. Private respondent (a ael '. 5rtanez iled with the (egional Trial 0ourt o Muezon 0ity a co%plaint or annul%ent o %arriage with da%ages against petitioner Teresita 'alcedo? 5rtanez, on grounds o lacG o %arriage license andNor psychological incapacity o the petitioner. )%ong the exhi$its o ered $y private respondent were three &#, cassette tapes o alleged telephone conversations $etween petitioner and unidenti ied persons. The trial court issued the assailed order ad%itting all o the evidence o ered $y private respondent, including tape recordings o telephone conversations o petitioner with unidenti ied persons. These tape recordings were %ade and o$tained when private respondent allowed his riends ro% the %ilitary to wire tap his ho%e telephone. "id the trial court act properly when it ad%itted in evidence said tape recordings?

Held: Republic )ct &o. %544 entitled K)n )ct to Prohibit and Penalize (ire Tapping and Bther Related Eiolations of the Privacy of ,ommunication, and *or Bther PurposesK e7pressly ma0es such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. 7 7 7. ,learly, respondent trial court and ,ourt of )ppeals failed to consider the afore?-uoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in -uestion. )bsent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the sub8ect tapes is mandatory under Rep. )ct &o. %544. )dditionally, it should be mentioned that the above?mentioned Republic )ct in 2ection 5 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than si7 ="> months and up to si7 ="> years for violation of said )ct. (Salce4'@O!&ane< v. C'u!& '3 A11eals, 235 SCRA ---, Aug. 4, -994 [ a4"lla$% The Ri$ht t Pri'"!( #1. 4s there a constitutional right to privacy? Held: The essence of privacy is the @right to be let alone.A 6n the !#"/ case of ;riswold v. 0onnecticut &#81 B.'. -.1, 1- l. ed. 2" *1+ 911/*:,, the 1nited 2tates 2upreme ,ourt gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. 6t held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the *irst, Third, *ourth, *ifth and &inth )mendments. 6n the !#"9 case of 6or e v. 6utuc &22 '0() -2-, ---? --*,, we adopted the ;riswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. The 2, clarified that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our ,onstitution. 6t is e7pressly recognized in 2ection $=!> of the 'ill of Rights. Bther facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the 'ill of Rights, i.e., 2ecs. !, 5, ", 9, and !;. (O1le v. *'!!es, +.R. ,'. -279.5, 8ul/ 23, -99. [ un'$% -+. 4denti y the zones o privacy recognized and protected in our laws. Held: The 0ivil 0ode provides that @IeJvery person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other personsA and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 6t also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The (evised Penal 0ode ma0es a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. 6nvasion of privacy is an offense in special laws li0e the )nti?(iretapping Law =R.). %544>, the 2ecrecy of 'an0 +eposits =R.). !%4/> and the 6ntellectual Property ,ode =R.). 95#$>. The (ules o 0ourt on privileged communication li0ewise recognize the privacy of certain information &'ection 2-, (ule 1#+9c:, (evised (ules on Evidence,. (O1le v. *'!!es, +.R. ,'. -279.5, 8ul/ 23, -99. [ un'$% -1. "iscuss why )d%inistrative 5rder <o. #+8 &issued $y the President prescri$ing or a <ational 4" syste% or all citizens to acilitate $usiness transactions with govern%ent agencies engaged in the delivery o $asic services and social security provisions, should $e declared unconstitutional. Held: (e prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the ,onstitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that ).B. &o. $49 is 8ustified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. ).B. &o. $49 is predicated on two considerations< =!> the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and =5> the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons see0ing basic services. 6t is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of ).B. &o. $49. =ut what is not argua$le is the $roadness, the vagueness, the over$readth o ).5. <o. #+8 which i i%ple%ented will put our peopleKs right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart o ).5. <o. #+8 lies in its 2ection % which provides for a Population Reference &umber =PR&> as a @common reference number to establish a lin0age among concerned agenciesA through the use of @'iometrics TechnologyA and @computer application designs.A 4t is noteworthy that ).5. <o. #+8 does not state what speci ic $iological characteristics and what particular $io%etrics technology shall $e used to identi y people who will seeG its

coverage. 0onsidering the $an!uet o options availa$le to the i%ple%entors o ).5. <o. #+8, the ear that it threatens the right to privacy o our people is not groundless. ).5. <o. #+8 should also raise our antennas or a urther looG will show that it does not state whether encoding o data is li%ited to $iological in or%ation alone or identi ication purposes. J x x. 0learly, the inde initeness o ).5. <o. #+8 can give the govern%ent the roving authority to store and retrieve in or%ation or a purpose other than the identi ication o the individual through his P(<. The potential or %isuse o the data to $e gathered under ).5. <o. #+8 cannot $e underplayed x x x. The %ore re!uent the use o the P(<, the $etter the chance o $uilding a huge and or%ida$le in or%ation $ase through the electronic linGage o the iles. The data %ay $e gathered or gain ul and use ul govern%ent purposes> $ut the existence o this vast reservoir o personal in or%ation constitutes a covert invitation to %isuse, a te%ptation that %ay $e too great or so%e o our authorities to resist. 6t is plain and we hold that ).B. &o. $49 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for une-uivocally speci ied purposes. The lac0 of proper safeguards in this regard of ).B. &o. $49 may interfere with the individual:s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to trac0 down his movementC it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self?incriminationC it may pave the way for @fishing e7peditionsA by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possi$ilities o a$use and %isuse o the P(<, $io%etrics and co%puter technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacGs control over what can $e read or placed on his 4", %uch less veri y the correctness o the data encoded. They threaten the very a$uses that the =ill o (ights seeGs to prevent. The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle?to?grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national networ0 is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. G 7 7. Retrieval of stored data is simple. (hen information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be e7tracted together with other data on the sub8ect. Bnce e7tracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins. ITJhe ,ourt will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people:s liberty if it would not immediately smother the spar0s that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them. 9):nd we now hold that when the integrity o a unda%ental right is at staGe, this 0ourt will give the challenged law, ad%inistrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. 4t will not do or the authorities to invoGe the presu%ption o regularity in the per or%ance o o icial duties. <or is it enough or the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational or a $asic right can $e di%inished, i not de eated, even when the govern%ent does not act irrationally. They %ust satis actorily show the presence o co%pelling state interest and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude a$uses. This approach is demanded by the !#9; ,onstitution whose entire matri7 is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. 6n case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the ,onstitution. The right to privacy is one o the %ost threatened rights o %an living in a %ass society. The threats emanate from various sources H governments, 8ournalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 6n the case at bar, the threat comes from the e7ecutive branch of government which by issuing ).B. &o. $49 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the prete7t that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. ;iven the record?Geeping power o the co%puter, only the indi erent will ail to perceive the danger that ).5. <o. #+8 gives the govern%ent the power to co%pile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. G 7 7 I(Je close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our ,onstitution for flattery. (O1le v. *'!!es, +.R. ,'. -279.5, 8ul/ 23, -99. [ un'$% -2. 'hould in ca%era inspection o $anG accounts $e allowed? 4 in the a ir%ative, under what circu%stances should it $e allowed? Held: The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents re-uested by the Bmbudsman. )nd whether the order of the

Bmbudsman to have an in ca%era inspection of the -uestioned account is allowed as an e7ception to the law on secrecy of ban0 deposits =R.). &o. !%4/>. )n e7amination of the secrecy of ban0 deposits law =R.). &o. !%4/> would reveal the following e7ceptions< !> 5> $> %> /> (here the depositor consents in writingC 6mpeachment casesC 'y court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officialsC +eposit is sub8ect of litigationC 2ec. 9, R.). &o. $4!#, in cases of une7plained wealth as held in the case of P<= v. ;ancayco &122 Phil. *+#, *+8 911/*:,.

The order of the Bmbudsman to produce for in ca%era inspection the sub8ect accounts with the 1nion 'an0 of the Philippines, 3ulia Eargas 'ranch, is based on a pending investigation at the Bffice of the Bmbudsman against )mado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.). &o. $4!#, 2ec. $ =e> and =g> relative to the 3oint Eenture )greement between the Public Dstates )uthority and ) )R6. (e rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent 8urisdiction. *urther, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the sub8ect matter of the pending case before the court of competent 8urisdiction. The ban0 personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. 6n Bnion =anG o the Philippines v. 0ourt o )ppeals , we held that @2ection 5 of the Law on 2ecrecy of 'an0 +eposits, as amended, declares ban0 deposits to be Nabsolutely confidential: e7cept< !> 6n an e7amination made in the course of a special or general e7amination of a ban0 that is specifically authorized by the onetary 'oard after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a ban0 fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to loo0 into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, 5> 6n an e7amination made by an independent auditor hired by the ban0 to conduct its regular audit provided that the e7amination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the e7clusive use of the ban0, $> 1pon written permission of the depositor, %> 6n cases of impeachment, /> 1pon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or "> 6n cases where the money deposited or invested is the sub8ect matter of the litigationA. 6n the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. (hat is e7isting is an investigation by the Bffice of the Bmbudsman. 6n short, what the Bffice of the Bmbudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge )mado Lagdameo, et. al., with the 2andiganbayan. ,learly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the ban0 account for inspection. Oones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The ,ivil ,ode provides that @IeJvery person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other personsA and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 6t also holds public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal ,ode ma0es a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. 6nvasion of privacy is an offense in special laws li0e the anti?(iretapping Law , the 'ecrecy o =anG "eposits )ct, and the 6ntellectual Property ,ode . (L'u!4es *. Ma!>ue< v. )'n. An"an' A. 6es"e!&', +.R. ,'. -35..2, 8une 27, 200-, En Banc [ a!4'$% Freed * ) E+pressi n -#. "istinguish Dcontent?$ased restrictionsE on ree speech ro% Dcontent?neutral restrictions,E and give exa%ple o each.

Held: 0ontent?$ased restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are, therefore, sub8ect to the clear?and?present danger test. *or e7ample, a rule such as that involved in 'anidad v. 0o%elec &181 '0() *21 9111+:,, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. 6n addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness. 0ontent?neutral restrictions, on the other hand, li0e 2ec. !!=b> of R.). &o. ""%", which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. ) deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear?and?present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws, li0e 2ec. !!=b> of R.). &o. ""%", which are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear?and?present danger test to such regulatory measures would be li0e using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed. The test for this difference in the level of 8ustification for the restriction of speech is that content?based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. &o such reasons underlie content?neutral regulations, li0e regulation of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under '.P. 'lg. 994, the Public )ssembly )ct of !#9/. (Os#ena v. COMELEC, 2.. SCRA 447, Ma!c5 3-, -99. [Men4'<a$% --. "oes the conduct o exit poll $y )=' 0=< present a clear and present danger o destroying the credi$ility and integrity o the electoral process as it has the tendency to sow con usion considering the rando%ness o selecting interviewees, which urther %aGes the exit poll highly unrelia$le, to justi y the pro%ulgation o a 0o%elec resolution prohi$iting the sa%e? Held: 2uch arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. 2irst, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. 'econd, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official ,omelec count. 6t consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. 2inally, not at sta0e are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are e7ercises that are separate and independent from the e7it polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of e7it polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. 6f at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other. The ,B DLD,:s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of e7it polls H disorder and confusion in the voting centers H does not 8ustify a total ban on them. 1ndoubtedly, the assailed ,omelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without -ualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing, however, that e7it polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. &either has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of e7it poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. oreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of e7it poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters: answers to the survey -uestions will forever remain un0nown and une7plored. 1nless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election?day and other factors on voters: choices. The absolute ban imposed by the ,omelec cannot, therefore, be 8ustified. 6t does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through e7it polling. Bn the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the ,omelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by e7it surveys. (ith foregoing premises, it is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Puite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, e7it polls H properly conducted and publicized H can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible electionsC and for the elimination of election?fi7ing, fraud and other electoral ills. (ABS@

CB, B!'a4cas&"ng C'!1'!a&"'n v. COMELEC, +.R. ,'. -334.9, 8an. 2., 2000, En Banc [ angan":an$% -*. 'ection *.- o (.). <o. 1++/ &2air Election )ct, which providesC D'urveys a ecting national candidates shall not $e pu$lished i teen &1*, days $e ore an election and surveys a ecting local candidates shall not $e pu$lished seven &., days $e ore an election.E The 'ocial Weather 'tations, 4nc. &'W',, a private non?stocG, non?pro it social research institution conducting surveys in various ields> and Oa%ahalan Pu$lishing 0orporation, pu$lisher o the 6anila 'tandard, a newspaper o general circulation, which eatures newsworthy ite%s o in or%ation including election surveys, challenged the constitutionality o a oresaid provision as it constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise o reedo% o speech without any clear and present danger to justi y such restraint. 'hould the challenge $e sustained? Held: *or reason hereunder given, we hold that 2ection /.% of R.). &o. #44" constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, e7pression, and the press. To be sure, 2ection /.% lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, e7pression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen =!/> days immediately preceding a national election and seven =;> days before a local election. 'ecause of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, e7pression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. 6ndeed, @any system of prior restraints of e7pression comes to this ,ourt bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity 7 7 7. The Fovernment Nthus carries a heavy burden of showing 8ustification for the enforcement of such restraint.:A There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation. &or may it be argued that because of )rt. 6G?,, 2ec. % of the ,onstitution, which gives the ,omelec supervisory power to regulate the en8oyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure li0e 2ec. /.%. *or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the ,omelec under )rt. 6G?,, 2ec. % is limited to ensuring @e-ual opportunity, time, space, and the right to replyA as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for @public information campaigns and forums among candidates.A G77 &or can the ban on election surveys be 8ustified on the ground that there are other countries 7 7 7 which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of election surveys. )t best this survey is inconclusive. 6t is noteworthy that in the 1nited 2tates no restriction on the publication of election survey results e7ists. 6t cannot be argued that this is because the 1nited 2tates is a mature democracy. &either are there laws imposing an embargo on survey results, even for a limited period, in other countries. G 7 7. (hat test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 2ection /.%Q The 1nited 2tates 2upreme ,ourt 7 7 7 held in Bnited 'tates v. 5K =rienC I)J government regulation is sufficiently 8ustified =!> if it is within the constitutional power of the governmentC =5> if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interestC =$> if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free e7pressionC and =%> if the incidental restriction on alleged *irst )mendment freedoms =of speech, e7pression and press> is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest &#11 B.'. #/., 2+ 7. Ed. 2d /12, /8+ 911/8: 9$racGeted nu%$ers added:,. This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content?based from content? neutral regulations and is said to have @become canonical in the review of such laws.A 6t is noteworthy that the 5K =rien test has been applied by this ,ourt in at least two cases &)diong v. 0o%elec, 2+. '0() .12 91112:> 5s%ena v. 0o%elec, supra.,. 1nder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is @not unrelated to the suppression of free e7pression.A oreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of e7pression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in -uestion. Bur in-uiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to 2ec. /.%. 2irst. 2ec. /.% fails to meet criterion =$> of the 5K =rien test because the causal connection of e7pression to the asserted governmental interest ma0es such interest @not

unrelated to the suppression of free e7pression.A 'y prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 2ec. /.% actually suppresses a whole class of e7pression, while allowing the e7pression of opinion concerning the same sub8ect matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TE commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion ma0ers. 6n effect, 2ec. /.% shows a bias for a particular sub8ect matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of e7pression means that @the government has no power to restrict e7pression because of its message, its ideas, its sub8ect matter, or its contents.A The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the e7pression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in 0haplinsGy v. <ew 3a%pshire &#1* B.'. */8, *.1?*.2, 8/ 7. Ed. 1+#1, 1+#* 911-2:,, thus< There are certain well?defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any ,onstitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or Nfighting: words H those which by their very utterance inflict in8ury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. I2Juch utterances are no essential part of any e7position of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. &or is there 8ustification for the prior restraint which 2ec. /.% lays on protected speech. 6n <ear v. 6innesota &28# B.'. /1., .1*?.1/, .* l. Ed. 1#*., 1#/. 911#1:,, it was held< ITJhe protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. 'ut the limitation has been recognized only in e7ceptional cases 7 7 7. &o one would -uestion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. Bn similar grounds, the primary re-uirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government 7 7 7. Thus, 7 7 7 the prohibition imposed by 2ec. /.% cannot be 8ustified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of e7pression is direct, absolute, and substantial. 6t constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen =!/> days immediately before a national election and seven =;> days immediately before a local election. This sufficiently distinguishes 2ec. /.% from R.). &o. ""%", 2ec. !!=b>, which this ,ourt found to be valid in <ational Press 0lu$ v. 0o%elec &supra.,, and 5s%ena v. 0o%elec &supra.,. *or the ban imposed by R.). &o. ""%", 2ec. !!=b> is not only authorized by a specific constitutional provision &)rt. 4J?0, 'ec. -,, but it also provided an alternative so that, as this ,ourt pointed out in 5s%ena, there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by the ,omelec space, and ,omelec hour. 'econd. Dven if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free e7pression is only incidental, 2ec. /.% nonetheless fails to meet criterion =%> of the 5K =rien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. )s already stated, 2ec. /.%. aims at the prevention of last?minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, @8un0ingA of wea0 or @losingA candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called @dagdag?bawas.A Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of e7pression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. Thus, under the )dministrative ,ode of !#9; &=G. @, Tit. 4, 'u$tit. 0, 0h 1, 'ec. #91:,, the ,omelec is given the power< To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlaw ul, libelous, %isleading or alse election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in 2ec. /.%. Pursuant to this power of the ,omelec, it can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters. ,andidates can have their own surveys conducted. &o right of reply can be invo0ed by others. &o principle of e-uality is involved. 6t is a free mar0et to which each candidate brings his ideas. )s for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Fovernment can deal with this natural?enough tendency of some voters. 2ome voters want to be identified with the @winners.A 2ome are susceptible to the herd mentality.

,an these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of survey results which are a form of e7pressionQ 6t has been held that @ImereJ legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to 8ustify such as diminishes the e7ercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.A To summarize then, we hold that 2ec. /.%. is invalid because =!> it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of e7pression, =5> it is a direct and total suppression of a category of e7pression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and =$> the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of e7pression. (S'c"al Dea&5e! S&a&"'ns, (nc., v. COMELEC, +.R. ,'. -4757-, Ma/ 5, 200-, En Banc [Men4'<a$% -/. "iscuss the Fdoctrine o air co%%entF as a valid de ense in an action or li$el or slander. Held: *air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is 8udicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. 6n order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. 6f the comment is an e7pression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mista0en, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (B'!Aal v. CA, 30- SCRA -, 8an. -4, -999, 2n4 6"v. [Bell's"ll'$% -.. What is the Draison dKetreE or the <ew AorG Ti%es v. 'ullivan &#./ B' 2*-, holding that honest criticis%s on the conduct o pu$lic o icials and pu$lic igures are insulated ro% li$el judg%ents? Held: The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with 0nowledge that it was false or with rec0less disregard of whether it was false or not. The raison dKetre for the <ew AorG Ti%es doctrine was that to re-uire critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel 8udgments would lead to self?censorship, since would?be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the e7pense of having to prove it . (B'!Aal v. CA, 30- SCRA -, 8an. -4, -999, 2n4 6"v. [Bell's"ll'$% -8. Who is a Dpu$lic igure,E and there ore su$ject to pu$lic co%%ent? Held: I(Je deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the <ew AorG Ti%es ruling. )t any rate, we have also defined @public figureA in )yers Production Pty., 7td. v. 0apulong &;.(. <os. 82#8+ and 82#18, 21 )pril 1188, 1/+ '0() 8/1, as H G 7 7 a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a Npublic personage.: .e is, in other words, a celebrity. Bbviously, to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. 6t includes public officers, famous inventors and e7plorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Freat D7alted Ruler of the lodge. 6t includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. The *&,LT =*irst &ational ,onference on Land Transportation> was an underta0ing infused with public interest. 6t was promoted as a 8oint pro8ect of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government officials and prominent businessmen. *or this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. )s its D7ecutive +irector and spo0esman, private respondent conse-uently assumed the status of a public figure. 'ut even assuming ex?gratia argu%enti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the *&,LT, would not -ualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he

could not validly be the sub8ect of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. 6f a matter is a sub8ect of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public:s primary interest is in the eventC the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant:s prior anonymity or notoriety. (B'!Aal v. CA, 30- SCRA -, 8an. -4, -999, 2n4 6"v. [Bell's"ll'$% -1. The 5 ice o the 6ayor o 7as Pinas re used to issue per%it to petitioners to hold rally a rally in ront o the Iustice 3all o 7as Pinas on the ground that it was prohi$ited under 'upre%e 0ourt En =anc (esolution dated Iuly .,1118 in ).6. <o. 18?.?+2?'0, entitled, F(eC ;uidelines on the 0onduct o "e%onstrations, PicGets, (allies and 5ther 'i%ilar ;atherings in the @icinity o the 'upre%e 0ourt and )ll 5ther 0ourts.F Petitioners thus initiated the instant proceedings. They su$%it that the 'upre%e 0ourt gravely a$used its discretion andNor acted without or in excess o jurisdiction in pro%ulgating those guidelines. Held: (e shall first dwell on the critical argument made by petitioners that the rules constitute an abridgment of the peopleLs aggregate rights of free speech, free e7pression, peaceful assembly and petitioning government for redress of grievances citing 2ec. %, )rticle 666 of the !#9; ,onstitution that Kno law shall be passed abridgingK them. 6t is true that the safeguarding of the peopleLs freedom of e7pression to the end that individuals may spea0 as they thin0 on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be e7posed through the processes of education and discussion, is essential to free government . 'ut freedom of speech and e7pression despite its indispensability has its limitations. 6t has never been understood as the absolute right to spea0 whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, place, and time of public discussion can be constitutionally controlled . ITJhe better policy is not liberty untamed but liberty regulated by law where every freedom is e7ercised in accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others . ,onventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a comple7 society preclude an absolutist interpretation of freedom of e7pression where it does not involve pure speech but speech plus physical actions li0e pic0eting. There are other significant societal values that must be accommodated and when they clash, they must all be weighed with the promotion of the general welfare of the people as the ultimate ob8ective. 6n balancing these values, this ,ourt has accorded freedom of e7pression a preferred position in light of its more comparative importance. .ence, our rulings now musty in years hold that only the narrowest time, place and manner regulations that are specifically tailored to serve an important governmental interest may 8ustify the application of the balancing of interests test in derogation of the peopleLs right of free speech and e7pression. (here said regulations do not aim particularly at the evils within the allowable areas of state control but, on the contrary, sweep within their ambit other activities as to operate as an overhanging threat to free discussion, or where upon their face they are so vague, indefinite, or ine7act as to permit punishment of the fair use of the right of free speech, such regulations are void. Prescinding from this premise, the ,ourt reiterates that 8udicial independence and the fair and orderly administration of 8ustice constitute paramount governmental interests that can 8ustify the regulation of the publicLs right of free speech and peaceful assembly in the vicinity of courthouses. 6n the case of 4n (eC E%il P. Iurado, the ,ourt pronounced in no uncertain terms that< K7 7 7 freedom of e7pression needs on occasion to be ad8usted to and accommodated with the re-uirements of e-ually important public interests. Bne of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of 8ustice. There is no antinomy between free e7pression and the integrity of the system of administering 8ustice. *or the protection and maintenance of freedom of e7pression itself can be secured only within the conte7t of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing 8ustice, within the conte7t, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of 8ustice which are accepted by the general community. 7 7 7K &4n (eC E%il P. Iurado, 2-# '0() 211, #2#?#2- 9111*:, 6t is sadly observed that 8udicial independence and the orderly administration of 8ustice have been threatened not only by contemptuous acts inside, but also by irascible demonstrations outside, the courthouses. They wittingly or unwittingly, spoil the ideal of sober, non?partisan proceedings before a cold and neutral 8udge. Dven in the 1nited 2tates, a prohibition against pic0eting and demonstrating in or near courthouses, has been ruled as valid and constitutional notwithstanding its limiting effect on the e7ercise by the public of their liberties. G 7 7

The administration of 8ustice must not only be fair but must also appear to be fair and it is the duty of this ,ourt to eliminate everything that will diminish if not destroy this 8udicial desideratum. To be sure, there will be grievances against our 8ustice system for there can be no perfect system of 8ustice but these grievances must be ventilated through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings. 2uch a mode is in 0eeping with the respect due to the courts as vessels of 8ustice and is necessary if 8udges are to dispose their business in a fair fashion. 6t is the traditional conviction of every civilized society that courts must be insulated from every e7traneous influence in their decisions. The facts of a case should be determined upon evidence produced in court, and should be uninfluenced by bias, pre8udice or sympathies. ((n Re2 e&"&"'n &' Annul En Banc Res'lu&"'n A.M. 9.@7@02@SC @ R"ca!4' C. Val#'n&e an4 =n"'n '3 LaE/e!s an4 A4v'ca&es 3'! *!ans1a!enc/ "n +'ve!n#en& [=LA*$, +.R. ,'. -3492-, Se1&. 29, -99.% *+. "id the 'upre%e 0ourt co%%it an act o judicial legislation in pro%ulgating En =anc (esolution ).6. 18?.?+2?'0, entitled, F(eC ;uidelines on the 0onduct o "e%onstrations, PicGets, (allies and 5ther 'i%ilar ;atherings in the @icinity o the 'upre%e 0ourt and )ll 5ther 0ourts?F Held: Petitioners also claim that this ,ourt committed an act of 8udicial legislation in promulgating the assailed resolution. They charge that this ,ourt amended provisions of 'atas Pambansa ='.P.> 'lg. 994, otherwise 0nown as Kthe Public )ssembly )ct,K by converting the sidewal0s and streets within a radius of two hundred =544> meters from every courthouse from a public forum place into a Kno rallyK zone. Thus, they accuse this ,ourt of 7 7 7 violating the principle of separation of powers. (e re8ect these low watts arguments. Public places historically associated with the free e7ercise of e7pressive activities, such as streets, sidewal0s, and par0s, are considered, without %ore, to be public fora . 6n other words, it is not any law that can imbue such places with the public nature inherent in them. 'ut even in such public fora, it is settled 8urisprudence that the government may restrict speech plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are content?neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. ,ontrary therefore to petitioners: impression, '.P. 'lg. 994 did not establish streets and sidewal0s, among other places, as public fora. ) close loo0 at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it re-uires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places sub8ect, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud spea0ers or sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly. The e7istence of '.P. 'lg. 994, however, does not preclude this ,ourt from promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of 8ustice as mandated by the ,onstitution. To insulate the 8udiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public hysteria, this ,ourt merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a 544?meter radius from every courthouse. 6n fine, '.P. 'lg. 994 imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. Bn the other hand, the resolution of this ,ourt regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve 8udicial independence and the orderly administration of 8ustice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures. 2imply put, '.P. 'lg. 994 and the assailed resolution complement each other. (e so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible . ((n Re2 e&"&"'n &' Annul En Banc Res'lu&"'n A.M. 9.@7@02@SC @ R"ca!4' C. Val#'n&e an4 =n"'n '3 LaE/e!s an4 A4v'ca&es 3'! *!ans1a!enc/ "n +'ve!n#en& [=LA*$, +.R. ,'. -3492-, Se1&. 29, -99.% *1. 'hould live %edia coverage o court proceedings $e allowed? Held: The propriety of granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of 8ustice. ,ollaterally, it also raises issues on the nature of the media, particularly television and its role in society, and of the impact of new technologies on law. The records of the ,onstitutional ,ommission are bereft of discussion regarding the sub8ect of cameras in the courtroom. 2imilarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the -uestion s-uarely.

(hile we ta0e notice of the 2eptember !##4 report of the 1nited 2tates 3udicial ,onference )d .oc ,ommittee on ,ameras in the ,ourtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the *ederal ,ourts of the 1nited 2tates prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule /$ of the *ederal Rules of ,riminal Procedure forbids the ta0ing of photographs during the progress of 8udicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. ) trial of any 0ind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious -uest for truth for which our 8udicial proceedings are formulated. ,ourts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom . 6n Estes v. Texas &#81 B.'. *#2,, the 1nited 2tates 2upreme ,ourt held that television coverage of 8udicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of a criminal defendant. Eoting /?%, the ,ourt through r. 3ustice ,lar0, identified four =%> areas of potential pre8udice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the 8ury, witnesses, the trial 8udge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated< KD7perience li0ewise has established the pre8udicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. (itnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are sub8ect to e7traordinary out?of?court influences which might affect their testimony. )lso, telecasting not only increases the trial 8udgeLs responsibility to avoid actual pre8udice to the defendantC it may as well affect his own performance. 3udges are human beings also and are sub8ect to the same psychological reactions as laymen. *or the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and sub8ects him to e7cessive public e7posure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense. KThe television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.K Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporterLs constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary 8udicial atmosphere and decorum that the re-uirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom. ,onsidering the pre8udice it poses to the defendantLs right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of 8ustice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and pre8udicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Eideo footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the 8udicial officers, the parties and their counsel ta0en prior to the commencement of official proceedings. &o video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper. (Su1!e#e C'u!& En Banc Res'lu&"'n Re2 L"ve *V an4 Ra4"' C've!age '3 &5e )ea!"ng '3 !es"4en& C'!a<'n C. A>u"n'Fs L":el Case, 4a&e4 Oc&. 22, -99-% *2. 'hould the 0ourt allow live %edia coverage o the anticipated trial o the plunder and other cri%inal cases iled against or%er President Ioseph E. Estrada $e ore the 'andigan$ayan in order Dto assure the pu$lic o ull transparency in the proceedings o an unprecedented case in our historyE as re!uested $y the Oapisanan ng %ga =rodGaster ng Pilipinas? Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. (hen these rights race against one another, 8urisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. (ith the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to ma0e absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on

the basis of a 8ust and dispassionate 8udgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any 0ind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a 8udge with an unpre8udiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. +ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an ob8ect of public:s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. (itnesses and 8udges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that @television can wor0 profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.A Dven while it may be difficult to -uantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of 8udges cannot be evaluated but, it can li0ewise be said, it is not at all unli0ely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. 6t might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. To say that actual pre8udice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to 8ustice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of 8ustice can create . The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far?fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we 0now it now. )n accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. ) public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be un8ustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. ) public trial is not synonymous with publicized trialC it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. 6n the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings . The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. 6t also approves of media:s e7alted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in ac-uainting the public with the 8udicial process in actionC nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. 3ustice ,lar0 thusly pronounced, @while a ma7imum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its e7ercise must necessarily be sub8ect to the maintenance of a$solute fairness in the 8udicial process.A G77 The 6ntegrated 'ar of the Philippines 7 7 7 e7pressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of r. DstradaC to paraphrase< Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on e7clusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trialC at sta0e in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal 8ustice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the @hooting throngA to arrogate unto themselves the tas0 of 8udging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popularC and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of 8ustice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. G77 1nli0e other government offices, courts do not e7press the popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are tas0ed to only ad8udicate controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. ) trial is not a free trade of ideas. &or is a competing mar0et of thoughts the 0nown test of truth in a courtroom. (Re2 Re>ues& Ra4"'@*V c've!age '3 &5e *!"al

"n &5e San4"gan:a/an '3 &5e lun4e! Cases aga"ns& &5e 3'!#e! Es&!a4a, A.M. ,'. 0-@4@03@SC, 8une 29, 200-, En Banc [V"&ug$% Freed * ) Reli$i n

!es"4en& 8'se15 E.

*#. "iscuss why the +e!'na ruling &justi ying the expulsion ro% pu$lic schools o children o IehovahKs Witnesses who re use to salute the lag and sing the national anthe% during lag cere%ony as prescri$ed $y the 2lag 'alute 7aw, should $e a$andoned. Held: Bur tas0 here is e7tremely difficult, for the $4?year old decision of this court in ;erona upholding the flag salute law and approving the e7pulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with. 6t is somewhat ironic however, that after the ;erona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the )dministrative ,ode of !#9;, the present ,ourt believes that the time has come to ree7amine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one:s 8ob or of being e7pelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of *ilipinos who cut their teeth on the 'ill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech &The lag salute, singing the national anthe% and reciting the patriotic pledge are all or%s o utterances., and the free e7ercise of religious profession and worship . Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his ,reator &0hie Iustice Enri!ue 6. 2ernandoKs separate opinion in ;er%an v. =arangan, 1#* '0() *1-, *#+?*#1,. @The right to religious profession and worship has a two?fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one:s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is sub8ect to regulation where the belief is translated into e7ternal acts that affect the public welfareA &I. 0ruz, 0onstitutional 7aw, 1111 Ed., pp. 1./?1..,. Petitioners stress 7 7 7 that while they do not ta0e part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in @e7ternal actsA or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in e7pressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They -uietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the rights of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. 2ince they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their e7pulsion. @The sole 8ustification for a prior restraint or limitation on the e7ercise of religious freedom &according to the late 0hie Iustice 0laudio TeehanGee in his dissenting opinion in ;er%an v. =arangan, 1#* '0() *1-, *1., is the e7istence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the 2tate has a right =and duty> to prevent.A )bsent such a threat to public safety, the e7pulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not 8ustified. The situation that the ,ourt directly predicted in ;erona that< @ITJhe flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism H a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an e7emption.A has not come to pass. (e are not persuaded that by e7empting the 3ehovah:s (itnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a @small portion of the school populationA will sha0e up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation @untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes . )fter all, what the petitioners see0 only is e7emption from the flag ceremony, not e7clusion from the public schools

where they may study the ,onstitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of @patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values &'ec. #92:, )rt. J4@, 118. 0onstitution, as part of the curricula. D7pelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this ,ourt had feared in ;erona. *orcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. )s r. 3ustice 3ac0son remar0ed in West @irginia v. =arnette, #11 B.'. /2- &11-#,C

@7 7 7 To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to ma0e an unflattering statement of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. 7 7 7 (hen they =diversity> are so harmless to others or to the 2tate as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. 'ut freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the e7isting order.A @*urthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, 7 7 7 H assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion H is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the e7pense of religious liberty. ) desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.A &6eyer v. <e$rasGa, 2/2 B.'. #1+, /. 7. ed. 1+-2, 1+-/, oreover, the e7pulsion of members of 3ehovah:s (itnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the !#9; ,onstitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the 2tate to @protect and promote the right of all citizens to -uality education 7 7 7 and to ma0e such education accessible to allA &'ec. 1, )rt. J4@,. 6n @ictoriano v. Elizalde (ope WorGersK Bnion, *1 '0() *-, .2?.*, we upheld the e7emption of members of the 6glesia &i ,risto, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to 8oin any labor group< @7 7 7 6t is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the landC but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, e7emptions ought to be granted unless some Ncompelling state interests: intervenes. &'her$ert v. =erner, #.- B.'. #18, 1+ 7. Ed. 2d 1/*, 1.+, 8# '. 0t. 1.1+,.E (e hold that a similar e7emption may be accorded to the 3ehovah:s (itnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however @bizarreA those beliefs may seem to others. &evertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic e7ercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this ,ourt in <on v. "a%es 44, 18* '0() *2#, *#*, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free e7ercise of their religion, @this should not be ta0en to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline themA if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. 6f they -uietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose @a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the 2tate has a right =and duty> to prevent.E (E:!al"nag v. *5e 6"v"s"'n Su1e!"n&en4en& '3 Sc5''ls '3 Ce:u, 2-9 SCRA 259, 299@273, Ma!c5 -, -993, En Banc [+!"n'@A>u"n'$% *-. ) pre?taped T@ progra% o the 4glesia <i 0risto &4<0, was su$%itted to the 6T(0= or review. The latter classi ied it as Drated JE $ecause it was shown to $e attacGing another religion. The 4<0 protested $y clai%ing that its religious reedo% is per se $eyond review $y the 6T(0=. 'hould this contention $e upheld? Held: The right to religious profession and worship has a two?fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on oneLs belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is sub8ect to regulation where the belief is translated into e7ternal acts that affect the public welfare. The 6glesia &i ,ristoLs postulate that its religious freedom is per se beyond review by the TR,' should be re8ected. 6ts public broadcast on TE of its religious programs brings it out of

the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The e7ercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the 2tate when it will bring about the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the 2tate is duty?bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. ) laissez aire policy on the e7ercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the ,ourt against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our society today. K*or sure, we shall continue to sub8ect any act pinching the space for the free e7ercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational e7ercise to the irrationality of man. *or when religion divides and its e7ercise destroys, the 2tate should not stand still.K ((gles"a ," C!"s&' v. CA, 259 SCRA 529, 8ul/ 29, -999 [ un'$% **. "id the 6T(0= act correctly when it rated DJE the 4glesia <i 0ristoPs pre?taped T@ progra% si%ply $ecause it was ound to $e FattacGingF another religion? Held: The TR,' may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by the 6glesia &i ,risto but that gives it no e7cuse to interdict such criticisms, however unclean they may be. 1nder our constitutional scheme, it is not the tas0 of the 2tate to favor any religion by protecting it against an attac0 by another religion. Religious dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the 2tate from leaning towards any religion. @is?Q?vis religious differences, the 2tate en8oys no ban-uet of options. &eutrality alone is its fi7ed and immovable stance. 6n fine, the TR,' cannot s-uelch the speech of the 6&, simply because it attac0s another religion. 6n a 2tate where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedroc0 of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the mar0etplace of dueling ideas. (hen the lu7ury of time permits, the mar0etplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spar0 of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth. ((gles"a ," C!"s&' v. CA, 259 SCRA 529, 8ul/ 29, -999 [ un'$% */. 4s solicitation or the construction o a church covered $y P.". <o. 1*/- and, there ore, punisha$le i done without the necessary per%it or solicitation ro% the "'W"? Held: 2irst. 2olicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for Kcharitable or public welfare purposeK but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. ) fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not li0e fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the li0e. Li0e solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. 2uch solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. 2uch solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution. 'econd. The purpose of the +ecree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic pro8ects. Bn the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not e7ist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic pro8ects as to 8ustify state regulation. Third. To re-uire a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free e7ercise of religion. 2uch restraint, if allowed, may well 8ustify re-uiring a permit before a church can ma0e 2unday collections or enforce tithing. 'ut in )%erican =i$le 'ociety v. 0ity o 6anila &1+1 Phil. #8/ 911*.:,, we precisely held that an ordinance re-uiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellantLs sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the e7ercise of a constitutional right. 6t is for the same reason that religious rallies are e7empted from the re-uirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public par0s and streets ='.P. 'lg. 994, 2ec. $IaJ>. To read the +ecree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the *ree D7ercise of Religion ,lause of the ,onstitution 7 7 7. (C'ncu!!"ng O1"n"'n, Men4'<a, V.V., 8., "n Cen&en' v. V"llal'n@ '!n"ll's, 239 SCRA -97, Se1&. -, -994% *.. What is a purely ecclesiastical a air to which the 'tate can not %eddle? Held: )n ecclesiastical affair is @one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of e7cluding from such

associations those deemed not worthy of membership.A 'ased on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, e7amples of this so?called ecclesiastical affairs to which the 2tate cannot meddle are proceedings for e7communication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. ( as&'! 6"'n"s"' V. Aus&!"a v. ,LRC, +.R. ,'. -243.2, Aug. -9, -999, -s& 6"v. [0a1unan$% *8. Petitioner is a religious %inister o the 'eventh "ay )dventist &'"),. 3e was dis%issed $ecause o alleged %isappropriation o deno%inational unds, will ul $reach o trust, serious %isconduct, gross and ha$itual neglect o duties and co%%ission o an o ense against the person o his e%ployerKs duly authorized representative. 3e iled an illegal ter%ination case against the '") $e ore the la$or ar$iter. The '") iled a %otion to dis%iss invoGing the doctrine o separation o 0hurch and 'tate. 'hould the %otion $e granted? Held: (here what is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, i.e., the minister was not e7communicated or e7pelled from the membership of the congregation but was terminated from employment, it is a purely secular affair. ,onse-uently, the suit may not be dismissed invo0ing the doctrine of separation of church and the state. ( as&'! 6"'n"s"' V. Aus&!"a v. ,LRC, +.R. ,'. -243.2, Aug. -9, -999, - s& 6"v. [0a1unan$% The Ri$ht ) the Pe ple t In) r*"ti n n ,"tters ) Pu&li! C n!ern *1. "iscuss the scope o the right to in or%ation on %atters o pu$lic concern. Held: 6n @al%onte v. =el%onte, Ir., the ,ourt emphasized that the information sought must be @matters of public concern,A access to which may be limited by law. 2imilarly, the state policy of full public disclosure e7tends only to @transactions involving public interestA and may also be @sub8ect to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.A )s to the meanings of the terms @public interestA and @public concern,A the ,ourt, in 7egaspi v. 0ivil 'ervice 0o%%ission, elucidated< @6n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. NPublic concern: li0e Npublic interest: is a term that eludes e7act definition. 'oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub8ects which the public may want to 0now, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. 6n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.A ,onsidered a public concern in the above?mentioned case was the @legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions re-uiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.A 2o was the need to give the general public ade-uate notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Tanada. Li0ewise did the @public nature of the loanable funds of the F262 and the public office held by the alleged borrowers =members of the defunct 'atasang Pambansa>A -ualify the information sought in @al%onte as matters of public interest and concern. 6n )!uino?'ar%iento v. 6orato &2+# '0() *1*, *22?2#, <ove%$er 1#, 1111,, the ,ourt also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in characterC hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to pu$lic records. 1nder Republic )ct &o. ";!$, public officials and employees are mandated to @provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, IandJ ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearing whenever appropriate 7 7 7,A e7cept when @otherwise provided by law or when re-uired by the public interest.A 6n particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government and government?owned or controlled corporationsC and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. 6n general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants . 1ndeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free?flow of thoughtC but thoughts and ideas must be well?informed so that

the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. ,ertainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited e7change of ideas among a well?informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. (C5ave< v. C++, 299 SCRA 744, 6ec. 9, -99., [ angan":an$% /+. What are so%e o the recognized restrictions to the right o the people to in or%ation on %atters o pu$lic concern? Held: !> &ational security matters and intelligence information. This 8urisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. Li0ewise, information on inter?government e7changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and e7ecutive agreements may be sub8ect to reasonable safeguards for the sa0e of national interestC 5> Trade or industrial secrets =pursuant to the 6ntellectual Property ,ode IR.). &o. 95#$, approved on 3une ", !##;J and other related laws> and ban0ing transactions =pursuant to the 2ecrecy of 'an0 +eposits )ct IR.). &o. !%4/, as amendedJ>C $> ,riminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not in-uire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecutionC %> Bther confidential information. The Dthical 2tandards )ct =R.). &o. ";!$, enacted on *ebruary 54, !#9#> further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging @confidential or classified information officially 0nown to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public.A =2ec. ;IcJ, ibid.> Bther ac0nowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door ,abinet meetings and e7ecutive sessions of either house of ,ongress, as well as the internal deliberations of the 2upreme ,ourt. (C5ave< v. C++, 299 SCRA 744, 6ec. 9, -99. [ angan":an$% /1. 4s the alleged ill?gotten wealth o the 6arcoses a %atter o pu$lic concern su$ject to this right? Held: (ith such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the arcosesL alleged ill?gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest . (e may also add that @ill?gotten wealthA refers to assets and properties purportedly ac-uired, directly or indirectly, by former President arcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or propertiesC or their having ta0en undue advantage of their public officeC or their use of powers, influences or relationships, @resulting in their un8ust enrichment and causing grave damage and pre8udice to the *ilipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.A ,learly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. )s such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, sub8ect only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be ad8udged by competent courts. )nother declared overriding consideration for the e7peditious recovery of ill?gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. (e believe the foregoing dis-uisition settles the -uestion of whether petitioner has a right to respondentsL disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the arcoses: purported ill?gotten wealth. (C5ave< v. C++, 299 SCRA 744, 6ec. 9, -99. [ angan":an$% Freed * ) Ass !i"ti n /2. "oes the right o civil servants to organize include their right to striGe? 0lari y. Held: 2pecifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in )ssociation o 0ourt o )ppeals E%ployees &)0)E, v. 2errer?0alleja &2+# '0() *1/, <ove%$er 1*, 1111,. 'ut, as in the e7ercise of the rights of free e7pression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association, the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions &People v. 2errer, -8 '0() #82, "ece%$er 2., 11.2, per 0astro, I., where the 0ourt, while upholding the validity o the )nti?'u$version )ct which outlawed the 0o%%unist Party o the Philippines and other Fsu$versiveF organizations, clari ied, FWhatever interest in reedo% o speech and reedo% o association is in ringed $y the prohi$ition against

Gnowing %e%$ership in the 0o%%unist Party o the Philippines, is so indirect and so insu$stantial as to $e clearly and heavily outweighed $y the overriding considerations o national security and the preservation o de%ocratic institutions in this country.F 4t cautioned, though, that Fthe need or prudence and circu%spection 9cannot $e overe%phasized: in 9the lawPs: en orce%ent, operating as it does in the sensitive area o reedo% o expression and $elie .F, )s regards the right to stri0e, the ,onstitution itself -ualifies its e7ercise with the proviso Kin accordance with law.K This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. D7ecutive Brder &o. !94 &4ssued $y or%er President 0orazon 0. )!uino on Iune 1, 118., which provides guidelines for the e7ercise of the right of government wor0ers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier ,2, circular which Ken8oins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging stri0es, demonstrations, mass leaves, wal0outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public serviceK &0'0 6e%orandu% 0ircular <o. /, s. 118., dated )pril 21, 118., by stating that the ,ivil 2ervice law and rules governing concerted activities and stri0es in the government service shall be observed . 6t is also settled in 8urisprudence that, in general, wor0ers in the public sector do not en8oy the right to stri0e. )lliance o 0oncerned ;overn%ent WorGers v. 6inister o 7a$or and E%ploy%ent &12- '0() 1, )ugust #, 118#, also per ;utierrez, Ir., I., rationalized the proscription thus< KThe general rule in the past and up to the present is that the Lterms and conditions of employment in the Fovernment, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.L G 7 7. 2ince the terms and conditions of government employment are ixed $y law, government wor0ers cannot use the same weapons employed by the wor0ers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. 2ub8ect to the minimum re-uirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. 6n government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fi7 the terms and conditions of employment. )nd this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.K &4$id., p. 1#, )fter delving into the intent of the framers of the ,onstitution, the ,ourt affirmed the above rule in 'ocial 'ecurity 'yste% E%ployees )ssociation &'''E), v. 0ourt o )ppeals &1.* '0() /8/, Iuly 28, 1181, and e7plained< KFovernment employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the ,ongress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fi7ed by law. 6f there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public 2ector Labor? anagement ,ouncil for appropriate action. 'ut employees in the civil service may not resort to stri0es, wal0outs and other temporary wor0 stoppages, li0e wor0ers in the private sector, to pressure the Fovernment to accede to their demands. )s now provided under 2ec. %, Rule 666 of the Rules and Regulations to Fovern the D7ercise of the Right of Fovernment Dmployees to 2elf?Brganization, which too0 effect after the instant dispute arose, LItJhe terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government?owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not stri0e for the purpose of securing changes ItheretoJ.LL &4$id., p. /18, (8ac"n&' v. C'u!& '3 A11eals, 2.- SCRA 957, ,'v. -4, -997, En Banc [ angan":an$% /#. Petitioners pu$lic school teachers walGed out o their classes and engaged in %ass actions during certain dates in 'epte%$er 111+ protesting the alleged unlaw ul withholding o their salaries and other econo%ic $ene its. They also raised national issues, such as the re%oval o B' $ases and the repudiation o oreign de$ts, in their %ass actions. They re used to return to worG despite orders to do so and su$se!uently were ound guilty o conduct prejudicial to the $est interests o the service or having a$sented the%selves without proper authority, ro% their schools during regular school days, and penalized. They denied that they engaged in DstriGeE $ut clai%ed that they %erely exercised a constitutionally guaranteed right R the right to peacea$ly asse%$le and petition the govern%ent or redress o grievances ? and, there ore, should not have $een penalized. 'hould their contention $e upheld?

Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not see0 to establish that they have a right to stri0e. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in 2eptember !##4 were a valid e7ercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not a stri0e, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. 6P'T) v. 7aguio &'upra, per <arvasa, I., now 0I., and )0T v. 0arino &4$id.,, in which this ,ourt declared that Kthese Lmass actionsL were to all intents and purposes a stri0eC they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, wor0 which it was the teachersL duty to perform, underta0en for essentially economic reasons,K should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical. 'triGe, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of wor0 done by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute . ) labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employmentC or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fi7ing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the pro7imate relation of employers and employees. (ith these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition. 6t cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non?holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities ? essentially, their KemployersK ? to fully and 8ustly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially 7 7 7. )nd probably to clothe their action with permissible character &4n justi ying their %ass actions, petitioners liGen their activity to the pro? $ases rally led $y or%er President 0orazon 0. )!uino on 'epte%$er 1+, 1111, participated in, as well, $y pu$lic school teachers who conse!uently a$sented the%selves ro% their classes. <o ad%inistrative charges were allegedly instituted against any o the participants., , they also raised national issues such as the removal of the 1.2. bases and the repudiation of foreign debt. 6n =alingasan v. 0ourt o )ppeals &;.(. <o. 12-/.8, Iuly #1, 111., per (egalado, I., , however, this ,ourt said that the fact that the conventional term Kstri0eK was not used by the participants to describe their common course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, was deemed controlling. 6oreover, the petitioners here x x x were not penalized or the exercise o their right to asse%$le peace ully and to petition the govern%ent or a redress o grievances. (ather, the 0ivil 'ervice 0o%%ission ound the% guilty o conduct prejudicial to the $est interest o the service or having a$sented the%selves without proper authority, ro% their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the %ass protest, their a$sence inelucta$ly resulting in the non? holding o classes and in the deprivation o students o education, or which they were responsi$le. 3ad petitioners availed the%selves o their ree ti%e ? recess, a ter classes, weeGends or holidays ? to dra%atize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the $ounds o law, no one ? not the "E0', the 0'0 or even this 0ourt ? could have held the% lia$le or the valid exercise o their constitutionally guaranteed rights. )s it was, the te%porary stoppage o classes resulting ro% their activity necessarily disrupted pu$lic services, the very evil sought to $e orestalled $y the prohi$ition against striGes $y govern%ent worGers. Their act $y their nature was enjoined $y the 0ivil 'ervice law, rules and regulations, or which they %ust, there ore, $e %ade answera$le. (8ac"n&' v. CA, 2.- SCRA 957, ,'v. -4, -997, En Banc [ angan":an$% The - n.I*p"ir*ent Cl"use /-. 4s the constitutional prohi$ition against i%pairing contractual o$ligations a$solute? Held: !. &or is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the 'ill of Rights. The e7ecutive order creating the PBD) was enacted to further implement the social 8ustice provisions of the !#;$ ,onstitution, which have been greatly enhanced and e7panded in the !#9; ,onstitution by placing them under a separate )rticle &)rticle J444,. The )rticle on 2ocial 3ustice was aptly described as the Kheart of the new ,harterK by the President of the !#9" ,onstitutional ,ommission, retired 3ustice ,ecilia unoz Palma . 2ocial 8ustice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and re-uires the e7tensive use of such power . G 7 7.

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal e7actness. 6t is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some ob8ect of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of 8usticeC it has no application to statutes relating to public sub8ects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the 2tate and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. 6t does not prevent a proper e7ercise by the 2tate of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the 2tate to regulate and control them. Eerily, the freedom to contract is not absoluteC all contracts and all rights are sub8ect to the police power of the 2tate and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the 2tate, but all such regulations must be sub8ect to change from time to time, as the general well?being of the community may re-uire, or as the circumstances may change, or as e7perience may demonstrate the necessity. )nd under the ,ivil ,ode, contracts of labor are e7plicitly sub8ect to the police power of the 2tate because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. )rticle !;44 thereof e7pressly provides< )rt. !;44. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are sub8ect to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, stri0es and loc0outs, closed shop, wages, wor0ing conditions, hours of labor and similar sub8ects. The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of D.B. &o. ;#; =,reating the PBD)>, which was enacted under the police power of the 2tate, they cannot be struc0 down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long?established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause. (*5e C'n3e!ence '3 Ma!"&"#e Mann"ng Agenc"es, (nc. v. OEA, 243 SCRA 999, A1!"l 2-, -995 [6av"4e, 8!.$% 5. Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because private respondents have voluntarily e7ecuted -uitclaims and releases and received their separation pay. Petitioners claim that the present suit is a Kgrave derogation of the fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith.K The ,ourt disagrees. 3urisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of non? impairment of contract is sub8ect to the police power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting health, morals, safety and welfare. &ot all -uitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, e7cept =!> where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or =5> where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. 6n these cases, the law will step in to annul the -uestionable transactions . 2uch -uitclaim and release agreements are regarded as ineffective to bar the wor0ers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights. 6n the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the -uitclaim and release in consideration of their separation pay. 2ince they were dismissed allegedly for business losses, they are entitled to separation pay under )rticle 59$ of the Labor ,ode. )nd since there was thus no e7tra consideration for the private respondents to give up their employment, such underta0ings cannot be allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal. (B'g'@Me4ell"n Suga!cane lan&e!s Ass'c"a&"'n, (nc. v. ,LRC, 299 SCRA -0., -24, [ angan":an$% $. Bnly slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of ,RD') that the imposition of the E)T on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that K&o law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.K 6t is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the e7ercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the e7ercise of the ta7ing power of the 2tate. *or not only are e7isting laws read into contracts in order to fi7 obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains ade-uate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 6n truth, the ,ontract ,lause has never been thought as a limitation on the e7ercise of the 2tateLs power of ta7ation save only where a ta7 e7emption has been granted for a valid consideration. G 7 7. (*'len&"n' v. Sec!e&a!/ '3 7"nance, 235 SCRA 930, 9.5@9.9, Aug. 25, -994, En Banc [Men4'<a$%

%. 2ince timber licenses are not contracts, the non?impairment clause 7 7 7 cannot be invo0ed. G 7 7, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an e7ecutive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of e7isting timber licenses. .ence, the non?impairment clause cannot as yet be invo0ed. &evertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non?impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the e7ercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing their general welfare. G 7 7. 6n short, the non?impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. *inally, it is difficult to imagine 7 7 7 how the non?impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to en8oin the respondent 2ecretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as yet e7isted in the other instances. oreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. (O1'sa v. 7ac&'!an, 8!., 224 SCRA 792 [-993$% /. )nent petitionersL contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that KInJot all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non?suabilityC distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental. 'esides, the ,ourt is in agreement with the 2olicitor Feneral that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation. (Bla>ue!a v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 399, 449, Se1&. --, -99., En Banc [ u!"s"#a$% The In.Cust di"l In'esti$"ti n Ri$hts ) "n A!!used Pers n /*. 'tate the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating o icer or his co%panions %ust do and o$serve at the ti%e o %aGing an arrest and again at and during the ti%e o the custodial interrogation. Held: Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the ,ourt, as guardian o the rights o the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of ma0ing an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the ,onstitution, 8urisprudence and Republic )ct &o. ;%$9 &)n )ct "e ining 0ertain (ights o Person )rrested, "etained or Bnder 0ustodial 4nvestigation as well as the "uties o the )rresting, "etaining, and 4nvestigating 5 icers and Providing Penalties or @iolations Thereo ,. 6t is high? time to educate our law?enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so?called iranda rights which had become insufficient and which the ,ourt must update in the light of new legal developments< !> The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language 0nown to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Dvery other warnings, information or communication must be in a language 0nown to and understood by said personC .e must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he ma0es may be used as evidence against himC .e must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choiceC .e must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for himC and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting on his behalfC That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted e7cept in the presence of his counsel of after a valid waiver has been madeC The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most e7pedient means ? telephone, radio, letter or messenger ? with his lawyer =either retained or appointed>, any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any

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one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non?government organization. 6t shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplishedC ;> .e must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, 0nowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the sameC 9> 6n addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to spea0C #> That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be -uestioned with warning that once he ma0es such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already begunC !4> The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invo0ing it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some -uestions or volunteered some statementsC !!> .e must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or e7culpatory, in whole or in part, shall be admissible in evidence. ( e'1le v. Ma5"na/, 302 SCRA 455, 7e:. -, -999, En Banc [ e! Cu!"a#$% //. Explain the Gind o in or%ation that is re!uired to $e given $y law en orce%ent o icers to suspect during custodial investigation. Held: I6Jt is settled that one:s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather 8ust the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. 6t is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of 2ection !5, )rticle 666 of the !#9; ,onstitutionC the former must also e7plain the effects of such provision in practical terms H e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do H and in a language the sub8ect fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to e7plain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the sub8ect:s understanding of what is conveyed. 2ince it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of e7planation re-uired will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. 6n further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the sub8ect is informed of such rightC he should also be as0ed if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could as0 for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his re-uest. 6f he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel, who, under prevailing 8urisprudence, must be a lawyer. ( e'1le v. Can'/, 32. SCRA 3.5, Ma!c5 -7, 2000, -s& 6"v. [6av"4e, C8$% /.. What is the %eaning o Dco%petent counselE under 'ection 12 o the =ill o (ights? Held: The meaning of @competent counselA was e7plained in People v. "eniega &2*1 '0() /2/, /#., as follows< @7 7 7 ITJhe lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing -uestioning. 6f the lawyer were one furnished in the accused:s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual:s rights. 6n People v. =asay &211 '0() -+-, -18,, this ,ourt stressed that an accused:s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel Ncontemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than 8ust the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.: @6deally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation =if the latter could not afford one> Nshould be engaged by the accused =himself>, or by the latter:s relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.: Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

@7 7 7 The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.A ( e'1le v. Es1"!"&u, 302 SCRA 533, 7e:. 2, -999, 3 !4 6"v. [ angan":an$% /8. 0an a P)5 lawyer $e considered an independent counsel within the conte%plation o 'ection 12, )rticle 444, 118. 0onstitution? Held: 6n People v. 5racoy, 22- '0() .*1 9111#:> People v. =andula, 2#2 '0() *// 9111-:, the 2, has held that a P)B lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the ,onstitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused?appellant. Thus, the assistance of a P)B lawyer satisfies the constitutional re-uirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused. ( e'1le v. Bac'!, 309 SCRA 522, A1!"l 30, -999, 2n4 6"v. [Men4'<a$% /1. 4s the con ession o an accused given spontaneously, reely and voluntarily to the 6ayor ad%issi$le in evidence, considering that the 6ayor has Doperational supervision and controlE over the local police and %ay argua$ly $e dee%ed a law en orce%ent o icer? Held: (hile it is true that a municipal mayor has @operational supervision and controlA over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying 2ection !5=!> and =$> of )rticle 666 of the ,onstitution, however, appellant:s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. 6n fact, the mayor did not -uestion the appellant at all. &o police authority ordered appellant to tal0 to the mayor. 6t was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not 0now that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talGed with the %ayor as a con idant and not as a law en orce%ent o icer, his uncounselled con ession to hi% did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through -uestioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. (hat the ,onstitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under 2ection !5 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the 2tate as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. ( e'1le v. An4an, 299 SCRA 95, Ma!c5 3, -997% .+. )re con essions %ade in response to !uestions $y news reporters ad%issi$le in evidence? Answer: Yes. ,onfessions made in response to -uestions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer, are admissible. 6n People v. @izcarra, 11* '0() .-#, .*2 91182:, where the accused, under custody, gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press reporters in the office of the chief of the ,62, it was held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. 6n e'1le v. An4an, 299 SCRA 95, Ma!c5 3, -997, it was held that appellant:s confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 6n fact, they as0ed his permission before interviewing him. The 2upreme ,ourt further ruled that appellant:s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by 2ection !5=!> and =$> of )rticle 666 of the ,onstitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence. .1. "iscuss the two Ginds o involuntary or coerced con essions under 'ection 12, )rticle 444 o the 118. 0onstitution. 4llustrate how the 0ourt should appreciate said involuntary or coerced con essions. Held: There are two 0inds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision< =!> those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 5 of 2ection !5, and =5> those which are given without the benefit of iranda warnings, which are the sub8ect of paragraph ! of the same 2ection !5. )ccused?appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. )side from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. .e did

not see0 medical treatment nor even a physical e7amination. .is allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it. G77 (e discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily e7ecuted from the fact that it was signed by accused?appellant five times. G77 D7tra8udicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant:s consent in e7ecuting the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained. oreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. G 7 7. 6t has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. (hen the details narrated in an e7tra8udicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not ta0e part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the e7traction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence e7ists showing that the statement was voluntarily e7ecuted, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession. 'ut what renders the confession of accused?appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused?appellant was not given the iranda warnings effectively. 1nder the ,onstitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the 1nited 2tates from which )rticle 666, 2ection !5=!> was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. 2wept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. &ow, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is re-uired that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings< =!> he must be informed of his right to remain silentC =5> he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against himC and =$> he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. G77 There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the iranda rights to accused?appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This 0ind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this ,ourt, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inade-uate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Dspecially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused?appellant was specifically as0ed these -uestions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. G 7 7 oreover, )rticle 666, 2ection !5=!> re-uires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. .ere, accused?appellant was assisted by )tty. +e los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an @independent counselA as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the (P+ at the time he assisted accused?appellant. G 7 7. This is error. )s observed in People v. =andula &2#2 '0() *// 9111-:,, the independent counsel re-uired by )rticle 666, 2ection !5=!> cannot be special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. 6n this case, )tty. +e los Reyes, as P, ,aptain and 2tation ,ommander of the (P+, was part of the police force who could not be e7pected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused?appellant in the investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation . ( e'1le v. O:!e!', 332 SCRA -90, 220 G 20., Ma/ -7, 2000, 2n4 6"v. [Men4'<a$% .2. What are the re!uire%ents or an extra?judicial con ession o an accused to $e ad%issi$le in evidence?

Held: !. 6n 8urisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given< !> *reely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or tric0eryC 5> Rnowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rightsC and $> 6ntelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its conse-uences. Bnce admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal e7perience of man0ind can accept as being within the realm of probability. ) confession meeting all the foregoing re-uisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will 0nowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. (hen all these re-uirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused. ( e'1le v. 7a:!', 277 SCRA -9, Aug. --, -997 [ angan":an$% 5. &umerous decisions of this ,ourt rule that for an e7tra8udicial confession to be admissible, it must be< !> voluntaryC 5> made with the assistance of competent and independent counselC $> e7pressC and %> in writing. The mantle of protection afforded by the above?-uoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is ta0en into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody . The e7clusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. .owever, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. ( e'1le v. Base, 329 SCRA -5., -99@-7-, Ma!c5 30, 2000, -s& 6"v. [Cna!es@San&"ag'$% .#. 4s the choice o a lawyer $y a person under custodial investigation who cannot a ord the services o a counsel exclusive as to preclude other e!ually co%petent and independent attorneys ro% handling his de ense? Held: 6t must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. 6ndeed H The phrase @competent and independentA and @preferably of his own choiceA were e7plicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the !#9" ,onstitutional ,ommission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. &0iting 4 (ecord o the 0onstitutional 0o%%ission .#1?.#-> 4 =ernas, The 0onstitution o the (epu$lic o the Philippines, 118. 1st ed., p. #-., G77 777 777

(ithal, the word @preferablyA under 2ection !5=!>, )rticle $ of the !#9; ,onstitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is e7clusive as to preclude other e-ually competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. 6f the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter. (hile the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the inal choice as he may re8ect the counsel chosen for him and as0 for another one. ) lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any ob8ection against the former:s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.

Eerily, to be an effective counsel @IaJ lawyer need not challenge all the -uestions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our ,onstitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false &People v. 7ayuso, 1.* '0() -. 91181:,. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused ro% reely and voluntarily telling the truth.E ( e'1le v. Base, 329 SCRA -5., -99@-7-, Ma!c5 30, 2000, -s& 6"v. [Cna!es@San&"ag'$% .-. 'hould courts $e allowed to distinguish $etween preli%inary !uestioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule? Held: The e7clusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. 6t was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue . Law enforcement agencies are re-uired to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. )ny measure short of this re-uirement is considered a denial of such right . ,ourts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary -uestioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the e7clusionary rule. )ny information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struc0 down as inadmissible . 6t has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the e7clusionary rule. The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written e7tra?8udicial confessionC the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an @informal tal0A at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and 0illing of 7 7 7. The arresting policeman testified that the appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of 3anuary !5, !##%, the probable time of the commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drun0 to remember what subse-uently happened. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. (e note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed. The e7clusionary rule applies. The accused was under arrest for the rape and 0illing of 7 7 7 and any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman:s apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made during an @informal tal0A prior to custodial investigation prior is not tenable. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general in-uiry for any possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. )t the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and 0illing of 7 7 7. The e7clusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. 2upportive of such presumption is the absence of a written e7tra?8udicial confession to that effect and the appellant:s denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struc0 down as inadmissible. ( e'1le v. B!av', 3-. SCRA .-2, ,'v. 22, -999, En Banc [+'n<aga@Re/es$% .*. Explain the procedure or out?o ?court identi ication o suspects and the test to deter%ine the ad%issi$ility o such identi ication. Held: !. 6n People v. TeehanGee, Ir. &2-1 '0() *-, 5cto$er /, 111*,, the ,ourt 7 7 7 e7plained the procedure for out?of?court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification. 6t listed the following ways of identifying the suspects during custodial investigation< show?up, mug shots and line?ups. The ,ourt there ruled< @7 7 7. But?of?court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. 6t is done thru show?ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. 6t is done thru %ug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. 6t is also done thru line ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. 2ince corruption of out?o ?court identification contaminates the integrity of in court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the re-uirements of constitutional due process. 6n resolving the admissibility of and relying on out?of? court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality o circu%stances test where they consider the following factors, vizC =!> the witness:

opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crimeC =5> the witness: degree of attention at that timeC =$> the accuracy of any prior description given by the witnessC =%> the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identificationC =/> the length of time between the crime and the identificationC and ="> the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.A &4$id., p. 1*, ( e'1le v. *"#'n, 2.- SCRA 577, ,'v. -2, -997 [ angan":an$% 5. 7 7 7. The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional re-uirements of due process in regard to out?of?court identification. These cited factors must be considered to prevent contamination of the integrity of in?court identifications better. ( e'1le v. +a#e!, 329 SCRA 990, 7e:. 29, 2000, 2n4 6"v. [Bu"su#:"ng$% ./. "oes the prohi$ition or custodial investigation conducted without the assistance o counsel extend to a person in a police line?up? 0onse!uently, is the identi ication $y private co%plainant o accused who was not assisted $y counsel during police line?up ad%issi$le in evidence? Held: The prohibition 7 7 7 does not e7tend to a person in a police line?up because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation . 6t has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person is ta0en into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to as0 -uestions on the suspect:s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission . The stage of an investigation wherein a person is as0ed to stand in a police line?up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general in-uiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. 6t has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line?up does not preclude the admissibility of an in?court identification. The identification made by the private complainant in the police line?up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused?appellant was not assisted by counsel. G 7 7 ( e'1le v. av"lla!e, 329 SCRA 9.4, 994@995, A1!"l 5, 2000, En Banc [ e! Cu!"a#$% ... Petitioner in a case Dx x x posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial investigation when his urine sa%ple was taGen and che%ically exa%ined, Exhi$its D7E and D6,E x x x are also inad%issi$le in evidence since his urine sa%ple was derived in e ect ro% an uncounselled extra?judicial con ession. Petitioner clai%s that the taGing o his urine sa%ple allegedly violates )rticle 444, 'ection 2 o the 0onstitution x x x.E 'hould his contentions $e upheld? Held: (e are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is ta0en into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to as0 -uestions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. 2uch right is guaranteed by the ,onstitution and cannot be waived e7cept in writing and in the presence of counsel. .owever, what the ,onstitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to e7tort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. 6n fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the e7emption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be e7amined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. 6n fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co?accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were re-uested to undergo a drug test. (+u&ang v. e'1le, 335 SCRA 479, 8ul/ --, 2000, 2n4 6"v. [6e Le'n$% The Ri$ht t B"il .8. 4n $ail application where the accused is charged with a capital o ense, will it $e proper or the judge to grant $ail without conducting hearing i the prosecutor interposes no o$jection to such application? Why? Held: 3urisprudence is replete with decisions compelling 8udges to conduct the re-uired hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of ob8ection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the 8udge has no right to presume that the prosecutor 0nows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. K2aid reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of e7ercising 8udicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. 3udicial

discretion is the domain of the 8udge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to e7ercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.K 6mposed in =aylon v. 'ison &2-# '0() 28-, )pril /, 111*, was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecutionLs refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fi7 bail. (8'sel"&' V. ,a!c"s' v. 7l'! Ma!"e S&a. R'#ana@C!u<, +.R. ,'. -34504, Ma!c5 -7, 2000, 3!4 6"v. [ angan":an$% .1. What are the duties o the judge in cases o $ail applications where the accused is charged with capital o ense? Held: =asco v. (apatalo &2/1 '0() 22+, 6arch *, 111., enunciated the following duties of the trial 8udge in such petition for bail< !> &otify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or re-uire him to submit his recommendationC 5> ,onduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to e7ercise its sound discretionC $> +ecide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecutionC %> 6f the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Btherwise, petition should be denied. The ,ourt added< KThe above?enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial 8udge in cases of bail applications. 2o basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to 8udicial apostasy for any member of the 8udiciary to disclaim 0nowledge or awareness thereof.K )dditionally, the courtLs grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the 8udgeLs own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defenseC its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail. (8'sel"&' V. ,a!c"s' v. 7l'! Ma!"e S&a. R'#ana@C!u<, +.R. ,'. -34504, Ma!c5 -7, 2000, 3 !4 6"v. [ angan":an$% 8+. 'hould the accused who re%ained at large a ter their conviction $e allowed provisional li$erty? 0an the $ail $ond that the accused previously posted $e used during the entire period o appeal? Held: +espite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the ,ourt of )ppeals, petitioners had remained at large. 6t is a7iomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one:s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free . Petitioners: ,ompliance and otion 7 7 7 came short of an unconditional submission to respondent court:s lawful order and to its 8urisdiction. The trial court correctly denied petitioners: motion that they be allowed provisional liberty after their conviction, under their respective $ail $onds. )part from the fact that they were at large, 2ection /, Rule !!% of the Rules of ,ourt, as amended by 2upreme ,ourt )dministrative ,ircular !5?#%, provides that< G77 The ,ourt, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal sub8ect to the consent of the bondsman. The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the !/?day period to appeal =Rule !55> and not during the entire period o appeal. This is consistent with 2ection 5=a> of Rule !!% which provides that the bail @shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the pro%ulgation o the judg%ent o the (egional Trial 0ourt, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it.A This amendment, introduced by 2, )dministrative ,ircular !5?#% is a departure from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even during the period of appeal. oreover, under the

present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. *rom the record, it appears that the bondsman 7 7 7 filed a motion in the trial court 7 7 7 for the cancellation of petitioners: bail bond for the latter:s failure to renew the same upon its e7piration. Bbtaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. (Magu44a&u v. C'u!& '3 A11eals, 329 SCRA 392, 7e:. 23, 2000, -s& 6"v. [0a1unan$% 81. 4s a condition in an application or $ail that accused $e irst arraigned $e ore he could $e granted $ail valid? Held: 6n re-uiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. .ence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner:s bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. )fter that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of the hearing and his failure to appear is un8ustified, since under )rt. 666, 2ec. !%=5> of the ,onstitution, trial in a$sencia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its 7 7 7 order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment. This theory is mista0en. 6n the first place 7 7 7 in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to -uash. *or if the information is -uashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. 6n the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. 1nder Rule !!%, 2ec. 5=b> of the Rules on ,riminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that @the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so re-uired by the court or these Rules,A while under Rule !!", 2ec. !=b> the presence of the accused at the arraignment is re-uired. Bn the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between =!> filing a motion to -uash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to -uash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and =5> foregoing the filing of a motion to -uash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused:s constitutional right not to be put on trial e7cept upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (Lav"4es v. CA, 324 SCRA 32-, 7e:. -, 2000, 2 n4 6"v. [Men4'<a$% The Ri$ht t &e In) r*ed ) the -"ture "nd C"use ) A!!us"ti n "$"inst the A!!used 82. What are the o$jectives o the right to $e in or%ed o the nature and cause o accusations against the accused? Held: 6nstructive in this regard is 2ection ", Rule !!4 of the Rules of ,ourt 7 7 7. The purpose of the above?-uoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land &)rticle 444, 'ection 1-92:, 118. 0onstitution,. Dlaborating on the defendant:s right to be informed, the ,ourt held in Pecho v. People &2/2 '0() *18, that the ob8ectives of this right are< !> To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to ma0e the defenseC 5> To avail himself of his conviction or ac-uittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same causeC and $> To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. 6t is thus imperative that the 6nformation filed with the trial court be complete H to the end that the accused may suitably prepare for his defense. ,orollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused. G77 6n the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the %inority o the victi% 7 7 7 although the same was proven during the trial 7 7 7. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. 6t

matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the ,omplaint or 6nformation on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. .e has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the ,omplaint or 6nformation on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right. ( e'1le v. Ba//a, 327 SCRA 77-, Ma!c5 -0, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$% The Ri$ht t " F"ir Tri"l 8#. What is the purpose o the rule $arring trial or sentence o an insane person? What are the reasons underlying it? Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public . 6t has been held that it is inhuman to re-uire an accused disabled by Fod to ma0e a 8ust defense for his life or liberty . To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trialC and this has several reasons underlying it. *or one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. oreover, he is not in a position to e7ercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. 'econd, the fairness of the proceedings may be -uestioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is e7pected to ma0e for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is li0ely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Dven if the defendant remains passive, his lac0 of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. ) criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. 6f the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the ad8udication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and becomes and invective against an insensible ob8ect. 2ourth, it is important that the defendant 0nows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. )n incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its significance . ( e'1le v. Es&!a4a, 333 SCRA 999, 7-.@7-9, 8une -9, 2000, En Banc [ un'$% The Ri$ht t "n I*p"rti"l Tri"l 8-. What are the two principal legal and philosophical schools o thought on how to deal with the rain o unrestrained pu$licity during the investigation and trial o high pro ile cases? Held: There are two =5> principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases . The =ritish approach the problem with the presu%ption that publicity will pre8udice a 8ury. Thus, Dnglish courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The )%erican approach is different. 12 courts assume a sGeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong li0elihood, clear and present danger, etc. (Es&!a4a v. 6es"e!&', +.R. ,'s. -497-0@ -5, Ma!c5 2, 200-, En Banc [ un'$% 8*. 'hould the 5%$uds%an $e stopped ro% conducting the investigation o the cases iled against petitioner & or%er President, Estrada due to the $arrage o prejudicial pu$licity on his guilt? Held: Petitioner 7 7 7 contends that the respondent Bmbudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of pre8udicial publicity on his guilt. .e submits that the respondent Bmbudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process. G77 This is not the irst ti%e the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this ,ourt to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. 6n People v. TeehanGee, Ir. &2-1

'0() *- 9111*:,, later reiterated in the case of 7arranaga v. 0ourt o )ppeals, et al. &28. '0() *81 at pp. *1/?*1. 91118:,, we laid down the doctrine that< @(e cannot sustain appellant:s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to pre8udicial publicity. 6t is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, 8ust li0e all high profile and high sta0e criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right o an accused to a air trial is not inco%pati$le to a ree press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused:s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective 8udicial administration, especially in the criminal field 7 7 7. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of 8ustice by sub8ecting the police, prosecutors, and 8udicial processes to e7tensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se pre8udicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day?to?day, gavel?to?gavel coverage does not $y itsel prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial 8udge and impaired his impartiality. *or one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre?trial and other off?court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our brea0fast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. *or another, our idea of a fair and impartial 8udge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. (e have not installed the 8ury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. 7 7 7. Bur 8udges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off?court evidence and on? camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere e7posure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. )t best, appellant can only con8ure possi$ility o prejudice on the part of the trial 8udge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. 6n 6artelino, et al. v. )lejandro, et al., we re8ected this standard of possibility of pre8udice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of pre8udicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the 8udges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. 6n the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial 8udge developed actual $ias against appellant as a conse-uence of the e7tensive media coverage of the pre?trial and trial of his case. The totality o circu%stances o the case does not prove that the trial 8udge ac-uired a ixed opinion as a result of pre8udicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. )ppellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.A (e e7pounded further on this doctrine in the subse-uent case of We$$ v. 3on. (aul de 7eon, etc. &2-. '0() /*2 9111*:, and its companion cases, viz.C @)gain, petitioners raise the effect of pre8udicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. (e find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial ris0 to their liberty whole undergoing a preliminary investigation. G77 The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its e7cessiveness has been aggravated by 0inetic developments in the telecommunications industry. *or sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Bur daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. ,ommentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. 6ndeed, even the principal actors in the case H the &'6, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers H have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. 6n the seminal case of (ich%ond <ewspapers, 4nc. v. @irginia, it was wisely held< N7 7 7 =a> The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in )nglo? )merican 8ustice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this &ation:s organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in Dngland had long been

presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging per8ury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. 6n addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized< when a shoc0ing crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of 8ustice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To wor0 effectively, it is important that society:s criminal process Nsatisfy the appearance of 8ustice,: Bffutt v. 1nited 2tates, $%9 12 !!, !%, ## L Dd !!, ;/ 2 ,t !!, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. *rom this unbro0en, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this &ation:s system of 8ustice, ,f., e.g., Levine v. 1nited 2tates, $"5 12 "!4, % L Dd 5d #9#, 94 2 ,t !4$9. =b> The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, e7pressly guaranteed by the *irst )mendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. 6n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the *irst )mendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those e7plicit guaranteesC the *irst )mendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the conte7t of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the *irst )mendment was adopted. oreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free e7ercise of the other *irst )mendment rights with which it was deliberately lin0ed by the draftsmen. ) trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally H and representatives of the media H have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and -uality of what ta0es place. =c> Dven though the ,onstitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not e7pressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the en8oyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the *irst )mendment< without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have e7ercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.: 'e that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and pre8udicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in 6artelino, et al. v. )lejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of pre8udicial publicity there must be allegation and proo that the 8udges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. 6n the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the +B3 Panel. Petitioners cannot 8ust rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the +B3 Panel, for these are basically unbe0nown and beyond 0nowing. To be sure, the +B3 Panel is composed of an )ssistant ,hief 2tate Prosecutor and 2enior 2tate Prosecutors. Their long e7perience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the 0lieg lights of publicity. 6ndeed, their 5"?page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any e7tra?record evidence e7cept evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite it summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners spea0 well of their fairness. )t no instance, we note, did petitioners see0 the dis-ualification of any member of the +B3 Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of pre8udicial publicity.A )pplying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this 0ourt to enjoin the preli%inary investigation o the petitioner $y the respondent 5%$uds%an. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof . .e needs to show more than weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a 8udge to render a bias?free decision. (ell to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Bmbudsman. &o allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive

pre8udicial publicity against him. 6ndeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the ,ourt cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner. (Es&!a4a v. 6es"e!&', +.R. ,'s. -497-0@-5, Ma!c5 2, 200-, En Banc [ un'$% The Ri$ht "$"inst Sel).In!ri*in"ti n 8/. "iscuss the types o i%%unity statutes. Which has $roader scope o protection? Held: Bur immunity statutes are of )merican origin. 6n the 1nited 2tates, there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the use?and?derivative?use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. 'y its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction . 6n contrast, by the grant of use?and?derivative?use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subse-uent prosecution. (Ma1a, 8!. v. San4"gan:a/an, 23SCRA 7.3, 797@79., A1!"l 29, -994, En Banc [ un'$% 8.. 4s the grant o i%%unity to an accused willing to testi y or the govern%ent a special privilege and there ore %ust $e strictly construed against the accused? Held: I(Je re8ect respondent court:s ruling that the grant of section / immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. 6t simplistically characterized the grant as a special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. 6n ta0ing this posture, it misread the raison dK etre and the long pedigree of the right against self?incrimination vis?Q?vis immunity statutes. The days of in-uisition brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. &ot the least of these abuses is the e7pert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self?incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries. Bver the years, however, came the need to assist government in its tas0 of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matri7 of public welfare. To accommodate the need, the right against self? incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. 6mmunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self?incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be 0nown as transactional or a use?derivative?use immunity 7 7 7. Puite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it H the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Bur hierarchy of values demands that the right against self?incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly. (Ma1a, 8!. v. San4"gan:a/an, 23- SCRA 7.3, .05@.09, A1!"l 29, -994, En Banc [ un'$% The Ri$ht "$"inst D u&le /e p"rd( 88. "iscuss the two Ginds o dou$le jeopardy. Held: Bur 'ill of Rights deals with two =5> 0inds of double 8eopardy. The first sentence of ,lause 54, 2ection !, )rticle 666 of the ,onstitution ordains that @no person shall be twice put in 8eopardy of punishment for the same offense.A The second sentence of said clause provides that @if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or ac-uittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.A Thus, the first sentence prohibits double 8eopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double 8eopardy of punishment for the same act. 1nder the first sentence, one may be twice put in 8eopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute. 6f the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or ac-uittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. 6ncidentally, such conviction or ac-uittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double 8eopardy of punishment or the same offense. 2o long as 8eopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor ac-uittal in either case.

Dlsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important in-uiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double 8eopardy is available only where an identity is shown to e7ist between the earlier and the subse-uent offenses charged. The -uestion of identity or lac0 of identity of offenses is addressed by e7amining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. ( e'1le v. Bu"Aa4a, 259 SCRA -9-, 8ul/ 24, -999% 81. What %ust $e proved to su$stantiate a clai% o dou$le jeopardy? When %ay legal jeopardy attach? Held: To substantiate a claim of double 8eopardy, the following must be proven< =!> ) first 8eopardy must have attached prior to the secondC =5> the first 8eopardy must have been validly terminatedC =$> the second 8eopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. Legal 8eopardy attaches only< =!> upon a valid indictmentC =b> before a competent courtC =c> after arraignmentC =d> when a valid plea has been enteredC and =e> the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e7press consent of the accused. (Cu"s'n v. CA, 2.9 SCRA -59, A1!"l -5, -99. [ angan":an$% 1+. 4n its decision in a cri%inal case, the Iudge pro%ulgated only the civil aspect o the case, $ut not the cri%inal. Will the pro%ulgation o the cri%inal aspect later constitute dou$le jeopardy? Held: Petitioner contends that Kthe promulgation by 3udge Ramos on )pril %, !##/ of the Respondent ,ourtLs decision of 3une $4, !##! by reading its dispositive portion has e ectively ter%inated the cri%inal cases against the petitioner x x x.F 6n other words, petitioner claims that the first 8eopardy attached at that point. The ,ourt is not persuaded. )s a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. .ence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. .ere, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. ITJhe promulgation of the ,) +ecision was not complete. 6n fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incompleteC it was also void. 6n e7cess of its 8urisdiction, the trial 8udge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on )pril %, !##/, and he repeated his mista0e in his )pril !5, !##" Brder. (e emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. 2ince the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first 8eopardy has not yet attached. .ence, double 8eopardy cannot prosper as a defense. (e must stress that Respondent ,ourtLs -uestioned +ecision did not modify or amend its 3uly $4, !##! +ecision. 6t merely ordered the promulgation of the 8udgment of conviction and the full e7ecution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. (Cu"s'n v. CA, 2.9 SCRA -59, A1!"l -5, -99. [ angan":an$% The Ri$ht "$"inst E+ P st F"!t L"ws "nd Bills ) Att"inder 11. What is a $ill o attainder? 4s P.". 18// a $ill o attainder? Held: ITJhe ,ourt, in People v. 2errer &;.(. <os. 7?#2/1#?1-, "ece%$er 2., 11.2, -8 '0() #82,, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a 8udicial trial. Dssential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lac0 of 8udicial trial. This last element, the total lac0 of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. P.+. &o. !9"" does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. 6t does not see0 to inflict punishment without a 8udicial trial. &owhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. (hat the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the -ualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the -ualifying circumstances attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the ,onstitution and 8udicial

precedents re-uire. (M"s'las v. [C'!&es$%

anga, -.- SCRA 94., 959@990, 8an. 30, -990, En Banc

12. What is an ex post acto law? 4s (.). <o. 82-1 an ex post acto law? Held: Ex post acto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.). 95%# is not a penal law. 6t is a substantive law on 8urisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violationsC or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.). ;#;/, which amended P.+. !"4" as regards the 2andiganbayan:s 8urisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the ,ourt as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all 0inds can properly administer 8ustice. &ot being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.). 95%# cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. Petitioner:s and intervenors: contention that their right to a two?tiered appeal which they ac-uired under R.). ;#;/ has been diluted by the enactment of R.). 95%#, is incorrect. The same contention has already been re8ected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post acto laws. R.). 95%# pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not parta0e the nature of an ex post acto law. 6t does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. oreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 6t has been ruled that ad8ective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. )t any rate, R.). 95%# has preserved the accused:s right to appeal to the 2upreme ,ourt to review -uestions of law. Bn the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the 2upreme ,ourt still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome. ( an3"l' M. Lacs'n v. *5e E?ecu&"ve Sec!e&a!/, e&. al., +.R. ,'. -2.099, 8an. 20, -999 [Ma!&"ne<$%