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CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.

L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]


Monday,
February
09,
2009
Posted
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

by Coffeeholic

Writes

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by
Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer
to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid
by

Estelita

before

she

could

be

allowed

to

leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without

returning

the

advance

payment

it

gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective


employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact
that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer
from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as
much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

Rubi et al., vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (G.R. No. L-14078, 1919 March 7)
FACTS: This is a petition for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

a) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on


the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.

b) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on


the ground of religious discrimination.

c) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on


the ground that it denied liberty without due process of law and equal protection of the
laws.

d) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on


the ground that it constituted slavery and involuntary servitude.

e) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is a valid exercise of
police power.

RULING: The petition for habeas corpus is granted.

HELD:

a) Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is a valid delegation of legislative power
by the Legislature, hence constitutional. The Legislature merely conferred, upon the
provincial governor with the approval of the provincial board and the department head,
discretionary authority as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.

b) Since the term "non-Christian" is construed to refer to the natives with a low grade of
civilization, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 does not discriminate between
individuals on account of religious differences and is therefore constitutional.

c) Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 does not unduly interfere liberty of the
citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is concerned. They are restrained
for their own good and the general good the Philippines. Neither it violated due process and
equal protection of the laws since the law is reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure and it applies to all.

d) Confinement in reservations in accordance with the said law does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. Hence, constitutional.

e) It is a valid exercise of police power because its purpose is to provide them education
and to improve their health and morals.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode
was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the
women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in
the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;


For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each,
plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong
that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity
in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)


Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former
Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right
of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of

abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.
Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to
travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right
to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of
is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such
rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SALONGA VS HERMOSO
Political Law Right to Travel Even During Martial Law
Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to compel Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center
to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel to Salonga. This is not however the first time that
Salonga filed such a complaint and this issue is considered moot and academic. The SocGen, in his reply, has already indicated that the certificate was indeed issued and that there
should be no cause of action. The issuance of the certificate is in pursuant to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under
martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The Travel Processing
Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous
of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or
annoyance this is to avoid such similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the
Courts effort and time.
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953]
Monday,
February
09,
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

2009

Posted

by Coffeeholic

Writes

Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila
for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paidoutright, and the balance was made payable as
follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943,
with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of
P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay
the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter
instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The
complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with
law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer,
having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for thelosses he had
suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium
law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The
complaintwas dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of
RA

342.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.

Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the


state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of
police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing
and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is
not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are
reasonable

and

appropriate

to

that

end.

However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court
believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared
that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void
and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive OrdersNos. 25 and 32, with greater
force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of
time as regards thesuspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.

TIRO VS HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Superintendent Tiro because the latter forbade the formers
collection of salary checks of school teacher from division office, following the issuance of
Circular No. 21 s. 1969 by the Director of Public Schools. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to
honor the special powers of attorney and to declare Circular No. 21 as illegal. The trial court
ruled in favor of Zafra. Tiro sought a petition for review and reversal of trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 21 s.1969 is invalid for being violative of the non-impairment
clause under the Constitution.
HELD:
No. The circular is valid and enforceable, and is never invasive of any contract. Petition is
granted.
RATIO:

The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to
him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the
Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no
power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis
Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.

Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.


Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred
their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed
with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential
purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour
Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for
banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to
stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed
according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area
along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706
was
made
and
decided
in
favour
of
Feati.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not
be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which
results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by
Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer
to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid
by
Estelita
before
she
could
be
allowed
to
leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without
returning
the
advance
payment
it
gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact
that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer
from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as
much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.