Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Dear readers,
It is our pleasure to send you the first issue of the fourth volume of the Amsterdam Argumentation Chronicle. Throughout its three years of existence the Chronicle has kept our former students, colleagues and friends, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, updated about the academic and educational activities that take place at the Amsterdam School of Argumentation. It is indeed rewarding for us to see that the number of subscribers to this newsletter continues to increase. It goes without saying that we are deeply grateful to all of you for your comments and suggestions and hope that you will enjoy reading the material that we have enclosed in this issue. With kind regards,
A picture of Lugano at sunset taken by Bart Garssen, one of the participants in the Amsterdam-Lugano Colloquium, on December 1st 2007
In this issue Students about their programme Manoeuvring within pragma-dialectics By Halvor Berggrav Voice from within Argumentation theory from an empirical point of view Interview with Bart Garssen Career story Career By Evgeny Kovalishin Work in progress The application of the pragma-dialectical framework to the analysis of argumentative moves on the macro-level By Kamila Debowska Thesis summary Argumentative reality in defence of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation By Theodora Achourioti Voice from without Persuasion research under the loop Interview with Daniel J. OKeefe News Book Publications of the Amsterdam School
9 12 15
Halvor Berggrav (Norway) is a student in the Research Masters programme Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory, and Philosophy (RAP).
I came from an ex post facto, exploratory way of approaching studying, to a scientifically and theoretically stringent program and department, where everything seemed centred around one core. My questioning of the adequacy of language for instance, seemed if not irrelevant then out of the field in focus; and the same seemed to apply to what I later learned to be higher order conditions. Where were Bourdieus social inequalities, where were the structural aspects of Foucaults discourses? Where was the conflict outside of the immediate discussion? The only thing I saw was a micro-interactionistic approach combined with notions from rational choice theory. Thus far during my period of studying in Amsterdam I have been given the chance to delve into several similar but diverse topics on my own. I have done analyses both in terms of the classical pragma-dialectical framework and of the latest strategic manoeuvring. But I have among other things also worked on reviewing approaches to the understanding of metaphors; on looking into the preconditions for public deliberation; and on a rhetorical analysis of a controversial newspaper oped concerning last years Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In other words, it seems that I in fact have been working on both the relation between thought and language, on the structural aspects, and on a conflict (unfortunately) transcending language.
Bart Garssen is lecturer in the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric in the University of Amsterdam. His specialisations include argumentative writing and empirical research into fallacies and argument schemes.
I think two things have changed: the students and the programme. When I was a student it was not obvious that argumentation theory and speech communication should be part of the curriculum of Dutch studies. This has disappeared altogether. Students do not question the usefulness of argumentation or speech communication. But also the curriculum changed for the better, both on the bachelor and the master level. There is much more coherence and classes follow up on each other in a very systematic way.
You have collaborated with Bert Meuffels and Frans van Eemeren on an empirical project on ordinary arguers judgement of fallacies. How important is empirical research for argumentation theory? That depends on what the argumentation scholar is after. For building theories, constructing criteria, evaluating certain discussion rules, and for looking at certain fallacies empirical research is of little relevance. You can develop models and criteria without any recourse to empirical research, but if you want to know more about the relation between theory and practice, the way people argue in practice, then, of course, empirical research is
needed. What ordinary language users know about the theory, in what respects they have pretheoretical insights are also questions that can be answered empirically. And then there are of course more practical considerations that empirical research can help with, for instance in teaching argumentation, debate, writing, etc.: we would like to know what could be problematic for ordinary language users when you want to teach them argumentation. You have done some work on ordinary peoples conception of argument schemes. What are the implications of your findings? I tried to figure out whether language users have some pre-theoretical ideas on argument schemes. So, I started from the three main types of argumentation schemes; the question was if ordinary language users have the same kind of concept when they argue: to what extent do ordinary language-users have an idea about the type of argument they are using? Or do they have an idea about the type of argumentation they are criticising? In other words: do they have a pretheoretical idea about the step from argument to standpoint? That question is very broad and cannot be answered with yes or no because there are all kinds of graduations. What I found was that people had a very good insight in the step from argument to standpoint, when it comes to criticising. Their criticisms of causal argumentation really differ from their criticisms of arguments from analogy. At the same time, the research shows that inspite of this pre-theoretical insight, it still makes sense to instruct people about argument schemes and critical questions.
Apart from the fact that fallacies with argument schemes (such as ad consequentiam) can be considered as derailments of strategic manoeuvring, what are the different ways in which the concept of strategic manoeuvring can relate to argument schemes? I actually think that a scheme fallacy like the argumentum ad consequentiam provides an excellent possibility of showing how manoeuvring in a specific context may derail. The ad consequentiam is a formal fallacy in the sense that if you use an argument by that form, it is fallacious. It is interesting, however, that you have a reasonable counterpart that seems to have the same form. In that respect, that kind of fallacy resembles the logical kind of fallacies like denying the consequence, which also has its reasonable counterpart, the modus tollens argument. So you can find reasonable counterparts for the original fallacy, but they are not the same. When an argument scheme is used in an incorrect way, the derailment is of another type. Now it is a matter of failing to answer critical questions. This is of course something that depends on the context or the activity type in which the argumentation occurs. Among your specialisations is argumentative writing, which is certainly very important for everyone who comes to study at the university. At the level of the University of Amsterdam, do you think that the argumentative writing programme is given the importance that it deserves? Of course it is, because we are responsible for that programme! I think we have good reasons to do this. First of all, if you want to have a writing course, that should be organised and taught by experts, i.e. by people who know about writing and argumentation. On our side of the picture, it is good that we are in the position to put the theory into practice and that we can show that what is developed in theory really works. I strongly believe that an academic writing course should focus on argumentation and on argumentative structures. In the end it is expected from students to justify their ideas not to just produce literature overviews.
A last question: What are your future projects? We are in the process of finishing up the project about conventional validity of the discussion rules. The main result of this research project is that we know that ordinary arguers in general denounce unreasonable discussion moves. This raises of course a second question: how is it possible that in practice so many fallacies remain unnoticed, if ordinary arguers in principle find them unreasonable? In our research we used clear cases, but what makes fallacies in real life so hard to detect? The next question is therefore: how can you disguise unreasonable moves by way of special kinds of strategic manoeuvring and what kind of strategic manoeuvres are effective in disguising the unreasonableness of certain discussion moves? A second line of research focuses on strategic manoeuvring and general persuasive effects. This consists of finding out how different types of presenting argumentation in the broad sense - leads to persuasion effects. If you look at persuasion research that has been done so far, in my mind, not much attention has been paid to the circumstances in which a certain type of argumentation or presentation is effective. I think if we want to look at the persuasion process from a dialectical perspective much more is to be gained if we take strategic manoeuvring into account. This means that we not just look at the persuasiveness of certain forms, but focus on the circumstances in which certain forms are effective. For instance, the question is not whether standpoint deletion is more effective than explicitly stating the standpoint, but in which circumstances it can be effective.
Career story
CAREER STORY
Career
By Evgeny (Gino) Kovalishin My first engagement with the department of Speech Communication and Argumentation theory was in 2004 when I came to UvA as an exchange student from Moscow State University, where I studied Dutch philology. And if UvA as such was more or less a conscious choice even because its in Amsterdam where some people still speak Dutch, I cant say the same about the Argumentation theory whose connection with Dutch literature (the field of my study back then) was very loose, if was at all. But the good thing about studying Dutch philology in Moscow was that almost nobody from the study administration had any clue of what it meant in reality. Their idea was that it is equal to studying Dutch in any of its manifestations, and as a result I got a full carte blanche for my stay in Amsterdam, that is, I wasnt tied to any course whatsoever. Logically enough, I decided that doing a full time study similar to what I had studied in Moscow would be boring; I opted for something completely different and new. That was debating, or more precisely Argumentation and Discussion. The class was in Dutch and I was the only foreign student in the group. However, I felt so engaged in debating that even language difficulties did not make me give up. I must say that it was a challenge. By the time of going back to Moscow to obtain my MA degree I already knew I would return to Amsterdam. There were at least two good reasons: firstly, I fell in love with the city, and secondly I felt a little confused about argumentation. I understood that what I had seen was just a tiny part of it, and in order to salve my conscience I had to see the rest. And I got enrolled in DASA. That was a beautiful year of both study and pleasure, which led me to my second MA degree. I will not tell you about the programme, new friends, experiences etc. I will just say: I miss it all. But one year flew by and I had to come back to Russia again. This time not for studying but for The Big Life. I decided not to continue the academic career (and I still dont know if its a right decision), but to try myself somewhere else. So, on returning to Moscow I was lucky to get at least 2 good job offers. This seemed to be a problem since both offers were completely different and very tempting. I had to choose between
Evgeny (Gino) Kovalishin (Russia) graduated in August 2006 from the Master in Discourse and Argumentation Studies (DASA).
Gazprom, the biggest gas company in the world, and the exhibition business with opportunity to travel all over the world (and get paid for it). But after a few weeks of interviews and meditation I decided that it would be boring. And I accepted some uncertain offer from the show business field. Why was it uncertain? Because I still cannot say what I am exactly, even after almost 1 year working. Some people say Im an executive producer, and I have to believe them. Because together with 20 more people we produce the best shows and events in Russia. You can think of Oscar Award in US we are doing the same kind of events in Moscow. And my task is to coordinate and direct everybody engaged, some 500 people if we are talking about a big project. My boss was charmed by my description of DASA, got it a completely wrong and decided to offer me a leading position in his company. He thought my communication skills would allow me to do the job better than others. And sometimes it is true. The fact is that this job requires more that average argumentation and communication abilities, especially when you have to explain somebody what to do and how to do it right. Especially if this somebody is Mick Jagger, Scarlett Johansson or, say, the CEO of Chanel or Cartier. I still don't know if communication with celebrities requires a special kind of argumentation, but sometimes to convince them is very difficult. So far I'm good in that.
Work in progress
WORK IN PROGRESS
The application of the pragma-dialectical framework to the analysis of argumentative moves on the macro-level
By Kamila Debowska Since 2005 I have been conducting a qualitative research pertaining to argumentative discourse at Adam Mickiewicz University in Pozna (the School of English, the Department of Linguistic Semiotics). The study of the argumentative discourse was preceded by thorough examination of the most influential argumentation theories. The results of the study will be described in detail in my Ph.D. dissertation which will be completed in 2008. The research focuses on the study of natural discussions in which a conflict of opinions is externalised. The study is carried out on the basis of the recorded material of natural discussions held between English native speakers and an equivalent number of natural discussions held between Polish native speakers. In both cases the discussions are held among the speakers of similar educational and social background. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is applied to the study of argumentative discourse. The model of critical discussion introduced by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984,1992) serves as a tool for the analysis. The theoretical model provides a series of norms by which it can be determined whether a discussion is aiming at the resolution of a difference of opinions. The reason for preferring the pragmadialectical framework to the logical framework for evaluating argumentation in the study is twofold. First, it is assumed that pragma-dialectics offers a more appropriate framework for the analysis of natural discussions as it joins rhetorical, dialectical and pragmatic approaches in the analysis of the standards of reasonableness of arguers. The logical framework deals only with evidently true premises and logically valid inferences. Second, contrary to pragma-dialectics, formal logic and informal logic are not concerned with empirical investigation. Pragma-dialectitians carried out a comprehensive research that was concerned with the violation of the rules of rational conduct on the micro-level (van Eemeren, Garssen, Meuffels 2002: 275-278).
Kamila Debowska (Poland) is a PhD student in the Department of Linguistic Semiotics at Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna, Poland.
The primary aim of the current study is to show that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation may be adapted to the study of real-life discourse if implicated assumptions are taken into account while evaluating arguments in terms of their reasonableness on the macro-level. The secondary aim of the study is to show that complex relations between arguments, namely coordinatively compound argumentation, subordinatively compound argumentation, and multiple argumentation, contribute to the evaluation of arguments in terms of their reasonableness on the macro-level. The study proves that the implicated assumptions, namely the macroproposition of argumentation (van Dijk 1977), the gradual inference rule (topoi of both the doxal type and the non-doxal type) of an argument (Raccah 1995) and the warrant of an argument (Toulmin 1969/2003, Freeman 1992, 2005), may validate the argumentative moves in which the balance between rhetorical and dialectical aims seems not be maintained on the micro-level. Thus, it is concluded that argumentative moves are not to be considered as derailments of strategic manoeuvring on the macro-level if the macroproposition of argumentation, the topoi of an argument and the warrant of an argument fulfil the speakers commitment to the burden of proof incurred by the expression of the standpoint on the common propositional content.
Thesis summary
THESIS SUMMARY
Argumentative reality in defense of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation
By Theodora (Dora) Achourioti
Theories of argumentation are typically classified as being either descriptive or normative. Descriptive theories of argumentation take argumentative reality as their starting point and seek to unveil principles and rules that steer and determine argumentative practice. Normative theories take the opposite approach. They start from clear conceptualisations of what argumentation is and how it should ideally be conducted. These conceptualisations form the basis for the development of a theory that can subsequently be used to analyse and evaluate argumentative practice. The aim of this thesis was to challenge this polarizing distinction between normative and descriptive theories of argumentation, specifically in so far as the analysis and representation of argumentative reality is concerned. Due to its comprehensive and systematic appeal, I took the pragma-dialectical approach as an example of a normative theory of argumentation. It is true that the analysis and reconstruction of argumentation that pragmadialectics proposes is first and foremost motivated by the theorys normative objectives as they are realized in the ideal model of critical discussion. I tried to show, however, that the way the theory depicts argumentation is not necessarily far removed from ordinary practice. To this end, I distinguished three features that are central to the way argumentation is viewed from the pragmadialectical approach; I set out to ground these features in the pragmatics of argumentative discourse and show that they correspond to characteristics inherent in the practice of argumentation. First, I discussed the significance of reconstructing argumentation into the form of an assertive speech act, even though in real discourse arguments are not exclusively put forward by means of performing assertives. Here it was important to show that substantial pragmatic information is not necessarily lost in such a process of reconstruction. Quite the contrary; I claimed that there are independent reasons calling for an analysis in terms
Theodora (Dora) Achourioti (Greece) is a PhD student in the department of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam
of an assertive, especially as far as the externalisation and specification of the commitments involved are concerned. Second, notwithstanding the variety and complexity of ordinary language use, I argued that argumentation can be identified as a speech act in its own right, alongside the other types of speech acts that ordinary language users perform. What is more, it is possible in argumentative activity to isolate and formulate accompanying conditions and presuppositions that cut across the different contexts in which arguments can be found to emerge. Finally, I stressed that a pragmatic analysis of argumentative reality should in no way be assumed to deny that argumentation is an intrinsically rational activity. This is because engaging in argumentation is in itself a normative endeavour, in the sense that arguers naturally seek to appeal to rational standards, even if only to maintain the image of doing so. In the end, I concluded that considerations regarding argumentative reality are just as relevant to a normative approach to argumentation as to a descriptively motivated one. This is because theories that aim at optimising the practice of argumentation are first and foremost in need of a fair understanding and representation of their object of study, if only to guarantee applicability of theory to practice.
Amjarso: Professor OKeefe, welcome to Amsterdam once again and to this interview. I would first like to know who Daniel OKeefe, the persuasion scholar, is. OKeefe: I became interested in studying persuasion when I was an undergraduate at the University of Illinois. After receiving my PhD, my first job was at the University of Michigan, and one of my first teaching responsibilities was a course in persuasion. I actually had a very broad undergraduate education and a very broad graduate education too, with courses in psychology and philosophy as well as in communication. So I was interested in lots of things, but persuasion has always been one of my main interests. I have had the chance to look at your list of publications. You have been working on argumentation for almost as long as you have been working on persuasion. Argumentation was also one of the subjects I studied as a graduate and undergraduate student. I was a debater in high school, and as an undergraduate at the University of Illinois I was part of the debate team and took courses in argumentation as a natural corollary of that. And in fact one of the first courses that I taught at the University of Michigan was a course in argumentation. So right from the beginning there have been connections for me between argumentation and persuasion. You are a friend of the Amsterdam Argumentation School. How old is this friendship? My relationship with the Amsterdam School dates to 1993 when I received a letter from Frans van Eemeren, inviting me to be a keynote speaker at the third (1994) ISSA conference. I had not attended the first two ISSA conferences, but I had friends who had
Daniel J. O'Keefe is Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University. His specializations include persuasion theory, metaanalysis of persuasion effects research, and argumentation theory. OKeefe is the author of Persuasion: Theory and Research.
I have come to every ISSA conference since then and have enjoyed an enduring friendship with the members of the Amsterdam School. Frans came as a visiting scholar at Northwestern University last year - just one example of our many opportunities for interaction.
Now about meta-analysis: You have been the author of various meta-analyses of persuasion research concerning various persuasive message features. If I am not mistaken, your first ever meta-analysis dates back to 1987. What was the reason for starting this line of research and what kept you doing it? Anyone who teaches about any area of socialscientific research knows that one of the challenges is finding out what the research literature taken corporately shows about any given research question. That is, one of the challenges is that of synthesizing existing research. Most graduate training is quite appropriately directed at generating new findings by doing new studies, but the conclusions that one can draw from any single study are necessarily limited, and for that reason I came to be interested in problems of research synthesis how one can take a large number of studies and extract dependable generalizations from them.
attended them who said that they were wonderful conferences and that I really had to go and then fortunately I was able to attend my first one under extraordinarily happy circumstances.
10
In the case of quantitative social-scientific research, methods of meta-analysis quantitative research synthesis technique are a natural fit. Mathematical and statistical bases for these techniques are quite old, but it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that the techniques became widely known and more widely available. So during the 1980s I learned meta-analysis and began doing it. It has turned out that my own predispositions are ones that fit happily with meta-analysis. One of the biggest challenges in doing meta-analysis is being persistent in finding relevant literature; Im very persistent and I like working in libraries and tracking down obscure studies. So I turned out to be the kind of person who enjoys doing meta-analytic work. Does good persuasion research have to include attitude research? No. Persuasion inevitably involves changing the mental state of the receiver, but a variety of mental states can be relevant to persuasion. Attitude, that is, a persons general evaluation of an object or policy or behaviour, is often, but not always, the relevant mental state. For example, people often have positive attitudes towards exercising and they think its a good idea, but they dont engage in regular exercise. For many people thats because they think that they dont have the ability to perform the behaviour the gym is too far away or they dont have the right equipment or they dont have enough time and so on. In a circumstance like that, a persuaders task is not to change peoples attitudes because people already have the attitude that the persuader wants. Instead, the persuaders task is one of convincing people that they are capable of performing the behaviour, so in a situation like that the proximate success of a persuasive message will be assessed by indications that the persons self-efficacy, the persons perceived ability to perform the behaviour, has changed.
How has persuasion research changed in the last fifteen years, that is, after the publication of the first edition of Persuasion: theory and research? Over the last fifteen years, it has mostly been more of the same, that is more research of the kinds with which we are familiar and research on theoretical perspectives of the sorts that we are familiar with. But there have been two notable more general theoretical developments. First, there has been over the last fifteen years increasing attention in some domains to what are sometimes called stage models of behavioural change. These are models that suggest that the process of changing someones behaviour characteristically involves a sequence of more or less discrete stages. The best-known example of such a model is the so-called transtheoretical model, or the stages-of-change model, in which for example a smoker is said progressively first to not even think about quitting smoking and so is said to be in a precontemplation stage. Then next they are in a contemplation stage when they are thinking about quitting. Then there is a planning stage when they set a date to quit or they buy nicotine gum, followed by an action stage in which they have quit, at least for a time. And then ideally comes a maintenance stage where they have quit in a long-term kind of way. The idea is that how one persuades a person will be different depending upon which stage the person is in. Thats one general theoretical development that you see especially in the study of health-related behaviours. And the other general theoretical development worth noting is the articulation of the unimodel of persuasion as a competitor to dual-process models of persuasion like the elaboration likelihood model and the heuristicsystematic model. The argument of the unimodel is that there are not really two distinct persuasion processes but simply one underlying process in which people reason from information to conclusions. Sometimes the information is about the communicators expertise (commonly treated as a peripheral cue), and sometimes that information is the messages arguments (commonly seen as involved in central-route processing). But the suggestion is that there is only a single underlying process of reasoning and persuasion, not two different ones.
11
At the ISSA conference of 1994, you talked about ways in which dual models of persuasion and argumentation theory can benefit from one another. How much, in your opinion, have argumentation scholars and persuasion scholars learned from each other in the last ten years? Well, the relationship between argumentation and persuasion is a kind of curious one in the sense that, broadly put, the two enterprises have different purposes. The characteristic interest of an argumentation scholar has to do with normative considerations about advocacy and decision making, what makes for better and worse arguments or argument procedures, whereas the paradigmatic persuasion researcher is interested simply in persuasive effectiveness, independent of normative worth. So the two enterprises, in a sense, have only a tangential connection to one another and yet its possible for each to potentially benefit from one another. For example, argumentation provides considerable mechanisms for thinking systematically about argument-related features of messages, conceptual equipment that persuasion researchers characteristically lack. And insofar as facts about what makes for more or less successful persuasive appeals are relevant to considerations of the design of normatively ideal argumentation systems, then obviously persuasion research has something to contribute to argumentation studies. Apart from being a distinguished scholar, you have all the way through also been a distinguished teacher. The number of teachingrelated awards that you have won since 1978 leaves no doubt about that. So what makes for a good teacher in your opinion? What makes for a good teacher will vary from one person to another. There are some general common characteristics: good teachers will be knowledgeable and enthusiastic about their subject matters, for example. But beyond that I think that what makes for good teaching is the teachers recognizing his or her strengths and weaknesses and organizing instruction in ways that exploit ones strengths and protect ones weaknesses.
For example the teacher who is excellent at the give-and-take of discussion and asking probing questions but is terrible at giving a well-organized lecture should not teach lecture classes, but should try as far as possible to teach using the kind of discussion-oriented method that works best for that teacher; the teacher who is great at the organized lecture but not so good at running discussion should teach in a way that exploits that strength. So there is no one method of teaching that would be suitable for everyone. Teachers ought to reflect on the kinds of teaching experiences they have had that might give them insights into their own strengths and weaknesses and so give them a sense of how to arrange instruction in the most effective ways for their students. How important is argumentation theory for students curriculum at Northwestern University? Argumentation studies has long been and continues to be one of my departments great strengths. We have a very long history of excellence in argumentation studies, and both for undergraduate and graduate students there is first-rate instruction in argumentation. In fact, a general argumentation class is required for undergraduate majors in communication studies at Northwestern. The person who usually teaches that class is David Zarefsky, a top-flight argumentation scholar and a terrific teacher and an ISSA keynote speaker in 1994. What is Daniel OKeefe going to do next? Many of my future projects involve meta-analysis of persuasion effects research. I am interested especially in some questions of how adaptation of appeals to the audiences values can make for differences in persuasiveness. Jos Hornikx and I have recently collaborated on a meta-analysis looking at the effects of consumer advertisements adapting their appeals to the cultural values of the audience, the idea being that appeals that invoke the audiences cultural values ought to be more persuasive than ads that do not. There are a number of these sorts of audience-adaptation message variations that are of considerable interest for future meta-analysis.
12
News
NEWS
Second NWO conference on the persuasive effects of strategic manoeuvring takes place in Amsterdam
The second NWO conference was held in the Tropenmuseum (Tropical museum) in Amsterdam on May 25, 2007. The theme of this conference was the persuasive effects of strategic manoeuvring. During this one-day conference speakers and commentators discussed, from a qualitative and quantitative empirical perspective the persuasive effects of various strategic manoeuvres that occur in argumentative discourse. The speakers at this conference were Corina Andone, Hans Hoeken, Manfred Kienpointner, Piere Livet, Bert Meuffels and Daniel OKeefe. The commentators were Bilal Amjarso, Bart Garssen, Sara Greco Morasso, Dima Mohammed, Peter Schulz and Yvon Tonnard.
Erik Krabbe (Predicaments of the concluding stage), Jan Albert van Laar (In other words: Confrontation manoeuvring with the formulation of standpoints), Vesel Memedi (Resolving deep disagreement: a case in point), Dima Mohammed (activity types and the account of arguers empirical aims), Jos Plug (Analyzing and evaluating argumentation in parliamentary debates), Agns van Rees (Dialectical and rhetorical effects of dissociation), Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (Manoeuvering strategically with praeteritio: manifestations and effects of pseudo-omissions) and Assimakis Tseronis (Evaluating qualified standpoints).
23rd World IVR Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy held in Poland
23rd World IVR Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy was held at the Jagiellonian
13
University in Krakow, Poland, from the 1st till the 6th of August, 2007. The theme of the conference was Law and Legal Cultures in the Twenty First Century. Eveline Feteris and Harm Kloosterhuis coordinated a special Workshop aimed at discussing the various approaches and dimensions of legal argumentation and interpretation. In this workshop researchers from different backgrounds, such as argumentation theory, legal theory and legal philosophy, who represented different countries and legal systems, were invited to present a paper on the topic of legal argumentation and interpretation.
University in Santiago in Chile organised a conference in honour of Frans van Eemeren. Van Eemerens contributions were on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, the notion of critical discussion, and the rules of critical discussion and fallacies.
Frans van Eemeren and Bart Garssen guest lecturers at the University of Sao Paolo
On August the 15th, Frans van Eemeren and Bart Garssen held lecturers on argumentation and critical discussion at the faculty of letters and Human Sciences at the University of Sa Paolo, Brazil. During the lectures, Frans van Eemeren and Bart Garssen talked about the basic principles of argumentation and strategic manoeuvring, argumentative discussion in various types of discourse. The lectures were organised by Professor Lineide Salvador Mosca and Professor Ademar Ferreira.
Frans van Eemeren and Bart Garssen lecture at the Catholic University of Chile
On August 21st, 2007, Frans van Eemeren and Bart Garssen were guest lecturers at the faculty of Philosophy of Catholic University of Chile in Santiago. The title of the lecture given by Frans van Eemeren was Pragmadialectics: reasonableness in critical discussion and in strategic manoeuvring. The lecture given by Bart Garssen was on the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.
Conference on Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies held at Andres Bello University in Chile
On August 22th, 2007, the deparment of Cultural Extension of the Andres Bello
14
The title of the research project that Lotte van Poppel will work on as a PhD student is Strategic manoeuvring with pragmatic argumentation in persuasive texts in institutional contexts. Van Poppel will focus on the stylistic characteristics of pragmatic argumentation in argumentative texts in a medical context. Van Poppel will conduct this project under the supervision of Frans van Eemeren and the cosupervision of Eveline Feteris. Lotte van Poppel graduated in August 2007 from the Research Master Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy (RAP). The title of her Master thesis is Manoeuvring strategically with litotes.
the legislative process that are sensitive to the institutional and political context of their occurrence. Such instruments are to be designed on the basis of a careful study of the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in two parliamentary settings: the British and the Spanish parliaments. Ihnen will carry out this research under the supervision of Frans van Eemeren and the co-supervision of Jos Plug. Constanza Ihnen graduated last August from the Research Master Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy (RAP). Her thesis was entitled Analysing and evaluating ways of strategic manoeuvring advanced at the argumentation stage within institutionalised argumentative activity types. Arguments from authority in the Chilean parliamentary debate on the New Civil Marriage Law (1997/ 19952004), a case in point.
Gordon Mitchell appointed as Deputy Director of the Mathew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh
Gordon Mitchell has been appointed as Deputy Director of the Mathew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania.
15
In 1993 Mitchell was an exchange student in the Discourse and Argumentation Studies programme (DASA). He is currently associate professor of debate in the department of communication at the University of Pittsburgh. His research focuses on public argument, rhetoric of science, and social movements. In 2007 he received the Outstanding Article Award (for Team B Intelligence Coups) at the National Communication Association, Political Communication Division.
Participants in this years instalment were Bilal Amjarso, Corina Andone, Frans H. van Eemeren, Eveline T. Feteris, Agatha Filimon, Bart Garssen, Giovanni Gobber, Sara Greco-Morasso and Sarah Bigi, Fabrizio Macagno, Bert Meuffels, Dima Mohammed, Sara Montanari, Camilla Palmieri, Rudi Palmieri, H. Jos Plug, Eddo Rigotti, Andrea Rocci, Sara Rubinelli and Peter Schulz, Yvon Tonnard and Jean Wagemans.
Third NWO conference on strategic manoeuvring in institutionalised contexts takes place in Amsterdam
The third NWO conference was held in in Schuilkerk De Hoop in Amsterdam, on October the 26th, 2007. During this one-day conference speakers and commentators exchanged views regarding the various ways in which arguers manoeuvre strategically in resolving their differences of opinion in institutionalised contexts. Participants who presented a paper were Isabela Ietcu Fairclough, Eveline Feteris, Thomas Goodnight, Sally Jackson, Erik Krabbe, Dima Mohammed, Peter Schulz and David Zarefsky. Comments were given by Bilal Amjarso, Corina Andone, Bart Garssen, Marcin Lewinski and Yvon Tonnard. In addition to these commentators, some speakers also commented on papers.