Learning and Individual Differences 13 (2002) 101 114

A short history of g: Psychometrics most enduring and controversial construct

Joseph A. Buckhalt
Counseling and Counseling Psychology Department, Auburn University, Haley Center 2084, Auburn, AL 36849, USA Received 9 September 2002; accepted 9 September 2002

Abstract The construct of g, originated by Charles Edward Spearman (1863 1945) in the early 20th century, has been the single most significant and influential construct for the study of human intelligence throughout the history of psychological science. While numerous objections and criticisms from a number of perspectives have been made over that long period, beginning as soon as Spearman described g, and continuing to the present, g continues to be central to both intelligence theory and measurement. D 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Charles Edward Spearman; g-psychometrics; Intelligence

1. Spearmans discovery While scholars before the 20th century had dealt with intelligence in largely philosophical terms, Spearman and his contemporaries (most notably Burt, Cattell, and Thorndike) set about to devise a theoretical approach grounded in empiricism. In the Forward of The Abilities of Man, published in 1927, Spearman writes,

E-mail address: buckhja@auburn.edu (J.A. Buckhalt). 1041-6080/02/$ see front matter D 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 0 4 1 - 6 0 8 0 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 7 4 - 2

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This work is the product of many hands and much patience. The lines of investigation were suggestedand even extensive beginnings made to follow them upover twenty years ago. Since, there have been carried out a long train of laborious researches, each bringing, as it were, a single stone upon a preconceived unitary plan. And here, in this volume, at last, every stone is fitted into its place to build up the common edifice. (p. v) The edifice that Spearman assembled continues into the 21st century. Moreover, his metaphor is an apt one for the central component of his theory. When many single stones of particular and disparate measures are assembled, a robust edifice, general intelligence, termed g by Spearman, is observed. I have elsewhere asserted (Buckhalt, 1999) that it deserves to be called the central dogma of psychometrics, and in a similar vein, Jensen (1998) writes in his preface, I have come to view g as one of the most central phenomena in all of the behavioral science, with broad explanatory powers at least as important for understanding human affairs as E.L. Thorndikes Law of Effect (or Skinners reinforcement principle). Moreover. . .the g factor is essentially a biologically based variable, which, like other biological functions in the human species, is necessarily a product of the evolutionary process. The human condition in all of its aspects cannot be adequately described or understood in a scientific sense without taking into account the powerful explanatory role of the g factor. (p. xii) 2. Central aspects of Spearmans Law Spearman considered an earlier volume (Spearman, 1923) to be an account of the general laws of cognition, and the 1927 work to be the application of those laws to individual differences of ability (Spearman, 1927, p. vi). Spearman seemed to view his theoretical work as very preliminary, and one gets the sense that he felt the primary contribution of his work was to establish clear and systematic empirical methods for testing hypotheses and building theory. He was in fact modest about the elements of the theory, and even reluctant to characterize the work as a theory. While he referred to several qualitative and quantitative laws of cognition, he used different terminology in characterizing his discovery of g, referring instead to a unitary system (p. 415). My own opinion, looking back at the work and all the support that has followed, is that the term law is appropriate. Briefly, Spearmans Law is that, when a sufficient number of individuals are given a sufficient number of mental tasks to perform that are quantifiable along some metric, and the results are subjected to factor analysis, measures of all the tasks are positively correlated (the positive manifold manifested by his tetrad difference method), and the variance among the tasks is best represented by two major categories: a large general factor Spearman named g, and smaller specific (s) factors. With error-free scores on the measures, the correlations of g with s and all the ss with each other should approach zero. Moreover, a robust g factor is found regardless of the particular nature of the specific tasks measured. This phenomenon Spearman called the theorem of the indifference of the indicator. Spearman himself was not certain of the underlying nature of g,

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but he hypothesized that all mental tasks that evoked g involved three essential cognitive operations: apprehension of experience, education of relations, and education of correlates. These three seemed to Spearman to be fundamental regardless of the widely varying content of tasks.

3. Theories and tests of intelligence, past and present Spearmans work was aimed at deriving a model of intelligence based on scientific measurement and mathematical analysis. The opening chapters of The Abilities of Man reflect Spearmans irritation with earlier approaches to intelligence, which to Spearman seemed hopelessly misguided. He writes with some sarcasm of the symposia assembled to define intelligence in the following passages, the first referring to the meeting of American psychologists reported in the Journal of Educational Psychology in 1921 (Intelligence and its measurement: A symposium, 1921): But as for the essential aim, that of supplying the psychology of intelligence with a generally acceptable analysis, there appears to have been no success obtained. Each speaker had his own opinion; almost all of these turned out to differ widely; and reconciliation among them was not even attempted. (p. 9) Eventually, yet another symposium was called together, this time at Oxford in 1923. But the situation became even more perplexed than at the previous meeting. For then the problem had only been as to the nature of the single thing, intelligence. But now, there appeared in the field many different intelligences, each presenting as hard a problem of its own! (p. 9) Spearmans contemporary, Edward Lee Thorndike (18741949), also published a major work, The Measurement of Intelligence, in 1927 (Thorndike, Bregman, Cobb, & Woodyard, 1927). In that work, he alludes to Spearmans attempt to reduce intellect to apprehension and education of relations and correlates, summarizing his view as follows: There is no doubt that the appreciation and management of relations is a very important feature of intellect, by any reasonable definition thereof. Yet it seems hazardous and undesirable to assume that the perception and use of relations is all of intellect. In practice, tests in paragraph reading, in information, and in range of vocabulary, seem to signify intellect almost as well as the opposites and mixed relations tests. In theory, analysis (thinking things into their elements), selection (choosing the suitable elements), and organizing (managing many thoughts), seem to be as important as deserving of consideration as the perception and use of relations. (p. 21) And earlier, Spearman had quoted a passage from an earlier work of Thorndike that illustrated his objection to a unitary model of intelligence. . . .the mind is a host of particularized and independent faculties. (Spearman, 1927, p. 56)

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Thorndike articulated his own multifactorial theory of intelligence, and many others followed over the years, the most notable of which were those of Thurstones (1938) primary mental abilities, Guilfords (1956, 1967) structure of intellect model, Vernons (1950) hierarchical theory, Horn & Cattells (1967) theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence, up to the most recent, Gustafssons (1984) unifying model, and Carrolls (1993) three stratum theory. All of these theories have been based on the basic paradigm of factoring tests of intelligence into varying numbers of constituents, although they vary in the importance ascribed to a general versus specific factors. Considerable consensus seems to be emerging in support of Carrolls hierarchical model derived from meta-analysis of a large number of independent factor analytic studies, which places g alone in the third stratum, eight broad factors in the second stratum, and a great many smaller factors in the first stratum. Perhaps some measure of the acceptance of g in this formulation is the recent statement by Robert Sternberg, whose extensive writing has advocated abandoning or at least de-emphasizing gbased measures in favor of those based on nonconventional alternatives, indicating his acknowledgment that measures of g are useful. . . .measures of g are important predictors of many things, and. . .such measures and the g construct on which they are based will continue to be important to theory, research, and practice in psychology. (Sternberg, 2002, p. 118) Of the most used comprehensive, individually administered intelligence tests in use at present in schools and other applied settings, virtually all include a composite g-based measure, even though a variety of inventive labels have been devised, perhaps to disguise the fact that they are, after all IQ tests. The Wechsler Scales (1991) continue to use IQ, but the Stanford-Binet 4th Edition (SB4; Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986) yields a Test Composite, the Differential Ability Scales (DAS; Elliott, 1990) a measure of General Conceptual Ability, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983), a Mental Processing Composite, and the WoodcockJohnson III (WJ3; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001), the General Intellectual Ability score. A number of approaches have been advanced over the past century that have departed from the mainstream factorial model. Piaget proposed a framework in the 1930s for understanding the development of intelligence that has stimulated a substantial body of research, but has yielded surprisingly little application to the central tasks for which factor-based tests have put to use. Sattler (2001) notes that there still exists no comprehensive standardized battery of Piagetian tests. The British Ability Scales (BAS; Elliott, 1983), the predecessor of the DAS included a subtest for Formal Operational Thinking, but that subtest was expunged from the DAS, because of measurement and scaling difficulties. Similarly, Feuerstein (1979), Feuerstein, Feuerstein, & Gross (1997), Lidz (1997), and Vygotsky (1978) proposed models that have attracted considerable attention, but there has been very little application in psychological practice (Haney & Evans, 1999). Naglieri and Das (1997) have recently developed the Cognitive Assessment System (CAS) based on Lurias (1973) neuropsychological theories, and have made the claim that their method is a significant and radical departure from g-based tests of the past (Naglieri, 1998). A test battery even more representative of Lurias theories is the NEPSY (Kemp, Kirk, & Korkman, 2001; Korman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998).

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Sternbergs work has been very prominent in intelligence theory and research for over two decades. In one of his earliest works, he outlined a componential approach (Sternberg, 1977) that drew from experimental cognitive psychology and emphasized the importance of a great number of narrowly circumscribed tasks and abilities. He later (e.g., Sternberg, 1985) presented what he termed a triarchic theory of intelligence, the triad being componential, experiential, and contextual dimensions of intelligence, and also expanded his interests to the determinants of success in the everyday world, ascribing success to something apart from conventionally conceived intelligence he called practical intelligence (e.g., Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). More recently, Sternberg has broadened his writing into the areas of wisdom (e.g., Sternberg, 1990), and to a new label, successful intelligence (Sternberg, 1996). An unusually large corpus of research studies and books have been produced addressing the ideas, mostly by Sternberg and his colleagues, and the many ideas continue to hold promise for important theoretical and practical advances. But because no tests of capabilities different from conventional ones measured by intelligence tests have come forth, the prodigious research has not been incorporated into a unified hierarchical factorial theory expressed most definitively by Carroll (1993). Factor theorists and practitioners continue to await tests of the various capabilities Sternberg has suggested. When those test become available, we may be assured that they will be examined carefully and thoroughly to determine whether they fit within existing factor theory, or if they measure entirely different factors, as Sternberg has repeatedly suggested. Gardners (1983) multiple intelligences is another idea that has captured the interest of many, and Gardner rivals Sternberg not only in alleging that many varieties of human intelligence exist unmeasured by tests, but also in mounting continuous challenges to the dominant theoretical and practical conceptualizations of intelligence. Gardner originally claimed that linguistic, logicalmathematical, musical, spatial, bodily kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligences existed, and that conventional theory and tests capture (partially and not very well) only the first two of those. Later works of Gardner (Gardner, Kornhaber & Wake, 1996; Gardner, 1998a) have added naturalistic, spiritual, and existential intelligences to the list. Golemans (1995) popular book, Emotional Intelligence, has likewise had the effect of extending the construct to domains far from the dominant paradigm. This body of work has appealed to a broad range of constituencies in the public and education fields, in part perhaps because it holds out the hope that those found deficient in traditional gbased measures will be found to excel in one or more other areas. It provides some basis in serious scholarship for the notion that all children are smart (a sentiment with which all parents, including this writer, can certainly relate), some are just not as smart in the areas on which they are tested, and educators and psychologists have just not been capable and discerning enough to recognize their hitherto hidden intelligences. Another reason Gardners ideas have been embraced by many, is the same as that expressed very early by the prominent columnist of the day, Lippman (1922). Basically, the argument is that everyone knows that human intelligence is at once so diverse, so complex, and so remarkable, and so unparalleled in the universe, that like human beauty, it defies measurement and most certainly cannot be reduced to a only one ( g-like) metric. (Brand, 1996; Brand et al.,

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2002) has argued that one reason many intellectuals resist the notion of g is that it belies their everyday experiences. Since they interact typically with persons in their upper ability range, they have no experience with intelligence levels across the full range. Accordingly, the differences they observe are more likely to be functions of specialized knowledge and abilities other than g. And when data conflict with common experience, scepticism about the data overrides scepticism about ones direct experiences with others. Brand also presents evidence (Kane & Brand, in press) that intelligence differentiates to a greater degree at higher versus lower levels of g. While Gardners ideas have achieved popularity in some circles, conspicuously absent are supporters among other researchers and theorists in psychometrics. Sternbergs comments are representative of the professional psychometric community when he addresses Gardners work in his article, Death, Taxes, and Bad Intelligence Tests: Although I like Gardners assessments at a theoretical level, they are a psychometric nightmare. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify performance on them; assessments take place over extremely long periods of time, and it is questionable whether anything approaching objective scoring is even possible. The tests seem to measure a nondecomposable composite of interest and motivation, initiative, abilities of various kinds, achievement, socialization, and enculturation. The tests are of the kind that will generate smiles from teachers, and expressions of horror from those who work in measurement (Sternberg, 1991, p. 266). Jensen (1998, p. 129) suggests further that, The boundaries of these criteria seem vague or elastic and one can easily imagine other intelligences that could be admitted by such criteria. Why is there no sexual intelligence (Casanova) or criminal intelligence (Al Capone)? For his part, Gardner is undaunted by the calls for him to cast his theory in terms that conventional psychometricians can measure. In their introduction to The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) state that Gardner has been unique among modern investigators of intelligence who, since Spearman, have followed a measurement model, in his disinterest in quantification and scaling. In support of their conclusion, they quote Gardner, I fear. . . that I cannot accept these correlations at face value. Nearly all current tests are so devised that they call principally upon linguistic and logical facility. . . Accordingly, individuals with these skills are likely to do well even in tests of musical or spatial abilities, while those who are not especially facile linguistically and logically are likely to be impaled on such standardized tests. (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 19; Gardner, 1983, p. 17) Gardner, in his own defense, has stated that he is not opposed to trying to measure intelligence, he rather believe that the way psychometricians have gone about it is wholly inadequate (Gardner, 1998b).

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4. Support for g Spearmans work has been vindicated by those who accept the principles of measurement and analysis he created in that they have found exceptionally strong support for the validity of Spearmans Law as well as considerable practical utility. For example, a wealth of empirical studies have found that g reliably predicts educational and vocational performance, and does so better than any other measures or methods yet studied (Gottfredson, 1986, 1997; Jensen, 1998). Jensen (1998), Carroll (1993, in press), and others who have recently tried to synthesize intelligence research and theory have found a primary role for g (e.g., Deary, 2000; Mackintosh, 1998) that exhibits considerable consilience with levels of science both below (e.g., heritability and biological correlates) and above (correspondence with performance of a multitude of tasks in widely ranging settings) the level of psychometrics.

5. Arguments against the existence or importance of g Opposition to Spearmans Law come from such an astonishing number of perspectives and has persisted with such vigor over the years, that its durability and validity is all the more impressive. Spearman (1932, pp. viiviii) addressed the criticisms of his day in his 1927 book, but as reflected by his notes to the second edition, he appeared to believe that his most serious critics had been won over based on the evidence of research. Spearman no doubt had confidence that agreement on empirically based definitions and measures would resolve permanently the morass he perceived as preceding his work. He might well be disappointed and amazed that such vigorous opposition continues, but gratified that those who accept the principles of measurement and analysis he created have found exceptionally strong support. 5.1. Racial differences Perhaps the most well known objections have come from those who question the most controversial of results from widespread measurement of intelligence in schools and other contexts. The argument is essentially based on a beginning assumption that racial groups do not differ in intelligence, so the fact that composite scores on intelligence tests show racial differences is an indication that something fundamental is wrong with the tests, with the underlying theoretical foundation supporting them, and/or the way the tests have been administered and used. Most prominent among the contested results is the well-replicated mean difference between IQ scores of AfricanAmerican and white individuals. Jensens 1969 article called attention to the difference, and offered a critique of attempts to decrease or remove the difference through compensatory education programs like Head Start. Jensens critique was vigorously renounced by many scholars of the day. Paramount in evoking critics attacks was Jensens suggestion that heritability estimates for human intelligence did not

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auger well for lasting changes in ability even through substantial and early educational interventions. The timing of the articles appearance, during the midst of Americas Civil Rights Movement, ensured that every aspect of Jensens data and conclusions received thorough scrutiny. But by the mid-1990s, when Herrnstein and Murrays (1994) The Bell Curve was published, and a comparable storm of opposition arose, no diminishment of Jensens original conclusions had occurred. In fact, advances in behavior genetics had strengthened the framework of his basic argument. Furthermore, mean differences in IQ scores had continued to persist, even though much research had been done investigating the hypothesis that bias in the tests, bias by examiners, bias in the entire educational and societal system were responsible, and generally come up with no strong claim that differences could be laid to bias. Developments in tests had not changed the general picture either. Widely used tests like the StanfordBinet and Wechsler Scales included representative percentages of American racial groups in their restandardizations. Kaufmans first test (K-ABC, 1983) was introduced with much fanfare based on the claim that it was based on a different theoretical model and more culturally fair, but while surveys of school psychologists continue to reflect its use even with outdated norms (e.g., Wilson & Reschly, 1996), the factor validity was questioned from the beginning (e.g., Strommen, 1988), and the degree of reduction of racial differences is still uncertain (e.g., Naglieri, 1986; Vincent, 1991), there is some evidence that whatever diminishment of racial differences the K-ABC demonstrates is due to removal of subtests more related to g from the composite index (Jensen, 1998; Naglieri & Jensen, 1987). Early allegations of absence of validity for the racial differences centered on cultural and racial bias within the tests or within the practices and motives of examiners. These kinds of allegations have been investigated rather extensively in empirical studies, and found to have little merit (Jensen, 1980). Nevertheless, arguments from that perspective persist. For example, Helms (1992, 1997) gives examples from WAIS subtest formats and items that may be biased, but offers no support beyond speculations. One WAIS subtest cited for such bias is Block Design, which is said to possibly be inordinately difficult for persons involved in heavy labor due to its reliance on rapid manipulation of small objects. Also mentioned is that the task may be unfamiliar to persons who suffered disadvantaged childhoods and were not exposed to blocks. The recently released report of the Presidents Commission on Excellence in Special Education (2002, p. 26) includes the statement, The Commission found that several factors were responsible for this overrepresentation (in special education classes), including the reliance on IQ tests that have known cultural bias. The evidentiary basis for this conclusion is not available in the report, but it speaks volumes about the current zietgeist for the villainy of IQ tests. Other recent arguments addressing racial disparities seem to be based more in some of the other categories of objections mentioned below. For example, the title of Graves and Johnson (1995), The Pseudoscience of Psychometrics, casts aspersions on the fundamental framework upon which psychometrics rests. Onwuegbuzie and Daley (2001) offer refutation (but no data) of eight major premises alleged to be held by those they regard as misguided at best, and racist misanthropes at worst. Among the premises are the unidimensionality and the heritability of intelligence. A recent body of work by Steele (Steele, 1997, 1998; Steele &

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Aronson, 1995) has given a new explanation for the racial disparity with support from empirical investigations that provides evidence for stereotype threat resulting in test anxiety being responsible for lowering performance of AfricanAmericans. Little research by independent investigators has been conducted to verify this explanation, but see Chan, Schmitt, DeShon, and Clause (1997) for one such study. Another recent body of inquiry by Hale and colleagues (e.g., Hale & Fiorello, 2001; Hale, Fiorello, Kavanagh, Hoeppner, & Gaither, 2001) suggests that while IQ tests may not be biased in the statistical sense, they may be unfair to those in certain racial and ethnic groups by virtue of their inclusion of crystallized intelligence measures in the calculation of global IQ scores. After over a century of study, questions of fairness and bias are still not settled with any degree of wide professional consensus. 5.2. Methodological objections Critics of the construct of g have long questioned the fundamental methodology by which it has been measured, and the philosophical assumptions underlying the measurement model. There have been recent cogent criticisms of the positivist assumptions of science that underlie mental testing (Barrett, 2000; Gergen, 2001; Kline, 1998; Michell, 1999, 2000). Barrett (2000), in reviewing Jensens (1998) The g Factor, for example, makes the allegation that . . .psychologists. . .assume they are doing science when they are merely observing and classifying phenomena, a charge which Jensen dismisses as nihilistic and imposing restrictions that would halt progress not only in psychology, but in any other relatively undeveloped science (Jensen, 2000). But even if one grants that human intelligence is amenable to scientific study, there have long been criticisms of factor analysis, one of the methodological bulwarks of intelligence theory from Spearman to the present. Goulds (1981, p. 320) well-known The Mismeasure of Man contained a thorough critique of factor analysis and what he called the resultant reification of intelligence based on one mathematical solution among many equivalent alternatives. Michell (1999) and Schoenemann (1997) present more recent versions of this basic objection. Questions about how intelligence is measured are also central to Gardners work, who has been challenged to submit measures for his various intelligences, and has essentially replied that while he doesnt know exactly how to go about that, he nevertheless rejects how intelligence has been measured in the past (e.g., see Gardner, 1998b). 5.3. Objections based on function and importance A further category of objections seems to be related to the incestuous relationship between measure of intelligence and the categories and classifications constructed for educational and psychological treatment. Some have argued from a postmodern perspective that those categories are themselves flawed (Danforth, 1997, 2000; Jacobson, 2001), while other have maintained that even if g is a valid index of general intelligence, its continued dominance and use is not justifiable in view of the factorial richness now available with contemporary instruments. Pasternack (2002) has recently made the argument that the discrepancy model

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in definition of learning disability should be abandoned by claiming that: (1) validity of the concept of LD does not hinge on the validity of IQ-Achievement Discrepancy as a means for identifying individuals with LD; (2) IQ-Achievement Discrepancy is not a valid means for identifying individuals with LD; (3) there is no compelling need for the use of IQ tests in the identification of LD; (4) elimination of IQ tests in the identification of LD will help shift the emphasis in Special Education away from eligibility and towards getting children the interventions they need to be successful learners. This argument apparently was convincing enough to the Presidents Commission on Excellence in Special Education (2002) to support elimination of IQ tests from learning disability identification. Vellutino (Vellutino, 2001; Vellutino, Scanlon, & Lyon, 2000) had earlier made a similar argument, and Sternberg and Grigerenko (2002) offer ten reasons that discrepancy scores are inappropriate for children with reading disabilities. Hale and Fiorello (2001) and Hale et al. (2001) present evidence that g does not well represent global intellectual functioning for students with learning disabilities. They have additionally reached the same conclusion after studying children with ADHD and even typical children with significant factor variability. In two of the other areas of exceptionality for which intelligence measures have played a central role, mental retardation, and giftedness, there have long been arguments that other factors, namely adaptive behavior and evidence of talent and creativity, are orthogonal to intelligence, more germane to the essence of the condition, and of more benefit in shaping educational treatment. Perhaps no two persons have had as much impact on the practice of intelligence testing in schools in the last 30 years as Jerome Sattler and Alan Kaufman. From the publication of Sattlers first edition of his popular book in 1973 (Sattler, 1973) to the most recent edition in 2001, many of his recommendations for intellectual assessment have been widely adopted, including the interpretation of scores beyond single ( g-based) indices of intelligence. Similarly, ever since his 1979 Intelligent Testing with the WISC-R, Kaufmans method of profile analysis for Wechsler scales, with its de-emphasis on the Full Scale IQ, has been widely followed in school psychology assessment. The work of McDermott, Glutting and others (e.g., Glutting, Youngstorm, Ward, Ward, & Hale, 1997; McDermott, Fantazzo, & Glutting, 1990) on subtest analysis has led them to the conclusion that practitioners predilection for much of the kind of interpretation suggested by Sattler and Kaufman is scientifically unjustified, even though some (e.g. Hale et al., 2001) question their methodology. A recent survey indicates that while researchers may disagree about the justification for profile analysis, a substantial majority of practitioners use profile analysis in clinical practice (Pfeiffer, Reddy, Kletzel, Schmelzer, & Boyer 2000). Finally, the recent work of Woodcock and McGrew (e.g., Woodcock et al., 2001; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002) has advanced theory and measurement of intelligence, and while they acknowledge the existence of g, they make the case that secondstratum factors are much more interesting and useful. So, at the same time special education categories (i.e., mental retardation, learning disability, and giftedness) continue to depend on single index measures of g, most school psychologists seem to have been convinced that something is seriously wrong with the model of intelligence that underlies and justifies their primary role. Oddly enough, the legacy of Spearman and one of the few phenomena that have

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attained the status of a law in psychometrics and in all of psychology, has few supporters among either those who give the tests or those who publish articles and books that give direction to the field.

6. Where does this leave us? We are, a century later, still very divided regarding the dilemma Spearman saw and did a creditable job addressing. We lack a consensual set of measures and methods guided by the principles of science. We continue to have advocates of Spearmans Law, but resistance and even hostility to it has, if anything, become even stronger. Spearman noted in 1927 that . . .there has been sounded in certain places a note of solicitude, of suspicion, and even downright hostility. Still more strange is that such scepticism toward the testing of intelligence, instead of quietly subsiding under the influence of its victorious career, would seem on the contrary to be always gathering more force (p. 8). Spearman would surely be gratified that his model has enjoyed strong empirical support and widespread application in industrial and postindustrial societies; he would be amused and perhaps annoyed that so many continue to misunderstand or discount his discovery. He would have little tolerance today, as in his day, for the approach of calling together yet another symposium (or worse yet, a surveySnyderman & Rothman, 1987) to define intelligence, and even less for the proliferation of multiple intelligences we have seen of late. And I doubt that he would appreciate the irony that the majority of presenters at the 2001 Spearman Conference (see abstracts at http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/spearman) took positions basically against g, or at least in favor of looking elsewhere for viable areas in which to improve or enhance intelligence. References
Barrett, P. (2000). Intelligence, psychometrics, IQ, g, and mental abilities: quantitative methodology dressed as science. Review of Jensen on Intelligence-g-Factor. Psycoloquy, 11(46). http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/ psyc/newpsy?10.47. Also published in Psycoloquy reviews of The g Factor and replies by Arthur Jensen (2000). Berkeley, CA: Author. Brand, C. (1996). The g factor: general intelligence and its implications. Available at http://www.douance.org/qi/ brandbook.htm and http://www.crispian.demon.co.uk/index.htm. Brand, C., Constales, D., & Kane, H. (2002). Why ignore the g factor? Historical considerations. In H. Nyborg (Ed.), A festschrift for Arthur Jensen. Oxford, UK: Pergamon, in press. Buckhalt, J. A. (1999). Defending the science of mental ability and its central dogma. Review of Jensen on Intelligence-g-Factor. Psycoloquy, 10(23). http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.47. Also published in Psycoloquy reviews of The g Factor and replies by Arthur Jensen (2000). Berkeley, CA: Author. Carroll, J. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: a survey of factor-analytic studies. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Carroll, J. B. (in press). The higher-stratum structure of cognitive abilities: current evidence supports g and about ten broad factors. In H. Nyborg (Ed.), The scientific study of intelligence: tribute to Arthur R. Jensen. Elsevier/ Pergamon, Oxford, UK. Chan, D., Schmitt, N., DeShon, R. P., & Clause, C. S. (1997). Reactions to cognitive ability tests: the relationships

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