Executive- Immunity from suit Gloria v.

CA FACTS: Private respondent Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent. Icasiano requested to reconsider his re assignment but it was denied. He then filed a petition for preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The CA ruled that the reassignment of Icasiano is declared to be violative of his rights to security of tenure, and Gloria was prohibited from implementing the reassignment of Icasiano. Petitioners seek relief from the decision of the appellate court arguing that the filing of the case violated the immunity of the President from suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit. HELD: Petition is DENIED. Decision of CA is AFFRIMED. RATIO: Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Judicial - The Supreme Court: Mode of Sitting MMDA v. Jancom FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the Courts affirming the judgment of the CA, which in turn affirmed that of the RTC, declaring that there is a valid and perfected waste management contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM Environmental Corporation, and dismissing the petition filed by petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for lack of merit. Petitioner has likewise filed a motion that the case at bar be heard and resolved by the Court en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be referred to the Court en banc. HELD: Petitioners motion for reconsideration is DENIED. And the denial is FINAL. RATIO: Circular No. 2-89 "The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed." A decision of a Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court. The Division thought it wise to refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc, suggesting or inquiring if the Court en banc should take over and whether the case should be re-raffled courtwide. The Court en banc, however, declined to take over the case and returned it to the Third Division with instructions that it be re-raffled among the other members of the Division. Circular 2-89 further pertinently provides that "No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained."

People v. Gacott FACTS: Respondent judge Gacott was charged of ignorance of the law for erroneously dismissing a criminal case. He was given a reprimand and a fine of P10, 000. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration. He questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to administratively discipline him. ISSUE: Whether or not to require the referral of the case, or at least the disciplinary aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. HELD: Petition DENIED. RATIO: Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. Yet, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.

Meralco v. Pasay Trans Co. FACTS: A petition of the Manila Electric Company (Meralco), requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Meralco and the compensation to be paid to the Meralco by such transportation companies. The petition was submitted to the court in relation to section 11 of Act No. 1446 which states Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can be appointed in the board of arbitrators. HELD: The members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter. RATIO: It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of jurisdiction by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.

Garcia v. Macaraig FACTS: Administrative complaint filed by Paz Garcia against the Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of CFI of Laguna, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence. Respondent took his oath as Judge of CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City. The court is one of the newly created CFI branches and had to be organized from scratch. Because of the circumstances and difficulties, it took him long before he can discharged his judicial duties. When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Macaraig can exercise his function as undersecretary of justice even if he took his oath as Judge of CFI. HELD: Administrative complaint is DISMISSED. RATIO: In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the government will be discussed a non. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.