RAYRAY VS LEE Article 45 Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea.

Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila for an action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lees whereabouts cannot be determined and that his consent in marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been living with other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were made known to Lee but due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default. The lower court denied Rayrays action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee. ISSUE: Whether or not Rayrays marriage with Lee is null and void. HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. As far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayrays evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men which is considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also, through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a

legal impediment to any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case. G.R. No. L-5897 April 23, 1954

KING MAU WU, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO SYCIP, defendant-appellant. I.C. Monsod for appellant. J.A. Wolfson and P. P. Gallardo for appellee. PADILLA, J.: This is an action to collect P59,082.92, together with lawful interests from 14 October 1947, the date of the written demand for payment, and costs. The claim arises out of a shipment of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion sold by the plaintiff, as agent of the defendant, to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, who in turn assigned it to Fortrade Corporation. Under an agency agreement set forth in a letter dated 7 November 1946 in New York addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter on the 22nd day of the same month, the plaintiff was made the exclusive agent of the defendant in the sale of coconut oil and its derivatives outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 1/2 per cent on the total actual sale price of sales obtained through his efforts in addition thereto 50 per cent of the difference between the authorized sale price and the actual sale price. After the trial where the depositions of the plaintiff and of Jas. Maxwell Fassett and several letters in connection therewith were introduced and the testimony of the defendant was heard, the Court rendered judgment as prayed for in the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was denied. A motion for a new trial was filed, supported by the defendant's affidavit, based on newly discovered evidence which consists of a duplicate original of a letter dated 16 October 1946 covering the sale of 1,000 tons of coconut oil soap emulsion signed by Jas. Maxwell Fassett

assigned by the latter to the defendant; the letter of credit No. 20122 of the Chemical Bank & Trust Company in favor of Jas. Maxwell Fassett assigned by the latter to the defendant; and a letter dated 16 December 1946 by the Fortrade Corporation to Jas. Maxwell Fassett accepted it on 24 December 1946, all of which documents, according to the defendant, could not be produced at the trial, despite the use of reasonable diligence, and if produced they would alter the result of the controversy. The motion for new trial was denied. The defendant is appealing from said judgment. Both parties agreed that the only transaction or sale made by the plaintiff, as agent of the defendant, was that of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion f.o.b. in Manila, Philippines, to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, in whose favor letter of credit No. 20112 of the Chemical Bank & Trust Company for a sum not to exceed $400,000 was established and who assigned to Fortrade Corporation his fight to the 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion and in the defendant the letter of credit referred to for a sum not to exceed $400,000. The plaintiff claims that for that sale he is entitled under the agency contract dated 7 November 1946 and accepted by the defendant on 22 November of the same year to a commission of 2 1/2 per cent on the total actual sale price of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion, part of which has been paid by the defendant, there being only a balance of $3,794.94 for commission due and unpaid on the last shipment of 379.494 tons and 50 per cent of the difference between the authorized sale price of $350 per ton and the actual selling price of $400 per ton, which amounts to $25,000 due and unpaid, and $746.52 for interest from 14 October 1947, the date of the written demand. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that the transaction for the sale of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not covered by the agency contract of 22 November 1946 because it was agreed upon on 16 October 1946; that it was an independent and separate transaction for which the plaintiff has been duly compensated. The contention is not borne out by the evidence.

The plaintiff and his witness depose that there were several drafts of documents or letter prepared by Jas. Maxwell Fassett preparatory or leading to the execution of the agency agreement of 7 November 1946, which was accepted by the defendant on 22 November 1946, and that the letter, on which the defendant bases his contention that the transaction on the 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not covered by the agency agreement, was one of those letters. That is believable. The letter upon which defendant relies for his defense does not stipulate on the commission to be paid to the plaintiff as agent, and yet if he paid the plaintiff a 2 1/2 per cent commission on the first three coconut oil emulsion shipments, there is no reason why he should not pay him the same commission on the last shipment amounting to $3,794.94. There can be no doubt that the sale of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not a separate and independent contract from that of the agency agreement on 7 November and accepted on 22 November 1946 by the defendant, because in a letter dated 2 January 1947 addressed to the plaintiff, referring to the transaction of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion, the defendant says . . . I am doing everything possible to fulfill these 1,000 tons of emulsion, and until such time that we completed this order I do not feel it very sensible on my part to accept any more orders. I want to prove to Fortrade, yourself and other people that we deliver our goods. Regarding your commission, it is understood to be 2 1/2 per cent of all prices quoted by me plus 50-50 on over price. (Schedule B.) In another letter dated 16 January 1957 to the plaintiff, speaking of the same transaction, the defendant says As per our understanding when I was in the States the overprice is subject to any increase in the cost of production. I am not trying to make things difficult for you and I shall give you your 2 1/2 per cent commission plus our overprice provided you can give me substantial

order in order for me to amortize my loss on this first deal. Unless such could be arranged I shall remit to you for the present your commission upon collection from the bank. (Schedule C.) In a telegram sent by the defendant to the plaintiff the former says . . . Your money pending stop understand you authorized some local attorneys and my relatives to intervene your behalf. (Schedule D.) The defendant's claim that the agreement for the sale of the 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was agreed upon in a document, referring to the letter of 16 October 1946, is again disproved by his letter dated 2 December 1946 to Fortrade Corporation where he says: The purpose of this letter is to confirm in final form the oral agreement which we have heretofore reached, as between ourselves, during the course of various conversations between us and our respective representatives upon the subject matter of this letter. It is understood that I am to sell to you, and you are to purchase from me, 1,000 tons of coconut oil soap emulsion at a price of $400. per metric ton, i.e. 2,204.6 pounds, F.O.B. shipboard, Manila, P.I. (Exhibit S, Special. Emphasis supplied.) The contention that as the contract was executed in New York, the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over this case, is without merit, because a non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country1 where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable upon execution in the case of a favorable, final and executory judgment. It is a personal action for the collection of a sum of money which the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to try and decide. There is no conflict of laws involved in the case, because it is only a question of enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract; and unless

the enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced. The plaintiff is entitled to collect P7,589.88 for commission and P50,000 for one-half of the overprice, or a total of P57,589.88, lawful interests thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, and costs in both instances. As thus modified the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur. Llorente vs CA Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County ofSan Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diegofound all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutoryjudgment of divorce.

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of hislast will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzossurviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition.

The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining. Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state. As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK G. R. No. 2935 March 23, 1909 FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period. Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract. The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFIManila to recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract. The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that (1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that (2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law. the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars ISSUE: 1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant? 2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy? HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed 1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had

been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant. 2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.

hilippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc. Facts: 1. The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M. 2. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex

International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%. 3. 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its rights and interests to VPECI. 4. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an advance payment bond representing 10% of the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract. To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors. 5. But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to provide the counter guarantee. 6.Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37. 7.The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked for the renewal or extension (12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986. 8. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in

abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars. 9. Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq. 10. Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money. 11. Trial Court ruling: Dismissed. Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents. The joint venture incurred no delay in the execution of the project considering that SOB's violations of the contract rendered impossible the performance of its undertaking. 12. CA: Affirmed. Issue: What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted? Held: The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the INTRINSIC validity of the contract. No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt this: to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not against the law,

morals, public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq. BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply. According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him. As found by the lower courts: the delay or noncompletion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly it's failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.

The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are simple and are soon resolved. Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Pte. Ltd. of Germany, based on Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the MV Tibati for the stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a month from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982. 1 The, Crew Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981, provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB Standard Format" and was validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on January 14,1981. 2 On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him while working on the vessel in Bombay, India. 3 In due time, his father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits computed at the rate of 36 months times the seaman's monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Law of Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The, private respondents, while admitting liability, contended that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the NSB Standard Format. On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration sustained the private respondent and held that the applicable law was Philippine law. 4 On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission except that it increased the award to P75,000.00 pursuant to NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981. 5 In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public respondent on the ground that Singaporean law should have been applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen Board, 6 where the foreign law was held controlling because it provided for greater benefits for the claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the application of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981, which they say became effective after the seaman's death. 7 On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to the present petition. The, reason is

G.R. No. 71604 August 11, 1989 JOSE B. ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. PHILIMARE SHIPPING AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRANS OCEAN LINER (Pte) LTD., PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Linsangan Law Office for petitioner. Prudencio Cruz for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

that in that case, it was specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is greater. 8 That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration. Instead, it is clearly stated therein that the insurance benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law. 9 The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only the minimum benefits and does not preclude the parties from stipulating for higher compensation. That may be true enough. But the point is that the parties in this case did not provide for such higher benefits as the parties did in the Norse case. There was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement of January 3, 1981, that the employee would be entitled to whichever greater insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or the foreign law; on the contrary, it was plainly provided that insurance benefits would be determined according to the NSB Standard Format then in force. The consequence is that the petitioner cannot now claim a higher award than the compensation prescribed in the said format. As We said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. NLRC: 10 We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000.00 over and above the benefits' for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine Law. Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the

applicable law. The, case of Norse Management Co. v. National Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater." The next issue involves the effectivity of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, which appears to have been retroactively applied by the NLRC in increasing the compensation from P40,000.00 The amended award was based by the POEA on NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46, which became effective in 1979. 11 The NLRC, apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum Circular No. 71 was already effective at the time of the seaman's death on May 12, 1981, increased the death benefits to P75,000.00 as provided thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule became effective only in December 1981, as certified by the POEA itself, 12 or seven months after Atienza's fatal accident. On the petitioner's claim that the award should be adjusted in view of the decrease in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, it suffices to cite the following relevant ruling of the Court in Sta. Rita and Well Run Maritime SA Ltd. v. NLRC: 13 Regarding the third contention of the petitioners, the records show that when Sta. Rita died on September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46 (Series of 1979) was the applicable law. Pursuant to this circular, in case of a seaman's death during the terms of his contract, the company shall pay

his beneficiaries the amount of P30,000.00. On November 18, 1981 or more than one month after Sta. Rita's death the administrative regulations were amended to increase death compensation for seamen to P50,000.00, effective December 1, 1981. Considering that the applicable law governing death compensation for seamen at the time of Sta. Rita's death was Memorandum Circular No. 46, Series of 1979, the petitioner's liability should be limited to P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning agents or shipping corporations secure employer's insurance to cover their liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of officers and ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent of the coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in effect at the time the contingency occurs. WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 15 July 1985 is SET ASIDE and that of the POEA is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Narvasa, (Chairperson), Gancayco, Gri;o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Facts: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Boards Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case. Held: The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondents husband states that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.

provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor. avida v Dizon Facts: Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants motion to dismiss provided the defendants: (1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States (2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in

which his injury occurred. (3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas; (4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and (5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court. In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for. Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598): 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.) NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s

up to the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being. Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court. Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court. Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that

defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that (t)he authority of each designated representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court. The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional. Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398) Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL

MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities. The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility, Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP. Eventually, the cases reached the SC! Present case: The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case. DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court

may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in these cases. Held: Yes. 1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was: In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos

(P200,000.00). Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 0994, states: The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City. 2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs. 3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution

through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce, and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, coworkers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines. ---Re: Jurisdiction over the person The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below. In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction. --Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. ---Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice. This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit. It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. * We REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints.