1

THE REVISED PENAL CODE

BY LUIS B. REYES

BOOK I
Codal Provisions, Punishable Acts, Elements of Crimes & Essential Doctrines
General Principles Criminal La ! "e#ine".
Criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for their punishment.

Crime! "e#ine".
Crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or commanding it.

P$ er %$ "e#ine an" p&nis' crimes.

The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by natural law belongs to the sovereign power, instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community.

Limi%a%i$ns $n %'e p$ er $# %'e la ma(in) *$"+ %$ enac% penal le)isla%i$n.

1. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted (Sec. 22, rt. !!! of the 1"#$ %onstitution&. rt. ( of the 1"#$

2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law (Sec. 1', %onstitution&.

An ex post facto la

is $ne

'ic',

1. )akes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act* 2. (. ggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed* %hanges the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law anne+ed to the crime when committed*

'. lters the legal rules of evidence, and authori,es conviction upon less or different testimony than the law re-uired at the time of the commission of the offense* .. ssumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful* and /. 0eprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or ac-uittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. ( In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429, 431&

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C'arac%eris%ics $# Criminal La , !. GENERAL. Criminal la

is *in"in) $n all pers$ns

'$ li-e $r s$.$&rn in P'ilippine %erri%$r+.

No foreigner en1oys in this country e+tra2territorial right to be e+empted from its laws and 1urisdiction, with the e+ception of heads of states and diplomatic representatives who, by virtue of the customary law of nations, are not sub1ect to the 3hilippine territorial 1urisdiction.

As a )eneral r&le! .&ris"ic%i$n $# ci-il c$&r%s is n$% a##ec%e" *+ %'e mili%ar+ c'arac%er $# %'e acc&se".
U.S. v. Sweet acts! Sweet interposed the defense that the fact that he was an employee of the 4.S. military authorities deprived the court of the 1urisdiction to try and punish him. "eld! 5urisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before them for trial, unless controlled by e+press legislation to the contrary.

Ci-il c$&r%s 'a-e c$nc&rren% .&ris"ic%i$n $# %'e Arme" 0$rces $# %'e P'ilippines.

i%' )eneral c$&r%s/mar%ial $-er s$l"iers

The civil courts have concurrent 1urisdiction with the military courts or general courts2martial over soldiers of the rmed 6orces of the 3hilippines. 7ven in times of war, the civil courts have concurrent 1urisdiction, provided that in the place of the commission of the crime, no hostilities are in progress and civil courts are functioning.

T'e RPC $r $%'er penal la c$)ni1ance $# %'e case.

is n$% applica*le

'en a mili%ar+ c$&r% %a(es

rticles of 8ar

8hen the military court takes cogni,ance of the case involving a person sub1ect to miltary law, the apply.

2&ris"ic%i$n $# mili%ar+ c$&r%s,

Section 1 of 9. . No. $:.. reads; )embers of the rmed 6orces of the 3hilippines and other persons sub1ect to military law shall be tried by the proper civil court, e+cept when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service2connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court2martial. The rticles of 8ar are those under amended. rticles .' to $:, rticles $2 to "2, and rticles ". to "$ of %. . No. ':#, as

!n view of the clear mandate of 9. . No. $:.., the 9egional Trial %ourt cannot divest the <eneral %ourt2)artial of its 1urisdiction ever those charged with violations of rticles /( (0isrespect Toward the 3resident etc.&, /' (0isrespect Toward Superior =fficer&, /$ ()utiny or Sedition&, "/ (%onduct 4nbecoming an =fficer and a <entleman& and "$ (<eneral rticle& of the rticles of 8ar, as these are specifically included as >service2connected offenses or crimes.?

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T'e pr$sec&%i$n $# an acc&se" *e#$re a c$&r%/mar%ial is a *ar %$ an$%'er pr$sec&%i$n #$r %'e same $##ence.
court2martial is a court, and the prosection of an accused before it is a criminal, not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the accused for the same offense.

O##en"ers acc&se" $#

ar crimes are %ria*le *+ mili%ar+ c$mmissi$n.

acts! The petitioner is a 6ilipino citi,en though of a 5apanese father, and associating himself with 5apan in the war against the 4nited States of merica and the 3hilppines, committed atrocities against unarmed and non2combatant 6ilipino civilians. @e is, indeed, a war criminal sub1ect to the 1urisdiction of the military commission. "eld! military commission >has 1urisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues.? This includes the period of an amistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of peace.

E3cep%i$ns %$ %'e )eneral applica%i$n $# Criminal La .

rticle 2 of the 93% says that the provisions of this %ode shall be enforced within the 3hil. provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application.# rchipelago, >e+cept as

rticle 1' of the New %ivil %ode provides that penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or so1ourn in 3hil. Territory, sub$ect to the principles of public international law and to treat% stipulations.

Pers$ns e3emp% #r$m %'e $pera%i$n $# $&r criminal la s *+ -ir%&e $# %'e principles $# p&*lic in%erna%i$nal la .
The following are not sub1ect to the operation of our criminal laws; 1. 2. Sovereigns and other chiefs of states. mbassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and char&es d'affaires.

A c$ns&l is n$% en%i%le" is n$% %$ %'e pri-ile)es an" imm&ni%ies $# an am*assa"$r $r minis%er.
%onsuls, vice2consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status of, and cannot claim the privileges and immunities accorded to ambassadors and ministers. !!.

TERRITORIAL.
%eri%$r+.

Criminal la s &n"er%a(e %$ p&nis' crimes c$mmi%%e"

i%'in P'ilippines

E3cep%i$ns %$ %'e %erri%$rial applica%i$n $# criminal la .

rticle 2 of the 93% provides that its provisions shall be enforced outside of the 1urisdiction of the 3hilippines against those who; 1. Should commit an offense while on a 3hilippine ship or airship*

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the 3hilippines or obligations and securities issued by the <overnment of the 3hilippines* (. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the 3hilippines of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number* '. .. 8hile being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the e+ercise of their functions* or Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations.

!!!.

PROSPECTIVE.

A penal la cann$% ma(e an ac% p&nis'a*le in a manner in 'ic' i% as n$% p&nis'a*le 'en c$mmi%%e" . s provided in rticle (// of the 93%, crimes are punished &n"er %'e la s in #$rce a% %'e %ime $# %'eir c$mmissi$n.

E3cep%i$ns %$ %'e pr$spec%i-e applica%i$n $# criminal la s.

8henever a new statute dealing with crime establishes conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused, it can be given a retroactive effect. This e+ception has no application! 1. 2. 8here the new law is e3pressl+ ma"e inapplica*le to pending actions or e+isting causes of action. 8here the offender is a 'a*i%&al criminal under 9ule ., rticle /2, 93%.

Di##eren% e##ec%s $# repeal $n penal la .

Penal%+ li)'%er in ne la Hea-ier penal%+ in ne la Ne la %$%all+ repeals $l" la ct which was penali,ed under the old law is not longer punishable, the crime is obliterated.

New law shall be applied, e+cept when the offender is a habitual delin-uent or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or e+isting causes of action.

The law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied.

4'en %'e repeal is a*s$l&%e! %'e $##ense ceases %$ *e criminal.

Aut repeal of a penal law by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal liablity.

4'en %'e ne la an" %'e $l" $l" la *e %rie" &n"er %'e $l" la .

penali1e %'e same $##ense! %'e $##en"er can

8here an ct of the Begislature which penali,es an offense repeals a former ct which penali,ed the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of 1urisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal.

4'en %'e repealin) la #ails %$ penali1e %'e $##ense &n"er %'e $l" la ! %'e acc&se" cann$% *e c$n-ic%e" &n"er %'e ne la .
The court loses 1urisdiction where the repealin& law wholl% fails to penali(e the act defined and penali,ed as an offense in the old law. The accused, charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal, cannot be legally prosecuted after such repeal.

A pers$n err$ne$&sl+ acc&se" an" c$n-ic%e" &n"er a repeale" s%a%&%e ma+ *e p&nis'e" &n"er %'e repealin) s%a%&%e.
The fact that the offender was erroneously accused and convicted under a statute which had already been repealed and therefore no longer e+isted at the time the act complained of was committed does not prevent conviction under the repealing statute which punishes the same act, provided the accused had an opportunity to defend himself against the charge brought against him.

A ne la 'ic' $mi%s an+%'in) c$n%aine" in %'e $l" la "ealin) $n %'e same s&*.ec%! $pera%es as a repeal $# an+%'in) n$% s$ incl&"e" in %'e amen"a%$r+ ac%.
Thus, the legal ma+im, cessante ratione le&is vessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases&, applies to this case.

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C$ns%r&c%i$n $# penal la s,
1. 3enal laws are strictly construed against the <overnment and liberally in favor of the accused. The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked $nl+ %'e la is am*i)&$&s an" %'ere is "$&*% as %$ i%s in%erpre%a%i$n. 'ere

2.

!n the construction or interpretation of the provisions of the 93%, the Spanish te+t is controlli Da%e

$#

E##ec%i-eness. Ar%icle 5. )ime when Act ta*es effect. / T'is C$"e s'all %a(e e##ec% $n %'e #irs% "a+ $# 2an&ar+! nine%een '&n"re" an" %'ir%+/% $. T $ %'e$ries in Criminal La .
1. 2. %lassical Theory 3ositivist theory

C'arac%eris%ics $# %'e classical %'e$r+.

1. The basis of criminal liabilit% is human free will and the purpose of the penalt% is retribution. 2. That man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil, thereby placing more stress upon the effect or result of the felonious act than upon the man, the criminal himself. (. mechanical and direct proportion between crime and penalty. '. scant re&ard to the human element.

C'arac%eris%ics $# %'e p$si%i-is% %'e$r+.

1. That man is subdued occassionally by a strange and morbid phenomenon which constrains him to do wrong, in spite of or contrary to his volition. 2. That crime is essentially a social and natural phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be treated and checked by the application of abstract principles of law and 1urisprudence nor by the imposition of a punishment, fi+ed and determined a priori* but rather through the enforcement of individual measures in each particular case after a thorough, personal and individual investigation conducted by a competent body of psychiatrists and social scientists.

Ar%icle 6. Application of its provisions. / E3cep% as pr$-i"e" in %'e %rea%ies an" la s $# pre#eren%ial applica%i$n! %'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'is C$"e s'all *e en#$rce" n$% $nl+ i%'in %'e P'ilippine Arc'ipela)$! incl&"in) i%s a%m$sp'ere! i%s in%eri$r a%ers an" mari%ime 1$ne! *&% als$ $&%si"e $# i%s .&ris"ic%i$n! a)ains% %'$se '$, 5. S'$&l" c$mmi% an $##ense 'ile $n a P'ilippine s'ip $r airs'ip

6. S'$&l" #$r)e $r c$&n%er#ei% an+ c$in $r c&rrenc+ n$%e $# %'e P'ilippine Islan"s $r $*li)a%i$ns an" sec&ri%ies iss&e" *+ %'e G$-ernmen% $# %'e P'ilippine Islan"s7 8. S'$&l" *e lia*le #$r ac%s c$nnec%e" i%' %'e in%r$"&c%i$n in%$ %'ese islan"s $# %'e $*li)a%i$ns an" sec&ri%ies men%i$ne" in %'e presi"in) n&m*er7 9. 4'ile *ein) p&*lic $##icers $r empl$+ees! s'$&l" c$mmi% an $##ense in %'e e3ercise $# %'eir #&nc%i$ns7 $r :. S'$&l" c$mmi% an+ $# %'e crimes a)ains% na%i$nal sec&ri%+ an" %'e la $#

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na%i$ns! "e#ine" in Ti%le One $# B$$( T $ $#

this %ode.

In 'a% cases are %'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'e RPC applica*le e-en i# %'e #el$n+ is c$mmi%%e" $&%si"e $# %'e P'ilippines;
1. +hen the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship. Aut when the 3hilippine vessel or aircraft is in the territor% of a forei&n countr%, the crime committed on said vessel or aircraft is sub1ect to the laws of that foreign country. !t is the registration of the vessel or aircraft in accordance with the laws of the 3hilippines, not the citi,enship of its owner, which makes it a 3hilippine ship or airship. The 3hilippine court has no 1urisdiction over the crime of %'e#% committed on the hi&h seas on board a vessel not re&istered or licensed in the 3hilippines. ,. .. 0. +hen the offender should for&e or counterfeit an% coin or currenc% note of the Philippines or obli&ations and securities issued b% the -overnment. +hen the offender should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the Philippines of the /obli&ations and securities# mentioned in the /precedin& number.# +hen the offender, while bein& a public officer or emplo%ee, should commit an offense in the exercise of his functions. The crimes that may be committed in the e+ercise of public functions are direct bribery ( rt. 21:&, indirect bribery ( rt. 211&, frauds against the public treasury ( rt. 21(&, possession of prohibited interest ( rt. 21/&, malversation of public funds or property ( rts 21$&, failure of accountable officer to render accounts ( rt. 21#&, illegal use of public funds or property ( rt. 22:& failure to make delivery of public funds or property ( rt. 221&, and falsification by a public officer or employee committed with abuse of his official position. ( rt. 1$1& :. +hen the offender should commit an% of the crimes a&ainst the national securit% and the law of nations.

Crimes p&nis'a*le in %'e P'ilippines &n"er Ar%icle 6 are c$)ni1a*le *+ %'e Re)i$nal Trial C$&r% in 'ic' %'e c'ar)e is #ile". Crimes c$mmi%%e" $n *$ar" a #$rei)n merc'an% s'ip $r airs'ip.
n offense committed on the hi&h seas on board a forei&n merchant vessel is not triable by our courts.

C$n%in&in) $##enses $n *$ar" a #$rei)n -essel.

Aut a continuing crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing from 6ormosa to the 3hilippines, by failing to provide stalls for animals in transit in violation of ct No. .., is triable in the 3hilippines.

O##enses c$mmi%%e" $n *$ar" a #$rei)n merc'an% -essel is %ria*le *e#$re $&r c$&r%.

'ile $n P'ilippine

a%ers

Since the 3hilippine territory e+tends to three miles from the headlands, when a forei&n merchant vessel enters this three2mile limit, the shipCs officers and crew become sub1ect to the 1urisdiction of our courts. 0renc' R&le Such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the safety of the state is endangered. !n this country, we observe the En&lish 1ule. En)lis' R&le Such crimes are triable in that country, unless they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management thereof.

D$ %'e P'ilippine c$&r%s 'a-e .&ris"ic%i$n $-er %'e crime $# '$mici"e c$mmi%%e" $n *$ar" a #$rei)n merc'an% -essel *+ a mem*er $# %'e cre a)ains% an$%'er;
0isorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with e+clusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local 1urisdiction. ll must concede that felonious homicide is a sub1ect for the local 1urisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding wiih the case in the regular way, the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.

Crimes n$% in-$l-in) a *reac' $# p&*lic $r"er c$mmi%%e" $n *$ar" a #$rei)n -essel in %ransi% n$% %ria*le *+ $&r c$&r%s.
)ere possession of opium aboard a foreign merchant vessel in %ransi% is not triable in 3hilippine courts, because that fact alone does not constitute a breach of public order. Aut said courts ac-uire 1urisdiction when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel on 3hilippine soil. Banding or using opium is an open violation of the laws of the 3hilippines. 8hen the foreign merchant vessel is not in transit because the 3hilippines is its terminal port, the person in possession of opium on board that vessel is liable.

Sm$(in) $pi&m c$ns%i%&%es a *reac' $# p&*lic $r"er.

Smoking opium aboard an 7nglish vessel while anchored two and one2half miles in )anila Aay constitutes a breach of public order.

P'ilippine c$&r%s 'a-e n$ .&ris"ic%i$n $-er $##enses c$mmi%%e" $n *$ar" #$rei)n ars'ips in %erri%$rial a%ers.
distinction must be made between merchant ships and warships* the former are more or less sub1ected to the territorial laws.

Ar%icle 8. De#ini%i$ns. / Ac%s an" $missi$ns p&nis'a*le *+ la <"eli%$s=.

are #el$nies

0el$nies are c$mmi%%e" n$% $nl+ *e means $# "ecei% <"$l$= *&% als$ *+ means $# #a&l% <culpa=. T'ere is "ecei% 'en %'e ac% is per#$rme" i%' "eli*era%e in%en% an" %'ere is #a&l% 'en %'e r$n)#&l ac% res&l%s #r$m impr&"ence! ne)li)ence! lac( $# #$resi)'%! $r lac( $# s(ill. Elemen%s $# #el$nies.
The elements of felonies in general are; 1. 2. (. That there must be an act or omission. That the act or ommission must be punishable by the 93% That the act or ommission incurred by means of dolo or culpa. (People No. #:$/2, )arch 1", 1"":, 1#( S%9 (:", (2'& . !on"ales, <.9.

>eanin) $# %'e

$r" ?ac%.@

ny bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the e+ternal world, it being unnecessary that the same be

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actually produced, as possibilit% of its production is sufficient. n e+ternal act which has direct connection with the felony intended to be committed.

Onl+ e3%ernal ac% is p&nis'e".

@ence, a criminal thought or a mere intention, no matter how immoral or improper it may be, will never constitute a felony.

>eanin) $# %'e

$r" ?$missi$n.@

Ay omission is meant inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to do. There must be a law re-uiring the doing or performance of an act.

E3amples $# #el$n+ *+ $missi$n,

1. nyone who fails to render assistance to any person whom he finds in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying ( rt. 2$., par. 1& 2. n officer entrusted with collection of ta+es who voluntarily fails to issue a receipt as provided by law, is guilty of illegal e+action. ( rt. 21(, par. 2DbE& (. 7very person owing allegiance to the 3hils., without being a foreigner, having knowledge of any conspiracy against the government, who does not disclose and make known the same to the proper authority, is liable for misprison of treason. ( rt. 11/&

T'e $missi$n m&s% *e p&nis'a*le *+ la . ?P&nis'a*le *+ la .@

/2ullum crimen, nulla poena sine le&e,# that is, there is no crime where there is no law punishing it. The term >felony? means acts and omissions punished in the 93%, to distinguish it from the words >crime? and >offense? which are applied to infractions of the law punished by special statutes.

In%en%i$nal #el$nies an" c&lpa*le #el$nies "is%in)&is'e".

!n intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. !n culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious.

0el$nies c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# dolo $r

i%' malice.

Dolus is e-uivalent to malice, which is the intent to do an in$ur% to another. (! 8hartonCs %riminal Baw 1#:& There are few felonies committed by means of fault or culpa. rticle 11$ punishes malversation through negligence. rticle 22' punishes evasion through negligence. rticle (/. punishes acts by imprudence or negligence, which, had they been intentional, would constitute grave, less grave or light felonies. %rimes which cannot be committed through imprudence or negligence, such as, murder, treason, robbery, and malicious mischief.

A pers$n '$ ca&se" an in.&r+! lia*le #$r c&lpa*le #el$n+.

i%'$&% in%en%i$n %$ ca&se an e-il! ma+ *e 'el"

Impr&"ence! ne)li)ence! lac( $# #$resi)'% $r lac( $# s(ill.

!mprudence indicates a deficienc% of action . Negligence indicates a deficienc% of perception. Negligence usually involves lac( $# #$resi)'%. !mprudence usually involves lac( $# s(ill.

In #el$nies c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# dolo $r i%' malice an" in #el$nies c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# #a&l% $r culpa! %'e ac%s $r $missi$ns are -$l&n%ar+.
n intentional felony is committed when the act is performed with deliberate intent, which must necessarily be voluntary. =n the other hand, in culpable felony, which is committed when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill, the act is also voluntar%. !n the first, the offender acts with malice* whereas, in the second, the offender acts without malice. criminal act is presumed to be voluntary.

4'+ %'e ac% $r $missi$n in #el$nies m&s% *e -$l&n%ar+.

1. 2. The 93% continues to be based on the %lassical Theory. =ne must prove that his case falls under rt. 12 to show that his act or omission is not voluntary.

(. !n felonies by dolo, the act is performed with deliberate intent which must necessarily be voluntary* and in felonies b% culpa, the imprudence consists in voluntaril%, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material in1ury results. i. Aut the intent or malice in intentional felonies is replaced by imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies.

ReA&isi%es $# dolo $r malice.

a& b& c& @e must have 69770=) while doing an act or omitting to do an act* @e must have !NT7BB!<7N%7 while doing the act or omitting to do the act* @e must have !NT7NT while doing the act or omission.

1. reedom. 8hen a person acts without freedom, he is no longer a human being but a tool. ( rt. 12, par. . or rt. 12, par. /& 2. 3ntelli&ence. 8ithout this power, necessary to determine the moralit% of human acts , no crime can e+ist. ( rt. 12, pars. 1, 2 and (& (. 3ntent. !ntent to commit the act with malice, being purely a mental process, is presumed and the presumption arises from the proof of the commission of an unlawful act. > voluntary act is a free, intelli&ent, and intentional act.#

In%en% pres&pp$ses %'e e3ercise $# #ree"$m an" %'e &se $# in%elli)ence. T'e e3is%ence $# in%en% is s'$ n *+ %'e $-er% ac%s $# a pers$n.
!ntent is a mental state, the e+istence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person.

Criminal in%en% is pres&me" #r$m %'e c$mmissi$n $# an &nla #&l ac%.

%riminal intent and the will to commit a crime are always presumed to e+ist on the part of the person who e+ecutes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.

B&% %'e pres&mp%i$n $# criminal in%en% "$es n$% arise #r$m %'e pr$$# $# %'e c$mmissi$n $# an ac% 'ic' is n$% &nla #&l.
"eld! The act of the accused, in permitting the sums deposited with hint to be attached in satisfaction of the

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1udgment rendered by him, was not unlawful. 7verything he did was done in good faith under the belief that he was acting 1udiciously and correctly. The ma+im is; actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea F a crime is not committed if the minde of the person performing to act complained be innocent. Aut it must be borned in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act. !n the case at bar, the act was not criminal. )here is no felon% b% dolo if there is no intent. People v. 4eronilla acts! The accused acted upon orders of superior officers which turned out to be illegal. s a military subordinate, he could not -uestion the orders of his superior officers. @e obeyed the orders in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on his part. "eld! To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such b% statute, be accompanied by criminal intent, or by such ne&li&ence or indifference to dut% or to conse5uences, as in law, is e5uivalent to criminal intent.

>is%a(e $# #ac%.
!gnorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability ( i&norantia facti excusat.6

ReA&isi%es $# mis%a(e $# #ac% as a "e#ense,

1. 2. (. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be* That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful* and That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.

Lac( $# in%en% %$ (ill %'e "ecease"! *eca&se 'is in%en%i$n n$% relie-e %'e acc&se" #r$m criminal resp$nsi*ili%+.

as %$ (ill an$%'er! "$es

In mis%a(e $# #ac%! %'e in%en%i$n $# %'e acc&se" in per#$rmin) %'e ac% s'$&l" *e la #&l. N$ crime $# resis%ance 'en %'ere is a mis%a(e $# #ac%.

=ne who resists an arrest, believing that the peace officer is a bandit, but who submits to the arrest immediately upon being informed by the peace officer that he is a policeman, is not guilty of the crime of resistance to an agent of the authorities.

4'en %'e acc&se" is ne)li)en%! mis%a(e $# #ac% is n$% a "e#ense.

The defense of mistake of fact is untenable when the accused is charged with a culpable felony. !n felonies committed through negligence, there is no intent to consider, as it is replaced by imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

Dis%inc%i$n *e% een )eneral in%en% an" speci#ic in%en%.

!n felonies committed by dolus, the third element of voluntariness is a general intent* whereas, in some particular felonies, proof of particular specific intent is re-uired. Thus, in certain crimes against property, there must be the intent to gain ( rt. 2"( F robbery* rt. (:# F theft&. !ntent to kill is essential in frustrated or attempted homicide ( rt. / in relation to rt. 2'"&* in forcible abduction ( rt. ('2&, the specific intent of lewd designs must be proved.

4'en %'e acc&se" is c'ar)e" a "e#ense.

i%' in%en%i$nal #el$n+! a*sence $# criminal in%en% is

11

ll reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused.

Criminal in%en% is replace" *+ ne)li)ence an" impr&"ence in #el$nies c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# culpa.
!n felonies committed by means of culpa, the mind of the accused is not criminal. @owever, his act is wrongful, because the in1ury or damge caused to the in1ured party results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the accused. T'ere#$re! in $r"er %'a% %'e ac%! $r $missi$n in #el$nies c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# #a&l% $r culpa ma+ *e c$nsi"ere" -$l&n%ar+! %'e #$ll$ in) reA&isi%es m&s% c$nc&r, (1& (2& ((& @e must have 69770=) while doing an act or omitting to do an act* @e must have !NT7BB!<7N%7 while doing the act or omitting to do the act* @e is !)39407NT, N7<B!<7NT or B %IS 6=97S!<@T or SI!BB while doing the act or omitting to do the act.

In c&lpa*le #el$nies! %'e in.&r+ ca&se" %$ an$%'er s'$&l" *e &nin%en%i$nal! i% *ein) simpl+ %'e inci"en% $# an$%'er ac% per#$rme" i%'$&% malice. >is%a(e in %'e i"en%i#+ $# %'e in%en"e" -ic%im is n$% rec(less impr&"ence.
8here such an unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.

A pers$n ca&sin) "ama)e $r in.&r+ %$ an$%'er! criminall+ lia*le &n"er %'e RPC.

i%'$&% malice $r #a&l%! is n$%

Dolo is n$% reA&ire" in crimes p&nis'e" *+ special la s. In %'$se crimes p&nis'e" *+ special la s! %'e ac% al$ne! irrespec%i-e $# i%s m$%i-es! c$ns%i%&%es %'e $##ense. G$$" #ai%' an" a*sence $# criminal in%en% n$% -ali" "e#enses in crimes p&nis'e" *+ special la s.
E3cep%i$ns, 1. 4nlicensed firearm was in his possession prior to his turning it over to the )ayor of Taal in connection with the drive of the government in the collection of loose firearms. 0efendant told the 3% soldiers that he bought the firearm from a stranger with the purpose of selling it to the 3% who were paying for loose firearms. "eld! To implement the policy of the government on loose firearms, it is imperative that the persons collecting and surrendering loose firearms should have temporary and incidental possession thereof, for how can one collect and deliver without temporarily laying his hands on the firearmsG =f course, it would be a different story if it is shown that the possessor has held on to the firearm for an undue length of time when he had all the chances to surrender it to the proper authorities. 2. 8here the accused had a pending application for permanent permit to possess a firearm, and whose possession was not unknown to an agent of the law who advised the former to keep it in the meantime.

7ala in se an" mala prohibita, "is%in)&is'e".

7ala in se So serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members. 7ala Prohibita Hiolations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.

12
!ntent governs. The only in-uiry is, has the law been violatedG

4'en %'e ac%s are in'eren%l+ imm$ral! %'e+ are mala in se, e-en i# p&nis'e" &n"er special la .
People v. Sunico, et al. acts! The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks whose duty among others was to transfer the names of e+cess voters in other precincts to the list of a newly created precinct. Several voters were omitted in the list. Aecause their names were not in the list, some of them were not allowed to vote. The accused were prosecuted for violation of Sections 1:1 and 1:( of the 9evised 7lection %ode. "eld! The acts of the accused cannot be merely mala prohibita 8 they are mala per se. The omission or failure to include a voterCs name in the registry list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited* it is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and violates one of his fundamental rights. @ence, for such act to be punishable, it must be shown that it has been committed with malice.

13

>$%i-e )oving power which impels one to action for a definite result.

In%en% 3urpose to use a particular means to effect such result.

>$%i-e!
1.

'en rele-an% an"

'en nee" n$% *e es%a*lis'e".

8here the identity of a person accused of having committed a crime is in dispute.

2. )otive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assistant. !t is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified. (. 8here the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary to in-uire into his motive for doing the act. '. )otive is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing.

.. 8here the identification of the accused proceeds from an unreliable source and the testimony is inconclusive and not free from doubt, no eyewitnesses to the crime, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons. !f the evidence is merely circumstantial.

Pr$$# $# m$%i-e al$ne is n$% s&##icien% %$ s&pp$r% a c$n-ic%i$n.

)ere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no reliable evidence from which it may be reasonably deduced that the accused was the malefactor. 7ven a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Ar%icle 9. Criminal liabilit%. / Criminal lia*ili%+ s'all *e inc&rre", 5. B+ an+ pers$n c$mmi%%in) a #el$n+ <"eli%$= al%'$&)' %'e "$ne *e "i##eren% #r$m %'a% 'ic' 'e in%en"e". r$n)#&l ac%

6. B+ an+ pers$n per#$rmin) an ac% 'ic' $&l" *e an $##ense a)ains% pers$ns $r pr$per%+! ere i% n$% #$r %'e in'eren% imp$ssi*ili%+ $# i%s acc$mplis'men% $r an acc$&n% $# %'e empl$+men% $# ina"eA&a%e $r ine##ec%&al means. One '$ c$mmi%s an in%en%i$nal #el$n+ is resp$nsi*le #$r all %'e c$nseA&ences 'ic' ma+ na%&rall+ an" l$)icall+ res&l% %'ere#r$m! 'e%'er #$reseen $r in%en"e" $r n$%. Ra%i$nale $# r&le in para)rap' 5 $# Ar%icle 9.
/El 5ue es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado# (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused&.

I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES IN PARAGRAPH 5 O0 ARTICLE 9. 9. /Committin& a felon%.#

The felony committed by the offender should there be one committed by means of dolo, that is, with malice, because paragraph 1 of rticle ' speaks of wrongful act done >different from that which he intended.? !f the wrongful act results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the offender, his liability should be determined under rticle (/.. The act or omission should not be punished by a special law.

14

Ar%icle 9! para)rap' 5! is n$% applica*le in %'is case.

"eld! ccusedCs defense was that he undertook to render medical assistance in good faith and to the best of his ability to cure her of ulcer. @e admitted applying petroleum but denied causing the burns. 8hile there was no intention to cause an evil but to provide a remedy, accused was liable for in1uries thru imprudence. 2ote! !f at all, he committed illegal practice of medicine, which is punished by a special law. Hiolation of statute is proof of negligence or imprudence. 0efendant is liable for two offenses; (1& physical in1uries through imprudence* and (2& illegal practice of medicine.

4'en a pers$n 'as n$% c$mmi%%e" a #el$n+! 'e is n$% criminall+ lia*le #$r %'e res&l% 'ic' is n$% in%en"e".
(a& =ne who, because of curiosity, snatched the bolo carried by the offended party at his belt, and the latter instinctively caught the blade of said bolo in trying to retain it, is not criminally liable for the physical in1uries caused. (b& =ne who tries to retain the possession of his bolo which was being taken by another and because of the struggle, the tip of the bolo struck and pierced the breast of a bystander, is not criminally liable thereof, because the law allows a person to use the necessary force to retain what belongs to him. J was only defending his possession of the bolo, which K was trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly legal.

6. Althou&h the wron&ful act done be different from that which he intended.#
4nder paragraph 1, a. b. rticle ', a person committing a felony is still criminall% liable even if:

There is a mistake in the identity of the victim F error in personae. !n the darkness of the evening, defendant mistook J for K and inflicted upon him a mortal wound with a bolo. There is a mistake in the blow F aberratio ictus. @aving discharged his firearm at K but because of lack of precision, hit and seriously wound L.

c.

The in1urious result is greater than the intended F praeter intentionem.

ReA&isi%es $# para)rap' 5 $# Ar%icle 9.

!n order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, the following re-uisites must be present; 1. 2. That an intentional felony has been committed. That the wrong done be the direct, natural and lo&ical conse-uence of the felon% committed by the offender.

2o felon% is committed ;96 when the act or omission is not punishable b% the 1PC, or ;,6 when the act is covered b% an% of the $ustif%in& circumstances enumerated in Article 99. !f , in attempting a suicide, 1umped out of the window to kill himself, but when he dropped to the ground he fell on an old woman who died as a conse-uence, is not criminally liable for international homicide. !f A, who was being fired at with a gun by % to kill him, fired his pistol at the latter in self2defense, but missed him and instead hit and killed 0, a bystander, A is not criminally liable for the death of 0. The slug fired from the pistol of the policeman, after hitting the prisoner on his right leg, hit and seriously in1ured a passerby. =f course, the act of defense or fulfillment of duty must be e+ercised with due care.

15
An+ pers$n '$ crea%es in an$%'erBs min" an imme"ia%e sense $# "an)er! 'ic' ca&ses %'e la%%er %$ "$ s$me%'in) res&l%in) in %'e la%%erBs in.&ries! is lia*le #$r %'e res&l%in) in.&ries.
>!f a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape 1umps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self2preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning.?

4r$n) "$ne m&s% *e %'e "irec%! na%&ral! an" l$)ical c$nseA&ence $# #el$ni$&s ac%.
!t is an established rule that a person is criminally responsible for the acts committed by him in violation of the law and for all the natural and lo&ical conse-uences resulting therefrom. !n the following cases, the wrong done is considered the direct, natural, and lo&ical conse-uence of the felony committed. a&The victim who was threatened or chased by the accused with a *nife, 1umped into the water and because of the strong current or because he did not know how to swim, sank down and died of drowning. b&The victim removed the draina&e from the wound , which resulted in the development of peritonitis which in turn caused his death, it appearing that the wound caused by the accused produced e+treme pain and restlessness which made the victim remove it. c& <ther causes cooperated in producing the fatal result, as lon& as the wound inflicted is dan&erous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life. This is true even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or uns*illful medical or sur&ical treatment. d& The victim was suffering from internal malady. 4low was efficient cause of death. 0eceased had a delicate constitution and was suffering from tuberculosis. The accused gave fist blows on the deceasedCs right hypochondrium, bruising the liver and producing internal hemorrhage, resulting in the death of the victim. The accused was liable for homicide. 4low accelerated death. The deceased was suffering from internal malady. The accused gave fist blows in the back and abdomen, producing inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis, and causing death. The accused was liable for homicide, because by his fist blows he produced the cause for the acceleration of the death of the deceased. 4low was proximate cause of death. The deceased was suffering from heart disease. The accused stabbed the deceased with a knife, but as the blade of the knife hit a bone, it did not penetrate the thoracic cavity, but it produced shock, resulting in the death of the victim. The accused was liable for homicide, because the stabbing was the pro+imate cause of the death of the deceased. e& The offended party refused to submit to surgical operation. The offended party is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. f& The resulting in1ury was aggravated by infection. 1. 8hen the offended party entered the hospital, no anti2tetanus in1ection was given to him and the wounds became infected when he went out of the hospital. 2. "eld! The accused is responsible for the duration of the treatment and disability prolonged by the infection. (. Aut the infection should not be due to the malicious act of offended party. '. lthough the wounds might have been cured sooner than .# days had the offended party not been

16
addicted to tuba drinking, this fact does not mitigage the liability of the accused. The accused attacked the deceased with a bolo. fter the deceased had fallen, the accused threw a stone which hit him on the right clavicle. The wounds inflicted could not have caused the death of the deceased. week later, the deceased died of tetanus secondary to the infected would. "eld; The accused is responsible for the death of the deceased.

T'e #el$n+ c$mmi%e" m&s% *e %'e pr$3ima%e ca&se $# %'e res&l%in) in.&r+.
3ro+imate cause is >that cause, which, in natural and continuous se-uence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the in1ury, and without which the result would not have occured.? ( #a$aclan . %e&ina, 1'2 P(il. 1'1, 1)*, +,o$ing 3) Am. -,r. *95& There must be a relation of Mcause and effect,M the cause being the felonious act of the offended, the effect being the resultant in1uries andNor death of the victim. The >cause and effect? relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre2e+isting conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim .las con&iciones pa$ologica &el lesiona&o/0 the predisposition of the offended party .la cons$i$,$ion 1isica &el (eri&o/0 or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors .la 1al$a &e me&icos para sis$er al (eri&o/0 or the conditions supervening the felonies act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.

T'e #el$n+ c$mmi%%e" is n$% %'e pr$3ima%e ca&se $# %'e res&l%in) in.&r+

'en,

a&There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting in1ury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused* or b& The resulting in1ury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

T'e #$ll$ in) are n$% e##icien% in%er-enin) ca&ses,

1. The weak or diseased physical condition of the victim, as when one is suffering from tuberculosis or heart disease. 2. The nervousness or temperament of the victim, as when a person dies in conse-uence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctorOs orders, because of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by the accused. (. %auses which are inherent in the victim, such as (a& the victim not knowing how to swim, and (b& the victim being addicted to tuba drinking. '. Neglect of the victim or third person

.. 7rroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment, as when the assault took place in an outlying barrio where proper modern surgical service was not available. Those causes, not being efficient intervenin& causes , do not break the relation of cause and effect F the felony committed and the resulting in1ury.

4'en "ea%' is pres&me" %$ *e %'e na%&ral c$nseA&ence $# p'+sical in.&ries in#lic%e".

The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural conse-uence of the physical in1uries inflicted, when the following facts are established; 1. 2. That the victim at the time the physical in1uries were inflicted was in normal health. That death may be e+pected from the physical in1uries inflicted.

N$% "irec%! na%&ral an" l$)ical c$nseA&ence $# %'e #el$n+ c$mmi%%e".

!f the conse-uences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutel% forei&n from the criminal act, the offender is not responsible for such conse-uences.

17

Thus, where a person struck another with his fist and knocked him down, and a horse near them 1umped upon him and killed him, the assailant was not responsible for the death of that other person. !n the following cases, the in1ury caused is not the direct, logical, and necessary conse-uence of the felony committed, because the felony committed is not the pro+imate cause of the resulting in1ury; a. !f slight physical in1uries be inflicted by upon A, and the latter deliberately immerses his body in a contaminated cesspool, thereby causing his in1uries to become infected and serious, cannot be held liable for the crime of serious physical in1uries. The accused struck a boy on the mouth with the back of his hand. Bater, the boy died. 0eath might have been caused by fever prevalent in the locality, not by the blow on the mouth. The accused who gave the blow was not liable for the death of the deceased. The accused struck a child, who was seriously ill with fever for three weeks, upon the thighs with a slipper, pushed and dragged him, throwing him heavily on the mat spread on the floor. The child died two days later. s the true cause of the childOs death was not proved, the accused was convicted of physical in1uries only. 8here medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, the accused must be ac-uitted of the crime of homicide.

b.

c.

d.

Imp$ssi*le crimes.
The penalty for impossible crime is provided in ReA&is%es $# imp$ssi*le crime, 1. 2. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or propert%. That the act was done with evil intent. rticle ." of this %ode.

(. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either inade5uate or ineffectual. '. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the 93%.

I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES IN PARAGRAPH 6 O0 ARTICLE 9. 5. ?Performin& an act which would be an offense a&ainst persons or propert%.#
!f the act performed would be an offense other than a felony against persons or against property, there is no impossible crime. )hat that act was done with evil intent. , who wanted to kill A, looked for him. 8hen saw A, he found out that A was already dead. To satisfy his grudge, stabbed A in his breast three times with a knife. !s this an impossible crimeG No. knew that A was already dead when he stabbed the lifeless body. There was no evil intent on the part of 6.

=+ere it not for the inherent impossibilit% of its accomplishment or on account of the emplo%ment of inade5uate or ineffectual means.=
a. =3nherent impossibilit% of its accomplishment.= There must be either;

18

(1& le&al impossibilit%, or (2& ph%sical impossibilit% of accomplishing the intended act. 7+amples; (1& 8hen one tries to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is common salt* and (2& 8hen one tries to murder a corpse. b. =Emplo%ment of inade5uate= means. , determined to poison A, uses a small -uantity of arsenic by mi+ing it with the food given to A, believing that the -uantity employed by him is sufficient. Aut since in fact it is not sufficient, A is not killed. The means employed (small -uantity of poison& is inade-uate to kill a person. +here the means emplo%ed is ade5uate. Aut where the means employed is ade5uate impossible crime, but a frustrated felony. c. Emplo%ment of /ineffectual means.# tried to kill A by putting in his soup a substance which he thought was arsenic when in fact it was sugar. A could not have been killed, because the means employed was ineffectual. Aut showed criminal tendency and, hence, he should be punished , with intent to kill 1(, aimed his revolver at the back of the latter, , not knowing that it was empty. 8hen he pressed the trigger it did not fire. The means used by is ineffectual. and the result e+pected is not produced, it is not an

In'eren% Imp$ssi*ili%+ $# Acc$mplis'men%.

collector for a company did not remit the customerOs check payment to the company but instead, appropriated it for herself by depositing it to the bank account of a relative. The check was, however, dishonored. !n this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of -ualified theft, which is a crime against property. 8ere it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which as not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the e+traneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. There can be no -uestion that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for the company, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

O##ense A)ains% Pers$ns.

The accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latterCs bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. @e was ad1udged guilty only of an imp$ssi*le crime as defined and penali,ed in paragraph 2, rticle ' , in relation to rticle .", both of the 93%, because of the factual impossiblity of producing the crime.

In imp$ssi*le crime %'e ac% per#$rme" s'$&l" n$% c$ns%i%&%e a -i$la%i$n $# an$%'er pr$-isi$n $# %'e C$"e.
, who knew that A owned and always carried a watch, decided to rob A of said watch. 8hen met A for that purpose, A did not have the watch because he forgot to carry it with him. Thinking that A had the watch with him, pointed his gun at him and asked for the watch. 6inding that A did not have the watch, allowed A to go without further molestation. !s this an impossible crimeG There was intent to gain on the part of when he decided to take the watch of A at the point of gun. The crime of robbery with intimidation of person is not produced, not because of the inherent imposibbility of its accomplishment, but because of a cause or accident (that A forgot to carry the watch with him& other than Cs

19
own spontaneous desistance. ( rt. /, par. (& Note also that Cs pointing his gun at A already constituted at least the crime of grave threats under rticle 2#2, subdivision 2, of the 93%.

Ar%icle :. Dut% of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered b% the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. / 4'ene-er a c$&r% 'as (n$ le")e $# an+ ac% 'ic' i% ma+ "eem pr$per %$ repress an" 'ic' is n$% p&nis'a*le *+ la ! i% s'all ren"er %'e pr$per "ecisi$n! an" s'all rep$r% %$ %'e C'ie# E3ec&%i-e! %'r$&)' %'e Depar%men% $# 2&s%ice! %'e reas$ns 'ic' in"&ce %'e c$&r% %$ *elie-e %'a% sai" ac% s'$&l" *e ma"e %'e s&*.ec% $# le)isla%i$n. In %'e same a+! %'e c$&r% s'all s&*mi% %$ %'e C'ie# E3ec&%i-e! %'r$&)' %'e Depar%men% $# 2&s%ice! s&c' s%a%emen% as ma+ *e "eeme" pr$per! i%'$&% s&spen"in) %'e e3ec&%i$n $# %'e sen%ence! 'en a s%ric% en#$rcemen% $# %'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'is C$"e $&l" res&l% in %'e imp$si%i$n $# a clearl+ e3cessi-e penal%+! %a(in) in%$ c$nsi"era%i$n %'e "e)ree $# malice an" %'e in.&r+ ca&se" *+ %'e $##ense.
The 1st paragraph of this article which contemplates a trial of a criminal case re-uires the following; 1. 2. (. '. The act committed by the accused appears not punishable by any law* Aut the court deems it proper to repress such act* !n that case, the court must render the proper decision by dismissing the case and ac-uitting the accused* The 1udge must then make a report to the %hief 7+ecutive, through the Secretary of 5ustice, stating the reasons which induce him to believe that the said act should be made the sub1ect of penal legislation.

The second paragraph of

rticle . re-uires that 2

The court after trial finds the accused guilty* 1. The penalty provided by law and which the court imposes for the crime committed appears to be clearly e+cessive, because F a. b. 2. the accused acted with lesser degree of malice* andN or there is no in1ury or the in1ury caused is of lesser gravity.

The court should not suspend the e+ecution of the sentence.

(. The 1udge should submit a statement to the %hief 7+ecutive, through the Secretary of 5ustice, recommending e+ecutive clemency.

20
Ar%icle C. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. / C$ns&mma%e" #el$nies as ell as %'$se 'ic' are #r&s%ra%e" an" a%%emp%e" are p&nis'a*le. A #el$n+ is c$ns&mma%e" 'en all %'e elemen%s necessar+ #$r i%s e3ec&%i$n an" acc$mplis'men% are presen%7 an" i% is #r&s%ra%e" 'en %'e $##en"er per#$rms all %'e ac%s $# e3ec&%i$n 'ic' $&l" pr$"&ce %'e #el$n+ as a c$nseA&ence *&% 'ic'! ne-er%'eless! "$ n$% pr$"&ce i% *+ reas$n $# ca&ses in"epen"en% $# %'e ill $# %'e perpe%ra%$r. T'ere is an a%%emp% 'en %'e $##en"er c$mmences %'e c$mmissi$n $# a #el$n+ "irec%l+ $r $-er ac%s! an" "$es n$% per#$rm all %'e ac%s $# e3ec&%i$n 'ic' s'$&l" pr$"&ce %'e #el$n+ *+ reas$n $# s$me ca&se $r acci"en% $%'er %'an %'is $ n sp$n%ane$&s "esis%ance.
C$ns&mma%e" ll the elements nesessary for its e+ecution and accomplishment are present. 0r&s%ra%e" =ffender performs all the acts of e+ecution which would produce the felony as a conse-uence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. A%%emp%e" =ffender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of e+ecution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

De-el$pmen% $# crime.
6rom the moment the culprit conceives the idea of committing a crime up to the reali,ation of the same, his act passes through certain stages. These stages are; (1& internal acts and (2& e+ternal acts. 1. 3nternal acts, such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are not punishable even if, had they been carried out, they would constitute a crime. 2. a. External acts cover (a& preparatory acts* and (b& acts of e+ecution. Preparator% acts 8 ordinaril% the% are not punishable. =rdinarily, preparatory acts are not punishable. @ence, proposal and conspiracy to commit a felony, which are only preparatory acts, are not punishable, e+cept when the law provides for their punishment in certain felonies. ( rt. #& Aut preparatory acts which are considered in themselves, by law, as independent crimes are punishable. Example! 3ossession of picklocks under rt. (:'. The possession of picklocks is a preparatory act of the commission of robbery. ( rts. 2"" and (:2& b. Acts of execution F the% are punishable under the 1PC. The stages of acts of e+ecution F attempted, frustrated, and consummated 2 are punishable. ( rt. /&

21
A%%emp%e" #el$n+.
7lements of attempted felony; 1. 2. (. '. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts* @e does not perform all the acts of e+ecution which should produce the felony* The offenderCs act is not stopped b% his own spontaneous desistance> The non:performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES IN ARTICLE C. 5. /Commences the commission of a felon% directl% b% overt acts.#
1. 2. That there be external acts7 Such e+ternal acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed .

T'e e3%ernal ac%s m&s% *e rela%e" %$ %'e $-er% ac%s $# %'e crime %'e $##en"er in%en"e" %$ c$mmi%. ?<vert acts,# defined.
n overt act is some ph%sical activit% or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by e+ternal obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will lo&icall% and necessaril% ripen into a concrete offense.

Prepara%$r+ ac%s an" $-er% ac%s! "is%in)&is'e".

!f bought poison from a drugstore, in preparation for the killing of A by means of poison, such act is only a preparatory act. !t is not an overt act, because it has no direct connection with the crime of murder which intended to commit. The poison purchased may be used by to kill rats or insects. Aut if mi+ed the poison with the food intended for A, and the latter, not knowing that it contained poison, put into his mouth a spoonful thereof, the act of was more than a mere planning or preparation for the commission of murder. The buying of poison and mi+ing it with the food of A who later put into his mouth part thereof to eat it, taken together, constituted the overt acts of murder.

Prepara%$r+ ac%s an" $-er% ac%s! "is%in)&is'e".

Prepara%$r+ Ac% bought poison from a drugstore, in preparation for the klling of A by means of poison. =nly preparatory act because it has no direct connection with the crime of murder which intended to commit. O-er% Ac% Aut if mi+ed the poison with the food intended for A, and the latter not knowing that it contained poison, put it into his mouth a spoonful thereof

Dra in) $r %r+in) %$ "ra

a pis%$l is n$% an $-er% ac% $# '$mici"e. i%' i% is n$% an $-er% ac% $#

Raisin) a *$l$ as i# %$ s%ri(e %'e $##en"e" par%+ '$mici"e.

!n the case of U.S. v. Simeon, ( 3hil. /##, it was held that the crime committed was only that of threatening another with a weapon ( rt. 2#., par. 1&, because all that the accused did was to raise his bolo as if to stri*e or stab the offended party with it. The latter shouted for help and ran away. No blow was struck* nor was there proof of threats to kill or to do bodily harm.

22
<vert act ma% not be b% ph%sical activit%.
There are felonies where, because of their nature or the manner of committing them, the overt acts are not performed with bodily movement or by physical activity. Thus, a proposal consisting in making an offer of money to a public officer for the purpose of corrupting him is the overt act in the crime of corruption of public officer.

T'e e3%ernal ac%s m&s% 'a-e a "irec% c$nnec%i$n c$mmi%%e" *+ %'e $##en"er.

i%' %'e crime in%en"e" %$ *e

t early dawn, was surprised by a policeman while in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. t that time the owner of the store was sleeping inside with another %hinaman. had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall. !s there an attempted robbery in this %aseG No. The crime committed was attempted trespass to dwelling, because the intention of the accused was obviously disclosed by his act of making an opening through the wall, and that was to enter the store against the will of its owner who was then living there. !t is only an attempt, because was not able to perform all the acts of e+ecution which should produce the felony of trespass to dwelling. @ad commenced entering the dwelling through the opening, he would have performed all the acts of e+ecution.

4'a% is an in"e%ermina%e $##ense;

!t is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. ob1ective is ambiguous. !ts nature in relation to its

!n the case of People v. ?amahan&, supra, the final ob1ective of the offender, once he succeeded in entering the store, may be to rob, to cause physical in1ury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense. !n such a case, there is no 1ustification in finding the offender guilty of attempted robbery by the use of force upon things.

T'e in%en%i$n $# %'e acc&se" m&s% *e -ie e" #r$m %'e na%&re $# %'e ac%s e3ec&%e" *+ 'im! an" n$% #r$m 'is a"missi$n. 5. ?Directl% b% overt acts.#

=nly offenders who personall% execute the commission of a crime can be guilty of attempted felony. The word =directl%= suggests that the offender must commence the commission of the felony by taking direct part in the e+ecution of the act.

6.

?Does not perform all the acts of execution.#

!f the offender has performed all the acts of e+ecution F nothing more is left to be done F the stage of e+ecution is that of a frustrated felony, if the felony is not produced* or consummated, if the felony is produced. !f an%thin& %et remained for him to do, he would be guilty of an attempted crime. .3.S. . 4&,a e, 3* P(il. 2'9/

8.

?4% reason of some cause or accident.#

!n attempted felony, the offender fails to perform all the acts of e+ecution which should produce the felony because of some cause or accident. Examples! Cause. picked the pocket of A, inside of which there was a wallet containing 3.:.::. Aefore could remove it from the pocket of A, the latter grabbed Cs hand and prevented him from taking it. !n this case, failed to perform all the acts of e+ecution, that is, taking the wallet, because of a cause, that is, the timely discovery by A of the overt act of .

23
Accident. aimed his pistol at A to kill the latter, but when he pressed the trigger it 1ammed and no bullet was fired from the pistol.

9.

?<ther than his own spontaneous desistance#

!f the actor does not perform all the acts of e+ecution b% reason of his own spontaneous desistance , there is no attempted felony. The law does not punish him.

T'e "esis%ance s'$&l" *e ma"e *e#$re all %'e ac%s $# e3ec&%i$n are per#$rme".
stole a chicken under the house of A one evening. 9eali,ing that what he did was wrong, returned the chicken to the place under the house of A. Since the crime of theft was already consummated, the return of the stolen property does not relieve of criminal responsibility.

T'e "esis%ance 'ic' e3emp%s #r$m criminal lia*ili%+ 'as re#erence %$ %'e crime in%en"e" %$ *e c$mmi%%e"! an" 'as n$ re#erence %$ %'e crime ac%&all+ c$mmi%%e" *+ %'e $##en"er *e#$re 'is "esis%ance.
, with intent to kill, fired his pistol at A, but did not hit the latter. A cried and asked desisted from firing his pistol again at A. !s criminally liableG not to shoot him.

Kes, not for attempted homicide because he desisted before he could perform all the acts of e+ecution, but for grave threats which was already committed by him when he desisted. 3llustration of a case where the accused inflicted in$ur%. Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co2accusedG "eld! The slight wound did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contribute to it. @is liability should therefore be limited to the slight in1ury he caused. @owever, the fact that he inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill. @e is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight in1ury.

S&*.ec%i-e p'ase $# %'e $##ense.

!n attempted felon%, the offender never passes the sub1ective phase of the offense.

De#ini%i$n $# s&*.ec%i-e p'ase $# %'e $##ense.

!t is that portion of the acts constitutin& the crime, starting from the point where the offender begins the commission of the crime to that point where he has still control over his acts, including their (actCs& natural course. !f between these two points the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the sub1ective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. !f he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated, provided the crime is not produced. The acts then of the offender reached the ob$ective phase of the crime.

24

0r&s%ra%e" #el$n+. Elemen%s,

1. 2. (. '. The offender performs all the acts of execution> ll the acts performed would produce the felon% as a conse5uence> Aut the felon% is not produced> Ay the reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES. 5. Performs all the acts of execution.#

!n frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the acts of e+ecution. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. This element distinguishes frustrated felony from attempted felony. !n attempted felony, the offender does not perform all the acts of e+ecution. @e does not perform the last act necessary to produce the crime. @e merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. The beliefs of the accused need not be considered. 8hat should be considered is whether all the acts of e+ecution performed by the offender >would produce the felony as a conse5uence.#

In %'e #$ll$ in) cases! %'e s%a)e $# e3ec&%i$n %'e $&n" in#lic%e" as m$r%al,
a.

as 'el" %$ *e #r&s%ra%e"! *eca&se

People v. "onrada, /2 3hil. 112, where the accused stabbed the offended party in the abdomen, penetrating the liver, and in the chest. !t was only the prompt and skillful medical treatment which the offended party received that saved his life. People v. 7ercado, .1 3hil. "", where the accused wounded the victim in the left abdomen with a sharp2edged weapon, causing a wound in the peritoneal cavity, serious enough to have produced death. People v. David, /: 3hil. "(, where the accused in firing his revolver at the offended party hit him in the upper side of the body, piercing it from side to side and perforating the lungs. The victim was saved due to ade-uate and timely intervention of medical science.

b.

c.

In %'e #$ll$ in) cases! %'e s%a)e $# e3ec&%i$n as 'el" %$ *e a%%emp%e"! *eca&se %'ere as n$ $&n" in#lic%e" $r %'e $&n" in#lic%e" as n$% m$r%al.
a. U.S. v. 4ien, 2: 3hil. (.', where the accused threw a %hinaman into the deep water, and as the %hinaman did not know how to swim, he made efforts to keep himself afloat and sei,ed the gunwale of the boat, but the accused tried to loosen the hold of the victim with the oar. The accused tried to loosen the hold of the victim with the oar. The accused was prevented from striking the latter by other persons. Since the accused had the intent to kill the offended party, the former actually committed attempted homicide against the latter. People v. @alalo, et al., ." 3hil. $1., where the accused fired four successive shots at the offended party while the latter was fleeing to escape from his assailants and save his own life. Not having hit the offended party, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, the accused failed to perform all the acts of e+ecution by reason of a cause other than his spontaneous desistance. 7ven if no wound was inflicted, the assailant may be convicted of attempted homicide, provided he had the intent to kill the offended party. (People v. Aban, % 2<.9. No. 1:(''29, November (:, 1".'&

b.

25
c. People v. Domin&o, % 2<.9. N=. 1'22229, pril 11, 1"./, where two physicians called to the witness stand by the prosecution could not a&ree that the wounds inflicted upon the complainant would cause death. =ne of them, 0r. 9otea, testified that the wounds were not serious enough to produce death even if no medical assistance had been given to the offended party. People v. Somera, et al., .2 =.<. ("$(, where the head of the offended party was merely gra,ed by the shot which hit him, the wound being far from fatal.

d.

,.

/+ould produce the felon% as a conse5uence.#

All the acts of execution performed by the offender could have produced the felon% as a conse-uence. !n crimes against persons, such as murder, which re-uire that the victim should die to consummate the felony, it is necessary for the frustration of the same that a mortal wound is inflicted.

8.

/Do not produce it.#

!n frustrated felony, the acts performed by the offender do not produce the felony, because if the felony is produced it would be consummated.

9.

/3ndependent of the will of the perpetrator.#

7ven if all the acts of e+ecution have been performed, the crime may not be consummated, because certain causes may prevent its consummation. These certain causes may be intervention of third persons who prevented the consummation of the offense or may be due to the perpetrator's own will. !f the crime is not produced because of the timely intervention of a third person, it is frustrated. !f the crime is not produced because the offender himself prevented its consummation, there is no frustrated felon%, for the 'th element is not present. Problem! doctor conceived the idea of killing his wife, and to carry out his plan, he mi+ed arsenic with the soup of his victim. !mmediately after the victim took the poisonous food, the offender suddenly felt such a twinge of conscience that he himself washed out the stomach of the victim and administered to her the ade-uate antidote. 8ould this be a frustrated parricideG %ertainly not, for even though the sub1ective phase of he crime had already been passed, the most important re-uisite of a frustrated crime, i.e., that the cause which prevented the consummation of the offense be independent of the will of he perpetrator, was lacking. (<uevara& The crime cannot be considered attempted parricide, because the doctor already performed all the acts of e+ecution. t most, the crime committed would be physical in1uries, as the poison thus administered, being an in1urious substance, could cause the same.

A%%emp%e" $r #r&s%ra%e" #el$n+ "is%in)&is'e" #r$m imp$ssi*le crime.

A%%emp%e" $r #r&s%ra%e" #el$n+ The evil intent of the offender is not accomplished. The evil intent of the offender is possible of accomplishment. 8hat prevents its accomplishment is the intervention of certain cause or accident in which the offender had no part. Imp$ssi*le crime The evil intent of the offender is not accomplished. The evil intent accomplished. of the offender cannot be

The evil intent of the offender cannot be accomplished because it is inherently impossible of accomplishment or because the means employed by the offender is inade-uate or ineffectual.

26

C$ns&mma%e" #el$n+.
felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its e+ecution and accomplishment are present.

I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES.

/All the elements# necessary for its e+ecution and accomplishment >are present.? 7very crime has its own elements which must all be present to continue a culpable violation of a precept of law.

4'en n$% all %'e elemen%s $# a #el$n+ are pr$-e".

8hen a felony has two or more elements and one of them is not proved by the prosecution during the trial, either (1& the felony is not known to have been consummated, or (2& the felony is not shown to have been committed, or ((& another felony is shown to have been committed. !n the prosecution for estafa ( rt. (1.&, if the element of deceit or abuse of confidence is not proved, there is no crime. There is only civil liability. Aut if the element of damage only not proved, the accused may be found guilty of attempted or frustrated estafa. !n the prosecution for robbery with violence against persons ( rt. 2"'&, if the element of intent to gain is not proved, the accused can be found guilty of &rave coercion ( rt. 2/$&, another felon%. !n the prosecution for forcible abduction ( rt. ('2&, if the element of lewd designs is not proved, the accused may be held liable for kidnapping and serious illegal detention ( rt. 2/$&, another felon%.

Elemen% $# in%en% %$ (ill!

'en presen% in in#lic%in) p'+sical in.&ries.

!f any of the physical in1uries described in rticles 2/(, 2/', 2/. and 2// is inflicted with intent to *ill on any of the persons mentioned in rticle 2'/, or with the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in rticle 2'#, the crime would be either attempted or frustrated parricide or murder as the case may be. acts! 0efendant with a pocket knife inflicted several wounds on the victim. The words >until ! can kill you? were uttered by the assailant. "eld! 00 Phil. BCD6 ttempted homicide, not physical in1uries, because the intention to kill is evident. ;U.S. v. Aoven,

acts! The accused inflicted bolo wounds on the shoulder and across the lips of the victim and then withdrew. "eld! Not frustrated homicide, but serious physical in1uries as the accused probably knew that the in1uries were not such as should produce death. !ntent to kill was not present. (4.S. v. )aghirang, 2# 3hil. /..& 8here the accused voluntarily left their victim after giving him a sound thrashing, without inflicting any fatal in1ury, although they could have easily killed their said victim, considering their superior number and the weapons with which they were provided, the intent to kill on the part of the accused is wanting and the crime committed is merely physical in1uries and not attempted murder. ( People v. 7alinao, ECAF GB <.-. ,.,H6

>anner $# c$mmi%%in) %'e crime.

1. ormal crimes 8 consummated in one instant, no attempt.

There are crimes, like slander and false testimon%, which are consummated in one instant, by sin&le act. These are formal crimes. 2. Crimes consummated b% mere attempt or proposal or b% overt act.

27

li&ht to enem%'s countr% ( rt. 121&. F !n this crime the mere attempt to flee to an enemy country is a consummated felony. Corruption of minors ( rt. (':&. F consummate the offense. (. elon% b% omission. There can be no attempted stage when the felony is by omission, because in this kind of felony the offender does not e+ecute acts. @e omits to perform an act with the law re-uires him to do. '. Crimes re5uirin& the intervention of two persons to commit them are consummated b% mere a&reement. !n those crimes, like bettin& in sport contests and corruption of public officer ( rt. 1"$ and rt. 212&, which re-uire the intervention for two persons to commit them, the same are consummated by mere agreement. !n the case of U.S. v. )e )on&, 2/ 3hil. '.(, where the roll of bills amounting to 3.:: was accepted by the police officer for the purpose of using the same as evidence in the prosecution of the accused for attempted bribery (attempted corruption of a public officer&, it was held that the accused who delivered the money was guilty of attempted bribery. .. 7aterial crimes 8 there are three stages of e+ecution. Thus, homicide, rape, etc., are not consummated in one instant or by a single act. mere proposal to the minor to satisfy the lust of another will

28

Ar%icle D. +hen li&ht felonies are punishable. / Li)'% #el$nies are p&nis'a*le $nl+ 'en %'e+ 'a-e *een c$ns&mma%e"! i%' %'e e3cep%i$n $# %'$se c$mmi%%e" a)ains% pers$n $r pr$per%+.
)he li&ht felonies punished b% the 1PC! 1. 2. (. '. .. Slight physical in1uries. ( rt. 2//& Theft. ( rt. (:", pars. $ and #& lteration of boundary marks. ( rt. (1(& )alicious mischief. ( rt. (2#, par. (* !ntriguing against honor. ( rt. (/'& rt. (2", par. (&

The penalty for the above2mentioned crimes is arresto menor (imprisonment from one day to thirty days&, or a fine not e+ceeding 32::.

I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES.

1. /+ith the exception of those committed a&ainst persons or propert%.#

General R&le.
Bight felonies are punishable onl% when they have been consummated. Exception! Bight felonies committed against persons or propert%, are punishable even if attempted or frustrated.

E3ample $# li)'% #el$nies a)ains% pers$n,

rt. 2// F Slight physical in1uries and maltreatment.

E3amples $# li)'% #el$nies a)ains% pr$per%+,

1. rt. (:", No. $ F Theft by hunting or fishing or gathering fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products upon an inclosed estate or filed where trespass is forbidden and the value of the thing stolen does not e+ceed 3..::. rt. (:", No. # F Theft, where the value of the stolen property does not e+ceed 3..:: and the offender was prompted by hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning livelihood. rt. (1( F lteration of boundary marks.

2. (. '.

rt. (2#, No. (* rt. (2", No. ( F )alicious mischief where the damage is not more than 32::.:: or if it cannot be estimated.

29

Ar%icle E. Conspirac% and proposal to commit felon%. / C$nspirac+ an" pr$p$sal %$ c$mmi% #el$n+ are p&nis'a*le $nl+ in %'e cases in 'ic' %'e la speciall+ pr$-i"es a penal%+ %'ere#$r. A c$nspirac+ e3is%s 'en % $ $r m$re pers$ns c$me %$ an a)reemen% c$ncernin) %'e c$mmissi$n $# a #el$n+ an" "eci"e %$ c$mmi% i%. T'ere is pr$p$sal 'en %'e pers$n '$ 'as "eci"e" %$ c$mmi% a #el$n+ pr$p$ses i%s e3ec&%i$n %$ s$me $%'er pers$n $r pers$ns. I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES. 5. 6. /Conspirac% and proposal to commit felon%.# ?<nl% in the cases in which the law speciall% provides a penalt% therefore.# 'en %'e la speci#icall+ pr$-i"es a penal%+

A c$nspirac+ is n$% a crime e3cep% %'ere#$r.

C$nspirac+ rela%es %$ a crime actuall% committed !t is not a felony but only a manner of incurring criminal liability, that is, when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

C$nspirac+ is $nl+ a ma%%er $# inc&rrin) criminal lia*ili%+ !t is not punishable as a separate offense.

7ven if the conspiracy relates to any of the crimes of treason, rebellion and sedition, but any of them is actuall% committed, the conspiracy is not a separate offense* it is only a manner of incurring criminal liability, that is, all the conspirators who carried out their plan and personally took part in its e+ecution are e-ually liable. The offenders are liable for treason, rebellion, or sedition, as the case may be, and the conspiracy is absorbed. 3ndications of conspirac%. 8hen the defendants by their acts aimed at the same ob1ect, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same ob1ect, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be 1ustified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy. (People v. -eronimo, 2o. ?:.GBII, <ctober 9G, 9CB., G. SC1A ,0D, ,G06 )he acts of the defendants must show a common desi&n. !t is fundamental for conspiracy to e+ist that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the e+ecution of the unlawful ob1ective. lthough the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy. ;People v. Dorico, 2o. ?:.9GDH, 2ovember ,C, 9CB., G0 SC1A 9B,, 9HD:9HH6

ReA&isi%es $# c$nspirac+,
1. 2. (. That two or more persons came to an agreement* That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony* and That the execution of the felony be decided upon.

30

F&an%&m $# pr$$# reA&ire" %$ es%a*lis' c$nspirac+.

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cogni,ance or approval of an illegal act is re-uired.

ReA&isi%es $# pr$p$sal,
1. 2. That a person has decided to commit a felon%> and That he proposes its execution to some other person or persons.

T'ere is n$ criminal proposal

1.

'en G

)he person who proposes is not determined to commit the felon%.

Example! desires that the present government be overthrown. Aut is afraid to do it himself with others. then suggest the overthrowing of the government to some desperate people who will do it at the slightest provocation. !n this case, is not liable for proposal to commit rebellion, because has not decided to commit it. 2. (. )here is no decided, concrete, and formal proposal. 3t is not the execution of a felon% that is proposed.

Example. conceived the idea of overthrowing the present government. called several of his trusted followers and instructed them to go around the country and to secretly organi,e groups and convince them of the necessity of having a new government. Note that what proposed in this case is not the e+ecution of the crime of rebellion, but the performance of preparatory acts for the commission of rebellion. Therefore, there is no criminal proposal. Aut once a proposal to commit rebellion is made by the proponent to another person, the crime of proposal to commit rebellion is consummated and the desistance of the proponent cannot legally e+empt him from criminal liability.

I% is n$% necessar+ %'a% %'e pers$n %$ c$mmi% re*elli$n $r %reas$n.

'$m %'e pr$p$sal is ma"e a)rees %$

Pr$p$sal as an $-er% ac% $# c$rr&p%i$n $# p&*lic $##icer.

=ne who offers money to a public officer to induce him not to perform his duties, but the offer is re1ected by the public officer, is liable for attempted briber%. Note that while it is true that the act performed by the offender is in the nature of a proposal, and is not punishable because it does not involve treason or rebellion, nevertheless, the proposal in this case is an overt act of the crime of corruption of the public officer.

T'e crimes in 'ic' c$nspirac+ an" pr$p$sal are p&nis'a*le are a)ains% %'e sec&ri%+ $# %'e S%a%e $r ec$n$mic sec&ri%+.

31

Ar%icle H. -rave felonies, less &rave felonies and li&ht felonies. / Gra-e #el$nies are %'$se %$ 'ic' %'e la a%%ac'es %'e capi%al p&nis'men% $r penal%ies 'ic' in an+ $# %'eir peri$"s are a##lic%i-e! in acc$r"ance i%' Ar%. 6: $# %'is C$"e. Less )ra-e #el$nies are %'$se 'ic' %'e la p&nis'es i%' penal%ies 'ic' in %'eir ma3im&m peri$" are c$rrec%i$nal! in acc$r"ance i%' %'e a*$-e/men%i$ne" Ar%icle. Li)'% #el$nies are %'$se in#rac%i$ns $# la #$r %'e c$mmissi$n $# 'ic' a penal%+ $# arres% men$r $r a #ine n$% e3cee"in) 6II pes$s $r *$%'7 is pr$-i"e". I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES. 5. /)o which the law attaches the capital punishment.#
Capital punishment is death penalty.

6. /<r penalties which in an% of their periods are afflictive.#

lthough the word >an%? is used in the phrase, when the penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two or more distinct penalties, the higher or highest of the penalties must be an afflictive penalty. Example; felony punishable by prision correccional to prision ma%or is a grave felony, because the higher of the two penalties prescribed, which is prision ma%or ; rt. $1&, is an afflictive penalty. Example! felony punishable by prision correccional in its ma+imum period to prision ma%or in its minimum period is a grave felony, because the higher period, which is the minimum of prision ma%or, is a period of an afflictive penalty. Example! felony punishable by the medium and ma+imum periods of prision ma%or or by prision ma%or in its ma+imum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period is a grave felony, because both prision ma%or and reclusion temporal are afflictive penalties. The afflictive penalties in accordance with 1eclusion perpetua, 1eclusion temporal, 3erpetual or temporary absolute dis-ualification, 3erpetual or temporary special dis-ualification, Prision ma%or. rticle 2. of this %ode are;

8.

/Penalties which in their maximum period are correctional.#

Example! felony punishable by arresto menor to destierro is a less grave felony, because the higher of the two penalties prescribed, which is destierro, is a correctional penalty. Example! felony punishable by arresto menor in its ma+imum period to destierro in its minimum period is a less grave felony, because the higher of the penalties is a period of a correctional penalty. The following are correctional penalties! Prision correccional,

32
Arresto ma%or, Suspension, Destierro.

9.

/)he penalt% of arresto menor or a fine not exceedin& ,II pesos, or both, is provided.#
8hen the %ode provides a fine of e+actly 32::.:: for the commission of a felony, it is a light felony. !f the amount of the fine provided by the %ode is more than 32::.::, then it is a less grave felony, because according to rticle 2/, a fine not exceedin& 3/,:::.:: is a correctional penalty. !f the amount of the fine provided by the %ode is more than 3/,:::.::, it is a grave felony, because according to rticle 2/, a fine exceedin& 3/,:::.:: is an affective penalty.

33

Ar%icle 5I. <ffenses not sub$ect to the provisions of this Code. / O##enses 'ic' are $r in %'e #&%&re ma+ *e p&nis'a*le &n"er special la s are n$% s&*.ec% %$ %'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'is C$"e. T'is C$"e s'all *e s&pplemen%ar+ %$ s&c' la s! &nless %'e la%%er s'$&l" speciall+ pr$-i"e %'e c$n%rar+. T'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'e RPC $n penal%ies cann$% *e applie" %$ $##enses p&nis'a*le &n"er special la s. B&% 'ere %'e special la a"$p%e" penal%ies #r$m %'e RPC! %'e r&les #$r )ra"&a%in) penal%ies *+ "e)rees $r "e%erminin) %'e pr$per peri$" s'$&l" *e applie". Ar%. C $# %'e RPC cann$% *e applie" %$ $##enses p&nis'e" *+ special la s. O##enses &n"er special la s! n$% s&*.ec% %$ %'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'is C$"e rela%in) %$ a%%emp%e" an" #r&s%ra%e" crimes. T'e special la 'as %$ #i3 penal%ies #$r a%%emp%e" an" #r&s%ra%e" crime.

4'en a special la c$-ers %'e mere a%%emp% %$ c$mmi% %'e crime "e#ine" *+ i%! %'e a%%emp%e" s%a)e is p&nis'a*le *+ %'e same penal%+ pr$-i"e" *+ %'a% la . Ar%. 5I is n$% applica*le %$ p&nis' an acc$mplice &n"er %'e special la . Plea $# )&il%+ is n$% mi%i)a%in) in ille)al p$ssessi$n $# #irearms p&nis'e" *+ special la . N$ access$r+ penal%+! &nless %'e special la pr$-i"es %'ere#$r. '$

Ar%. 56! par. 8! $# %'e RPC! applie" %$ min$r $-er H *&% less %'an 5: +ears $l" -i$la%e" a special la . S&pple%$r+ Applica%i$n $# %'e RPC.

Thus, in the following cases, the Supreme %ourt applied suppletorily the provisions of the revisions of the 93% to offenses under under special laws; 1. Subsidiar% Penalt% F The %ourt applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under rticle (" of the 93% to cases of violations of ct No. (""2, otherwise known as the 9evised )otor Hehicle Baw. 2. Civil ?iabilit% 8 The %ourt applied suppletorily the provision on case for violation of the 9evised )otor Hehicle Baw. rticle 1:: (civil liability& of the 93% to a

(. 1ules on Service of Sentence 8 The %ourt applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in rticle $: of the 93% in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of 9. . No. /'2., otherwise known as the 0angerous 0rugs ct of 1"$2. '. Definition on Principals, Accomplices and Accessories F the %ourt applied suppletorily rticles 1$, 1# and 1" of the 93% to define the words principal, accomplices, and accessories under 9. . No. #:'2, otherwise known as the )igrant 8orkers and =verseas 6ilipinos ct of 1""., because said words were not defined therein.

34
.. Principle of Conspirac% F The %ourt applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under 93% to A.3. Alg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein. rticle # of the

S&*si"iar+ Impris$nmen% #$r -i$la%i$n $# B.P. Bl). 66

S% dministrative %ircular No. 1(22::1 issued on 6ebruary 1', 2::1 states that if the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court, >there is no legal obstacle to the application of the 93% provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.?

RPC! n$% s&pple%$r+ %'$se &n"er %'e RPC.

'en %'e penal%ies &n"er %'e special la

are "i##eren% #r$m

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances cann$% *e apprecia%e"! in $##enses p&nis'e" *+ special la s. Special la s amen"in) %'e RPC are s&*.ec% %$ i%s pr$-isi$ns.

35

I. 2&s%i#+in) Circ&ms%ances Ar%icle 55. Austif%in& circumstances. / T'e #$ll$ in) "$ n$% inc&r an+ criminal lia*ili%+, 5. An+$ne '$ ac%s in "e#ense $# 'is pers$n $r ri)'%s! pr$-i"e" %'a% %'e #$ll$ in) circ&ms%ances c$nc&r, 0irs%. Unla #&l a))ressi$n. Sec$n". Reas$na*le necessi%+ $# %'e means empl$+e" %$ pre-en% $r repel i%. T'ir". Lac( $# s&##icien% pr$-$ca%i$n $n %'e par% $# %'e pers$n "e#en"in) 'imsel#. 6. An+ $ne '$ ac%s in "e#ense $# %'e pers$n $r ri)'%s $# 'is sp$&se! ascen"an%s! "escen"an%s! $r le)i%ima%e! na%&ral $r a"$p%e" *r$%'ers $r sis%ers! $r 'is rela%i-es *+ a##ini%+ in %'e same "e)rees an" %'$se c$nsan)&ini%+ i%'in %'e #$&r%' ci-il "e)ree! pr$-i"e" %'a% %'e #irs% an" sec$n" reA&isi%es prescri*e" in %'e ne3% prece"in) circ&ms%ance are presen%! an" %'e #&r%'er reA&isi%e! in case %'e re-$ca%i$n as )i-en *+ %'e pers$n a%%ac(e"! %'a% %'e $ne ma(in) "e#ense 'a" n$ par% %'erein. 8. An+$ne '$ ac%s in "e#ense $# %'e pers$n $r ri)'%s $# a s%ran)er! pr$-i"e" %'a% %'e #irs% an" sec$n" reA&isi%es men%i$ne" in %'e #irs% circ&ms%ance $# %'is Ar%icle are presen% an" %'a% %'e pers$n "e#en"in) *e n$% in"&ce" *+ re-en)e! resen%men%! $r $%'er e-il m$%i-e. 9. An+ pers$n '$! in $r"er %$ a-$i" an e-il $r in.&r+! "$es n$% ac% 'ic' ca&ses "ama)e %$ an$%'er! pr$-i"e" %'a% %'e #$ll$ in) reA&isi%es are presen%, 0irs%. T'a% %'e e-il s$&)'% %$ *e a-$i"e" ac%&all+ e3is%s7 Sec$n". T'a% %'e in.&r+ #eare" *e )rea%er %'an %'a% "$ne %$ a-$i" i%7 T'ir". T'a% %'ere *e n$ $%'er prac%ical an" less 'arm#&l means $# pre-en%in) i%. :. An+ pers$n '$ ac%s in %'e #&l#illmen% $# a "&%+ $r in %'e la #&l e3ercise $# a ri)'% $r $##ice. C. An+ pers$n '$ ac%s in $*e"ience %$ an $r"er iss&e" *+ a s&peri$r #$r s$me la #&l p&rp$se.

36

Basis $# .&s%i#+in) circ&ms%ances.

The law recogni,es the non2e+istence of a crime by e+pressly stating in the opening sentence of persons therein mentioned >do not incur any criminal liability.? rticle 11 that the

Par. 5. / Sel#/"e#ense. An+$ne '$ ac%s in "e#ense $# 'is pers$n $r ri)'%s! pr$-i"e" %'a% %'e ## circ&ms%ances c$nc&r,
<5= <6= <8= unlawful a&&ression> reasonable necessit% of the means emplo%ed to prevent or repel it> and lac* of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defendin& himself.

Sel#/"e#ense.
8ell2entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self2defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. @e must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Self2defense, must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that e+cludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it, and it cannot be 1ustifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but, in itself, is e+tremely doubtful. The plea of self2defense cannot be 1ustifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is e+tremely doubtful.

Ri)'%s incl&"e" in sel#/"e#ense.

Self2defense includes not only the defense of the person or bod% of the one assaulted but also that of his ri&hts, that is, those rights the en1oyment of which is protected by law.

Reas$n

'+ penal la

ma(es sel#/"e#ense la #&l.

The law on self2defense embodied in any penal system in the civili,ed world finds 1ustification in manCs natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril* it is based on that impulse of self2preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being.

Unla #&l a))ressi$n is an in"ispensa*le reA&isi%e.

!t is a statutory and doctrinal re-uirement that for the 1ustifying circumstance of self2defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine 5ua non. There can be no self2defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. 6or the right of defense to e+ist, it is necessary that we have assaulted or that we be attacked, or at least that we be threatened with an attack in an immediate and imminent manner. !f there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothin& to prevent or repel.

A))ressi$n m&s% *e &nla #&l.

There are two kinds of aggression; (1& lawful, and (2& unlawful. The fulfillment of a dut% or the exercise of a ri&ht in a more or less violent manner is an aggression, but it is lawful.

37

>eanin) $# &nla #&l a))ressi$n.

4nlawful aggression is e-uivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to oneCs life, limb, or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. There must be an actual ph%sical assault upon a person, or at least a threat to inflict real in1ury. !n case of threat, the same must be offensive and positivel% strong, showing the wrongful intent to cause an in1ury. +hen there is no peril to one's life, limb, or ri&ht, there is no unlawful a&&ression.

Peril %$ $neBs li#e.

1. 2. Actual 8 that the danger must be present, that is, actuall% in e+istence. 3mminent 8 that the danger is on the point of happening. !t is not re5uired that the attack already begins, for it may be too late.

Peril %$ $neBs lim*

The blow with a deadl% weapon may be aimed at the vital parts of his body, in which case there is danger to his life* or with a less deadly weapon or any other weapon that can cause minor physical in1uries only, aimed at other parts of the body, in which case, there is danger only to his limb. The peril to oneCs limb may also be actual or only imminent.

T'ere m&s% *e ac%&al p'+sical #$rce $r ac%&al &se $#

eap$n.

The person defending himself must have been attacked with actual ph%sical force or with actual use of weapon. Thus, insultin& words addressed to the accused, no matter how ob1ectionable they may have been, without ph%sical assault, could not constitute unlawful a&&ression. li&ht push on the head with the hand does not constitute unlawful aggression. Aut a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression.

>ere *elie# $# an impen"in) a%%ac( is n$% s&##icien%.

)ere belief of an impending attack is not sufficient. Neither is an intimidating or threatening attitude.

?0$$%/(ic( )ree%in)@ is n$% &nla #&l a))ressi$n.

"eld! playful kick at the foot by way of greeting between friends may be a practical 1oke, and may even hurt* but it is not a serious or real attack on a personCs safety. !t may be a mere slight provocation.

A s%r$n) re%alia%i$n #$r an in.&r+ $r %'rea% ma+ am$&n% %$ an &nla #&l a))ressi$n.
8hen a person who was insulted, sli&htl% in$ured, or threatened, made a strong retaliation by attacking the one who gave the insult, caused the slight in1ury, or made the threat, the former became the offender, and the insult, in1ury, or threat should be considered only as a provocation mitigating his liability.

38

Re%alia%i$n is n$% sel#/"e#ense.

9etaliation is different from an act of self2defense. !n retaliation, the a&&ression that was begun by the in1ured party alread% ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. !n self2defense, the aggression was still existin& when the aggressor was in1ured or disabled by the person making a defense.

Re%alia%i$n is n$% a .&s%i#+in) circ&ms%ance.

The settled rule in 1urisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.

T'e a%%ac( ma"e *+ %'e "ecease" an" %'e (illin) $# %'e "ecease" *+ "e#en"an% s'$&l" s&ccee" eac' $%'er i%'$&% apprecia*le in%er-al $# %ime.
!n order to 1ustify homicide on the ground of self2defense, it is essential that the killing of the deceased by the defendant be simultaneous with the attack made by the deceased, or at least both acts succeeded each other without appreciable interval of time. +hen the *illin& of the deceased b% the accused was after the attac* made b% the deceased, the accused must have no time nor occasion for deliberation and cool thin*in&.

T'e &nla #&l a))ressi$n m&s% c$me #r$m %'e pers$n acc&se".

'$

as a%%ac(e" *+ %'e

The alleged act of the victim in placing his hand in his pocket, as if he was going to draw out something, cannot be characteri,ed as unlawful aggression. =n the other hand, the accused was the aggressor. @is act of arming himself with a bolo and following and overtaking the group of the victim shows that he had formed the resolution of li-uidating the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there could be no self2defense.

A p&*lic $##icer e3cee"in) 'is a&%'$ri%+ ma+ *ec$me an &nla #&l a))ress$r.
The lawful possessor of a fishing net was 1ustified in using force to repel sei,ure by a peace officer who was taking it without order from the court.

Na%&re! c'arac%er! l$ca%i$n! an" e3%en% $# $&n" $# %'e acc&se" alle)e"l+ in#lic%e" *+ %'e in.&re" par%+ ma+ *elie claim $# sel#/"e#ense.
1. 2. The location, number and seriousness of the stab wounds inflicted on the victims belie the claim of self2defense. =ne of the victims alone sustained 21 wounds. >The nature and number of wounds inflicted by an assailant constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self2defense.? The deceased suffered three stab wounds, two of which were fatal, and one incised wound. ppellantCs theory of self2defense is negatived by the nature and location of the victimCs wounds which, having a right2to2left direction, could not have possibly been inflicted by a right2handed person in front of the victim with a two2feet long bolo. The accused was the only eyewitness to the crime.

(.

'.

The nature, character, location, and e+tent of the wound, as testified to by the doctor who had e+amined the wound, clearly show that the deceased was struck either from behind or while his body was in a reclining position.

Impr$*a*ili%+ $# %'e "ecease" *ein) %'e a))ress$r *elies %'e claim $# sel#/"e#ense.
!t is unlikely that a se+agenarian would have gone to the e+tent of assaulting a 2' year old accused who was armed with a gun and a bolo, 1ust because the latter refused to give him a pig.

T'e #ac% %'a% %'e acc&se" "ecline" %$ )i-e an+ s%a%emen% p$liceman is inc$nsis%en% i%' %'e plea $# sel#/"e#ense.

'en 'e s&rren"ere" %$ a

39

protestation of innocence or 1ustification is the logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who finds himself in such an in c,lpatory predicament as that in which the policemen came upon him still clutching the death weapon and his victim dying before him.

P'+sical #ac% ma+ "e%ermine

'e%'er %'e acc&se" ac%e" in sel#/"e#ense.

The physical fact belies the claim of self2defense. The revolver of the deceased was still tucked inside the waistband of his pants which is indicative of his unpreparedness when he was fired upon simultaneously by the accused with their high2calibered weapons. The fact that the deceased received a total of 1( gunshot wounds is inconsistent with the claim that the deceased was fired upon in self2defense.

4'en %'e a))ress$r #lees! &nla #&l a))ressi$n n$ l$n)er e3is%s.

8hen unlawful aggression which has begun no lon&er exists, because the aggressor runs away, the one ma*in& a defense has no more ri&ht to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. !n a case where the deceased, who appeared to be the first aggressor, ran out of bullets and fled, and the accused pursued him and after overtaking him, inflicted several wounds on the prosterior side of his body, it was held that in such a situation the accused should have stayed his hand, and not having done so he was guilty of homicide.

Re%rea% %$ %a(e m$re a"-an%a)e$&s p$si%i$n.

!f it is clear that the purpose of the a&&ressor in retreating is to ta*e a more advanta&eous position to insure the success of the attack already begun by him, the unlawful a&&ression is considered still continuin&, and the one making a defense has a right to pursue him in his retreat and to disable him.

N$ &nla #&l a))ressi$n

1.

'en %'ere is a)reemen% %$ #i)'%.

No unlawful aggression in concerted fi&ht, as when the accused and the deceased, after an altercation in a bar, agreed to fight, went to a store and purchased two knives* that thereafter, the accused repeatedly e+pressed his desire and wish to the deceased not to fight, and that the former begged the latter that there be no fight between them, and that the deceased paid no heed to such re-uest and attacked the accused* but the accused succeeded in killing the deceased. )here is a&reement to fi&ht in this case.

2.

8hen the accused, pursued by the deceased, reached his house, he picked up a pestle and, turning towards the deceased, faced him, saying; >%ome on if you are brave,? and then attacking and killing him. (. )he challen&e to a fi&ht must be accepted.

Reas$n #$r %'is r&le.

8hen parties mutually agree to a fight, it is immaterial who attacks or receives the wound first, for the first act of force is an incident of the fight itself and in no wise is it an unwarranted and unexpected aggression which alone can legali,e self2defense.

A))ressi$n

'ic' is a'ea" $# %'e s%ip&la%e" %ime an" place is &nla #&l.

8here there was a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful. The acceptance of the challenge did not place on the offended party the burden of preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed time and place for the agreed encounter.

One

'$ -$l&n%aril+ .$ine" a #i)'% cann$% claim sel#/"e#ense.

ppellantCs version of the incident was to the effect that he had come to the aid of Hillafria at the latterCs call when Hillafria bo+ed )ariano 0ioso and engaged the group of 0ioso, Saldo, and %aunte in a fight. !n other words, he voluntarily 1oined the fight, when he did not have to. @e voluntarily e+posed himself to the conse-uences of a fight with his opponents.

40
T'e r&le n$ is ?s%an" )r$&n" 'en in %'e ri)'%.@

So, where the accused is where he has the ri&ht to be, the law does not re-uire him to retreat when his assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly weapon. The reason for the rule is that if one flees from an aggressor, he runs the risk of being attacked in the back by the aggressor.

H$

%$ "e%ermine %'e &nla #&l a))ress$r.

!n the absence of direct evidence to determine who provoked the conflict, it has been held that it shall be presumed that, in the nature of the order of things, the person who was deeply offended by the insult was the one who believed he had a right to demand e+planation of the perpetrator of that insult, and the one who also struck the first blow when he was not satisfied with the e+planation offered.

Unla #&l a))ressi$n in "e#ense $# $%'er ri)'%s.

1. a. Attempt to rape a woman F defense of ri&ht to chastit%. 7mbracing a woman, touching her private parts and her breasts, and throwing her to the ground for the purpose of rapin& her in an uninhabited place when it was twilight, constitute an attac* upon her honor, and, therefore, an unlawful aggression. 3lacing of hand by a man on the womanCs upper thigh is unlawful aggression.

b. 2.

0efense of property.

0efense of property can be invoked as a 1ustifying circumstance onl% when it is coupled with an attac* on the person of one entrusted with said property. (. Defense of home.

Hiolent entry to anotherCs house at ni&httime, by a person who is armed with a bolo, and forcin& his wa% into the house, shows he was ready and looking for trouble, and the manner of this entry constitutes an act of aggression. The owner of the house need not wait for a blow before repelling the aggression, as that blow ma% prove fatal.

T'e *elie# $# %'e acc&se" ma+ *e c$nsi"ere" in "e%erminin) %'e e3is%ence $# &nla #&l a))ressi$n.
> , in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees A rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arm and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. @aving approached near enough in the same attitude, , who has a club in his hand, strikes A over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged* and of the wound A dies. !t turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of A is only to terrif% .?

T'ere is sel#/"e#ense e-en i# %'e a))ress$r &se" a %$+ pis%$l! pr$-i"e" %'e acc&se" *elie-e" i% as a real )&n.
Note; orcibl% pushin& pic*eters to let compan% truc*s enter the compound is not unlawful a&&ression a&ainst the ri&hts of the pic*eters.

T'rea% %$ in#lic% real in.&r+ as &nla #&l a))ressi$n.

7+amples of threats to inflict real in1ury; 1. 8hen one aims a revolver at another with the intention of shooting him.

2. The act of a person in retreating two steps and placing his hand in his pocket with a motion indicating his purpose to commit an assault with a weapon. (. The act of opening a knife, and ma*in& a motion as if to make an attack.

4'en in%en% %$ a%%ac( is mani#es%! pic(in) &p a

eap$n is s&##icien% &nla #&l

41
a))ressi$n. A))ressi$n m&s% *e real! n$% merel+ ima)inar+.
There was no unlawful aggression, notwithstanding the claim of the accused that the deceased was a man of violent temper, -uarrelsome, and irritable, and that the latter might attack him with the *ris, because he merel% ima&ined a possible aggression. The aggression must be real, or at least, imminent.

A))ressi$n %'a% is e3pec%e".

!t is well2known that the person who pursues another with the intent and purpose of assaulting him does not raise his hand to discharge the blow until he believes that his victim is within his reach. !n this case, it is not necessary to wait until the blow is about to be discharged.

6n" reA&isi%e $# De#ense $# Pers$n $r Ri)'%, Reas$na*le necessi%+ $# %'e means empl$+e" %$ pre-en% $r repel i%.
The law protects not only the person who repels an aggression (meaning actual&, but even the person who tries to prevent an aggression that is expected (meaning imminent&. The second re-uisite of defense means that 1. 2. There be a necessity of the course of action taken by the person making a defense, and there be a necessity of the means used.

Aoth must be reasonable.

T'e reas$na*leness $# %'e necessi%+ "epen"s &p$n %'e circ&ms%ances.

!n a situation where the accused, who was then unarmed, was being mauled with fistic blows by the deceased and his companions for refusing their offer to drink wine, picked up a lead pipe within his reach and with it struck the deceased on the forehead resulting in the latterCs death, the use by the accused of such lead pipe under the circumstances is reasonable.

9.

2ecessit% of the course of action ta*en.

!f there was no unlawful aggression or, if there was, it has ceased to e+ist, there would be no necessity for any course of action to take as there is nothing to prevent or to repel. a. Place and occasion of the assault considered.

The command given to the accused by the deceased in a dar* and an uninhabited place, for the purpose of playing a practical 1oke upon him, >lie down and give me your money or else die,? made the accused act immediately by discharging his pistol against the deceased. !t was held that a person under such circumstances cannot be e+pected to adopt a less violent means of repelling what he believed was an attack upon his life and property. b. )he dar*ness of the ni&ht and the surprise which characteri(ed the assault considered.

8hen the accused, while walking along in a dar* street at ni&ht with pistol in hand on the lookout for an individual who had been making an insulting demonstration in front of his house, was suddenly held from behind and an attempt was made to wrench the pistol from him, he was 1ustified in shootin& him to death, in view of the dar*ness and the surprise which characteri,ed the assault.

N$ necessi%+ $# %'e c$&rse $# ac%i$n %a(en.

The claim of self2defense is not credible as the accused narrated that he had succeeded in disarming the victim of the piece of wood the latter was allegedly carrying so that stabbing with such fre-uency, fren,y, and force can no longer be considered as reasonably necessary. 8hile the accused might have been and doubtless was 1ustified in picking up the bamboo pole to keep his

42
adversary at bay, he was not 1ustified in striking the head of the deceased with it, as he was not in any real danger of his life, for his adversary, although armed with a bolo, had not attempted to draw it. 8hile there was an actual physical invasion of appellantCs property when the deceased chiseled the walls of his house and closed appellantCs entrance and e+it to the highway. 8hen the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.

4'en a))ress$r is "isarme".

Aut when the defendant, who had been attacked by the deceased, succeeded in snatching the bolo away from the latter, and the deceased already manifested a refusal to fight, the defendant was not 1ustified in killing him.

4'en $nl+ min$r p'+sical in.&ries are in#lic%e" a#%er &nla #&l a))ressi$n 'as cease" %$ e3is%! %'ere is s%ill sel#/"e#ense i# m$r%al $&n"s ere in#lic%e" a% %'e %ime %'e reA&isi%es $# sel#/"e#ense ere presen%.
This ruling should not be applied if the deceased, after receiving minor wounds, dropped his weapon, and signified his refusal to fight any longer, but the accused hacked him to death.

T'e pers$n "e#en"in) is n$% e3pec%e" %$ c$n%r$l 'is *l$ .

+hen the a&&ression is so sudden that there is no time left to the one ma*in& a defense to determine what course of action to ta*e. acts! t the moment the deceased was about to stab the superior officer of the accused, the latter hit the deceased with a palma brava. The trial court believed that the accused should have only struck his hand to disable it, or only hit him in a less vulnerable part of the body. "eld! The trial court demanded too much of the accusedCs wisdom, 1udgment, and discretion during the split second he had to thin* and act to save his superior officer .

In repellin) $r pre-en%in) an &nla #&l a))ressi$n! %'e $ne "e#en"in) m&s% aim a% 'is assailan%! an" n$% in"iscrimina%el+ #ire 'is "ea"l+ eap$n.
@owever, because he did not aim at his assailant but instead indiscriminately fired his deadly weapon at the risk of the lives and limbs of the innocent persons he knew were in the place of occurrence, his act of defense was not e+ercised with due care. @owever, there being no intent to kill, appellant was held liable for physical in1uries.

6.
1.

2ecessit% of the means used.

sleeping woman, who was awakened by her brother2in2law grasping her arm, was not $ustified in using a *nife to kill him as the latter did not perform any other act which could be construed as an attempt a&ainst her honor.

2. 8hen a man placed his hand on the upper thigh of a woman seated on a bench in a chapel where there were many people and which was well2lighted, there was no reasonable necessit% to *ill him with a *nife because there was no danger to her chastity or honor. !t is otherwise, where the husband of the accused was kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck when she pulled out the knife inserted at the left side of her husbandCs belt and plunged it at his body hitting the left back portion 1ust below the waist.

T'e %es% $# reas$na*leness $# %'e means &se".

8hether the means emplo%ed is reasonable, will depend upon the nature and 5ualit% of the weapon used by the aggressor, his ph%sical condition, character, si(e! and other circumstances, and those of the person defending himself, and also the place and occasion of the assault. Perfect e5ualit% between the weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is

43
not %et re5uired, because the person assaulted does not have sufficient tran-uility of mind to think, to calculate, and to choose which weapon to use. 8hat the law re-uires is rational e-uivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is e+posed, and the instinct, more than reason, that moves or impels the defense.

T'e reas$na*leness $# %'e means empl$+e"

1. )he nature and 5ualit% of the weapons!

ill "epen" &p$n G

a. lthough as a general rule a dagger or a knife is more dangerous than a club, the use of a knife or dagger, when attacked with a club, must be deemed reasonable if it cannot be shown that the person assaulted (1& had other available means or ;,6 if there was other means, he could cooll% choose the less deadl% weapon to repel the assault. Since the deceased was a gangster with a reputation for violence, the use by the accused of a dagger to repel the persistent aggression by the deceased with a wooden pestle is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of a revolver against an aggressor armed with a bolo was held reasonable, it appearing that the deceased was advancing upon the accused and within a few feet of striking distance when the latter shot him. b. To use a firearm against a da&&er or a *nife, in the regular order of things, does not impl% an% difference between such weapons. This ruling is sub1ect to the limitations mentioned in the case of People v. Padua c. Aut when a person is attacked with fist blows, he must repel the same with the weapon that nature gave him, meaning, with fists also. This ruling applies only when the aggressor and the one defending himself are the same si(e and stren&th. 2. Ph%sical condition, character and si(e. Thus, when the one defending himself who was of middle a&e, was cornered, had his back to the iron railing, and three or four men bi&&er, and stron&er than he were striking him with fists, such person was 1ustified in using a knife. (. <ther circumstances considered. 3n view of the imminence of the dan&er, a shot&un is a reasonable means to prevent an a&&ression with a bolo. ), being abruptly awakened by shouts that 3 was pursuing @ and )Cs two children, and seeing, upon awakening, that in fact 3 was infuriated and pursuing @ with a bolo in his hand and his arm raised in an attitude as if to strike, took up a shotgun lying within his reach and fired at 3, killing him at once. s ) had on hand a loaded shot&un, this weapon was the most appropriate one that could be used for the purpose, even at the risk of killing the aggressor, since the latterCs aggression also gravely threatened the lives of the parties assaulted.

Reas$na*le necessi%+ $# means empl$+e" %$ pre-en% $r repel &nla #&l a))ressi$n %$ *e li*erall+ c$ns%r&e" in #a-$r $# la /a*i"in) ci%i1ens. R&le re)ar"in) %'e reas$na*leness $# %'e ?necessi%+ $# %'e means empl$+e"@ 'en %'e $ne "e#en"in) 'imsel# is a peace $##icer.
The peace officer, in the performance of his duty, represents the law which he must uphold. 8hile

44
the law on self2defense allows a private individual to prevent or repel an aggression, the duty of a peace officer re5uires him to overcome his opponent. Thus, the fact that a policeman, who was armed with a revolver and a club, might have used his club instead, does not alter the principle since a policemanCs club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not re5uired to afford a person attac*in& him, the opportunit% for a fair and e5ual stru&&le.

0irs% % $ reA&isi%es c$mm$n %$ %'ree (in"s $# le)i%ima%e "e#ense.

The first two re5uisites thus far e+plained are common to self:defense, defense of a relative, and defense of a stran&er. These three kinds of legitimate defense differ onl% in the third re5uisite.

T'ir" reA&isi%es $# sel#/"e#ense.

>?ac* of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defendin& himself.#

Reas$n #$r %'e %'ir" reA&isi%e $# sel#/"e#ense.

@ence, to be entitled to the benefit of the 1ustifying circumstance of self2defense, the one defending himself must not have given cause for the aggression by his un$ust conduct or by inciting or provoking the assailant.

Cases in

'ic' %'ir" reA&isi%e $# sel#/"e#ense c$nsi"ere" presen%.

The third re-uisite of self2defense is present F 1. 2. (. '. 8hen no provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself* or 8hen, even if a provocation was given, it was not sufficient* or 8hen, even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not &iven b% the person defendin& himself> or 8hen, even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not pro+imate and immediate to the act of aggression.

H$

%$ "e%ermine %'e s&##icienc+ $# pr$-$ca%i$n

The provocation must be sufficient, which means that it should be proportionate to the act of aggression and ade-uate to stir the aggressor to its commission. The provocation is sufficient F 1. 2. 8hen one challenges the deceased to come out of the house and engage in a fist2fight with him and prove who is the better man. 8hen one hurls insults or imputes to another the utterance of vulgar language, as when the accused and his brothers imputed to the deceased, the utterance of vulgar language against them, which imputation provoked the deceased to attack them. Aut it is not enou&h that the provocative act be unreasonable petty -uestion of pride does not 1ustify the wounding or killing of an opponent. (. 8hen the accused tried to forcibl% *iss the sister of the deceased. or annoying.

ReA&isi%e $# ?lac( $# s&##icien% pr$-$ca%i$n@ re#ers e3cl&si-el+ %$ ?%'e pers$n "e#en"in) 'imsel#.@
Thus, if the accused appears to be the a&&ressor, it cannot be said that he was defending himself from the effect of anotherCs aggression.

Pr$-$ca%i$n *+ %'e pers$n "e#en"in) 'imsel# n$% pr$3ima%e an" imme"ia%e %$ %'e

45
a))ressi$n.
Thus, if slapped the face of A one or two days before, and A, upon meeting , attacked the latter but was seriously in1ured when defended himself, the provocation given by should be disregarded, because it was not pro+imate and immediate to the aggression made by A.

0li)'%! inc$mpa%i*le

i%' sel#/"e#ense.

The appellant went into hiding after the hacking incident. Suffice it to state that flight after the commission of the crime is highly evidentiary of guilt, and incompatible with self2defense.

46
Par. ,. Defense of relatives Rela%i-es %'a% can *e "e#en"e".
1. 2. (. '. .. Spouse. scendants. 0escendants. Begitimate, natural or adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same degrees. 9elatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.

Rela%i-es *+ a##ini%+
9elatives by affinity, because of marriage, are parents2in2law, son or daughter2in2law, and brother or sister2in2law.

Rela%i-es *+ c$nsan)&ini%+.
%onsanguinity refers to blood relatives. Arothers and sisters are within the second civil degree* uncle and niece or aunt and nephew are within the third civil degree* and first cousins are within the fourth civil de&ree.

1e5uisites of defense of relatives!

1. 2. (. 4nlawful aggression* 9easonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it* and !n case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one ma*in& a defense had no part therein. (See People . 4&,ar$e, !.R. 6o. 5295*, -,ly 9, 199', 1)5 SCRA 291, 2950 People . Agapinay, !.R. 6o. 5555*, -,ne 25, 199', 1)* SCRA )12, )23.

De#ense $# rela%i-es als$ reA&ires %'a% %'ere *e &nla #&l a))ressi$n.

8hen two persons are getting ready to strike each other, there can be no unlawful aggression, and hence, a relative of either who butts in and administers a deadly blow on the other to prevent him from doing harm is not acting in defense of a relative, but is guilty of homicide.

>&s% &nla #&l a))ressi$n e3is% as a ma%%er $# #ac%! $r can i% *e ma"e %$ "epen" &p$n %'e '$nes% *elie# $# $ne ma(in) a "e#ense;
Kes. !t can be made to depend upon the honest belief of the one making a defense. ( 3.S. . 4sme&ia, 15 P(il. 2*', 2*4& Thus, when attacked and wounded A with a dagger, causing the latter to fall down, but A immediately stood up and defended himself by striking with a bolo and as result, was seriously wounded and fell in the mud with A standing in front of in a position as if to strike again in %ase would stand up, there is no doubt that was the unlawful aggressor. Aut when the sons of a came, what they saw was that their father was lying in the mud wounded. They believed in &ood faith that their father was the victim of an unlawful aggression. !f they killed A under such circumstances, they are 1ustified.

T'ir" reA&isi%e $# "e#ense $# rela%i-e.

The clause, >in case the provocation was given by the person attacked? used in stating the third re-uisite of defense of relatives, does not mean that the relative defended should give provocation to the aggressor. The clause merely states an event which may or may not take place. 1eason for the rule! That although the provocation pre1udices the person who gave it its effect do not reach the defender who took no part therein, because the latter was prompted by some noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a relative.

47
+hen the third re5uisite is lac*in&. The accused was previously shot by the brother of the victim. !t cannot be said, therefore , that in attacking the victim, the accused was impelled by pure compassion or benevolence or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted in his cousin. 9ather, he was, motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a running feud between them. ( People . 7oring/

T'e #ac% %'a% %'e rela%i-e "e#en"e" )a-e pr$-$ca%i$n is imma%erial.

Suppose the person defending his relative was also induced by revenge or hatred, would there be a legitimate defense of relativeG s long as the re-uisites of defense of relatives is present, it will still be a legitimate defense.

48
Par. .. Defense of stran&er. 1e5uisites!
1. 2. (. 4nlawful aggression. 9easonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it* and The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other civil motive. ( See People . %oral&

4asis of defense of stran&er. 8hat may one do in his defense, another may do for him. 3ersons acting in defense of others are in in the same condition and upon the same plane as those who act in defense of themselves. ny person not included in the enumeration of relatives mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, is considered stranger for the purpose of paragraph (. )he person defendin& /be not induced.# @ence, even if the person has a standing grudge against the assailant, if he enters upon the defense of a stranger out of generous motive to save the stranger from the serious bodily harm or possible death, the third re-uisite of defense of stranger still e+ists. The third re-uisite would be lacking if such person was prompted by his grudge against the assailant. urnishin& a weapon to one in serious dan&er of bein& throttled is defense of stran&er.

49
Par. 0. Avoidance of &reater evil or in$ur%. /Dama&e to Another.#
This term covers in$ur% to persons and dama&e to propert%.

/)hat the evil sou&ht to be avoided actuall% exists.#

' of !f the evil sought to be avoided is merely e+pected or anticipated or may happen in the future, paragraph rt. 11 is not applicable.

/)hat the in$ur% feared be &reater than that done to avoid it.#
The instinct of self2preservation will always make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another. )he &reater evil should not be brou&ht about the ne&li&ence or imprudence of the actor. +hen the accused was not avoidin& an% evil, he cannot invo*e the $ustif%in& circumstance of avoidance of a &reater evil or in$ur%. )he evil which brou&ht about the &reater evil must not result from a violation of law b% the actor. Thus, an escaped convict who has to steal clothes in order to move about unrecogni,ed, does not act from necessity. ( lbert& @e is liable for theft of the clothes.

50
Par. G. ulfillment of dut% or lawful exercise of ri&ht or office. 1e5uisites!
1. 2. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful e+ercise of a right or office* That the in1ury caused or the offense committed be the necessary conse-uence of the due performance of duty or the lawful e+ercise of such right or office. ( People . 8anis* People . Pa:ena&o&

0&l#illmen% $# a "&%+. R&lin) in %'e Delima case! applie" %$ a case 'ere an escapin) "e%ainee c'ar)e" i%' a rela%i-el+ min$r $##ense $# s%ealin) a c'ic(en as s'$% %$ "ea%' *+ a p$liceman.
!n the case of 3.S. . %agno, where the prisoner attempted to escape, and the %onstabulary soldiers, his custodians, shot him to death in view of the fact that the prisoner, disregarding the warning of his custodians, persisted in the attempt to escape, and there was no other remedy but to fire at him in order to prevent him from getting away, it was held that three %onstabulary soldiers acted in the fulfillment of duty and, therefore, were not criminally liable.

S'$$%in) an $##en"er

'$ re#&se" %$ s&rren"er is .&s%i#ie".

!n the case of People . !ayrama, where the accused, who had slashed with a bolo the municipal president on his arm, ran away, and refused to be arrested, it was stated that if the chief of police had been armed with the revolver and had used it against the accused, the act of the chief of police under those circumstances would have been fully 1ustified.

B&% s'$$%in) a %'ie#

'$ re#&se" %$ *e arres%e" is n$% .&s%i#ie".

acts! security guard accosted a thief who had stolen ore in the tunnel of a mining company. The thief tried to flee. The security guard ordered him to stop, but the latter disregarded the order. The security guard fired four shots into the air with his carbine in order to scare the thief and stop him. s the thief continued to flee, saying that he would not stop even if he died, the security guard fired the fifth shot directed at the leg of the thief, but the bullet hit him at the lumbar region. The thief died. "eld! The security guard acted in the performance of his duty, but e+ceeded the fulfillment of his duty by shooting the deceased. @e was ad1udged guilty of homicide. !n the case of People . 8anis, it was held that although an officer in making a lawful arrest is 1ustified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never 1ustified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be affected otherwise.

Dis%in)&is'e" #r$m sel#/"e#ense an" c$nseA&ence $# #el$ni$&s ac%.

!n the case of People . 9elima, the prisoner who attacked the policemen with >a stroke of his lance? was already running away when he was shot, and, hence, the unlawful aggression had already ceased to e+ist* but the killing was done in the performance of a duty. The rule of self2defense does not apply. Thus, when the guard leveled his gun at the escaping prisoner and the prisoner grabbed the mu,,le of the gun and, in the struggle for the possession of the gun, the guard 1erked away the gun from the hold prisoner, causing the latter to be thrown halfway around, and because of the force of the pull, the guardCs finger s-uee,ed the trigger, causing it to fire, hitting and killing the prisoner, the guard was acting in the fulfillment of duty. !n either case, if the accused were a private person, not in the performance of a duty, the result would be different. !n the first case, there would be no self2defense because there is no lawful aggression. !n the second case, the one pointing the gun at another would be committing a felony. (grave threat under rt. 2#2&

51
La #&l e3ercise $# ri)'% $r $##ice.
<f ri&ht. 4nder the %ivil %ode ( rt. '2"&, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to e+clude any person from the en1oyment and disposal thereof. 6or this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonabl% necessar% to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

D$c%rine $# ?sel#/'elp@ &n"er Ar%icle 96H! Ci-il C$"e! applie" in Criminal La .

People v. Depante ;C.A., GH <.-. C,D6 acts! t about " oCclock in the morning of 0ecember 2", 1".#, while )ariano 0epante was in a %hinese store, 3aciencia !-uiran, his -uerida, saw him holding a five2peso bill in his left hand. )ariano had 1ust bought a package of cigarettes and the five2peso bill he was holding was part of the change he had 1ust received from the store keeper. 3aciencia, who was in a bad mood because )ariano had not given her support for sometime, approached him and after uttering words, grabbed the five2peso bill from )arianoCs hand. 8hen he acted to recover the same, she grabbed his shirt, tearing the same. )ariano gave her fist blows on the forehand. =n the right side of the head and on the middle part of her left arm, knocking her down. 8as the act of 3acencia in grabbing the five2peso bill an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of )arianoCs 0epanteCs propertyG "eld! The %ourt finds that it was. 0id )ariano use such force as was reasonably necessary to repel or prevent the actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his propertyG =n this point, the %ourt finds that he cannot claim full 1ustification, for the three fistblows which rendered 3acencia unconscious for sometime were not reasonable, considering the gender of the complainant.

T'e ac%&al in-asi$n $# pr$per%+ ma+ c$nsis% $# a mere "is%&r*ance $# p$ssessi$n $r $# a real "isp$ssessi$n.
!f it is mere disturbance of possession, force may be used against it at any time as long as it continues. !f the invasion, however, consists of a real dispossession, force to regain possession can be used only immediately after the dispossession. !f the property is immovable, there should be no delay in the use of force to recover it* a delay, even if e+cusable, such as when due to the ignorance of the dispossession will bar the right to the use of force. <f ri&ht. The e+ercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments under Section 2( of 3.0. No. ".$ is a valid defense against the purported violations of A.3. Alg. 22 that petitioner is charged with. <f office. surgeon who amputated the leg of a patient to save him from gangrene is not liable for the crime of mutilation, because he was acting in the lawful e+ercise of his office.

52
Par. D. <bedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. 1e5uisites!
1. 2. (. That an order has been issued by a superior That such order must be for some lawful purpose. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.

Example of absence of the third re5uisite. The court ordered that the convict should be e+ecuted n a certain date. The e+ecutioner put him to death on a day earlier than the date fi+ed by the court.

4'en %'e $r"er is n$% #$r a la #&l p&rp$se! %'e s&*$r"ina%e criminall+ lia*le.
1. 2.

'$ $*e+e" i% is

=ne who prepared a falsified document with full *nowled&e of its falsity is not e+cused even if he merely acted in obedience to the instruction of his superior. =bedience to an order of a superior is 1ustified only when the order is for some lawful purpose. The order to torture the deceased was illegal, and the accused was not bound to obey it.

T'e s&*$r"ina%e is n$% lia*le #$r carr+in) $&% an ille)al $r"er $# 'is s&peri$r! i# 'e is n$% a are $# %'e ille)ali%+ $# %'e $r"er an" 'e is n$% ne)li)en%.

53
II. E3emp%in) circ&ms%ances Ar%icle 56. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liabilit%. / %'e #$ll$ in) are e3emp% #r$m criminal lia*ili%+, 5. An im*ecile $r an insane pers$n! &nless %'e la%%er 'as ac%e" "&rin) a l&ci" in%er-al. 6. 4'en %'e im*ecile $r an insane pers$n 'as c$mmi%%e" an ac% 'ic' %'e la "e#ines as a #el$n+ <"eli%$=! %'e c$&r% s'all $r"er 'is c$n#inemen% in $ne $# %'e '$spi%als $r as+l&ms es%a*lis'e" #$r pers$ns %'&s a##lic%e"! 'ic' 'e s'all n$% *e permi%%e" %$ lea-e i%'$&% #irs% $*%ainin) %'e permissi$n $# %'e same c$&r%. 8. A pers$n &n"er nine +ears $# a)e. 9. A pers$n $-er nine +ears $# a)e an" &n"er #i#%een! &nless 'e 'as ac%e" i%' "iscernmen%! in 'ic' case! s&c' min$r s'all *e pr$cee"e" a)ains% in acc$r"ance i%' %'e pr$-isi$ns $# Ar%. EI $# %'is C$"e. :. 4'en s&c' min$r is a".&")e" %$ *e criminall+ irresp$nsi*le! %'e c$&r%! in c$n#$rma*l+ i%' %'e pr$-isi$ns $# %'is an" %'e prece"in) para)rap'! s'all c$mmi% 'im %$ %'e care an" c&s%$"+ $# 'is #amil+ '$ s'all *e c'ar)e" i%' 'is s&r-eillance an" e"&ca%i$n $%'er ise! 'e s'all *e c$mmi%%e" %$ %'e care $# s$me ins%i%&%i$n $r pers$n men%i$ne" in sai" Ar%. EI. C. An+ pers$n '$! 'ile per#$rmin) a la #&l ac% i%' "&e care! ca&ses an in.&r+ *+ mere acci"en% i%'$&% #a&l% $r in%en%i$n $# ca&sin) i%. D. An+ pers$n '$ ac% &n"er %'e c$mp&lsi$n $# irresis%i*le #$rce.

E. An+ pers$n '$ ac%s &n"er %'e imp&lse $# an &nc$n%r$lla*le #ear $# an eA&al $r )rea%er in.&r+. H. An+ pers$n '$ #ails %$ per#$rm an ac% reA&ire" *+ la ! s$me la #&l ins&pera*le ca&se. 4urden of Proof.
ny of the circumstances mentioned in rticle 12 is a matter of defense and the same must be proved by the defendant to the satisfaction of the court.

'en pre-en%e" *+

54
Par. 9 8 An imbecile or an insane person unless the latter has acted durin& a lucid interval.
Im*ecili%+ Exempt in all cases from criminal liability. Insani%+ )he insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he acted durin& a lucid interval.

0uring the lucid interval, the insane acts with intelli&ence. m imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age.

T$ c$ns%i%&%e insani%+! %'ere m&s% *e c$mple%e "epri-a%i$n $# in%elli)ence $r %'a% %'ere *e a %$%al "epri-a%i$n $# %'e #ree"$m $# %'e ill.
his acts. Thus abnormality of mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of t most, it is only a mitigating circumstance. ( rt. 1(, par."&

4'$ 'as %'e *&r"en $# pr$$# %$ s'$

insani%+;

Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed upon the presumption that the accused was sane and responsible when the offense was committed. The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the burden of proof of insanity is on the defense . .People . A+,ino, !.R. 6o. )5'54, -,ne 25 199', 1)* SCRA )51,)5), ci$ing cases/

H$

m&c' e-i"ence is necessar+ %$ $-er%'r$

%'e pres&mp%i$n $# sani%+;

!n order to ascertain a personCs mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind during a reasonable period of both before and after that time. Insane at the time $##ense 7+cempt from criminal liability. as c$mmi%%e" Sane a% %ime $# c$missi$n! *&% *ec$mes insane "&rin) %'e %rial Biable criminally. Aut trial will be suspended.

E-i"ence $# Insani%+.
The evidence of insanity must refer to the time precedin& the act under prosecution or to the ver% moment of its e+ecution. !f the evidence points to insanity subse-uent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be ac-uitted. @e is presumed to be sane when he committed it. !f the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in its nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise. 8here it is shown that the defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that the offense was committed in one of them. Aut a person who has been ad1udged insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane, is presumed to continue to be insane . .People . #onoan, *4 P(il. )5/ +hen defense of insanit% is not credible. 1. Bira placed his right hand inside his pocket and with the other hand pushed a chair towards him* the offended party became >confused? because he remembered that Bira threatened to kill him if he would see him again* at this point ?he lost his senses? and regained it when he heard the voice of )rs. Tan saying; >Boreto, donCt do that,? and then he found out that he had wounded Bira. !f appellant was able to recall all those incidents, we cannot understand why his memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Bira to return at the snap of the finger as it were, after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim. The defense of insanity is incredible. 2. @e e+hibited remorse for killing the victim, his wife, and he voluntarily surrendered to the head-uarters where he e+ecuted a statement confessing his misdeed. @e was coherent and intelligent. Aefore the killing, he was working for a living through fishing three times a week and he himself fi+ed the prices for his catch. The presumption of sanity has not been overcome.

55
(. The accused was afflicted with >schi,ophrenic reaction? but knew what he was doing* he could distinguish between right and wrong. @e had no delusions and he was not mentally deficient. The accused was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim.

Demen%ia praec$3 <Sc'i1$p'renia= c$-ere" *+ %erm insani%+.

Thus, when a person is suffering from a form of psychosis, a type of dementia praeco+, homicidal attack is common, because of delusions that he is being interfered with se+ually, or that his property is being taken. 0uring the period of e+citement, such person has no control whatsoever of his acts. ( People . #onoan& !n the #onoan case, an irresistible homicidal impulse was considered embraced in the term /insanit%.#

Klep%$mania.
!f the unlawful act irresistible impulse, as when him to prevent himself from considered as covered by the of the accused is due >to his mental disease or a mental defect, producing an the accused has been deprived or has lost the power of his will which would enable doing the act,? the irresistible impulse, even to take anotherCs property, should be term >insanity.?

=n the other hand, if the mental disease or mental defect of the accused only diminishes the e+ercise of his will2power, and did not deprive him of the consciousness of his acts, then kleptomania, if it be the result of his mental disease or mental defect, is only a mitigating circumstance.

Epileps+ ma+ *e c$-ere" *+ %'e %erm ?insani%+.@

8here the accused claimed that he was an epileptic but it was not shown that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit when he committed the offense, he is not e+empt from criminal liability.

0ee*lemin"e"ness is n$% im*ecili%+.

6eeblemindedness is not e+empting, because the offender could distinguish right and wrong. or an insane cannot distinguish right and wrong. n imbecile

Pe"$p'ilia is n$% insani%+.

@e e+plained that pedophilia is a se+ual disorder wherein the sub1ect has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable se+ual and physical fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill, especially when there are no people around. @e claimed, however, that despite his affection, the sub1ect could distinguish between right and wrong.

Amnesia is n$% a pr$$# $# men%al c$n"i%i$n $# %'e acc&se".

6ailure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime was performed.

O%'er cases $# lac( $# in%elli)ence.

5. Committin& a crime while in a dream. Somnambulism or sleepwalking, where the acts of the person afflicted are automatic, is embraced in the plea of insanity and must be clearly proven. 6. Committin& a crime while sufferin& from mali&nant malaria Thus, one who was suffering from malignant malaria when she wounded her husband who died as a conse-uence is not criminally liable. Aecause such illness affects the nervous system and causes among others such complication as acute melancholia and insanity at times

Basis $# Para)rap' 5.
Aased on the complete absence of intelligence, an element of voluntariness.

56

Par.,. : A person under fifteen %ears of a&e. A)e $# a*s$l&%e irresp$nsi*ili%+ raise" %$ #i#%een +ears $# a)e.
4nder Section / of (9. ."(''& a child 1. years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be e+empt from criminal liability, the child shall be sub1ect to an intervention program as provided under Section 2: of the same law.

Basis $# Para)rap' 6.
Aased also on the complete absence of intelli&ence.

Par... : A person over fifteen %ears of a&e and under ei&hteen unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded a&ainst. 3n accordance with the provisions of Section D of 1.A. C.00
A c'il" #i#%een <5:= +ears $# a)e $r &n"er a% %'e %ime $# %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e $##ense 7+empt from criminal liability. @owever, the child shall be sub1ect to an intervention program pursuant to Section 2: of this ct. A c'il" a*$-e #i#%een <5:= +ears *&% *el$ ei)'%een <5E= +ears $# a)e Bikewise e+empt from criminal liability and sub1ected to an intervention program, unless heNshe has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be sub1ect to the appropriate proceedings.

C'il"ren a*$-e 5: *&% *el$ 5E +ears $# a)e e3emp% #r$m criminal lia*ili%+.

'$ ac%e"

i%'$&% "iscernmen%

Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a minor who is over 1. but under 1# years of age has acted with discernment, in order for the minor not to be entitled to this e+empting circumstance.

Peri$"s $# criminal resp$nsi*ili%+

The life of a human being is divided into four periods; T'e a)e $# a*s$l&%e irresp$nsi*ili%+ 1. years and below (infancy&. T'e a)e $# c$n"i%i$nal resp$nsi*ili%+ 1. years and 1 day to 1# years. T'e a)e $# #&ll resp$nsi*ili%+ 1# years or over (adolescence& to $: years (maturity&. T'e a)e $# mi%i)a%e" resp$nsi*ili%+ 1. years and 1 day to 1# years, the offender acting with discernment* over $: years of age.

Senility, which is the age over $: years, is only a mitigated responsibility.

C'il" in c$n#lic%

i%' %'e La .

A child in conflict with the law is a person who at time of the commission of the offense is below 1# years old but not less than 1. years and 1 day old.

>eanin) $# ?"iscernmen%.@
0iscernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense to understand the differences between right and wrong and the conse-uences of the wrongful act.

Discernmen% ma+ *e s'$ n *+ <5= %'e manner %'e crime %'e c$n"&c% $# %'e $##en"er a#%er i%s c$mmissi$n.
9. 7anner of committin& the crime.

as c$mmi%%e"! $r <6=

57

Thus, when the minor committed the crime during nighttime to avoid detection, or took the loot to another town to avoid discovery, he manifested discernment. ,. Conduct of the offender The accused, 11 years old, shot the offended party, who had caught him shooting at the latterCs mango fruits, with a slingshot at the latter in one of his eyes, and after having done so said; >3utang ina mo, mabuti matikman mo.? !t was held that the first part of the remark early manifested the perverted character of the accused and the second part reflected his satisfaction and elation upon the accomplishment of his criminal act.

Pres&mp%i$n $# >in$ri%+.
The child in conflict with the law shall en1oy the presumption of minority and shall en1oy all rights of a child in conflict with the law until proven to be 1# years old or older at the time of the commission of the offense.

De%ermina%i$n $# A)e.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of a child is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth. 2. !n the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificates and school records or any pertinent document that shows the date of birth of the child. (. !n the absence of the documents under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section due to loss, destruction or unavailability, the testimony of the child, the testimony of the member of the family related to the child by affinity or consanguinity who is -ualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree, the testimonies of the other persons, the physical appearance of the child, and other relevant evidence shall suffice.

B&r"en $# Pr$$# $# A)e.

!f the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the information in court, a case for determination of age under summary proceeding may be filed before the 6amily %ourt which shall render its decision within 2' hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all parties. !n all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical finding to the age of the child.

T'e alle)a%i$n $# ? i%' in%en% %$ (ill@ in %'e in#$rma%i$n is s&##icien% alle)a%i$n $# "iscernmen%.
The re-uirement that there should be an allegation that she acted with discernment should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that the accused acted >with the intent to kill.? The allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew what would be the conse-uence of her unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong.

Basis $# Para)rap' 8.
Aased also on the complete absence of intelligence.

58
Par.0. 8 An% person who, while performin& a lawful act with due care, causes an in$ur% b% mere accident without fault or intention of causin& it. Elements!
1. 2. (. '. person is performing a lawful act* 8ith due care* @e causes in1ury to another by mere accident* 8ithout fault or intention of causing it. (See People . Vi$,g&

T'e pers$n m&s% *e per#$rmin) a la #&l ac%. S%ri(in) an$%'er i%' a )&n in sel#/"e#ense! e-en i# i% #ire" an" seri$&sl+ in.&re" %'e assailan%! is a la #&l ac%.
8hether the gun was cocked or uncocked, the striking could not have been done in any manner. The in1ury, therefore, that resulted from the firing of the gun was caused by the accident and without any fault or intention on the part of the defendant in causing it, in accordance with the ( rd and 'th re-uisites. 4nder the circumstances, striking him, as was done here, and not shooting him, was the more prudent and reasonable thing to do, whether the gun was cocked or uncocked. Aut the act of drawing a weapon in the course of a -uarrel not being in self defense, is unlawful. !t is a light threat ( rt. 2#., par, 9ev. 3enal %ode&, and there is no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for e+emption.

T'e pers$n per#$rmin) a la #&l ac% m&s% "$ s$ ne)li)ence. E3ample $# an acci"en%.

i%' "&e care!

i%'$&% #a&l% $r

chauffer, while driving his automobile on the proper side of the road at a moderate speed and with due diligence, suddenly and une+pectedly saw a man in front of his vehicle coming from the sidewalk and crossing the street without any warning that he would do so. Aecause it was not physically possible to avoid hitting him, the said chauffer ran over the man with his car. !t was held that he was not criminally liable, it being a mere accident.

4'a% is an acci"en%;
n accident is something that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable conse5uences. !f the conse-uences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence. ( lbert&

Case $# ne)li)ence! n$% acci"en%.

acts! s the two person fighting paid him no attention, the defendant drew a .'. caliber pistol and shot twice in the air. The bout continued, however, so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit 7ugenio 6rancisco, an innocent bystander, who died thereafter. "eld! !t is apparent the defendant willfull% discharged his gun, without ta*in& the precautions demanded b% the circumstances that the district was populated, and the li*elihood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the thoroughfare.

Acci"en% an" ne)li)ence are in%rinsicall+ c$n%ra"ic%$r+.

59

4'en claim $# acci"en% n$% apprecia%e".

1. 2. 9epeated blows negate claim of wounding by mere accident. ccidental shooting is negated and still aiming the gun at the prostate body of the victim.

(. acts! @usband and wife had an altercation. The deceased husband got a carbine and holding it by the nu,,le raised it above his right shoulder in an attempt to strike accused wife. She side2stepped and grappled with him for the possession of the gun and in the scuffle the gun went off, the bullet hitting her husband in the neck. So went the version of the accused. "eld! !t was difficult, if not well2nigh impossible, for her who was frail and shorter than her husband, who was robust and taller, to have succeeded in taking hold of the carbine, for if her husband was to strike her with the butt of the carbine and she2stepped, he would not have continued to hold the carbine in a raised position. The absence of any powder burns at the entrance of the wound in the deceased is convincing proof that he was hot from a distance, and not with the mu,,le of the gun resting on his shoulder or the back of the neck.

Basis $# para)rap' 9.
Aased on lack of negligence and intent.

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Par. G. 8 An% person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. Elements!
1. 2. (. That the compulsion is by means of physical force. That the physical force be irresistible. That the physical force must come form a third person.

N$ c$mp&lsi$n $# irresis%i*le #$rce.

The pretention of an accused that he was threatened with a gun by his friend, the mastermind, is not credible where he himself was armed with a rifle.

Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n cann$% c$inci"e

i%' irresis%i*le #$rce.

The irresistible force can never consist in an impulse or passion, or obfuscation. !t must consist of an e+traneous force coming from a third person.

Basis $# para)rap' :.
Aased on the complete absence of freedom, an element of voluntariness.

Na%&re $# #$rce reA&ire".

The force must be irresistible to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well2grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. threat of future in1ury is not enough.

61
Par. D. 8 An% person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear an e5ual or &reater in$ur%. Elements!
1. 2. That the threat which causes the fear is an evil greater than or at least e-ual to, that which he is re-uired to commit* That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. (3.S. . 4licanal&

3llustration!
Biberato 7+altacion and Auenaventura Tachinco were compelled under fear of death to swear allegiance to the Iatipunan whose purpose was to overthrow the government by force of arms. !n this case, the accused cannot be held criminally liable for rebellion, because they 1oined the rebels under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an e-ual in1ury. Aut if had threatened to burn the house of A should the latter not kill his (ACs& father, and A killed his father for fear that might burn his (ACs& house, A is not e+empt from criminal liability for the reason that the devil with which he was threatened was much less than that of killing his father.

Na%&re $# "&ress as a -ali" "e#ense.

0uress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for oneCs life and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear.

T'e acc&se" m&s% n$% 'a-e $pp$r%&ni%+ #$r escape $r sel#/"e#ense.

0uress is unavailing where the accused had every opportunity to run away if he had wanted to or to resist any possible aggression because he was also warned. 8here the accused, who testified that he was intimated into committing the crime, had several opportunities of leaving the gang which had decided to kidnap the victim, his theory that he acted under intimidation is untenable. Command of "u*balahap *illers, as cause of uncontrollable fear. Timoteo )ontemayor was accused of murder, for having told his two companions to fetch shovels and dig a grave and for having walked behind the @ukbalahap killers to the place of the e+ecution of the victim. The place was isolated, escape was at least risky, and protection by lawfully constituted authorities was out of reach. The accused was ac-uitted, for having acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an e-ual or greater in1ury. 3n treason. !n the eyes of the law, nothing will e+cuse that act of 1oining an enemy, but the fear of immediate death.

Spec&la%i-e! #anci#&l an" rem$%e #ear is n$% &nc$n%r$lla*le #ear.

"eld! !f the only evidence relating to a sort of a threat is the testimony of the defendant; > s they and ! informed them that ! could not do it, then %aptain Susuki told me, Kou have to comply with that order of )a1or Sasaki* otherwise, you have to come along with us.? That threat is not of such a serious character and imminence as to create in the mind of the defendant an uncontrollable fear that an e-ual or greater evil or in1ury would be inflicted upon him if he did not comply with the alleged order to kill the deceased. )ere fear of a member of the @uk movement to disobey or refuse to carry out orders of the organi,ation, in the absence of proof of actual physical or moral compulsion to act, is not sufficient to e+empt the accused from criminal liability.

62

Dis%inc%i$n *e% een irresis%i*le #$rce an" &nc$n%r$lla*le #ear.

Irresis%i*le #$rce =ffender uses violence or physical force to compel another person to commit a crime. Unc$n%r$lla*le #ear =ffender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a crime.

Basis $# para)rap' C.
Aased on the complete absence of freedom. /Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.# (> n act done by me against my will is not my act.?&

63
Par.B. 8 An% person who fails to perform an act re5uired b% law when prevented b% some lawful or insuperable cause. Elements!
1. 2. (. That an act is re-uired by law to be done* That a person fails to perform such act* That this failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable cause.

4'en pre-en%e" *+ s$me la #&l ca&se.

4nder rticle 11/, a 6ilipino citi,en who knows of such conspiracy must report the same to the governor or fiscal of the province where he resides. !f the priest does not disclose and make known the same to the proper authority, he is e+empt from criminal liability, because under the law, the priest cannot be compelled to reveal any form of information which he came to know by reason of the confession made to him in his professional capacity.

4'en pre-en%e" *+ s$me ins&pera*le ca&se.

Examples! 1. The )unicipality president detained the offended party for three days because to take him to the nearest 1ustice of the peace re-uired a 1ourney for three days by boat as there was no other means of transportation. mother who at the time of childbirth was overcome by severe di,,iness e+treme debility, and left the child in a thicket where said child died, is not liable for infanticide, because it was physically impossible for her to take home the child.

2.

Basis $# para)rap' D.
3aragraph $ of rticle 12 e+empts the accused from criminal liability, because he acts without intent, the third condition of voluntariness in intentional felony.

Dis%inc%i$n *e% een .&s%i#+in) an" e3emp%in) circ&ms%ances.

2&s%i#+in) circ&ms%ances There is neither a crime nor a criminal. No civil liability e+cept in par. ' (causing damage to another in state of necessity&. E3emp%in) circ&ms%ances There is a crime but no criminal liability. The act is not 1ustified, but the actor is not criminally liable. There is civil liability, e+cept in pars. ' and $ (causing an in1ury by mere accident* failing to perform an act re-uired by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause& of rt. 12. (See art. 1:1 which does not mention pars. ' and $ of rt. 12&.

64
A*s$l&%$r+ ca&ses! "e#ine".
Absolutor% causes are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.

Ins%i)a%i$n is an a*s$l&%$r+ ca&se. En%rapmen% is n$% an a*s$l&%$r+ ca&se. En%rapmen% an" ins%i)a%i$n "is%in)&is'e".
En%rapmen% No bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. The entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while e+ecuting his criminal plan. The means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. person has planned, or is about to commit a crime, and ways and means are resorted to by a public officer to trap and catch the criminal. 7ntrapment is not a defense. Ins%i)a%i$n The accused must be ac-uitted. The instigator practically induces the would2be defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co2principal. The law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggest to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into e+ecution.

Ins%i)a%i$n m&s% *e ma"e *+ p&*lic $##icers $r pri-a%e "e%ec%i-es.

sound public policy re-uires that the courts shall condemn this practice by directing an ac-uittal whenever it appears that the public authorities or private detectives, with their cogni,ances, have taken active steps to lead the accused into the commission of the act. !f the one who made the instigation is a private individual, not performing public function, both he and the one induced are criminally liable for the crime committed, as principal by induction* and the latter, as principal by direct participation.

T'ere is nei%'er ins%i)a%i$n n$r en%rapmen% "isc$-ere".

'en %'e -i$la%i$n $# la

is simpl+

acts! The accused having sold a can of )ennen Talcum 3owder for 3 1.:: when the ceiling price for said article was 3:.#/, the defense contended that the government agent induced the accused to violate the law by purchasing from him the article and paying for it in an amount above the ceiling price. "eld! The agent did not induced the accused to violate the law. @e simply discovered the violation committed by the accused when he (the agent& purchased the article from him. Thus, the accused who delivered to the barrio lieutenant a gun and ammunition when the latter announced >that anyone who is concealing firearms should surrender them so that he will not be penali,ed? is not e+empt from criminal responsibility arising from the possession of the unlicensed firearms and ammunition.

65
C$mple%e "e#ense in criminal cases.
1. 2. (. '. ny of the essential elements of the crime charge is not proved by the prosecution and the elements proved do not constitute any crime. The act of the accused falls under any of the 1ustifying circumstances. ( rt. 11& The case of the accused falls under any of the e+empting circumstances. ( rt. 12& The case is covered by any of the absolutory causes; a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. .. /. $. Spontaneous desistance during attempted stage ( rt. /&, and no crime under another provision of the %ode or other penal law is committed. Bight felony is only attempted or frustrated, and is not against persons or property. ( rt. $& The accessory is a relative of the principal. ( rt. 2:& Begal grounds for arbitrary detention. ( rt. 12'& Begal grounds for trespass. ( rt. 2#:& The crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief is committed against a relative. ( rt. ((2& 8hen slight or less serious physical in1uries are inflicted by the person who surprised his spouse or daughter in the act of se+ual intercourse with another person. ( rt. 2'$& )arriage of the offender with the offended party when the crime committed is rape, abduction, seduction, or acts of lasciviousness. ( rt. (''& !nstigation

<uilt of the accused not established beyond reasonable doubt. 3rescription of crimes. ( rt. #"& 3ardon by the offended party before the institution of criminal action in crimes against chastity. ( rt. (''&

66
III. >i%i)a%in) circ&ms%ances.
%lasses of mitigating circumstances. 1. 2. <rdinar% miti&atin& 8 subsections 1 to 1: of Privile&ed miti&atin& 8 a. rt. /#. Penalt% to be imposed upon a person under 9H %ears of a&e. i. 3erson under 1., and a person over 1. and under 1# years of age who acted without discernment, are e+empt from criminal liability ii. person over 1. and under 1# years of age who acted with discernment, the penalty ne+t lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. rt. 1(.

b. rt /". Penalt% to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholl% excusable . F penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly e+cusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions re-uired to 1ustify the same or to e+empt from criminal liability, provided, that the ma$orit% of such conditions be present. c. rt. /'. 1ules for application of penalties which contain three periods. F The courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are mitigating or aggravating circumstances. i. 8hen there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances present, the court shall impose the penalty ne+t lower to that prescribed by law. d. Holuntary release of the person illegally detained within ( days wihtout the offender attaining his purpose and before the institution of the criminal action. ( rt. 2/#, par. (& e. bandonment without 1ustification of the spouse who committed adultery. ( rt. (((, par. (&. Pri-ile)e" mi%i)a%in) %annot be offset by any aggravating circumstance. 3roduces the effect of imposing upon the offender the penalty lower by one or two de&rees than that provided b% law for the crime.

Or"inar+ mi%i)a%in) Susceptible of being offset by any aggravating circumstance. !f not offset by an aggravating circumstance, produces only the effect of applying the penalty provided by law for the crime in its minimum period ;divisible penalt%6.

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Ar%icle 58. 7iti&atin& circumstances. / T'e #$ll$ in) are mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ances, 5. T'$se men%i$ne" in %'e prece"in) c'ap%er! 'en all %'e reA&isi%es necessar+ %$ .&s%i#+ $r %$ e3emp% #r$m criminal lia*ili%+ in %'e respec%i-e cases are n$% a%%en"an%. 6. T'a% %'e $##en"er is &n"er ei)'%een +ear $# a)e $r $-er se-en%+ +ears. In %'e case $# %'e min$r! 'e s'all *e pr$cee"e" a)ains% in acc$r"ance i%' %'e pr$-isi$ns $# Ar%. EI. 8. T'a% %'e $##en"er 'a" n$ in%en%i$n %$ c$mmi% s$ )ra-e a c$mmi%%e". r$n) as %'a%

9. T'a% s&##icien% pr$-$ca%i$n $r %'rea% $n %'e par% $# %'e $##en"e" par%+ imme"ia%el+ prece"e" %'e ac%. :. T'a% %'e ac% as c$mmi%%e" in %'e imme"ia%e -in"ica%i$n $# a )ra-e $##ense %$ %'e $ne c$mmi%%in) %'e #el$n+ <"eli%$=! 'is sp$&se! ascen"an%s! $r rela%i-es *+ a##ini%+ i%'in %'e same "e)rees. C. T'a% $# 'a-in) ac%e" &p$n an imp&lse s$ p$ er#&l as na%&rall+ %$ 'a-e pr$"&ce" passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n. D. T'a% %'e $##en"er 'a" -$l&n%aril+ s&rren"ere" 'imsel# %$ a pers$n in a&%'$ri%+ $r 'is a)en%s! $r %'a% 'e 'a" -$l&n%aril+ c$n#esse" 'is )&il% *e#$re %'e c$&r% pri$r %$ %'e presen%a%i$n $# %'e e-i"ence #$r %'e pr$sec&%i$n7 E. T'a% %'e $##en"er is "ea# an" "&m*! *lin" $r $%'er ise s&##erin) s$me p'+sical "e#ec% 'ic' %'&s res%ric%s 'is means $# ac%i$n! "e#ense! $r c$mm&nica%i$ns i%' 'is #ell$ *ein)s. H. S&c' illness $# %'e $##en"er as $&l" "iminis' %'e e3ercise $# %'e p$ er $# %'e $##en"er i%'$&% '$ e-er "epri-in) 'im $# c$nsci$&sness $# 'is ac%s. ill/ %'e

5I.An"! #inall+! an+ $%'er circ&ms%ances $# a similar na%&re an" anal$)$&s %$ %'$se a*$-e men%i$ne".

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Par.9. 8 )hose mentioned in the precedin& chapter when all the re5uisites necessar% to $ustif% the act or to exempt from criminal liabilit% in the respective cases are not attendant. Circ&ms%ances $# .&s%i#ica%i$n $r e3emp%i$n 'ic' ma+ )i-e place %$ mi%i)a%i$n.

The circumstances of 1ustification or e+emption which may give place to mitigation, because not all criminal liability in the respective cases are the act or to e+empt from criminal liability in the respective cases are attendant, are the following; Ar%. 55 G 2&s%i#+in) Circ&ms%ances Self2defense. ( rt. 11, par. 1& 0efense of relatives. ( rt. 11, par. 1 0efense of stranger. ( rt. 11, par. (&* State of necessity. ( rt. 11, par. '& 3erformance of duty. ( rt.11, par..& =bedience to order of superior. ( rt. 11, par./& Ar%.56 G E3emp%in) Circ&ms%ances )inority above 1. but below 1# years of age. (9. . No."(''& %ausing in1ury by mere accident. ( rt.12, par.'& 4ncontrollable fear. ( rt.12, par. /&

4'en all %'e reA&isi%es necessar+ %$ .&s%i#+ %'e ac% are n$% a%%en"an%.
1. Incomple$e sel1;&e1ense, &e1ense o1 rela$i es, an& &e1ense o1 s$ranger. Note that in these three classes of defense, unlawful aggression must be present, it being an indispensable re-uisite. 8hat is absent is either one or both of the last two re-uisites.

Para)rap' 5 $# Ar%icle 58 is applica*le $nl+ 'en &nla #&l a))ressi$n is presen% in an+ $# %'e cases re#erre" %$ in circ&ms%ances N$s. 5! 6 an" 8 $# Ar%icle 55.
8hen two of the three re-uisites mentioned therein are present (for e+ample, unlawful aggression and any one of the other two&, the case must not be considered as one in which an ordinary or generic mitigating circumstance is present. !nstead, it should be considered a privileged mitigating circumstance.

4'en all reA&isi%es necessar+ %$ e3emp% #r$m criminal lia*ili%+ are n$% a%%en"an%.
2. Incomple$e e<emp$ing circ,ms$ance o1 acci&en$. 4nder paragraph ' of rticle 12, there are four re-uisites that must be present in order to e+empt one from criminal liability, namely; a. b. c. d. person is performing a lawful act* 8ith due care* @e causes an in1ury to another by mere accident* and 8ithout fault or intention of causing it. In%en%i$nal #el$n+ !f the first re-uisite and the 2 nd part of the fourth re-uisite are absent, because the person committed an unlawful act and had the intention of causing the in1ury. The 2nd and (rd re-uisites will not be present either.

Ar%. 8C: G #el$n+ *+ ne)li)ence $r impr&"ence !f the second re-uisite and the 1st part of the fourth re-uisite are absent.

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Par. ,. 8 )hat the offender is under ei&hteen %ears of a&e or over sevent% %ears. 3n the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded a&ainst in with the provisions of Section -.1.A. C.00 Para)rap' 6! Ar%icle 58 $# %'e RPC implie"l+ repeale" *+ Rep&*lic Ac% N$. H899
=n the other hand, if such offender acted with discernment, such a child in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion programs provided under %hapter 2 of 9. . No. "(''.

>eanin) $# Di-ersi$n an" Di-ersi$n Pr$)ram &n"er Rep&*lic Ac% N$. H899
/Diversion# refers to an alternative, child2appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of hisNher social, cultural, and economic background without resorting to court proceedings. (Sec.'D1E, 9. . No. "(''& /Diversion Pro&ram# refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is re-uired to undergo after heNshe is found for an offense without resorting to formal court proceedings. (Sec.'D1E, 9. . No. "(''&

S+s%em $# Di-ersi$n.
Imp$sa*le penal%+ #$r %'e crime c$mmi%%e" is n$% m$re %'an si3 <C= +ears impris$nmen%. The law enforcement office of 3unong Aarangay with the assistance of the local social welfare and development officer or other members of the Bocal %ouncils for the 3rotection of %hild (B%3%&, shall conduct mediation family conferencing and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous modes of conflict resolution in accordance with the best interest of the child. The child and hisNher family shall be present on these activities. Vic%imless crimes 'ere %'e imp$sa*le penal%+ is n$% m$re %'an si3 <C= +ears $# impris$nmen%. The local social welfare and development officer shall meet with the child and hisNher parents or guardians for the development of the appropriate diversion and rehabilitation program. Imp$sa*le penal%+ #$r %'e crime c$mmi%%e" e3cee"s si3 <C= +ears impris$nmen%. 0iversion measures may be resorted to only by court. (Section 2(, 9. . No. "(''&

C$n%rac% $# Di-ersi$n.
!f during the conferencing, mediation, or conciliation, the child voluntarily admits the commissions of the act, a diversion program shall be developed when appropriate and desirable as determined under Section (:. Such admission shall not be used against the child in any subse-uent 1udicial, -uasi21udicial, or administrative proceedings. The diversion proceedings shall be completed within forty2five ('.& days. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended until the completion of the diversion proceedings but it should not e+ceed forty2five ('.& days. 6ailure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of diversion, as certified by the local social welfare and development officer, shall give the offended party the option to institute the appropriate legal action. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended during the effectivity of the diversion program, but not e+ceeding a period of two (2& years. Sec. 2/, 9. . No."(''&

T'a% %'e $##en"er is $-er DI +ears $# a)e is $nl+ a )eneric mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ance. Basis $# para)rap' 6.
Aased on the diminution of intelli&ence , a condition of voluntariness.

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Par. 8. / )hat the offender had no intention to commit so &rave a wron& as that committed. R&le #$r %'e applica%i$n $# %'is para)rap'.
=nly when the facts proven show that there is a no$a=le and e i&en$ &ispropor$ion between the means employed to e+ecute the criminal act and its conse-uences. T'e #ac%s pr$-en s'$ %'a% %'ere is a notable an" evident disproportion *e% een %'e means empl$+e" %$ e3ec&%e %'e criminal ac% an" i%s c$nseA&ences. The husband who was -uarreling with his wife punched her in the abdomen, causing the rupture of her hypertrophied spleen, from which she died. T'e #ac%s pr$-en DO NOT s'$ %'a% %'ere is a notable an" evident disproportion *e% een %'e means empl$+e" %$ e3ec&%e %'e criminal ac% an" i%s c$nseA&ences. The accused confined himself to giving a single blow with a bolo on the right arm of the victim and did not repeat the blow. The death of the victim was due to neglect and the lack of medical treatment.

T'e eap$n &se"! %'e par% $# %'e *$"+ in.&re"! %'e in.&r+ in#lic%e"! an" %'e manner i% is in#lic%e" ma+ s'$ %'a% %'e acc&se" in%en"e" %'e r$n) c$mmi%%e".
1. 2. (. '. Thus, when the accused used a (ea y cl,= in attacking the deceased whom he 1ollo>e& some &is$ance, >i$(o,$ gi ing (im an oppor$,ni$y $o &e1en& (imsel1, it is to be believed that he intended to do e+actly what he did and must be held responsible for the result, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. 8hen a person stabs another with a le$(al >eapon s,c( as a 1an ?ni1e (and the same could be said of the =,$$ o1 a ri1le/, upon a part of the body, for e+ample, the (ea&, c(es$, or s$omac(, death could reasonably be anticipated. The >eapon ,se&, the 1orce o1 $(e =lo>, the spo$ >(ere $(e =lo> >as &irec$e& an& lan&e&, and the cold blood in which it was inflicted, all tend to negate any notion that the plan was anything less than to finish the intended victim. The clear intention of the accused to kill the deceased may be inferred from the fact that he used a deadly weapon and fired at the deceased almost point blank, thereby hitting him in the abdomen and causing death.

In1lic$ing o1 1i e s$a= >o,n&s in rapi& s,ccession nega$es pre$ense o1 lac? o1 in$en$ion $o ca,se so serio,s an in:,ry.

Ar%. 58! par. 8! is n$% applica*le

'en %'e $##en"er empl$+e" *r&%e #$rce.

M!t is easy enough for the accused to say that he had no intention to do great harm. Aut he knew the girl was very tender in age (/ years old&, weak in body, helpless, and defenseless. @e knew or ought to have known the natural and inevitable result of the act of strangulation, committed by men of superior strength, especially on an occasion when she was resisting the onslaught upon her honor. The brute force employed by the appellant, completely contradicts the claim that he had no intention to kill the victim.M (People s. @,& I$ is $(e in$en$ion o1 $(e o11en&er a$ $(e momen$ >(en (e is commi$$ing $(e crime >(ic( is consi&ere&. !f the original plan, as alleged by the accused, was merely to ask for forgiveness from the victimOs wife who scolded them and threatened to report them to the authorities, which led to her killing, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. The records show that the accused held the victimOs wife until she fell to the floor, whereupon they strangled her by means of a piece of rope tied around her neck till she died. The brute force employed by the accused completely contradicts the claim that they had no intention to kill the victim.

Lac( $# in%en%i$n %$ c$mmi% s$ )ra-e a

r$n) is mi%i)a%in) in r$**er+

i%' '$mici"e.

8here it has not been satisfactorily established that in forcing entrance through the door which was then closed, with the use of pieces of wood, the accused were aware that the deceased was behind the door and would be hurt, and there is no clear showing that they ever desired to kill the deceased as they sought to enter the house to retaliate against the male occupants or commit robbery.

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Apprecia%e" in m&r"er A&ali#ie" *+ circ&ms%ances *ase" $n manner $# c$mmissi$n! n$% $n s%a%e $# min" $# acc&se".
The mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed is based on the state of mind of the offender. @ence, there is no incompatibility between evident premeditation or treachery, which refers to the manner of committing the crime, and this mitigating circumstance.

N$% apprecia%e" in m&r"er A&ali#ie" *+ %reac'er+.

The record shows, however, that the offense committed was characteri,ed by treachery and the accused left the scene of the crime only after the victim had fallen down. @ence, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention cannot be appreciated in their favor.

Lac( $# in%en% %$ (ill n$% mi%i)a%in) in p'+sical in.&ries.

!n crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical in1uries, but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under rt. 1(, par. (.

N$% applica*le %$ #el$nies *+ ne)li)ence.

The reason is that in felonies through negligence, the offender acts without intent. The intent in intentional felonies is replaced by negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies. @ence, in felonies through negligence, there is no intent on the part of the offender which may be considered as diminished.

Applica*le $nl+ %$ $##enses res&l%in) in p'+sical In.&ries $r ma%erial 'arm.

Not appreciated in cases of defamation or slander.

Applie" in >al-ersa%i$n $# P&*lic 0&n"s.

3etitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and his family. 3er his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to pay off a debt owed by his brother. nother portion of the misappropriated funds when to his medications for his debilitating diabetes. 6urther, as shown earlier, petitioner restituted all but 7ight Thousand 3esos (3#,:::.::& of the funds in less than one moth and a half and said small balance in three ((& months from receipt of demand of %= on 5anuary ., 1""". 7vidently, there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Basis $# para)rap' 8.
!ntent, an element of voluntariness in intentional felony, is diminished.

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Par. 0. : )hat sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended part% immediatel% preceded the act. 1e5uisites!
1. 2. (. That the provocation must be sufficient. That it must originate from the offended party. That the provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked.

T'e pr$-$ca%i$n m&s% *e s&##icien%.

The word MsufficientM means ade-uate to e+cite a person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. 0epends upon the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, the place and the time when the provocation is made. 4<amples o1 s,11icien$ pro oca$ion. 1. 2. (. '. "eld : 8hen the aggression is in retaliation for an ins,l$, in:,ry, or threat, the offender cannot successfully claim self2defense, but at most, he can be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance under the provisions of paragraph ' of rticle 1(. 8hen the deceased abused and ill2treated the accused by kicking and cursing the latter. 8hen in his house the accused saw an unknown person 1ump out of the window and his wife begged for his par2 don on her knees, he killed her. lthough there was no unlawful aggression, because the challenge was accepted by the accused, and therefore there was no self2defense, there was however the mitigating circumstance of immediate provocation. B&% when the defendant sou&ht the deceased, the challen&e to fi&ht b% the latter is not provocation. 1. 2. (. The victimOs act of kicking the accused on the chest prior to the stabbing does not constitute unlawful aggression for purposes of self2defense, but the act may be considered as sufficient provocation on the victimOs part, a mitigating circumstance. The victimOs act of kicking the accused on the chest prior to the stabbing does not constitute unlawful aggression for purposes of self2defense, but the act may be considered as sufficient provocation on the victimOs part, a mitigating circumstance. Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. There was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.

Pr$-$ca%i$n 'el" n$% s&##icien%.

(a& 8hen the in1ured party merely asked the accused for an e+planation for the latterOs derogatory remarks against certain ladies. (b& 8hile the accused was taking a walk at the New Buneta one evening, the deceased met him and pointing his finger at the accused asked the latter what he was doing there and then said; M0onOt you know we are watching for honeymooners hereGM The accused drew out his knife and stabbed the deceased. (c& The fact that the deceased (a public officer& had ordered the arrest of the accused for misdemeanor is not such a provocation within the meaning of this paragraph that will be considered in mitigation of the penalty for the crime of homicide. (d& )oreover, the deceasedOs act of asking for an e+planation from the accused was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or in1ure the deceased.

73
Pr$-$ca%i$n m&s% $ri)ina%e #r$m %'e $##en"e" par%+.
and A were together. hit % on the head with a piece of stone from his sling2shot and ran away. s he could not overtake , % faced A and assaulted the latter. !n this case, % is not entitled to this mitigating circumstance, because A never gave the provocation or took part in it. S&##icien% pr$-$ca%i$n as an elemen% $# sel#/ "e#ense 3ertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself. S&##icien% pr$-$ca%i$n as a mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ance 3ertains to its presence on the part of the offended party.

Pr$-$ca%i$n m&s% *e imme"ia%e %$ %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime.

8hen there is an interval of time between the provocation and the commission of the crime, the conduct of the offended party could not have e+cited the accused to the commission of the crime, he having had time to regain his reason and to e+ercise self2control.

T'rea% %'a% imme"ia%el+ prece"e" %'e ac%.

The threat should not be offensive and positively strong, because, if it is, the threat to inflict real in1urty is an unlawful aggression which may give rise to self2defense. Ja&ue threats not sufficient. The victimCs mere utternace, >!f you do not agree, beware,? without further proof that he was bent upon transalating his vague threats into immediate action, is not sufficient.

74
Par. G. : )hat the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a &rave offense to the one committin& the felon% ;delito6, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, le&itimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives b% affinit% within the same de&rees. 1e5uisites!
1. That there be a &rave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees* That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication and the doing of the grave offense.

2.

3llustrations! 1. 2. Aeing accused by the victim that the accused stole the formerOs rooster which made the latter feel deeply embarrassed, and the encounter took place in about half an hourOs time. Stabbing to death the son of the accused which most naturally and logically must have enraged and obfuscated him that, sei,ed by that feeling of hatred and rancour, he stabbed indiscriminately the people around.

Applies %$ )ra-e $##ense c$mmi%%e" a)ains% s&r-i-in) sp$&se $# "ecease" rela%i-e.

Thus, if (the surviving husband of A& was killed by %, ACs brothers would be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of vindication of grave offense if they cause serious physical in1uries to % immediately after learning of Cs death.

A lapse $# %ime is all$ e" *e% een %'e )ra-e $##ense an" %'e -in"ica%i$n.
The fact that the accused >as slappe& =y $(e &ecease& in $(e presence o1 many persons a 1e> (o,rs =e1ore the former killed the latter, was considered a mitigating circumstance that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense. The killing of the paramour by the offended husband one &ay after the adultery was considered still pro+imate. Bapse of time between the grave offense (abducting the daughter of the accused by the deceased& and the vindication (killing of the deceased& was $>o or $(ree &ays. The Supreme %ourt said although the elopement took place on 5anuary ', 1"(., and the aggression on the $th of said month and year, the offense did not cease while (the abducted daughterOs& whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegali,ed. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication thereof.

In%er-al $# %ime ne)a%in) -in"ica%i$n.

1. ppro+imately nine ("& months before the killing, the deceased bo+ed the accused several times in the face resulting in the conviction of the deceased for less serious physical in1uries. the second incident was not an immediate or a pro+imate vindication of the first. 0eceased uttered the following remark at eleven oOclock in the morning in the presence of the accused and his officemates; MNag2iistambay pala dito ang magnanakaw.M t five oOclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused killed the deceased. The mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense does not avail.

2.

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Dis%in)&is' pr$-$ca%i$n #r$m -in"ica%i$n.
Pr$-$ca%i$n !t is made directly only to the person committing the felony. The cause that brought about the provocation need not be a grave offense. !t is necessary that the provocation or threat immediatel% preceded the act, i.e., that there be no interval of time between the provocation and the commission of the crime. Vin"ica%i$n The grave offense may be committed also against the offenderOs relatives mentioned by the law. The offended party must have done a &rave offense to the offender or his relatives mentioned by the law. The vindication of the grave offense may be proximate, which admits of an interval of time between the grave offense done by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused.

Reas$n #$r %'e "i##erence. Killin) a rela%i-e is a )ra-e $##ense.

=n the other hand, the attenuating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense2the stabbing of his son to death, or of having committed the crime upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, may be deemed to have attended the commission of the crime alternatively , because both mitigating circumstances cannot co2e+ist.

Basis %$ "e%ermine %'e )ra-i%+ $# $##ense In -in"ica%i$n.

The social standing of the person, the place, and the $ime when the insult was made. 0uring a fiesta, an old man $: years of age asked the deceased for some roast pig. !n the presence of many guests, the deceased insulted the old man, saying; MThere is no more. %ome here and ! will make roast pig of you. M little later, while the deceased was s-uatting down, the old man came up behind him and struck him on the head with an a+e. "eld : 8hile it may be mere trifle to an average person, i$ e i&en$ly was a serious matter to an old man, to be made the butt of a 1oke in the presence of so many guests.

C$nsi"ere" )ra-e $##ense,

1. 2. (. '. .. Sarcastic remark implying that the accused was a petty tyrant. 9emark of the in1ured party before the &uests that accused lived at the e+pense of his wife. Taking into account that the merican forces had 1ust occupied )anila, it is not strange that the accused should have considered it then as a grave offense when the offended party said; MKou are a 5apanese spy. M !f a person kills another for having found him in the act of committing an attempt a&ainst his (accusedOs& wife. 8here the in1ured party had insulted the father of the accused by contemptuously telling him; M3hse, ichura mong lalakeM (3shaw, you are but a shrimp&.

T'e pr$-$ca%i$n s'$&l" *e pr$p$r%i$na%e %$ %'e "ama)e ca&se" *+ %'e ac% an" a"eA&a%e %$ s%ir $ne %$ i%s c$mmissi$n.
The remark attributed to the deceased that the daughter of the accused is a flirt does not warrant and 1ustify the act of accused in slaying the victim.

Basis $# para)rap' :. Base" $n %'e "imin&%i$n $# %'e c$n"i%i$ns $# -$l&n%ariness.

The supposed grave offense done by the victim was an alleged remark made in the presence of the accused that the %ivil Service %ommission is a hangout of thieves. The accused felt alluded to because he was facing then criminal and administrative charges on several counts involving his honesty and integrity. The remark itself was general in nature and not specifically directed to the accused. =ther people in the vicinity who might have heard the remark could not have possibly known that the victim was insulting the accused unless they were aware of the background of the criminal and administrative charges involving moral

76
turpitude pending against the accused. The remark cannot be considered a grave offense against the accused.

Vin"ica%i$n $# a )ra-e $##ense is Inc$mpa%i*le

i%' passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n.

77
Par. D. : )hat of havin& acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturall% to have produced passion or obfuscation. T'is para)rap' reA&ires %'a% G
1. 2. (. The accused acted upon an impulse. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produced passion or obfuscation in him. 9ule for the application of this paragraph.

R&les #$r applica%i$n $# %'is para)rap'.

Ins%ance 'en i% is mi%i)a%in) =nly when the same arose from la>1,l sen$imen$s. Ins%ance 'en i% is NOT mi%i)a%in) The act is committed in a spirit of lawlessness. The act is committed in a spirit of re enge.

ReA&isi%es $# %'e mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ance $# passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n,

1. 2. That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind* and That said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal e-uanimity. (People s. Alang,ilang, .2 3hil. //(, //., citing earlier cases* People s. 3li$a, 1:# 3hil. $(:, $'(* People s. !ra ino, Nos. B2(1(2$22", )ay 1/, 1"#(, 122 S%9 12(, 1('&.

T'e ac% $# %'e $##en"e" par%+ m&s% *e &nla #&l $r &n.&s%.

The crime committed by the accused must be provoked by prior ,n:,s$ or improper acts of the in1ured party. Thus, a common;la> >i1e, who, having left the common home, refused to go home with the accused, was ac$ing >i$(in (er rig($s, and the accused (the common2law husband& had no legitimate right to compel her to go with him. The mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of the owner who, upon seeing the person who stole his carabao, shoots the supposed thief. The act of the deceased in creating trouble during the wake of the departed father of defendant2appellant scandali,es the mourners and offends the sensibilities of the grieving family. ccused2appellantCs guilt is mitigated by passion or obfuscation. The accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation where he hit the deceased upon seeing the latter bo+ his '2year2old son.

E3ercise $# a ri)'% $r #&l#illmen% $# "&%+ is n$% pr$per s$&rce $# passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n.

The accused killed the deceased when the latter was about to take the carabao of the accused to the barrio lieutenant. Ael&: The action of the deceased in taking the carabao of the accused to him and demanding payment for the sugar cane destroyed by that carabao and in taking the carabao to the barrio lieutenant when the accused refused to pay, was perfectly legal and proper and constituted no reasonable cause for provocation to the accused. 8here the accused was making a disturbance on a public street and a policeman came to arrest him, the anger and indignation of the accused resulting from the arrest cannot be considered passion or obfuscation, because the policeman was performing a la>1,l ac$.

T'e ac% m&s% *e s&##icien% %$ pr$"&ce s&c' a c$n"i%i$n $# min".

!f the cause of the loss of self2control was trivial and slig($, as when the victim failed to work on the hacienda of which the accused was the overseer, or where the accused saw the in1ured party picking fruits from the tree claimed by

78
the former, the obfuscation is not mitigating. )he defense must prove that the act which produced passion or obfuscation too* place at a time not far removed from the commission of the crime. )he crime committed must be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fur%. =bfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which was planne& and calmly meditated or if the impulse upon which the accused acted >as deliberatel% fomented by him for a considerable period of time.

Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n m&s% arise #r$m la #&l sen%imen%s.

1. 3.S. s. Aic?s.

6or about . years, the accused and the deceased lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wife. fterwards, the deceased separated from the accused and lived with another man. The accused killed the deceased. 7ven if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation because of 1ealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss of selfcontrol are such which originate from legi$ima$e 1eelings, and not those which arise from vicious, ,n>or$(y and immoral passions. 2. Aut the ruling in the case of @icks should be distinguished from the case where the accused, in the heat of passion, killed his common2law wife upon discovering her in 1lagran$e in carnal communication with a common ac-uaintance. 3. People vs. 4ngay. Bac$s: The accused, as common2law wife, lived with the deceased for 1. years, whose house she helped sup2 port. Bater, the deceased married another woman. The accused killed him. The accused lived for 1. long years as the real wife of the deceased, whose house she helped to support, could not but arouse that na$,ral 1eeling o1 &espair in the woman who sa> (er li1e =ro?en an& 1o,n& (ersel1 a=an&one& =y the very man whom she considered for so long a time as her husband and 1or >(om s(e (a& ma&e so many sacri1ices. The mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation was considered in favor of the accused. '. 3assion or obfuscation must originate from lawful sentiments, not from the fact that, for e+ample, the girlOs sweetheart killed the girlOs father and brother because the girlOs parents ob1ected to their getting married and the girl conse-uently broke off their relationship.

T'e $##en"er m&s% ac% &n"er %'e imp&lse $# special m$%i-es.

7+citement is the natural feeling of all persons engage& in a 1ig($, especially those who had received a beating, and the impulse in that state is not considered in law so powerful as to produce obfuscation sufficient to mitigate liability.

Ill&s%ra%i$n $# imp&lse $# special m$%i-es.

The accused killed 3, because the latter did not deliver the letter of 6 to , on which (letter& the accused had pinned his hopes of settling the case against him amicably. The failure of 3 to deliver the letter is a prior ,n:,s$ and improper act sufficient to produce great e+citement and passion in the accused as to confuse his reason and impel him to kill 3. !t was a legitimate and natural cause of indignation and anger.

Ill&s%ra%i$n $# imp&lse $# special m$%i-es.

The accused killed 3, because the latter did not deliver the letter of 6 to , on which (letter& the accused had pinned his hopes of settling the case against him amicably. The failure of 3 to deliver the letter is a prior ,n:,s$ and improper act sufficient to produce great e+citement and passion in the accused as to confuse his reason and impel him to kill 3.

O*#&sca%i$n arisin) #r$m .eal$&s+.

8here the killing of the deceased by the accused arose out of rivalry for the hand of a woman, passion or obfuscation is mitigating. The feeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful instigator of 1ealousy and prone to produce anger and obfuscation.

79
O*#&sca%i$n / 'en rela%i$ns'ip is ille)i%ima%e / n$% mi%i)a%in).

The relations of the accused with 9osario 9ian,ales were illegitimate. The in1ured party made indecent propositions to her which provoked the accused. The accused attacked the in1ured party. The obfuscation of the accused is not mitigating.

T'e ca&se pr$"&cin) passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n m&s% c$me #r$m %'e $##en"e" par%+.
The two sons, believing that S would inflict other wounds upon their father, who was already wounded, in defense of their father, immediately killed S. 4nder this great e+citement, the two sons also proceeded to attack and did kill % who was near the scene at the time.

>a+ passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n la #&ll+ arise #r$m ca&ses e3is%in) $nl+ in %'e '$nes% *elie# $# %'e $##en"er;
Kes. (1& (2& Thus, the =elie1 of the defendant that the deceased had caused his dismissal from his employment is sufficient to confuse his reason and impel him to commit the crime. !t has also been held that the =elie1 entertained in goo& 1ai$( by the defendants that the deceased cast upon their mother a spell of witchcraft which was the cause of her serious illness, is so powerful a motive as to naturally produce passion or obfuscation.

Basis $# para)rap' C. T'e $##en"er '$ ac%s in%elli)ence an" in%en%. i%' passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n s&##ers a diminution $# 'is

Pr$-$ca%i$n an" $*#&sca%i$n arisin) #r$m $ne an" %'e same ca&se s'$&l" *e %rea%e" as $nl+ $ne mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ance. Vin"ica%i$n $# )ra-e $##ense cann$% c$/e3is% i%' passi$n an" $*#&sca%i$n.

Thus, where the deceased, a %hinaman, had eloped with the daughter of the accused, and later when the deceased saw the accused coming, the deceased ran upstairs in his house, there are two facts which are closely connected, namely; (1& elopement, which is a grave offense to a family of old customs, and (2& refusal to deal with him, a stimulus strong enough to produce in his mind a fit of passion. Two mitigating circumstances of (1& vindication, and (2& passion were considered in favor of the accused.

E3cep%i$n J 4'en %'ere are $%'er #ac%s! al%'$&)' cl$sel+ c$nnec%e".

Thus, where the deceased, a %hinaman, had eloped with the daughter of the accused, and later when the deceased saw the accused coming, the deceased ran upstairs in his house, there are two facts which are closely connected, namely; 1. 7lopement, which is a grave offense to a family of old customs, 2. 9efusal to deal with him, a stimulus strong enough to produce in his mind a fit of passion. 2 mitigating circumstances of 1. Hindication and 2. 3assion were considered in favor of the accused.

Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n is c$mpa%i*le Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n is inc$mpa%i*le

i%' lac( $# in%en%i$n %$ c$mmi% s$ )ra-e a i%' %reac'er+.

r$n).

Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n "is%in)&is'e" #r$m irresis%i*le #$rce.

Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n )itigating circumstance. %annot give rise to an irresistible force because irresistible force re-uires physical force. !n the offender himself. )ust arise from lawful sentiments. Irresis%i*le #$rce 7+empting circumstance. 9e-uires physical force.

)ust come from a third person. 4nlawful.

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Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n "is%in)&is'e" #r$m pr$-$ca%i$n.
Passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n 3roduced by an impulse which may be caused by provocation. The offense which engenders perturbation of mind need not be immediate. !t is only re-uired that the influence thereof lasts until the moment the crime is committed. The effect is the loss of reason and self2control on the part of the offender. Pr$-$ca%i$n %omes from the in1ured party. )ust immediately precede the commission of the crime.

The effect is the loss of reason and self2control on the part of the offender.

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Par. B. : )hat the offender 'a" voluntaril% surrendered himself to a person in authorit% or his a&ents, or that he had voluntaril% confessed his &uilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. T $ mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ances are pr$-i"e" in %'is para)rap'.
8hen both are present, they should have the effect of mitigating as two independent circumstances. !f any of them must mitigate the penalty to a certain e+tent, when both are present, they should produce this effect to a greater e+tent.

ReA&isi%es $# -$l&n%ar+ s&rren"er.

a. b. c. That the offender had not been actuall% arrested. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authorit% or to the latterKs a&ent. That the surrender was voluntary. (4s$acio s. San&igan=ayan, <.9. No. $.(/2, )arch /,1"":,1#( S%9 12, 2', citing People s. Canamo, 1(# S%9 1'1, 1'. and People s. Aanasan, No. B22."#", Sept. (:, 1"/", 2" S%9 .(', .'12.'2&

1e5uisite of voluntariness.
)ust be spontaneous in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and e+penses necessarily incurred in his search and capture )erely re-uesting a policeman to accompany the accused to the police head-uarters is not e-uivalent to the re-uirement that he Mvoluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents.M The accused must actually surrender his own person to the authorities, admitting complicity in the crime.

Cases $# -$l&n%ar+ s&rren"er.

4pon seeing a patrolman, he immediately threw away his bolo, raised his two hands, offered no resistance and said to the patrolman Mhere is my bolo, ! stabbed the victim.M =nce in the hotel, the accused dropped his weapon at the door and when the policemen came to investigate, he readily admitted ownership of the weapon and then voluntarily went with them. @e was investigated by the fiscal the following day. No warrant had been issued for his arrest. )erely re-uesting a policeman to accompany the accused to the police head-uarters is not e-uivalent to the re-uirement The accused must actually surrender his own person to the authorities, admitting complicity in the crime. The two accused left the scene of the crime but made several attempts to surrender to various local officials which somehow did not materiali,e for one reason or another. !t was already a week after when they were finally able to surrender. Holuntary surrender avails. That they had no opportunity to surrender because the peace officers came, should not be charged against them. 6or one thing is certain 2 they yielded their weapons at the time. Not only that. They voluntarily went with the peace officers to the municipal building. 8here there is nothing on record to show that the warrant for the arrest of the accused had actually been served on him, or that it had been returned unserved for failure of the server to locate said accused, and there is direct evidence to show that he voluntarily presented himself to the police

Cases n$% c$ns%i%&%in) -$l&n%ar+ s&rren"er.

1. 2. (. '. The warrant of arrest showed that the accused was i n fact arrested. The accused surrendered only after the warrant of arrest was served upon him. 8here the accused was actually arrested by his own admission or that he yielded because of the warrant of arrest. 8here the accused were asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they refused until only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were completely sur2 rounded and there was no chance of escape. 8here the search for the accused had lasted four ('& years, which belies the spontaneity of the surrender.

..

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No evidence was presented to establish indubitably that he deliberately surrendered to the police. /. $. 8here the accused only went to the police station to report that his wife was stabbed by another person and to seek protection as he feared that the same assailant would also stab him. 8here the accused was arrested in his boarding house and upon being caught, pretended to say that he was on his way to the municipal building to surrender to the authorities, for that is not the nature of voluntary surrender that may serve to mitigate oneOs liability in contemplation of law.

N$% mi%i)a%in)

'en "e#en"an%

as in #ac% arres%e".

Aut where a person, after committing the offense and having opportunity to escape, voluntarily waited for the agents of the authorities and voluntarily gave himself up, he is entitled to the benefit of this circumstance, even if he was placed under arrest by a policeman then and there. 8hen the accused helped in carr%in& his victim to the hospital where he was disarmed and arrested, it is tantamount to voluntar% surrender . )he accused who ran to the municipal buildin& after the commission of the crime had the intention or desire to surrender. )he accused who fled and hid himself to avoid reprisals from the companions of the deceased, but upon meetin& a policeman voluntaril% went with him to the $ail, is entitled to the benefit of the miti&atin& circumstance of voluntar% surrender.

4'en %'e arran% $# arres% 'a" n$% *een ser-e" $r n$% re%&rne" &nser-e" *eca&se %'e acc&se" cann$% *e l$ca%e"! %'e s&rren"er is mi%i)a%in). T'e la "$es n$% reA&ire %'a% %'e s&rren"er *e pri$r %$ %'e $r"er $# arres%.

The mere filing of an information andNor the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender >involuntary?. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up.

KV$l&n%aril+ s&rren"ere" 'imsel#.K

fter the incident, the accused reported it to the councilor* the stayed in the councilorOs place for about an hour* and thereafter he went to the chief of police to whom he related what had happened between him and the in1ured party and surrendered the bolo 2 not his person 2 to said chief of police. "eld: The foregoing facts do not constitute voluntary surrender. 8here the accused merely surrendered the gun used in the killing, without surrendering his own person to the authorities, such act of the accused does not constitute voluntary surrender. ppellant did not go to the 3% head-uarters after the shooting to surrender but merely to report the incident. !ndeed, he never evinced any desire to own the responsibility for the killing of the deceased.

T'e s&rren"er m&s% *e ma"e %$ a pers$n in a&%'$ri%+ $r 'is a)en%.

Holuntary surrender to commanding officer of the accused is mitigating, because the commanding officer is an agent of a person in authority. Holuntary surrender to the chief clerk of a district engineer is not mitigating, because such chief clerk is neither a person in authority nor his agent.

V$l&n%ar+ s&rren"er "$es n$% simpl+ mean n$n/#li)'%.

8hat the law considers as mitigating is the voluntary surrender of an accused before his arrest, showing either

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acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities form the trouble and e+pense that his search and capture would re-uire.

Time an" place $# s&rren"er.

6ive days after the commission of the crime of homicide and two days after the issuance of the order for his arrest, the accused presented himself in the municipal building to post the bond for his temporary release. "eld: This is a voluntary surrender constituting a mitigating circumstance. The law does not re-uire that the surrender be prior to the issuance of the order of arrest. )oreover, the surrender of the accused to post a bond for his temporary release was in obedience to the order of arrest and was tantamount to the delivery of his person to the authorities. 6o$e: !n such a case, there is nothing in the record to show that the warrant had actually been served on the ac cused, or that it had been returned unserved for failure of the server to locate the accused. The implication is that if the accused cannot be located by the server of the warrant, the ruling should be different.

T'e s&rren"er m&s% *e *+ reas$n $# %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime #$r is pr$sec&%e". S&rren"er %'r$&)' an in%erme"iar+. 4'en is s&rren"er -$l&n%ar+;

'ic' "e#en"an%

surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either (1& because he ac*nowled&es his guilt, or (2& because he wishes to save them the trouble and e+penses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. !f none of these two reasons impelled the accused to surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated more by an intention to insure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and therefore not voluntary.

T'e s&rren"er m&s% *e sp$n%ane$&s.

Holuntary surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of an accused who surrenders only after a warrant of arrest is issued and he finds it futile to continue being a fugitive from 1ustice. 3ntention to surrender, without actuall% surrenderin&, is not miti&atin&. 6o$e: The law re-uires that the accused must surrender himself. )here is spontaneit% even if the surrender is induced b% fear of retaliation b% the victimKs relatives. Ael&: That the surrender was induced by his fear of retaliation by the victimOs relatives does not gainsay the spontaneity of the surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, this accused saved the State the time and trouble of searching for him until arrested. +hen the offender imposed a condition or acted with external stimulus, his surrender is not voluntar%. 8hen they started negotiations for their surrender, the roads through which their escape could be attempted were blocked and the house where they were hiding was surrounded by the %onstabulary forces. They surrendered, because of their belief that their escape was impossible under the circumstances. The surrender was not voluntary.

ReA&isi%es $# plea $# )&il%+.

!n order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating, the three re-uisites must be present; 1. 2. (. That the offender spontaneousl% confessed his &uilt> That the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case* and That the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. (See People s. Crisos$omo, No. B2(22'(, pril 1., 1"##, 1/: S%9 '$, ./, citing earlier cases. lso, People s. #,e"a, <.9. No. $"/1", ug. 2:, 1"":, 1## S%9 /#(, /#"&

84

)he plea must be made before trial be&ins. plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. Plea of &uilt% on appeal, not miti&atin&. 3lea of guilty in the %ourt of 6irst !nstance (now 9T%& in a case appealed from the )unicipal %ourt is not mitigating, because the plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, that is, in the )unicipal %ourt.

Plea $# )&il%+ a% %'e preliminar+ in-es%i)a%i$n is n$ plea a% all.

!f an accused is charged with an offense cogni,able by the court of first instance, and pleads not guilty before the municipal court at its preliminary investigation, and after the elevation of the case to the court of first instance2the court of competent 1urisdiction2he pleads guilty upon arraignment before this latter court, the plea of not guilty upon arraignment at the preliminary investigation in the municipal court is no plea at all.

T'e c$n#essi$n $# )&il% m&s% *e ma"e in $pen c$&r%.

The e<$ra:,&icial confession made by the accused is not the voluntary confession which the %ode contemplates. 7(e con1ession o1 g,il$ m,s$ =e ma&e prior $o $(e presen$a$ion o1 $(e e i&ence 1or $(e prosec,$ion. !t is not necessary that all the evidence of the prosecution have been presented. 7ven if the first witness presented by the prosecution had not finished testifying during the direct e+amination when the accused withdrew his former plea of Mnot guiltyM and substituted it with the plea of Mguilty,M the plea of guilty is not mitigating.

4i%'"ra al $# plea n$% )&il%+ an" plea"in) )&il%+ *e#$re presen%a%i$n $# e-i"ence *+ pr$sec&%i$n is s%ill mi%i)a%in).
7(e c(ange o1 plea s(o,l& =e ma&e a$ $(e 1irs$ oppor$,ni$y. A con&i$ional plea o1 g,il$y is no$ a mi$iga$ing circ,ms$ance. M n accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him.M

Plea $# )&il%+ %$ amen"e" in#$rma%i$n.

Trial had already begun on the original information for murder and frustrated murder. @owever, in view of the willingness of the accused to plead guilty for a lesser offense, the prosecution, with leave of court, amended said information to make it one for homicide and frustrated homicide, and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. That was an entirely new information and no evidence was presented in connection with the charges made therein before the accused entered his plea of guilty. The accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

Plea $# )&il%+ %$ lesser $##ense %'an %'a% c'ar)e"! is n$% mi%i)a%in).

6or voluntary confession to be appreciated as an e+tenuating circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense charged, i.e., robbery with homicide in the present case, and not to either robbery or homicide only.

Basis $# para)rap' D,
The lesser perversity of the offender.

Plea $# )&il%+ Is n$% mi%i)a%in) in c&lpa*le #el$nies an" in crimes p&nis'e" *+ special

85
la s.
rt. (/., par. ., of the 9evised 3enal %ode, which prescribes the penalties for culpable felonies, provides that Min the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall e+ercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in rt. /'.M This last mentioned article states, among other rules, that when there is a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is the minimum period of the divisible penalty. 8hen the crime is punished by a special law, the court shall also e+ercise its sound discretion, as rt. /' is not applicable. The penalty prescribed by special laws is usually not divisible into three periods. rt. /' is applicable only when the penalty has three periods.

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Par. H. : )hat the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise sufferin& from some ph%sical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow bein&s. Dea# an" "&m*.
!n a criminal case charging robbery in an inhabited house, the accused is deaf and dumb. "eld: @e is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of being deaf and dumb under rticle 1(, paragraph #.

P'+sical "e#ec% m&s% res%ric% means $# ac%i$n! "e#ense! $r c$mm&nica%i$n *ein)s.

i%' #ell$

3hysical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as being armless, cripple, or a stutterer, whereby his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings are limited. ( lbert& This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deaf2mute or blind persons.

Basis $# para)rap' E.
3aragraph # of rt. 1( considers the fact that one suffering from physical defect, which restricts oneOs means of action, defense, or communication with oneOs fellow beings, does not have complete 1ree&om o1 action and, therefore, there is a diminution of that element of voluntariness.

87
Par. C. : Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will: power of the offender without however deprivin& him of consciousness of his acts. ReA&isi%es,
1. 2. That the illness of the offender must diminish the e+ercise of his will2power. That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.

N$%e, 4'en %'e $##en"er c$mple%el+ l$s% %'e e3ercise $# e3emp%in) circ&ms%ance. D$es %'is circ&ms%ance incl&"e illness $# %'e min";

ill/p$ er! i% ma+ *e an

!t is said that the foregoing legal provision refers only to diseases of patholo&ical state that trouble %'e conscience $r will. Aut in the case of People vs. Brancisco, 5) 3hil. /"', it was held that this paragraph applies to defendant who committed the crime while suffering from some illness ($# %'e bod%, %'e mind, %'e ner-es! $r %'e moral facult% /. !t would seem that a diseased mind, not amounting to insanity, may give place to mitigation.

Illness $# %'e $##en"er c$nsi"ere" mi%i)a%in).

1. =ne who was suffering from acute neurosis which made him ill2tempered and easily angered is entitled to this mitigating circumstance, because such illness diminished his e+ercise of will power. The fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance either under paragraph # or under paragraph " of rt. 1(. The evidence of accused2appellant shows that while he was shown to suffer from the chronic mental disease called schi(o:affective disorder or psychosis, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive him of his intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.

2. (.

@e may thus be credited with this mitigating circumstance but will not e+empt him from his criminal liability.

Basis $# para)rap' H. T'e circ&ms%ance in para)rap' H $# Ar%icle 58 is mi%i)a%in) *eca&se %'ere is a "imin&%i$n $# in%elli)ence an" in%en%.

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Par. 9I. : And, finall%, an% other circumstance of a similar nature and analo&ous to those abovementioned. >&s% *e $# similar na%&re an" anal$)$&s %$ %'$se men%i$ne" in pars. 5/H $# Ar%. 58. O-er CI +ears $l" i%' #ailin) si)'% men%i$ne" in par. 6. as 'el" %$ *e similar %$ $-er DI +ears $# a)e

O&%ra)e" #eelin) $# cre"i%$r! similar %$ passi$n an" $*#&sca%i$n men%i$ne" in para)rap' C.

person who killed his debtor who had tried to escape and refused to pay his debt is entitled to mitigating circumstance similar to passion and obfuscation.

Imp&lse $# .eal$&s #eelin)! similar %$ passi$n an" $*#&sca%i$n.

The fact that the accused committed slander by charging the offended party with being the concubine of the husband of the accused under the impulse of a 1ealous feeling apparently 1ustified, though later discovered to be unfounded, because the complainant, as verified by physical e+amination, was a virgin.

Espri% "e c$rps! similar %$ passi$n an" $*#&sca%i$n.

)ass psychology and appeal to espri$ &e corps is similar to passion or obfuscation. !n this case, many of the soldiers >(o took part in the killing of the deceased responded to the call and appeal of their lieutenant who urged them to avenge the outrage committed by the deceased who had summarily e1ected certain soldiers from the dance hall. They considered the act of the deceased a grave insult against their organi,ation.

V$l&n%ar+ res%i%&%i$n $# s%$len men%i$ne" in para)rap' D.

pr$per%+!

similar

%$

-$l&n%ar+

s&rren"er

E3%reme p$-er%+ an" necessi%+! similar %$ inc$mple%e .&s%i#ica%i$n *ase" $n s%a%e $# necessi%+. <Un"er Ar%. 55! par. 9=
The accused, on account of e+treme poverty and of the economic difficulties then prevailing, was forced to pilfer two sacks of paper valued at 31:.:: from the %ustomhouse. @e sold the two sacks of paper for 32..:. State of necessity is a 1ustifying circumstance under rticle 11, paragraph '. !ncomplete 1ustification is a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 1 of rticle 1(. 7+treme poverty may mitigate a crime against property, such as theft, but not a crime of violence such as murder. Aut it is not mitigating where the accused had impoverished himself and lost his gainful occupation by committing crimes, and not driven to crime due to want and poverty.

Tes%i#+in) #$r %'e pr$sec&%i$n! anal$)$&s %$ plea $# )&il%+.

The act of the accused of testifying for the prosecution without previous discharge is a mitigating circumstance analogous to a plea of guilty.

Res%i%&%i$n in mal-ersa%i$n case is $nl+ a mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ance.

3ayment or reimbursement is not a defense for e+oneration in malversation* it may only be considered as mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation

Killin) %'e

r$n) man is n$% mi%i)a%in).

N$% resis%in) arres%! n$% anal$)$&s %$ -$l&n%ar+ s&rren"er.

89
T'e c$n"i%i$n $# r&nnin) am&c( is n$% mi%i)a%in). >i%i)a%in) circ&ms%ances 'ic' are pers$nal %$ %'e $##en"ers.

)itigating circumstances which arise (1& from the moral attributes of the offender, or (2& form his private relations with the offended party, or ((& form any other personal cause, shall only serve to mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices, and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 6o$e: !t seems that all mitigating circumstances are personal to the offenders.

Circumstances which are neither exemptin& nor miti&atin&. 1. 2. (. '. .. )istake in the blow or a=erra$ion ic$,s, for under penalty is even higher. )istake in the identity of the victim. 7ntrapment of the accused. The accused is over 1# years of age. !f the offender is over 1# years old, his age is neither e+empting nor mitigating. 3erformance of righteous action. rticle '#, there is a comple+ crime committed. The

lthough the accused had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he caused the killing of a single human being, he is, nonetheless, criminally liable.

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Ar%icle 59. A&&ravatin& circumstances. / T'e #$ll$ in) are a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances, 5. T'a% a"-an%a)e *e %a(en *+ %'e $##en"er $# 'is p&*lic p$si%i$n. 6. T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" in c$n%emp% $r a&%'$ri%ies. i%' ins&l% %$ %'e p&*lic

8. T'a% %'e ac% *e c$mmi%%e" i%' ins&l% $r in "isre)ar" $# %'e respec% "&e %'e $##en"e" par%+ $n acc$&n% $# 'is ran(! a)e! $r se3! $r %'a% is *e c$mmi%%e" in %'e " ellin) $# %'e $##en"e" par%+! i# %'e la%%er 'as n$% )i-en pr$-$ca%i$n. 9. T'a% %'e ac% *e &n)ra%e#&lness. c$mmi%%e" i%' a*&se $# c$n#i"ence $r $*-i$&s

:. T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" in %'e palace $# %'e C'ie# E3ec&%i-e $r in 'is presence! $r 'ere p&*lic a&%'$ri%ies are en)a)e" in %'e "isc'ar)e $# %'eir "&%ies! $r in a place "e"ica%e" %$ reli)i$&s $rs'ip. C. T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" in %'e ni)'% %ime! $r in an &nin'a*i%e" place! $r *+ a *an"! 'ene-er s&c' circ&ms%ances ma+ #acili%a%e %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e $##ense. 4'ene-er m$re %'an %'ree arme" male#ac%$rs s'all 'a-e ac%e" %$)e%'er in %'e c$mmissi$n $# an $##ense! i% s'all *e "eeme" %$ 'a-e *een c$mmi%%e" *+ a *an". D. T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" $n %'e $ccasi$n $# a c$n#la)ra%i$n! s'ip rec(! ear%'A&a(e! epi"emic $r $%'er calami%+ $r mis#$r%&ne. E. T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" ins&re $r a##$r" imp&ni%+. H. T'a% %'e acc&se" is a reci"i-is%. A reci"i-is% is $ne '$! a% %'e %ime $# 'is %rial #$r $ne crime! s'all 'a-e *een pre-i$&sl+ c$n-ic%e" *+ #inal .&")men% $# an$%'er crime em*race" in %'e same %i%le $# %'is C$"e. 5I.T'a% %'e $##en"er 'as *een pre-i$&sl+ p&nis'e" *+ an $##ense %$ 'ic' %'e la a%%ac'es an eA&al $r )rea%er penal%+ $r #$r % $ $r m$re crimes %$ 'ic' i% a%%ac'es a li)'%er penal%+. 55.T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" in c$nsi"era%i$n $# a price! re ar"! $r pr$mise. 56.T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# in&n"a%i$n! #ire! p$is$n! e3pl$si$n! s%ran"in) $# a -essel $r in%erna%i$nal "ama)e %'ere%$! "erailmen% $# a l$c$m$%i-e! $r *+ %'e &se $# an+ $%'er ar%i#ice in-$l-in) )rea% as%e an" r&in. 58.T'a% %'e ac% *e c$mmi%%e" i%' e-i"ence preme"i%a%i$n. i%' %'e ai" $# arme" men $r pers$ns '$

59.T'a% %'e cra#%! #ra&" $r "is)&ise *e empl$+e". 5:.T'a% a"-an%a)e *e %a(en $# s&peri$r s%ren)%'! $r means *e empl$+e" %$ ea(en %'e "e#ense. 5C.T'a% %'e ac% *e c$mmi%%e" i%' %reac'er+ <ale-$sia=.

91

5D.T'ere is %reac'er+ 'en %'e $##en"er c$mmi%s an+ $# %'e crimes a)ains% %'e pers$n! empl$+in) means! me%'$"s! $r #$rms in %'e e3ec&%i$n %'ere$# 'ic' %en" "irec%l+ an" speciall+ %$ ins&re i%s e3ec&%i$n! i%'$&% ris( %$ 'imsel# arisin) #r$m %'e "e#ense 'ic' %'e $##en"e" par%+ mi)'% ma(e. 5E.T'a% means *e empl$+e" $r circ&ms%ances *r$&)'% a*$&% i)n$min+ %$ %'e na%&ral e##ec%s $# %'e ac%. 5H.T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" a#%er an &nla #&l en%r+. T'ere is an &nla #&l en%r+ "$$r! $r in"$ *e *r$(en. 'en an en%rance $# a crime a all! r$$#! #l$$r! 'ic' a""

6I.T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" i%' %'e ai" $# pers$ns &n"er #i#%een +ears $# a)e $r *+ means $# m$%$r -e'icles! m$%$ri1e" a%ercra#%! airs'ips! $r $%'er similar means. 65.T'a% %'e r$n) "$ne in %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime *e "eli*era%el+ a&)men%e" *+ ca&sin) $%'er r$n) n$% necessar+ #$r i%s c$mmissi$ns. Basis,
4ased on the &reater perversit% of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony as shown by; 1. 2. (. '. .. )otivating power itself. The place of commission. )eans and ways employed. Time. 3ersonal circumstances of the offender or offended party.

0$&r (in"s $# a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances.

1. !eneric F Those that can generally apply to all crimes. !n rticle 1', the circumstances in paragraphs Nos. 1, 2, ( (dwelling&, ', ., /, ", 1:, 1', 1#, 1", and 2:, e+cept >by means of motor vehicles,? 2. Speci1ic F Those that apply only to particular crimes. !n (. rticle 1', the circumstances in paragraphs Nos. ( (e+cept dwelling&, 1., 1/, 1$ and 21.

C,ali1ying F Those that change the nature of the crime. rticle 2'# which enumerates the -ualifying aggravating circumstances which -ualify the killing of person to murder.

'.

In(eren$ F Those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the crime

F&ali#+in) a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance "is%in)&is'e" #r$m )eneric a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.

Generic A))ra-a%in) Not offset by any mitigating circumstance, is to increase the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the ma+imum period, but without e+ceeding the limit prescribed by law. %an be offset by a mitigating circumstance. F&ali#+in) A))ra-a%in) Not only to give the crime its proper and e+clusive name but also to place the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed by law for said crime. %annot be offset by a mitigating circumstance.

-ualifying aggravating circumstance to be such must be alleged in the information.

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4'en %'e p&*lic $##icer "i" n$% %a(e a"-an%a)e $# %'e in#l&ence $# 'is p$si%i$n! %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance is n$% presen%.
acts! Thirty2nine (("& persons re-uested the accused, then a councilor, to purchase ce&,las for them giving him 3(".::. @e took only 1/ ce&,las, and spent the rest of the money. "eld! 8hen a public officer commits a common crime independent of his official functions and does acts that are no$ connec$e& >i$( $(e &,$ies o1 (is o11ice , he should be punished as private individual without this aggravating circumstance.

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances
1.

'ic' "$ n$% 'a-e %'e e##ec% $# increasin) %'e penal%+.

They shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. a. b. That the crime be committed > =y means <<< 1ire, <<< e<plosionD is in itself a crime of arson or crime involving destruction. >That the act +++ be committed in the dwelling of the offended party? or >that the crime be committed after an unlawful entry? or >that as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.?

2.

The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must be of necessity to accompany the commission thereof. a. b. 7vident premeditation is inherent in theft, robbery, estafa, adultery and concubinage. Taking advantage of public position is inherent in crimes where the offenders, who are public officers, committed the crime in the e+ercise of their functions, such as in bribery,

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances

'ic' are pers$nal %$ %'e $##en"ers.

ggravating circumstances which arise; (a& from the moral attributes of the offender* or (b& from his private relations with the offended party* or (c& from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate the liability of the principals, accomplices, and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 4<amples: 1. , with evident premeditation, gave A 31::: to kill %. A immediately killed %. 7vident premeditation is an aggravating circumstance which arises from the moral attribute of . !t shall serve to aggravate only the liability of , but not that of A. , stepson of A, killed the latter. %, knowing that killed A without 1ustification, buried the dead body of A to prevent the discovery of the crime. The private relation of with A shall serve to aggravate only the liability of .

2.

9ecidivism is an aggravating circumstance which arises from personal cause. !t shall serve to aggravate only the liability of , but not, that of A.

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances $# %'e $##en"ers.

'ic' "epen" #$r %'eir applica%i$n &p$n %'e (n$ le")e

The circumstances which consist (1& in the material e+ecution of the act, or (2& in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the e+ecution of the act or their cooperation therein. ( rt. /2, par. '& Ill,s$ra$ions: 1. !n his house, ordered A to kill %. and A did not talk about the manner % would be killed. A left the house of and looked for %. A found % and killed the latter with treachery. ( rt. 1', par. 1/& The aggravating circumstance of treachery consists in the material e+ecution of the act. Since had no knowledge of it, treachery shall only aggravate the liability of A. ordered A and % to kill 0, instructing them to wait until nighttime so that the crime could be committed

2.

93
with impunity, A and % killed at nighttime. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime shall also aggravate his liability, because he had knowledge of it at the time of the e+ecution of the act by A and %.

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance n$% pres&me".

n aggravating circumstance should be proved as fully as the crime itself in order to increase the penalty.

Ar%. 59. A&&ravatin& Circumstances. T$ *e apprecia%e"! A&ali#+in) an" a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances m&s% *e alle)e" in %'e in#$.
7vident premeditation, dwelling and unlawful entry, not having been alleged in the info, may not now be appreciated to enhance the liability of the accused2appellant. !f not alleged, they may still be considered in the award of damages. %annot be appreciated for the purpose of fi+ing a heavier penalty in this case, they should, however, be considered as bases for the award of e+emplary damages, conformably to current 1urisprudence.

94

Par. 9 L )hat advanta&e be ta*en b% the offender of his public position.

Aasis; Aased on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the personal circumstance of the offender and also by the means used to secure the commission of the crime.

>eanin) $# ?a"-an%a)e *e %a(en *+ %'e $##en"er $# 'is p&*lic p$si%i$n.@

The public officer must use the influence, prestige, or ascendancy which his office gives him as the means by which he reali,es his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the in-uiry, >0id the accused a=,se his office in order to commit the crimeG (3.S. . Ro&rig,e"& 4<amples: a. b. c. The accused took advantage of his public position. @e could not have maltreated the victim if he was not a policeman on guard duty. There is abuse of public position where a police officer in the course of investigation of a charge against him for grave threats shot the complainant in a treacherous manner. 8here the accused used their authority as members of the police and constabulary to disarm the victim before shooting him.

T'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance is n$% presen% resis%ance %$ a peace $##icer.

'en a C$n)ressman $##ere"

!n the case of a %ongressman who offered resistance to his captor upon being surprised in a gambling house, this aggravating circumstance is not present. The reason for this ruling is that the %ongressman did not take advantage of the influence or reputation of his office.

T'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance is presen% misappr$pria%es %'em.

'en a c$&ncil$r c$llec%s #ines an"

acts: The accused, shortly after entering upon his duties as councilor of the town of parri, ordered that deaths of all large animals must be reported to him as councilman. s a result of this instruction, the owners of several such animals were induced to pay the accused supposed fines on the belief that such were re-uired by a municipal ordinance. @e spent the money paid to and received by him as fines. !t is true that he had no right to either impose or collect any fine whatsoever and it is likewise true that a municipal councilor is not an official designated by law to collect public fines, but these facts do not destroy or disprove the important fact that the accused did, by taking advantage of his public position, deceive and defraud the in1ured parties out of the money they paid him. 6o$e: The crime committed by Torrida is estafa by means of deceit. ( rt. (1., par. 2&

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances.
These circumstances are based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the personal circumstances of the offended party and the place of the commission of the crime. Thus, in the case of the robbery of a thing belonging to the 3resident, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of respect due the offended party cannot be taken into account, because the mere fact that the thing belongs to the 3resident does not make it more valuable than the things belonging to a private person. !t is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. There must be evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused &eli=era$ely in$en&e& $o offend or insult the se+ or age of the offended party =ld age cannot be considered aggravating. There was no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to of2 fend or insult the age of the victim.

95

Par. 8. 4i%' ins&l% $r in "isre)ar" $# %'e respec% "&e %'e $##en"e" par%+ $n acc$&n% $# 'is ran(! a)e! $r se3! $r %'a% i% *e c$mmi%%e" in %'e " ellin) $# %'e $##en"e" par%+! i# %'e la%%er 'as n$% )i-en pr$-$ca%i$n.
1. <f the ran* of the offended part%. There must be a difference in the social condition of the offender and the offended party. 7eanin& of ran*. M9ankM refers to a high social position or standing* or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position. 2. <f the a&e of the offended part%. offender. This circumstance is present when the offended person, by reason of his age, could be the father of the This aggravating circumstance applies to an aggressor, '. years old, while the victim was an octogenarian. This aggravating circumstance was applied also in the case where the person killed was eighty years old and very weak. The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in cases where the victim is of tender age as well as of old age. This circumstance was applied in a case where one of the victims in a murder case was a 122year2old boy. Deliberate intent to offend or insult re5uired. Disre&ard of old a&e not a&&ravatin& in robber% with homicide. @omicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter be2 ing the main purpose and ob1ect of the criminal. (. <f the sex of the offended part%. This refers to the female se+, not to the male se+. 8hen a person compels a woman to go to his house against her will The accused who, upon knowing the death of their relative, and not being able to take revenge on the killers, because of their imprisonment, selec$e& and killed a female relative of the killers in retaliation. 0irect assault upon a lady teacher. @illin& a $man is not attended b% this a&&ravatin& circumstance if the offender did not manifest an% specific insult or disrespect towards her sex.

N$% applica*le in cer%ain cases.

This aggravating circumstance is not to be considered in the following cases; 9. ,. 8. +hen the offender acted with passion and obfuscation. +hen there exists a relationship between the offended part% and the offender. +hen the condition of bein& a woman is indispensable in the commission of the crime. Thus, in (a& parricide, (b& rape, (c& abduction, or (d& seduction, se+ is not aggravating.

Disre)ar" $# se3 a*s$r*e" in %reac'er+. T'a% %'e crime *e c$mmi%%e" in %'e " ellin) $# %'e $##en"e" par%+.
0welling must be a building or structure, e<cl,si ely used for rest and comfort. (People s. %agnaye&, or a market stall where the victim slept is not a dwelling. Mcombination house and store M

96
Basis of this a&&ravatin& circumstance. B+ %'e place of the commission $# %'e $##ense. 4'a% a))ra-a%es %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime in $neLs " ellin),
A*&se $# c$n#i"ence 8hich the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the door to him. Vi$la%i$n $# %'e sanc%i%+ $# %'e '$me Ay trespassing therein with violence or against the will of the owner.

O##en"e" par%+ m&s% n$% )i-e pr$-$ca%i$n.

8hen it is the offended party who has provoked the incident, he loses his right to the respect and consideration due him in his own house.

>eanin) $# pr$-$ca%i$n in %'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance $# " ellin).

The provocation must be; 1. <iven by the owner of the dwelling,

2. Sufficient, and (. !mmediate to the commission of the crime. !f an% of those conditions is not present, the offended party is deemed not to have given provocation, and the fact that the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party is an aggravating circumstance.

I# %'e pr$-$ca%i$n is n$% imme"ia%e! " ellin) is a))ra-a%in).

The defendant learned that the deceased and the formerOs wife were maintaining illicit relations. =ne night, he went to the house of the deceased and killed him then and there. "eld : That the provocation (the illicit relations& was not given immediatel% prior to the commission of the crime. 0welling is still aggravating. !f the defendant surprised the deceased and the wife of the defendant in the act of adultery in the house of the deceased, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling would not e+ist.

O ner $# " ellin) )a-e imme"ia%e pr$-$ca%i$n / " ellin) is n$% a))ra-a%in).
0welling is not aggravating, although the incident happened in the house of the victim, where the stabbing was triggered off by his provocative and insulting acts, for having given sufficient provocation before the commission of the crime, he has lost his right to the respect and consideration due him in his own house. (People s. A$(ena& 8hile in her house, the offended party began to abuse the daughter of the accused and to call her vile names. The accused heard the insulting words and appeared in front of the offended partyOs house and demanded an e+planation. -uarrel ensued, and the accused, becoming very angry and e+cited, entered the house of the offended party and struck her with a bolo. !n that case, the invasion of the privacy of the offended partyOs home was the direct and immediate conse5uence $# %'e provocation given by her. No aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

Pr$sec&%i$n m&s% pr$-e %'a% n$ pr$-$ca%i$n

as )i-en *+ %'e $##en"e" par%+.

E-en i# %'e $##en"er "i" n$% en%er %'e " ellin)! %'is circ&ms%ance applies.
6or this circumstance to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense* it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without. 0welling is aggravating, even if the offender did not enter the upper part of the house where the victim was, but shot from under the house.

E-en i# %'e (illin) %$$( place $&%si"e %'e " ellin)! i% is a))ra-a%in) pr$-i"e" %'a% %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime as *e)&n in %'e " ellin).

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Thus, where the accused began the aggression upon the person of the deceased in the latterOs dwelling by binding his hands or by dragging him from his house and after taking him to a place near the house he killed him, dwelling is aggravating. Dwellin& is a&&ravatin& in abduction or ille&al detention. Aut dwelling was not aggravating in a case where the deceased was called down from his house and he was murdered in the vicinity of the house.

4'a% " ellin) incl&"es.

0welling includes dependencies, the foot of the staircase, and enclosure under the house. !f the deceased was onl% about to step on the first run& of the ladder when he was assaulted, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling will not be applicable.

4'en %'e "ecease" 'a" % $ '$&ses 'ere 'e &se" %$ li-e! %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e cime in an+ $# %'em is a%%en"e" *+ %'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance $# " ellin).
0welling is not aggravating in the following cases; 1. 2. 8hen both offender and offended party are occupants of the same house and this is true even if offender is a servant in the house. 8hen the robbery is committed by the use of force upon thin&s , dwelling is not aggravating because it is inherent.

Aut dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended partyOs house. 0welling is not inherent, hence, aggravating, in robbery with homicide. (. '. .. /. !n the crime of trespass to dwelling, it is inherent or included by law in defining the crime. This crime can be committed only in the dwelling of another. 8hen the owner of the dwelling gave sufficient an" immediate provocation. 8hen the dwelling where the crime was committed did not belong to the offended party. 8hen the rape was committed in the ground floor of a two2story structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a private place of abode or residence.

D ellin) as #$&n" a))ra-a%in) in %'e #$ll$ in) cases al%'$&)' %'e crimes c$mmi%%e" n$% in %'e " ellin) $# %'e -ic%ims.
1. The victim was raped in the boarding house where she was a bedspacer. @er room constituted a Mdwelling.M

ere

2. The victims were raped in their paternal home where they were guests at the time and did not reside there. Aut dwelling was not considered aggravating because the victim was a mere visitor in the house where he was killed. (. '. The victim was killed in the house of her aunt where she was living with her niece. 0welling was considered aggravating. The victims, while sleeping as guests in the house of another person, were shot to death in that house.

D ellin) is a))ra-a%in) $cc&pie" *+ 'er. In case $# a"&l%er+.

'en %'e '&s*an" (ille" 'is es%ran)e"

i#e in %'e '$&se s$lel+

98

8hen adulter% is committed in the dwelling of the husband, even if it is also the dwelling of the unfaithful wife, it is aggravating. Dwellin& not a&&ravatin& in adulter% when paramour also lives there. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence was properly applied, when the offended husband took the paramour into his home, furnished him with food and lodging without charge, and treated him like a son.

D ellin) is n$% incl&"e" in %reac'er+.

lthough nocturnity and abuse of superior strength are always included in the -ualifying circumstance of treachery, dwelling cannot be included therein.

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Par. 9. J )hat the act be committed with 9. Abuse of confidence, or ,. <bvious un&ratefulness. Basis $# %'ese a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances.
Aased on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the means and >ays employe&.

A*&se $# c$n#i"ence.
This circumstance e+ists only when the offended party (as $r,s$e& the o11en&er who later a=,ses s,c( trust by committing the crime. The abuse of confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime

1e5uisites!
1. 2. (. That the offended party had trusted the offender. That the offender abused such trust by committing a crime against the offended party. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime. (People s. E,c(ico&

Example! 1ealous lover, >(o (a& already determined to kill his sweetheart, invited her to a ride in the country. The girl, unsuspecting of his plans, went with him. 8hile they were in the car, the 1ealous lover stabbed her. Confidence does not exist. acts! fter preliminary advances of the master, the female servant refused and fled. The master followed and after catching up with her, threw her on the ground and committed the crime of rape. 8hen the master raped the offended party, she had alread% lost her confidence in him 1rom the moment he made an indecent proposal and offended her with a kiss. There is no abuse of confidence in attempted rape where on the day of the crime, the accused was in the company of the offended girl, not because of her confidence in him, but because they were partners in a certain business.

Special rela%i$n $# c$n#i"ence *e% een acc&se" an" -ic%im.

4etra%al of confidence is not a&&ravatin&. acts! The offended party was living in the house of the accused, her parents having entrusted her to the care of said accused. =ne day, at about /;(: in the evening, while the offended party was standing in front of a store watching some children who were playing, the accused approached her, took her by the arm and forcibly led her to an isolated toilet. @e intimidated her with a knife and through the use of force and violence succeeded in having se+ual intercourse with her. "eld! The accused =e$raye& the con1i&ence reposed in him by the parents of the girl. Aut this is not an aggravating circumstance. !t must be an abuse of confidence that facilitated the commission of the crime which is aggravating.

T'e c$n#i"ence *e% een %'e $##en"er an" %'e $##en"e" m&s% *e imme"ia%e an" pers$nal.
)ere fact that the voters had reposed confidence in the defendant does not mean that he abused their confidence when he committed estafa against them. Abuse of confidence inherent in some felonies. !t is inherent in malversation ( rt. 21$&, -ualified theft ( rt. (1:&, estafa by conversion or misappropriation ( rt. (1.&, and -ualified seduction ( rt. (($&.

Un)ra%e#&lness m&s% *e $*-i$&s! i.e.! mani#es% an" clear.

This aggravating circumstance was present in the case of the accused who killed his father2in2law in whose house he lived and who partially supported him.

100
The circumstance was present where a security guard killed a bank officer and robbed the bank. The circumstance was present where the victim was suddenly attacked while in the act of giving the assailants their bread and coffee for breakfast. The circumstance e+ists when a visitor commits robbery or theft in the house of his host.

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Par. :. )hat the crime be committed in the palace of Chief Executive, or in his presence, or where public authorities are en&a&ed in the dischar&e of their duties, or in a place dedicated to reli&ious worship. Basis $# %'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances.
They are based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the commission of the crime, which must be respected.

Place 'ere p&*lic a&%'$ri%ies are en)a)e" in %'e "isc'ar)e $# %'eir "&%ies <par. :=! "is%in)&is'e" #r$m c$n%emp% $r ins&l% %$ p&*lic a&%'$ri%ies. <par. 6=
C$n%emp% $r ins&l% %$ p&*lic a&%'$ri%ies <Par. 6= The public authorities are in the performance of their duties. The public authorities are performing their duties outside of their office. The public authority should not be the offended party. En)a)e" in %'e "isc'ar)e $# %'eir "&%ies <Par. := The public authorities are in the performance of their duties. The public authorities who are in the performance of their duties must be in their office. @e may be the offended party.

O##icial $r reli)i$&s #&nc%i$ns! n$% necessar+.

The place of the commission of the felony (par. .&, if it is )alacanang palace or a church, is aggravating, regardless of whether State or official or religious functions are being held. The %hief 7+ecutive need not be in )alacanang palace. @is presence alone in any place where the crime is committed is enough to constitute the aggravating circumstance.

O%'er p&*lic a&%'$ri%ies m&s% *e ac%&all+ en)a)e" in %'e per#$rmance $# "&%+.

Aut as regards the place where the public authorities are en&a&ed in the discharge of their duties, there must be some performance of public functions. Thus, where the accused and the deceased who were respectively plaintiff and defendant in a civil case in the court of a 1ustice of the peace, having gotten into some trouble, left the courtroom and went into an ad1oining room, where the accused, without any warning, attacked the deceased with a knife and killed him on the spot, it has been held that it was error to consider the aggravating circumstance of having committed the offense in the place where the public authority was e+ercising his functions. An electoral precinct durin& election da% is a place =where public authorities are en&a&ed in the dischar&e of their duties.= Thus, the aggravating circumstance was appreciated in the murder of a person in an electoral precinct or polling place during election day. %emeteries are not such a place, however respectable they may be, as they are no$ &e&ica$e& to the worship of <od. The church is a place dedicated to religious worship.

O##en"er m&s% 'a-e in%en%i$n %$ c$mmi% a crime

' e n ' e en%ere" %'e place.

acts! t the time of the commission of the crime, both the deceased and defendant were inside a chapel. The deceased placed his hand on the right thigh of defendant girl, who pulled out with her right hand a fan knife and stabbed him. "eld : The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally considered, where there is no evidence to show that the defendant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel on the fatal night.

102

Par. D. G )hat the crime be committed 9. 3n the ni&httime, or ,. 3n an uninhabited place, or .. 4% a band, whenever such circumstances ma% facilitate the commission of the offense. Basis $# %'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances.
They are based on the time and place of the commission of the crime and means and ways employed.

4'en a))ra-a%in).
2i&httime, uninhabited place or band is aggravating F 1. 2. (. 8hen it facilitated the commission of the crime* or 8hen especiall% sou&ht for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity (People s. Par&o, $" 3hil. ./#, .$#&* or 8hen the offender too* advanta&e thereof for the purpose of impunity. (3.S. .$', .$"* People s. %a$=agon, /: 3hil. ##$, #"(& s. #ille&o, (2 3hil.

!f it appears that the accused too* advanta&e of the darkness for the more successful consummation of his plans, to prevent his being recogni,ed, and that the crime might be perpetrated unmolested, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity should be applied.

>eanin) $# ?especiall+ s$&)'% #$r!@ ?#$r %'e p&rp$se $# imp&ni%+!@ an" ?%$$( a"-an%a)e %'ere$#.@
Nighttime is not especially sought for, when the notion to commit the crime was conceived only shortl% before its commission (People s. Par&o, $" 3hil. ./#, .$#2.$"&, or when the crime was committed at night upon a mere casual encounter. Aut where the accused waited for the ni&ht before committing robbery with homicide, nighttime is especially sought for.

Ni)'%%ime nee" n$% *e speci#icall+ s$&)'% #$r 'en 5. I% #acili%a%e" %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e $##ense! $r 6. T'e $##en"er %$$( a"-an%a)e $# %'e same %$ c$mmi% %'e crime.
The circumstance of nocturnity, although not specifically sought for by the culprit, shall aggravate his criminal liability if it facilitated the commission of the offense or the offender took advantage of the same to commit the crime. = or the purpose of impunit%# means to prevent his (accusedOs& bein& reco&ni(ed, or to secure himself against detection and punishment.

Ni)'%%ime.
Ay the word MnighttimeM should be understood, according to Hiada, that period of darkness be&innin& at end of dus* and endin& at dawn. 2i&httime b% and of itself is not an a&&ravatin& circumstance. Ay and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. !t becomes so only when it is especially sought by the offender, or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to insure his immunity from capture. 8here the darkness of the night was merely incidental to the collision between two vehicles which caused the heated argument and the eventual stabbing of the victim, nighttime is not aggravating.

103

T'e in#$rma%i$n m&s% alle)e %'a% ni)'%%ime as s$&)'% #$r $r %a(en a"-an%a)e $# *+ %'e acc&se" $r %'a% i% #acili%a%e" %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime.
The bare statement in the information that the crime was committed in the darkness of the night fails to satisfy the criterion.

N$% a))ra-a%in)

'en %'e crime *e)an a% "a+%ime.

)he commission of the crime must be&in and be accomplished in the ni&httime. Thus, although the safe was thrown into the bay at night, but the money, the taking of which constituted the offense, was withdrawn from the treasury during the daytime, the crime of malversation was not attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. )he offense must be actuall% committed in the dar*ness of the ni&ht. Thus, when the defendants did not intentionall% see* the cover of darkness for the purpose of committing murder and they were carrying a li&ht of sufficient brilliance which made it easy for the people nearby to reco&ni(e them nighttime is not aggravating. +hen the place of the crime is illuminated b% li&ht, ni&httime is not a&&ravatin&.

T'e li)'%in) $# a ma%c's%ic( $r &se $# #las'li)'%s "$es n$% ne)a%e %'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance $# ni)'%%ime.
!t is self2evident that nighttime was sought by appellant to facilitate the commission of the offense, when all the members of the household were asleep. The fact that 9estituto 5uanita hit a matchstick does not negate the presence of said aggravating circumstance.

4'a% is &nin'a*i%e" place;

n uninhabited place is one where there are no houses at all, a place at a considerable distance from town, or where the houses are scattered at a great distance from each other. This aggravating circumstance should not be considered when the place where the crime was committed could be seen and the voice of the deceased could be heard from a nearby house. This aggravating circumstance should be determined not by the distance of the nearest house from the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of the commission of the offense there was a reasonable possibilit% of the victim receivin& some help. Thus, the crime is committed in an uninhabited place where the killing was done during nighttime, in a sugarcane plantation about a hundred meters from the nearest house, and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby. 4ninhabited place is aggravating where the felony was perpetrated in the open sea, where no help could be e+pected by the victim from other persons and the offenders could easily escape punishment. place about a kilometer from the nearest house or other inhabited place is considered an uninhabited place. The accused sought the solitude of the place in order to better attain their purpose without interference, and to secure themselves against detection and punishment.

4'en %'e -ic%ims are %'e $cc&pan%s $# %'e $nl+ '$&se in %'e place! %'e crime is c$mmi%%e" in an &nin'a*i%e" place.

104

S$li%&"e m&s% *e s$&)'% %$ *e%%er a%%ain %'e criminal p&rp$se.

!t must appear that the accused sou&ht the solitude of the place where the crime was committed, in order to better attain his purpose. (1& To an eas% and uninterrupted accomplishment of their criminal designs, or (2& to insure concealment of the offense, that he might thereby be better secured against detection and punishment. %annot be considered against the defendants, although the house nearest to the dwelling of the victim was about a kilometer away, if the defendants did not select the place either to better attain their ob1ect without interference or to secure themselves against detection and punishment.

4'a% is a *an";
)ore than three armed malefactors shall have acted to&ether in the commission of an offense. )he armed men must act to&ether in the commission of the crime. The mere fact that there are more than three armed men at the scene of the crime does not prove the e+istence of a band, if only one of them committed the crime while the others were not aware of the commission of the crime. >Stone? is included in the term >arm.?

I# $ne $# %'e 9 arme" pers$ns is a principal *+ in"&cemen%! %'e+ "$ n$% #$rm a *an".
ll the armed men, at least four in number, must take direct part in the e+ecution of the act constituting the crime.

4'en ni)'%%ime! &nin'a*i%e" place! $r *+ a *an" "i" n$% #acili%a%e %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime! as n$% especiall+ s$&)'% #$r! $r as n$% %a(en a"-an%a)e $#.
8hen four armed persons, who casuall% met another group of three armed persons in an uninhabited place at ni&httime, -uarreled with the latter and, in the heat of an&er, the two groups fought against each other, resulting in the death of one of the, three which formed the other group, nighttime, uninhabited place, and by a band are not aggravating circumstances.

?B+ a *an"@ is a))ra-a%ain) in crimes a)ains% pr$per%+ $r a)ains% pers$ns $r in %'e crime $# ille)al "e%en%i$n $r %eas$n. N$% applica*le %$ crimes a)ains% c'as%i%+.
Thus, in the crime of rape committed by four armed persons, this circumstance was not considered.

A*&se $# s&peri$r s%ren)%' an" &se $# #irearms! a*s$r*e" in a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance ?*+ a *an".@ ?B+ a *an"@ is in'eren% in *ri)an"a)e. ?B+ a *an"@ is a))ra-a%in) in r$**er+ i%' '$mici"e.

105

Par. B. G )hat the crime be committed on the occasion of a confla&ration, shipwrec*, earth5ua*e, epidemic, or other calamit% or misfortune. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis of this aggravating circumstance has reference to the time of the commission of the crime.

Reas$n #$r %'e a))ra-a%i$n.

The reason for the e+istence of this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the conte+t of the phrase Mother calamity or misfortune.M

Par. H. G )hat the crime be committed with the aid of 9. Armed men, or ,. Perons who insure or afford impunit%. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
!t is based on the means and >ays of committing the crime.

ReA&isi%es $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.

1. 2. That armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directl% or indirectl%. That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed.

R&le #$r %'e applica%i$n $# %'is circ&ms%ance.

The casual presence of armed men near the place where the crime was committed does not constitute an aggravating circumstance when it appears that the accused did not avail himself of their aid or rel% upon them to commit the crime.

T'e arme" men m&s% %a(e par% "irec%l+ $r in"irec%l+.

MThe testimony of the accused, corroborated by that of the is that the crime was committed by him (accused& alone, without assistance from any one. !t is true that in the house near the place where the crime was committed there were ten men armed with daggers, and five without arms, but these men took no part, directl% or indirectl%, in the commission of the crime . The accused, therefore, did not avail himself of their aid or rely upon them to commit the crime.M

E3amples $#

i%' %'e ai" $# arme" men.

= and B were prosecuted for robbery with rape. !t appeared from their written confessions that they had companions who were armed when they committed the crime. !t was held that they were guilty of robbery with rape with the aggravating circumstance of aid of armed men. Exceptions! 1. e-ually armed. 2. This aggravating circumstance is not present when the accused as well as those who cooperated with him in the commission of the crime acted under the same plan and for the same purpose. 8hen both the attacking party and the party attacked were

106

K4i%' %'e ai" $# arme" menK <Par. E=! "is%in)&is'e" #r$m K*+ a *an".K <Par. C=
id of armed men 3resent even if one of the offenders merely relied on their aid, for actual aid is not necessary. Ay a band 9e-uires that more than three armed malefactors shall have acted to&ether in the commission of an offense.

Ai" $# arme" men is a*s$r*e" *+ empl$+men% $# a *an".

!f there are four armed men, aid of armed men is absorbed in employment of a band. !f there are three armed men or less, aid of armed men may be the aggravating circumstance.

Par. C. 8 )hat the accused is a recidivist. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.

This is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by his inclination to crimes.

4'$ is a reci"i-is%;
recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final 1udgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the 9evised 3enal %ode. ( People s. Eagar$o, <.9. No. /.#((, )ay /, 1""1, 1"/ S%9 /11, /1"&

1e5uisites!
1. 2. (. '. That the offender is on trial for an offense* That he was previousl% convicted by final $ud&ment of another crime* That both the first and the second offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code> That the offender is convicted of the new offense.

?A% %'e %ime $# 'is %rial #$r $ne crime.@

8hat is controlling is the time of trial, not the time of the commission of the crime. !t is employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the 1udgment. !t is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the 1udge in open court. 2o recidivism if the subse5uent conviction is for an offense committed before the offense involved in the prior conviction. The accused was convicted of robbery with homicide committed on 0ecember 2(, 1"'$. @e was previousl% convicted of theft committed on 0ecember (:, 1"'$. "eld! The accused was not a recidivist.

KPre-i$&sl+ c$n-ic%e" *+ #inal .&")men%.K

The accused was prosecuted and tried for theft, estafa and robbery. 5udgments for three offenses were read on the same day. !s he a recidivistG No, because the 1udgment in any of the first two offenses was not yet final when he was tried for the third offense.

T'ere is reci"i-ism e-en i# %'e lapse $# %ime *e% een % $ #el$nies is m$re %'an 5I +ears.
9ecidivism must be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance no matter how many years have

107
intervened between the first and second felonies.

Par. 9I. : )hat the offender has been previousl% punished for an offense to which the law attaches an e5ual or &reater penalt% or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a li&hter penalt%. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis is the same as that of recidivism, i.e., the greater perversity of the offender as shown by his inclination to crimes.

1e5uisites!
1. 2. That the accused is on trial for an offense* That he previously served sentence for another offense to which the law attaches an e5ual or &reater penalty, or for two or more crimes to which it attaches li&hter penalty than that for the new offense* and That he is convicted of the new offense.

(.

I% is %'e penal%+ a%%ac'e" %$ %'e $##ense! n$% %'e penal%+ ac%&all+ imp$se".
3aragraph No. 1: of rt. 1' speaks of penalty attached to the offense, which may have several periods. @ence, even if the accused served the penalty of prision ma%or in its minimum period and is now convicted of an offense for which the penalty of prision ma%or ma+imum is imposed, there is still habituality, provided that the penalty attached to the two offenses is prision ma%or in its full e+tent. Reci"i-ism !t is enough that a final $ud&ment has been rendered in the first offense. 9e-uires that the offenses be included in the same title of the code. lways to be taken into consid2eration in fi+ing the penalty to be imposed upon the accused. Rei%eraci$n !t is necessary that the offender shall have served out his sentence for the first offense The previous and subse-uent offenses must not be embraced in the same title of the %ode. Not always an aggravating circumstance.

T'e #$&r #$rms $# repe%i%i$n are,

1. 2. (. '. 9ecidivism. (3aragraph ", rt. 1'& 9eiteracion or habituality. (3aragraph 1:, rt. 1'& )ulti2recidivism or habitual delin-uency. ( rt. /2, paragraph .& Puasi2recidivism. ( rt. 1/:&

The first two are &eneric aggravating circumstances, while the third is an extraordinar% aggravating circumstance. The fourth is a special aggravating circumstance.

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Par. 99. : )hat the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise. 4asis!
This is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the motivating power itself.

T'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance pres&pp$ses %'e c$nc&rrence $# % $ $r m$re $##en"ers.

8hen this aggravating circumstance is present, there must be two or more principals, the one who gives or offers the price or promise and the one who accepts it.

Is %'is para)rap' applica*le %$ %'e $ne

'$ )a-e %'e price $r re ar";

!t affects not only the person who received the price or reward, but also the person who gave it. People . 7alle&o F 7im=re"a F price or reward cannot be considered against the other accused for reason that it was not she who committed the crime in consideration of price or reward. !f alleged in the information as -ualifying aggravating circumstance, it shall be considered against all the accused, being an element of the crime of murder.

Price! re ar" $r pr$mise m&s% *e #$r %'e p&rp$se $# in"&cin) an$%'er %$ per#$rm %'e "ee".
!f such was given voluntarily after the crime had been committed as an e+pression of his appreciation for the sympathy and aid shown by other accused, should not be taken into consideration for increase of penalty.

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Par. 9,. 8 )hat the crime be committed b% means of inundaition, fire, poison, explosion, strandin& of a vessel or intentional dama&e thereto, detailment of a locomotive, or b% the use of an% other artifice involvin& &reat waste or ruin. Basis,
This circumstance has reference to the means and ways involved.

4'en &se" as a means %$ (ill an$%'er pers$n! %'e crime is m&r"er.

9. =4% means of fire= !n order to constitute murder, there should be an actual desi&n to *ill and that the use of fire should be purposel% adopted as a means to that end. !f the offender had the intent to *ill the victim, burned the house where the latter was, and the victim died as a conse-uence, the crime is murder, -ualified by the circumstance that the crime was committed Mby means of fire.M Aut if a house was set on fire after the *illin& of the victim, there would be two separate crimes of arson and murder or homicide. (People s. #ase=all, '# 3hil. '(", ''1* People s. Pining, /( 3hil. .'/, ..2& There would not be an aggravating circumstance of Mby means of fire.M ,. /4% means of explosion= 8hat crime is committed if a hand grenade is thrown into the house where a family of seven persons live, and as a result of the explosion, the wall of the house is damagedG The offense is a crime involving destruction ( rt. (2'&. !f one of the people there died, but there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, it will be a crime involving destruction also, but the penalty will be lower. .. =4% means of derailment of locomotive= 8hat crime is committed if as a result of the derailment of cars only property is damagedG !t is damage to means of communication under rt. ((:. 8hat is the crime if the death of a person also results without intent to *ill on the part of the offenderG !t is a comple+ crime of damage to means of communication with homicide. ( rts. ((: and 2'" in relation to rts. ' and '#& 8hat is the crime committed, if the death of a person resulted and there was intent to kill on the part of the offenderG !t is murder, because the derailment of cars or locomotive was the means used to kill the victim. ( rt. 2'#& Ae noted that each of the circumstances of Mfire,M Me+plosion,M and Mderailment of a locomotiveM may be a part of the definition of particular crime, such as, arson ( rt. (2:&, crime involving destruction ( rt. (2'&, and damages and obstruction to means of communication. ( rt. ((:& Par. 9, distin&uished from Par. B. 4nder par. 12, the crime is committed by means of any of such acts involving great waste or ruin. 4nder par. $, the crime is committed on the occasion of a calamity or misfortune.

110

Par. 9.. G )hat the act be committed with evident premeditation. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis has reference to the ways of committing the crime, because evident premeditation implies a deliberate planning of the act before e+ecuting it.

1e5uisites of evident premeditation!

1. 2. (. The prosecution must prove The time when the offender determined to commit the crime* n act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination* and sufficient lapse of time between the determination and e+ecution, to allow him to reflect upon the conse-uences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. ( People s. Eagar$o, <.9. No. /.##(, )ay /, 1""1, and legions of other cases&.

Essence $# preme"i%a%i$n.
That the e+ecution of the criminal act must be preceded b% cool thou&ht and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm $ud&ment. 7vident premeditation may not be appreciated absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Neither is it aggravating where the fracas was the result of rising tempers, not a deliberate plan. !t is not aggravating in the absence of evidence showing that. the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution, and the deceased was unknown to the accused before the incident.

T'e preme"i%a%i$n m&s% *e e-i"en%.

There must be evidence showing that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when the crime was conceived b% him and the time it was actuall% perpetrated.

T'e "a%e an" %ime

'en %'e $##en"er "e%ermine" %$ c$mmi% %'e crime is essen%ial.

Aecause the lapse of time for the purpose of the third re-uisite is computed from that date and time.

Sec$n" reA&isi%e necessar+.

The premeditation must be based upon external acts and not presumed from mere lapse of time. Thus, although in the offenderOs confession there is a statement that, on the morning of Aune ,C, when he heard that %alma was at large, he proposed to kill him, there is an entire absence of evidence showing that he meditated and reflected on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated.

Sec$n" reA&isi%e e3is%s.

After the offenders had determined (conceived& to commit the crime, they manifestly indicated that they clung to their determination 2 1. 2. (. 8hen the crime was carefull% planned by the offenders. 8hen the offenders previousl% prepared the means which they considered ade-uate to carry it out. 8hen a grave was prepared at an isolated place in the field for the reception of the body of the person whom the criminals intended to kill. (3.S. s. Arreglla&o, 1( 3hil. //:&

111

'. .. /. $.

8hen the defendants made repeated statements that the hour of reckoning of the victim would arrive and armed themselves with deadly weapons. 8hen a grave was prepared at an isolated place in the field for the reception of the body of the person whom the criminals intended to kill. (3.S. s. Arreglla&o, 1( 3hil. //:& 8hen the defendants made repeated statements that the hour of reckoning of the victim would arrive and armed themselves with deadly weapons. 0efendant, according to his own confession, three times attempted to take the life of the deceased in order to be able to marry his widow, with whom he was in love.

>ere %'rea%s
1.

i%'$&% %'e sec$n" elemen% "$es n$% s'$

e-i"en% preme"i%a%i$n.

threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence, which would disclose the true criminal state of mind of the accused, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation. ( People s. B,en$es,ela, <.9. No. B2'#2$(, pril 22, 1"'2& The mere fact that the accused stated in his e+tra1udicial confession that as soon as he heard that the deceased had escaped from the army stockade he prepared to kill him, is not sufficient to establish evident premeditation. The killing happened when appellant was plowing the field and the deceased une+pectedly appeared thereat. !t is clear that appellantOs act of shooting the deceased was not premeditated.

2.

E3is%ence $# ill/#eelin) $r )r&")e al$ne n$% pr$$# $# e-i"en% preme"i%a%i$n.

!t is true that about twelve days before the killing, the accused tried to in1ure the victim. @e desisted after he was restrained by third persons who intervened during the altercation. The prosecutionOs evidence does not show the steps that the accused took thereafter in order that he could kill the victim on that fateful hour when the latter was answering a call of nature on the porch of his house. )ere fact that after lunch time the accused mauled and detained the victim and that at around four oOclock, while the latter was in their custody, he was killed, would not mean that there was evident premeditation.

4'a% is s&##icien% lapse $# %ime;

8here the accused had had three dayOs time to meditate upon the crime which he intended to commit, and was not prompted by the impulse of the moment. 8here the accused had more than one2half day for meditation and reflection and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will ;veneer las determinaciones de la voluntad6 had he desired to hearken to its warnings. our hours that intervened between rage and aggression of the accused is sufficient time for desistance.

8 '$&rs $r less is c$nsi"ere" s&##icien% lapse $# %ime.

Aut where the defendant constabulary soldier was rebuked by his superior at around $;:: a.m. and, a 5uarter of an hour later, he shot to death his superior, there was no premeditation because a sufficient time did not elapse to allow the conscience of the accused to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired to hearken to its warning. Nevertheless in People vs. Dumdum, it was held that the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident premeditation because the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before its perpetration.

4'+ s&##icien% %ime is reA&ire".

7vident premeditation contemplates cold and deep meditation, and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. )ere determination to commit the crime does not of itself establish evident premeditation for it

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must appear, not only that the accused made a decision to commit the crime prior to the moment of e+ecution, but also that his decision was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection or persistent attempt.

T'ere m&s% *e s&##icien% %ime *e% een %'e $&% ar" ac%s an" %'e ac%&al c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime.
Aut when it appears that the accused borrowed a bolo for the purpose of committing the crime earl% in the morning and was lying in wait for some time before he attacked his victim, evident premeditation is sufficiently established.

C$nspirac+ )enerall+ pres&pp$ses preme"i%a%i$n.

8here conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of e+ecuting the crime, the e+istence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. Exception! 8hen conspiracy is only implied.

E-i"en% preme"i%a%i$n an" price $r re ar" can c$/e3is%.

3remeditation is absorbed by reward or promise. Aut this rule is applicable only to the inductor. The mere fact that another e+ecuted the act on the promise of reward does not necessarily mean that he had sufficient time to reflect on the conse-uences of his act.

4'en -i%cim is "i##eren% #r$m %'a% in%en"e"! preme"i%a%i$n is n$% a))ra-a%in).

7vident premeditation ma% not be properl% taken into account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. Distin&uish the rulin& in the )imbal case from that in the -uillen case. )imbol, et al., <.9. Nos. B2'$'$12'$'$(, ugust ', 1"'', it was held that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also an% one who ma% help him put a violent resistance.

I% is n$% necessar+ %'a% %'ere is a plan %$ (ill a par%ic&lar pers$n.

fter careful and thou&htful meditation, the accused decided to kill, at the first opportunity, whatever individual he should meet from the town of )acabebe, on account of the previous illness of his son of cholera which he attributed to the persons from )acabebe. "eld! !nasmuch as the accused intentionally sought out a native of the town of )acabebe, a human bein&, there is no doubt that, actuated by the impulse of his pre1udice against any individual from )acabebe and obedient to his criminal resolution seriously conceived and selected to carry out vengeance, he perpetrated the crime with premeditation.

Reas$n #$r %'e "i##erence $# %'e r&lin)s.

8hen the offender decided to kill a particular person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he actually killed another person, it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Aut if the offender premeditated on the killing of an% person, like the offender in the )analinde case who decided to kill the first two persons he would meet in the market place, it is proper to consider against the offender the aggravating circumstance of premeditation.

E-i"en% preme"i%a%i$n! 'ile in'eren% in r$**er+! ma+ *e a))ra-a%in) in r$**er+ i%' '$mici"e i# %'e preme"i%a%i$n incl&"e" %'e (illn) $# %'e -ic%im.
8here the killing of a person during the commission of robbery was only an incident, because their original plan was only to rob, and they killed the deceased when the latter refused to open the Mkaha de yeroM and fought with

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them, this aggravating circumstance should be disregarded.

Par. 90. : )hat ;96 craft, ;,6 fraud, or ;.6 dis&uise be emplo%ed. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis has reference to the means employed in the commission of the crime.

Applica%i$n $# %'is para)rap'.

This circumstance is characteri,ed by the intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the criminal resorts to carry out his design. This paragraph was intended to cover, for e+ample, the case where a thief falsely represents that he is the lover of the servant of a house in order to gain entrance and rob the owner ;astucia6> or where ;fraude6 simulates the handwriting of A, who is a friend of %, inviting the latter, without the knowledge of A, by means of a note written in such simulated hand, to meet A at the designated place, in order to give , who lies in wait at the place appointed, an opportunity to kill %* or where ;disfra(6 one uses a disguise to prevent being recogni,ed.

Cra#% <in-$l-es intellectual tric*er% and cunnin& on the part of the accused6.
%raft involves the use of intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused. !t is not attendant where the regular driver of the victim feigned illness to enable another driver to drive for the victim who drove the vehicle first to the house of the regular driver who said he was already well and so he boarded with his co2accused, took over the driverOs seat, and during the trip shot the victim who was also on board the vehicle. The act of the accused in pretending to be bona fide passengers in the ta+icab driven by the deceased, when they were not so in fact, in order not to arouse his suspicion, and then killing him, constituted craft. The act of the accused in assuming position of authority, pretending to be a member of the %!0 when he was not, to gain entrance and be able to be with the offended party alone in the TatterOs house, thus enabling him to commit acts of lasciviousness against her, constituted craft. The act of the accused in brushing the dirt on the pants of the offended party, which the accused himself had dirtied, and while the attention of the offended party was centered on the act of the accused, a confederate of the accused grabbed the wallet of the offended party from behind, constituted craft. Aut craft is not attendant where the unlawful scheme could have been carried out 1ust the same even without the pretense.

Cra#%!

'en n$% an a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.

%raft is not clearly established where the evidence shows that the accused and his companions, who came out from behind a patch of bamboo trees, did not camouflage their hostile intentions at the incipiency of the attack, as they announced their presence at the scene of the crime with shouts and gunshots.

0ra&" ;insidious words or machinations used to induce the victim to act in a manner which would enable the $##en"er to carr+ out his "esi)n=.
8here the defendants, upon the prete+t of wanting to buy a bottle of wine, induced the victim to go down to the lower story of his dwelling where the wine was stored, entered it when the door was opened to him, and there commenced the assault which ended in his death, it was also held that there was fraud.

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Par. 9G. : )hat the offender had ta*en advanta&e of superior stren&th, or that means be emplo%ed to wea*en the defense. T'ere m&s% *e a s'$ in) $# n$%$ri$&s ineA&ali%+ $# #$rces *e% een %'e -ic%im an" %'e a))ress$r.
The number of the assailants and the firearms and bolos which they used on the victim show notorious ine-uality of forces between the victim and the aggressor. buse of superior strength is present not only when the offenders en1oy numerical superiority or there is a notorious ine-uality of force between the victim and the aggressor, but also when the of fender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party. 8here abuse of superior strength is to be estimated as an aggravating circumstance from the mere fact that more than one person participated in the offense, it must appear that the accused cooperated to&ether in some way designed to weaken the defense. This would make them guilty in the character of principals. This circumstance is present in illegal detention ( rts. 2/$ and 2/#&, where si+ persons took and carried away the victim from his home. in robbery with rape, committed by five armed persons and robbery with homicide, committed by three men.

T'e circ&ms%ance $# K*+ a *an"K an" %'a% $# Ka*&se $# s&peri$r s%ren)%'!K "is%in)&is'e".
The circumstance of abuse of superiority was, however, withdrawn by the prosecution on the ground that since the offense of robbery with homicide was committed by a band, the element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. 8e believe that said withdrawal was ill advised since the circumstances of band and abuse of superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is appreciated when the offense is committed by more than three armed malefactors regardless of the comparative strength of the victim or victims. =n the other hand, the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their collective strength to overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims.

A*&se $# s&peri$ri%+ a*s$r*s cuadrilla.

The two circumstances have the same essence which is the utili,ation of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim and consummate the killing.

T'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance $# *+ a *an" is a*s$r*e" in %reac'er+. T'a% ?means *e empl$+e" %$ ea(en %'e "e#ense.@

The circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is illustrated in the case where one, struggling with another, suddenly throws a cloak over the head of his opponent and while in this situation he wounds or kills him.

In%$3ica%in) %'e -ic%im %$

ea(en "e#ense.

7+ists also when the offender, who had the intention to kill the victim, made the deceased intoxicated, thereby materiall% wea*enin& the latterOs resisting power.

I# %'e s%a%e $# in%$3ica%i$n is s&c' %'a% %'e -ic%im cann$% p&% &p an+ s$r% $# "e#ense / %reac'er+.
!f in his into+icated state it was impossible for the victim to put up an% sort of resistance at the time he was attacked, treachery may be considered.

Applica*le $nl+ %$ crimes a)ains% pers$ns! e%c.

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>eans %$ ea(en %'e "e#ense is a*s$r*e" in %reac'er+.

Par. 9D. 8 )hat the act be committed with treacher% ;Alevosia6. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis has reference to the means an& >ays employed in the commission of the crime.

>eanin) $# %reac'er+.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, emplo%in& means, methods or forms in the e+ecution thereof which tend directl% and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Applies $nl+ %$ crimes a)ains% pers$ns. I% is n$% necessar+ %'a% %'e m$"e $# a%%ac( ins&res %'e c$ns&mma%i$n $# %'e $##ense.
The treacherous character of the means employed in the aggression does not depend upon the result thereof but upon the means itself, in connection with the aggressor Os purpose in employing it. =therwise, there would be no attempted or frustrated murder -ualified by treachery. 6or this reason, the law does not re-uire that the treacherous means insure the e+ecution of the aggression, without risk to the person of the aggressor arising from the defense which the offended party might make, it being sufficient that it tends to this end.

Treac'er+ cann$% *e pres&me".

The suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victimOs helpless position was accidental. 8here no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the deceased began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.

Ill&s%ra%i$ns <n$ %reac'er+ in %'ese cases=,

8here the assailant was alone while his victim had four ('& companions nearby who could respond instinctively upon seeing their in1ured companion* an altercation preceded the attack* and the meeting of the victim and the assailant was only accidental. 8here no witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented. Neither is the circumstance attendant where the attack was frontal, indicating that the victim was not totally without opportunity to defend himself, and all surrounding circumstances indicate that the attack was the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment. Exceptions! 8hen the victim was tied elbow to elbow, his body with many wounds and his head cut off, treachery may be con 2 sidered, though no witnesses saw the killing. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on the victims, the victims had no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused2appellants had earlier tied their hands. Treachery must be appreciated in the killing of a child even if the manner of attack is not shown.

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T'e m$"e $# a%%ac( m&s% *e c$nsci$&sl+ a"$p%e".

This means that; The accused must ma*e some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the e+ecution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate The mode of attac* must be thou&ht of b% the offender, and must not spring from the une+pected turn of events.

3n the followin& cases, it was held that there was treacher%!

The act of shooting the victim at a distance, without the least e+pectation on his part that he would be assaulted, is characteri,ed by treachery. The accused made a deliberate, surprise attack on the victims. They perpetrated the killings in such a manner that there was no risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victims might have made. @is hands were raised and he was pleading for mercy with one of the assailants when another struck him on the neck with a bolo. The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. @e was unarmed and defenseless. @e was not e+pecting to be assaulted. @e did not give any immediate provocation. 8here the victim was tied and gagged before being stabbed. The accused, after having made two steps behind the victim, suddenly and une+pectedly, with the use of a bolo, hacked the deceased at his back causing a deep wound and fracture of the .th rib. 8hen the victim faced the accused, he was again hacked at the forehead.

4'en %reac'er+ is n$% presen%.

The attack was perpetrated in a frontal encounter, shown by the location of the wounds on the front part of the victimOs body. There were no wounds on the back. The assailants did not make any deliberate, surprise attack on the victim. The malefactors gave him an ominous warning of their presence and heralded their entrance into his house by firing two gunshots at the ground. They first mauled him presumably in a frontal encounter. They announced their presence at the scene of the crime with shouts and gunshots. That mode of attack negated the e+istence of treachery since the element of surprise, which marks the presence of treachery.

4'en %reac'er+ cann$% *e c$nsi"ere".

%annot be appreciated where there is nothing in the record to show that the accused had pondered upon the mode or method to insure the killing of the deceased or remove or diminish any risk to himself that might arise from the defense that the deceased might make. 8hen there is no evidence that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit the crime, or there is no proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, treacher% cannot be considered. !f the decision to *ill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberatel% sou&ht by the accused, but was purely accidental. )ere suddenness of the attack is not enough to constitute treachery. Such method or form of attack must be deliberatel% chosen by the accused.

)hat the mode of attac* was consciousl% adopted ma% be inferred from the circumstances.
Ay their acts of showering the house with bullets, e+ecuted in the darkness of the night, the offenders employed means, methods and forms in the e+ecution of the crime, which tended directly to insure the e+ecution of their

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criminal design without risk to themselves arising from the defense, which the occupants of the house might make. The offended party was unable to prepare himself for his defense. Treachery is present although the shooting was frontal, as when the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim was not in a position to offer an effective defense. Treachery attended where the victim was completely taken by surprise and shot, where he was seated peacefully eating with his family. That he was shot face to face did not make the attack any less treacherous as he was totally taken aback and rendered completely defenseless when he was shot.

0las'in) %'e *eam $# a #las'li)'% $n %'e #ace $# -ic%im.

8here immediately prior to the stabbing, the accused flashed the beam of his flashlight $n the face of his victim, momentarily blinding the latter, the attack, thou&h frontal, was sudden and per petrated in a manner tending directly to insure its e+ecution.

Treac'er+ m&s% *e pr$-e" *+ clear an" c$n-incin) e-i"ence.

Treachery cannot be presumed* it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing, if such be the crime, itself.

A%%ac( #r$m *e'in" is n$% al a+s ale-$sia.

!t must appear that such mode of attack was consciously adopted and the -uestion of risk to the offender must be taken into account. !t must appear that such mode of attack was consciously adopted and the -uestion of risk to the offender must be taken into account. The mere fact that the victim had a stab wound at the back is not indicative of alevosia, where the deceased had sustained two (2& other stab wounds at the front, and the evidence clearly shows that the stab wound at the back was the last to be inflicted.

>&s% %reac'er+ *e presen% in %'e *e)innin) $# %'e assa&l%;

!t depends upon the circumstances of the case. <eneral 9ule; !t must be shown that the treacherous acts were present and preceded the commencement of the attac* which caused the in$ur% complained of. Aut even though in the inception of the aggression which ended in the death of the deceased, treachery was not present, if there was a brea* in the continuit% of the aggression and at the time the fatal wound was inflicted on the deceased he was defenseless, the circumstance of treacher% must be ta*en into account. U.S. vs. 4alu%ot acts! The accused fired at the governor, hitting the latter in the region of the right shoulder blade and passing through the body, an inch or two from the wound made by the first shot. The governor continued his flight along the corridor and took refuge in a closet at the end of the corridor. =nce within, he shut the door and placed himself in a position to obstruct the entrance of his pursuer, who vainly attempted to open the door. The governor screamed for help. This time, the accused who was outside the closet stopped for a moment and $ud&in& the position of the &overnorKs head from the direction of the sound emitted, fired his revolver in the direction indicated. The bullet passed through the panel of the door and struck the governor in the forward part of the head near and above the temple. This wound was necessarily fatal. !n the closet with the door shut, it was impossible for the governor to see what his assailant was doing or to make any defense whatever against the shot directed through the panel of the door. !t was as if the victim had been bound or blind2folded, or had been treacherously attacked from behind in a path obscured by the darkness of the night Aefore the fatal third wound was inflicted by the accused, he had stopped for sometime. This fact is deducible

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from the circumstances that the accused attempted vainly to open the door of the closet* and that when he failed, he 1udged the position of the head of the governor before firing his revolver. 7vidently, a certain period of time must have elapsed in doing all of these acts. Aecause of that interruption, the assault was not continuous up to the moment when the fatal blow was inflicted treacherously.

S&mmar+ $# %'e r&les.

1. 2. 8hen the aggression is continuous, treachery must be present in the be&innin& of the assault. 8hen the assault was not continuous, in that there was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery was present at the moment the fatal blow was &iven.

In %reac'er+! i% ma(es n$ "i##erence 'e%'er $r n$% %'e -ic%im pers$n '$m %'e acc&se" in%en"e" %$ (ill.

as %'e same

Treachery, whenever present in the commission of a crime, should be taken into account no matter whether the victim of the treacherous attack was or was not the same person whom the accused intended to kill.

4'en %reac'er+ is n$% %$ *e c$nsi"ere" as %$ %'e principal *+ in"&c%i$n.

8hen it is not shown that the principal by induction directed or induced the killer of the deceased to adopt the means or methods actually used by the latter in accomplishing the murder, because the former left to the latter the details as to how it was to be accomplished.

Treac'er+! a*&se $# s&peri$r s%ren)%'! an" means empl$+e" %$ "e#ense! "is%in)&is'e".

Treac'er+ )eans, methods or forms of attack are employed by the offender to make it impossible or hard for the offended party to put up any sort of resistance. A*&ses $# s&peri$r s%ren)%' The offender does not employ means, methods or forms of attack* he only takes advantage of his superior strength.

ea(en %'e

>eans empl$+e" %$ ea(en" %'e "e#ense The offender, like in treachery, employs means but the means employed onl% materiall% weakens the resisting power of the offended party.

4'en %'ere is c$nspirac+! %reac'er+ is c$nsi"ere" a)ains% all %'e $##en"ers.

@ence, if there was no conspiracy even if two accused helped each other in attacking the deceased, only the one who inflicted the wound upon the deceased while the latter was struggling with the other defendant, is to suffer the effect of the attendance of treachery. That is, treachery should be considered against Mthose persons only who had *nowled&e= of the employment of treachery Mat the time of the e+ecution of the act or their cooperation therein.M

T'e mas%ermin" s'$&l" 'a-e (n$ le")e $# %'e empl$+men% $# %reac'er+ i# 'e n$% presen% 'en %'e crime as c$mmi%%e".

as

I# %'e in%er-en%i$n $# $%'er pers$ns "i" n$% "irec%l+ an" especiall+ ins&re %'e e3ec&%i$n $# %'e crime i%'$&% ris( %$ %'e acc&se"! %'ere is n$ %reac'er+.
Thus, even if the wife and sister of the accused held the deceased by his shirt when the accused inflicted the bolo wounds which caused his death, there is no treachery, because the body and hands of the deceased were not deprived of liberty of action and, hence, there is still risk to the person of the accused arising from the defense which the victim might make. Aut if, of the four persons who were to rob a house, one grappled with the watchman while the two opened fire and mortally wounded both combatants, it was held that even though in the in ception of the aggression, the watchman carried a carbine and was at liberty to defend himself, it is a fact that at the time the fatal wounds were inflicted, he was defenseless.

Treac'er+! e-i"en% premi"%a%i$n an" &se $# s&peri$r s%ren)%' are a*s$r*e" in

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%reas$n *+ (illin)s. Treac'er+ a*s$r*s a*&se $# s&peri$r s%ren)%'! ai" $# arme" men! *+ a *an" an" means %$ ea(en %'e "e#ense.
8hen treachery is taken into account as a -ualifying circumstance in murder, it is improper to consider, in addition to that circumstance, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, since the latter is necessarily included in the former. Nighttime and abuse of superior strength are inherent in treachery and cannot be appreciated separately. buse of superiority and aid of armed men are absorbed in treachery.

4'en ni)'%%ime is n$% a*s$r*e" in %reac'er+.

There was treachery in the commission of the offense at bar. The victimsO hands were tied at the time they were beaten. Since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed therein, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom.

Cra#% is incl&"e" an" a*s$r*e" *+ %reac'er+.

Aut when craft was employed in robbery with homicide, not with a view to making treachery more effective as nighttime or abuse of superior strength would in the killing of the victim, but to facilitate the taking of the 1eep in the robbery scheme as planned by the culprits, it is not absorbed in treachery.

A)e an" se3 are incl&"e" in %reac'er+. Dwellin& is not included in treacher%. Treac'er+ is in'eren% in m&r"er *+ p$is$nin). Treac'er+ cann$% c$/e3is% i%' passi$n $r $*#&sca%i$n.

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Par. 9B. : )hat means be emplo%ed or circumstances brou&ht about which add i&nomin% to the natural effects of the act. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
Aasis has reference to the means employed.

I)n$min+! "e#ine".
!gnominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and oblo-uy to the material in1ury caused by the crime.

Applica*le %$ crimes a)ains% c'as%i%+! less seri$&s p'+sical In.&ries! li)'% $r )ra-e c$erci$n! an" m&r"er.
!gnominy was considered in the crime of li&ht coercion under rticle 2#$, paragraph 2, in a case where the accused who embraced and *issed the offended party acted under an impulse of anger rather than a desire to satisfy his lust. The act was committed in the presence of many persons. The offended party was a young woman. There is ignominy when before he was killed, the deceased, a landowner, was forced by the accused to kneel in front of his house servants drawn up in line before him.

KT'a% means *e empl$+e".K

8hen the accused raped a woman after winding cogon grass around his genital organ, he thereby augmented the wrong done.

KT'a% 3 3 3 circ&ms%ances *e *r$&)'% a*$&%K

1. 2. (. '. !t would be present in a case where one rapes a married woman in the presence of her husband. =r where a woman was successively raped by four men. =r where the accused used not only the missionary position, i.e., male superior, female inferior, but also the dog style of se+ual intercourse, i.e., entry from behind. Aut not where the rape of the wife was not perpetrated in the presence or with the knowledge of her husband, or where the rape was done after the husband was killed.

K4'ic' a"" i)n$min+ %$ %'e na%&ral e##ec%s $# %'e ac%.K

!t is incorrect to appreciate adding ignominy to the offense where the victim was already dead when his body was dismembered.

N$ i)n$min+

'en a man is (ille" in %'e presence $# 'is

i#e.

Aecause no means was employed nor did any circumstance surround the act tending to make the effects of the crime more humiliating.

Rape as i)n$min+ in r$**er+

i%' '$mici"e.

9apes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main criminal ob1ective.

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Par. 5E. / )hat the crime be committed after an unlawful entr%. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis has reference to the means and >ays employed to commit the crime.

>eanin) $# &nla #&l en%r+.

8hen an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose.

T$ e##ec% en%rance! n$% #$r escape.

4nlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and not for escape. !s there unlawful entry if the door is broken and thereafter made an entry thru the broken doorG No, it will be covered by paragraph 1".

Applica%i$n $# %'is circ&ms%ance.

1. 2. (. '. .. !n rape committed in a house after an entry through the window. lso in murder where the accused entered the room of the victim through the window. lso in robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, because unlawful entry is not inherent in that particular kind of robbery. !f the crime charged in the information was only theft, and during the trial, the prosecution proved unlawful entry, it is a generic aggravating circumstance !t would be improper to convict the accused of robbery with force upon things because unlawful entry was not alleged in the information.

Dwellin& and unlawful entr% are ta*en separatel% in murders committed in a dwellin&. Unla #&l en%r+ is n$% a))ra-a%in) in %respass %$ " ellin). <Ar%. 6EI=

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Par.9C. : )hat as a means to the commission of a crime, a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be bro*en. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance.
The basis has reference to means and >ays employed to commit the crime.

Is %'e c&%%in) $# %'e can-as $# %'e %en% 5H;

'ere s$l"iers are sleepin) c$-ere" *+ par.

!t was considered aggravating in murder where the accused cut the ropes at the rear of a field tent and killed two soldiers inside the tent.

KAs a means %$ %'e c$mmissi$n $# a crime.K

To be considered as an aggravating circumstance, breaking the door must be utili,ed as a means to the commission of the crime. !t is not to be appreciated where the accused did not break the door of the victims as a means to commit robbery with homicide where the accused after breaking the rope which was used to close the door could have already entered the house.

T$ e##ec% en%rance $nl+.

Aut it may be resorted to as a means to commit a crime in a house or building. 6or e+ample, a murderer who, for the purpose of entering the house of his victim, brea*s a wall or a window of the house. !f the wall, etc., is broken in order to get out of the place, it is not an aggravating circumstance.

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Par. ,I. : )hat the crime be committed ;96 with the aid of persons under fifteen %ears of a&e, or ;,6 b% means of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means. Basis $# %'e a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances.
The basis has reference to means and >ays employed to commit the crime.

T $ "i##eren% a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances in para)rap' 6I.

6irst one tends to repress, so far as possible, the fre-uent practice resorted to by professional criminals to avail themselves of minors taking advantage of their irresponsibilit%> and the second one is intended to counteract the &reat facilities found by modern criminals in said means to commit crime and flee and abscond once the same is committed. ( lbert&

KB+ means $# m$%$r -e'icles.K

4se of motor vehicle is aggravating where the accused used the motor vehicle in going to the place of the crime, in carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their escape. 2ote! !f the motor vehicle was used only in facilitating the escape, it should not be an aggravating circumstance. 8here it appears that the use of motor vehicle was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult, the circumstance is not aggravating.

Es%a#a! 'ic' is c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# "ecei% $r a*&se $# c$n#i"ence! cann$% *e c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# m$%$r -e'icle. T'e#%! 'ic' is c$mmi%%e" *+ merel+ %a(in) pers$nal pr$per%+ 'ic' nee" n$% *e carrie" a a+! cann$% *e c$mmi%%e" *+ means $# m$%$r -e'icles.
7+amples of crimes committed by means of motor vehicle. 1. 2. (. '. .. /. , with the help of A and with lewd designs, forcibly took and carried away a woman by means of an automobile to another town. 8here a truck was used in carrying away the stolen rails and iron and wooden ties from the scene of the theft to the place where they were sold. 7ven if the victims rode voluntaril% in the 1eepney, since they were lured and ta*en to the place where they were killed, the use of motor vehicles was considered aggravating. 7ven if the victims rode voluntaril% in the 1eepney, since they were lured and ta*en to the place where they were killed, the use of motor vehicles was considered aggravating. 8hen the accused stabbed and inflicted upon his girlfriend, mortal wounds which caused her death, while they were in a ta+i which was hired and used by him. 8hen the accused stabbed and inflicted upon his girlfriend, mortal wounds which caused her death, while they were in a ta+i which was hired and used by him.

KOr $%'er similar means.K

Should be understood as referring to motori(ed vehicles or other efficient means of transportation similar to automobile or airplane.

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Par. ,9. : )hat the wron& done in the commission of the crime be deliberatel% au&mented b% causin& other wron& not necessar% for its commission. Basis $# %'is a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance
This circumstance has reference to >ays employe& in committing the crime.

4'a% is cr&el%+;
8hen the culprit en$o%s and deli&hts in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. The evidence must show that the sadistic culprit, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and gradually, The evidence must show that the sadistic culprit, for his pleasure and satisfac tion, caused the victim to suffer slowly and gradually.

ReA&isi%es $# cr&el%+,
1. 2. That the in1ury caused be deliberatel% increased by causing other wron&> That the other wrong be unnecessary for the e+ecution of the purpose of the offender.

KBe "eli*era%el+ a&)men%e" *+ ca&sin) $%'er

r$n).K

)eans that the accused at the time of the commission of the crime had a deliberate intention to prolong the suffering of the victim. 1. 2. (. Not present in a case where the assailant stoned twice the victim, not for the purpose of increasing his sufferings, but to kill him. =r where the victim was drowned in the sea after stabbing him while bound. =r where the victim was buried after being stabbed, not to make him suffer any longer but to conceal his body and the crime itself.

Cr&el%+ re#ers %$ p'+sical s&##erin) $# -ic%im p&rp$sel+ in%en"e" *+ $##en"er. Cruelt% cannot be presumed.
%ruelty is not to be inferred from the fact that the body of the deceased was dismembered, in the absence of proof that this was done while the victim was still alive. MThe mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervenin& between the infliction of one wound and that of another to show that the offender wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration. M !n the absence of a showing that the other wounds found on the body of the victim were inflicted to prolong his suffering before the fatal wound was dealt, it cannot be concluded that cruelty was duly proven. %ruelty cannot be presumed. %utting e+tremities after victim is killed is not cruelty. !f at the time the house was set on fire the inmates who had been seriously wounded were already dead, there is no cruelty.

I)n$min+ "is%in)&is'e" #r$m cr&el%+.

!gnominy (par. 1$& involves moral suffering, while cruelty (par. 21& refers to ph%sical suffering.

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Rapes! r$**er+ an" $%'er #$rms $# cr&el%ies are a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances $# i)n$min+ an" cr&el%+ in %reas$n. Rape as a))ra-a%in) in r$**er+ Rape as a))ra-a%in) in m&r"er.
Since the victim was already at the %'res'$l" of death when she was ra-is'e"! that bestiality may be regarded either as a form of ignominy causing disgrace or as a form of cruelty which aggravated murder.

i%' '$mici"e.

A))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ances pec&liar %$ cer%ain #el$nies.

1. !f violation of domicile be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. ( rt. 12#, par. 2& !f interruption of religious worship shall have been committed with violence or threats. ( rt. 1(2, par. 2& !f direct assault is committed with a weapon, or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. ( rt. 1'#& !f slavery be committed for the purpose of assigning the offended party to some immoral traffic, the penalty shall be imposed in its ma+imum period. ( rt. 2$2, par. 2& !f grave threats be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its ma+imum period. ( rt. 2#2& !f robbery with violence a&ainst or intimidation of persons (e+cept robbery with homicide, or robbery with rape, etc.& is committed in an uninhabited place or by a band, etc., or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm. ( rt. 2".& !f the robbery with the use of force upon thin&s ( rt. 2""& is committed in an uninhabited place and by a band.

2. (. '. .. /.

$.

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V. Al%erna%i-e Circ&ms%ances Ar%icle 5:. )heir concept. / Al%erna%i-e circ&ms%ances are %'$se 'ic' m&s% *e %a(en in%$ c$nsi"era%i$n as a))ra-a%in) $r mi%i)a%in) acc$r"in) %$ %'e na%&re an" e##ec%s $# %'e crime an" %'e $%'er c$n"i%i$ns a%%en"in) i%s c$mmissi$n. T'e+ are %'e rela%i$ns'ip! in%$3ica%i$n an" %'e "e)ree $# ins%r&c%i$n an" e"&ca%i$n $# %'e $##en"er. T'e al%erna%i-e circ&ms%ance $# rela%i$ns'ip s'all *e %a(en in%$ c$nsi"era%i$n 'en %'e $##en"e" par%+ in %'e sp$&se! ascen"an%! "escen"an%! le)i%ima%e! na%&ral! $r a"$p%e" *r$%'er $r sis%er! $r rela%i-e *+ a##ini%+ in %'e same "e)rees $# %'e $##en"er. T'e in%$3ica%i$n $# %'e $##en"er s'all *e %a(en in%$ c$nsi"era%i$n as a mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ances 'en %'e $##en"er 'as c$mmi%%e" a #el$n+ in a s%a%e $# in%$3ica%i$n! i# %'e same is n$% 'a*i%&al $r s&*seA&en% %$ %'e plan %$ c$mmi% sai" #el$n+ *&% 'en %'e in%$3ica%i$n is 'a*i%&al $r in%en%i$nal! i% s'all *e c$nsi"ere" as an a))ra-a%in) circ&ms%ance. 4asis of the alternative circumstances.
The basis is the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission.

O%'er rela%i-es incl&"e".

The rela%i$ns'ip of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or s%ep"a&)'%er is incl&"e" *+ analogy as similar to that of ascendant and descendant. The rela%i$ns'ip of a"$p%e" parent and a"$p%e" child may also be incl&"e"! as similar to that of ascendant and descendant. Aut the rela%i$ns'ip between uncle and niece is not covered by any of the rela%i$ns'ips mentioned. s a rule, rela%i$ns'ip is miti&atin& in crimes a&ainst propert% !n view of the pr$-isi$n of rt. 886! 'en the crime committed is (1& theft, (2& swindling or estafa, or ((& malicious mischief, relationship is exemptin&.

I% is a&&ravatin& in crimes a&ainst persons in cases 'ere %'e $##en"e" par%+ is a rela%i-e $# a hi&her de&ree %'an %'e $##en"er! $r 'en %'e $##en"er an" %'e $##en"e" par%+ are rela%i-es $# %'e same level, as (illin) a brother or a brother:in: law.
!f the offense of serious ph%sical in$uries is committed by the offender against his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his legitimate other descendants, rela%i$ns'ip is a))ra-a%in). B&% %'e seri$&s p'+sical in.&ries m&s% n$% *e in#lic%e" *+ a paren% &p$n his child by e+cessive chastisement.

+hen the crime is less serious ph%sical in$uries or sli&ht ph%sical in$uries, the ordinar% rule applies. +hen the crime a&ainst persons is homicide or murder, relationship is a&&ravatin& even if the victim of the crime is a relative of lower de&ree. 1elationship is miti&atin& in trespass to dwellin&.

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?O%'er c$n"i%i$n a%%en"in)@ %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime.

8hile the relationship of brothers2in2law is aggravating when one commits a crime against the other ( Anc(e$a case&, such rela%i$ns'ip is mitigating when the accused killed his *r$%'er/in/la in view $# %'e conduct pursued by the latter in contracting adulterous relations with the wife of the accused ( Velar&e case&. The reason for the difference in the rule is the =other condition attendin&= the commission of the crime, which in the Anc(e$a case is the conduct of the deceased in having adulterous relations with the wife of the accused* and in the Velar&e case, the desire of the accused to render service to a relative.

In%$3ica%i$n.
7iti&atin& : (1& if into+ication is not habitual, or (2& if into+ication is not subse5uent to the plan to commit a felony. A&&ravatin& : (1& if into+ication is habitual> or (2& if it is intentional <s&*seA&en% to the plan to commit a felony&. Dr&n(enness or into+ication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not s&*seA&en% to the plan to commit the crime. !t is aggravating if habitual or intentional. habitual "r&n(ar" is one given to into+ication by e+cessive use of into+icating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. !t is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. !t lessens individual resistance to evil %'$&)'% and undermines will2power making its victim a p$%en%ial e-il"$er. I% m&s% *e s'$ n %'a% <a= a% %'e %ime $# %'e c$mmissi$n of the criminal act, he has taken such -uantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control, and (b& that such into+ication is not habitual, or subse-uent to the plan to commit the felony.

E-i"ence #$r in%$3ica%i$n %$ *e a))ra-a%in).

There is no showing of e+cessive and habitual use of into+icating drinks, or that the accused p&rp$sel+ got "r&n( in order to commit the crime, where the witness merely declared that the accused were "rin(in) li-uor on the night in -uestion and were telling stories, singing, laughing, and shouting and were very 1olly, al%'$&)' said witness further testified that the accused used to drink li-uor every Saturday night.

T'e acc&se"Ls s%a%e $# in%$3ica%i$n m&s% *e pr$-e".

!nto+ication was not completely pr$-en in a case where the only evidence was that the defendant had a gallon of tuba with him at the time he committed the crime. 8here the court below found that the appellant was under the influence of li-uor in the afternoon immediately preceding the incident and %'ere is no e-i"ence in"ica%in) that he is a habitual drunkard, the mitigating circumstance of into+ication should be considered in favor of the appellant. Thus, if the am$&n% of the liA&$r the acc&se" had taken was not of sufficient 5uantit% to affect his mental faculties, he was not in a state of in%$3ica%i$n. Al%'$&)' the acc&se" had %a(en some liA&$r $n the day of the s'$$%in)! if 'e as aware of ever%thin& that occurred on that day and he was able to )i-e a detailed account %'ere$#! in%$3ica%i$n is not mi%i)a%in). !f %'e+ were sufficientl% sober to know what they were "$in) mi%i)a%in) circ&ms%ance $# in%$3ica%i$n cann$% *e c$nsi"ere". 'en c$mmi%%in) the &nla #&l ac%! %'e

K4'en %'e in%$3ica%i$n is 'a*i%&al.K

The mere fact that the acc&se" had *een "rin(in) in%$3ica%in) liA&$r a*$&% se-en m$n%'s and that he had been "r&n( $nce or twice a m$n%' is n$% c$ns%i%&%in) 'a*i%&al "r&n(enness.

Dr&n(enness as als$ #$&n" %$ *e 'a*i%&al 'ere %'e "e#en"an%s a"mi%%e" in $pen c$&r% %'a% *e#$re %'e+ c$mmi%%e" %'e crime! %'e+ "ran( #$r %'ree '$&rs an" $#%en 'a" a "rin(in) par%+.

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E-en i# in%$3ica%i$n is n$% 'a*i%&al! i% is a))ra-a%in) %$ c$mmi% %'e crime.

'en s&*seA&en% %$ %'e plan

So, it was held that it appearin) that the accused, who had plotted the death of the victim, drank wine in order to embolden himself in the carrying out of his evil plan! his into+ication cannot *e c$nsi"ere" as a mitigating circumstance.

Reas$ns #$r %'e al%erna%i-e circ&ms%ance $# in%$3ica%i$n.

s a mitigating circumstance F 8hen a person is under the influence of li-uor, his exercise of will power is impaired. s an a))ra-a%in) circumstance F because it is intentional* the offender resorted to it in order to bolster his courage to commit a crime. !t is aggravating when into+ication is habitual 2 the constant use of into+icating li-uor lessens the in"i-i"&al resistance to evil %'$&)'%s and undermines the will p$ er ma(in) himself a potential evildoer

N$n/'a*i%&al in%$3ica%i$n! lac( $# ins%r&c%i$n an" $*#&sca%i$n are n$% %$ *e %a(en separa%el+.
s non2habitual into+ication implies a disturbance of the reasoning powers of the offender, his lack of instruction cannot have any influence over him, and obfuscation >(ic( has the same effect on his reasoning powers cannot be considered independently of nonhabitual into+ication.

De)ree $# ins%r&c%i$n an" e"&ca%i$n $# %'e $##en"er.

Bow degree of ins%r&c%i$n an" e"&ca%i$n $r lac( $# it is generally mitigating. @igh degree of ins%r&c%i$n an" e"&ca%i$n is aggravating, when the offender avails himself of his learnin) in committing the crime. !t cannot be taken into account where the defendant admitted that he studied in the first grade in a public elementary school. !t is not mitigating where the accused finished <rade Two and answered in Tagalog, -uestions put to him in 7nglish. ?ac* of sufficient intelli&ence is re5uired in illiterac%. Not illiteracy alone, but also lack of sufficient intelligence are necessary to invoke the benefit of the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction, the determination of which is left to the trial court.

T'e A&es%i$n $# lac( $# ins%r&c%i$n cann$% *e raise" #$r %'e #irs% %ime in %'e appella%e c$&r%.
8hen the trial court did not make any findings as to the degree of instruction of the offenders, on appeal that alternative circumstance cannot be considered in fi+ing the penalty to be imposed on the accused2appellants.

Or"inaril+! l$

"e)ree $r lac( $# ins%r&c%i$n is mi%i)a%in) in all crimes.

Back of instruction or low degree of it is appreciated as mitigating circumstance in almost all crimes. Exceptions! 1. 2ot miti&atin& in crimes against propert%, such as estafa, theft, robbery, arson. No one, however &nsc'$$le" he may be, is so ignorant as not to know that theft or robbery, or assault upon the person of another is inherently wrong and a violation of the law. 2. 2ot miti&atin& in crimes a&ainst chastit%, such as rape and adultery No one is so ignorant as not to know that the crime of rape is wrong and in violation of the law.

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H$

a*$&% in %reas$n;

Not mitigating, because love of country should be a natural feeling of every citi,en, however unlettered or uncultured he may be.

Lac( $# e"&ca%i$n an" ins%r&c%i$n is n$% mi%i)a%in) in m&r"er.

Back of education and instruction cannot mitigate appellantOs guilt because to kill is forbidden by natural law which every rational being is endowed to know and feel. Exception! The same may be so considered because the crimes would probably not have been committed if the accused were not so ignorant as to believe in witchcraft.

Hi)' "e)ree $# ins%r&c%i$n! as a))ra-a%in).

Examples! lawyer, who, with abuse of his education and learning, commits estafa. Aut the fact that the accused was a lawyer was not considered aggravating in physical in1uries. @e did not take advantage of his high degree of education.

Access$ries are n$% lia*le #$r li)'% #el$nies.

!n view of the omission of accessories in naming those liable for light felonies, the accessories are not liable for light felonies.

R&les rela%i-e %$ li)'% #el$nies,

Li)'% #el$nies, P&nis'a*le only when c$ns&mma%e". ( rt. $& they have been B&% 'en li)'% #el$nies are c$mmi%%e" a)ains% pers$ns $r pr$per%+, 3unishable even if they are $nl+ in the attempted or frustrated stage of e+ecution. ( rt. $&

=nly principals an" accomplices are liable for light felonies. ( rt. 1/& ccessories are not liable for light felonies, even if they are committed against persons or property. ( rt. 1/&

Ac%i-e s&*.ec% an" passi-e s&*.ec% $# crime.

!n all crimes there are always two parties, namely; the active sub1ect (the criminal& and the passive sub1ect (the in1ured party&.

Onl+ na%&ral pers$ns can *e ac%i-e s&*.ec% $# crime.

=nly natural persons can be the active sub1ect of crime because of the hi&hl% personal nature of the criminal responsibility.

O##icers! n$% %'e c$rp$ra%i$n! are criminall+ lia*le.

corporation can act only through its officers or incorporators, and that as regards a violation of the law committed by an officer of a corporation, in the exercise of his duties , he answers criminally for his acts, and not the corporation to which he belongs, for being an artificial person, it cannot be prosecuted criminally.

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2&ri"ical pers$ns are criminall+ lia*le &n"er cer%ain special la s.

4nder ct 1'." (%orporation Baw&, %om. ct No. 1'/ (3ublic Service Baw&, the Securities Baw, and the 7lection %ode, corporations may be fined for certain violations of their provisions.

Onl+ %'e $##icers $# %'e c$rp$ra%i$n '$ par%icipa%e" ei%'er as principals *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n $r principals *+ in"&c%i$n $r *+ c$$pera%i$n! $r as acc$mplices in %'e c$mmissi$n $# an ac% p&nis'a*le *+ la are lia*le.
s a general rule, a director or other officer of a corporation is criminally liable for his acts, though in his official capacity, if he participated in the unlawful act either directly or as an aider, abettor or accessory, but is not liable criminally for the corporate acts performed by other officers or agents thereof.

>ana)er $# par%ners'ip is lia*le e-en i# %'ere is n$ e-i"ence $# 'is par%icipa%i$n in %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e $##ense.
!n the prosecution for a violation of Section 1$:, paragraph 2, of the National !nternal 9evenue %ode, the manager of the partnership is criminally liable, even in the a*sence of evidence regarding his direct participation in the commission of the offense.

Passi-e s&*.ec% $# crime.

The passive sub1ect of a crime is the holder of the in$ured ri&ht; the man, the 1uristic person, the group, and the State. Thus, while a corporation or partnership cannot be the active sub1ect, it can be a passive sub1ect of a crime.

C$rpse $r animal cann$% *e passi-e s&*.ec%.

Exception! 4nder rt. (.(, the crime of defamation may be committed if the imputation tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

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Ti%le T $ PERSONS CRI>INALLY LIABLE 0OR 0ELONIES Ar%icle 5C. +ho are criminall% liable. / T'e #$ll$ in) are criminall+ lia*le #$r )ra-e an" less )ra-e #el$nies, 5. Principals. 6. Acc$mplices. 8. Access$ries. T'e #$ll$ in) are criminall+ lia*le #$r li)'% #el$nies, 5. Principals 6. Acc$mplices. Ar%icle 5D. Principals. / T'e #$ll$ in) are c$nsi"ere" principals, 5. T'$se 6. T'$se '$ %a(e a "irec% par% in %'e e3ec&%i$n $# %'e ac%7 '$ "irec%l+ #$rce $r in"&ce $%'ers %$ c$mmi% i%7

8. T'$se '$ c$$pera%e in %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e $##ense *+ an$%'er ac% i%'$&% 'ic' i% $&l" n$% 'a-e *een acc$mplis'e". PA1. 9. : P132C3PA?S 4M D31EC) PA1)3C3PA)3<2.
G7(ose >(o $a?e a &irec$ par$ in $(e e<ec,$ion o1 $(e ac$.G

T $ $r m$re $##en"ers as principals *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n.

Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are principals by direct participation, when the following re-uisites are present; 1. 2. That they participated in the criminal resolution> That they carried out their plan and personall% too* part in its e+ecution by acts which directl% tended to the same.

Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspirac% at the time of the commission of the crime.

T$ *e a par%+ %$ a c$nspirac+! $ne m&s% 'a-e %'e in%en%i$n %$ par%icipa%e in %'e %ransac%i$n i%' a -ie %$ %'e #&r%'erance $# %'e c$mm$n "esi)n an" p&rp$se.
!t must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co2conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by e+erting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to e+ecuting the conspiracy.

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)ere knowledge, ac-uiescence, or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Silence "$es n$% ma(e $ne a c$nspira%$r. C$nspirac+ %ranscen"s c$mpani$ns'ip. T'e #ac% %'a% %'e % $ acc&se" ma+ 'a-e 'appene" %$ lea-e %$)e%'er! an" $ne $# %'em le#% a cl$sin) arnin) %$ %'e -ic%im! cann$% ins%an%l+ s&pp$r% a #in"in) $# c$nspirac+. E3is%ence $# c$nspirac+.
The e+istence of conspiracy does not re5uire necessarily an agreement for an appreciable len&th of time prior to the e+ecution of its purpose. %onspiracy arises on the ver% instant the plotters agree, e+pressly or impliedl%, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. =nce this assent is established, each and every one are considered to be conspirators with regard to the crime charged.

Pr$$# $# c$nspirac+.
The direct evidence of conspiracy may consist in the interlocking e+tra1udicial confessions of several accused and the testimony of one of the accused who is discharged and made a witness against his co2accused who did not make any confession. !n the absence of collusion among the declarants, their confessions may form a complete picture of the whole situation and may be considered collectively as corroborative andNor confirmatory of the evidence independent therefrom. !t is not essential that there be proofs as to the previous agreement and decision to com mit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same ob$ective.

0$rmal a)reemen% $r pre-i$&s acA&ain%ance am$n) se-eral pers$ns n$% necessar+ in c$nspirac+.
!t is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack so that the act of one accused becomes the act of all. !f it is proved that two or more persons aimed, by their acts, at the accomplish ment of the same unlawful ob1ect, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert ways and means is proved. Thus, when it is shown that all the accused were already armed when they met, and that they went together in a 1eep to the place where they robbed the house of the offended party and raped his maids, their conspiracy is implied. %onspiracy is shown where the offenders were all present at the scene of the crime, acted in concert in attacking the victims, assaulting and beating them up and chasing them and stabbing them and in divesting them of their watches, gold rings and money, and after the bloody slayings were done, they fled from the scene and went their separate ways.

C$nspirac+ m&s% *e es%a*lis'e" *+ p$si%i-e an" c$ncl&si-e e-i"ence.

Aut while conspiracy ma% be implied from the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, it is nevertheless a rule that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. Thus, too, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not by itself sufficient to establish conspiracy.

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!t must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co2conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by e+erting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to e+ecuting the conspiracy. 8hen there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for the act performed by him. !n the crime of homicide, immediate participation in the criminal desi&n entertained by the slayer is essential to the responsibility of one who is alleged to have taken a direct part in the killing, but who has not himself inflicted an in1ury materiall% contributin& to the death. (People s. 7amayo, '' 3hil. (#, '/&

Par%icipa%i$n in criminal res$l&%i$n essen%ial.

!t is not enough that a person participated in the assault made by another in order to consider him a co2principal in the crime committed. @e must also participate in the criminal resolution of the other. The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous *nowled&e of the criminal purpose. Spontaneous a&reement at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create 1oint responsibility. Example! Thus, where the deceased challenged the two accused, who accepted, assaulted and killed the challenger, it was said that the acceptance of the challenge b% the two accused and their concert of attac* clearly showed a community of purpose and design. Active cooperation b% all the offenders in the perpetration of the crime will also create $oint responsibilit%. acts! stepped up behind the deceased and struck him on the back of the head with a piece of wood. The deceased reeled under the blow and turned inclining backwards. 8hile in this attitude, the deceased was struck on the upper lip with a whip in the hands by A. t this moment, % sei,ed the deceased by the left hand and 0 sei,ed him by the right. 8hile the deceased was still inclining backwards with his hands held fast by % and 0, 7 placed himself in front of the deceased and plunged a knife into the body of the latter. "eld! There was no proof sufficient to establish anything like an anterior conspirac%. Aut the manner in which the accused cooperated in the perpetration of the homicide shows that they were moved by a common motive and that their intention was to accomplish the death of the deceased. Simultaneity per se is not a badge of conspiracy, absent the re-uisite concurrence of wills. !t is not sufficient that the attack is 1oint and simultaneous* it is necessary that the assailants are animated by one and the same purpose. The fact of conspiracy is well2established where one of the appellantOs companions announced the holdup while the rest took the personal effects of the victims, the appellant himself drawing out a bladed weapon and proceeding to rob the victims as well. )anifested in the coordinated acts of the assailants, of one of them holding the hand of the victim while another was stabbing him and a third delivering fist blows on different parts of the body of the victim, and, when the victim was able to escape, of giving chase and the first accused shooting the deceased five (.& times. Contributin& b% positive acts to the reali,ation of a common criminal intent also creates $oint responsibilit%. 1. acts! 6or several years, marked enmity e+isted between two families, the 3alisocs and belonged to the gbuya family, while % belonged to the 3alisoc family. gbuyas. and 0

, preparatory to the commission of the crime, cleaned his shotgun. 8hile cleaning his shotgun, in5uired from 0 whether he had seen %. Bater, carried the gun from his house to a certain place accompanied by his son 0 to look for %. !n that place, 0 waited for % and, when the latter was coming, handed his shotgun to 0. 0 fired at %, killing him then and there. "eld! 8here the homicide was committed by the act of one of the two accused in shooting the deceased with

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a &un which was supplied b% his co:accused, father of the actual slayer, and where it also appeared that the latter contributed to the commission of the homicide b% various other si&nificant acts, it was held that both father and son were properly convicted as principals in the crime. There is a common criminal intent in this case, because there was bad blood between the 3alisocs and the father and son took common cause. 2. gbuyas and the

8hile it is true that the wounds which caused 9oberto HillelaOs death were not inflicted by %rispino )ancao but by his co2accused %iriaco guilar, yet said %rispino )ancao, having been the insti&ator and a&&ressor and having called his harvesters to his aid, among them the said %iriaco guilar, wanted them to carry out, as in fact they did, the criminal act started by him and, therefore, he is liable not only for his own acts, but also for the acts of those who aided him. acts! band composed of some 2. men succeeded in capturing . merican soldiers and subse-uently took them to a certain place and detained them in a house there. ive of the band, among them the accused, subse-uently took the Americans from the house in which they were living and led them away. The mericans were killed by two members of the band. "eld! !t is of no importance that the accused did not himself strike the blow or blows by which the prisoners were killed. 3t is sufficient that he was present at the place of the commission of the act, au&: mentin& with his arms and presence the power of the band, thus aiding the common act of all. 2ote! There is a band in these cases. This circumstance is presumptive of a previous understanding between one offender and the others who formed the band, whereby he voluntarily lent his assistance of thought and action for the reali,ation of the criminal ob1ect.

(.

C$nspirac+ is presumed

'en the crime is committed b% a band.

Aut where at the start of the encounter between the constabulary forces and an insurgent band, the accused, who was with the band, fled from the scene of the fight and did not take part therein, he is not criminally liable. 8here one of the accused knew of the plan of the others to kill the two victims and he accepted the role assigned to him, which was to shoot one of the victims, and he actu ally performed that role, he is a co:principal by direct participation in the double murder.

A c$nspira%$r s'$&l" necessaril+ *e lia*le #$r %'e ac%s $# an$%'er c$nspira%$r e-en %'$&)' s&c' ac%s "i##er radicall% an" s&*stantiall% #r$m %'a% 'ic' %'e+ in%en"e" %$ c$mmi%.
!n a case, the Supreme %ourt said; M4pon the circumstance that the wound made with the knife on the leg of the person assaulted was the primary cause of death and that the author of this in1ury has not been identified, the attor neys for the accused chiefly planted their defense, and in this connection it is insisted that the conspiracy to attack <ines contemplated only beating him up and did not include the infliction of in1ury by means of a cutting instrument. DThe %ourtE DisE of the opinion that F blow inflicted by one of the small iron bars used in this assault might well have resulted in the taking of life, and the circumstance that a knife was also used in striking the deceased does not relieve the appellants from the con2 se-uence of their 1oint acts.?

S&pp$se %'a% %'ree pers$ns c$nspire" %$ c$mmi% r$**er+ $nl+! *&% in %'e c$&rse $# %'e r$**er+ $ne $# %'em (ille" an inma%e $# %'e '$&se! m&s% all $# %'em *e 'el" lia*le #$r r$**er+ i%' '$mici"e;
!t seems that the others must not be held responsible for the homicide which was not contemplated in their conspiracy and in which they did not take part. The reason for this opin ion is that rt. 2"/ of the 9evised 3enal %ode defines the liability of the offenders in robbery if committed by a band, that is, any member of a band (at least four armed men& is liable for any assault committed by the other member of the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same. @ence, if the robbers are only three, or even more than three but not more than three are armed, applicable and the robber who does not take part in the assault is not liable therefor. rt. 2"/ is not

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4'ere %'ere is c$nspirac+ %$ c$mmi% a #el$n+! all %'e c$nspira%$rs are lia*le #$r i%s c$nseA&ences.
!t is argued for appellant Aarauel that inasmuch as there was no conspiracy to kill cuiia, and inasmuch as Aarauel only hit him with an iron bar, the latter may not be held responsible for the death. "eld! Since there was conspiracy to punish cura, and the death of cura resulted, all the conspirators are responsible for the conse-uences that arose from the punishment. 2ote! The ruling is in accordance with the provision of rticle ', paragraph 1, of the 9evised 3enal %ode.

A c$nspira%$r is n$% lia*le #$r an$%'erLs crime 'ic' is n$% an $*.ec% $# %'e c$nspirac+ $r 'ic' is n$% a necessar+ an" l$)ical c$nseA&ence %'ere$#.
O%'er "e#en"an%s n$% 'el" lia*le #$r %'e (illin)s $# pers$ns n$% c$-ere" *+ %'e c$nspirac+. ppellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of %asiano %abi,ares, notwithstanding a conspiracy between him and Serapio )a-uiling. The conspiracy was to kill 9afael only and no one else. Nothing was said or agreed upon about the members of 9afaelOs family. Their target was solely 9afael %abi,ares. nd the rule has always been that co2conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspirac%. 6or other acts done outside the contemplation of the co2conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical conse-uence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. The ruling in the case of People vs. 9e la Cerna should be distinguished from the ruling in the cases of People s. 4nri+,e", .# 3hil. .(/, and People s. Rosario, /# 3hil. $2:. %onspirators are liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such acts differ radically and substantially from that which they intend to commit.

C$nspirac+ ma+ c$-er pers$ns pre-i$&sl+ &n"e%ermine".

The act of a conspirator who, as soon as the aggression was started by his co2conspirators, ran away and called for help of other persons who hurriedly responded, is an act of desistance from taking an active part in the aggression which removes the case from the operation of the established rule that when a con spiracy is proved, the act of one co2conspirator is the act of all.

4'en %'ere is c$nspirac+! i% is n$% necessar+ %$ ascer%ain %'e speci#ic ac% $# eac' c$nspira%$r.
%onspiracy having been established, it is immaterial who of the conspirators fired the fatal shot. 8hen there is conspiracy, the fact that an element of the offense is not present as regards one of the conspirators is immaterial Thus, in the comple+ crime of seduction by means of usurpation of official functions, where one of the accused simulated and falsely pretended to be a minister authori,ed to perform marriage ceremonies and did simulate that he was performing a marriage ceremony between his co2accused and a girl in order thus the more easily to deceive her and cause her to live in marital relations with the other accused, the element of performance of official funcitons was present as regards one of the accused only, but the Supreme %ourt declared the other accused guilty of, and sentenced him to the penalty for, the same crime comple+ed with seduction which he ac 2 tually committed. All are liable for the crime of abduction, even if onl% one acted with one acted with lewd desi&ns. Exceptions! 1. !n the crime of parricide, the element of relationship must be present as regards all the offenders. Aut if the wife of the deceased and a stranger conspired to kill him and did kill him, only the wife is guilty of parricide and the stranger is guilty of homicide or murder, as the case may be. The reason for the e+ception is that rt. /2, par. (, provides that aggravating circumstances which arise from the private relations of the offender with the offended party shall serve to aggravate only the

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liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 2. !n the crime of murder where treachery is an element of the crime, all the offenders must at least have knowledge of the employment of treachery at the time of the e+ecution of the act or their cooperation therein.

The reason for this e+ception is that rt. /2, par. ', provides that the circumstances which consist in the material e+ecution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the e+ecution of the act or their cooperation therein.

Second re5uisite : ;Principals b% direct participation6.

That the culprits Mcarried out their plan and personally took part in its e+ecution, by acts which directly tended to the same end.M

T'e principals *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n m&s% *e a% %'e scene $# %'e crime! pers$nall+ %a(in) par% in i%s e3ec&%i$n.
principal by direct participation must personall% ta*e part in e+ecuting the criminal plan to be carried out. This means that he must be at the scene of the commission of the crime, personall% ta*in& part in its e+ecution.

T'e e3cep%i$n %$ %'e r&le,

case where there was conspiracy to kidnap and kill the victim and only one of the conspirators kidnapped the victim and, after turning him over to his co2conspirators for e+ecution, left the spot where the victim was killed. The reason for the e+ception is that by kidnapping the victim, he alread% performed his part and the killing was done by his co2conspirators in pursuance of the conspiracy. !n a murder which the offenders previousl% a&reed to commit, not only the one who inflicts the fatal wound is considered a principal, but also the one who holds down the victim and the one who lies in wait at the door to prevent any help from being rendered. The acts of each and every one of the offenders in this case are all directed to the same end, that is, the killing of their victim.

One ser-in) as )&ar" p&rs&an% %$ %'e c$nspirac+ is a principal *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n.

=ne who stands guard outside the house for the purpose of keeping others away, or of warning his fellow2 conspirators of danger of discovery, while the latter are murdering the occupant, takes a direct part in the commission of the crime of murder, and is guilty as a principal by direct participation. @e is in fact present, aidin&, and abettin& in the commission of the crime. Exception! ccused Samano and lcantara admitted that they acted as guards near the place of the crime, but that they did so in obedience to superior orders and without *nowled&e that the deceased who was then under investigation would later be killed. There was no evidence that there was conspirac% between those who pleaded guilty and the present appellants.

4'en %'e sec$n" reA&isi%e is lac(in)! %'ere is $nl+ c$nspirac+.

!f this second re-uisite is lacking, at most, there is only a conspiracy among the several defendants who participated in the criminal resolution, and if the crime they agreed and decided to commit is not treason, rebellion or sedition, they are not criminally liable. Thus, if four of the accused merely attended the conferences and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme, merely assenting out of respect and fear, and after the commission of the murders they 1oined with the other accused in celebrating with a fiesta, by way of custom, they were neither co2principals nor accomplices.

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PA1. ,. : P132C3PA?S 4M 32DUCE7E2).

MThose who directly force or induce others to commit it.M

T $

a+s $# *ec$min) principal *+ in"&cemen%.

rt. 1$, namely;

There are two ways of becoming a principal by induction under the second paragraph of 1. 2. Ay directly forcin& another to commit a crime, and Ay directly inducing another to commit a crime. There are two ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime. They are; a. b. Ay using irresistible force. Ay causing uncontrollable fear.

!n these cases, there is no conspirac%, not even a unity of criminal purpose and intention. =nly the one using force or causing fear is criminally liable. The material e+ecutor is not criminally liable because of rt. 12, pars. . and /.

B+ "irec%l+ in"&cin) an$%'er %$ c$mmi% a crime.

There are two ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime. They are; B+ )i-in) price! $r $##erin) reward $r promise. Aoth the one giving the price or offering reward or promise and the one committing the crime in consideration thereof are principals 22 the former, by inducement* and the latter, by direct participation. There is collective criminal responsibility. wife, who induced the killing of the mistress of her husband by giving money to the killer, is a principal by induction. The killer is a principal by direct participation. (People s. Eao, No. B21:'$(, 5an. 2#, 1"/1, 1 S%9 '2& B+ &sin) $r"s of command. Aoth the person who used the words of command and the person who committed the crime, because of the words of command, are e-ually liable. There is also collective criminal responsibility.

ReA&isi%es,
!n order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement, the following re-uisites must be present; 1. 2. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime* and That such inducement be the determinin& cause of the commission of the crime by the material e+ecutor. (3.S. s. In&anan, 2' 3hil. 2:(* 3eople vs. Iiichi =mine, /1 3hil. /:"&

There must e+ist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime. The proposition of the woman constituted something more than mere counsel or advice which her co2defendant was entirely free to accept or not. !t was coupled with a consideration which, in view of the relations e+isting between them, furnished a motive stron& enou&h to induce the man to take the life of her husband. thoughtless e+pression without intention to produce the result is not an inducement to commit a crime. Thus, a chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a

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thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spo*e the word or performed the act havin& an% expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce the result.

T'e in"&cemen% ma+ *e *+ ac%s $# c$mman"! a"-ice! $r %'r$&)' in#l&ence! $r a)reemen% #$r c$nsi"era%i$n.
The inducement and the commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a principal, to the same e+tent and effect as if he had physically committed the crime, may e+ist in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or a&reement for a consideration, or through an influence so effective that it alone determines the commission of the crime. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation.

4$r"s $# c$mman" $# a #a%'er ma+ in"&ce 'is s$n %$ c$mmi% a crime.

distinction should be made between the words of command of a father to his sons, under conditions which determine obedience, and the e+cited e+clamations uttered by an individual to whom obedience is not due. The moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases where the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression.

>eanin) $# %'e sec$n" reA&isi%e.

!t is necessary that the inducement be the determinin& cause of the commission of the crime by the principal by direct participation, that is, without such inducement the crime would not have been committed.

T'e in"&cemen% m&s% prece"e %'e ac% in"&ce" an" m&s% *e s$ in#l&en%ial in pr$"&cin) %'e criminal ac% %'a% i%'$&% i%! %'e ac% $&l" n$% 'a-e *een per#$rme".
Thus, the price given to the principal by direct participation after the commission of the crime, without prior promise to give a price or reward, could not be an inducement. !f the person who actually committed the crime had a reason of his own to commit the crime, it cannot be said that the inducement was influential in producing the criminal act.

B+ &sin)

$r"s $# c$mman".

8ith respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the offense. !t must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to become the determinin& cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producin& the result. !n other words, the inciting words must have great dominance and influence over the person who acts* they ought to be direct and as efficacious or powerful as physical or moral coercion or violence itself.

In $r"er %'a% a pers$n &sin) $r"s $# c$mman" ma+ *e 'el" lia*le as principal &n"er para)rap' N$. 6 $# Ar%. 5D! %'e #$ll$ in) #i-e reA&isi%es m&s% all *e presen%,
a. b. c. d. e. That the one uttering the words of command must have the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. That the one who made the command must have an as cendanc% or influence over the person who acted. That the words used must be so direct, so efficacious, so powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion. The words of command must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime. The material e+ecutor of the crime has no personal reason to commit the crime.

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Ascen"anc+ $r in#l&ence as %$ am$&n% %$ m$ral c$erci$n is n$% necessar+ %'ere is c$nspirac+.

People vs. ?awas

'en

acts! 8hile the home guards were given an order by accused Bawas to fire at the )oros then on the ground, said order could not imply or include an order to go up the house and massacre the inno cent and defenseless women and children. "eld! Bawas is not guilty of murder for the killing of the women and children, because to hold him liable as principal by induction, it is necessary (1& that the inducement is material and precedes the commission of the crime, and (2& that such inducement is the determinin& cause thereof.

E##ec%s $# acA&i%%al $# principal *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n &p$n %'e lia*ili%+ $# principal *+ in"&cemen%.
Conspirac% is ne&atived b% the ac5uittal of co:defendant. =ne cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another. Aut if the one charged as principal by direct participation is ac-uitted because he acted without criminal intent or malice, his ac-uittal is not a ground for the ac-uittal of the principal by inducement.

P$ssess$r $# recen%l+ s%$len pr$per%+ is a principal.

3ossessor of a recently stolen article is considered a principal, not merely as an accessory or an accomplice, unless he proves in a satisfactory manner that he is but an accessory or an accomplice thereto and that another person, from whom the article came, is the one who stole it from the owner thereof.

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PA1. .. : P132C3PA?S 4M 32D3SPE2SA4?E C<<PE1A)3<2.

G7(ose >(o coopera$e in $(e commission o1 $(e o11ense =y ano$(er ac$ >i$(o,$ >(ic( i$ >o,l& no$ (a e =een accomplis(e&.G

ReA&isi%es,
1. 2. 3articipation in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged* and %ooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act, without which it would not have been accomplished.

irst re5uisite! There must be conspiracy. Aut concurrence with the principal by direct participation in the purpose of the latter is sufficient, because the cooperation is indispensable to the accomplishment of the commission of the offense. Second re5uisite! !f the cooperation is not indispensable, the offender is only an accomplice. =Cooperate x x x b% another act= The act of the principal by indispensable cooperation should be different from the act of the principal by direct participation. Examples! 8here it appears that % sei,ed the hands of a 122year2old girl, dragged her by force and violence to a place behind a house where there were some trees whence he called to his confederate, 5, and then went away from the scene of the crime so that 5 might freely consummate the prearranged rape, it was held that % cooperated in the perpetration of the crime by acts without which its commission would not have been accomplished. ( 3.S. s. -a ier& 9, an employee of a bank, had the duty to e+amine the account of the drawer of a check, to determine whether or not the drawer of the check had sufficient balance to his credit to re-uire the payment of the check, and to indorse upon the check, if it was entitled to payment, the words M%orriente, 3.=. Buciano de los 9eyes.M 9, in connivance with A, and knowing that the latter had no sufficient funds in the bank, indorsed upon a check drawn by A the words M%orriente, 3.=. Buciano de los 9eyes.M The cashier, rely ing upon the indorsement, ordered the payment of the check, thus enabling A to draw the amount of the check. !n this case, 9 was a principal by indispensable cooperation. (3.S. s. Eim #,anco& !t will be noted that the cooperation of the other accused consisted in performing an act which is different from the act of e+ecution of the crime committed by the other accused. !n the case of 3.S. s. -a ier, the act of cooperation is the forcible taking of the girl to the place where the rape was committed by the other accused. !n the case of 3.S. s. Eim #,anco, the act of cooperation of the other offender is the certification that the check was entitled to payment. !f the cooperation of one of the accused consists in performing an act necessary in the execution of the crime committed, he is a principal by direct participation. Thus, if in the commission of homicide, one of the offenders held the victim while the other was stabbing him, the one who held the victim should be a principal by direct participation.

Lia*ili%+ $# c$nspira%$rs

'$ %$$( %&rns in rapin) a )irl.

6our persons each took turns in having se+ual intercourse with a girl by force. !t was held that each of them is responsible, not only for the act of rape committed personally by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because while one of them was having se+ual intercourse with the girl, the others were holding her, so that each one of them cooperated in the consummation of the rape committed by the others by acts without which

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it could not have been accomplished.

Principal *+ in"&c%i$n! except %'a% '$ "irec%l+ #$rce" an$%'er %$ c$mmi% a crime! and principal *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n 'a-e c$llec%i-e criminal resp$nsi*ili%+. Principal *+ in"ispensa*le c$$pera%i$n 'as c$llec%i-e criminal resp$nsi*ili%+ with %'e principal *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n. E3ample $# in"i-i"&al resp$nsi*ili%+.
The deceased was the one who assaulted a group of three individuals with a knife, and in the course of an incomplete self2defense, two of them caused less serious physical in1uries upon the assailant, while the third inflicted the fatal wound. !n this case, the party who inflicted the fatal wound would be the only one responsible as principal for the crime of homicide* the other two would be held liable only for less serious physical in1uries.

F&asi/c$llec%i-e criminal resp$nsi*ili%+ G s$me $# %'e $##en"ers in %'e crime are principals an" %'e $%'ers are accomplices.

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Ar%icle 5E. Accomplices. / Acc$mplices are %'$se pers$ns '$! n$% *ein) incl&"e" in Ar%icle 5D! c$$pera%e in %'e e3ec&%i$n $# %'e $##ense *+ pre-i$&s $r sim&l%ane$&s ac%s. KN$% *ein) incl&"e" in Ar%icle 5D.K
8hen there is no conspiracy between or among the defendants but they were animated b% one and the same purpose to accomplish the criminal ob1ective, those who cooperated by previous or simultaneous acts but cannot be held liable as principals are accomplices.

In case $# "$&*% as %$

'e%'er principal $r acc$mplice.

!n case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

4'en %'e par%icipa%i$n $# an acc&se" is n$% "iscl$se"! 'e is $nl+ an acc$mplice.

person who assists one who commits the crime of arson and who *nows the latterOs purpose, but whose participation in the arson is not disclosed, may not be considered as a principal, because his acts are neither direct nor absolutely necessary for the commission of the offense, nor do they induce the said commission. n accomplice does not have previous agreement or understanding or is not in conspiracy with the principal by direct participation.

Dis%inc%i$n *e% een acc$mplice an" c$nspira%$r.

%onspirators and accomplices have one thing in common; they know and agree with the criminal design. %onspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. ccomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its e+ecution. %onspirators decide that a crime should be committed* accomplices merely concur in it. ccomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed* they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. %onspirators are the authors of a crime* accomplices are merely instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.

>a+ a c$/c$nspira%$r *e 'el" lia*le as an acc$mplice $nl+;

The fact that the role of a malefactor in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was of a minor character is of no conse-uence, since having been in conspiracy with the others, the act of one is the act of all. !f a malefactor entered with the others into an a&reement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it, the malefactor and the others participated in the criminal resolution. I# %'ere as n$ s&c' a)reemen% an" "ecisi$n! *&%! (n$ in) %'e criminal "esi)n $# %'e $%'ers! %'e mal/ e#ac%$r merel+ c$nc&rre" in %'eir criminal p&rp$se! %'ere is $nl+ c$mm&ni%+ $# "esi)n.

In $r"er %'a% a pers$n ma+ *e c$nsi"ere" an acc$mplice! %'e #$ll$ in) reA&isi%es m&s% c$nc&r.
1. That there be community of design* that is, *nowin& the criminal desi&n of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose* That he cooperates in the e+ecution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the e+ecution of the crime in an efficacious way* and That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

2. (.

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irst re5uisite!
Note that before there could be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation. Aut the principal ori&inates the criminal design. The accomplice merely concurs with the principal in his criminal purpose. The sentry improperly permitted certain convicts to go out of 1ail, accompanied by the corporal of the guards. The convicts committed robbery. 8as the sentry an accomplice in the crime of robbery committed by the convictsG No. 8hen the sentry permitted the convicts to go at large, the sentry had no knowledge of their intention. Aut the driver of a ta+icab who, *nowin& that his co2accused were going to make a hold2up, permitted them to use the ta+icab driven by him in going to a store where his said co2accused staged the hold2up, and waited for them until after the hold2up, is an accomplice in the crime of robbery.

H$

an acc$mplice acA&ires (n$ le")e $# %'e criminal "esi)n $# %'e principal.

8hen the principal informs or tells the accomplice of the formerOs criminal purpose. 8hen the accomplice saw the criminal acts of the principal. acts! After the blow struck by 5ose, which 1amon saw, the latter continued to choke the deceased until life was e+tinct. The choking by 9amon was not the cause of death. !t was the blow delivered by 5ose which caused the death of the deceased. "eld! 9amon is an accomplice. The reason is that after the deceased had received the fatal in1ury, 9amon continued to hold and choke the deceased until after life was e+tinct. !t shows that 9amon approved of the blow struck by 5ose, thereby showing his participation in the criminal design of 5ose. An$%'er case, 5ovito %agalingan stabbed the deceased after lfredo %agalingan had stabbed said deceased at the back, while Hictor 9omina, 5r. stabbed the same deceased while the latter was already lying prostrate on the ground. 8hile the acts of 5ovito %agalingan and Hictor 9omina, 5r. show a community of design with the principal, lfredo %agalingan, who inflicted the fatal wound, their acts were not absolutely indispensable in the commission of the crime. person who assails a victim already fatally wounded by another is only regarded as accomplice.

C$nc&rrence

i%' %'e criminal p&rp$se $# an$%'er ma+ ma(e $ne a c$/principal.

7ven if only one of the offenders originated the criminal design and the other merely concurred with him in his criminal purpose, but before the actual commission of the crime both of them a&reed and decided to commit it, the other is not merely an accomplice. acts! %rispin Her,o caused madeo Sala,ar and <avino Bargo to load a time bomb in a 3 B plane, which carried 6ructuoso Su,ara. Her,o was the paramour of Su,araOs wife. The bomb e+ploded when the plane was in mid2air. "eld! Sala,ar and Bargo were accomplices in the crime of which %rispin Her,o was found guilty as principal, Mbecause although they cooperated in the e+ecution of the criminal act with knowledge that something illicit or forbidden was being done, there is no evidence that they knew that the act would, or was intended to, cause the destruction of the plane and its passengers.M 8here the accomplices consent to aid in the commission of forcible abduction (a crime in which the use of force is involved&, they will be responsible as such accomplices for the resulting homicide, the commission of which might reasonably have been regarded as a possibility in attempting to carry out the abduction, and this even if it appears that the purpose to commit the homicide on the part of the principal was un*nown to the accomplices.

Second re5uisite!
Bike the principal by cooperation under par. ( of rt. 1$, the accomplice cooperates with the principal by direct participation. Aut the cooperation of an accomplice is only necessary, not indispensable. @owever, if there is conspiracy between two or among several persons, even if the cooperation of one offender is only necessary* the latter is also a principal by conspiracy. Examples of cooperation b% accomplice! a. Ay previous acts. The lending of a dagger or pistol to the murderer, *nowin& the latterOs criminal purpose.

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The pharmacist who, knowing the criminal purpose of another, furnishes him the drug with which he will put his victim to sleep in order to rape her. b. 4% simultaneous acts. The defendant who held one of the hands of the victim and tried to take away the latterOs revolver, while his co2 defendant was attacking him. The three other accused who held the victimOs companion, in order to prevent the latter from rendering any help to the victim, were accomplices, there being no conspiracy among them. The act of one, blocking people coming to the aid of the victim while being assailed is undoubtedly one of help and cooperation to the assailants. Aut, it is not indispensable to the stabbing of the victim. @ence, he is merely an accomplice. =ne who acted as a look2out or guard and also assisted in taking the stolen articles in the crime of robbery with homicide, absent a conspiracy. The accomplice merely supplies the principal with material or moral aid without conspiracy with the latter. @owever, in going with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill the victim, the appellant effectively sup plied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.

T'e $&n"s in#lic%e" *+ an acc$mplice in crimes a)ains% pers$ns s'$&l" n$% 'a-e ca&se" %'e "ea%' $# -ic%im.
The person charged as an accomplice should not have inflicted a mortal wound. (People s. Aplegi&o, $/ 3hil. .$1& !f he inflicted a mortal wound, he becomes a principal by direct participation.

R&les,
1. 2. (. '. The one who had the ori&inal criminal desi&n is the person who committed the resulting crime. The accomplice, after concurring in the criminal purpose of the principal, cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts. 8hen the cooperation is by simultaneous act, the accomplice takes part while the crime is being committed by the principal by direct participation or immediatel% thereafter. The accomplice in crimes against persons does not inflict the more or most serious wounds.

Problem! gave a fist blow on the face of A. Seeing what had done to A, % stabbed A to death. !s an accompliceG No, absent knowledge of the criminal purpose of the principal, giving aid or encouragement, either morally or materially, in the commission of the crime, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not make one an accomplice. The responsibility of the accomplice is to be determined by acts of aid and assistance, either prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the crime, rendered *nowin&l% for the principal therein, and not by the mere fact of having been present at its e+ecution, unless the ob$ect of such presence was to encoura&e the principal or to apparentl% or reall% increase the odds a&ainst the victim.

)hird re5uisite!
There must be a relation between the criminal act of the principal and the act of the one charged as accomplice. 3t is not enou&h that a person entertains an identical criminal design as that of the principal. There must be a relation between the criminal act of the principal by direct participation and that of the person charged as accomplice.

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An acc$mplice ma+ *e lia*le #$r a crime "i##eren% #r$m %'a% c$mmi%%e". 'ic' %'e principal

attacked A with treachery, the attack being sudden and une+pected. 8hen A was mortally wounded, %, father of appeared, placed himself upon AOs abdomen, and held his hands. Bater, 0 also appeared and held both knees of % and 0 made it possible for to search the body of A for the latterOs revolver. !t was not shown that % and 0 knew of the manner attacked A. 8hat they knew was that had unlawfully attacked and wounded A. !t was held that was guilty of murder -ualified by treachery ( rt. 2'#& and % and 0 were guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. , a N 9!% guard, asked % to help him ( & remove from the N 9!% warehouse some sacks of rice belonging to the N 9!%, and sold them to 0. The -ualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confi dence which in the case of makes the crime 5ualified theft ( rt. (1:& does not apply to %, who was not in confidential relations with the N 9!%. % is guilty as accomplice in the commission of the crime of simple theft.

Dis%in)&is' an acc$mplice #r$m a principal *+ c$$pera%i$n.

!f one lends his dagger or pistol to a murderer fully knowing that the latter will commit murder, he undoubtedly cooperates in the commission of the crime of murder with a previous act which, however, cannot be considered indispensable for the reason that even though the offender did not lend his dagger or pistol, the murderer could have obtained it somewhere else or from some other person. !n such a case, the participation of the offender is that of an accomplice by virtue of the provisions of this article. 8here the accused struck the deceased on the forehead with a piece of wood, rendering the latter unconscious, thereby facilitating the subse-uent slaying of the deceased by the other accused, the former must be deemed responsible as an accomplice in the killing. The accused who struck the deceased on the forehead must have *nowled&e of the intention of the other accused to *ill the deceased before he struck the deceased. !f he had no such knowledge, he is not an accomplice in the killing of the deceased. 8hile the act of holding the victim by 9omeo was one of help and cooperation, it is not indispensable for the commission of the offense by the others who boloed the victim. !f there was conspiracy between 1omeo and the others, he would be liable as principal, notwithstanding the fact that his cooperation was not indispensable.

Dis%in)&is' an acc$mplice #r$m a principal *+ "irec% par%icipa%i$n.

!n both, there is community of criminal design. The person who entertains the owner of a house while robbers are assaulting it, so that he will not return thereto until after the robbery has been consummated, is an accomplice in the crime, inasmuch as he cooperated therein by simultaneous act, although not an indispensable one for its accomplishment. This case implies that the owner of the house was entertained at some distance from the place where the robbery was committed. !f that person was in the same place, say under the house, talking with the owner of the house in order to distract his attention from what was going on upstairs, he was a principal by direct par ticipation, serving as guard to warn his companions. s to the acts performed, there is no clear2cut distinction between the acts of the accomplice and those of the prin 2 cipal by direct participation. That is why, in case of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of lesser responsibility, that is, that of mere accomplice. Aetween or among principals liable for the same offense, there must be conspirac%> but between the principals and the accomplices, there is no conspirac%.

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Ar%icle 5H. Accessories. / Access$ries are %'$se '$! 'a-in) (n$ le")e $# %'e c$mmissi$n $# %'e crime! an" i%'$&% 'a-in) par%icipa%e" %'erein! ei%'er as principals $r acc$mplices! %a(e par% s&*seA&en% %$ i%s c$mmissi$n in an+ $# %'e #$ll$ in) manners, 5. B+ pr$#i%in) %'emsel-es $r assis%in) %'e $##en"er %$ pr$#i% *+ %'e e##ec%s $# %'e crime. 6. B+ c$ncealin) $r "es%r$+in) %'e *$"+ $# %'e crime! $r %'e e##ec%s $r ins%r&men%s %'ere$#! in $r"er %$ pre-en% i%s "isc$-er+. 8. B+ 'ar*$rin)! c$ncealin)! $r assis%in) in %'e escape $# %'e principals $# %'e crime! pr$-i"e" %'e access$r+ ac%s i%' a*&se $# 'is p&*lic #&nc%i$ns $r 'ene-er %'e a&%'$r $# %'e crime is )&il%+ $# %reas$n! parrici"e! m&r"er! $r an a%%emp% %$ %a(e %'e li#e $# %'e C'ie# E3ec&%i-e! $r is (n$ n %$ *e 'a*i%&all+ )&il%+ $# s$me $%'er crime. I>PORTANT 4ORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 5H. 5. ="avin& *nowled&e.=
n accessory must have knowledge of the commission of the crime, and having that knowledge, he took part subse5uent to its commission. )ere possession of stolen property does not make the accused an accessory where the thief was already convicted. !t is within the realm of possibilities that he received it honestly, in the legal course of transactions without knowing that it was stolen. 2ote! !f there has been no one convicted as the thief, the possessor should be prosecuted as principal of the crime of theft. 7ntertaining suspicion that a crime has been committed is not enough. Inowledge of the commission of crime may be ac-uired subse-uent to the ac-uisition of stolen property. U.S. vs. 7ontano acts! The robbers took and carried away carabaos belonging to another. These animals were found in the possession of who ac-uired them without knowing that they had been illegally taken. 8hen the owners of the carabaos informed that they were illegally deprived of their animals, demanded the payment of one2half of what he had paid for them. The owners promised to come back with the money. 8hen the owners came back, informed them that he had returned the animals to the persons from whom he had bought them. "eld! !t is sufficient that after ac-uiring that knowledge, he concealed or disposed of the property, thereby depriving the owner thereof. Inowledge of the commission of crime may be established by circumstantial evidence.

/Commission of the crime.#

Thus, where it is doubtful whether a woman killed her husband maliciously, as it is possible that she might have acted in self2defense, the fact that their servant took part in the burial of the deceased in a secluded place would not make the servant an accessory in parricide, an offense which was not conclusivel% proven.

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/+ithout havin& participated therein either as principals or accomplices, ta*e part subse5uent to its commission.=
5. 4% profitin& themselves or assistin& the offender to profit b% the effects of the crime. The crime committed by the principal under this paragraph may be any crime, provided it is not a light felony. a. 4% profitin& themselves b% the effects of the crime. !n murder, one who shared in the reward given for the commission of the crime. )he accessor% should not ta*e the propert% without the consent of the principal. !f he took it without the consent of the principal, he is not an accessory but a principal in the crime of theft. Theft may be committed by taking with intent to gain, personal property from one who stole it, without the latterOs consent. +hen is profitin& b% the effects of the crime punished as the act of principal, and not the act of accessor%N 8hen a person knowingly ac-uired or received property taken by the brigands. ( rt. (:$& b. Assistin& the offender to profit b% the effects of the crime. Examples! person who receives any property from another, which he knows to have been stolen, and sells the same for the thief to whom he gives the proceeds of the sale. !n kidnapping for ransom, those who acted as runners or couriers in obtaining the ransom money. An accessor% should not be in conspirac% with the principal. ,. 4% concealin& or destro%in& the bod% of the crime to prevent its discover%. Examples! Those who assist in the burial of the victim of a homicide to prevent the discovery of the crime. 6urnishing the means to make it appear that the deceased was armed, by placing a weapon in his hand when already dead, and that it was necessary to kill him on account of his resistance to the constabulary men. )here must be an attempt to hide the bod% of the crime. >)o prevent its discover%.# Simply assisting the principal in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for an%one to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. The concealing or destroying of the body of the crime, the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime. !s a person who merely received a property knowing it to be stolen liable as an accessoryG !n People vs. )anchoco, $/ 3hil. '/(, it was held; M person who receives any property from another, knowing that the same had been stolen, is guilty of the crime of theft, as an accessory after the fact ;encubridor6. .. 4% harborin&, concealin& or assistin& in the escape of the principal of the crime. Two classes of accessories are contemplated !n paragraph ( of rticle 1".

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a. Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the principal of an% crime ;not light felony& with abuse of his public functions. 1e5uisites! (1& (2& ((& ('& The accessory is a public officer. @e harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal. The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions. The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony.

b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime 2 &uilt% of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt a&ainst the life of the 3resident, or who is known to be habituall% &uilt% of some other crime. 1e5uisites! (1& The accessory is a private person. (2& @e harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime. ((& The crime committed by the principal is either; (a& treason, (b& parricide, (c& murder, (d& an attempt against the life of the 3resident, or (e& that the principal is *nown to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

/"abituall% &uilt% of some other crime.#

Aut the accessory must have knowledge of the principal being habitually guilty of some other crime, because the law says Mor is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.M

A ma+$r One

'$ re#&se" %$ pr$sec&%e $##en"er is access$r+. i%' re)ar" %$ %'e crime 'e i%nesse" is n$% an access$r+.

'$ (ep% silen%

Aut if that person went to the authorities and volunteered false information which tended affirmatively to deceive the prosecuting authorities and thus to prevent the detection of the guilty parties and to aid them in escaping discovery and arrest, he is liable as an accessory. 8here the accused was present when her husband was shot, but she did not only en1oin her daughter not to reveal to anyone what the latter knew, but also warned her daughter that she would kill her if she would tell it to somebody, the accused thereby concealed or assisted in the escape of the principal in the crime, which made her liable as an accessory.

Access$riesL lia*ili%+ is s&*$r"ina%e an" s&*seA&en%.

8here the alleged incendiary was ac-uitted, it is neither proper nor possible to convict the defendant as accessory. The responsibility of the accessory is subordinate to that of the principal in a crime. !f then the facts alleged are not proven in the prosecution instituted, or do not constitute a crime, no legal grounds e+ist for convicting a defendant as an accessory after the fact for a crime not perpetrated.

4'en is c$n-ic%i$n $# access$r+ p$ssi*le! e-en i# principal is acA&i%%e";

%onviction of an accessory is possible notwithstanding the ac-uittal of the principal, if the crime was in fact committed, but the principal was not held criminally liable, because of an e+empting circumstance ( rt. 12&, such as insanity or minority. s long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of

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the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal. 8here the commission of the crime and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory are established, the accessory can be convicted, notwithstanding the ac-uittal of the principal. 3n a case! Aarlam is here charged with having assisted in the escape of Aalisi, not with having profited from, or having concealed the effects or instruments of the crime. The principle we have 1ust stated cannot apply to a person who is sought to be implicated as an accessory after the fact because he concealed the principal of the crime or assisted him in escaping when the said principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, an attempt on the life of the %hief 7+ecutive or is otherwise habitually known to have committed another crime.

Reas$nin) in %'e 4arlam case re#&%e".

8hether the principal is brought to court or is at2large, the prosecution has to prove the commission of the crime charged, with the same -uantum of evidence, and the participation in it of all the persons named in the information. The accessory is accorded the opportunity to refute the evidence of the prosecution establishing the crime and the participation of the alleged principal. The court can make a finding as to whether the crime charged has been estab lished and the other accused is the principal thereof, without pronouncing 1udgment on him.

K0encin).K
The act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, ac-uire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, ob1ect or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Access$r+ "is%in)&is'e" #r$m principal an" #r$m acc$mplice.

n accessory does not ta*e direct part or cooperate in, or induce, the commission of the crime. n accessory does not cooperate in the commission of the offense b% acts either prior thereto or simultaneous therewith. n accessory comes in after the commission of the crime.

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Ar%icle 6I. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liabilit%. / T'e penal%ies prescri*e" #$r access$ries s'all n$% *e imp$se" &p$n %'$se '$ are s&c' i%' respec% %$ %'eir sp$&ses! ascen"an%s! "escen"an%s! le)i%ima%e! na%&ral! an" a"$p%e" *r$%'ers an" sis%ers! $r rela%i-es *+ a##ini%+ i%'in %'e same "e)rees! i%' %'e sin)le e3cep%i$n $# access$ries #allin) i%'in %'e pr$-isi$ns $# para)rap' 5 $# %'e ne3% prece"in) ar%icle. Gr$&n" #$r e3emp%i$n $# an Access$r+ &n"er Ar%icle 6I.
The e+emption provided for in rticle 2: is based on the ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of oneOs name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in this article.

Principals rela%e" %$ access$ries e3emp% #r$m criminal lia*ili%+.

n accessory is e+empt from criminal liability, when the principal is his F n accessory is e+empt from criminal liability, when the principal is his F 1. 2. (. '. Spouse, or scendant, or 0escendant, or Begitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or relative by affinity within the same degree.

7ven if only two of the principals guilty of murder are the brothers of the accessory and the others are not related to him, such accessory is e+empt from criminal liability.

Lia*ili%+ $# a p&*lic $##icer

'en rela%e" %$ %'e principal.

!s a public officer who, with evident abuse of his office, furnished the means of escape to his brother who had committed murder criminally liable as accessoryG Such a public officer does not incur any criminal liability. Ties of blood or relationship constitutes a more powerful incentive than the call of duty. rticle 2: does not grant the benefits of e+emption onl% to accessories who profited or helped the offender profit by the effects of the crime. This is the only case where the accessory who is related to the offender incurs criminal liability.

2o:o2