CANON 7 14. DELOS REYES V.

AZNAR

Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975); 6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975); 7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion. In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality. On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975); 8) ... ...; 9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she

would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ...

pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...; 10) ... ... ; 11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine)

that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ...

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows: EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975); 12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that: 1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman

was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975); 13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already

of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975); 2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach

been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 9091, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975); 3) 4) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975); sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41). Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ; 5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane

(Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology Edilberto Caban testified that: 1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975); xxx xxx xxx

wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977); 2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that: 1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44). In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar 2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him. On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit: From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him. It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself. General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75). determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69). of not less than three (3) years. the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43). male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar; Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced. It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court: When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]). The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47). On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows: A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959). Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by

We disagree. Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede,

reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

15. SOBERANO V. VILLANUEVA On March 12, 1955, complainant Mercedes H. Soberano filed with this Court a petition alleging that, after inducing her to take part, in December 1951, in a fake wedding under the belief, on her part, that it was a genuine and valid one, respondent Eugenio V. Villanueva cohabited with her and later lived with her as husband and wife, as a consequence of which she bore him two (2) children, and that, subsequently, he abandoned her and their children, and praying, therefore, that he be disbarred. Soon thereafter, she filed a communication, dated March 21, asking that her petition be "shelved"; that no action be taken thereon "until after her mother have arrived and decided on the, matter"; and that meanwhile "no person", not even respondent, be informed of said petition. This communication was followed by another, dated March 22, 1955, stating that complainant's mother had just arrived and that she (the mother) had "decided that the case must go on". On March 29, 1955, and, also, the next day, this Court received identify handwritten motions of the complainant, dated March 28, 1955, stating that the filing of said petition was "not sincerely" her "own wish" and had been "prompted by ill-advice unduly influencing" her, and "finally withdrawing" her complaint against respondent Villanueva. However, on April 2, 1955, complaint filed another "manifestation" praying that said motion for withdrawal of her petition be denied, respondent having secured the motion "by means of threats and intimidation". In his answer respondent denied the main allegations of the petition, particularly those referring to the allegedly simulated marriage and to his having lived with complainant as husband and wife, although he admitted having been intimate with her. Upon investigation, the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, filed the corresponding complaint for disbarment, which is a substantial reproduction of complainant's petition for disbarment. In his answer to this complaint, respondent reiterated the denials and allegations contained in his answer to said petition, and, in addition thereto, he set up "special defenses" as well as expressed the wish to present further evidence, which he was authorized to introduce and did introduce before an officer of this Court. After due hearing and the submission of memoranda, the matter was deemed submitted for decision. The first question for determination is whether or not there has been a simulated marriage between the parties herein. The only evidence thereon is complainant's testimony. Although she introduced, by way of corroboration, the testimony of one Beatriz Juada, the latter merely claimed to have seen a printed form of marriage contract, with the names of the complainant and the respondent typewritten at the bottom thereof. Beatriz did not even notice whether or not there were signatures at the bottom of said instrument. Upon the other hand, complainant's behavior belies her claim to the effect that, believing, in view of the allegedmarriage ceremony in December 1951, that respondent was her husband, she consented to cohabit with him, and later lived with him as his lawful wedded wife. Indeed, in her letter (Exhibit 16) to respondent, dated January 23, 1955 or over three (3) years after the aforementioned ceremony she reminded him of his unfulfilled promise to marry her after he passed the bar examination in 1954, thus leaving no room for doubt that

she did not consider him as her husband and that there had fake wedding in 1951. Again, her letters to him, Exhibits 1, 26, 2, 3, 6 and 7, dated, respectively, July 19, and September 6, 10 and 12, 1950, and February 24, 1951 made reference to their tryst in hotels, to her delayed menstruation, to the possibility of her being in the family way and to the need of seeing a physician in connection therewith, and, accordingly, reveal clearly that in relations had existed between them even prior to December, 1951. What is more, her letter to him, Exhibit 9, dated October 1, 1951, contains expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction they must have had sexual intercourse so often that she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing him with impudicity. In short, having possessed her at pleasure, without benefit of clergy, it is most incredible that respondent would subsequently resort to a simulated wedding order to cohabit with her. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that in September, 1953, she went to the National Bureau of Investigation and expressed the wish a complaint against respondent he having refused knowledge his offspring and failed to support her. When the Assistant Director of said office inquired whether respondent and she were married, her answer was in the negative. It is clear, therefore, that the alleged fake marriage was purely a figment of her imagination, without any factual basis whatever.lawphil.net The next question is whether the extra-marital relations between the parties, before respondent's administration to the Bar, warrant disciplinary action against him. The rule on this point is set forth in the American Jurisprudence (Vol. 5, p. 416) from which we quote: An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct committed before his admission to the Bar, and this notwithstanding that his certificate to practice was issued after a Board of Law Examiners, as required by law passed its judgment upon his moral character and standing. In order, however, to justify disbarment for breach of good faith committed before admission, the transaction or act must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especially in the light of the circumstances attending this case, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar. This is particularly true in the case under consideration, for no less than the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, where respondent practices his profession, as well as Dean Jeremias Montemayor of the College of Law of the Ateneo de Manila, and the Hon. Guillermo Santos, formerly Chairman of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission, then Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations and Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, have vouched for the good moral character of said respondent as a worthy and distinguished member of the Bar, attested by his subsequent election as president of the Negros Occidental Bar Association. Neither must we overlook the circumstance that, in view of the facts adverted to above and others revealed by the record which, for obvious reasons, need not be set forth in this decision it was rather difficult for respondent to marry complainant herein.

One other point should be disposed of. It is the allegation in complainant's "manifestation" of April 2, 1955, to the effect that her motion, dated March 28 1955 finally withdrawing her petition for disbarment of respondent herein because said petition did "not sincerely" reflect her "own wish" and had been "prompted by ill-advice unduly influencing her" had been secured by respondent through "threat and intimidation", and praying, therefore,that said motion be denied. Suffice it to say that the only proof in support of said "manifestation" is complainant's uncorroborated testimony, which is contradicted by respondent's testimony and deserves no credence not only for the reasons pointed out above also, because said motion was twice handwritten entirety by complainant herein, and her penmanship thereon is as good and firm as that of her aforementioned letters, admittedly made without any semblance of duress, thus showing that there was no "threat and intimidation" when she prepared said motion. In the light of the peculiar conditions obtaining in this case, the complaint against respondent herein is accordingly dismissed. It is so ordered.

16. ARCIGA V. MANIWANG Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then amedical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his

In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was brokenhearted when she returned to Davao. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J). Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959). Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation

acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z). When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the CebuCommunity Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child. Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.

from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535). Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102). (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256). (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313). (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450). (5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).

(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586). (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteenyear-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91). Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

17. MARCYADA V. NAZ This is a revival of the immorality charge against respondent Justiniano P. Naz. Salvacion E. Marcayda in a handwritten letter filed in this Court on April 19, 1977 asked that Naz's oathtaking as a member of the bar (after having flunked twice) be withheld pending negotiations for the support of his alleged child begotten with Salvacion. Naz in his answer of April 27, 1977 denied the paternity of the child. He alleged that the complaint was pure harassment and blackmail. He said that Salvacion could have filed an administrative complaint with theDepartment of Education and Culture since he was employed in the Legaspi branch of that Office but she never filed any such complaint. Accompanying his answer was an affidavit wherein Naz requested that, because clearance could not be given him to take the oath on April 29, 1977 due to Salvacion's complaint, he be allowed to take the oath but his signing of the Roll of attorneys be deferred pending resolution of Salvacion's complaint. On the following day, April 28, 1977, Naz and Salvacion, both 47, natives of Camalig Albay, executed in Manila a notarized agreement before lawyer Braulio R. G. Tansinsin wherein Naz admitted that he had an affair with Salvacion in 1964 as a result of which a boy named Rey E. Marcayda was born on January 8, 1965, (should beMarch 8, 1965, as shown in Exhibit 2). Naz was a married man. Salvacion was married to Primo Marcayda who died of tuberculosis on July

She testified that after Rey's birth Naz gave her forty pesos a month for six months. After she withdrew her complaint, Naz gave her one hundred pesos for May, 1977. As already stated, he did not comply with his commitment in the notarial agreement of support which was the basis of the withdrawal of the immorality complaint against him. Naz in his comment on the complaint and in his testimony in the Solicitor

General's office declared that Rey was not his son. Rey's 1965 birth certificate shows that he was born in wedlock to Salvacion and her husband, Primo (Exh. 21). He alleged that he was "coerced" to sign the agreement of support. The complaint was like "an Armalite trained on the head of the respondent". We hold that, as noted by the Solicitor General, Naz is not guilty of gross immorality. He should not be disbarred because he had admitted the paternity of Rey in a public document and agreed to support him. This circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and scandalous. (Arciga vs. Maniwang, Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,1981, 106 SCRA 591).

The agreement of support was the basis of the withdrawal of the 1917 complaint against him. The eleventh-hour withdrawal paved the way for his oath-taking. He cannot be allowed
to repudiate that public document of the ground of supposed coercion. Respondent Naz's stand of not giving any value to that public document shows a certain unscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble profession. It is tantamount to self stultification. His attitude is highly censurable. He wants to make a mockery of the proceedings in this Court by making it appear that he lied brazenly about the filiation of Rey Marcayda just to facilitate his admission to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood. The remedy of complainant Marcayda is a civil action for support on the basis of the agreement of support which isirrevocably binding on Naz. She could also file an administrative complaint against him with the Ministry of Education and Culture which could require him to give support to the child, Rey (See Sec. 36, Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807). WHEREFORE, respondent Naz is severely reprimanded for his attempt to nullify the notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation he had admitted. A copy of this resolution should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office. SO ORDERED.

5, 1965 (Exh. 1).

Naz in that agreement bound himself to pay Salvacion for Rey's support (1) back support of P2,000 on or before December 25, 1977 and another P2,000 on or before December 25, 1978 and (2) P100 or its dollar equivalent in advance within the first five days of every month, starting May, 1977 until Rey reached the age of twenty-one. Because of that public instrument admitting paternity and the promise to support the adulterous child, Salvacion on that same date, April 28, 1977, withdrew her complaint filed in this Court to withhold the oath-taking of Naz on the ground of immorality. The withdrawal document was also executed before Notary Tansinsin. It is document No.

628 of his notarial book while the document of acknowledgment and support is No. 629.
The result of these last minute maneuvers was this Court's resolution of April 28,

1977 allowing Naz to take his oath by reason of Salvacion's withdrawal of her complaint (SBC582). He took his oath on April 29, 1977 But Naz did not live up to his promise to give
support. In a verified complaint dated December 23, 1977 Salvacion asked for the reopening of the administrative case. She alleged that she withdrew the complaint so that Naz would have a higher salary and would be in a better position to support Rey. He is now an incumbent legal officer of Region V of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Legaspi City, with an annual salary of P17,724.

Separate Opinions MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein he committed adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married. Separate Opinions MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein he committed adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married.

The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).

18. TOLOSA V. CARGO On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8). Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations, to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken; (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday; (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so; (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood; and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.

2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo,Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983). 3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983). 4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q'). 5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). 6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K'). 7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). 8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). ( Rollo, pp. 3335). Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant; b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then; c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital, as assistance in her medical expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital; d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;

e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings; f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant; g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother, Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37). The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City. 2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. 3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences being one house away from each other. 4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice, because of her differences with complainant. 5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. 6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. 7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. 8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. 9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39). In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. 2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.

3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his differences with complainant. 4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40). Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
1

but must also so behave himself as to avoid

scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.

19. DE JES-PARAS VS. VAILOCES This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar. It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary public, Vailoces, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently the probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying probate to the will. This decision e final. On the basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental where after trial, they were found guilty and convicted On appeal, theCourt of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to Vailocess but modified it with record to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document defined and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and as sentenced to suffer an indeterminate Penalty ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, finest and costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party instituted the present disbarment proceedings. In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered against him in the criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed. Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good morals.1 Among the examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage.2 The crime of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime involves moral turpitude. Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206). It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on his part, much as we sympathize with him, to dispute now the sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we

are concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As this Court well said: The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice. (In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957). The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime which resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only be availed of when he is placed in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence" (In repose confidence"(In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 77). WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to this effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.

SEVILLA V. ZOLETA

CANON 8 1. INVESTMENT V. ROXAS The administrative proceedings against Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas started way back in 1975 when a petition for "disbarment or suspension" was filed, on 03 January of that year, by the Investment and Management Services Corporation. The petition averred that the complainant managed three corporations in the Philippines, to wit: Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc., Prime Trading Corporation and Luzon Leather Industries, Inc. Respondent lawyer, while he was still petitioners Administrative and Legal Officer, allegedly "misappropriated or appropriated for his own use and benefit certain sums of money or checks which he received in trust . . . from the Prime Trading Corporation and Luzon Leather Industries, Inc. amounting to P2,623.80. from the debtors of Luzon Leather Industries. Inc. amounting to P3,444.00, and from a number of employees of the Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc. amounting to P1,749.50 or a (grand) total of P7,817.30." 1 In addition according to petitioner, respondent issued bouncing checks to pay for personal obligations. In the Courts resolution of 13 January 1975, respondent was required to file an answer to the petition within ten (10) days The resolution was sent to his address at 647 John Glenn Street, Moonwalk Subdivision, Phase II, Paraaque, Rizal. There was no response. On 08 September 1977, or more than two and a half years later, respondent filed a "Motion for Substitution of Xerox Copy of the Petition" supposedly because the copy sent to him was not legible in certain portions that thereby prevented him from preparing an answer. He asked that the ten day period within which to file his answer be counted from his receipt of a new copy of the petition. He listed his address at 566-B Pedro Gil Street Malate, Manila. In a manifestation, dated 23 September 1977, petitioner informed the Court that respondent was furnished with a legible copy of the petition per Registry Receipt No. 12212. On 20 December 1977, petitioner filed a second manifestation stating that the legible copy of the petition sent to respondent at his Malate address was returned "unclaimed."cralaw virtua1aw library The Court, on 16 January 1978, directed the Clerk of Court to mail the copy of the petition to respondent at 89 Igualdad (Equalidad) Street, Lemery, Batangas, which was respondents permanent address shown in his petition to take the Bar Examinations. Respondent was given another ten (10) days within which to answer the petition. The Court further resolved to refer the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") for investigation, report and recommendation after the expiration of the ten-day period, with or without respondents answer, in order to avoid a further delay in the proceedings. On 27 April 1990, the OSG, through Assistant Solicitor General Edgardo L Kilayko, transmitted to the Court its report, with the recommendation that respondent be suspended for five (5) years from the practice of law. A separate complaint was filed by the OSG with the Court. From the Commissioners Report, dated 30 January 1995, it would appear that the case had been set for hearing a number of times but both complainant and respondent failed to appear. While the notices sent to respondent at his Sampaloc address were at first received by him, later communication, however, remained "unclaimed." The report noted that for lack of evidence, the complaint should be dismissed; however, it added that respondents Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable law and rules, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) month from the practice of law." 2 Services Corporation v. Adm. Case No 1417 Investment and Management RESOLUTION NO. XI-95-287 "Please take notice that on February 18, 1995 a resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in the above-entitled case the original of which is now on file in this office, quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library On 08 November 1995, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Agustinus V Gonzaga transmitted to the Court the records of the case, as well as the notice and copy of the decision, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph In the resolution of 04 February 1991, the matter was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") In his answer, filed on 20 July 1990, respondent denied the charges claiming that they were merely intended to harass or embarrass him. Respondent, this time, indicated his address at 2310-D San Anton Street, Sampaloc, Manila.The OSG filed its reply on 17 January 1991, averring that respondents general denial should be deemed an admission of the material allegations of the complaint. In its resolution, dated 04 June 1990, the Court required respondent to file his answer to the administrative complaint filed by the OSG within fifteen (15) days from notice.

"actuations," supra, in the course of the proceedings deserved disciplinary sanctions. IBP, adopting the Commissioners Report, ordered the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governing Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, if the IBP Board of Governors, by a majority vote of its total membership, determines that a lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The resolution, together with the whole record of the case, shall then be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. 3 In its resolution of 25 February 1992, the Court also directed; thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Re-Cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension or fine upon lawyers. The Court En Banc RESOLVED that effective today, all cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension or fine upon lawyers shall be decided either by Division or En Banc conformably with the following rules:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "(1) If the penalty of suspension is imposed for a period of one (1) year or less, the

A lawyer must constantly conduct himself with great propriety. He is also an officer of the court, and he owes to it, as well as to his peers, utmost respect and fidelity. His relationship with others should no less be characterized than by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. 4 When he took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by those pledges. In this covenant, respondent lawyer has miserably failed. WHEREFORE, Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon his receipt of this decision. 2. Yulo vs. Yang Chiao Seng Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as defendant's counterclaim. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The record discloses that on June 17, 1945, defendant Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the palintiff Mrs. Rosario U. Yulo, proposing the formation of a partnership between them to run and operate a theatre on the premises occupied by former Cine Oro at Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila. The principal conditions of the offer are (1) that Yang Chiao Seng guarantees Mrs. Yulo a monthly participation of P3,000 payable quarterly in advance within the first 15 days of each quarter, (2) that the partnership shall be for a period of two years and six months, starting from July 1, 1945 to December 31, 1947, with the condition that if the land is expropriated or rendered impracticable for the business, or if the owner constructs a permanent building thereon, or Mrs. Yulo's right of lease is terminated by the owner, then the partnership shall be terminated even if the period for which the partnership was agreed to be established has not yet expired; (3) that Mrs. Yulo is authorized personally to conduct such business in the lobby of the building as is ordinarily carried on in lobbies of theatres in operation, provided the said business may not obstruct the free ingress and agrees of patrons of the theatre; (4) that after December 31, 1947, all improvements placed by the partnership shall belong to Mrs. Yulo, but if the partnership agreement is terminated before the lapse of one and a half years period under any of the causes mentioned in paragraph (2), then Yang Chiao Seng shall have the right to remove and take away all improvements that the partnership may place in the premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

resolution of a case shall be by the Division concerned; if the penalty exceeds one (1) year, resolution shall be by the Court En Banc; "(2) If the penalty imposed is a fine of P10,000 or less, the resolution shall be by the

Division concerned; if more than P10,000 resolution will be by the Court En Banc; "(3) In case both suspension and a fine are involved, resolution shall be by the Court En

Banc if the suspension exceeds one (1) year or the fine exceeds P10,000 "(4) In case of two or more suspensions of the lawyer, service of the same will be

successive, not simultaneous."cralaw virtua1aw library Accordingly, we shall take the IBP decision ordering the one-month suspension of respondent to be merely recommendatory After a thorough review of the case, we find nothing to warrant a reversal of the findings of the IBP; indeed, the Court believes, given the circumstances, that a more severe penalty than that recommended needs to be imposed. Respondent clearly had no intention to squarely face the charges against him. By repeatedly changing his address without informing the investigating officials or the Court he somehow managed to evade the administrative investigation for, after years of delay, no longer could complainant corporation be reached to substantiate its charges. The Court cannot take the matter lightly.

Pursuant to the above offer, which plaintiff evidently accepted, the parties executed a partnership agreement establishing the "Yang & Company, Limited," which was to exist from July 1, 1945 to December 31, 1947. It states that it will conduct and carry on the business of operating a theatre for the exhibition of motion and talking pictures. The capital is fixed at P100,000, P80,000 of which is to be furnished by Yang Chiao Seng and P20,000, by Mrs. Yulo. All gains and profits are to be distributed among the partners in the same proportion as their capital contribution and the liability of Mrs. Yulo, in case of loss, shall be limited to her capital contribution (Exh. "B").chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In June , 1946, they executed a supplementary agreement, extending the partnership for a period of three years beginning January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1950. The benefits are to be divided between them at the rate of 50-50 and after December 31, 1950, the showhouse building shall belong exclusively to the second party, Mrs. Yulo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The land on which the theatre was constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. Yulo from Emilia Carrion Santa Marina and Maria Carrion Santa Marina. In the contract of lease it was stipulated that the lease shall continue for an indefinite period of time, but that after one year the lease may be cancelled by either party by written notice to the other party at least 90 days before the date of cancellation. The last contract was executed between the owners and Mrs. Yulo on April 5, 1948. But on April 12, 1949, the attorney for the owners notified Mrs. Yulo of the owner's desire to cancel the contract of lease on July 31, 1949. In view of the above notice, Mrs. Yulo and her husband brought a civil action to the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 3, 1949 to declare the lease of the premises. On February 9, 1950, the Municipal Court of Manila rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of Mrs. Yulo and Mr. Yang. The judgment was appealed. In the Court of First Instance, the two cases were afterwards heard jointly, and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Mrs. Yulo and her husband, and declaring the contract of lease of the premises terminated as of July 31, 1949, and fixing the reasonable monthly rentals of said premises at P100. Both parties appealed from said decision and the Court of Appeals, on April 30, 1955, affirmed the judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On October 27, 1950, Mrs. Yulo demanded from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the profits of the business. Yang answered the letter saying that upon the advice of his counsel he had to suspend the payment (of the rentals) because of the pendency of the ejectment suit by the owners of the land against Mrs. Yulo. In this letter Yang alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee and inasmuch as Mrs. Yulo has not paid to the lessors the rentals from August, 1949, he was retaining the rentals to make good to the landowners the rentals due from Mrs. Yulo in arrears (Exh. "E").chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In view of the refusal of Yang to pay her the amount agreed upon, Mrs. Yulo instituted this action on May 26, 1954, alleging the existence of a partnership between them and that the defendant Yang Chiao Seng has refused to pay her share from December, 1949 to December, 1950; that after December 31, 1950 the partnership between Mrs. Yulo and Yang terminated, as a result of which, plaintiff became the absolute owner of the building occupied by the Cine Astor; that the reasonable rental that the defendant should pay therefor from January, 1951 is P5,000; that the defendant has acted maliciously and refuses to pay the participation of the plaintiff in the profits of the business amounting to P35,000 from November, 1949 to October, 1950, and that as a result of such bad faith and malice on the part of the defendant, Mrs. Yulo has suffered damages in the amount of P160,000 and exemplary damages to the extent of P5,000. The prayer includes a demand for the payment of the above sums plus the sum of P10,000 for the attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In answer to the complaint, defendant alleges that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of lease and not of partnership; that the partnership was adopted as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition contained in the contract of lease between the owners and the plaintiff against the sublease of the said property. As to the other claims, he denies the same and alleges that the fair rental value of the land is only P1,100. By way of counterclaim he alleges that by reason of an attachment issued against the properties of the defendant the latter has suffered damages amounting to P100,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The first hearing was had on April 19, 1955, at which time only the plaintiff appeared. The court heard evidence of the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P41,000 for her participation in the business up to December, 1950; P5,000 as monthly rental for the use and occupation of the building from January 1, 1951 until defendant vacates the same, and P3,000 for the use and occupation of the lobby from July 1, 1945 until defendant vacates the property. This decision, however, was set aside on a motion for reconsideration. In said motion it is claimed that defendant failed to appear at the hearing because of his honest belief that a joint petition for postponement filed by both parties, in view of a possible amicable settlement, would be granted; that in view of the decision of the Court of Appeals in two previous cases between the owners of the land and the plaintiff Rosario Yulo, the plaintiff has no right to claim the alleged participation in the profit of the business, etc. The court, finding the above motion, well-founded, set aside its decision and a new trial was held. After trial the court rendered the decision making the following findings: that it is not true that a partnership was created between the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant has not actually contributed the sum mentioned in the Articles of Partnership, or any other amount; that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff did not share either in the profits or in the losses of the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil Code; and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the supposed existence of a partnership between them. It. therefore, denied plaintiff's claim for damages or supposed participation in the profits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to her claim for damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the use of the supposed lobby of the theatre, the court after ocular inspection found that the said lobby was very narrow space leading to the balcony of the theatre which could not be used for business purposes under existing ordinances of the City of Manila because it would constitute a hazard and danger to the patrons of the theatre. The court, therefore, dismissed the complaint; so did it dismiss the defendant's counterclaim, on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the same. It is against this decision that the appeal has been prosecuted by plaintiff to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The first assignment of error imputed to the trial court is its order setting aside its former decision and allowing a new trial. This assignment of error is without merit. As that parties

agreed to postpone the trial because of a probable amicable settlement, the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendant's absence at the time fixed for the hearing. The lower court, therefore, did not err in setting aside its former judgment. The final result of the hearing shown by the decision indicates that the setting aside of the previous decision was in the interest of justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant claims that the lower court erred in not striking out the evidence offered by the defendant-appellee to prove that the relation between him and the plaintiff is one of the sublease and not of partnership. The action of the lower court in admitting evidence is justified by the express allegation in the defendant's answer that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of lease and not of partnership, and that the partnership formed was adopted in view of a prohibition contained in plaintiff's lease against a sublease of the property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The most important issue raised in the appeal is that contained in the fourth assignment of error, to the effect that the lower court erred in holding that the written contracts, Exhs. "A", "B", and "C, between plaintiff and defendant, are one of lease and not of partnership. We have gone over the evidence and we fully agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agreement was a sublease, not a partnership. The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund; (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil Code.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the first place, plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20,000 capital. In the second place, she did not furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre. In the third place, it does not appear that she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the business. Were she really a partner, her first concern should have been to find out how the business was progressing, whether the expenses were legitimate, whether the earnings were correct, etc. She was absolutely silent with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done; all that she did was to receive her share of P3,000 a month, which can not be interpreted in any manner than a payment for the use of the premises which she had leased from the owners. Clearly, plaintiff had always acted in accordance with the original letter of defendant of June 17, 1945 (Exh. "A"), which shows that both parties considered this offer as the real contract between them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Plaintiff claims the sum of P41,000 as representing her share or participation in the business from December, 1949. But the original letter of the defendant, Exh. "A", expressly states that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was to end upon the termination of the right of the plaintiff to the lease. Plaintiff's right having terminated in July, 1949 as found by the Court of Appeals, the partnership agreement or the agreement for her to receive a participation of P3,000 automatically ceased as of said date.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find no error in the judgment of the court below and we affirm it in toto, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.chanroble

3. ASIA BANKING CORP. VS. HERRIDGE As a supplemental statement of its claim against the estate of U. de Poli, an insolvent, the Asia BankingCorporation alleges that, in addition to its security mentioned in its claim presented December 20, 1920, and as amended October 18, 1921, it held, as further security, three warehouse receipts in the form of letters issued to it by the debtor as of August 21, 25, and September 4, 1920, of which the following is a copy of the first: MANILA, August 21, 1920. Messrs. ASIA BANKING CORPORATION,

Wherefore, it prays that the assignee be ordered and directed to return to the bank the money and merchandise, which were erroneously delivered to him, and to also deliver the remaining 59,954 meters of sinamay, or the proceeds in the event the property has been sold. For answer, the assignee makes a general and specific denial of all of the material allegations of the petition, and, as a further and special defense, alleges that the bank has no valid security, or preference whatever, by virtue of the "letter-warehouse receipts," for the reason that they are null and void as against the general creditors of the insolvent state. First, because they are not valid warehouse receipts under the law, and are not evidenced by any public document, and that the property was never delivered to the bank, and, as a second special defense, alleges that the money and the property were voluntarily surrendered by the bank to the assignee with the full knowledge of all the facts and upon the advice of its present and former counsel, and, as a counterclaim, the assignee alleges that, without any legal right, the bank took and appropriated to its own use the property described in the letters, and that it was then of the value of P142,500; that, giving the bank credit for the money which it refunded to the assignee, there is a balance due and owing from the bank to

Manila, P.I.
DEAR SIRS: In addition to security now in your hands covered by Quedanes, as collateral of my daily overdraft I hold in my godown of No. 209 Estero de Binondo:

11,780 Buntal hats valued ...................... 6,150 Balibuntal hats valued ..................

P41,230.00 46,125.00

the assignee of P98,622.23, for which he prays judgment against the bank. The trial court denied the supplemental claim of the bank, and rendered judgment to the effect that the assignee should "have and recover of and from said Asia Banking Corporation the goods, wares, and merchandise hereinbefore described and

87,355.00 ========== which bring my position to a total of P321,556.94.

mentioned as having been taken into the possession of the Asia Banking Corporation on November 22, 1920, and stored on said date with the Derham Warehouse & Shipping Company, or, in the event of sales thereof, the proceeds of all of said property which has or shall have been sold, less the charges paid for storage and insurance, subject to the further orders of this court or of the Supreme Court in the premises." From this decision the Asia Banking Corporation appeals, specifying the following errors: I. The trial court erred in failing to find and declare that the claimant bank held a valid title to the money and merchandise described in its supplemental claim and was entitled to, preference with reference thereto over the assignee and all other creditors. II. Then trial court erred in finding that "Umberto de Poli was at least suspected by the claimant bank of impending insolvency" on the 22d of November, 1920, when it obtained possession of the merchandise in question. III. The trial court erred in finding to find that the negotiable neutral warehouse receipts issued on November 22, 1920, together with the previous letter pledges or promises to pledge, conveyed to the claimant bank absolute title to the said merchandise and that such title could only be defeated by proof of fraud on the part of the bank. IV. The trial court erred in holding that the assignee was and is a third person with reference to the claimant bank.

The other two letters are of the same tenor describing property of the value of P42,015. It is then alleged that of the property described in the letters, on November 22, 1920, De Poli delivered possession to the bank of sixty-eight cases of sinamay and 22,920 Philippine hats; that at the time of such delivery, the receipts of August 21st and September 4th were returned to De Poli, who promised to deliver the reminder of the property, which he failed to do; that of the property which was delivered and stored in neutral warehouses 18,518 of the hats were sold for P31,457.53; that the remaining 4,349, for the purposes of sale, were forwarded to New York City; that their probable value is P4,511; that due to a change in the management of the bank, the facts with reference to the said warehouse receipts were lost, and that the present management had no knowledge of such receipts, and for want thereof, and upon the advice of its present counsel, the bank delivered to the assignee the proceeds of the sale of the hats, together with 42,046 meters of sinamay of the value of P12,420.24; that such delivery was made through the error of both parties and in ignorance of the existence of the "letter-warehouse receipts;" that, acting upon information, which it received from the assignee, on November 23, 1921, the bank found the letters in question.

V. The trial court erred in failing to order said assignee to return the money and merchandise surrendered to him by mistake. JOHNS, J.: Relying upon the decisions of this court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (36 Phil., 27), and Mahoney vs. Tuason (39 Phil., 952), the attorneys for the bank vigorously contend that in this kind of a proceeding the assignee does not act for, or represent, general creditors of the insolvent estate, and that he represents the insolvent only; that De Poli could not personally question the legal force and effect of the "letter-warehouse receipts," and for such reasons his assignee cannot question them. It must be conceded that the language used and the authorities cited in the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha case tend to support counsel's contention. As applied to the facts therein stated, the decision in the Kaisha case upon the point in question was more or less obiter dictum, as in legal effect the court held that the transaction there in question was valid even as against general creditors. The question here involved is squarely met and decided in the case of Security Warehousing Co. vs. Hand ([1907], 206 U.S. 415; 51 L. ed., 1117, 1122-1124), in which that court says: There is, however, an important matter which has been raised by the appellants aside from the merits. That is, whether a trustee in bankcruptcy can question the validity of these receipts, or the sufficiency of the alleged transfer of the property belonging to the bankrupt knitting company, to constitute a pledge of such property. The right is denied by the appellants, and it is contended that the transfers were valid between the parties; that the trustee in bankcruptcy takes only the title and right of the bankrupt, and therefore he cannot assert a right not possessed by the knitting company. It is no new doctrine that the assignee or trustee in bankruptcy stands in the shoes of the bankrupt, and that the property in is hands, unless otherwise provided in the bankrupt act, is subject to all of the equities impressed upon it in the hands of the bankrupt. This has been the rule under former acts and is now the rule. (Hewit vs. Verlin Mach. Works, 194 U. S., 296; 48 L. ed., 986; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 690; Thompson vs.Fairbanks, 196 U.S., 516, 526; 49 L. ed., 577; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 306; Humphrey vs. Tatman, 198 U.S., 91; 49 L. ed., 956; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 567; York Mfg. Co. vs. Cassell, 201 U.S., 344, 352; 50 L. ed., 782, 785; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep., 481.) In analyzing its decision, that court quoted from its opinion in Thompson vs. Fairbanks, supra, where it is said: "Under the present bankrupt act, the trustee takes the property of the bankrupt, in cases unaffected by fraud, in the same plight and condition that the bankrupt himself held it, and subject to all the equities impressed upon it in the hands of the bankrupt, except in cases where there has been a conveyance or encumbrance of the property which is void as against the trustee by some positive provision of the act." Also from its opinion in the York Mfg. Co. vs. Cassell, supra, in which it is said:

This court had theretofore approved the remark in Re New York Economical Printing Co., 49 C.C.A. 133; 110 Fed., 514, 518, that the present bankrupt act contemplates that a lien good as against the bankrupt and all of his creditors at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy should remain undisturbed. Hewit Case, supra. Upon these facts it was reiterated that held it. the trustee takes the property as the bankrupt

The case at bar bears no resemblance in its facts to the cases just cited. There was no valid disposition of the property in the case before us, or any valid lien. The so-called warehouse receipts issued by the warehousing company to the knitting company, upon the facts of this case, gave no lien under the law in Wisconsin in which state they were issued. In such case this court follows the state court.
The law is well stated in Ruling Case Law, vol. 3, page 231, where it is said: 63. Nature and incidents of trustee's title. The trustee takes the property of the bankrupt, in cases unaffected by fraud, in the same plight and condition that the bankrupt himself held it and subject to all the equities impressed upon it in the hands of the bankrupt, except in cases where there has been a conveyance or incumbrance of the property which is void as against the trustee by some positive provision of the Act. This was the rule under former bankruptcy acts and continues to be the rule under the present act. He does not take the property of the bankrupt as a bona fide purchaser for value. It is only as to unlawful preferences and property fraudulently conveyed that the trustee has rights, in the interest of creditors, beyond those that the bankrupt himself could have enforced. In the notes, it is said: The rule that the trustee takes the estate of the bankrupt in the same plight as the bankrupt held it is not applicable to liens which, although valid as to the bankrupt, are invalid as to creditors. Baltimore First Nat. Bank vs. Staake, 202 U.S., 141; 26 S. Ct., 580; 50 U.S. [L. ed.], 967, affirming 133 Fed., 717; 66 C.C.A., 547; Forth St. Nat. Bank vs. Millbourne Mills Co.'s Trustee, 172 Fed., 177; 96 C.C.A., 629; 30 L.R.A. [N.S.], 552. Corpus Juris, vol. 7, page 224, says: (SEC. 345) D. Representation of creditors by trustee. The trustee is not the representative of the bankrupt, but of the creditors who are unsecured and who were such creditors at the time of the filing of the petition; and he holds title to the bankrupt's property in trust for the creditors and for the purpose of distribution among them. A trustee in bankruptcy, as the representative of the creditors, may sue to recover property which has been transferred by the bankrupt with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or to give a preference, or money which has been paid to create a preference. (P. 247.)lawphi1.net (2) Avoidance of fraudulent transfer or preference. The Bankruptcy Act in its present form expressly confers upon courts of bankruptcy jurisdiction of proceedings by the trustee to

recover property transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, or money or property paid or transferred with the intent to create a preference, where the payment or transfer occurred within four months prior to the filling of the petition in bankruptcy, regardless of the consent of the defendant; and an action by a trustee on behalf of creditors to avoid a transfer by the bankrupt which, under the state law, such creditors might have avoided, although not made within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, may not be brought in the court of bankruptcy without the consent of defendant. (P. 257.) (1) By trustee (a) To recover preference. In an action to recover an alleged preference, the burden rests upon the trustee to establish the fact of a payment or transfer by the bankrupt, and that it was preferential and avoidable rather than legal. He must therefore show that the payment or transfer took place within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy; that the bankrupt was insolvent at the time thereof; that defendant knew of such insolvency and had reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended, or, since the amendment of 1910, that the transfer would effect a preference; and that the effect of the payment or transfer would be to enable the recipient to obtain a greater portion of his claim than other creditors of the same class. (P. 270.) In legal effect, that was the decision of this court in Te Pate vs. Ingersoll, decided May 29, 1922, and reported in vol. 43, Philippine Reports, page 394, in which this court said: When goods or merchandise have been pledged to secure the payment of a debt of a particular creditor, the other creditors of the pledgor are "third persons" with relation to the pledge contract and the pledgor and pledgee. This is so because the insolvency proceedings operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. This is true, also, because the assignee is the representative of the creditors and not of the bankrupt. (Civil Code, article 1865, in relation to articles 1863 and 1226; Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, Act No. 1956, sec. 32; Tec Bi & Co. vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China [1916], 41 Phil., 596; 12 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, pp. 416, et seq.; Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. International Banking Corporation [1918], 37 Phil., 631.) We hold that in all actions or proceedings to set aside or nullify preferences of fraudulent transactions as void under the provisions of section 70 of Act No. 1956, known as the Insolvency Law, the assignee appears for, and represent, the general creditors, and that, in so far as the decision of this court in the Kaisha case is in conflict upon that point, it is hereby overruled. Section 70 of the Act Provides: If any debtor, being insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, within thirty days before the filing of a petition by or against him, with a view to giving a preference to any creditor or person having a claim against him or who is under any liability for him, procures any part of his property to be attached, sequestered, or seized on execution, or makes any payment, pledge, mortgage, assignment, transfer, sale or conveyance of any part of his property, either directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditionally, to anyone, the person receiving such

payment, pledge, mortgage, assignment, transfer, sale, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, or by such attachment or seizure, having reasonable cause to believe that such debtor is insolvent, and that such attachment, sequestration, seizure, payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance, transfer, sale or assignment is made with a view to prevent his property from coming to his assignee in insolvency, or to prevent the same from being distributed ratably among his creditors, or to defeat the object of, or in any way hinder, impede, or delay the operation of or to evade any of the provisions of this Act, such attachment, sequestration, seizure, payment, pledge, mortgage, transfer, sale, assignment, or conveyance is void, and the assignee, or the receiver, may recover the property, or the value thereof, as assets of such insolvent debtor. If such payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance, sale, assignment, or transfer is not made in the usual and ordinary course of business of the debtor, or if such seizure is made under a judgment which the debtor has confessed or offered to allow, that fact shall be prima facie evidence of fraud. Any payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance, sale, assignment, or transfer of property of whatever character made by the insolvent within one month before the filing of a petition in insolvency by or against him, except for a valuable pecuniary consideration made in good faith, shall be void. All assignments, transfers, conveyances, mortgages, or incumbrances of real estate shall be deemed, under this section, to have been made at the time the instrument conveying or affecting such realty was filed for record in the office of the register of deeds of the province or city where the same is situated. The important question here is whether the transaction in question constitutes a valid lien in favor of the bank, or a reference which is void as to creditors. We do not agree with counsel for the bank that the letters of August 21st and 25th and September 4th are in legal force and effect warehouse receipts. It is very apparent that the bank itself did not treat or consider them in the form or nature of warehouse receipts. They recite: In addition to security now in your hands covered by Quedanes, as collateral of my daily overdraft I hold in my godown of No. 209 Estero de Binondo: 11,780 Buntal hats valued ........................ 6,150 Balibuntal hats valued .................. P41,230.00 46,125.00

87,355.00 ========== which bring my position to a total of P321,556.94.

When the bank took the actual physical possession of the property in question, it was removed to the warehouses of Derham Bros., Inc., by which a warehouse receipt, with all of its legal formalities and in the usual and ordinary form, was issued to, and in favor of, the bank.

Prior to that time the bank never had the actual control or physical possession of the property described in the August and September letters. Although when written the letters may have had some legal value as between the bank and De Poli, yet, standing alone and without possession, they did not create any vested rights in the bank as between it and the creditors of the insolvent estate. The record shows that the bank took the physical possession of the property in question on November 22, 1920, sixteen days prior to the time that De Poli was adjudged insolvent. Hence, the question becomes important as to how, why and in what capacity the bank took possession, and whether it then knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that De Poli was insolvent. Upon the question of knowledge, in its opinion the trial court says: On November 22, 1920, when the said Umberto de Poli was at least suspected by the claimant bank of impending insolvency, the said bank obtained possession of the 22,920 Philippine hats described in the letters of August 21, and September 4, 1920, and of 42,046 meters of the 102,000 meters of sinamay described in the letter of August 25, 1920, and stored the same with the Derham Warehouse & Shipping Co., for which it received warehouse receipt No. 1701 in its own name. Q. And what was the first time that you knew that U. de Poli was about to be declared insolvent? A. I had an intimation of it at the time of the delivery of the merchandise to us. Q. Why was your attorney along with you. A. The depressed physical appearance of Mr. De Poli lead me to think he was in trouble.1awphi1.net Q. Why did you come to go down there and get that property on November 22d? Who told you to do that? A. Manager Beldon. Q. Did you ask him why? A. He stated that he wished to obtain additional security to cover Mr. De Poli's overdraft with us, and that Mr. De Poli had agreed to turn over certain merchandise already pledged to us. Q. Is it not a fact that these hats and this silk voile were taken from the U. de Poli bodega at night? A. It started in the afternoon about four or five o'clock and continued until about eight o'clock possibly. Q. Referring to your statement about the depressed condition of Mr. U. De Poli at the time you took delivery of these hats and this sinamay, how was that depression evidenced? A. Mr. De Poli was very sad and depressed. Q. Did he shed tears? A. In the presence of me and Colonel Wolfson, he cried. Q. And that lead you to suspect, for the first time as I understand it, that he was in financial difficulties, is that so? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarzkopf, who was then one of the attorneys for the bank, testified:

A. No, sir, my advice was based upon the fact that there was a rumor in the streets that the Philippine National Bank was about to take over the U. de Poli assets. Q. Why were they about to do that? A. I did not know. Q. And when you gave the bank this advice you told them, did you not, to take possession of this merchandise immediately, working day and night if necessary, and to get all they could out of this bodega? A. I told them to work quickly, and if necessary to work day and night. The reason why, the time and manner in which the bank took possession clearly indicate that it knew, or that at least it had reasonable grounds to believe, that De Poli was then insolvent. Again, it is very apparent from the time and manner of taking possession that it was not done "in the usual and ordinary course of business of the debtor." It clearly indicates that the bank thought and felt that an emergency existed, and that prompt action was required. The fact that the bank then surrendered two of the letters in question to the insolvent is conclusive proof that it then knew of the existence of the letters, and that it then at least thought and understood that the letters were of no legal value to the bank without possession of the property. In other words, it then took possession of it to further protect and secure its claim. Among other things section 70 provides: Any payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance, sale assignment, or transfer of property of whatever character made by the insolvent within one month before the filing of a petition in insolvency by or against him, except for a valuable pecuniary consideration made in good faith, shall be void. On page 35 of its opinion in the Kaisha case, this court says: There is no dispute about the facts between the Hongkong Bank and the intervener. Both agree that the title to the coal in question was in Chua Teng Chong. As above indicated, Chua Pue Tee, acting for Chua Teng Chong, attempted to pledge the coal to the bank on the 13th of April, 1914, by means of the private document, Exhibit 5. The bank, acting in good faith and without any knowledge of the insolvency of Chua Teng Chong, turned over to the latter's representative, Chua Pue Tee, the P30,000 in cash in consideration for the so-called pledge of April 13. On April 16 the bank, having in the meantime discovered that Chua Teng Chong was insolvent, secured a real pledge and took physical possession of the coal. (36 Phil., 35.) In other words, it is admitted there that, as a part of the transaction and concurrent with the making and delivery of the private document there in question, the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank parted with, and delivered to Chua Teng Chong, "the P30,000 in cash in consideration for the so-called pledge of April 13," That was a present loan as distinguished from a preexisting debt, in any by which the bank then and there parted with its money with the express understanding and agreement that it should have and receive a pledge of the property to secure the P30,000. Therein lies the important legal distinction between it and the instant case. Again, for aught that appears there, it was the only transaction between the parties.

Here, De Poli was a customer of the bank with which he had numerous previous dealings and a large overdraft at the time the letters in question were written, and the transaction in question was one of many dealings which he previously had with the bank, and the testimony of Mr. Brandt above quoted is clear and convincing that the bank took possession "to obtain additional security to cover Mr. De Poli's overdraft with us." Assuming that to be true, it would follow that at the time the bank took possession it had other and different security for its claim against De Poli, and that possession was taken to secure a preexisting debt, and that the transaction in question was not a pledge or transfer of property for a valuable pecuniary consideration made in good faith within the meaning of that portion of section 70 above quoted. In his supplemental brief of December 17th, counsel for the bank points out that in one of his former briefs it is said: That these promises to pledge "may possibly have been executed to some extent in consideration of a preexisting debt." And "The bank in the present case was constantly advancing money to the debtor at the time of the execution of the private documents or promises to pledge as is sufficiently shown on the face of those documents and by the proofs offered in this case." He then points out that: The balance of the daily overdraft on August 21, 1920, when the letter promises of that date was delivered to the bank was P321,556.94: On the delivery of the letter of August 25, 1920, P348,925.94, and on the delivery of the letter of September 4, 1920, P419,500.94. Thus it appears that the debtor U. de Poli overdrew his current account to the extent of P97,944 from August 12,1920, the date of the first letter, to September 4, 1920, the date of the third and last letter promise to pledge; that is to say, the debtor drew and the bank parted with that amount as a present or subsequent advancement against the security represented by those two letter promises, and whatever other security may have been deposited with the bank during the same period. Subsequent to the execution and delivery of the letter promise of September 4, 1920, the claimant bank, through the same current account thus secured by the three letter promises, advanced additional sums against all the securities deposited until the total overdraft amounted to over seven hundred thousand pesos . . . . This total overdraft, together with the list of the securities held by the bank, shows, conclusively that the latter, after the deposit of such securities, including the three letter promises to pledge, advanced against such securities sums largely in excess of their value. From which it is contended that the bank relied upon the letters for any advances which it made after September 4th. That position is not tenable and is not sustained by the proof. With all due respect to learned counsel for the bank, there is no financial statement of the bank in the record before us which shows the condition of De Poli's account with the bank

between those dates. The first entry in Exhibit GG is December 16, 1921. Exhibit A shows the condition of his account as of December 15, 1921, and neither exhibit shows the condition of his bank account at any time during the year, 1920. It is true that in his letter of August 21st De Poli says: Which bring my position to a total of P321,556.94. And in the one of August 25th, he says: Which bring my today's position to a total of P348,925.94. And in the one of September 4th, he says: Will bring my today's position to a total of P419,500.94. But this court has no legal right to accept De Poli's statements in the letters as to the amount of his overdraft in the bank as of those dates. Accepting his statement of P348,925.94 as of August 25th, and adding to it the P14,465, the value of the merchandise stated in the letter of September 4th, you have a total of P363,570.94, and in the letter of September 4th De Poli says: Will bring my today's position to a total of P419,500.94 showing an unexplained difference of P55,930. If it be a fact that the letters in question were written under an agreement with the bank that it would loan De Poli a specific amount on the merchandise evidenced by each letter, and that the bank made him the loan under such an agreement and later took possession of the merchandise described in the letters, another and a different question would be presented, and the decision in the Kaisha case would then be in point. But, here, the evidence tends to show that the latters in question were written and possession of the property taken to secure an open current account in the form of an overdraft evidencing a preexisting debt as distinguished from a present loan, and there is a failure of proof to show that the letters were written under an agreement to secure a present loan, or that the bank made a present loan and parted with its money under any such agreement. Again, it will be noted that the letters in question are not public instruments, and that neither of them is acknowledged or filed of record. Article 1865 of the Civil Code says: No pledge shall be effective as against a third person unless evidence of its date appears in a public instrument. In the case of Te Pate vs. Ingersoll, above quoted, it is further said: A pledge, to be valid against third persons, must be evidenced by a public instrument. This is a mandatory condition prescribed by article 1865 of the Civil Code, which must be met in

order to constitute the contract of pledge. An assignee is a "third person" within the meaning of this article of the Civil Code. Upon the facts in record here, the assignee represents the creditors, and is a third person within the meaning of article 1865. From what has been said, it follows that the judgment of the lower court on the merits must be affirmed. The assignee did not appeal. Hence, many of the questions discussed in his brief are not legally before this court. Suffice it to say that, upon the question of value, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the trial court as to the good faith of the bank and the disposition which it made of the property, the accounting which it should make, and the basis for its liability. In their respective briefs and oral arguments, there is more or less criticism of each other by opposing counsel, which is wholly immaterial and of no value to the court. Suffice it to say that no attorney ought to be criticized for the making of an honest legal effort to protect the interest of his client. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs to either party, and the case is remanded for an accounting and such further proceedings as are not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Separate Opinions STREET, J., concurring: I concur in the conclusion reached in this case but am unable to assent to the proposition that the decision in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (36 Phil., 27), contains anything that must be overruled. A careful examination of that decision will show I think that it rests upon the indisputable fact that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking was pledgee in due course and for a valuable pecuniary consideration paid in good faith. The pledge was therefore in all respects valid and could not be impeached by anybody, whether the pledgor, the vendor of the coal, or the assignee in bankruptcy. It must be confessed that the true ratio decidendiof that decision is not expressed with absolute clarity; and at one point the court might seem to have accepted the contention, advanced by the attorneys for the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, that "the assignee in bankruptcy is not a third person, but stands in the shoes of the bankrupt." But it cannot be fairly stated that the court intended to adopt the proposition thus broadly stated. The pledge there effected was undoubtedly binding on everybody, including the pledgor, the assignee in bankruptcy, and on the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, who claimed in right hostile to both. But this was because of the bona fide character of the pledge. Approaching insolvency, it must be remembered, does not discapacitate a merchant from making transfers or pledges in ordinary course, and a person who acquires rights by a bona fide purchase, or pledge, for value paid down, acquires an indefeasible right even though the transaction should be made on the very eve of insolvency.

In the case before us the pledge which was finally perfected by the delivery to the Asia Banking Corporation of the warehouse receipts issued by the Derham Company, was clearly not made "in the usual and ordinary course of business of the debtor." It was therefore prima

facie invalid by the express provision of section 70 of Act No. 1956; and it was incumbent on
the pledgee to show that the pledge was in fact made in good faith for a valuable pecuniary consideration. Now assuming, that this requirement could have been met by proof showing that the pledgee had advanced money in reliance upon the agreement to pledge contained in the letters of August 21, August 25, and September 4, 1920, yet we cannot discover that the bank did actually advance anything contemporaneously with or subsequent to the writing of those letters, upon the faith of the security therein pledged. On the contrary it would seem that the imperfect pledge thereby attempted was made for the purpose of securing advances that had already been made. We note in this connection that in each of those letters De Poli uses an expression which, it is suggested, indicates the extent of his overdraft and that this overdraft was increasing pari passu with the increase in the amount of merchandise thereby agreed to be pledged. The expression referred to is that in which De Poli speaks of his "position;" but "my to-day's position" as there used by him evidently refers, not to the extent of his existing overdraft, but to the amount of merchandise intended to be pledged. This is clearly shown by a comparison of the letters of August 21 and August 25, from which it will be seen that he is stating the total of the merchandise pledged, or intended to be pledged. It results that those letters show nothing with reference to the state of the contemporary overdraft. It therefore cannot be inferred, even remotely, that the bank advanced anything additional upon the faith of the increase in the amount of the intended collateral.

4. NARIDO V. LINSANGAN The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the defense of one's client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of opposing counsel. Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative cases wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney's oath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment, humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession. On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to

payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it must have been the plight of Mrs. Narido rather than his alleged financial interest that Compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file the case against Atty. Linsangan. ... There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of 'disbarment proceedings against a brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground' necessarily fails." 3 3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in the counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case is appealed, there was likewise a recommendation for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for attorney's fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he had been serving his povertystricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some of the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for acceptance. 4. This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to heed these words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo: 4 "It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickering and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court." 5 5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by thoroughness and diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on secondary authorities, both Philippine and American. WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of attorney's fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen's compensation suit is declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a poor client.

the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on May 31 of this year. 1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report contains the following: "In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainant Narido heavily relies on the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw despite warning the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios ..., which affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. ... Mrs. Narido and Atty. Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios." 1 Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: "With respect to the other allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty. Linsangan's awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating his attorney's oath." 2 2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: "This administrative complaint stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma 'by virtue of his financial interest in the Award,' instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 'in order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the expense, embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned brother-respondent.' ... It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state that Atty. Risma's missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma's dedication in championing the cause of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She needed every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the

5. JAVIER V. CORNEJO The respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practicing lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is charged with malpractice (a) for trying to collect from a brother attorney a sum of money by means of threat, and (b) for having instigated Severina Paz Teodoro to file a complaint against the herein complainant, Attorney Benedicto M. Javier, for malpractice (Administrative Case No. 757) knowing fully well that the charges therein preferred were malicious, flimsy and unfounded. The complainant in support of his charge refers to a letter dated December 2, 1935, in which demand was made upon him by the respondent for the delivery of P195 representing the amount collected and received by the said complainant by virtue of a judgment rendered in a certain case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein Severina Paz Teodoro was the judgment creditor and the herein complainant was her counsel. In the same letter the complainant was given ten days within which to turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint would be filed against him in this court. He was furthermore urged to settle the matter in due time for the preservation not only of his good name but also that of the legal profession. We find nothing improper in this letter of the respondent to the complainant which would justify us in takingdisciplinary action against the respondent. The letter was an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum of money which Severina Paz Teodoro had represented to the respondent as owing to her and which she sought to recover through his professional services. It was an honest effort on the part of the respondent to serve the interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and exertion of his utmost learning and ability", to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics, adopted by the American Bar Association and the Philippine Bar Association, No. 15; In re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil., 191, 194). As to second ground, it is alleged that the respondent in connivance with one Gregorio Tapia, induced Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse the herein complainant before this court of malpractice. It appears that herein complainant was respondent in Administrative Case No. 757 of this court upon a charge of unlawful conversion of a judgment fund amounting to P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz Teodoro. This charge, however, was dismissed by resolution of this court on July 10, 1936. Now the complainant comes back against the here in

(Exhibit E). This letter demanded the payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from the sum which the herein complainant had collected and received as judgment fund of his erstwhile client Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his failure to remit the amount demanded, the matter would be brought to the attention of this court. The complainant in Administrative Case No. 757, therefore, already knew on March 23, 1931, long before the respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo entered the scene, where to seek relief. It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recrimination, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court. The complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of merit.

6. MACIAS V. MALIG This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Atty. Manuel Y. Macias against respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Malig for suspension or disbarment upon grounds of malpractice and violation of the lawyer's oath. The charge by Atty. Macias in his sworn Complaint dated 14 June 1982, maybe summed up as follows: 1. He [Atty. Malig] acted as counsel for Rosario M. Llora in Special Proceedings No. 70878 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila although Atty. Macias was still her attorney of record. 2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special Proceeding No. 70878, and (b) Civil Case No. 73335 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which became G.R. No. L-34395 of this Honorable Court; and he intimidated Atty. Macias into signing: (a) the Waiver (Exhibit "C"), (b) the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 (Exhibit "R"), and (c) the substitution of counsel in Special Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibit "S"). 3. He did not substitute Atty. Macias in Civil Case No. 65763 but claimed for Himself the attorney's fees of Atty. Macias. 4. He extorted from Atty. Macias, the sum of P10,000.00. 5. He corruptly induced the late Judge Joel Tiangco to lift Atty. Macias attachment on a property belonging to the Lloras without notice to Atty. Macias. 6. He actively assisted the Lloras to dispose of all their properties in the Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias.
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respondent and charges him with having maliciously instigated the filing of the complaint in
the aforesaid Administrative Case No. 757. We find that Administrative Case No. 757 was instituted in this court on March 18, 1936 and that respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo intervened as counsel for the complainant therein on December 2, 1935. But long before this dates, Severina Paz Teodoro and her son Feliciano Patea had already been demanding from the herein complainant the return of the amount alleged to be due them (Exhibit B and C). The last demand letter (Exhibit C) was made on March 23, 1931, and its receipt acknowledged by the herein complainant in the same month

In turn, respondent Atty. Malig in his "Comment with Countercharges" dated 1 September 1982 sought the disbarment of complainant Atty. Macias. The countercharges against Atty. Macias are the following: 1. Atty. Macias made an unethical solicitation of case-the settlement of the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.

2. He instituted a patently baseless and malicious action, Civil case No. 109585, before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for attorney's fees and damage. against Antonio Ma. Llora, Rosario M. Llora and their family-owned corporations. 3. He maliciously and irresponsible charged Atty. Malig and his clients with having "exacted" and "extorted" from him the sum of P10,000.00 4. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and the late Judge Joel Tiangco with corruption in the lifting of an attachment. 5. He made an unethical representation of a client. 6. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients, the Llora spouses, with fraudulent disposition of the latter's properties and salting the proceeds [in] Australia.
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alleged that a prior agreement on attorney's fees, dated 22 November 1969, between complainant and the administrator of the estate should control the amount of fees payable to complainant. Complainant had previously indicated to Mrs. Llora that he felt he should be paid an amount equivalent to eight percent (8%) of the distributive share corresponding to Mrs. Valdes and now to Mrs. Llora in the estate of Doa Filomena Legarda. Pending resolution of complainant's Motion, a conference was called by the heirs of Doa Filomena Legarda to deal with the payment of attorney's fees to Macias. Agreement was reached by the parties: Complainant Macias would execute a waiver of his claim for attorney's fees insofar as the share of Mrs. Llora was concerned and would execute written "Substitution(s) of Counsel" in the several cases he had been handling for Mrs. Llora or her predecessors-in-interest; Mrs. Llora would, in turn, withdraw her Opposition to complainant's Motion to allow and direct payment of legal services in Special Proceedings No. 70878. On 22 July 1976, the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 70878 issued an order awarding complainant P286,102.91 as attorney's fees. The court order was silent in respect of the waiver executed by complainant in favor of the Lloras Mrs. Llora called complainant's attention to the failure of the order to refer to the waiver by complainant. Mrs. Llora subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the court to reduce the award to attorney's fees to complainant by an amount equivalent to her share in such payment. Pending resolution of Mrs. Lloras Motion, complainant sent the Lloras a letter dated 2 December 1976, which covered: an explanation that the award was not against the heirs in their personal capacity, but against the estate of Doa Filomena as an expense of administration; a request that Mrs. Lloras Motion for Reconsideration be withdrawn; an account of his meeting with some of the heirs of Doa Filomena and their counsel inside the Chambers of the Probate Judge on 19 November 1976, during which he agreed to the reduction of the award, now in the amount of P219,602.91 (this amount was arrived at after deducting earlier payments totalling P66,500.00 from the original amount of P286,102.91) by P34,602.91 making him entitled to only P185,000.00; and an advice that ultimately all the twenty-two (22) heirs of Doa Filomena would be sharing 1/22 of the net payable amount of P185,000.00, which is equivalent to P8,000.00 more or less. This letter notwithstanding, the Lloras required complainant to issue a postdated check payable to Mrs. Llora in the amount of P10,000.00, which complainant immediately did on 15 December 1976. On 21 December 1976, the day when the postdated check became due, complainant obtained an order of the Probate Court, approving the agreement reached at the 19 November 1976 conference, which reduced the amount of attorney's fees to P185,000.00 and enjoining the parties to keep full faith with the undertaking. This order enabled complainant to obtain immediate payment from the estate of Doa Filomena. On 15 July 1977, complainant instituted a civil suit against the Lloras and their family-owned corporations, docketed as Civil Case No. 109585, for the nullification of the waiver, for the refund of P10,000. 00 paid to Mrs. Llora and for the payment of attorney's fees in the amount ranging from P750,000.00 to P3,000,000.00 covering the legal services he allegedly rendered over the preceding thirty (30) years to Mrs. Llora predecessors-in- interest, Gen.

After considering the complaint, respondent's Comment with Countercharge, complainant's "Reply to Comment and Answer to Countercharge" dated 6 October 1982 and respondent's "Reply" dated 14 December 1982, the Court by a Resolution dated 26 January 1983, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 13 November 1986, the Solicitor General forwarded to the Court his Report and Recommendation dated 22 September 1986. It appears from the record that complainant Macias had been counsel for the Legarda family (including Rosario Legarda de Valdes) during the 1960s. A Retainer Agreement was eventually formalized on 31 December 1968, which Agreement defined the scope and nature of the services complainant was to render for the family including companies that Don Benito Legarda, Doa Rosario Legarda de Valdes and Doa Teresa Legarda might form. On 15 September 1969, Doa Rosario Legarda de Valdes died. Gen. Basilio Valdes, widower of Doa Rosario, and Rosario M. Llora, a legally adopted daughter of Gen. and Mrs. Valdes, requested complainant Macias to cause their substitution for the late Doa Rosario Legarda de Valdes in the pending cases and proceedings involving the decedent. On 26 January 1970, Gen. Valdes died, leaving Rosario M. Llora, married to Antonio Ma. Llora, as successor-in-interest. In 1972, Rosario M. Llora and her husband retained respondent Malig as counsel and executive officer of the various companies that the Lloras owned. Not long afterwards, the spouses Llora decided that they wanted to be represented by respondent Malig in all their pending cases. Mr. Llora advised the complainant of their desire, and requested him to withdraw from any cases he was then handling for Mrs. Llora or her parents, so that the Lloras could consolidate all their legal business, as it were, in the hands of Malig. Complainant filed in Special Proceedings No. 70878 (testate proceedings of Doa Filomena Legarda, mother of the deceased Doa Rosario Legarda de Valdes) a "Motion to allow and direct payment of legal services rendered to the estate," dated 10 December 1973, asking the Probate Court to fix and determine the fees payable to complainant from the estate for services rendered in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and to direct payment by the administrator to the complainant of the fees so fixed and determined. Because she would be affected by whatever amount the Court would fix as attorney's fees to be paid by the estate and charged against the interest of the heirs, Mrs. Llora opposed the Motion. Mrs. Llora

and Mrs. Basilio Valdes which, according to complainant, redounded to Mrs. Lloras benefit. Complainant succeeded in attaching one of the properties of the Lloras' RML Realty Development Corporation, after posting a bond of P25,000.00. The levy was soon discharged in an order issued by the late Judge Joel Tiangco dated 6 March 1979 upon approval of the counter-bond of P200,000.00 posted by the RML Realty Development Corporation through its counsel, the Ozaeta, Romulo Law Offices. This discharge was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an order dated 31 August 1979. Still later, on 15 June 1982, complainant instituted this administrative complaint against respondent Malig. The Solicitor General considered both the charges of complainant Macias against respondent Malig and the countercharges of respondent Malig against complainant Macias. In respect of the charges of complainant Macias against respondent Malig, the Solicitor General found the evidence presented by complainant as insufficient to sustain his charges against respondent: 1. Atty. Malig has the right to represent Rosario M. Llora in opposing Atty. Macias' motion for the payment of his attorney's fees for the simple reason that Atty. Macias cannot possibly act as her counsel in opposing his own motion. Moreover, Atty. Macias did not automatically become also the counsel of Rosario M. Llora upon the death of his client Rosario Legarda de Valdes. 2. Atty. Malig cannot be guilty of harassment and intimidation because he merely performed his duties as counsel for the Llora spouses and had even no participation in the negotiation for the execution of the Waiver (Exhibit "C"), the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 and Special Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibits "R" and "S", respectively). In fact, he was not even present in the conference held by Atty. Macias, Atty. Eduardo Hernandez, Antonio M. Llora and other heirs where Atty. Macias himself suggested the preparation of said documents. 3. The Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 65763 (Exhibit "6") clearly shows that Atty. Malig actually substituted Atty. Macias in .said case on March 31, 1974. 4. The P10,000.00 paid by Atty. Macias was in consideration of the withdrawal of the appeal interposed by Rosario M. Llora from the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Macias. The check (Exhibit "12") paid by Atty. Macias shows that the payee was Rosario M. Llora and it was deposited in her account. Atty. Malig therefore did not extort it from Atty. Macias. 5. Atty. Macias himself admitted that lie has no personal knowledge that Atty. Malig induced Judge Joel Tiangco to lift the attachment and that they have any relationship. On the contrary, the attachment property lifted by the trial court after Atty. Macias made his comment on it. Thus, the then Court of Appeals dismissed Atty. Macias' petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the said discharge of attachment. 6. The two deeds of sales (Exhibits"M" and "N") are insufficient to show that Atty. Malig assisted the Lloras spouses to dispose of their properties in the Philippines and remit the

proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias while they refer to the lands owned by the corporations owned by the Llora spouses, the RML Realty Development Corporation is precisely engaged in the real estate business. Besides, since the Llora spouses have already emigrated to Australia, their dispositions of there properties in the Philippines were in good faith. After careful examination of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General that complainant Macias charges against respondent Malig were indeed not substantiated. The Solicitor General also found that the countercharges of respondent Malig against complainant Macias, had not been adequately proved: On the other hand, the countercharges have not also been proved by sufficient evidence and are without merit for the following reasons: 1. As the counsel for 22 years since 1947 of Dr. Basilio J. Valdes and his wife Rosario Legarda de Valdes, it is only natural for him to inquire whether he will still continue his legal services upon the death of Rosario Legarda de Valdes. To immediately stop his legal services without first inquiring from her heirs would prejudice the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes. His solicitation [of information on] whether his legal services are still needed [was] therefore justified and made in good faith. 2. It would be premature to conclude that the Civil Case No. 109855 instituted by Atty. Macias is patently baseless and malicious. The case is still pending decision by the Regional Trial Court in Manila. In any case, it was filed by Atty. Macias in good faith. 3. The term "extorted" in the pleadings of Atty. Macias is not unethical but a common legal term descriptive of the overt act complained of. Since he believes in good faith that he was prejudiced by such act, he cannot be accused of charging Atty. Malig maliciously and irresponsibly. 4. Believing in good faith through the information of the branch clerk of court that Atty. Malig is related to Judge Joel Tiangco whom he induced to lift the attachment, Atty. Macias could likewise not be accused of charging Atty. Malig maliciously and irresponsibly. 5. Atty. Macias could not have made an unauthorized representation of Rosario M. Llora in Civil Case No. 65763, because the trial of the case had been completed in February, 1973, and he signed the substitution of counsel only in March 1974. It is only the writing and filing of the brief in C.A.-G.R. No. 63025 of the then Court of Appeals (Exhibit "P") which incidentally benefited Rosario M. Llora after March 31, 1974. 6. With knowledge of the sales covered by the two deeds of sale (Exhibit "M" and "N"), Atty. Macias believes in good faith that Atty. Malig is assisting his clients in disposing of their properties in the Philippines and in remitting the proceeds to Australia when they emigrated to defraud him of his attorney's fees. Especially so that the case Atty. Macias filed against the Llora spouses for attorney's fees is still pending decision.

With respect to most of the specific countercharges of respondent Malig against complainant Macias, the Court agrees with the general conclusion of the Solicitor General that these countercharges have not been adequately proved. In respect of Item No. 2 above, which relates to Civil Case No. 109855 commenced by complainant Macias against his former clients for claimed attorney's fees, complainant Macias is entitled to the benefit of a presumption of good faith. The Court would observe, however, that presumption is one juris

Complainant Macias and respondent Malig are not, however, in pari delicto. For purposes of determining appropriate penalties, in respect of complainant Macias, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this is not the first time that complainant Macias has been found guilty of using "improper and unethical language." In Beatriz L. Gonzales v. Court of First Instance of

Manila, et al., G.R. No. L-34395, this Court, in a Resolution dated 29 July 19871, held certain
statements made by complainant Macias in pleadings filed before this Court as "intemperate, tactless and offensive" and as constituting "contempt of court in facie curiae" for which complainant Macias was "severely reprimanded" and warned that, for a repetition of the offense, a more drastic penalty would be imposed. The Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that complainant Macias has more than once in the past been rebuked by this Court in relation to his conduct vis-a-vis clients and former clients.
3

tantum only, persisting until the final resolution of Civil Case No. 109855 should prove
otherwise Item No. 6 above is related to, but not dependent upon, Item No. 2 above. In Item No. 6, complainant Macias by charging that respondent Malig was assisting Rosario M. Llora and her husband in disposing of their properties and remitting the proceeds thereof to Australia in fraud of complainant Macias, was in effect accusing both respondent Malig and the spouses Llora of bad faith and fraud. The Court finds it very difficult to believe that complainant Macias could have supposed, in good faith, that his former clients would emigrate to Australia and dispose of their properties in the Philippines for the sole or principal purpose of defrauding him of attorney's fees. The records is bare of any suggestion that complainant Macias had previously investigated the truth of the charge which he so readily hurled against both respondent Malig and the spouses Llora. The fact that the Lloras had earlier successfully objected to the amount of fees complainant Macias sought to charge the estate of Doa Filomena Legarda, plus the fact that Macias soon thereafter commenced his suit against the Lloras for very large amounts of alleged fees, strongly suggest that the charge of bad faith and fraud against the Lloras and respondent Malig, was born out of improper motives. The Court is not prepared to condone by passing over subsilentio the misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis-a-vis the other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to believe the other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to which they both belong while vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each party here was too anxious and willing to make serious accusations against the other which the exertion of reasonable diligence along with simple courtesy would have shown to be unwarranted by the facts and the records. Each attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive language in describing the professional behavior of the other. Complainant Macias insisted that respondent Malig "extorted" P10,000.00 from him. The dictionary meaning of "to extort" is "to obtain from an unwilling or reluctant person by physical force, intimidation or the abuse of legal or official authority" (Webster's Third New International [1981, ed.].) Clearly, extortion is an unethical act and may well be criminal. "Harassment" and "intimidation" are other similarly unethical and offensive acts that complainant Macias so freely ascribed to respondent Malig "Corruption" with which complainant in Macias accused both respondent Malig and the deceased Judge Tiangco is an even more deplorable term. Upon the other hand, respondent Malig was not to be outdone and referred to complainant Macias as "denizen" of a "jungle" who "prey[s] upon his brother lawyer [and] his [own] clients" and likened him to "a baneful snake biting the hand of the client who fed him" (Comment with Countercharged, Rollo, p. 27).

The Solicitor General concluded his Report and Recommendation on in the following manner: Court dockets are severely clogged with litigation which demand prompt attention, but such desirable action can not be fully realized when members of the bar are the ones who themselves file administrative cases against each other only to have them withdrawn as soon as their personal egos have been assuaged. If the members of the bar can not restrain their tempers when their sensibility to criticism is involved, it becomes difficult for said officers of the court to restrain their own clients against commencing and pursuing innocuous litigation. Moreover, such conduct diminishes the opportunity of the Supreme Court to discipline erring members of the Bar. For contributing to this unwanted consequence in the administration of law, complainant and counter-complainant in Case No. 2409 should be severely disciplined by the imposition of heavy fine in addition to being subjected to stern censure by the Supreme Court. IX. RECOMMENDATION WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges and counter-charges between Atty. Macias and Atty. Malig be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, but both parties should be severely disciplined by the imposition of heavy fine in addition to being subjected to stern censure by the Supreme Court. We hold that complainant Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Lawyers must at all times treat each other, and as well their clients, former clients and the rest of the community, with that personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly demanded of members of the ancient and learned profession of the law.

7. PERKINS V. PERKINS

The parties to this action are husband and wife, married in Manila in 1914, and the wife has entered suit for separate maintenance. This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting certain amounts for maintenance and P1,000 for expenses for litigation. The item relating to the expenses of litigation has become moot due to agreement between the parties. A prior order of the court for monthly allowance for maintenance is not here on appeal. The order here complained of is for certain items of debts, advances, and living expenses existing at the time of the order fixing the monthly allowance. Appellee, in her brief, has moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the order is interlocutory, relying upon the language of this court in the case of Mendoza vs. Parungao (49 Phil., 271). In the case now before us, the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of November 27, 1925, may be considered as an order for the payment of P50 monthly as an advance payment on account of such share of the conjugal property as may be found from the liquidation to belong to Gorgonio Parungao. This order, however, being of an interlocutory character and not final (sec. 123, Act No. 190) no writ of execution can be issued thereon (sec. 443, Act No. 190; 23 C. J., 314); but its unjustified disobedience may constitute contempt of court and, after the proper proceedings prescribed by law in such cases, may be punished as such. Appellant claims that appellee is estopped from any right to the motion to dismiss, by allowing the bill of exceptions to be approved, by allowing the appellant to go to the expense of printing the bill of exceptions and the expense and trouble of preparing and printing his brief, which was filed on August 31, 1931, and on account of not raising the questions as to the right to appeal until October 27, 1931, when appellees brief was filed. Appellant relies on 3 Corpus Juris p. 689, where it is said:

These questions were presented to this court for the first time on the hearing of the case upon its merits. They should have been raised and determined by motion before the case was called for hearing. Before the hearing of the case upon its merits all preliminary questions should be disposed of, and when such questions as these are raised for the first time upon the hearing of the case on its merits they come too late. We believe this point of appellant well taken, and will therefore consider the appeal on its merits. Article 148 of the Civil Code reads in part: The obligation to give support may be enforced whenever the person having a right to claim it requires such assistance for his or her maintenance; such allowance, however, shall only be paid from the date of the filing of the complaint, and the character and the nature of the support is defined in Article 142. The pertinent portion thereof reads: By support is understood all that is necessary for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social standing of the family. In the opinion of the court, some of the items are clearly without the rules laid down in the Code, while others may be partly within the rules. Some, in their entirety, long precede the date of the filing of this suit. While the item known as the Manila Hotel is evidently allowable in part, being for ordinary necessities of life, it covers a period both before and after the filing of the suit. Others, such as the claim for money loaned to the wife, are not within the rule (13 R. C. L., 1209; Ramirez and De Marcaida vs. Redfern, 49 Phil., 849). It is impossible, from the evidence of record, for this court to state how much should be allowed. It is also noted that no allowance has as yet been made for the period from the filing of suit to the date of allowance of temporary maintenance two months thereafter. The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect.

Waiver of Objections to Right of Appeal. The right to object to the taking of an appeal or
the issuance of a writ of error may be waived by appellee or defendant in error whenever the objection is founded upon some act or omission on the part of appellant or plaintiff in error, which may be pleaded by his opponent as an estoppel to the right of review. This waiver may arise from express stipulation, or it may be implied from some act on the part of appellee or defendant in error, such as joining issue on the appeal or writ of error, or from some other act showing acquiescence or evincing an intention to treat the appeal or writ of error as valid. (Citing numerous decisions.) Thus, in Luengo and Martinez vs. Herrero (17 Phil., 29), wherein the appellees made a motion in their brief, to dismiss the appeal, this court ruled that the motion came too late, saying:

It being impossible for this court to state the amount that should be allowed, the case must be remanded for further proceedings in accord with the views herein expressed, and it is so ordered. No pronouncement is made regarding costs.

8. TOLENTINO V. BAYLOSIS By resolution dated April 8, 1959, Court of Appeals certified to us Case No. CA-G.R. No. 19432-R, an appeal taken to it from the decision of April 19, 1956 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Civil Case No. 67, dismissing plaintiff's complaint for damages, with costs, on the ground that the whole issue therein involved is one of law. Devoid of unessentials, records disclose that in Civil Case No. 79 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, entitled Jose Ruiz, et al. vs. Cirilo Baylosis, et al., for the annulment of certain certificates of title and recovery of damages, herein appellant Miguel Tolentino appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs, while appellee was theattorney of record for the defendants. In a pleading captioned "Reply to Answer on Counterclaim" and filed in that case, appellee made the following allegations: "Paragraph 2

Tolentino is not the type of attorney who can demand a professional service of ten thousand pesos, and in the honest belief of defendant, Atty. Tolentino is a counsel for just five hundred pesos in the event that plaintiff wins this case, and that damages is allowed by the Honorable Court, which of course is believed to be remote to happen before the Court. Urging that the statements aforequoted are libelous and derogatory to his character and reputation as a known lawyer, as a former high government official and employee, and as a citizen of good standing in the community appellant initiated these proceedings and seeks to recover from the appellee the sum of P100,000.00 as actual and moral damages. Appellee does not deny having made the allegations complained of, but advances the defense that said remarks were not libelous, and granting that they were, the same were privileged communications. In fact, appelle asserts a counterclaim for P105,000.00, representing actual damages and attorney's fees allegedly caused to him by appellant's own defamatory statements levelled against his (appellee's) person. Both complaint and counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court. However, only the plaintiff appealed. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the decisive issue calls only for a determination of whether or not appellee's statements as above reproduced constitute a valid cause of action for damages. This question was not, in our opinion, properly solved in the negative by the trial court. It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (see 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreno, et al., G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and authorities cited therein). For, as aptly observed in one case,1 "while the doctrine of priveleged communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships." And the test relevancy has been stated thus: ... As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the priveleged does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in pleading may be priveleged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.... (Ruling Case Law, vol. 17, p. 336, quoted with approval in Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Ellis, 48 Phil. 475, 481-482).

subpar. (b)That for the death of the said five plaintiffs, defendant has nothing to do nor to
answer or account for, but would rather state that the cause of their death may be due to the will of God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and counsel, ....

subpar. (c)That on the basis of Atty. Miguel Tolentino (sic), a deceased plaintiff is claiming
from defendant an amount of P28,591 and giving allowance of another 2 who may die, so he must be a wealth to anyone who has it; that when Atty. Tolentino made this allegation, he must be certainly not of his usual mind, otherwise with his old age, and long practice of law, he would not have dared to make such fictitious and malicious claim, and knowingly that this Honorable Court is not the place for every exagerrated and unreasonable demand in order to give trouble and worries to defendant;

subpar. (d), sub-sec.That the defendant for being the victorious party in the said case and
Atty. Miguel Tolentino, one of the losing counsels in said case, must be the one who is still liable for the damages sustained by defendant; "Paragraph 4

subpar. (c)Before the public, Attorney Tolentino cannot be judged as a prominent attorney
or a bright attorney for his several failures in the bar and his several losses of his cases are not in his favor.

subpar. (d)Defendant had seen Atty. Tolentino appeared before the Honorable Supreme
Court on January 24, 1955 in a certain argument on certiorari case, entitled Luis Baylosis, et al., petitioners vs. Agapito Alejar, et al., respondents, and in that argument Atty. Tolentino was badly humiliated because of his lack of knowledge of law and unpreparedness. On that same moment he perspired much despite the fact that the chamber was cool because of air conditioning. Again in the hearing of a certain injunction case at Batangas, Batangas, before the Honorable Judge E. Soriano, Atty. Tolentino lost against the fiscal and other lawyers. It is therefore the contention of the defendant, that the caliber and standing of Atty. Miguel

In the earliest of the leading cases on the subject the words used in determining the extent of matter that may be absolutely privileged were "relevant" or "pertinent", but these words have in a measure a technical meaning, and perhaps they are not the best words that could be used. So some courts have preferred the use of the words "have in reference", "having relation to the cause or subject matter", or "made with reference"; and strict legal materiality or relevancy is not required to confer the privilege. There is difficulty in determining in some cases what is relevant or pertinent and in deciding the question the courts are liberal, and the privilege embraces anything that may possibly be pertinent, or which has enough appearance in connection with the case so that a reasonable man might think it relevant. All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court will assume the alleged slanderous charges to be true, however false they may have been in fact. (53 C.J.S., pp. 171-172). Applying the above rule to the case at bar, there is little doubt but that the alleged defamatory remarks of counsel herein complained of, in paragraph 4 of his reply(already quoted), can not be the basis of an action for damages. It appears that, among the issues involved in Civil Case No. 79 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, was the propriety of recovering damages allegedly cause by herein appellee, among others to the plaintiffs therein, including, but not limited to, herein appellant's claim for attorney's fees. Thus, appellant himself had laid open the pertinency not only of the amount of damages supposedly due to the plaintiffs, but, likewise, appellant's own standing as a lawyer by reason of his claim for attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. Although the language used by the appellee in the paragraph referred to was undoubtedly strong, it was made in legitimate defense of his own and his client's interests, and we cannot say that the statements in his pleadings concerning appellant's standing and ability as counsel were irrelevant or impertinent. Hence, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged. However, the relevancy (and, therefore, the privileged character) of appellee's statements made in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (b) and (c), of his "Reply to Answer on Counterclaim" is not as apparent as those made by him in paragraph 4, heretofore discussed. The averments in subparagraph (b) that the cause of death of plaintiffs' decedents may be due to the will of God or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and counsel were evidently a conjecture that had no place in a pleading, which is well understood to be limited to statements of fact. Equally irrelevant are the allegations complained of in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the reply of appellee, in response to the counterclaim for damages. The averment that Attorney Tolentino (appellant) was "not of his usual mind" in making the claim, "otherwise with his old age and long practice of law, he would have not dared to make such fictitious and malicious claim" is certainly not relevant or pertinent to the issue whether the damages asked were true or untrue. These damages were asked for, not by the appellant, but by his clients; hence their counsel's state of mind is not, and could not be a proper subject of inquiry.

As pointed out by the Court in Anonymous vs. Trenkman, et al., 48 Fed. (2d) 571, 574 The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved.... If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege. Without this limitation to the immunity enjoyed by pleadings, the same could be easily diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform the court of the issues in litigation, and perverted into a vehicle for airing charges motivated by personal rancor. That such misuse of judicial proceedings must be firmly and resolutely discouraged and curbed by Courts needs no demonstration. It appears, however, that the appellant herein was libeled by way of retaliation, because three days previously, appellant Tolentino, in a counterclaim filed against appellee Baylosis, had personally attacked the latter in the following passage (Rec. App., p. 46-57) Defendant Baylosis has been the Vice-President of the "Samahang Magbubukid." The prevailing and tempting "motto" of this organization is that the tenant must not leave the lands tilled by them because the same belong to them in their own right. It is highly inconceivable now how could the defendant trample upon the only chance of the plaintiffs to own the lands in question, in gross violation of the "motto" of his own organization on which a Huk or PKM organization at that, according to this Honorable Court in Crim. Case No. 10898, People vs. Ceferino Inciong, Cirilo P. Baylosis, et al., for inciting to sedition and in Criminal Case No. 510, People vs. F. Buhay for libel. Considering that it was appellant here who first libeled appellee, although the latter did not appeal the dismissal of his own claim for damages; that appellant, therefore, did not really come to court with clean hands; that no adequate evidence exists that appellant suffered material damage; and that indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof be privileged, we find no reversible error in the dismissal of appellant's damage claim by the Court below. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

9. PEOPLE V. SESBRENO This appeal from an order quashing an information furnishes occasion to reiterate the ambits of the well-established doctrine of privileged communications. The appeal was certified to us by the Court of Appeals on a finding that it involves a pure question of law. In an Information filed on March 4, 1981, the City Fiscal's Office of Cebu City accused Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno of the crime of libel based on alleged defamatory statements found in a pleading entitled "PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION DATED MARCH 9TH" dated March 11, 1980 filed in Civil Case No. R-18181 entitled"HEIRS OF ROBERTO CENIZA, ET AL. V.

The doctrine of privileged communication, moreover, is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to tile general principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true, in the absence of "good intention" and "justifiable motive" (Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra). However, this doctrine is not without qualification. Statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra;People v. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555). A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being considered libelous (Armovit v. Purisima, 118 SCRA 247). As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal (People v. Alvarez, supra; Malit v. People, 114 SCRA 348). The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety (Malit v. People, supra). In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings, It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra; People v. Alvarez, supra). It appears that in connection with the initial formal hearing of Civil Case No. R-18181 on February 7, 1980, appellant Atty. Ceniza as counsel for the defendant, filed an Urgent Motion to Transfer Hearing, receipt of notice of which was denied by herein appellee Atty. Sesbreno, counsel for the plaintiff. Upon the latter's representation, the court a quo granted the motion for postponement, ordering Atty. Ceniza, however, to reimburse Atty. Sesbreno's clients for expenses incurred in attending the supposed hearing slated that day. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Atty. Ceniza showing evidence of receipt of notice of hearing by Atty. Sesbreno's office. The same was granted. The court ordered Atty. Sesbreno to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt for misrepresentation. Against said order, Atty. Sesbreno filed a motion seeking reconsideration with a counter-motion for contempt against the appellant for reneging on his commitment to reimburse appellee's clients and for resorting to dilatory tactics. To that, Atty. Ceniza, filed his "Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Etc." charging Sesbreno with misrepresentation, prevarication, and "telling a barefaced and documented lie." Replying to these remarks, Sesbreno then filed his "REPLY" subject matter of Ceniza's libel suit. Applying the liberal rule to the case at bar and considering the incidents which preceded it, we find appellee's alleged slanderous statements pertinent to the motion to cite appellant Ceniza in contempt. Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the pleading in question was undoubtedly strong, since it was made in legitimate defense of his own and of his client's interest, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra).

DANIELA CENIZA UROT" now pending litigation before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, 14th Judicial District. On March 5, 1981, the accused filed a MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION. The main thrust of the motion is that on the face itself of the information, it is obvious that the allegedly libelous statements imputing that Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is an irresponsible person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar and irresponsible childish prankster are contained in a pleading filed in court and, therefore, covered by the DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; hence, no civil or criminal liability can arise therefrom. A decision was rendered by the court a quo quashing the information and dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the same to us. The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged has been expressed in a long line of cases (Us v. Salera, 32 Phil. 365; Us v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 732; Giler v. billiard, 43 Phil. 180; Santiago v. Calvo, 47 Phil. 919; People v. Flores, G.R. No. 7528, Dec. 18, 1957; Tupas v. Parreno, 105 Phil. 1304; Unrep., April 30, 1959; Smith Bell and Co. v. Ellis, 48 Phil. 475; People v. Valerio Andres, 107 Phil. 1046: Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60; Tolentino v. Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555; Cuenco v. Cuenco, 70 SCRA 235; Elizalde v. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448; PCIB v. Philnabank Employees' Association, July 2, 1981, 105 SCRA 314), The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer (People v. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947). While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would give rise to greater hardships. (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages (Deles v. Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633). Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language (Deles v. Aragona, supra).

However, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that, at times zeal in the defense of one's client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from modifying (Narido v. Linsangan, 58 SCRA 85). Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court (Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293). Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and Idiosyncracies of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided (Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics). Lawyers owe respect not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other members of the Bar. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language should likewise be dignified (In re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 121). Choice of language is a very important requirement in the preparation of pleadings (Rule 8, Sec. 1; Rule 9, Sec. 5; Rule 7 Sec. 5, Revised Rules of Court). Appropriately, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. Greater care and circumspetion must be exercised in the preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of practising attorneys Festin v. Faderanga, 111 SCRA 1). Time and again we have rebuked and punished lawyers for conduct showing them unfit to practice law. The Supreme Court as guardian of the legal profession has ultimate powers over attorneys. Its authority to discipline lawyers stems from its constitutional prerogative to regulate the practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage therein 1 Section 5(5), Article X, The 1973 Philippine Constitution; In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 1954). Apart from the constitutional mandate. the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over attorneys is an inherent power incidental to its proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154: In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 573; In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Edillon, G.R. No. AC-1928 [IBP Adm. Case No. DD-1] August 3, 1978). Furthermore, attorneys are the court's constituency to aid in the administration of justice (Doge S. State, 39 NE 745). A lawyer occupies what may be termed a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the court, and like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice (Kerlin v. Culkin, 60 ALR 851). Thus, only those complying with the strict standards of legal practice are maintained in the roll of attorneys and those falling short thereof may be disbarred. Thus, both attorneys are advised accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Atty. Raul Sesbreno is reprimanded and admonished to refrain from employing language unbecoming of a member of the Bar and to extend courtesy and respect to his brothers in the profession with a warning that any future infraction of a nature similar to that found in this case shall be dealt with more severely.

10. IN RE SORIANO By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare behavior. His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause whydisciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was on the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19 hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate.

In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. 2 Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts. Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity

Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria,
as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. 3 He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate in his actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident, categorically denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram. We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty.

Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.

11. CAMACHO V. PANGULAYAN Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof,viz: A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law. Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students. The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in

behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President. Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case. It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation;viz:

1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. xxx xxx xxx

3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q97-30549 will by filed them.1wphi1 The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

12. OSOP VS. FONTANILLA In a verified complaint filed on April 15, 1999, complainant Abedin Limpao Osop charged Atty. V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla with Grave Misconduct in connection with Civil Case No. 6381 entitled, "Abedin Limpao Osop vs. Macapado Muslim and Virgilio Ramos" for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's Fees with the Regional Trial Court at General Santos City, Branch 22. On July 24, 1998, the respondent, Atty. Fontanilla, suggested that Abedin Limpao Osop write a letter of reconsideration to Macapado Muslim, Chancellor of the Mindanao State University at General Santos City, one of the defendants in the case. Atty. Fontanilla represented on record that Mr. Muslim was his classmate/contemporary at MSU and that he could possibly convince the latter to reconsider. During the hearing held on July 27, 1998, Atty. Fontanilla once again urged Mr. Osop to write the letter of reconsideration so that the negotiations could begin. At first Atty. Virgilio Alconera (counsel for the complainant) opposed the suggestion but eventually gave in by saying that if the court would direct his client to write a letter, he (Mr. Osop) would do so. On this basis, the court issued an order suggesting that Mr. Osop write the chancellor a letter of reconsideration without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing on the petition for a temporary restraining order should the latter be not receptive to the request. Based on the order of the court, and upon advise of his counsel, Mr. Osop wrote the letter of reconsideration on the same day. He furnished a copy to Atty. Fontanilla on even date and to the office of the chancellor the following day, July 28, 1998. On July 30, 1998, Atty. Fontanilla filed a Manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case without prejudice in new of the Indorsement by defendant Macapado Muslim of Mr. Osop's letter to the University President for appropriate disposition, and in conjunction with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy. The following day, Atty. Fontanilla manifested in court that he was not able to convince Mr. Muslim to agree to a settlement and apologized to the complainant and his counsel. On August 6, 1998, respondent Atty. Fontanilla filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the grounds of, among others, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum-shopping on account of the letter of reconsideration written and filed by Mr. Osop. Abedin Limpao Osop claimed, among other things, that in filing the "Manifestation" and "Motion to Dismiss," Atty. Fontanilla had breached the trust and faith that he and his counsel have reposed in the latter; that the act of Atty. Fontanilla in soliciting the letter of reconsideration and using the same letter against him was a betrayal of trust; that it was Atty. Fontanilla who caused the creation of the administrative forum by soliciting the letter of reconsideration; that Atty. Fontanilla had committed a gross malpractice of law that constituted the administrative offense of grave misconduct.

In response, Atty. V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla admitted that he made the suggestion to Mr. Osop and his counsel in good faith and in order for the parties to settle their dispute amicably; and that Mr. Osop was ably represented by counsel at the time the suggestion to write the letter of reconsideration was made. He denied misleading or misinforming the court or deceiving Mr. Osop and Atty. Alconera when he filed the manifestation and the motion to dismiss; that he raised the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies even before the court approved his suggestion of a letter of reconsideration; and that he was merely complying with his duties as an officer of the court by bringing to the court's attention the fact that the issues raised by the complainant were being treated in two separate fora. He emphasized that the complainant suffered no damage because the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and not due to the writing of the letter of reconsideration. The main issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Fontanilla committed misconduct as a member of the bar when he solicited the said letter of reconsideration and later on using it to support his arguments for the dismissal of the civil case. We find that Atty. V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla is guilty of misconduct. Misconduct, as defined in the case of Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative vs. NLRC,1 is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful

intent and not mere error in judgment (emphasis supplied).

We can not find fault with Atty. Fontanilla's desire to have the case amicably settled. To this end he made the suggestion that Mr. Osop write the letter of reconsideration to serve as the starting point for the negotiation. In open court, Atty. Fontanilla intimated that Chancellor Muslim had the power to reconsider the termination of Mr. Osop's services in MSU General Santos City and made it clear that he could probably convince the chancellor to reconsider his decision if a letter of reconsideration is written. The Indorsement made by Chancellor Muslim to the University President indubitably showed that it is the latter who is the proper authority to resolve the letter of reconsideration. The act of Atty. Fontanilla in rushing to court and filing the Manifestation the minute he got the Indorsement brings out in the open his not being totally bent on the idea of negotiation even if he was the one who broached the idea and his desire to have the case dismissed at the expense of Mr. Osop. Furthermore, since it is the University President who would decide on complainant's letter, it would have been prudent of Atty. Fontanilla to preserve the status quo and wait for the resolution on the said letter. It is deplorable that the letter written by Mr. Osop in good faith and upon the solicitation of respondent was used against him as ammunition to have his case dismissed. And that this unconscionable act was done by a member of the Philippine Bar.

Atty. Fontanilla's employment of the said letter against the interest of Mr. Osop, after he had actively solicited the same, was not proper and revealed his lack of candor and absence of good faith in his dealings with Mr. Osop. Moreover, Atty. Fontanilla conveniently omitted to state in his motion to dismiss that the letter of reconsideration was written at his solicitation to facilitate a possible settlement. The said omission is not only unfair to Mr. Osop but had a tendency to mislead the court as to the true circumstances material to resolving the incident. Forum-shopping exists when the petitioner files multiple petitions or complaints involving the same issues in two or more tribunals or agencies.2 It is highly unfair of Atty. Fontanilla to accuse Mr. Osop of forum-shopping solely on the basis of the letter of reconsideration, as complainant did not file multiple petitions or complaints involving the same issues in two or more tribunals or agencies. In the case at bar, Mr. Osop had only harbored the idea of seeking relief before the courts. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 6381. Even if the case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction, it does not excuse Atty. Fontanilla's actuation of imputing forum-shopping and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies when the same are baseless. While we find that there is a clear case of misconduct, as Atty. Fontanilla has not been candid and fair in his dealings with the complainant, the penalties of either suspension or disbarment are too harsh to be imposed upon him. It has been said that charges meriting disciplinary action against a member of the Bar generally involve the motives that induced him to commit the act or acts charged and that, to justify disbarment or suspension, the case against him must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to his motive. As punishment by disbarment or suspension will deeply affect a lawyer's professional life, neither should be imposed unless (the) case against him is free from doubt not only as to the acts charged but as to his he did. The actuation of Atty. Fontanilla, although improper, was mitigated when he apologized to Mr. Osop and Atty. Alconera in open court and by the absence of material damage caused to the complainant. Moreover, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline finds: that there is no evidence on record of past misconduct attributed to herein respondent. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla is hereby REPRIMANDED. He is further WARNED that any repetition of the same or similar infractions would be dealt with more severely. Let this judgment be entered in respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. motive. 3 There is nothing in the record to clearly show the motivation which induced Atty. Fontanilla to do what 13. TORRES V. JAVIER By complaint1 dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino (complainants) charge Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers oath. The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by respondent in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA), as counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his wifeformer UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) against herein complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105004-LRD (audit case),2 and from the pleadings filed by respondent in another labor case as counsel for the one hundred seventy six (176) faculty members of the University of the East complainants against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L. Torres, et al.,3 docketed as NCR-0D0201-0005-LRD (attorneys fees case).4 The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action against respondent. The first cause of action is based on respondents "Urgent Motion to Expedite with Manifestation and Reiteration of Position" (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case which complainants allege contained statements which are absolutely false, unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFAs funds, destruction or concealment of UEFAs documents and some other acts tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon their persons.5 Portions of the questioned motion read: Undersigned attorney would like to manifest just so it can not be said later on that he kept mum on the matter that when individual respondents-appellants realized that an audit of Union funds was looming, it appears that they decided to destroy or conceal documents as demonstrated by an "Incident Report Re Robbery" dated May 6, 2002 (a copy just recently secured by the undersigned), attached hereto as Annex "A", where the police investigator stated that "no forcible entry" was noted by him but "that air condition on the respective rooms were (sic) slightly move (sic) to mislead that suspect as the same as their point of entry.["] The police officers stated that "no cash of (sic) money were stolen but instead claimed that still undetermined documents/important papers were stolen by the suspects." This brings to mind the United States case against Andersen officials who shredded documents related to theEnron scandal when they thought nobody was looking. As in the Andersen/Enron case, the individual respondents-appellants in the instant case knew that

the law was going to come knocking at their door, asking a lot [of] questions about financial matters. From the undersigneds standpoint, the alleged "robbery" of "still undetermined

the burglary and the audit the burglary having rendered the complete implementation of the audit unattainable.15 With respect to the attorneys fees case, respondent claims that Atty. Torres did not in his Answer confront the issues thereof but instead "mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed] and distort[ed] realities"16 by including malicious, libelous and impertinent statements and accusations against his wife which exasperated him.17 A portion of Atty. Torres Answer in the attorneys fees case reads: x x x in her incumbency as President of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999) she got only about P2.00/hr CBA increase which took effect only [in] 1994, with no other substantial improvements of the teachers benefits, and yet she spent for more than h alf a million negotiation expenses from the UEFAs funds. Her 1994-1999 CBA was only a carbon copy of her old 1989-1994 CBA with no substantial improvements, with uncertain amount of her expenses, because she removed/concealed all the financial records of the UEFA during her term. . . I and the other lawyers/teachers denounced her unlawful deduction of 10% attorneys fees from the small backwages received by the teachers on April 28, 1993 although there was actually no lawyer who worked for itand there was no Board nor General Membership Assembly Resolutions passedthe assembly [Nov. 24, 2001] was apparently irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor, like a confused gabble (sic)18 Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent admits having responded with a counter-attack in his "Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment"19 wherein he stated: What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres just cannot kick the habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters in his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his teeth.The undersigned thinks that if he has any common sense at all he should shut up about his accusation that Prof. Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation expensesshe obtained only P2-increase in union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of the damage suit against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case No. NCR-OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain "pogi" points prior to the UEFA election in 1994.20 xxx To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any common sense at all, he should stop making irrelevant, libelous and impertinent allegations in his pleadings. This means changing his "standard tactic" of skirting the main issues by injecting a web or a maze of sham, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matters.21 (Underscoring supplied) Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the BLRs attention that Atty. Torres had the habit of hurling baseless accusations against his wife to embarrass her, including one for unjust vexation and another for collection and damages both of which were dismissed after

documents/papers" was an inside job as investigation has shown that there is no evidence of forced entry. Besides, it would be a cinch to establish a motive by individual respondentsappellants Torres and Celestino to destroy documents related to the audit ordered by Regional Director Alex E. Maraan. In any event, the undersigned thinks that the legal process should go on. Lumang gimmick na yang "robbery" ng mga evidensya. They may try to cover up the "looting" of union funds, but there is such a thing as secondary evidence, not to mention the power of this Honorable Office to issuesubpoenas even to the unions depositary banks.6 (Underscoring supplied) Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorneys oath that he "obey the laws" and "do no falsehood," the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the Rules of Court for directly pointing to them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery at the UEFA office, and for citing the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant, impertinent, and immaterial to the subject of quasi-judicial inquiry.7 As second cause of action, complainants allege that in the attorneys fees case, respondent, in his "Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment" filed before the DOLE, used language that was clearly abusive, offensive, and improper,8 inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.9 As third/last cause of action, complainants quote respondents statement in the aforesaid Reply, to wit: It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths and certify documents. x x x,10 and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession, "uncalled for and deserve[s] censure, [as] the same might shrink the degree of confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document."11 By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he was angry12 while he was preparing his "Motion to Expedite" in the audit case, it having come to his knowledge that the UEFA office had been burglarized and complainant Atty. Torres had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary.
13

Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the loss of the vital documents so that the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by complainants would be expedited;14 and that the information regarding the burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case as a figure of speech were relevant in drawing a link between

trial on the merits, thus prompting him to state that "these dismissed cases indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental dishonesty."22 Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the same attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres accused his client, Prof. Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary public and of "deliberately us[ing] a falsified/expired Community Tax Certificate" in order to justify the dismissal of the case against him (Atty. Torres);23 and that Atty. Torres continued harassing his clients including his wife by filing baseless complaints for falsification of public document.24 Hence, in defense of his clients, the following statements in his Reply: Respondent further concluded that lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad "falsified the said petition by causing it to appear that he participated" in the falsification "when he did not in truth and in fact participate thereat" . . . obviously oblivious of the obvious that it is highly improbable for Prof. Maguigad to have forged the signature of the notary public. If he intended to forge it, what was the big idea of doing so? To save Fifty Pesos (P50.00) for notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation that lead (sic) petitioner Maguigad used a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently unfounded and malicious. But that is not all. Respondents went further and charged Profs. Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez and Javier with the same crime of falsification of public document . . . "by causing it to appear that Rogelio Maguigad had indeed participated in the act of verifying/subscribing and swearing the subject petition before notary public Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, when in truth and in fact he did not participate thereat." To the mind of the undersigned, this is the height of irresponsibility, coming as it does from a member of the Philippine Bar. There is no evidence to charge them with falsification of public document, i.e. the "verification" appended to the present petition. They did not even sign it. The crime imputed is clearly bereft of merit. Frankly, the undersigned thinks that even a dimwitted first-year law student would not oblige with such a very serious charge. It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s] to hear notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to "operate" a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths, and certify documents. Believing that the said "veification" was signed by an impostor-relative of the notary public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan] through no fault of his client, Prof. Maguigad, the undersigned sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the undersigned to inform him that he arrested in the area near UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen whom he caught in flagrante delicto notarizing an affidavit of loss and feigning to be Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his uncle.25 xxx Petitioners devoted so much space in their answer/comment vainly trying to prove that Profs. Maguigad, Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and Javier committed the crime of falsification of public document reasoning out that they made "untruthful statements in the narration of facts" in the basic petition.

Respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law books is he reading? He should know or ought to know that the allegations in petitioners pleading are absolutely privileged because the said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues.26 (Underscoring supplied) The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for using inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings. The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation read: Respondent admits that he was angry when he wrote the Manifestationand alleges that Complainant implicated his wife in a burglary. Moreover, Respondent alleges that Complainant has been "engaged in intimidating and harassing" his wife. It appears that herein Complainant and herein Respondents wife have had a series of charges and counter-charges filed against each other. Both parties being protagonists in the intramurals within the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA). Herein Complainant is the President of the UEFA whereas Respondents wife was the former President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat this matter of charges and counter-charges filed, which involved the UEFA, as extraneous, peripheral, if not outright irrelevant to the issue at hand. xxx Clearly, [r]espondents primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained. Indeed, the remarks quoted above are offensive and inappropriate. That the Respondent is representing his wife is not at all an excuse.27 (Underscoring supplied) Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by Resolution28 of October 7, 2004, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken but not its recommendation to reprimand him. It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be.29 The requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a

cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified.30 If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege.31 A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.32 That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.33 The first cause of action of complainants is based on respondents allegation in his "Motion to Expedite" that a burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out the burglary the concealment and destruction of vital documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be false but it could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the resolution of the audit case. In that light, this Court finds that the first cause of action may not lie. As regards the second cause of action, it appears that respondent was irked by Atty. Torres Answer to the complaint in the attorneys fees case wherein he criticized his (respondents) wifes performance as past President of UEFA. This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres incorporating in his Answer in the attorneys fees case statements such as "the assembly . . . was apparently irked by Mrs. Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor like a confused gabble ( sic)." But neither does it countenance respondents retaliating statements like "what kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?," "he lies through his teeth," "if he has any common sense at all he should shut up," and "Atty. Torres forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which he filed to gain pogi points." Nor respondents emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the habit of hurling baseless accusations against his wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases against his wife, of which Atty. Torres was the complainant, "indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental dishonesty." The issue in the attorneys fees case was whether the 10% attorneys fees "checked off" from the initial backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the above-quoted statements of respondent in the immediately preceding paragraph cannot be said to be relevant or pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may have conducted himself improperly is not a justification for respondent to be relieved from observing professional conduct in his relations with Atty. Torres. Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward each other or toward suitors in the case.34 In the attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as counsel for himself as respondent and complainant was acting as counsel for his wife as complainant. Although it is understandable,

if not justifiable, that in the defense of ones clients - especially of ones wife or of ones self, the zeal in so doing may be carried out to the point of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, and detract from the dignity of the legal profession.35 Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the attorneys fees case on the basis of the alleged forgery of the notary publics signature, respondent did not only endeavor to point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an argument, but personally attacked Atty. Torres mental fitness by stating that "the undersigned thinks that even a dim -witted firstyear law student would not oblige with such a very serious charge," and "[r]espondent Torres is a member of the bar [b]ut what law books is he reading." In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language must be dignified and choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings.36 In the assertion of his clients rights, a lawyer even one gifted with superior intellect is enjoined to rein up his temper.37 As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should be carefully avoided.38 If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public documents against respondents clients as a scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate recourse in law, for if they plead for a righteous cause, the course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, the courts being ever vigilant in the protection of a partys rights.39 Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESSS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. instructs that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.40 The language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.41 As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of notaries public basis of the last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that should characterize the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document, respondent, who

justifies the same as legitimate defense of his client who was being accused by Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the relevance of the statement to the subject matter of the pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt. Respecting the verified complaint Annex "EJ-A"42 to the Comment of respondent filed by his wife, Prof. Eleonor R. Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the same cannot be consolidated with the present administrative case since the parties and causes of action of such complaint are completely different from those of the present complaint. WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings, respondent Atty. Jose C. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Month, effective upon receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.