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AZUELA V. CA (2006) Will was two pages long.

The number of pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a blank was there. The will was not properly acknowledged. (Nilagdaanko at ninotariokongayong 10 unyo, ditosa !anila."# The witnesses also did not sign under the attestation clause but on the left hand margin of the page. eld$ %n&alid will. Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case because no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below it. Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to 'rt (0). 'cknowledgement is the act of one who has e*ecuted a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. !oreo&er, will must be acknowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. ' notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defecti&e, e&en if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. TABAOADA V. ROSAL (1982) +n the first page (which contained the entire testamentary dispositions#, the testatri* signed at the bottom, while the witnesses signed at the left,hand margin. +n the second page which contained the attestation clause, the testatri* signed at the left hand margin, and the witnesses signed below the attestation clause. The attestation clause also did not state the number of pages. eld$ -alid. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatri* but also the due e*ecution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The ob.ects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied when the witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contained all the testamentary dispositions. The failure to state the number of pages would ha&e been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really composed of only / pages duly signed by the testatri* and her instrumental witnesses. AJERO VS. CA 0e1uirements under 'rt (12 and (13 on the authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions refer only to the &alidity of the dispositions, but not its probate. %f the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. 4uch failure, howe&er, does not render the whole testament &oid.

JABONETA V. GUSTILO: The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the e*ecution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might ha&e seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature." The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. 5aboneta doctrine$ the 1uestion whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment e*isting conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could ha&e seen each other sign. ICASIANO V. ICASIANO (1964) [64] The inad&ertent failure of one witness to affi* his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to .ustify denial of probate. That the failure of the witness to sign page three was entirely through pure o&ersight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in e&ery page. 067$ The %casiano holding cannot, and should not, be taken as a departure from the rule that the will should be signed by the witnesses on e&ery page. The carbon duplicate was regular in all aspects. ' ca&alier disregard of the formal re1uirements of wills in reliance on %casiano is not recommended. JAVELLANA Acknowledgement V. LEDES A before a (19!!) notary ["0] public.

6act$ 8odicil signed by testatri* and witnesses at the hospital9 the notary public brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there. Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgement in the presence of the testatri* and the witnesses does not affect the &alidity of the codicil. The 8i&il 8ode does not re1uire that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. The subse1uent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. 067$ (a# ratio$ The certification of acknowledgement need not be signed in the presence of the testator and the witnesses9 (b# obiter$ 'rt. (0) does not re1uire that the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge on the same day that it was e*ecuted.











The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attesting witnesses. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his ha&ing signed the will. %f the third witness were the notary public himself, he would ha&e to a&ow, assent, or admit his ha&ing signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. 6urthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. 6or then he would be interested in sustaining the &alidity of his own act. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would ha&e the effect of ha&ing only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contra&ention of the 'rticle (0: re1uiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of 'rticle (0) which re1uires that the testator and the re1uired number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. CAGRO V. CAGRO (19!#) [68]

6act$ petitioners a&er that the attestation clause is fatally defecti&e since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. 48 agrees with petitioners. The absence of a statement that the witnesses signed the will and e&ery page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is a fatal defect which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. 4uch defect in the attestation clause cannot be characteri<ed as merely in&ol&ing form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule contemplated in 'rt. (0=. The defect is not only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element re1uired by 'rt. (0: to be specifically stated in the attestation clause. >roper interpretation of the substantial compliance rule in 'rt. (0=$ +mission which can be supplied by an e*amination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to e*trinsic e&idence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. owe&er, those omissions which cannot be supplied e*cept by e&idence aliunde (from another source, from elsewhere, from outside source"# would result in the in&alidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. ALVARADO V. GAVIOLA (199#) [80]

The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the attestation clause. 6act$ signature of the three witnesses do not appear on the bottom of the attestation clause, but the page containing the clause is signed by the witnesses on the left,hand margin. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the e*ecution of the will" re1uired by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signature. 'n unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signature at the bottom thereof negati&es their participation. The signatures on the left,hand margin cannot be deemed as their signature to the clause because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left,hand margin of all its pages. %f an attestation clause not signed by the witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subse1uent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. ;issenting opinion of 7autista 'ngelo$ (a# substantial compliance9 (b# the uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses that the clause was already written in the will when the same was signed ob&iates fear of the ma.ority that the clause may ha&e been only added on a subse1uent occasion and not at the signing of the will. The re1uirement has been liberally applied, the 48 declaring substantial compliance to be sufficient. 6acts$ The lawyer who drafted the will and subse1uent codicil read them aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respecti&e copies pre&iously furnished them. 4ubstantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, because the solemnities surrounding the e*ecution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are ne&er intended to be so rigid and infle*ible as to destroy testamentary pri&ilege. %t was not only the lawyer who read the documents. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. With four persons following the reading word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions#, were the terms actually appearing in the typewritten documents. RO$AS V. DE JESUS (198!) [10#]

%ssue$ whether 6?7.@)1" appearing in the holographic will is a &alid compliance with 'rt. (10. A ' complete date is re1uired to pro&ide against such contingencies as that of two competing wills e*ecuted on the

same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a will was e*ecuted. There is no contingency in this case. 's a general rule, the date" in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of its e*ecution. owe&er, when, as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date 6?7.@=1" is a &alid compliance with 'rt. (10, probate of the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. 1#. CODO% &'. CALUGA% 6acts$ 0espondents are de&isees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased >etitioners filed an opposition: to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is e&en illegible. 0espondents presented fi&e (:# witnesses none of whom saw the testator actually write her signature. 8ourt of 'ppeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the re1uirement of three witnesses, under 'rticle (11, in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in '<aola &s. 4ingson,21ruling that the re1uirement is merely directory and not mandatory. %ssue$ Whether the pro&isions of 'rticle (11 of the 8i&il 8ode are permissi&e or mandatory. eld$ !andatory. The article pro&ides, as a re1uirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses e*plicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1Bwphi1.nCt We are con&inced, based on the language used, that 'rticle (11 of the 8i&il 8ode is mandatory. The word DshallD connotes a mandatory order. We ha&e ruled that DshallD in a statute commonly denotes an imperati&e obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word Dshall,D when used in a statute is mandatory. 14. (AULA DE LA CERNA &'. (OTOT ANUELA REBACA

%ssue$ W+N the decree allowing probate of a .oint will be annulled after becoming final. eld$ No. ?rror in .udgment is still &alid and binding, as distinguished from error in .urisdiction which is &oid. The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1=2= by the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of 8ebu (when the testator, 7ernabe de la 8erna, died#, has conclusi&e effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that e&en then the 8i&il 8ode already decreed the in&alidity of .oint wills, whether in fa&or of the .oint testators, reciprocally, or in fa&or of a third party ('rt. ))=, old 8i&il 8ode#. The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should ha&e been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the .urisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusi&e effect of its final decision, howe&er erroneous. ' final .udgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (!analo &s. >aredes, 3G >hil. =2(9 %n re ?states of 5ohnson, 2= >hil. 1:)#9 and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors .udgment of courts should become final at some definite date fi*ed by law. %nterest rei publicae ut finis set litium (;y 8ay &s. 8rossfield, 2( >hil, :/1,H 7ut the 8ourt of 'ppeals should ha&e taken into account also, to a&oid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1=(= could only affect the share of the deceased husband, 7ernabe de la 8erna. %t could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Eer&asia 0ebaca, who was then still ali&e, and o&er whose interest in the con.ugal properties the probate court ac1uired no .urisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. 7e it remembered that prior to the new 8i&il 8ode, a will could not be probated during the testatorHs lifetime. 1!. GONZALES V. CA 6acts$ >etitioner 0i<alina Eon<ales and Iutgarda 4antiago (>ri&ate respondent# are the nieces of the deceased %sabel Eabriel who died a widow. ' will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to ha&e been e*ecuted in 'pril 1=)1 or two months prior to the death of %sabel. %t consisted of : pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatri* on page 3 and the left margin of all the pages. Iutgarda was named as the uni&ersal heir and e*ecutor. The petitioner opposed the probate. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not e*ecuted and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses. %ssue$ Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the &alidity of a will ?I;$ No. The law re1uires only that witnesses posses the 1ualifications under 'rt. (/0 (N88# and none of the dis1ualifications of 'rt. (0/. There is no re1uirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is belie&ed and accepted in court. 6or the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that e&idence be established on record that the witnesses ha&e good standing in the the community. 8ompetency is distinguished from credibility, the

6'8T4$4pouses, 7ernabe de la 4erna and Eer&asia 0ebaca, e*ecuted a .oint last will and testament in fa&or of !anuela 0ebaca, their neice. 7ernabe dela 4erna died on 'ugust 20, 1=2=, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Eer&asia and !anuela before the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of 8ebu which, allowed the probate of the .oint will. Fpon the death of Eer&asia 0ebaca on +ctober 13, 1=:/, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Eer&asia was concerned was filed on No&ember ), 1=:/.. The 8ourt of 6irst %nstance declared the testament null and &oid, for being e*ecuted contrary to the prohibition of .oint wills in the 8i&il 8ode ('rt. ))=, 8i&il 8ode of 1((= and 'rt. (1(, 8i&il 8ode of the >hilippines#9 but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the 8ourt of 'ppeals re&ersed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1=2= was issued by a court of probate .urisdiction and conclusi&e on the due e*ecution of the testament.

former being determined by 'rt. (/0 while the latter does not re1uire e&idence of such good standing. 8redibility depends on the con&incing weight of his testimony in court. 16. )ALA* V. RELOVA E.0. No. I,30/0G 4eptember /(, 1=(3 6acts$ Eregorio Jalaw, the pri&ate respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Nati&idad, filed a peition for probate of the latterHs holographic will in 1=)(. The will contained / alterations$ a# 0osaHs name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead D0osarioD was written abo&e it. 4uch was not initialed, b# 0osaHs name was crossed out as sole e*ecutri* and EregorioHs ma,e was written abo&e it. This alteration was initialed by the testator. 0osa contended that the will as first written should be gi&en effect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions. %ssue$ Whether or not the will is &alid ?I;$ No. +rdinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby in&alidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. owe&er, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial pro&ision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the re1uisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is &oided or re&oked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain &alid. To state that the Will as first written should be gi&en efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatri*. 7ut that change of mind can neither be gi&en effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner re1uired by law ('rt. (13# by affi*ing her full signature. 'rt. (13. %n case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. 1". GAN &'.%A( 6acts$ >etitioner 6austo ?. Ean initiated them proceedings in the !anila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly e*ecuted by the deceased, 6elicidad Kap. +pposing the petition, her sur&i&ing husband %ldefonso Kap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor e*ecuted any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. >etitioner tried to establish its contents and due e*ecution by the statements in open court of 6elina ?sguerra, >rimiti&o 0eyes, 4ocorro +larte and 0osario Ean 5imene<,who allegedly had read and witnessed the writing of the will by the deceased $

When on No&ember 1=, 1=:1, 6elicidad was confined at the F.4.T. ospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to 6elina ?sguerra. 7ut a few hours later, %ldefonso Kap, her husband, asked 6elina for the purse$ and being afraid of him by reason of his well,known &iolent temper, she deli&ered it to him. Thereafter, in the same day, %ldefonso Kap returned the purse to 6elina, only to demand it the ne*t day shortly before the death of 6elicidad. 'gain, 6elina handed it to him but not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time. 4ince then, the will was no longer seen. %44F?$ !ay a (lost or destroyed# holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who ha&e allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testatorL eld$ No. The e*ecution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be pro&ed by the bare testimony of witnesses who ha&e seen and@or read such will.( Fnder the pro&isions of 'rt. (2( of the New 8i&il 8ode, we are empowered to adopt this opinion as a 0ule of 8ourt for the allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate, howe&er, to make this 0ule decisi&e of this contro&ersy, simultaneously with its promulgation. 'nyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the e&idence presented by petitioner 6austo ?. Ean. 't this point, before proceeding further, it might be con&enient to e*plain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be pro&ed by testimonial e&idence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. %n the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself9 in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now#. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof9 if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are a&ailable to authenticate. 18. R+,-./' &. A0/12/ 6acts$ The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of 0icardo 7onilla in 1=GG. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not lea&e any will, holographic or otherwise. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original. %ssue$ Whether or not a holographic will can be pro&ed by means of a photocopy eld$ Kes. ' photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator ' distinction must be obser&ed in Ean &s Kap where not e&en a photocopy of the will was presented before the probate court to compare the handwriting therein to that of the testator. 19. N-3+456-1+ &. C+507 +8 A33-/.'

6acts$!artin ugo died on 1=G3 and he left a will wherein he instituted 4ofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only e*ecutor. %t was also pro&ided therein that he was married to 0ufina Eome< with whom he had 2 children. >etitioner (4ofia# filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testatorHs admission of cohabitation, hence making the will in&alid on its face. The 8ourt of 'ppeals re&ersed and held that the will is &alid e*cept the de&ise in fa&or of the petitioner which is null and &oid in &iolation of 'rt. G2= and 10/(. %ssue$ Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic &alidity of a will eld$ Kes, as an e*ception. 7ut the general rule is that the courtHs area of in1uiry is limited to the an e*amination and resolution of the e*trinsic &alidity of the will. This general rule is howe&er not infle*ible and absolute. Ei&en e*ceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain pro&isions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. The will was &alidly e*ecuted in accordance with law but the court didnHt find it to ser&e a practical purpose to remand the nullified pro&ision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic &alidity of its pro&isions. The de&isee is in&alid by &irtue of 'rt. G2= which &oids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery@concubinage at the time of the donations. Fnder 'rt, 10/( it is also prohibited. 21. NOLI AL9ONSO: &'. S(OUSES ANDRES 6acts$ !arcelino 'lfonso died intestate, lea&ing his two children 'lfonso and 6elomina (petitioners# which e*ecuted an e*tra.udicial settlement of estate thereafter. 'lfonso sold his share in the estate to herein respondents. 4uch sale later on assailed by petitioners, the heirs of 'lfonso. >etitioners theori<e that publication of the deed of e*tra.udicial settlement of the estate of !arcelino 'lfonso is re1uired before the intestate heir (5ose# could &alidly transfer (sell# the sub.ect property. %ssue$ W+N the sale was &alid despite the lack of publication of e*tra.udicial settlement. eld$ Kes. %n 'le.andrino &. 8ourt of 'ppeals,1/ the 8ourt upheld the effecti&ity of a deed of e*tra.udicial settlement that was neither notari<ed nor published. 4ignificantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. 4uch transmission is sub.ect to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and e*penses, but this does not pre&ent an immediate passage of the

title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.121a&&phi1 The deed of e*tra.udicial settlement e*ecuted by 6ilomena 4antos -da. de 'lfonso and 5ose e&idences their intention to partition the inherited property. %t delineated what portion of the inherited property would belong to whom. The sale to respondents was made after the e*ecution of the deed of e*tra.udicial settlement of the estate. The e*tra.udicial settlement of estate, e&en though not published, being deemed a partition13 of the inherited property, 5ose could &alidly transfer ownership o&er the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him.1:


1. BAGTAS VS. (AGUIO 6'8T4$ >io1uinto >aguio died on 4eptember /(, 1=0=. 6or some 13 or 1: years prior to the time of his death, he suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body9 that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. e retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.The testator wrote out on se&eral pieces of paper the disposition of his property. The same was in turn deli&ered to one 4eMor !arco who transcribed and put them in form.The pieces of paper were then deli&ered to a lawyer who read them to the testator asking if they were his dispositions.The testator assented each time with an affirmati&e mo&ement of his head. The widow of the decedent 5uliana 7agtas then sought the probate of the purported last will and testament of >io1uinto.The 86% of 7ataan admitted the same for probate. %sidoro >aguio, a son of the decedent by a former marriage, opposed the probation on the ground that the testator was not n full en.oyment and use of his mental faculties and was without mental capacity necessary to e*ecute a &alid will. %44F?$Was the will was &alidly e*ecutedL ?I;$Kes. The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well,established, and the testator in the case at bar ne&er ha&ing been ad.udged insane by the court of competent .urisdiction , this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to o&ercome this legal presumption by proper e&idence. The opponents failed to do this. The courts ha&e repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body , induced by age and disease does not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not re1uire that a person shall continue in the full en.oyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to e*ecute a &alid will. %f such were the legal standard , few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such e*acting re1uirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are uni&ersal in the statement that the

1uestion of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated insanity or idiocy. /. ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR: &'.LORENZO LA$A: 6acts$ Testator >aciencia was a G( year old spinster when she made her last will and testament The Will, e*ecuted in the house of retired 5udge ?rnestino E. Iimpin (5udge Iimpin#, was read to >aciencia twice. 'fter which, >aciencia e*pressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. >etitioners opposed the probate alleging, among others, that >aciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its e*ecution >aciencia was referred to as DmagulyanD or DforgetfulD because she would sometimes lea&e her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.3: %44F?$ W+N the state of being forgetfulness incapacitate the person to e*ecute a will . ?I;$ No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to e*ecute a Will.)( 6orgetfulness is not e1ui&alent to being of unsound mind. 7esides, 'rticle G== of the New 8i&il 8ode states$ 'rt. G==. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, in.ury or other cause. %t shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper ob.ects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. ere, there was no showing that >aciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. 8learly, thus, the burden to pro&e that >aciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. owe&er and as earlier mentioned, no substantial e&idence was presented by them to pro&e the same, thereby warranting the 8'Ns finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden. #. LETICIA VAL ONTE ORTEGA &'.JOSE9INA C. VAL ONTE 6acts$ Two years after the testatorNs arri&al from the Fnited 4tates and at the age of (0 he wed 5osefina who was then /( years old. 7ut in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, testator died. Testator e*ecuted a notarial last will and testament written in ?nglish and consisting of two (/# pages, and dated 5une 1:, 1=(2 but acknowledged only on 'ugust =, 1=(2. >etitioner opposed the will on the ground that it was not e*ecuted and attested as re1uired by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with9

%44F?$ W+N the will shall be e*ecuted and attested to on the same date eld$ No. 's correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not in&alidate the document, Dbecause the law does not e&en re1uire that a OnotarialP will * * * be e*ecuted and acknowledged on the same occasion.D1( !ore important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.1= 6urthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public./0 %n any e&ent, we agree with the 8' that Dthe &ariance in the dates of the will as to its supposed e*ecution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasi&ely e*plained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.D/1 4. ;ERACIO R. REVILLA &'. ;ON. COURT O9 A((EALS: 9ORTUNATO REVILLA: LUZ REVILLA DAVID: LORETO REVILLA GUTIERREZ: VENERANDA REVILLA ANI<UEZ: NICASIO REVILLA: (ER9ECTA REVILLA BALACANIA: JUSTINA REVILLA DEL ROSARIO /1, AGRI(INA REVILLA C;ACON: 0-'3+1,-17'. 6'8T4$ ;on 8ayetano 0e&illa, a bachelor, without issue nor any sur&i&ing ascendants, e*ecuted a last will and testament be1ueathing all his properties to his nine (=# nephews and nieces, the parties herein, who are full blood brothers and sisters, including the petitioner, eracio 0e&illa. To each of them, he be1ueathed an undi&ided one,tenth (1@10# of his estate reser&ing the last tenth for masses to be said after his death, and for the care of the religious images which he kept in a chapel in 4an !iguel, 7ulacan, where masses could be held also ;uring his lifetime, ;on 8ayetano had himself sought the probate of his will which the 86% allowed and admitted said will to probate. owe&er, the 8ity all of !anila was destroyed by fire including the decree allowing the will to probate. 4hortly thereafter, a petition for the reconstitution of the records of 4pecial >roceeding was filed, and after a proper hearing wherein ;on 8ayetano testified again, the petition for reconstitution was granted. When ;on 8ayetano died eracio 0e&illa, the oldest nephew, filed a petition for probate of another will, allegedly e*ecuted by ;on 8ayetano prior to the reconstitution proceeding, wherein he ( eracio# was instituted as sole heir of his uncleHs estate and e*ecutor of the will. %44F?$ W+N the alleged second will shall be allowed. ?I;$ N+. When ;on 8ayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made only two months prior to the date of reconstitution proceeding. e identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. e denied ha&ing subse1uently made another will. This categorical denial by the late 8ayetano 0e&illa must be belie&ed by e&erybody. %f he denied ha&ing e*ecuted another will, who are we to insist that he made another or second will

after the probate of his will dated 5anuary /(, 1=G(L The testimonies of the alleged notary public as well as the three instrumental witnesses of the alleged second will of the late 8ayetano 0e&illa cannot outweigh the denial of the late 8ayetano 0e&illa.

4. REVILLA &'. CA: J/15/0= 2": 199# 9/67': ;on 8ayetano 0e&illa, a bachelor, owned / pieces of land with buildings in !anila and ) parcels of land in his hometown in 7ulacan. These properties are worth >20!. %n 1=G(, he e*ecuted a 12,page last will and testament, be1ueathing all his properties to his = nephews and nieces including petitioner, eracio 0e&illa. To each, he ga&e 1@10 of his estate reser&ing the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in 7ulacan. ;uring his lifetime, ;on 8ayetano sought the probate of his will to which the 86% !anila admitted. owe&er, the 8ity all of !anila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. ' petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted. 'fter ;on 8ayetano died, eracio 0e&illa filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted eracio as sole heir of his uncleNs estate and e*ecutor of the will allegedly e*ecuted in 1=(/. The probate was opposed by eracioNs ( brothers and sisters on the grounds that$ , 4ince 1=G( up to 8ayetanoNs death, he ne&er informed that he re&oked the will e*ecuted in 1=G( , The 1=(/ will was not e*ecuted in accordance with law and the signature of 8ayetano was different from his usual and customary signature , 8ayetano was of unsound mind when he e*ecuted the will , That the alleged will was e*ecuted with undue pressure and influence , That the 1=G( will is &oid for the reason that it was e*ecuted under duress or the influence of fear or threats , 8ayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fi*ing his signature The trial court disallowed the second will. +n appeal, the 8' affirmed the trial court. I''5-: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.

;-.,: When ;on 8ayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. e identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. e could not ha&e e*ecuted a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for / months# and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. ;uring the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. %t was placed in a browned en&elope stating 7uksan ito pagkalibing ko" to which 8ayetano agreed to open. e recogni<ed the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. %n the court records, 8ayetano declared that he did not e*ecute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated. 4ignificantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of ;on 8ayetanoHs first will, he did not re&eal the second will which ;on 8ayetano supposedly made only /months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. %f the second will already e*isted on No&ember /G, 1=(/, it would ha&e been eracioHs strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will. 4ince the e*ecution of the second will could not ha&e occurred on the alleged date (4eptember 12, 1=(/# appearing therein (for ;on 8ayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then# it must ha&e been procured at the time when the testator was a &irtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. 5udge ?duardo 7engson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his ( brothers and sisters to &isit ;on 8ayetano. +nly then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that eracio had placed around their uncle. ' &ideotape, taken during their &isit and shown in court, belied eracioHs allegation that ;on 8ayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. ;espite 5udge 7eng<onHs order, eracio did not cease his efforts to monopoli<e ;on 8ayetano and his estate. To isolate ;on 8ayetano and make him inacessible to the pri&ate respondents, eracio transferred him from his own house in !anila to eracioHs house in Que<on 8ity. The e*ecution of the second will in an en&ironment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his ( other nephews and nieces, .ustified the trial courtHs and the 8ourt of 'ppealsH belief that undue influence was e*ercised by oracio o&er ;on 8ayetano to make him sign the second will (which ;on 8ayetano did not know to be such# in order to depri&e his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncleHs estate. There was fraud because ;on 8ayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with 8o, 7arredo and 7

Iim ( as witnesses# was a second will re&oking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. ad he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not ha&e denied that he made it. e would probably ha&e caused it to be probated while he was still ali&e, as he did with his first will. 7ut apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the pri&ate respondents, but from ;on 8ayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by ;on 8ayetano is pro&en by the omission of ;on 8ayetanoHs reser&ation of one,tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That pro&ision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not ha&e been deleted by ;on 8ayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. 7ut eracio o&erdid himself. e wanted e&erything. R'ssuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was e*ecuted, the testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (2# instrumental witnesses were not gi&en credit because of ma.or contradictions in testimonies. !. SEANGIO VS. ;ON. A OR E.0. No&ember /G, /00)9 '<cuna, 5.$ A. RE%ES

be1ueath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole e*ception of 'lfredo.

6. NUGUID VS NUGUID 33= 5FN? /2, 1=))


E0N I,/233 1G 480'

0osario Nuguid , single, died in ;ecember 20, 1=)/.4he was without descendants but was sur&i&ed by her parents and siblings. +n !ay 1(, 1=)2, 0emedios Nuguid, her sister filed in 86% a holographic will allegedly e*ecuted by 0osario on No&ember 1G, 1=:1 or 11 years ago, said will instituted 0emedios as the uni&ersal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a conse1uence, the institution is &oid. The courtNs order held that the will in 1uestion is a complete nullity. %44F?$ Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will &oid. Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic &alidity of the will. 0FI%NE$ The statute we are called upon to apply in article (:3 of the ci&il code which states$ The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether li&ing at the time of the e*ecution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir9 but the d and legacies shall be &alid insofar as they are not inofficious The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were recei&ed nothing by the testament. The one,sentence will institutes petitioner as the uni&ersal heir. No specific legacies or be1uest are therein pro&ided for. %t is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. >reterition consists in the omission in the testatorNs will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are e*pressly disinherited as heirs nor are e*pressly disinherited. ;isinheritance is a testamentary disposition depri&ing any compulsory heir his@her share in the legitime for a cause authori<ed by law. +n the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courtNs area of in1uiry is limited to the e*trinsic &alidity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. owe&er if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions$ time, effort, e*penses and added an*iety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head,on 8

6'8T4$ +n 4eptember 1=((, pri&ate respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late 4egundo. >etitioners opposed assailing among others that 4egundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of disinheritance affecting 'lfredo, one of the pri&ate respondents. >ri&ate respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. 0T8 dismissed the petition for probate easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition. %44F?$ Whether or not the document e*ecuted by 4egundo can be considered as a holographic will. 0FI%NE$ ' holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself. 'n intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmati&e deposition of the latterNs property, the disinheritance of 'lfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in fa&or of those who would succeed in the absence of 'lfredo. With regard to the issue on preterition, the court belie&es that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. %t was 4egundoNs last e*pression

the issue of the &alidity of the pro&isions of the will in 1uestion. ". NERI GR N+.L>4""99: "4 (;IL 18! &. /= A)UTIN 194#

ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. ;ue to the denial of 'cainNs motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for re&iew on certiorari before the 4upreme 8ourt. ISSUE: Whether or not -irginia 6ernande< and 0osa ;iongson ha&e been pretirited. RULING: Article 854 of the Civil Code: he preterition or omission of one! some! or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line! whether living at the time of the e"ecution of the will or born after the death of the testator! shall annul the institution of heir# but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator! the institution shall be effectual! without pre$udice to the right of representation. >reterition consists in the omission in the testatorNs will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are e*pressly disinherited. %nsofar as the widow is concerned, 'rticle (:3 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. owe&er, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Fnder 'rticle 2= of >.;. No. )02, known as the 8hild and Kouth Welfare 8ode, adoption gi&es to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. %t cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were depri&ed of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not e*pressly disinherited. ence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The uni&ersal institution of 'cain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of uni&ersal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. 9. VIADO NON &'. CA: 9-@05/0= 1!: 2000 9/67': >etitioners in this case are asserting co,ownership of the property while respondents claim that they are the absolute owners by &irtue of a deed of donation e*ecuted in their fa&or by the late patriarch, 5ulian -iado. They also claimed that petitioner wai&ed her rights o&er her share in the property of their late mother, -irginia -iado. 9


6'8T4$ This is a case where the testator 'gripino Neri in his will left all his property by uni&ersal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already gi&en each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents o&er which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father. %44F?$ 4hould there be cancellation of the will, in &iew of the omission of heirsL %s there disinheritance in this caseL ?I;$ Kes. The 8ourt annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by uni&ersal title to the children by his second marriage, without e*pressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had gi&en them already more shares in his property than those gi&en to the children by his second marriage. ;isinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is pre.udicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs. 8. C+1'7/17?1+ C. ACAIN: petitioner &s. ;+1. INTER EDIATE A((ELLATE COURT E.0. No. G/G0), +ctober /G, 1=(G 9ACTS: 8onstantino 'cain filed on the 0egional Trial 8ourt a petition for the probate of the will of his late Fncle, Nemesio 'cain, on the premise that the latter died lea&ing a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. 'fter the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, -irginia 6ernande< and 0osa ;iongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respecti&ely, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that$ (1# 8onstantino 'cain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings9 (/# he is merely a uni&ersal heir9 and (2# the widow and the adopted daughter ha&e been pretirited. 4aid motion was denied as well as the subse1uent motion for reconsideration. 8onse1uently, 6ernande< and ;iongson filed with the 4upreme 8ourt a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary in.unction which was subse1uently referred to the %ntermediate 'ppellate 8ourt. %'8 granted 6ernande< and ;iongsonNs petition and

I''5-: Whether there was &alid partition of the inherited properties formerly co,owned by the parties. R5.?1A: The 48 ruled for respondents. When the -irginia died intestate in 1=(/, her part of the con.ugal property was transmitted to her heirs S her husband 5ulian and their children. The inheritance, which &ested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co,ownership regime among the heirs until partition. ?&ery act intended to put an end to indi&ision among co, heirs and legatees or de&isees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an e*change, a compromise, a donation or an e*tra.udicial settlement." %n this case, the deed of donation and deed of e*tra,.udicial settlement consolidated the title solely to one of the heirs and ceased the co,ownership. The e*clusion of one of the children of the decedent from the deed of e*tra.udicial settlement has the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, in the absence of proof and bad faith, does not .ustify a collateral attack on the new T8T. The relief instead rests on 'rt.1103, N88 to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the &alue pertaining to her. !oreo&er, the 8ourt found the instruments e*ecuted showing donation was &alidly e*ecuted as petitioner failed to submit sufficient e&idence to pro&e otherwise. >etitioners claimed that the respondents forged her signature in the deeds of donation and of e*tra.udicial partition. The 8ourt found that such claim was &ague on how and what manner those supposed &ices occurred.

,>ertinent clauses of the Will$ '(inth. """) so that upon my death and after probate of this will! and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved! she will receive from my e"ecutri" and properties composing my hereditary estate! that she may en$oy them with *od+s blessing and my own. enth. ,hould my heiress Carmen *architorena die! I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children# and should any of these die! his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers -and sisters. by accretion! in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible. /leventh. ,hould my aforesaid heiress! Carmen *architorena! die after me while her children are still in their minority! I order that my estate be administered by my e"ecutri"! 0rs. 1osefa %aplana! and in her default! by Attorney 2amon ,alinas and in his default! by his son 2amon ,alinas# """.3 ,The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatri* has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution. ISSUE W+N a fideicommissary e*ists. ;ELD K?4. The re1uisites for a fideicommissary substitution e*ists, namely$ 1. 't first heir primarily called to the en.oyment of the estate. %n this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the en.oyment of the estate, according to clause %T of the will. /. 'n obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preser&e and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. 4uch an obligation is imposed in clause T which pro&ides that the Dwhole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiressHs# sur&i&ing children9D thus, instead of lea&ing the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of lea&ing the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in fa&or of the heiress instituted, but also pro&ides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatri*. 2. ' second heir. 4uch are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause T and in clause T%. 3. The fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. The children in this case are the owners of the inheritance by &irtue of the testatri*Ns 10

10. (EREZ &'. GARC;ITORENA: !4 (B?. 4#1 9ACTS$'na !aria 'lcantara (deceased# left >/1,3/(.:( on deposit in the 8armenHs name with the association known as %a &rbana in !anila, as the final payment of her li1uidated credit against 'ndres Earchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, !ariano. , !ariano Earchitorena held a .udgment for >G,(G/./2 against 5oa1uin, husband of 8armen. The sheriff pursuant to the writ of e*ecution issued in said .udgment le&ied an attachment on said amount deposited with %a &rbana. , 8armen secured a preliminary in.unction restraining the e*ecution of said .udgment on the sum so attached because the %a &rbana deposit belongs to her children as fideicommissary heirs of 'na !aria 'lcantara.

death. (T6, the deposit cannot be the sub.ect of e*ecution by Earchitorena as it doesnNt belong to 8armen.# Reasoning: ,This will certainly pro&ides for a substitution of heirs but not .ust a simple one considering that clause T% in connection with clause T pro&ides for a substitution where the heiress instituted dies after the testatri*. ,8lause T doesnNt conflict with the idea of fideicommisary$ The word sole does not necessarily e*clude the idea of substitute heirs9 and taking these three clauses together, such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance. The testatri* had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress in accordance with the limits fi*ed by ' G(1 88 which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be &alid Dpro&ided they do not go beyond the second degree.D 'nother indication of fideicommissary substitution is this clause pro&ides that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiressHs children, that is to say the heiress is re1uired to preser&e the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. , The disposition contained in clause %T is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution -it certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple substitution! where the heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance.: %n fact the en.oyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by &irtue of which the heir instituted recei&es the inheritance and en.oys it, although at the same time he preser&es it in order to pass it on the second heir. %t should also be noted that said clause %T &ests in the heiress only the right to en.oy but not the right to dispose of the estate. %t says, she may en.oy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution. ,8lause T% more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a pro&ision is therein made in the e&ent the heiress should die after the testatri*. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatri* and after recei&ing and en.oying the inheritance.

9ACTS: %n the codicil of testatri*, 0abadilla was instituted as a de&isee of a lot, containing the following pro&isions$ 1. 0abadilla shall ha&e the obligation until he dies, e&ery year, to gi&e to 7elle<a 100 piculs of sugar until 7elle<a dies9 /. 4hould 0abadilla die, his heir to whom he shall gi&e the lot shall ha&e to obligation to still gi&e yearly the sugar as specified to 7elle<a9 2. %n the e&ent that the lot is sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall ha&e also the obligation to respect and deli&er yearly sugar to 7elle<a. 4hould the command be not respected, 7elle<a shall immediately sei<e the lot and turn it o&er to the testatri*N near descendants. ISSUE: W+N the obligations of 5orge 0abadilla under the 8odicil are inherited by his heirs. ;ELD: TB?' ?' 1+7 / 6/'- +8 '?43.- '5@'7?757?+1. The codicil did not pro&ide that should 0abadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatri*N near descendants would substitute him. N-?7B-0 ?' 7B-0- / 8?,-?6+44?''/0= '5@'7?757?+1. ere, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the 8odicil to alienate the property pro&ided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatri*. 'lso, the near descendantsN right to inherit from the testatri* is not definite. %t will only pass to them if the obligation to deli&er is not fulfilled. !oreo&er, a fideicommissary substitution is &oid if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second degree. %n this case, the near descendants are not at all related to ;r. 0abadilla. TB?' ?' /.'+ 1+7 / 6+1,?7?+1/. ?1'7?757?+1. The testatri* did not make 0abadillaNs inheritance dependent on the performance of the said obligation. 4ince testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. %n case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. TB- 4/11-0 +8 ?1'7?757?+1 ?' 4+,/. because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the efficacy of such institution. ' 4+,- imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. %n a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend.

11. RABADILLA &'. CA 29: 2000

G.R. N+. 11#"2! J51-


12. NIEVA V. ALCALA (1920) 9/67': 5uliana Nie&a, the natural mother of 4egunda !aria Nie&a, married 6rancisco ;eocampo. +f said marriage 'lfeo ;eocampo was born. 5uliana died intestate on 'pril 1=, 1((=, and her son, 'lfeo ;eocampo, inherited from her ab intestate, the parcels of land in 1uestion. 'lfeo died intestate and without issue on 5uly G, 1(=0. Thus, the lands passed to his father, 6rancisco, by intestate succession. Thereafter,6rancisco married !anuela 'lcala, of which ma rriage was born 5ose ;eocampo. 6rancisco died on 'ugust 2, 1=13, whereupon his widow and son took possession of the lands in 1uestion. +n 4eptember 20, 1=1:, 4egunda, as acknowledged natural daughter of 5uliana, instituted the present action for the purpose of reco&ering from the parcels of land in 1uestion, in&oking the article (11 of the 8i&il 8ode. I''5-: Whether or not an illegitimate relati&e within the 2 rd degree is entitled to the reser&a troncal. ;-.,: !anresa, in determining the persons in whose fa&or the reser&ation is established, says$ D>ersons in whose fa&or the reser&ation is established. , U %n the interpretation of article (11 U the reser&ation is established in fa&or of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came. D%t treats of blood relationshipU %t could not be otherwise, becauserelationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the familyof the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be t o fa&or thetransmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is .ust what this article intends to pre&ent.D%t also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reser&e is a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no 1uestion, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in fa&or of that line is the reser&ation established. 6urthermore, we ha&e already said, the ob.ect is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family and it could not be otherwise. 'rticle =32 denies to legitimate parents the right

to succeed the natural child and &ice &ersa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither ha&e the right to inherit from legitimate ones9 the law in the article cited establishes a barrier between the two families9 properties of the legitimate family shall ne&er pass by operation of law to the natural family. 'rticle =32, abo&e referred to by !anresa, pro&ides as follows$D' natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed an intestate the legitimate children and relati&es of the father or mother who has acknowledged it9 nor shall such children or relati&es so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.D To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, 'lfeo ;eocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagrant &iolation of the e*press pro&isions of the foregoing article (=32#. 1#. SU A%A V. IAC (1991)

0aul 7alantakbo inherited from / different ascendants the / sets of properties sub.ect of this case$ 1# ' 1@2 interest, pro,indi&iso in a parcel of land situated in ;ita, Iilio (Iiliw#, Iaguna from his father 5ose, 4r., who died on 5anuary /(,1=3:9 /# ' 1@G interest pro,indi&iso in 10 parcels of registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Iuisa 7autista, who died on No&ember 2, 1=:0. +n 5une 12, 1=:/, 0aul died intestate, single, without any issue, and lea&ing only his mother, 8onsuelo 5oa1uin -da. de 7alantakbo, as his sole sur&i&ing heir to the real properties. +n No&ember 2, 1=:/, 8onsuelo ad.udicated unto herself the said properties in an 'ffida&it entitled D8audal erederario del finado 0aul 7alantakbo.D +n ;ecember /1, 1=:=, 8onsuelo 5oa1uin &da de. 7alantakbo sold the property inherited from 5ose, 4r., to !ari1uita . 4umaya. The same property was subse1uently sold by 4umaya to -illa onorio ;e&elopment 8orporation, %nc., on ;ecember 20, 1=)2. 'lso on ;ecember 20, 1=)2, 8onsuelo 5oa1uin &da. de 7alantakbo sold the properties inherited from Iuisa 7autista, to -illa onorio ;e&elopment 8orporation, %nc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in fa&or of Iaguna 'gro,%ndustrial 8oconut 8ooperati&e, %nc. which properties are presently in its possession. 12

+n 5anuary /2, 1=)G, -illa onorio ;e&elopment 8orporation transferred and assigned its rights o&er the property in fa&or of 'gro,%ndustrial 8oconut 8ooperati&e, %nc. The properties are presently in the name of the 8ooperati&e, /@2 share and the remaining 1@2 share is in the name of 4ancho 7alantakbo. The parties admit that the certificates of titles co&ering the abo&e described properties do not contain any annotation of its reser&able character. +n 5une 2, 1=)(, 8onsuelo 5oa1uin &da. de 7alantakbo died. +n !arch 3, 1=G0, 'madeo, 4ancho, ;onato, Iuis, and ?rasto, all surnamed 7alantakbo, brothers in full blood of 0aul 7alantakbo and Iuisa, 5ose and ;olores, also all surnamed 7alantakbo, sur&i&ing children of deceased 5ose 7alantakbo, 5r., another brother of the first named 7alantakbos, filed suit to reco&er the properties which they claimed were sub.ect to a reser&a troncal in their fa&or. eld$ +n the 1uestion of registration of reser&a troncal. Fpon the death of the propositus, 0aul 7alantakbo, the reser&ista, 8onsuelo &da. de 7alantakbo caused the registration of an affida&it of self ad.udication of the estate of 0aul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by 0aul from his father 5ose, 4r., and from his maternal grandmother, Iuisa 7autista. 4aid affida&it was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the 0egistry of ;eeds of the reser&able character of the properties. %n 4panish language, the affida&it clearly stated that the affiant, 8onsuelo, was a lone ascendant and heir to 0aul 7alantakbo, her son, who died lea&ing properties pre&iously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were in&entoried in the said affida&it. 'lthough the certificates of titles co&ering the properties in 1uestion show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale, the fact remains howe&er, that the affida&it of self,ad.udication e*ecuted by 8onsuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reser&able nature thereof was registered with the 0egister of ;eeds of Iaguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world. Thus, in Eatioan &. Eaffud, We held$ DWhen a con&eyance has been properly recorded such record is constructi&e notice of its contents and all interests, legal and e1uitable, included thereinU DFnder the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has e*amined e&ery instrument of record affecting the title. 4uch presumption is irrebuttable."

e is charged with notice of e&ery fact shown by the record and is presumed to know e&ery fact shown by the record and is presumed to know e&ery fact which an e*amination of the record would ha&e disclosed. This presumption cannot be o&ercome by proof of innocence or good faith. +therwise, the &ery purpose and ob.ect of the law re1uiring a record would be destroyed. 14. ORENTE V. DELA SANTA 9 (;IL #8"C DECE BER 19: 190" J. *ILLARD: FACTS$ 8onsuelo !orente died lea&ing a will which

states that (1# all her real setate shall pass to her husband, Eremersindo dela 4anta9 (/# that the husband shall not lea&e her brother after her death and not he shall not marry anyone9 should he ha&e children by anyone, he shall not con&ey any portion of the property e*cept 1@2 thereof and /@2 should be gi&en to her brother -icente or his children if any9 (2# after her death, husband should li&e in which the bakery id located. 6our months after her death, Eremersindo married again. ?lena !orente, sister of the testatri* filed a petition in the probate alleging /nd marriage of Eremersindo and asked for the annulment of the legacy. The 86% denied the petition. HELD: 'ffirmed. Testamentary pro&ision made

conditional and prohibiti&e against another marriage may be &alid against a widow or widower. ewe&er, under the will of the testatri*, there are se&eral directions gi&en to the husband, but no one of these orders is attached that condition that he fails to comply with them, he shall lose the legacy. %t is only in one e&ent, ha&ing children, the disposition will change. The will should be construed with reference to all the clauses and with reference to such surrounding circumstances. There being no e*press condition attached to the legacy in reference to the second marriage, there can be no implied condition from the conte*t of the will. %n order to make a testamentary pro&ision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will. 13

1:. LLORENTE &'. RODRIGUEZ: 10 ( !8! 9/67': 0osa Ilorente, a natural daughter of one of the legitimate children of the deceased !artina '&alle, tried to inter&ene in the settlement of the estate of the said deceased in representation of her father, a legitimate son of !artina '&alle, who had predeceased the latter. 7ut 0osa Ilorente was not allowed to inter&ene because, as a natural child of one of !artina '&alleHs legitimate children, she had no right to the inheritance. I''5-: 0osa may represent her father in the settlement of the estate. R5.?1A: N+. There can be no 1uestion on the proposition that natural children do not ha&e the right to represent their natural father or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter. The 8ourt ruled that this doctrine has been affirmed by the supreme court of 4pain in its decision of the 12th of 6ebruary, 1=02, and in said decision it was held that a natural child whose deceased father was a legitimate son! has no right whatever in the inheritance of his grandfather! even if the latter died without legitimate descendants surviving him, which appears plainly e&ident, not only because article =32 of the 8i&il 8ode denies the natural child the right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children and relati&es of the father or mother acknowledging the said child, included in which was the grandfather, nor because within the order of succession established for natural children and their descendants by article =2= to =33, the natural grandchild, whose father was legitimate, has no place9 but more especially (considering the direct application of said doctrine to the case# because, as children inherit by right from their father, and grandchildren from their grandfather by representation according to articles =2/ and =22, this right is only granted to the legitimate grandchildren and descendants when the the head of the descending direct line is a legitimate child, in conformity with the secular doctrine admitted by our code as the basis of the order of succession which the same establishes and particularly sanctions by article =21, where it is assumed that the descendants called upon to succeed by such line shall be the issue of a lawful marriage. 's a conse1uence of the law, the court below held that 0osa Ilorente had no right whate&er to the inheritance of the late !artina '&alle, and denied her all right to inter&ene in the proceedings regarding the estate of the said deceased.

The plea that because plaintiffs are poor and defendant rich, the land in dispute should be ad.udged to the former as a measure of social .ustice, runs counter to the present law on succession and is, therefore, beyond the power of the courts to grant.
1". *-16-'./ CAC;O &'.J+B1 G. UDAN /1, R5'7?6+ G. UDAN: G.R. N+. L>19996: A30?. #0: 196! 6'8T4$ 4il&ina Fdan, single, died lea&ing a will naming her son 6rancisco and one Wencesla 8acho as her sole heirs, share and share alike. 8acho then filed a petition to probate the said Will which was opposed by the testatorNs legitimate brother, 0ustico. Therafter, 6rancisco filed his opposition to the probate of the Will while 0ustico withdrew his opposition. 'fter 6ranciscoNs death, another legitimate brother of the testator, 5ohn, together with 0ustico, filed their respecti&e oppositions. 8onse1uently, 8acho filed a !otion to ;ismiss the +ppositions filed by 5ohn and 0ustico. 86% issued an order disallowing the two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate. The subse1uent !otions for 0econsiderations were denied hence, this appeal. %44F?$ Whether or not 5ohn and 0usticoFdan may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, 4il&ina.

0FI%NE$ %t is clear from 'rticle =(( and 1002 of the go&erning 8i&il 8ode of the >hilippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatri* that the oppositor brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, 4il&ina. 'rt. =((. %n the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. 'rt. 1002. %f there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a sur&i&ing spouse, the collateral relati&es shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. These legal pro&isions decree that collateral relati&es of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. 'lbeit the brothers and sister can concur with the widow or widower, they do not concur, but are e*cluded by the sur&i&ing children, legitimate or illegitimate. 6urther, the death of 6rancisco does not impro&e the situation of appellants. The rights ac1uired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, pursuant to 'rticle ==/. 'rt. ==/. 'n illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relati&es of his father or mother9 nor shall such children or relati&es inherit the same manner from the illegitimate child.


owe&er, the hearing on the probate must still proceed to ascertain the rights of 8acho as testamentary heir. 18. VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO: -7 /.: &'. CA G.R. N+. 12916# A30?. 22: 200# The original owners of the contro&erted lot, spouses 'nselmo 7aloyo and !acaria Iira<an had fi&e (:# children, namely$ (1# 'gueda 8olinco, (/# 8atalina 7aloyo, (2# ?duardo 7aloyo, (3# Eaudencia 7aloyo, and (:# 5ulian 7aloyo. 'll of the abo&e, named persons are now dead. The first child, 'gueda 8olinco, was sur&i&ed by her two children, namely, 'ntonio 8olinco and OrespondentP %rene 8olinco. 'ntonio 8olinco predeceased his three daughters, herein OrespondentsP, 0uth, +rpha, and Eoldelina, all surnamed 8olinco. The second child, 8atalina 7aloyo, was married to 5uan 'rbolario. Their union was blessed with the birth of only one child, >urificacion 'rbolario, who, in 1=(:, died a spinster and without issue. 0ecords disclose moreo&er that decedent >urificacionNs father, 5uan 'rbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of 6rancisca !al&as. 6rom this cohabitation was born the OpetitionersP, &i<, -oltaire 'rbolario, Iucena 'rbolario Taala, 6e 'rbolario, ?*altacion 'rbolario, and 8arlos 'rbolario (referred to hereinafter as V'rbolariosN#. %t is significant to note, at this .uncture, that all the foregoing OpetitionersP were born well before the year 1=:1. %n 1=:1, a notari<ed declaration of heirship was e*ecuted by and between 'gueda, 8atalina, Eaudencia, and their brothers ?duardo and 5ulian, who e*tra.udicially declared themsel&es to be the only heirs of the late spouses 'nselmo 7aloyo and !acaria Iira<an. The fourth child, Eaudencia 7aloyo, con&eyed her interest in the said lot in fa&or of her two nieces, %rene 8olinco to one,half (1@/# and >urificacion 'rbolario to the other half. The 'rbolarios contend that the V;eclaration of eirship and >artition 'greementN e*ecuted by the 8olincos was defecti&e and thus &oidable as they ('rbolarios# were e*cluded therein. The 'rbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half,sister, >urificacion 'rbolario9 and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot." The trial court held that the 'rbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased >urificacion 'rbolario, while the 8olincos were her cousins and nieces. >ursuant to 'rticle 100= of the 8i&il 8ode, the 8olincos could not inherit from her, because she had half,brothers and half,sisters. Their 1=(G ;eclaration of eirship and >artition 'greement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the e*istence of, and their relationship with, the 'rbolarios. The 4alhays, on the other hand, had no document to pro&e their ac1uisition and possession of a portion of the disputed lot. %ssue$ Whether or not the 'rbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half,sister >urificacion 'rbolario.

%44F?$ W@N the V;eclaration of eirship and >artition 'greementN e*ecuted by the 8olincos was defecti&e. 0FI%NE$ K?4. The 1=:1 ;eclaration re&eals that the year of 8atalinaNs death was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and =# and the last digit (2# are legible9 but the third digit has been written o&er to make it look like a D0.D 6urther, the paragraph 1uoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirsN years of death$ 'gueda died in 1=30 and ?duardo in 1=3G. ence, if 8atalina had indeed died in 1=02, why then was her name written after 'guedaNs and not before itL !oreo&er, the document, being in 4panish, re1uires an official translation. We cannot readily accept the ?nglish translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its correctness. 7esides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document. 4econd, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that 5uan 'rbolarioNs marriage to 6rancisca !al&as was &alid, supposedly because 8atalina 7aloyo was already dead when they were born. %t does not follow that .ust because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusi&ely married to the woman who bore his children. ' marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. Third, clear and substantial e&idence is re1uired to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited from the 1=:1 ;eclaration of eirship. The 0T8 ;ecision merely declared that they were half,brothers and half,sisters of >urificacion, while respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relati&es#. %t made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings. We 1uote the appellate court$ D* * *. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that con.ugal union of 5uan 'rbolario and 8atalina 7aloyo had been .udicially annulled before 1=:1, or before 5uan 'rbolario cohabited with 6rancisca !al&as, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the O'rbolariosP was e*tra,marital. 'nd conse1uently, * * * -oltaire 'rbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of 5uan 'lbolario. DThere is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this .urisdiction ('rticle /)1, New 8i&il 8ode#9 and whoe&er alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses must introduce such e&idence to pro&e his or her allegation (%bid.9 4ec. 3, 0ule 121, New 0ules on ?&idence#. %t is the * * * 'rbolarios, claiming to be born under a &alidly contracted subse1uent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. 7ut this, they ha&e miserably failed to do.D 19. ;EIRS O9 EVARISTA DELA JOSELITO DELA ERCED: G.R. 9EBRUAR% 2!: 1999 6acts$ ?&arista !. dela !erced died intestate, without issue. 4he left fi&e (:# parcels of land situated in +rambo, >asig 8ity. 't the time of her death, ?&arista was sur&i&ed by three sets of heirs. ERCED VS NO. 126"0"


6rancisco (?&aristaNs brother# died after a year. e was sur&i&ed by his wife 7lan1uita ?rreadela !erced and their three legitimate children, namely, Iuisito ?. dela !erced, 7lan1uita !. !acatangay and !a. +li&ia !. >aredes. +n 'pril /0, 1=(=, the three sets of heirs e*ecuted an e*tra.udicial settlement, entitled ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement of the ?state of the ;eceased ?&arista !. dela !erced" ad.udicating the properties of ?&arista to them, each set with a share of one,third (1@2# pro,indi&iso.

6'8T4$ >etra 0osales died intestate. 4he was sur&i&ed by her husband 6ortunato and their /children !agna and 'ntonio. 'nother child, 8arterio, predeceased her, lea&ing behind a child, !acike1uero*, and his widow %renea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross &alue of about >20,000., %n the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an +rder declaring the following indi&iduals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respecti&e share of the estate$ 6ortunato (husband#, 1@39 !agna (daughter#, 1@39 !acike1uero*(grandson#, 1@39 and 'ntonio (son#, 1@3., %renea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the sur&i&ing spouse of the late 8arterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother,in,law together with her son, !acike1uero*. The trial court denied her plea. ence, this petition. %44F? W+N the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother,in,law. ?I;$ N+. ' sur&i&ing spouse is not an intestate heir of his@her parent,in,law. 0easoning$ %ntestate or legal heirs are classified into / groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 0estated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession pro&ided for in the 88 or by the right of representation pro&ided for in 'rt =(1 of the same law., The rele&ant pro&isions of the 88 are 'rts. =(0, =(1, =(/ and ===. There is no pro&ision which states that a widow (sur&i&ing spouse# is an intestate heir of her mother,in,law. The entire 8ode is de&oid of any pro&ision which entitles her to inherit from her mother,in,law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The pro&isions of the 8ode which relate to the order of intestate succession ('rticles =G(to 1013# enumerate with meticulous e*actitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the 4tate as the final intestate heir. %f the legislature intended to make the sur&i&ing spouse an intestate heir of the parent,in,law, it would ha&e so pro&ided in the 8ode., %renea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the pro&isions of 'rt((G. The pro&ision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the sur&i&ing spouse (widow or widower# is a compulsory heir. %t does not apply to the estate of a parent,in,law., 7y the same token, the pro&ision of 'rt === does not support %reneaHs claim. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. The sub.ect matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased >etra& 0osales, the mother,in,law of %renea. %t is from the estate of >etra that !acike1uero* draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as pro&ided by 'rt =(1., 'rt =G1 e*plicitly declares that !acike1uero* is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. e does not succeed his father, 8arterio (the person represented# who predeceased his grandmother, >etra, but the latter whom his father would ha&e succeeded. %renea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother,in,law., %renea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of >etra 0osales

>ri&ate respondent 5oselito >. ;ela !erced, illegitimate son of the late 6rancisco de la !erced, filed a >etition for 'nnulment of the ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement of the ?state of the ;eceased ?&arista !. ;ela !erced with >rayer for a Temporary 0estraining +rder", alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late 6rancisco. 8laiming successional rights, pri&ate respondent 5oselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one,third (1@2# pro, indi&iso share in the estate of the deceased ?&arista, corresponding to the heirs of 6rancisco.

%ssue$ Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in the intestate estate of the late ?&arista !. ;ela !erced in his capacity as representati&e of his alleged father, 6rancisdo;ela !erced, brother of the deceased, whose succession is under consideration eld$ The law in point in the present case is 'rticle GGG of the New 8i&il 8ode which pro&ides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. 4ince ?&arista died ahead of her brother 6rancisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. 4ubse1uently, when 6rancisco died, his heirs, namely$ his spouse, legitimate children, and the pri&ate respondent, 5oselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (6ranciscoNs# share in the estate of ?&arista. %t bears stressing that 5oselito does not claim to be an heir of ?&arista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late 6rancisco, in the latterNs share (or portion thereof# in the estate of ?&arista. The present case, howe&er, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent ?&arista, ownership of which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of ?&arista. There is no legal obstacle for pri&ate respondent 5oselito, admittedly the son of the late 6rancisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his fatherNs estate, which estate includes a one,third (1@2# undi&ided share in the estate of ?&arista. 20. ROSALES &. ROSALES 148 SCRA 69 : 9-@05/0= 2": 198"


as compulsory heir. 7e that as it may, said right of her husband was e*tinguished by his death that is why itis their son !acike1uero* who succeeded from >etra by right of representation. e did not succeed from his deceased father 8arterio. 21. S(OUSES CA(ITLE &'. ELBA BUENA G.R. N+. 16919# N+&-4@-0 #0: 2006 0espondents 6ortunata ?lbambuena (6ortunata# and 0osalinda +lar (0osalinda#, spouse and daughter,in,law, respecti&ely, of +lar, now deceased, claim that +lar relin1uished one,half or 0.=0G/ hectare of the lot to 0osalinda by a DJasunduanD1dated 5uly 1G, 1==/ the e*ecution of which was witnessed by petitioner 8irilo 8apitle9 and that the remaining portion of the lot was surrendered to 6ortunata by an undated document. 0espondents, alleged that on petitionersN re1uest, petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of li&elihood. 4ince 1==0, howe&er, petitioners did not pay rentals despite demand therefor, and neither did they heed the demand to return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a >etition for 0eco&ery of >ossession and >ayment of 7ack 0entals against petitioners before the ;epartment of 'grarian 0eform 'd.udication 7oard (;'0'7# . >etitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they ha&e been in possession of the lot since 1=)0, presented a DWai&er of 0ightsD e*ecuted by +lar wherein he renounced in their fa&or his rights and participation o&er the lot9 a D4inumpaang 4alaysayD wherein +lar acknowledged that he co,possessed the lot with petitioner 8apitle since 1=)09 and a >inagsamang >atunay from the 7arangay 'grarian 0eform 8ommittee (7'08# 8hairman and barangay chairman of -alle certifying that they (petitioners# are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot. >etitioners further claim that since 1=:=, respondent 6ortunata was already separated from +lar and she e&en remarried, thus gi&ing her no right to inherit from +lar. >etitioners concede that although +larNs death passed all his rights and interest o&er the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not be1ueathing them to his estranged wife but to a relati&e, who helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him, should be accorded respect o&er the intent of the law on hereditary succession. %44F?$ W@N wife 6ortunata can inherit intestate from her husband despite the fact of their separation 0FI%NE$ >etitionersN argument that DOiPt would be absurd for O+larP to be1ueath his property to his estranged wife not to a relati&e who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and OtookP good care of his needs,D is a &irtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners, they ha&ing merely DhelpedD in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that +lar was the actual possessor and tiller. 'lthough estranged from +lar, respondent 6ortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the dis1ualification of a sur&i&ing spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. 0osalinda, on the other hand, is the

sur&i&ing spouse of +larNs son. The two are thus real parties,in, interest who stand to be in.ured or benefited by the .udgment on the cancellation of the 8I+' issued in +larNs name. 22. CRESENCIANA TUBO RODRIGUEZ(1+D ,-6-/'-,): '5@'7?757-, @= SUSANA A. LLAGAS &'. EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ: G.R. N+. 1"!"20: S-37-4@-0 11: 200" 6'8T4$ 5uanito 0odrigue< owned a fi&e,door apartment located at 4an 5ose 4treet, Euadalupe Nue&o, !akati 8ity. +n +ctober /G, 1=(2, he e*ecuted a uling abilin at Testamento gi&ing petitioner 8resenciana Tubo 0odrigue<, his li&e,in partner, apartments ; and ?, and his children7en.amin 0odrigue< (deceased husband of respondent ?&angeline 0odrigue<#, apartment ', respondent 7uena&entura 0odrigue<, apartment 7, and respondent 7elen 0odrigue<, apartment 8. 5uanito later on e*ecuted a ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale o&er the property in fa&or of petitioner who registered it in her name. 8resenciana then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents who, without her knowledge and consent, leased the units to some other persons who failed to &acate the premises and pay the rentals thereof. 0espondents in their answer claimed ownership o&er the property by succession, and alleged that petitioner is only the registered owner, not the lawful owner of the property because the ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale was simulated and &oid. They filed an action to assail the &alidity of the sale arguing that petitioner e*erted undue influence o&er 5uanito, who at the time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the property for only >/0,000 after knowing that only two apartments were gi&en to her in the uling abilin at Testamento. The !T8 in the unlawful detainer case ruled in respondentNs fa&or. +n appeal by petitioner, the 0T8 re&ersed the !T8 decision, in that petitionerNs certificate of title is a conclusi&e e&idence of ownership of the property. The 0T8 also held that the !T8 erred in relying hea&ily on 5uanitoNs last will and testament which was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein. 0espondents filed a petition for re&iew before the 8ourt of 'ppeals which re&ersed and set aside the 0T8 decision and reinstated that of !T8. >etitionerNs motion for reconsideration was denied. petition. ence, this

%44F?$ Whether or not a will which was not probated has effect or can confer a right. 0FI%NE$ N+. The 8ourt held that respondents failed to pro&e their right of possession, as the uling abilin at Testamento and the >artition 'greement ha&e no legal effect since the will has not been probated. 7efore any will can ha&e force or &alidity it must be probated. This cannotbe dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. 'rticle (2( of the 8i&il 8ode mandates that OnPo will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is pro&ed and allowed in accordance with the 0ules of 8ourt ." 's the will was not probated, the >artition 'greement which was e*ecuted pursuant to the last will of 5uanito cannot be gi&en effect. Thus, the fact


that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession. !oreo&er, at the time the deed of sale was e*ecuted in fa&or of the petitioner, 5uanito 0odrigue< remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was &alid is an issue that can be resol&ed only in the action filed by respondents with the 0T8 of !akati 8ity. The action in this case is one of unlawful detainer which is summary in nature and hence the &alidity of the will shall not be sub.ect to a collateral attack. The 8ourtNs ruling on the issue of ownership is only pro&isional to determinewho between the parties has the better right of possession. Thus, the 8ourt re&ersed and set aside the decision of the 8'.

%44F?$ W@N respondent 4ocorro 8. 0osales is incapacitated to redeem the property, she being merely the spouse of ;a&id 0osales, a son of !acaria, and not being a co,heir herself in the intestate estate of !acaria. 0FI%NE$ K?4, 4ocorro can. %t is true that 4ocorro, a daughter,in,law (or, for that matter, a mere relati&e by affinity#, is not an intestate heir of her parents, in,law9 howe&er, 4ocorroN s right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in !acariaNs estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, ;a&id 0osales, part of whose estate is a share in his motherNs inheritance. ;a&id 0osales, incontro&ertibly, sur&i&ed his motherNs death. When !acaria died on 0( !arch 1=:) her estate passed on to her sur&i&ing children, among them ;a&id 0osales, who thereupon became co,owners of the property. When ;a&id 0osales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undi&ided interest o&er the property inherited from !acaria, passed on to his widow 4ocorro and her co,heirs pursuant to the law on succession. '0T. ==:. %n the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the sur&i&ing spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without pre.udice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under 'rticle 1001. *** *** '0T. 1001. 4hould brothers and sisters or their children sur&i&e with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one,half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half." 4ocorro and herein pri&ate respondents, along with the co,heirs of ;a&id 0osales, thereupon became co,owners of the property that originally descended from !acaria. ***

2#. ZOSI A VERDAD &'. CA [G.R. N+. 1099"2. A30?. 29: 1996] The petitioner, Wosima -erdad, is the purchaser of a /3(,s1uare meter residential lot (identified to be Iot No. :/=, Ts, ): of the 7utuan 8adastre, located along !agallanes 4treet, now !arcos !. 8alo 4t., 7utuan 8ity#. >ri&ate respondent, 4ocorro 8ordero -da. de 0osales, seeks to e*ercise a right of legal redemption o&er the sub.ect property and traces her title to the late !acaria 'tega, her mother,in,law, who died intestate on 0( !arch 1=:). ;uring her lifetime, !acaria contracted two marriages$ the first with 'ngel 7urdeos and the second, following the latterNs death, with 8anuto 0osales. 't the time of her own death, !acaria was sur&i&ed by her son 0amon '. 7urdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter 6elicidad '. 7urdeos# ?stela Io<ada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, ;a&id 0osales, 5usto 0osales, 0omulo 0osales, and 'urora 0osales. 4ocorro 0osales is the widow of ;a&id 0osales who himself, some time after !acariaNs death, died intestate without an issue. %n an instrument, dated 13 5une 1=(/, the heirs of 0amon 7urdeos, namely, his widow !anuela Iegaspi 7urdeos and children 6elicidad and 0amon, 5r., sold to petitioner Wosima -erdad (their interest on# the disputed lot supposedly for the price of >::,3)0.00. %n a duly notari<ed deed of sale, dated 13 No&ember 1=(/, it would appear, howe&er, that the lot was sold for only >/2,000.00. >etitioner e*plained that the second deed was intended merely to sa&e on the ta* on capital gains. 4ocorro disco&ered the sale on 20 !arch 1=(G while she was at the 8ity TreasurerNs +ffice. +n 21 !arch 1=(G, she sought the inter&ention of the Iupong Tagapayapa of 7arangay =, >rincess Frdu.a, for the redemption of the property. 4he tendered the sum of >/2,000.00 to Wosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lotNs current &alue of >(0,000.00. No settlement ha&ing been reached before the Iupong Tagapayapa, pri&ate respondents, on 1) +ctober 1=(G, initiated against petitioner an action for Iegal 0edemption with >reliminary %n.unction" before the 0egional Trial 8ourt of 7utuan 8ity.

24. O9ELIA ;ERNANDO BAGUNU (IEDAD: G.R. N+. 1409": D-6 8: 2000 6acts$



+felia ernando 7agunu (collateral relati&e of the fifth ci&il degree# mo&ed to inter&ene in a special proceeding for the interstate proceeding of the ?state of 'ugusto . >iedad. +felia assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent >astora >iedad (collateral relati&e of the third ci&il degree# contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. %ssues$


8an petitioner, a collateral relati&e of the fifth ci&il degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relati&e of the third ci&il degreeL ;oes the rule of pro*imity in intestate succession find application among collateral relati&esL eld$ The rule on pro*imity is a concept that fa&ors the relati&es nearest in degree to the decedent and e*cludes the more distant ones e*cept when and to the e*tent that the right of representation can apply. (see art. =)/# %n the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, ne&er in the ascending, line. %n the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in fa&or of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children sur&i&e with their uncles or aunts. 0espondent, being a relati&e within the third ci&il degree, of the late 'ugusto . >iedad e*cludes petitioner, a relati&e of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. >etition denied. 2!. SA%SON &'. COURT O9 A((EALS GR N+'. 89224> 2!J/15/0= 2#: 1992 ;+8T0%N?$ 'dopted child@ children has no right of representation 6'8T4$ ?leno and 0afaela 4ayson begot fi&e children, namely, !auricio, 0osario, 7asilisa, 0emedios and Teodoro. ?leno died onNo&ember 10, 1=:/, and 0afaela on !ay1:, 1=G). Teodoro, who had married %sabel 7autista, died on !arch /2, 1=G/. is wife died nine years later. Their properties were left in the possession of ;elia, ?dmundo, and ;oribel, all surnamed 4ayson, who claim tobe their children.!auricio, 0osario, 7asilisa, and 0emedios together with 5uana 8. 7autista, %sabelHs mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and %sabel 4ayson. ;elia, ?dmundo and ;oribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of ?leno and 0afaela 4ayson, against the coupleHs four sur&i&ing children. 7oth cases filed on the Iower 8ourt were decided in fa&or ;elia, et al. +n the basis of practically the same e&idence. The Iower 8ourt declared that ;elia and ?dmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and %sabel 4ayson by &irtue of the decree of adoption. ;oribel was their legitimate daughter as e&idenced by her birth certificate. 8onse1uently, the three children were entitled to inherit from ?leno and 0afaela by right of representation. 7oth cases were appealed to the 8ourt of 'ppeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate court affirmed that ;elia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and %sabel 4ayson. owe&er, ;elia and ?dmundo are dis1ualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses ?leno and 0afaela 4ayson. %44F?$

W@N 8' is correct in holding that ;elia and ?dmundo are dis1ualified to inherit from the estate of the deceased spouses ?leno and 0afaela 4ayson. ?I;$ ' different conclusion must be reached in the case of ;elia and ?dmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and ha&e the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not e*tend to the blood relati&es of either party.%n sum, we agree with the lower courts that ;elia and ?dmundo as the adopted children and ;oribelas the legitimate daughter of Teodoro 4ayson and %sabel 7autista, are their e*clusi&e heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The 8ourt of 'ppeals was correct, howe&er, in holding that only ;oribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparentsH intestate estate, the other pri&ate respondents being only the adopti&e children of the deceased Teodoro. 26. RODOL9O 9ERNANDEZ: -7 /. &'. RO EO 9ERNANDEZ: -7 /. E. 0. No. 132/:). 'ugust /(, /001 The late 4pouses ;r. 5ose J. 6ernande<, and Eenerosa '. de -enecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at ;agupan 8ity co&ered by T8T No. T,=/)G (:/:# consisting of 1=3 s1. meters, and the two,storey building constructed thereon co&ered by Ta* ;eclaration //,:=/,1. %t is undisputed that Eenerosa ga&e birth to a baby boy named 0ogelio who died when he was only twel&e (1/# years old as paralytic. %n the testimony of 0omeo 6ernande< (T4N, 'ug. 21, 1==3, pp. =,13# it was re&ealed that the late 4pouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain !iliang for >/0.00 a one (1# month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as 0odolfo 6ernande<, the herein appellant. 'ppellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. e li&ed with the couple until they became old and disabled. +n 5uly /0, 1=(/, 5ose J. 6ernande< died thereby lea&ing his wife Eenerosa '. de -enecia and 0odolfo 6ernande< and an estate consisting of (a# ' parcel of land ..... and (b# ' two (/# storey residential building. +n 'ugust 21, 1=(=, appellant and Eenerosa de -enecia e*ecuted a ;eed of ?*tra,.udicial >artition di&iding and allocating to themsel&es . 'fter learning the transaction, 0omeo, >otenciano, 6rancisco, 5ulita, William, !ary, 'le.andro, Eerardo, 0odolfo and Eregorio, all surnamed 6ernande<, being nephews and nieces of the deceased 5ose J. 6ernande<, their father Eenaro being a brother of 5ose, filed on 4eptember /1, 1==3, an action to declare the ?*tra,5udicial >artition of ?state and ;eed of 4ale &oid ab initio (docketed as 8i&il 8ase No. =3,0001),;#. The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants#, moti&ated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of


depri&ing the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees# of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking ad&antage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Eenerosa de -enecia aggra&ated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be e*ecuted on 'ugust 21, 1=(= and .ointly on the same date, caused the e*ecution of the deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by Eenerosa de -enecia co&ering the same property described in the deed of e*tra,.udicial partition and by &irtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in their fa&or (0ecords, pp. 2, 3, 8omplaint#. 'ppellees thus prayed that the ;eed of ?*tra, .udicial >artition, ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale and Transfer 8ertificate of Title No. :3)31 be declared &oid from the beginning. 4ignificantly, in their answer, defendants alleged$ 1). That the deceased 4ps. 5ose J. 6ernande< and Eenerosa were husband and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant 0odolfo -. 6ernande< whom they acknowledged during their lifetime. (underscoring supplied# 1(. That the ;eed of ?*tra.udicial >artition and ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale e*ecuted by the late Eenerosa de -enecia and defendant 0odolfo -. 6ernande< which are now in 1uestion were all made with the full knowledge, consent and appro&al of the parties thereto and for &alue." (0ecords, pp. /0,/1, 'nswer#." %44F? 1$ W@N the e*tra,.udicial partition e*ecuted by petitioner 0odolfo 6ernande< and Eenerosa 6ernande<, widow of ;r. 5ose 6ernande<, is null and &oid because the former allegedly failed to pro&e legitimate filiation to his putati&e father, the late ;r. 5ose 6ernande<. 0FI%NE$ K?4. petitioner 0odolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses 6ernande< and not a legal heir of ;r. 5ose 6ernande< , thus the sub.ect deed of e*tra,.udicial settlement of the estate of ;r. 5ose 6ernande< between Eenerosa &da. de 6ernande< and 0odolfo is null and &oid insofar as 0odolfo is concerned pursuant to 'rt.110: of the New 8i&il 8ode which states$ ' partition which includes a person belie&ed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be &oid only with respect to such person." %44F? /$ >etitioners ne*t contend that respondents admitted that the property in 1uestion was the con.ugal property of the late spouses ;r. 5ose 6ernande< and Eenerosa de -enecia, thus when ;r. 5ose 6ernande< died intestate in 1=(/, his estate consisted solely of X pro indi&iso of the con.ugal property and the other half belonged to his wife Eenerosa de -enecia9 that granting ;r. 5ose 6ernande< was only sur&i&ed by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces of ;r. 5ose are entitled to inherit the X share of the decedentNs estate while the Y share of the con.ugal property will still belong to Eenerosa as the widow of ;r. 5ose 6ernande<, hence the trial courtNs order recon&eying the possession of the sub.ect lot and building to respondents was

contrary to the admitted facts and law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to Eenerosa &da de 6ernande<. 0FI%NE$ W? (48# 'E0??. 'rticle 1001 of the 8i&il 8ode pro&ides$ 4hould brothers and sisters or their children sur&i&e with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half." Eenerosa was the widow of ;r. 5ose 6ernande< and as pro&ided in the abo&e,1uoted 'rticle 1001, she is entitled to the X of the inheritance and the respondents to the other X. %n effect, Y pro indi&iso is the share of Eenerosa as the sur&i&ing spouse, i.e., X as her share of the con.ugal property estate and X of the remaining X as share as heir from her husbandNs estate. Thus, we find well taken the petitionersN assertion that the annulment of the e*tra,.udicial partition between Eenerosa and petitioner 0odolfo does not necessarily result in respondentsN ha&ing e*clusi&e right to the con.ugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court. Eenerosa, during her lifetime, had the right to en.oy and dispose of her property without other limitations than those established by law, which right she e*ercised by e*ecuting a deed of sale in fa&or of petitioner ?ddie 6ernande<. W ?0?6+0?, premises considered, the assailed .udgment is hereby 'ffirmed with !odification, as follows$ 1. 0espondents as legitimate heirs of ;r. 5ose 6ernande< are entitled to the Z share of the con.ugal lot and building of the deceased spouses 5ose and Eenerosa 6ernande< who died childless and intestate9 /. The deed of e*tra,.udicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner 0odolfo in the con.ugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of 0odolfo 6ernande<9 2. 8onsidering that the deed of sale is &alid insofar as the Y share of Eenerosa sold to petitioner ?ddie 6ernande<, T8T No. :3)=2 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of petitioner ?ddie 6ernande< and respondents as co,owners of the Y and Z shares respecti&ely in the con.ugal building. 3. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneyNs fees are deleted. 2". NELSON CABALES /1, RITO CABALES &'. CA A5A5'7 #1: 200"

0ufino 8abales died on 5uly 3, 1=)) and left a :,G13,s1uare meter parcel of land to his sur&i&ing wife 4aturnina and children 7onifacio, 'lbino, 6rancisco, Ieonora, 'lberto and petitioner 0ito. +n 5uly /), 1=G1, brothers and co,owners 7onifacio, 'lbino and 'lberto sold the sub.ect property to ;r. 8ayetano 8orrompido for >/,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight ((# years. The three (2# siblings di&ided the proceeds of the sale among themsel&es, each getting a share of >))).)).


?I;$ When 0ufino 8abales died intestate, his wife 4aturnina and his si* ()# children, 7onifacio, 'lbino, 6rancisco, Ieonora, 'lberto and petitioner 0ito, sur&i&ed and succeeded him. 'rticle ==) of the New 8i&il 8ode pro&ides that OiPf a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the sur&i&ing spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children." -erily, the se&en (G# heirs inherited e1ually on sub.ect property. >etitioner 0ito and 'lberto, petitioner NelsonNs father, inherited in their own rights and with e1ual shares as the others. 7ut before partition of sub.ect land was effected, 'lberto died. 7y operation of law, his rights and obligations to one,se&enth of sub.ect land were transferred to his legal heirs [ his wife and his son petitioner Nelson. 28. AR AS &. CALISTERIO 'pril ), /000 (E0 No. 12)3)G# 6'8T4$ +n /3 'pril 1==/, Teodorico 8alisterio died intestate, lea&ing se&eral parcels of land with an estimated &alue of >)03,G:0.00. Teodorico was sur&i&ed by his wife, herein respondent !arietta 8alisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of !arietta who had pre&iously been married to 5ames William 7ounds on 12 5anuary 1=3) at 8aloocan 8ity. 5ames 7ounds disappeared without a trace on 11 6ebruary 1=3G. Teodorico and !arietta were married ele&en years later, or on 0( !ay 1=:(, without !arietta ha&ing priorly secured a court declaration that 5ames was presumpti&ely dead. +n 0= +ctober 1==/, herein petitioner 'ntonia 'rmas y 8alisterio, a sur&i&ing sister of Teodorico, filed with the 0egional Trial 8ourt (D0T8D# of Que<on 8ity, 7ranch 103, a petition entitled, D%n the !atter of %ntestate ?state of the ;eceased Teodorico 8alisterio y 8acabelos, 'ntonia 'rmas, >etitioner,D claiming to be inter alia, the sole sur&i&ing heir of Teodorico 8alisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent !arietta ?spinosa 8alisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and &oid. 4he prayed that her son 4infroniano 8. 'rmas, 5r., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be ad.udicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would ha&e been settled. 0espondent !arietta opposed the petition. !arietta stated that her first marriage with 5ames 7ounds had been dissol&ed due to the latterHs absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than ele&en years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. 8ontending to be the sur&i&ing spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. +n 0: 6ebruary 1==2, the trial court issued an order appointing .ointly 4infroniano 8. 'rmas, 5r., and respondent !arietta administrator and administratri*, respecti&ely, of the intestate estate of Teodorico. %44F?$

W+N the marriage between deceased Teoderico 8. 'nd !arietta 8. is &alid. ?I;$ Kes. The law in force at the time of their marriage was the 8i&il 8ode, not the 6amily 8ode which took effect only on 02 'ugust 1=((. 'rticle /:) of the 6amily 8ode : itself limited its retroacti&e go&ernance only to cases where it thereby would not pre.udice or impair &ested or ac1uired rights in accordance with the 8i&il 8ode or other laws. 'rticle (2 of the New 8i&il 8ode which pro&ides$ 'rt. (2. 'ny marriage subse1uently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and &oid from its performance, unless$ 1# The first marriage was annulled or dissol&ed9 or /# The first spouse had been absent for se&en consecuti&e years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present ha&ing news of the absentee being ali&e, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than se&en years, is generally considered as dead and belie&ed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subse1uent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 2=0 and 2=1. The marriage so contracted shall be &alid in any of the three cases until declared null and &oid by a competent court. Fnlike in the 6amily 8ode, the New 8i&il 8ode does not necessitate a .udicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. 29. ARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ (EDROSA &'. CA: RODRIGUEZ -7 /. G.R. N+. 118680. /06B !: 2001 +n 'pril (, 1=3), the spouses !iguel 0odrigue< and 0osalina 5. de 0odrigue< initiated proceedings before the 86% of +<ami< 8ity for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, !aria ?lena 0odrigue< >edrosa. +n 'ugust 1, 1=3), the 86% granted the petition and declared petitioner >edrosa the adopted child of !iguel and 0osalina. +n 'pril /=, 1=G/, !iguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and 0osalina entered into an e*tra.udicial settlement of !iguelNs estate, ad.udicating between themsel&es in e1ual proportion the estate of !iguel. +n No&ember /1, 1=G/, pri&ate respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the 86% of +<ami< 8ity, with petitioner and herein respondent 0osalina as defendants docketed as +W 23=. +n 'ugust /(, 1=G3, the 86% denied the petition and upheld the &alidity of the adoption. Thereafter, the pri&ate respondents appealed said decision to the 8ourt of 'ppeals. +n !arch 11, 1=(2, while said appeal was pending, the 0odrigue<es entered into an e*tra.udicial settlement with respondent 0osalina for the partition of the estate of !iguel and of another sister, >ilar. 0osalina acted as the representati&e of the heirs of !iguel 0odrigue<. >ilar had no heirs e*cept his brothers and sisters.


The ;eed of ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement and >artition co&ered fourteen parcels of land co&ering a total area of //3,((2 s1uare meters. These properties were di&ided among 5ose, 8armen, !ercedes, 0amon and the heirs of !iguel, represented solely by 0osalina. The heirs of !iguel were gi&en //) s1uare meters of parcel /, and =,:)G s1uare meters and /3,3:G s1uare meters of parcels G and =, respecti&ely. The total land area allocated to the heirs of !iguel was 23,/:0 s1uare meters. 'rmed with the ;eed of ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement and >artition, respondents 0odrigue<es were able to secure new Transfer 8ertificates of Title (T8Ts# and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein. %44F?$ W@N the ;eed of ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement and >artition is &alid ?I;$ N+. 6ollowing 0ule G3 and the ruling in 7eltran &s. 'yson, since !aria ?lena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her. 4ection 1 of 0ule G3 of the 0ules of 8ourt is the applicable rule on publication of e*tra.udicial settlement. %t states$ The fact of the e*tra.udicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner pro&ided in the ne*t succeeding section9 but no e*tra.udicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Fnder said pro&ision, without the participation of all persons in&ol&ed in the proceedings, the e*tra.udicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the ;eed of 4ettlement and@or >artition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of e*tra.udicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. 6ollowing 0ule G3 and the ruling in 7eltran &s. 'yson, since !aria ?lena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her. The pro&ision of 4ection 3, 0ule G3 will also not apply when the deed of e*tra.udicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. ' deed of e*tra.udicial partition e*ecuted without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and &icious. !aria ?lena is an heir of !iguel together with her adopting mother, 0osalina. 7eing the lone descendant of !iguel, she e*cludes the collateral relati&es of !iguel from participating in his estate, following the pro&isions of 'rticle 1002 of the 8i&il 8ode. The pri&ate respondent 0odrigue<es cannot claim that they were not aware of !aria ?lenaNs adoption since they e&en filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were &alid since the adoption of !aria ?lena was still being 1uestioned at the time they e*ecuted the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty si* (/)# years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to pre&ent !aria ?lena from inheriting from her adopti&e parents. The decree of adoption was &alid and e*isting. With this factual setting, it is patent that pri&ate respondents e*ecuted the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud !aria ?lena. %n the case of 4egura &s. 4egura, the 8ourt held$

This section Oreferring to section 3, 0ule G3P pro&ides in gist that a person who has been depri&ed of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the e*tra.udicial or summary settlement of such estate under 4ections 1 and / respecti&ely of the same 0ule G3. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will ha&e prescribed. %t is clear that 4ection 1 of 0ule G3 does not apply to the partition in 1uestion which was null and &oid as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule co&ers only &alid partitions. The partition in the present case was in&alid because it e*cluded si* of the nine heirs who were entitled to e1ual shares in the partitioned property. Fnder the rule, no e*tra.udicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." 's the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the e*cluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its e*ecution in 1=31 To say that !aria ?lena was represented by 0osalina in the partitioning is imprecise. !aria ?lena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time !iguel died. 0osalina, only represented her own interests and not those of !aria ?lena. 4ince !iguel predeceased >ilar, a sister, his estate automatically &ested to his child and widow, in e1ual shares. 0espondent 0odrigue<esN interests did not include !iguelNs estate but only >ilarNs estate. 8ould petitioner still redeem the properties from buyersL Ei&en the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be reco&ered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The &alidity of the title can only be raised in an action e*pressly instituted for such purpose. #0. ZARAGOZA &'. CA: SE(TE EBER 29: 2000 6'8T4$ The father, during his lifetime, partitioned his properties to his children [ Eloria, Wacaria<, and 6lorentino, by way of ;eeds of 'bsolute 4ale e*cept that in respect to daughter 'lberta because of her marriage, she became an 'merican citi<en and was prohibited to ac1uire lands in the >hilippines, e*cept by hereditary succession. 'fter the father died without a will, 'lberta sued 6lorentino for the deli&ery of her inheritance, consisting of Iots (G1 and =32. 6lorentino claimed that Iot (G1 is still registered in their fatherNs name while Iot =32 was sold to him for a &aluable consideration. %44F?$ W@N the donations inter &i&os made by the father were &alid. ?I;$ The partition done during the lifetime of the father is &alid as long as it is done without impairing the legitime of compulsory


heirs. 4uch legitime is determined after collation by compulsory heirs of what they recei&ed during the lifetime of the deceased by way of donation or any other gratuitous title. %n this case, howe&er, collation could not be done because the other compulsory heirs were not impleaded in the case. The 48 dismissed the case without pre.udice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respecti&e legitime and if the partitioning inter &i&os pre.udiced the legitimes. #1. ADLA*AN V. ADLA*AN: JANUAR% 20: 2006 6'8T4$ 'rnelito was an illegitimate child of respondentsN brother. e filed a case for unlawful detainer against respondents for he is allegedly the sole heir of the house and lot. The respondents on the other hand contended that sub.ect property was the ancestral home co,owned by them with the petitionerNs father. ?I;$ 'ny of the co,owners may bring an action for e.ectment for the benefit of all the co,owners. Nonetheless, the action should be dismissed if the suit is for the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the property. #2. D- J-'5' &'. E'7/7- +8 J5/1 G/4@+/ D?2+1 6acts$ 5inkie and 5ac1ueline are the legitimate children of spouses ;anilo and 8arolina. owe&er, they were acknowledged as an illegitimate children by 5uan in a notari<ed document. 5uan died. %ssue$ Whether or not they are illegitimate children of 5uan for the purpose of inheriting from him. 0uling$ No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate children of 5uan cannot be ad.udicated without an action ha&ing been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of ;anilo and 8arolina in a &alid marriage. ##. ROLANDO SANTOS &'. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA 6'8T4$ 0olando 4antos and 8onstancia 4antos 'lana are half, blood siblings both asserting their claim o&er a 2=,s1uare meter lot in !anila. %t was registered in the name of their father who died intestate in 1=(). ;uring his lifetime, Eregorio donated the lot to 0olando which the latter accepted. 7y &irtue of the deed of donation annotated on EregorioHs title, a transfer certificate of

title was issued in 0olandoHs name. %n 1==1 8onstancia 4antos filed with the 0T8 of !anila a complaint for partition and recon&eyance against 0olando alleging that during the lifetime of their father, he denied ha&ing sold the sub.ect lot to petitioner9 that she learned of the donation in 1=G(9 and that the donation is inofficious as she was depri&ed of her legitime. 0olando countered that respondentHs suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware of his possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10# years9 and that the lot was sold to him by Eregorio. ence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime. 'ffirmed on appeal are the findings of the trial court which declared as in&alid contract the ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale since it was not signed by the parties nor registered in the 0egistry of ;eeds and sustained as &alid the deed of donation as it was duly e*ecuted by the parties and registered. %44F?4$ (1# Whether or not the donation is inofficious (/# Whether or not action of respondent is barred by prescription 0FI%NE$ (1# Kes. >ursuant to 'rticle G:/ of the 8i&il 8ode, a donation is inofficious if it e*ceeds this limitation , no person may gi&e or recei&e, by way of donation, more than he may gi&e or recei&e by will. Eregorio could not donate more than he may gi&e by will. 't the time of his death, he left no property other than the entire lot he donated to petitioner and that the deceased made no reser&ation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and compulsory heir. The donation is therefore inofficious as it impairs respondentHs legitime which, under 'rticle ((( of the 8i&il 8ode, consists of one,half (1@/# of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. 4ince the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one,half (1@/# thereof. (/# No. D;onations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case#, are not controlled by a particular prescripti&e period," as held in %mperial &s. 8ourt of 'ppeals but by ordinary rules of prescription. Fnder 'rticle 1133 of the 8i&il 8ode, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten,year prescripti&e period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, re1uired under 'rticle GG1 of the 8i&il 8ode, to the e*tent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The case of !ateo &s. Iagua, which in&ol&ed the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recogni<ed that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor,decedent, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. 4ince Eregorio died in 1=(), respondent had until 1==) within which to file the action. 4he filed her suit in 1==/, well within the prescripti&e period. #4. (ILA(IL VS. ;EIRS O9 A$I O


6'8T4$ !a*imino was married to ;onata but their union did not produce any children. When !a*imino died on 1 !ay 1=:/, ;onata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbandHs estate with the 8ebu 8ity 86%. The 86% subse1uently issued an +rder, dated / +ctober 1=:/, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to ;onata. +n /G 5une 1=)0, ;onata had the said 86% +rder recorded in the >rimary ?ntry 7ook of the 0egister of ;eeds and by &irtue thereof, recei&ed new T8Ts, co&ering the said properties, now in her name. ;onata died on 1 No&ember 1=GG. ?rlinda, one of ;onataHs nieces, instituted with the 0T8 a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of ;onata. +n /1 5anuary 1=(:, 4il&erio 7riones (4il&erio#, a nephew of !a*imino, filed a >etition1/ with the 0T8 for Ietters of 'dministration12 for the intestate estate of !a*imino. +n 2 !arch 1=(G, or 22 years after the death of !a*imo, his heirs filed a 8omplaint with the 0T8 against the heirs of ;onata for the partition, annulment, and reco&ery of possession of real property. %44F?$ W@N the heirs of !a*imo were depri&ed of their inheritance and entitled to reco&er the same from the heirs of ;onata. 0FI%NE$ %t is granted that the heirs of !a*imino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death on 1 !ay 1=:/, by &irtue of 'rticles ==: and 100: of the New 8i&il 8ode. Nonetheless, the 86%, in 4pecial >roceedings No. =/(,0, had declared ;onata as the sole, absolute, and e*clusi&e heir of !a*imino in its +rder, dated / +ctober 1=:/. This 8ourt, in the absence of e&idence to the contrary, can only presume that 4pecial >roceedings No. =/(,0 was fair and regular, which would conse1uently mean that the 86% complied with the procedural re1uirements for intestate proceedings such as publication and notice to interested parties, and that the 86% had carefully re&iewed and studied the claims of creditors, as well as the rights of heirs to the estate, before issuing the +rder, dated / +ctober 1=:/. There is no showing that the +rder, dated / +ctober 1=:/, had been appealed and had, therefore, long attained finality, which e&en this 8ourt would be bound to respect. Without doubt, if the action for partition, annulment, and reco&ery of possession instituted by the heirs of !a*imino in 8i&il 8ase No. 8?7,:G=3 succeeds, then, it would be a circum&ention of the finality of the 86% +rder, dated / +ctober 1=:/, in 4pecial >roceedings No. =/(,0, because, necessarily, a recognition of the rights of the other heirs to the estate of !a*imino would &iolate the sole, absolute, and e*clusi&e right of ;onata to the same estate pre&iously determined by the 86%.

#!. (/'65/. &'. 90/16?'6+>A.8+1'+ G.R. N+. 1#8""4. 2001

/06B 8:

!ay a legitimate daughter be depri&ed of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate childrenL 6'8T4$ 0espondent 'ida 6rancisco,'lfonso (hereafter 'ida# is the only daughter of spouses Eregorio 6rancisco and 8irila de la 8ru<, who are now both deceased. >etitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Eregorio 6rancisco with his common law wife 5ulia !endo<a, with whom he begot se&en (G# children. Eregorio 6rancisco (hereafter Eregorio# owned two parcels of residential land, situated in 7arangay Iolomboy, 7ocaue, 7ulacan, co&ered by T8T Nos. T,2/G30 and T,11G1)0. When Eregorio was confined in a hospital in 1==0, he confided to his daughter 'ida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of 0egina 6rancisco and Wenaida >ascual. 'fter Eregorio died on 5uly /0, 1==0, 'ida in1uired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Eregorio had sold the land to them on 'ugust 1:, 1=(2. 'fter &erification, 'ida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in fa&or of 0egina 6rancisco and Wenaida >ascual. Thus, on 'ugust 1:, 1=(2, Eregorio e*ecuted a Jasulatan sa Eanap na 7ilihan, whereby for >/:,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to 0egina 6rancisco and Wenaida >ascual. 7y &irtue of the sale, the 0egister of ;eeds of 7ulacan issued T8T No. T,:=.:(: to 0egina 6rancisco and T8T T,:=.:() to Wenaida >ascual. +n 'pril 1, 1==1, 'ida filed with the 0egional Trial 8ourt, 7ulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. 4he alleged that the signature of her late father, Eregorio 6rancisco, on the Jasulatan sa Eanap na 7ilihan dated 'ugust 1:, 1=(2, was a forgery. %n their .oint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. 'fter due proceedings, on 5uly /1, 1==3, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositi&e portion reads$ W ?0?6+0?, on the basis of the e&idence adduced and the law applicable thereon, the 8ourt hereby renders .udgment$ a# sustaining the &alidity of the Jasulatan 4a Eanap Na 7ilihan" e*ecuted on 1: 'ugust 1==2 by the late Eregorio 6rancisco in fa&or of the defendants9 b# affirming the &alidity of the Transfer 8ertificates of Title No. T,:=.:(: issued to defendant 0egina 6rancisco and No. T,:=.2() issued to defendant Wenaida >ascual9 and


c# dismissing the complaint as well as the defendantsN counterclaim for damages and attorneyNs fees for lack of merit." %n time, respondent 'lfonso appealed to the 8ourt of 'ppeals. 'fter due proceedings, on 'pril 20, 1===, the 8ourt of 'ppeals promulgated its decision re&ersing that of the trial court, the dispositi&e portion of which reads$ W ?0?6+0?, the ;ecision dated 5uly /1, 1==3 of the court a 1uo is 0?-?04?; and 4?T '4%;? and another rendered as follows$ 1. The Jasulatan 4a Eanap na 7ilihan dated 'ugust 1:, 1=(2 is declared null and &oid from the beginning and T8T Nos. T, :=.:(: (!# and T,:=,:() (!#, both of the 0egistry of ;eeds of 7ulacan (!eycauayan 7ranch# in the names of 0egina 6rancisco and Wenaida >ascual, respecti&ely, are annulled and cancelled9 /. The 0egister of ;eeds of 7ulacan (!eycauayan 7ranch# is ordered to cancel the aforementioned T8T Nos. T,:=.:(: (!# and T,:=.:() (!# and to reinstate Transfer 8ertificates of Title Nos. T,12/G30 and T,11G1)0 both in the name of Eregorio 6rancisco. 2. ;efendants,appellees 0egina 6rancisco and Wenaida >ascual .ointly and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff,appellant 'lfonso the amount of >:,000.00 as moral damages, >:,000.00 as e*emplary damages and >:,000.00 as attorneyNs fees. 3. The counterclaim of defendants,appellees is dismissed for lack of merit. 8osts of suit against said defendants,appellees." ence, this petition. The main issue raised is whether the 4upreme 8ourt may re&iew the factual findings of the appellate court. The .urisdiction of this 8ourt in cases brought before it from the 8ourt of 'ppeals under 0ule 3: of the 0e&ised 0ules of 8ourt is limited to re&iew of pure errors of law. %t is not the function of this 8ourt to analy<e or weigh e&idence all o&er again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally de&oid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute gra&e abuse of discretion 0FI%NE$ We affirm the decision of the 8ourt of 'ppeals because$ 6irst$ The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. 6elicitas de la 8ru<, a family friend of the 6ranciscos, testified that Wenaida >ascual and 0egina 6rancisco did not ha&e any source of income in 1=(2, when they bought the property, until the time when 6elicitas testified in 1==1.

's proof of income, howe&er, Wenaida >ascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in !ayon Night 8lub as well as buying and selling 0TW (0eady to Wear# items in 'ugust of 1=(2 and prior thereto. Wenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of >10,000.00. 4he did not withdraw money from her bank account at the 0ural 7ank of !eycauayan, 7ulacan, to pay for the property. 4he had personal sa&ings other than those deposited in the bank. er gross earnings from the 0TW for three years was >=,000.00, and she earned >:0.00 a night at the club. 0egina 6rancisco, on the other hand, was a market &endor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of >200.00 a day in 1=(2. 4he bought the property from the deceased for >1:,000.00. 4he had no other source of income. We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of >10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could sa&e enough to pay >1:,000.00, in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or abo&e its supposed market &alue. They could not e&en present a single witness to the kasulatan that would pro&e receipt of the purchase price. 4ince there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and &oid. 4econd$ ?&en if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still &iolated the 8i&il 8ode pro&isions insofar as the transaction affected respondentNs legitime. The sale was e*ecuted in 1=(2, when the applicable law was the 8i&il 8ode, not the 6amily 8ode.

+b&iously, the sale was EregorioNs way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the e*pense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was e*ecuted to pre&ent respondent 'lfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. 7efore his death, Eregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property. 'ccording to 'rticle (((, 8i&il 8ode$ The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one,half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half sub.ect to the rights of illegitimate children and of the sur&i&ing spouse as hereinafter pro&ided." Eregorio 6rancisco did not own any other property. %f indeed the parcels of land in&ol&ed were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would depri&e respondent of her share in


her fatherNs estate. 7y law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Eregorio 6rancisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. is compulsory heir can not be depri&ed of her share in the estate sa&e by disinheritance as prescribed by law. (ADDED) EDUVIGIS J. CRUZ: 3-7?7?+1-0: &'. COURT O9 A((EALS: ET AL.: 0-'3+1,-17'. 6'8T4$ %n ?du&igis 5. 8ru<, a childless widow, donated a /2:.: s1.m residential lot in 4an %sidro, Taytay 0i<al together with the two, door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces pri&ate respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled DJasulatan 4a JaloobpalaD. The property was accordingly transferred to the names of pri&ate respondents. %n 1=G3, ?du&igis 8ru< .udicially adopted 8resencia +creto, a minor, after which she e*tra.udicially tried to re&oke the donation, but the donees resisted. %n 1=G:, petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for re&ocation of donation in the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of 0i<al (8i&il 8ase No. /103=# in&oking 'rticle G)0, paragraph 2 of the New 8i&il 8ode, which reads$ 'rt. G)0, ?&er donation inter &i&os made by a person ha&ing no children or descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subse1uent marriage, or illegitimate, may be re&oked or reduced as pro&ided in the ne*t article, by the happening of any of these e&ents$ *** *** *** (2# %f the donor should subse1uently adopt a minor child. %44F?$ w@n the donation can be re&oked. 0FI%NE$ No. The trial court took into consideration only 'rticle G)0 of the 8i&il 8ode and ignored 'rticle G)1 which states$ D %n the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be re&oked or reduced insofar as it e*ceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. %n the case of the subse1uent adoption of a minor by one who had pre&iously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (8i&il

8ode, 'rticles G)0, G)1 and G)2#. +f course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff,donor, who must allege and establish the re1uirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be ad.udged. Fnfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the sub.ect donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. %ndeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. +n the contrary, there is unrebutted e&idence that the donor has another piece of land (/G,23/ s1. m.# situated in ;olores, Taytay, 0i<al worth >/G2,3/0.00 in 1=GG, although then sub.ect to litigation. #6. ONTERO VS. SE(TI O

6'8T4$ %n a ;ecision dated 'pril 11, /001, the 8' applied the +ld 8i&il 8ode on testate succession, and ruled that the property was registered in the name of 5ose 7alilo whose ci&il status was stated as single. 8onsidering that he was sur&i&ed by >urificacion !ontero, his wife 5uana -illarama and their son 5o&encio 7alilo when he died in 1=329 and when 5uana -illarama died intestate, was, in turn, sur&i&ed by her son 5o&encio 7alilo and >urificacion !ontero, 5o&encio was entitled to two,thirds undi&ided portion of the property, while >urificacion !ontero was entitled to one,third undi&ided portion of the property. 0espondent ?ugenia 4eptimo did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the decision. owe&er, >urificacion !ontero filed a motion for the partial reconsideration of the decision, alleging that, applying the pro&isions of the +ld 8i&il 8ode on intestate succession, she was entitled to an undi&ided one,half portion of the property. The 8', howe&er, denied the said motion. >urificacion !ontero, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for re&iew, contending that$ T ? 8+F0T +6 '>>?'I4 E0'-?IK ?00?; %N +I;%NE T 'T T ? >?T%T%+N?0 %4 ?NT%TI?; +NIK T+ +N?,T %0; (1@2# 4 '0? +6 T ? >0+>?0TK 4+FE T T+ 7? 0?8+-?0?; ?0?%N, 4'%; ';5F;%8'T%+N 6%N;%NE N+ I?E'I 4F>>+0T FN;?0 T ? 8%-%I 8+;? +6 4>'%N W %8 W'4 T ? I'W T ?N >0?-'%I%NE. The petitioner maintains that the 8' should ha&e applied the pro&isions of the +ld 8i&il 8ode on intestate succession because 5ose 7alilo died intestate in 1=32 before the New 8i&il 8ode took effect. 4he posits that she and 5o&encio 7alilo were entitled to inherit the property from 5ose 7alilo in e1ual shares, because there is no competent e&idence on record to pro&e that 5ose 7alilo and 5uana -illarama, the mother of 5o&encio, were married. %44F?$ What law shall go&ern the partition of estate of the decedentL


0FI%NE$ We agree with the contention of the petitioner that there is no e&idence on record that 5ose 7alilo and 5uana -illarama were married, or that they cohabited with each other as husband and wife. ?&en 5o&encio 7alilo opted not to testify. Neither was 5ose 7alilo sur&i&ed by any ascendants. owe&er, we agree with the ruling of the 8' that 5ose 7alilo and Eertrudes Nicdao were not, likewise, married. The contention of the petitioner that the 8' erred in applying the law on testate succession under the +ld 8i&il 8ode is, likewise, correct. The appellate court should ha&e applied the pro&isions of the +ld 8i&il 8ode on intestate succession considering that 5ose 7alilo died intestate in 1=32, before the effecti&ity of the New 8i&il 8ode. #". RE(UBLIC VS. GUZ AN Three essential elements of a donation$ 1. 0eduction in the patrimony of the donor /. %ncrease in the patrimony of the donee 2. %ntent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi %t is also re1uired that the donation be made in a public document and that its acceptance be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, which has to be recorded as well. 6'8T4$ ;a&id 0ey Eu<man, a natural,born 'merican citi<en, is the son of the spouses 4imeon Eu<man (naturali<ed 'merican# and elen !eyers Eu<man ('merican citi<en#. %n 1=)(, 4imeon died lea&ing to his heirs, elen and ;a&id, an estate consisting of se&eral parcels of land in 7ulacan. %n 1=G0, elen and ;a&id e*ecuted a ;eed of ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement of the ?state, di&iding and ad.udicating to themsel&es all of the property, and registered it to the 0; a year after. %n 1=(1, elen e*ecuted a ;eed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and con&eying her X share of the properties to ;a&id. 7ut since it was not registered, she e*ecuted another ;eed of Quitclaim to confirm the first. %n 1==3, 'tty. 7atongbacal wrote the +4E andfurnished it with documents showing that ;a&idNs ownership of X of the estate was defecti&e. e argued that 'rt. T%% of the 8onstitution only allows 6ilipinos to ac1uire pri&ate lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may ac1uire pri&ate property are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural,born citi<en who lost his 6ilipino citi<enship. !oreo&er, it contends that the ;eeds of Quitclaim e*ecuted by elen were really donations inter &i&os.

0epublic filed with 0T8 a >etition for ?scheat praying that X of ;a&idNs interest be forfeited in its fa&or. 0T8 dismissed. 8' affirmed. %44F?$ Whether or not there was a donation inter &i&os ?I;$ N+. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by &irtue of a ;eed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1# reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (/# conse1uent increase in the patrimony of ;a&id as donee. owe&er, elenNs (2# intention to perform an act of liberality in fa&or of ;a&id was not sufficiently established. The / Quitclaims re&eal that elen intended to con&ey to her son certain parcels of land and to re, affirm it, she e*ecuted a wai&er and renunciation of her rights o&er these properties. %t is clear that elen merely contemplated a wai&er of her rights, title, interest o&er the lands in fa&or of ;a&id, not a donation. 4he was also aware that donation was not possible. !oreo&er, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation &alid is lacking. The 4>' e*ecuted by ;a&id in fa&or of 'tty. 'bela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that ;a&id owns the property referred to and that he authori<es 'tty. 'bela to sell the same in his name. 6urther, there was nothing in the 4>' to show that he indeed accept the donation.

owe&er, the ine*istence of a donation does not make the repudiation of elen in fa&or ;a&id &alid. There is N+ &alid repudiation of inheritance as elen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with ;a&id, e*ecuted a ;eed of ?*tra.udicial 4ettlement of the ?state, di&iding and ad.udicating between them all the properties. 7y &irtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the / Quitclaims ha&e no legal force and effect. elen still owns X of the property. #8. 9IGURACION>GERILLA VS. VDA. DE 9IGURACION: ET AL. 6'8T4$ 4pouses Ieandro and respondent 8arolina 6iguracion (now both deceased# had si* children$ petitioner ?milia 6iguracion,Eerilla and respondents ?lena 6iguracion,'ncheta (now deceased#, ilaria 6iguracion, 6elipa 6iguracion,!anuel, Quintin 6iguracion and !ary 6iguracion,Eine<. Ieandro e*ecuted a deed of 1uitclaim o&er his real properties in fa&or of his ) children. When Ieandro died he left / parcels of land$ lots //== and G0:. +n !ay /2, 1==3, petitioner filed a complaint in the 0T8 for partition, annulment of documents, recon&eyance, 1uieting of


title and damages against respondents, praying, among others, for the partition of Iots //== and G0:. +n the other hand, respondents took the position that IeandroNs estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. 'nd they claimed that an accounting of e*penses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement. %44F?$ whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of IeandroNs intestate estate (that is, an accounting of the income of Iots //== and G0:, the payment of e*penses, liabilities and ta*es, plus compliance with other legal re1uirements, etc.# before the properties can be partitioned or distributed. 0FI%NE$ There are two ways by which partition can take place under 0ule )=$ by agreement under 4ection /11 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under 4ections 2 to ).1/ Neither method specifies a procedure for determining e*penses chargeable to the decedentNs estate. While 4ection ( of 0ule )= pro&ides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertyNs income (rentals and profits# in the course of an action for partition,12 there is no pro&ision for the accounting of e*penses for which property belonging to the decedentNs estate may be answerable, such as funeral e*penses, inheritance ta*es and similar e*penses enumerated under 4ection 1, 0ule =0 of the 0ules of 8ourt. %n a situation where there remains an issue as to the e*penses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Ieandro 6iguracionNs only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the 8' that Dcertain e*pensesD including those related to her fatherNs final illness and burial ha&e not been properly settled.13 Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents# ha&e to submit their fatherNs estate to settlement because the determination of these e*penses cannot be done in an action for partition. #9. I1 7B/77-0 +8 7B- I17-'7/7- E'7/7-' +8 7B- D-6-/'-,

particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun,ampunan# of the decedents. The 'lleged eirs of 5osefa ;elgado The deceased 5osefa ;elgado was the daughter of 6elisa ;elgado by one Iucio 8ampo. 'side from 5osefa, fi&e other children were born to the couple, namely, Na<ario, ?dilberta, 5ose, 5acoba, and Eorgonio, all surnamed ;elgado. 6elisa ;elgado was ne&er married to Iucio 8ampo, hence, 5osefa and her full, blood siblings were all natural children of 6elisa ;elgado. owe&er, Iucio 8ampo was not the first and only man in 6elisa ;elgadoNs life. 7efore him was 0amon +sorio with whom 6elisa had a son, Iuis ;elgado. The !arriage of Euillermo 0ustia and 5osefa ;elgado Euillermo 0ustia proposed marriage to 5osefa ;elgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. 4e&eral circumstances gi&e rise to the presumption that a &alid marriage e*isted between Euillermo 0ustia and 5osefa ;elgado. Their cohabitation of more than :0 years cannot be doubted. The 'lleged eirs of Euillermo 0ustia Euillermo 0ustia and 5osefa ;elgado ne&er had any children but they took into their home the youngsters Euillermina 0ustia 0ustia and Nanie 0ustia. These children, ne&er legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun,ampunan. ;uring his life with 5osefa, howe&er, Euillermo 0ustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the inter&enor,respondent Euillerma 0ustia, with one 'mparo 4agarbarria. %44F?4$ Who are the lawful heirs of 5osefa ;elgadoL Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of 5osefa ;elgado can inherit by right of representationL Who are the lawful heirs of Euillermo 0ustiaL ?I;$ 1. The Iawful eirs of 5osefa ;elgado

J+'-8/ D-.A/,+ /1, G5?..-04+ D-.A/,+: ;-?0' +8 L5?' DELGADO: 3-7?7?+1-0' V'. ;-?0' +8 /06?/1/ RUSTIA: 0-'3+1,-17'. E.0. No. 1::G22. 5anuary /G, /00) 6'8T4$ Euillermo 0ustia and 5osefa ;elgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be di&ided into two groups$ (1# the alleged heirs of 5osefa ;elgado, consisting of her half, and full, blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (/# the alleged heirs of Euillermo 0ustia,

%t was found out that 6elisa ;elgado and 0amon +sorio were ne&er married. ence, all the children born to 6elisa ;elgado out of her relations with 0amon +sorio and Iucio 8ampo, namely, Iuis and his half,blood siblings Na<ario, ?dilberta, 5ose, 5acoba, Eorgonio and the decedent 5osefa, all surnamed ;elgado, were her natural children. The abo&e,named siblings of 5osefa ;elgado were related to her by full,blood, e*cept Iuis ;elgado, her half,brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit


from each other. 'ccordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from 5osefa ;elgado. owe&er, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of 5osefa ;elgado. Fnder 'rticle =G/ of the new 8i&il 8ode, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in fa&or of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces#. 8onse1uently, it cannot be e*ercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relati&es of 5osefa ;elgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still ali&e at the time of her death on 4eptember (, 1=G/. They ha&e a &ested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the sur&i&ing brothers and sisters (or their children# of 5osefa ;elgado at the time of her death. Together with Euillermo 0ustia, they are entitled to inherit from 5osefa ;elgado in accordance with 'rticle 1001 of the new 8i&il 8ode$ 4hould brothers and sisters or their children sur&i&e with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one,half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one,half. /. The Iawful eirs of Euillermo 0ustia

shall be per capita# and the children of the late 0oman 0ustia, 4r. (who sur&i&ed Euillermo 0ustia and whose respecti&e shares shall be per stirpes#. 8onsidering that !arciana 0ustia &da. de ;amian and ortencia 0ustia 8ru< are now deceased, their respecti&e shares shall pertain to their estates. 40. GONZALES VS. C9I O9 6'8T4$ 7enito Iegarda, father of ) children and husband of 6ilomena 0oces (mother filomena# predeceased his father. Thus, represented by his ) children in the estate of the latter. +ne of benitoHs children, 6ilomena Iegarda (daughter filomena# died intestate without any issue. Thus, con&erying all her properties to her sole heir, mother 6ilomena. !other 6ilomena, made a holographic will disposing all the properties she inherited form daughter filomena to her 1) grand children. +ne of the ) children of 7emito and mother filomena filed a motion to e*clude from the in&entory of her motherHs estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, 6ilomena, on the ground that said properties are reser&able properties which should be inherited by daughter 6ilomena IegardaHs three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of 7enito, 'le.andro and 5ose, all surnamed Iegarda (grandchildren#. %44F?4$ 1. Whether the properties in 1uestion are sub.ect to reser&a troncal /. ;id !rs. Iegarda ha&e the right to con&ey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter 6ilomena to the reser&ees within the third degree and toH bypass the reser&ees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reser&ees in the second degree, the si* children of !rs. IegardaL 0FI%NE$ 1. Kes. ANILA

Euillerma 0ustia is an illegitimate child of Euillermo 0ustia. 's such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 4he failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Euillermina 0ustia 0ustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. Fnder 'rticle 100/ of the new 8i&il 8ode, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or sur&i&ing spouse, the collateral relati&es shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Euillermo 0ustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.

Therefore, the intestate estate of Euillermo 0ustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of 5osefa ;elgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a# the full and half,siblings of 5osefa ;elgado who sur&i&ed her and (b# the children of any of 5osefa ;elgadoNs full, or half,siblings who may ha&e predeceased her, also sur&i&ing at the time of her death. 5osefa ;elgadoNs grandnephews and grandnieces are e*cluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relati&es of 5osefa ;elgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Euillermo 0ustiaNs estate (including its one,half share of 5osefa ;elgadoNs estate# shall be inherited by !arciana 0ustia &da. de ;amian and ortencia 0ustia 8ru< (whose respecti&e shares

D'0T. (=1. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may ha&e ac1uired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reser&e such property as he may ha&e ac1uired by operation of law for the benefit of relati&es who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.D The reser&atario recei&es the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus#, said property merely re&erting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reser&istaHs lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reser&atarios that sur&i&e the reser&ista, the latter must be deemed to ha&e en.oyed no more than a life


interest in the reser&able property.D (5. 5.7.I. 0eyes in 8ano &s. ;irector of Iands, 10: >hil. 1, :.# %n the instant case, the properties in 1uestion were indubitably reser&able properties in the hands of !other filomena. Fndoubtedly, she was a reser&or. The reser&ation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reser&ees or relati&es within the third degree of the prepositus daughter 6ilomena were li&ing or they sur&i&ed mother filomena. /. We hold that !rs. Iegarda could not con&ey in her holographic will to her si*teen grandchildren the reser&able properties which she had inherited from her daughter 6ilomena because the reser&able properties did not form part of her estate (8abardo &s. -illanue&a, 33 >hil. 1(), 1=1#. The reser&or cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reser&able properties as long as the reser&ees sur&i&ed the reser&or. 's repeatedly held in the 8ano and >adura cases, the reser&ees inherit the reser&able properties from the prepositus, not from the reser&or. 'rticle (=1 clearly indicates that the reser&able properties should be inherited by all the nearest relati&es within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the si* children of !rs. Iegarda. 4he could not select the reser&ees to whom the reser&able property should be gi&en and depri&e the other reser&ees of their share therein. To allow the reser&or in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reser&able properties in fa&or of the reser&ees in the third degree and, conse1uently, to ignore the reser&ees in the second degree would be a glaring &iolation of article (=1. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed. +T ?0 F4?6FI >0%N8%>I?4 6+FN; %N T ? 8'4?$ %n reser&a troncal, (1# a descendant inherited or ac1uired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister9 (/# the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is ac1uired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (2# the said ascendant should reser&e the said property for the benefit of relati&es who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus# and who belong to the line from which the said property came. 4o, three transmissions are in&ol&ed$ (1# a first transmission by lucrati&e title (inheritance or donation# from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant9 (/# a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime# from the deceased descendant (causante de la reser&a# in fa&or of another ascendant, the reser&or or reser&ista, which two transmissions precede the reser&ation, and (2# a third transmission of the same property (in conse1uence of the reser&ation# from the reser&or to the reser&ees (reser&atarios# or the relati&es within the third degree from the deceased

descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant () 8astan TobeMas, ;erecho 8i&il, >art %, 1=)0, )th ?d., pp. 1=(,=#. %f there are only two transmissions there is no reser&a. Thus, where one 7onifacia Iacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, 5uan !arbebe, upon the death of 5uan, those lands should be inherited by his half,sister, to the e*clusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reser&able property within the meaning of article (11 (Iacerna &s. -da. de 8orcino, 111 >hil. (G/#. The persons in&ol&ed in reser&a troncal are (1# the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was recei&ed by the descendant by lucrati&e or gratuitous title, (/# the descendant or prepositus (propositus# who recei&ed the property, (2# the reser&or (reser&ista#, the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law and (3# the reser&ee (reser&atario# who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco# from which the property came and for whom the property should be reser&ed by the reser&or. The reser&ees may be half,brothers and sisters (0odrigue< &s. 0odrigue<, 101 >hil. 10=(9 8hua &s. 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of Negros +ccidental, I,/==01, 'ugust 21, 1=GG, G( 480' 31/#. 6ourth degree relati&es are not included (5ardin &s. -illamayor, G/ >hil. 2=/#. The rationale of reser&a troncal is to a&oid Del peligro de 1ue bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos e*traMas por el a<ar de los enlaces y muertes prematurasD, or Dimpedir 1ue, por un a<ar de la &ida, personas e*traMas a una familia puedan ad1uirir bienes 1ue sin a1uel hubieran 1uedado en ellaD () 8astan TobeMas, ;erecho 8i&il, >art 1, )th ?d., 1=)0, p. /029 >adura &s. 7aldo&ino, 103 >hil. 10):#. 'n illustration of reser&a troncal is found in ?droso &s. 4ablan, /: >hil. /=:. %n that case, >edro 4ablan inherited two parcels of land from his father -ictoriano. >edro died in 1=0/, single and without issue. is mother, !arcelina ?droso, inherited from him the two parcels of land. %t was held that the land was reser&able property in the hands of !arcelina. The reser&ees were >ablo 4ablan and 7asilio 4ablan, the paternal uncles of >edro 4ablan, the prepositus. !arcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reser&able property in fa&or of her two brothers,in,law, should they sur&i&e her, should be noted in the title. %n another case, it appears that !aria 'glibot died intestate in 1=0). er one,half share of a parcel of con.ugal land was inherited by her daughter, 5uliana !aMalac. When 5uliana died


intestate in 1=/0, said one,half share was inherited by her father, 'nacleto !aMalac who owned the other one,half portion. 'nacleto died intestate in 1=3/, sur&i&ed by his second wife and their si* children. %t was held that the said one,half portion was reser&able property in the hands of 'nacleto !aMalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Ieona 'glibot and ?&arista 'glibot, sisters of !aria and maternal aunts of 5uliana !aMalac, who belonged to the line from which said one,half portion came ('glibot &s. !aMalac, 113 >hil. =)3#. +ther illustrations of reser&a troncal are found in 6lorentino &s. 6lorentino, 30 >hil. 3(09 Nie&a and 'lcala &s. 'lcala and ;eocampo, 31 >hil. =1:9 !aghirang and Eutierre< &s. 7alcita, 3) >hil. ::19 Iunsod &s. +rtega, 3) >hil. ))39 ;i<on &s. Ealang, 3( >hil. )019 0iosa &s. 0ocha, 3( >hil. G2G9 8enteno &s. 8enteno, :/ >hil. 2//9 -elayo 7ernardo &s. 4io.o, :( >hil. (=9 ;irector of Iands &s. 'guas, )2 >hil. /G=9 6allorfina &s. 'bille, 8' 2= +.E. 1G(3. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last re&ol&ed by descent. e is called the prepositus (8abardo &s. -illanue&a, 33 >hil. 1(), 1=0#. %n the 8abardo case, one 8ornelia 'bordo inherited property from her mother, 7asilia 8abardo. When 8ornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Ioren<o 'bordo. %n his hands, the property was reser&able property. Fpon the death of Ioren<o, the person entitled to the property was 0osa 8abardo, a maternal aunt of 8ornelia, who was her nearest relati&e within the third degree. 6irst cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reser&ees. They cannot e&en represent their parents because representation is confined to relati&es within the third degree (6lorentino &s. 6lorentino, 30 >hil. 3(0#. Within the third degree, the nearest relati&es e*clude the more remote sub.ect to the rule of representation. 7ut the representati&e should be within the third degree from the prepositus (>adura &s. 7aldo&ino, 103 >hil. 10):#. 0eser&a troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. %llegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are e*cluded. Eratuitous title or titulo lucrati&o refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gi&es nothing in return such as donation and succession (8abardo &s. -illanue&a, 33 >hil. 1(), 1(=,1=0, citing ) !anresa, 8odigo 8i&il, Gth ?d., 1=:1, p. 2)0#. The reser&a creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1# the death of the ascendant obliged to reser&e and (/# the sur&i&al, at the time of his death, of relati&es within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (4ienes &s. ?sparcia, 111 >hil. 23=, 2:2#.

The reser&or has the legal title and dominion to the reser&able property but sub.ect to the resolutory condition that such title is e*tinguished if the reser&or predeceased the reser&ee. The reser&or is a usufructuary of the reser&able property. e may alienate it sub.ect to the reser&ation. The transferee gets the re&ocable and conditional ownership of the reser&or. The transfereeHs rights are re&oked upon the sur&i&al of the reser&ees at the time of the death of the reser&or but become indefeasible when the reser&ees predecease the reser&or. (4ienes &s. ?sparcia, 111 >hil. 23=, 2:29 ?droso &s. 4ablan, /: >hil. /=:9 Iunsod &s. +rtega, 3) >hil. ))39 6lorentino &s. 6lorentino, 30 >hil. 3(09 ;irector of Iands &s. 'guas, )2 >hil. /G=.# The reser&orHs title has been compared with that of the &endee a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional. The reser&orHs alienation of the reser&able property is sub.ect to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reser&orHs death, there are reser&ees, the transferee of the property should deli&er it to the reser&ees. %f there are no reser&ees at the time of the reser&orHs death, the transfereeHs title would become absolute. (Iunsod &s. +rtega, 3) >hil. ))39 Eueco &s. Iacson, 11( >hil. =339 Nono &s. Ne1uia, =2 >hil. 1/0#. +n the other hand, the reser&ee has only an inchoate, e*pectant or contingent right. is e*pectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reser&or. %t would become absolute should the reser&or predecease the reser&ee. The reser&ee cannot impugn any con&eyance made by the reser&or but he can re1uire that the reser&able character of the property be recogni<ed by the purchaser (0iosa &s. 0ocha, 3( >hil. G2G9 ?droso &s. 4ablan, /: >hil. /=:, 21/,29 Eueco &s. Iacson, 11( >hil. =33#. There is a holding that the renunciation of the reser&eeHs right to the reser&able property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (-elayo 7ernardo &s. 4io.o, :( >hil. (=, =)#. 'nd there is a dictum that the reser&eeHs right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the &endee only if and when the reser&ee sur&i&es the reser&or (4ienes &s. ?sparcia, 111 >hil. 23=, 2:2#. 41. IN RE: (ETITION 9OR (ROBATE O9 LAST *ILL AND TESTA ENT O9 BASILIO SANTIAGO VS. ZOILO SANTIAGO: ET AL. 6'8T4$ The testator wrote in his will, among others$ e# 'ng lupaHt bahay sa Iunsod ng !aynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na /(c# ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila !a. >ilar at 8lemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa


aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag,aral sa !aynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang itoHy walang magmamay,ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa !aynila at katabing mga lunsod * * * *O22P (emphasis and underscoring supplied# The heirs of the testator after more than /0 years, petitioned for the partition and distribution of the estate. erein petitioners ob.ect to the inclusion of the house and lot in !anila (abo&e, cited# co&ered by T8T No. 121033, among those to be transferred to the legatees,heirs as it would contra&ene the testatorHs intent that no one is to own the same. %44F?$ W@N the sub.ect house and lot may be partitioned to the heirs. 0FI%NE$ Kes. %t is clear from 7asilioHs will that he intended the house and lot in !anila to be transferred in petitionersH names for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common. The condition set by the decedent on the propertyHs indi&isibility is sub.ect to a statutory limitation. +n this point, the 8ourt agrees with the ruling of the appellate court, &i<$ 6or this 8ourt to sustain without 1ualification, OpetitionersPHs contention, is to go against the pro&isions of law, particularly 'rticles 3=3, (G0, and 10(2 of the 8i&il 8ode, which pro&ide that the 30+B?@?7?+1 7+ ,?&?,- / 30+3-07= ?1 / 6+>+D1-0'B?3 6/1 +1.= ./'7 8+0 7D-17= (20) =-/0' E E * * * * 'lthough the 8i&il 8ode is silent as to the effect of the indi&ision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co,ownership beyond the period e*pressly mandated by the 8i&il 8ode * * * *O23P 42. ARELLANO &'. (ASCUALC D-6. 1!: 2010 6'8T4$ 'ngel N. >ascual 5r. died intestate on 5anuary /, 1=== lea&ing as heirs his siblings, namely$ a# petitioner 'melia >. 'rellano who is represented by her daughters9 b# 'gnes >. 'rellano ('gnes#c# Nona >. 'rellano d#6rancisco >ascual and !iguel N. >ascual. %n a petition for 5udicial 4ettlement of %ntestate ?state and %ssuance of Ietters of 'dministration," filed by the respondents before the 0T8 of !akati, there is an allegation that the donation to petitioner is an ad&ance of her legitime. The said property is now registered under the name of the petitioner co&ered by T8T 1(1((= 0; of !akati. >ro&isionally passing, howe&er, upon the 1uestion of title to the donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedentNs estate, the probate court found the ;eed of ;onation &alid in light of the presumption of &alidity of notari<ed documents. %t thus went on to hold that it is sub.ect to collation. 'n appeal to the 8' was made, 1uestioning the order of the trial court to include the

property sub.ect of the donation as part of the ad&ance inheritance of the petitioner. The 8' sustained the findings of the trial court as to the collation of the said parcel of land. %44F?$ W+N the property sub.ect of the donation is sub.ect of collation and W+N the estate was de&ided e1ually. ?I;$ +n the first issue$ The term collation has two distinct concepts$ first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the &alue of donations made by the testator to the &alue of the hereditary estate9 and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrati&e title by the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure e1uality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. 8ollation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion . I8 7B-0- ?' 1+ 6+435.'+0= B-?0: 7B-0- ?' 1+ .-A?7?4- 7+ @- '/8-A5/0,-,. The decedent not ha&ing left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, e&en if nothing was left for his siblings,collateral relati&es to inherit. is donation to petitioner, assuming that it was &alid, is deemed as donation made to a stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, howe&er, the donated property is not sub.ect to collation. +n the second issue$ The decedentNs remaining estate should thus be partitioned e1ually among his heirs,siblings,collateral relati&es, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to 'rt. 1002 and 1003 of the N88.W ?0?6+0?, the petition is E0'NT?;. The decision of the 8' affirming the findings of the trial court is hereby re&ersed and 4?T '4%;?. The case is further 0?!'N;?; to the court a 1ou for the determination of the e1ual sharing among the heirs. 4#. BOLANOS &'. BERNARTEC N+&. 1": 2010 6'8T4$ 4ub.ect of the contro&ersy is a /2(,s1uare,meter lot, designated as Iot No. 1,>, and situated in >oblacion, 0apu,0apu, 'lbay. >etitioner,spouses !ariano and ?mma 7olaMos (petitioner, spouses# purchased it from 8resencia WuMiga,?chague (8resencia# on 5une /0, /001. The sale was registered in the name of petitioner,spouses before the !unicipal 'ssessorNs +ffice in 0apu,0apu, 'lbay. +n +ctober 20, /001, respondents 0oscef WuMiga 7ernarte, 8laro WuMiga, >erfecto WuMiga, and 8eferina WuMiga,Earcia (0oscef, et al.# filed a complaint1 for declaration of partial nullity of deeds of transfer and sale with prayer for preliminary in.unction against petitioner,spouses, 6la&ia WuMiga (6la&ia#, and 8resencia before the 0egional Trial 8ourt (0T8# of Iega<pi 8ity, docketed as 8i&il 8ase No. 10022.

1 32

The complaint, in essence, alleged that$ 0oscef, et al., and 6la&ia and 8resencia are legitimate half,blood brothers and sisters, all children of the deceased 0oman WuMiga, 4r. (0oman# from his second and first marriages, respecti&ely9 during his lifetime, 0oman owned a residential land with impro&ements, identified as Iot No. 1,> per Ta* ;eclaration No. ==,001,01G03/ for the year /0009 0oman had the lot declared for ta*ation purposes in the name of 6la&ia, 4isters and 7rothers, per a 4worn 4tatement 2 he e*ecuted in 1=G2, and filed with the then 'ssessorNs +ffice, which issued Ta* ;eclaration No. /=G:93 0oman died on 'ugust =, 1=G), and his heirs did not settle or partition the sub.ect property9 on 5une /0, /001, 6la&ia, without authority from the co,owners of the lot, e*ecuted a notari<ed ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale : o&er it in fa&or of 8resencia9 8resencia, in turn, also without authority from the said co,owners, e*ecuted on the same day a notari<ed ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale) in fa&or of petitioner,spouses9 on the basis of these notari<ed deeds, Ta* ;eclaration No. ==, 001,01G02G was issued to petitioner,spouses as sole declared owners of Iot No. 1,>. 0T8 rendered a decision against the petitioner,spouses. The 8' affirmed the 0T8 decision. %44F?$ W@N the sub.ect property herein (Iot No. 1,># is owned in common by the children of 0oman Wuniga from his two marriages. ?I;$ Kes. 8onsidering that 0oman died on 'ugust =, 1=G), the pro&isions of the 8i&il 8ode on succession, then the law in force, should apply, particularly 'rticles =G= and =(0. Thus, the 0T8 correctly ruled that Iot No. 1,> rightfully belongs to the 11 children of 0oman, se&en (G# from his first marriage with 6la&ia and four (3# from his second marriage with 8eferina, in e1ual shares. 's there was no partition among 0omanNs children, the lot was owned by them in common. 'nd inasmuch as 6la&ia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her ali1uot share to 8resencia, the transfer stands as &alid and effecti&e. 8onse1uently, what 8resencia sold to petitioner spouses was her own share and 6la&iaNs share in the property that she ac1uired by &irtue of the notari<ed deed of sale, which is only /@11 of Iot No. 1,>. Therefore, the restitution of the property in e*cess of that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.

44. TESTATE ESTATE O9 JOSE A.C J5.= 20: 19"9 6'8T4$

. VALEJO &'. CA -7.

+n 4eptember 1(, 1=)3, 5ose !. -alero donated to 8armen 7. -alero (who was already married to ;octor 4ergio 0ustia# his one,half proindiviso share (apparently his inchoate share# in two con.ugal lots, with the impro&ements thereon. is wife, 7eatri<, consented to the donation. owe&er, the deed of donation was not registered. +n 5anuary 12, 1=)), 5ose !. -alero, who was then se&enty, three years old, e*ecuted his last will and testament wherein he enumerated the con.ugal properties of himself and his wife, including the two con.ugal lots. %n that will, he did not mention the donation. e de&ised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute her legitime and be1ueathed the remainder to his two children, !rs. 0odrigue< and !rs. Eutierre<. 'bout a month later, or on 6ebruary 1:, 1=)), the -alero spouses, by means of a deed of absolute sale, con&eyed the lots and the impro&ements thereon to 8armen 7. -alero,0ustia. 7eatri< 7. -alero died intestate on 4eptember 1/, 1=G/, sur&i&ed by her husband and her adopted child. er estate is pending settlement in 4pecial >roceeding No. (((=) of the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of !anila. !rs. 0ustia was named administratri* of her adopted motherHs estate. !ore than a month later, or on +ctober 1(, 1=G/, 5ose !. -alero died testate, sur&i&ed by his two children, !rs. 0odrigue< and !rs. Eutierre< and was duly probated. The probate court in its order of ;ecember 13, 1=G2 ruled that the two lots were unconditionally e*cluded from the in&entory of 5ose !. -aleroHs estate, meaning Dthat they are not sub.ect to collationD. %44F?$ W@N the sub.ect properties (/ con.ugal lots# are sub.ect to collation. ?I;$ We hold that the order of e*clusion dated 'ugust =, 1=G2 was not a final order. %t was interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the 4an Ioren<o -illage lots. The probate court in the e*clusion incident could not determine the 1uestion of title. The pre&ailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the in&entory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusi&e and is sub.ect to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. We hold further that the dictum of the 8ourt of 'ppeals and the probate court that the two disputed lots are not sub.ect to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case which merely in&ol&ed the issue of inclusion in, or e*clusion from, the in&entory of the testatorHs estate. The issue of collation was not yet .ustifiable at that early

2 3 4

5 6 7


stage of the testate proceeding. %t is not necessary to mention in the order of e*clusion the contro&ersial matter of collation. Whether collation may e*ist with respect to the two lots and whether !rs. 0ustiaHs Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. 4!. TESTATE ESTATE O9 T;E LATE BALDO ERO J. LESACA &'. JUANA 9ELI$ VDA. DE LESACAC A30?. 21: 19!2 6'8T4$ 7aldomaro 5. Iesaca died in the 8ity of !anila on No&ember (, 1=3). e was sur&i&ed by his second wife (5uana 6eli*#, two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three acknowledged natural children by a third woman. %n his will he named 5uana 6. Iesaca and 8onsuelo 6. Iesaca, his children by his first marriage, co,e*ecutrices. >roceedings for the probate of the will and for the administration of the estate of the deceased ha&ing been instituted in the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of !anila, that court, at the instance of the widow but o&er the opposition of the co,e*ecutrices and the three acknowledge natural children, granted each of the two minor children a monthly allowance of >100 for the li&ing e*penses, Dplus an e*tra sum of >200 for their matriculation and uniforms,D and later ordered the co,e*ecutrices to deposit in court all the allowances in arrears. The co,e*ecutrices refused to make the deposit, contending that if any amount were to be paid for the support and education of the minors the same should be charged against their share of the inheritance. 7ut the court took a different &iew and issued an order, dated !arch 11, 1=3=, holding that the amounts it had authori<ed to be paid to the minors should be considered allowances for support, to be deducted from hereditary portion only insofar as they e*ceed what they are entitled to as fruits or income, and re1uiring the co,e*ecutrices to deposit in court D all the amounts due the said minors, namely >/,=::.(2, if and when the financial condition of this estate under administration so warrants.D %44F?$ Whether the allowances for support granted by the court to legitimate minor children of the deceased pending li1uidation of his estate are sub.ect to collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance.

%t is the decision of this 8ourt that S The order of !arch 11, 1=3=, declaring that the allowances granted the minors pending li1uidation of the estate should be deducted from their hereditary shares in so far as they e*ceed what they may be entitled to as fruits or income, is affirmed. 46. UDARBE &'. JURADO -7. A.C D-6-4@-0: 6: 19## (S(ANIS; T$T DA* ACCDG. TO LOLO GER S) 4". GUICO -7. A. &'. BAUTISTA -7. A.C D-6-4@-0 #1: 1960 6'8T4$ !ariano E. 7autista died intestate on ;ecember :, 1=3G and that his properties had already been e*tra.udicially partitioned among his heirs9 that Eertrudes Earcia likewise died intestate on 'ugust 21, 1=:) lea&ing as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants9 that said Eertrudes Earcia, during her lifetime, made se&eral deeds of donation of some of her properties in fa&or of all the defendants, but did not pro&ide that the properties donated would not be sub.ect to collation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation the &alue of the properties recei&ed by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be di&ided e1ually among the heirs9 and that the deceased Eertrudes Earcia left outstanding obligations to the 0ehabilitation 6inance 8orporation and the E.'. !achineries, %nc. %44F?$ Whether or not the donation inter &i&os recei&ed by the defendants from the deceased are sub.ect to collation. ?I;$ We are inclined to hold at the lower court that until all the debts of the estate in 1uestion are paid, appellantsH action for partition and li1uidation is premature. There is no 1uestion that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs, e*tra.udicially or through an ordinary action for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only Dif the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their .udicial guardiansD (sec. 1, 0ule G3#. The reason is that were the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to depri&e the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled. The situation is different, howe&er, where the deceased left pending obligations. %n such cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be di&ided among the heirs9 and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would ine&itably be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts.

?I;$ The answer should be the affirmati&e in &iew of 'rticle 1320 of the 8i&il 8ode of 1(=( (re,enacted as 'rticle 1(( of the new 8i&il 8ode# which pro&ides that Dthe sur&i&ing spouse and his or her children shall be gi&en an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the li1uidation of the in&entoried estate, and until their share has been deli&ered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion insofar as it e*ceeds what they may ha&e been entitled to as fruits or income.D

48. VISCONDE &'. CAC 9-@05/0= 11: 1998 6'8T4$ >etitioner Iauro E. -i<conde and his wife ?strellita Nicolas, -i<conde had two children, &i<., 8armela and 5ennifer.


>etitionerHs wife, ?strellita, is one of the fi&e siblings of spouses 0afael Nicolas and 4alud Eon<ales,Nicolas. ?strellita purchased from his father, 0afael, a parcel of land located at -alen<uela, 7ulacan and then sold such to 4pouses 8hiu, for >2,30:,)1/.00. Fsing a portion of the proceeds of sale of the -alen<uela property, she bought a new parcel of land with impro&ements situated at -in<on 4t., 76 omes, >araMa1ue. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank. The following year the unfortunate D-i<conde !assacreD came about. +n No&ember 1(, 1==/, 0afael died. +n !ay 1/, 1==2, 0amon filed his own petition, docketed as 4p. >roc. No. 8,1)==, entitled D%n The !atter +f The Euardianship +f 4alud E. Nicolas and 0icardo E. NicolasD and a&erred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by 0afael during his lifetime. 0amon stated that herein petitioner, !r. -i<conde, is one of 0afaelHs children Dby right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of ?strellita.D0amon also alleged that the transfer of the -alen<uela property in fa&or of ?strellita by her father was gratuitous and the sub.ect property in >araMa1ue which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased 0afael Nicolas in fa&or of ?strellita, is sub.ect to collation. The >robate 8ourt nullified the transfer of the -alen<uela property from 0afael to ?strellita, and declaring the >araMa1ue property as sub.ect to collation, which was sustained by the 8ourt of 'ppeals. %44F?$ W@N the 8ourt of 'ppeals correctly sustained the order of the >robate 8ourt ?I;$ N+. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent 8ourt of 'ppeals, committed re&ersible errors. The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. >etitioner, a son,in,law of 0afael, is not one of 0afaelHs compulsory heirs. 'rticle ((G of the 8i&il 8ode is clear on this point$ 'rt. ((G. The following are compulsory heirs$ (1# Iegitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants9 (/# %n default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants9 (2# The widow or widower9 children, and

filiation must be duly pro&ed. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the e*tent established by this 8ode." With respect to 0afaelNs estate, therefore, petitioner who was not e&en shown to be a creditor of 0afael is considered a third person or a stranger.i 's such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to inter&ene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding,ii which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. The order of the probate court sub.ecting the >araMa1ue property to collation is premature. 0ecords indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of 0afaelNs heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus ad&ert to our ruling in Fdarbe &. 5urado, := >hil. 11, 12,13, to wit$ We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. %n accordance with the pro&isions of article 102:iii of the 8i&il 8ode, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and pro&e that the donations recei&ed by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and pre.udiced the legitimate or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. %n the absence of e&idence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor." ?&en on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a re&ersible error in ordering collation of the >araMa1ue property. We note that what was transferred to ?strellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the -alen<uela property. The >araMa1ue property which ?strellita ac1uired by using the proceeds of the sale of the -alen<uela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. %ndeed collation of the >araMa1ue property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the >araMa1ue property was gratuitously con&eyed by 0afael to ?strellita. 0ecords indicate, howe&er, that the >araMa1ue property was con&eyed for and in consideration of >=00,000.00, by >remier omes, %nc., to ?strellita. 0afael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the >araMa1ue property is not one of 0afaelNs heirs. Thus, the probate courtNs order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with ?strellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not ha&e any interest in 0afaelNs estate. 's it stands, collation of the >araMa1ue property is improper for, to repeat, collation co&ers only properties gratuitously gi&en by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the >araMa1ue property. !oreo&er, 0afael, in a public instrument, &oluntarily and willfully wai&ed any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the >araMa1ue property. 6inally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the -alen<uela property may be brought to collation. ?strellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of 0afael. %n fact, it was 0afael who inherited from ?strellita an amount more than

(3# 'cknowledged natural natural children by legal fiction9

(:# +ther illegitimate children referred to in article /(G. 8ompulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 2, 3, and : are not e*cluded by those in Nos 1 and /9 neither do they e*clude one another. %n all cases of illegitimate children, their


the &alue of the -alen<uela property. ence, e&en assuming that the -alen<uela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the &alue of the -alen<uela property has long been returned to the estate of 0afael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter ser&es no &alid and binding purpose. W ?0?6+0?, the decision of the 8ourt of 'ppeals appealed from is hereby 0?-?04?; 'N; 4?T '4%;?. 49. TERESITA DE LEON -7 AL &'. CAC A5A5'7 6: 2002 6'8T4$ erein petitioner Teresita N. de Ieon was appointed administratri* of the estate of 0afael 8. Nicolas in 4p. >roc. No. 8,1)G=, entitled, %n the !atter of the %ntestate ?state of 0afael 8. Nicolas". ;eceased spouses 0afael and 4alud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de Ieon, ?strellita N. -i<conde, 'ntonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner Wenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners eirs of 'ntonio Nicolas#, 0amon Nicolas and 0oberto Nicolas. >ri&ate respondent 0amon E. Nicolas, an oppositor[applicant in the intestate proceedings, filed a !otion for 8ollation," claiming that deceased 0afael Nicolas, during his lifetime, had gi&en real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that administratri*,petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the in&entory of the estate of the decedent. Then, respondent 0amon filed an 'mended !otion for 8ollation specifying the properties to be collated. 0T8 issued an order for the collation of the properties included in the motion for collation filed by the respondent. 8' affirmed the decision of the 0T8 finding that the latterNs decision had become final for failure to appeal in due time. %44F?$ W@+ the decision of 8' is correct. ?I;$ 8ontrary to the finding of the 8ourt of 'ppeals that the +rder of No&ember 11, 1==3 had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said +rder is interlocutory in nature. +ur pronouncement in *arcia v. *arcia supports this ruling$ The court which ac1uires .urisdiction o&er the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has super&ision and control o&er the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the in&entory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law re1uires the administrator to set out in his in&entory. %n compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or e*cluded from the in&entory. 4hould an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the courtNs attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits ha&e been left out in the in&entory, it is likewise the courtNs duty to hear the obser&ations, with power to determine if

such obser&ations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties." ' probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon 1uestions of title pro&isionally. Euided by the abo&e .urisprudence, it is clear that the 8ourt of 'ppeals committed an error in considering the assailed +rder dated No&ember 11, 1==3 as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased 0afael Nicolas. Fnder the foregoing rulings of the 8ourt, any aggrie&ed party, or a third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims.

!0. E ILIANA BAUTISTA &'. CAC O67+@-0 28: 1988 6'8T4$ %n 8i&il 8ase No. 3022,>, petitioners instituted an action in the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of 0i<al to declare the deed of e*tra.udicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer 8ertificates Title Nos. 131(/, 131() and 1:)): all of 0egistry of ;eeds of >asay 8ity and Ta* ;eclaration No. :13G, null and &oid. The land in 1uestion was registered in the name of petitioner !anuel 7autista under T8T No. //10, and the latter inherited this land from his father, !ariano 7autista. +n ;ec. //, 1=)), a ;eed of ?*tra.udicial >artition was e*ecuted. >ri&ate respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner !anuel 7autista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner !anuel 7autista denied ha&ing signed that ?*tra.udicial >artition. The pri&ate respondents, with the e*ception of !anolito 7autista, e*ecuted a ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale in fa&or of !anolito 7autista of that property. +n 'ugust G, 1=)=, !anolito 7autista e*ecuted a ;eed of 4ale in fa&or of the other pri&ate respondents and upon registration of said ;eed of 4ale, T. 8.T. Nos. T,1 :)):, T, 1:))), T,1:))G, T,1:))(, T,1:))=, T, 1:)G0, T,1:)G1, were issued to pri&ate respondents. >etitioner !anuel 7autista married his second wife ?miliana Tamayo and had only a child, ?&angeline 7autista. The property in 1uestion was the sub.ect matter of e*tra.udicial partition of property on ;ecember //, 1=)), among the heirs of the late 5uliana No.adera, the first wife of !anuel 7autista. The 0T8 dismissed the petition. 8' had affirmed the lower courtNs decision. %44F?$ 8an the property of the sur&i&ing husband be the sub.ect of an e*tra.udicial partition of the estate of the deceased wifeL ?I;$ The e*tra.udicial partition was supposed to be a partition without court inter&ention of the estate of the late 5uliana No.adera, first


wife of !anuel 7autista, constituting the sub.ect property. %n the same document !anuel 7autista appears to ha&e wai&ed his right or share in the property in fa&or of pri&ate respondents. owe&er, the property sub.ect matter of said e*tra.udicial partition does not belong to the estate of 5uliana No.adera. %t is the e*clusi&e property of !anuel 7autista who inherited the same from his father !ariano 7autista, which was registered in his name under T.8.T. No. //10. Fnder 4ection 1, 0ule G3 of the 0ules of 8ourt an e*tra.udicial settlement of the ?state applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their .udicial or legal representati&es. %f the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the sub.ect matter of an e*tra.udicial partition. 's the sub.ect property does not belong to the estate of 5uliana No.adera, the ;eed of ?*tra.udicial >artition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an e*tra.udicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to depri&e the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. +nly property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful sub.ect matter of an e*tra.udicial partition. %n this case, the said partition ob&iously pre.udices the right of !anuel 7autista as e*clusi&e owner of the property. The said partition also effecti&ely resulted in the preterition of the right of ?&angeline 7autista as a compulsory heir of !anuel 7autista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. %t is difficult to belie&e that !anuel 7autista would wittingly o&erlook and ignore the right of her daughter ?&angeline to share in the said property. %t is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. !oreo&er, pri&ate respondents knew ?&angeline 7autista who is their half,sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded. The 8ourt obser&es that after the e*ecution of said e*tra.udicial partition and issuance of the title in their names, pri&ate respondents e*cept !anolito 7autista in turn e*ecuted a deed of absolute sale of the property in fa&or of the latter in whose name the title was also issued. 'nd yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was e*ecuted this time by !anolito 7autista selling back the same property to pri&ate respondents in whose names the respecti&e titles were thus subse1uently issued. This series of transactions between and among pri&ate respondents is an indication of a cle&er scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled thereto. !oreo&er, such e*tra.udicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property during the lifetime of its owner, !anuel 7autista. >artition of future inheritance is prohibited by law. 's said ?*tra.udicial >artition dated ;ecember //, 1=)), of property belonging e*clusi&ely to petitioner !anuel 7autista, is null and &oid ab initio it follows that all subse1uent transactions in&ol&ing the same property between and among the pri&ate respondents are also null and &oid.

!1. BALILO> ONTERO &'. SE(TI OC 4!# SCRA 2"! 6'8T4$ 5ose 7alilo was the owner of a parcel of land, with an area of G.G(2G hectares, located in 4an 5ose, +ccidental !indoro. +n 'ugust 1/, 1=32, 5ose 7alilo died intestate. 4ometime in 1=3(, Niniana 7alilo, the sister of 5ose 7alilo, filed a petition in the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance (86%# of >ampanga, for the guardianship of the property and the person of 5o&encio 7alilo whom she alleged to be the son of her brother, 5ose 7alilo9 hence, her nephew. Niniana filed a motion in the said case, for authority to e*ecute, for and in behalf of her ward, a deed of absolute sale o&er the property co&ered by +8T No. 2013 in fa&or of 5ose 4eptimo for >G:0.00. The 86% granted the motion. Niniana e*ecuted the deed of absolute sale o&er the property in fa&or of 5ose 4eptimo who, thereafter, declared the property in his name for ta*ation purposes and paid the realty ta*es thereon. owe&er, 5ose 4eptimo failed to register the deed in the +ffice of the 0egister of ;eeds and, conse1uently, to secure a torrens title o&er the property in his name. The guardianship case was terminated on 4eptember /3, 1=:1 per the +rder of the 86% of e&en date. Thereafter, on +ctober 1/, 1=)2, 5o&encio 7alilo filed a complaint against 5ose 4eptimo in the 86% of +ccidental !indoro, to compel the latter to resell the property to him. The case was docketed as 8i&il 8ase No. 0,1:=. 5o&encio alleged therein that he was the only legitimate child of the spouses 5ose 7alilo and 5uana -illarama, and that the latter died on 'ugust 20, 1=3). e prayed that, after due proceedings, .udgment be rendered in his fa&or. >urificacion 7alilo,!ontero filed a complaint with the 0egional Trial 8ourt (0T8# of 4an 5ose, +ccidental !indoro, 7ranch 3), against the respondents, ?ugenia 4eptimo, the sur&i&ing spouse of 5ose 4eptimo, and the spouses >lacido 0obles and 8onsuelo 0obles, for reco&ery of possession of the said property. owe&er, despite the allegation in his complaint in 8i&il 8ase No. 0,1:= that he was the only legitimate child of 5ose 7alilo, she impleaded 5o&encio 7alilo as party,plaintiff. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the parties were the children and only legal heirs of the late 5ose 7alilo who, before his death, was the owner of Iot No. 1)3= co&ered by +8T No. 2013 located in 4an 5ose, +ccidental !indoro9 only a year before the complaint was filed, >urificacion learned that she was one of the co,owners of the property9 that the respondents claimed ownership o&er the property and installed tenants thereon9 and despite their demands, the respondents and their tenants refused to do so. The trial court rendered .udgment in fa&or of 5o&encio and >urificacion. Then, the 8' affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. %44F?$ W@N the 8' gra&ely erred in holding that the petitioner is entitled only to 1@2 share of the property sought to be reco&ered herein. ?I;$


The petition is granted. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that there is no e&idence on record that 5ose 7alilo and 5uana -illarama were married, or that they cohabited with each other as husband and wife. ?&en 5o&encio 7alilo opted not to testify. Neither was 5ose 7alilo sur&i&ed by any ascendants. owe&er, we agree with the ruling of the 8' that 5ose 7alilo and Eertrudes Nicdao were not, likewise, married. The contention of the petitioner that the 8' erred in applying the law on testate succession under the +ld 8i&il 8ode is, likewise, correct. The appellate court should ha&e applied the pro&isions of the +ld 8i&il 8ode on intestate succession considering that 5ose 7alilo died intestate in 1=32, before the effecti&ity of the New 8i&il 8ode. 'rticle =21 of the +ld 8i&il 8ode pro&ides that when a person dies intestate, his legitimate children and their descendants succeed him, without distinction of se*, or age, e&en though they spring from different marriages. 'rticle =2/ of the same 8ode pro&ides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, di&iding the inheritance in e1ual shares. !oreo&er, under 'rticle =2= of the +ld 8i&il 8ode, in the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the natural children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal succession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. When 5ose 7alilo died intestate on 'ugust 1/, 1=32, he was sur&i&ed by his daughter, the petitioner herein, his son 5o&encio 7alilo, and Eertrudes Nicdao and 5uana -illarama. 8onformably to 'rticle =2= of the +ld 8i&il 8ode, only the petitioner and 5o&encio 7alilo inherited the property in e1ual shares, to the e*clusion of 5uana -illarama and Eertrudes Nicdao. Neither of them was the lawful wife of 5ose 7alilo. 7esides, under 'rticle =3) of the +ld 8i&il 8ode, the sur&i&ing spouse shall inherit only in default of the persons enumerated in the three sections ne*t preceding." 8onse1uently, when 5o&encio 7alilo, through his guardian Niniana 7alilo, e*ecuted the deed of absolute sale o&er the entire property on !ay /), 1=3( in fa&or of 5ose 4eptimo, the latter did not ac1uire title o&er the entire property, but only to an undi&ided one,half portion thereof which 5o&encio 7alilo had inherited from 5ose 7alilo. 5ose 4eptimo could not ha&e purchased and ac1uired the other half of the property from 5o&encio 7alilo because the latter was not the owner thereof. ence, the 8' erred in holding that 5o&encio 7alilo inherited an undi&ided two, thirds portion of the property, and that 5ose 4eptimo ac1uired title o&er the said two,thirds undi&ided portion.

usufruct of a fishpond was reser&ed for !aria (the widow#. 's appointed administratri*, !aria prepared a pro.ect of partition, signed by her in her own b e h a l f a n d a s guardian of the minor !ilagros. %t was a p p r o & e d , a n d t h e e s t a t e w a s distributed and the shares deli&ered. 4alud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of +8Ts and issuance of new titles in her name. Fpon !ariaNs death (!ar. :, 1=3(#, it was disco&ered that she e*ecuted two wills$ in the first, she instituted 4alud and !ilagros as her heirs9 in the second, she re&oked the same and left all her properties in fa&or of !ilagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first re.ected. %n re.ecting the first will presented by Tirso 0eyes (as guardian of the children of 4alud 7arretto#, the T8 held that 4alud was not the daughter of the decedent !aria by herhusband 7ibiano. The 48 affirmed the same. Trial 8ourtNs ;ecision$ The pro.ect of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the s t a t e o f 7 i b i a n o i s n u l l a n d & o i d ab initio (not merely &oidable# because the distributee (4alud#, predecessor of Tirso et. al., was not a daughter o f t h e 4 p s . 7ibiano and !aria. The nullity of the pro.ect of partition was decreed on the basis of 'rt. 10(1 (+88#( ' partition in which a person was belie&ed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and &oid#. 's !ilagros was the only true heir of 7ibiano, she was entitled to reco&er from 4alud and her successors all the properties recei&ed by her from 7ibianoNs estate, in &iew of 'rt. 13:) (N88# which states that property ac1uired by mistake or fraud is held by its ac1uirer in implied trust for the real owner.

a&ing lost the fight for a share in the estate of !aria as her legitimate heir, Tirso now fallsback upon the remnant of the estate of 7ibiano (the fishpond#, which was gi&en in usufructto !aria. ence, this action for the reco&ery of the one, half portion thereof. This action afforded !ilagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership9 not only of the fish pond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and deli&ered to 4alud, for being a s p u r i o u s h e i r , a n d not entitled to any share in the estate of 7 i b i a n o , t h e r e b y d i r e c t l y attacking the &alidity, not only of the pro.ect of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well. %44F?$

!2. RE%ES>BARRETO &'. BARRETO>DATUC 12! (B?. !01 6'8T4$ 7ibiano 7arretto was married to !aria Eerardo. ;uring their lifetime, they ac1uired &ast estate (real property in !anila, >ampanga and 7ulacan#. When 7ibiano died (6eb. 1(, 1=2)#,h e l e f t h i s s h a r e i n a w i l l t o 4 a l u d 7 a r r e t t o (mother of the minors# and Iucia !ilagros 7arretto9 and a small portion as legacies to his sisters 0osa 7arretto and 6elisa 7arretto and his nephew and nieces. The

W@N the partition from which 4alud ac1uired the fishpond in 1uestion is &oid ab initio and 4alud did not ac1uire &alid title to it. ?I;$ NO. >laintiffs,appellants correctly point out that 'rticle 10(1 of the old 8i&il 8ode has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is ob&ious$ 4alud 7arretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late 7ibiano 7arrettoHs last will and testament together with defendant !ilagros9 hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who


was belie&ed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and &oid under said article. The legal precept ('rticle 10(1# does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, &oluntary or intestate ones#, and the fact that 4alud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs e*pressly named in his testament9 for 7ibiano 7arretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoe&er he chose. While the share (X# assigned to 4alud impinged on the legitime of !ilagros, 4alud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of 7ibiano 7arretto. Nor does the fact that !ilagros was allotted in her fatherHs will a share smaller than her legitime in&alidate the institution of 4alud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. 6or this reason, (eri vs. Akutin, G/ >hil. 2//, in&oked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case in&ol&ing an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testatorHs former marriage. 'ppellee contends that the partition in 1uestion was &oid as a compromise on the ci&il status of 4alud in &iolation of 'rticle 1(13 of the old 8i&il 8ode. This &iew is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a contro&ersy through mutual concessions of the parties (8i&il 8ode of 1((=, 'rticle 1(0=9 8i&il 8ode of the >hilippines, 'rt. /0/(#9 and the condition of 4alud as daughter of the testator 7ibiano 7arretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be no compromise o&er issues not in dispute. 'nd while a compromise o&er ci&il status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties o&er the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. %n resume, we hold (1# that the partition had between 4alud and !ilagros 7arretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of 7ibiano 7arretto duly appro&ed by the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of !anila in 1=2=, in its 8i&il 8ase No. 3=)/=, is not &oid for being contrary to either 'rticle 10(1 or 1(13 of the, 8i&il 8ode of 1((=.

>uerta. 'fter hearing, the petition was granted. owe&er, the decision was appealed by %sabel to the 8ourt of 'ppeals. ;uring the pendency of the appeal, -icente died, prompting her to mo&e for the dismissal of the case. 8armelita, ha&ing been allowed to inter&ene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of -icente de la >uerta. The probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the e&idence at hand that 8armelita was a natural child of -icente de la >uerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that Dthe e&idence presented by the petitioner against it (was# too weak to discredit the same. +n appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court. %44F?$ !ay 8armelita de la >uerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of ;ominga 0e&ueltaL ?I;$ The answer to the 1uestion posed must be in the negati&e. The first reason is that -icente de la >uerta did not predecease his mother9 and the second is that 8armelita is a spurious child. 'ccording to 'rticle =G0 of the 8i&il 8ode$ 'rt. =G0. 0epresentation is a right created by fiction of law, by &irtue of which the representati&e is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and ac1uires the rights which the latter would ha&e if he were li&ing or if he could ha&e inherited. %t is settled that S %n testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases$ first, when the person represented dies before the testator9 second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator9 and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. %n all of these cases, since there is a &acancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation. Not ha&ing predeceased ;ominga 0e&uelta, her son -icente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was in&ol&ed, nor could it be in&oked by 8armelita upon her fatherHs death, which came after his own motherHs death. %t would ha&e been different if -icente was already dead when ;ominga 0e&uelta died. 8armelita could then ha&e inherited from her in representation of her father -icente, assuming the pri&ate respondent was a lawful heir. 7ut herein lies the cru*, for she is not. 's a spurious child of -icente, 8armelita is barred from inheriting from ;ominga because of 'rticle ==/ of the 8i&il 8ode, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article pro&ides 1uite clearly$

!#. ISABEL DELA (UERTA &'. CAC 9-@05/0= 6: 1990 6'8T4$ ;ominga 0e&uelta died on 5uly 2, 1=)), at the age of =/, with a will lea&ing her properties to her three sur&i&ing children, namely, 'lfredo, -icente and %sabel, all surnamed de la >uerta. %sabel was gi&en the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed e*ecutri* of the will. The petition for the probate of the will filed by %sabel was opposed by her brothers, who a&erred that their mother was already senile at the time of the e*ecution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. !oreo&er, some of the properties listed in the in&entory of her estate belonged to them e*clusi&ely. !eantime, %sabel was appointed special administratri* by the probate court. 'lfredo subse1uently died, lea&ing -icente the lone oppositor. +n 'ugust 1, 1=G3, -icente de la >uerta filed with the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of Que<on a petition to adopt 8armelita de la


'rt. ==/. 'n illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relati&es of his father or mother9 nor shall such children or relati&es inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. %ndeed, e&en as an adopted child, 8armelita would still be barred from inheriting from ;ominga 0e&uelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and conse1uently, no legal ties to bind them either. The result is that 8armelita, as the spurious daughter of -icente de la >uerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of ;ominga 0e&uelta. er claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own fatherHs estate and cannot be considered in the probate of ;ominga 0e&ueltaHs Will.

of the pro&isions of the will. 's a result, the declaration of the testator that 'suncion D+ningD 0eyes was his wife did not ha&e to be scrutini<ed during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of +ning 0eyes as one of the de&isees@legatees already in&ol&ed in1uiry on the willHs intrinsic &alidity and which need not be in1uired upon by the probate court. !!. (ALACIOS VS (ALACIOS 6acts$ 5uan >alacios e*ecuted his last will and testament on 5une /:, 1=3) and a&ailing himself of the pro&isions of the new 8i&il 8ode, he filed on !ay /2, 1=:) before the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of 7atangas a petition for its appro&al. %n said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children 'ntonio 8. >alacios and 'ndrea 8. >alacios. !aria 8atimbang filed a opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing here legitime. 0uling$ %t should be noted that petition instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will a&ailing himself of the pro&isions of 'rticle (2(, paragraph /, of the new 8i&il 8ode, which permit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will, but to such petition on !aria 8atimbang filed an opposition alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in the will thus impairing her ob.ect to the probate of the will insofar as it due e*ecution is concerned or on the ground that it has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law9 rather she ob.ects to its intrinsic &alidity or to the legality of the pro&isions of the will. We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been e*ecuted in accordance with the re1uirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is still ali&e and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will lea&ing the effects thereof after his death. This is in line with our ruling in !ontaMano &s. 4uesa, 13 >hil., )G), wherein we said$ DThe authentication of the will decides no other 1uestions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those re1uisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the &alidity of a will. %t does not determine nor e&en by implication pre.udge the &alidity or efficiency of the pro&isions9 that may be impugned as being &icious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The 1uestions relating to these points remain entirely un,affected, and may be raised e&en after the will has been authenticated.D

!4. RE%ES -7 AL &'. CAC O67+@-0 #0: 199" 6'8T4$ +n 5anuary 2, 1==/, Torcuato 0eyes e*ecuted his last will and testament. e be1ueathed all his prop to his wife 'suncion (+ning# and his brother 5ose. The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato 0eyes in the presence of three witnesses$ 'ntonio -eloso,Eloria 7orromeo, and 4oledad Eaputan. >ri&ate respondent 5ulio '. -i&ares was designated the e*ecutor and in his default or incapacity, his son 0och 'lan 4. -i&ares. >0 filed a petition for probate of the will. The recogni<ed natural children of Torcuato with ?stebana Ealolo and 8elsa 'gape filed an opposition. The court declared that the will was e*ecuted according w@ the forma prescribed by law. owe&er, it ruled that 'suncion was ne&er married to the deceased ( ence, disposition made in will is in&alid#. 5ulio -i&ares filed an appeal before the 8' with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present ay comp. e&idence that 'suncion was legally married to another person. The 8' affirmed the trial courtHs decision but with the modification that disposition in fa&or of +ning was &alid. ?I;$ 's a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the e*trinsic &alidity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely in1uires on its due e*ecution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. %t does not determine nor e&en by implication pre.udge the &alidity or efficacy of the willHs pro&isions. The intrinsic &alidity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been pro&ed and allowed. There are, howe&er, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic &alidity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically in&alid. The intrinsic &alidity of a will may be passed upon because Dpractical considerationsD demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary pro&isions are of doubtful legality. >arenthetically, the rule on probate is not infle*ible and absolute. Fnder e*ceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain pro&isions of the will. The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic &alidity or efficacy


+n the other hand, Dafter a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or re&oke the same before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testatorHs death would be in orderD (0eport of the 8ode 8ommission, pp. :2,:3#.The reason for this comment is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent ('rticle GGG, new 8i&il 8ode.#. %t is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an e*traneous matter which should be treshed out in a separate action. !6. ANINANG VS CA

issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings. %n the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of the pri&ate respondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further determination which can only be made if the will is allowed to be probated. !". DE JESUS VS CA ET AL 6acts$ erein respondents de 5esus, in their capacity as legal heirs and successors,in,interest to the property inherited by their late father 6ermin de 5esus (6ermin# filed a petition before the trial court on 2 5une 1==1, seeking the partition of a parcel of land left by their deceased grandparents. 0espondents de 5esus, namely 0onaldo, 'licia, 6lorante, Nelson, 7ellaflor, !ario, 'rnolfo, 5ocelyn, and Eodfrey, all surnamed de 5esus, represented by 0onaldo de 5esus (0onaldo#, are the legitimate children of 6ermin9 that >astor de 5esus is their uncle, being the brother of 6ermin. !ainly in dispute is the claim of respondents de 5esus that ownership of the said property had ne&er been transferred to anyone and@or partitioned among the legal heirs thereto, and that as legitimate children of 6ermin and by right of representation under the law of intestate succession, they are entitled to their rightful share of the estate left by their grandfather 5uan de 5esus. >astor de 5esus contended that respondents de 5esus are no longer entitled to their fatherNs share in the sub.ect property as the latter has already sold to >astor de 5esus his property right along with only sister 8onsolacion for a consideration of >10,000.00. This is e&idenced by the notari<ed ;eed of 4ale dated 12 4eptember 1=G=, which respondent admits has not yet been registered with the 0egistry of ;eeds. >astor de 5esus prayed, among others, for the dismissal of the petition for lack of factual and legal basis. %ssue$ Whether or not the testimony of the parties and witnesses should be gi&en more weight than the opinion of an e*pert witness denying the authenticity of a signature on the document. 0uling$ %t is true that the opinion of handwriting e*perts are not necessarily binding upon the court the e*pertNs function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. andwriting e*perts are usually helpful in the e*amination of forged documents because of the technical procedure in&ol&ed in analy<ing them. 7ut resort to these e*perts is not mandatory or indispensable to the e*amination or the comparison of handwriting. ' finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting e*perts, because the .udge must conduct an independent e*amination of the

6'8T4$ 4oledad !aninang filed a petition with the 86%,Que<on 8ity for the probate of the holographic will of 8lemencia 'seneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. Iater on, 7ernardo 'seneta (herein pri&ate respondent#, claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted intestate proceedings with the 86%,0i<al. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. 7ernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and &oid because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited9 thus, intestacy should ensue. %n her opposition, 4oledad a&erred that the courtNs area of in1uiry is limited to an e*amination of and resolution on the e*trinsic &alidity of the will and that 7ernardo was effecti&ely disinherited by the decedent. The motion was granted. The motion for reconsideration by 4oledad !aninang was denied for lack of merit. %n the same order, the court appointed 7ernardo 'seneta as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust. 4oledad !aninang filed petition for certiorari with the 8ourt of 'ppeals. %t was denied. ence, this petition was filed. %44F?$ Was the dismissal of the court a 1uo of the testate case properL 0FI%NE$ No, it was not proper. >robate of a will is mandatory as re1uired by law and public policy. +rdinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic &alidity9 but on the e*trinsic &alidity which includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance with the re1uisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the &alidity of wills. owe&er, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic &alidity of the will may be passed upon like when on its face there is really preterition or in&alid disinheritance making the will &oid. The probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically &oid. 4uch would shorten the proceedings if the


1uestioned signature in order to arri&e at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. %n support of >astor de 5esusNs contention, on the other hand, >astor de 5esus, 8onsolacion, 'tty. !arcos 8. ;iasen, 5r., and Wenaida Tua<on all testified that 6ermin signed the ;eed of 4ale in their presence. Thus, considering the testimonies of the witnesses and a plain comparison of the 1uestioned signatures with admittedly genuine ones, the 8ourt finds no reason to re&erse the findings of the two lower courts. 'lthough the ;eed of 4ale was a public document ha&ing in its fa&or the presumption of regularity, such presumption of regularity was ade1uately refuted by competent witnesses and the &isual analysis of the signatures made by the courts below. 4ince the signatures of 6ermin were forged, the ;eed of 4ale is effecti&ely nullified. The document should not be annulled only with respect to 6erminNs share. The document bearing the forged signatures is in fact an e*tra.udicial settlement which re1uires the assent of all the heirs to the e*tra.udicial partition. %t is not binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had notice thereof. !8. RE%ES VS ENRI<UEZ 6acts$ >etitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of ;ionisia 0eyes who co,owned the sub.ect parcel of land located in Talisay, 8ebu, with 'nacleto 8abrera. +n the other hand respondents, claim to be the heirs of 'nacleto 8abrera, as husband and daughter of 'nacletoHs daughter. +n 5une 1=, 1===, petitioners >eter and ;eborah 'nn ?nri1ue<, sold /00 s1. m. out of the 10:1s1. m. for >/00,000.00 to 4pouses ;ionisio and 8atalina 6ernande< (4pouses 6ernande<#, also their co,respondents in this case. When 4pouses 6ernande<, tried to register their share in the sub.ect land, they disco&ered that certain documents pre&ent them from doing so$ (1# 'ffida&it by 'nacleto 8abrera dated !arch 1), 1=:G stating that his share in Iot No. 1(:1, the sub.ect property, is appro*imately 2)= s1. m.9 (/# 'ffida&it by ;ionisia 0eyes dated 5uly 12, 1=/=stating that 'nacleto only owned Z of Iot No. 1(:1, while 20/.:: s1. m. belongs to ;ionisia and the rest of the property is co,owned by Nicolasa 7acalso, 5uan 0eyes, 6lorentino 0eyes and !a*imiano ;ico. 'lleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the Drepartition and resubdi&isionD of the sub.ect property. The 0T8 dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was re&ersed, hence the petition. %ssue$ Whether or not the respondents ha&e to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of 'nacleto 8abrera

before they can file an ordinary ci&il action to nullify theaffida&its of 'nacleto 8abrera and ;ionisia 0eyes. 0uling$ Kes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be madein the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recon&eyance of property. This must take precedence o&er the action for recon&eyance. The respondents ha&e yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of 'nacleto 8abrera who are, thus, entitled to the sub.ect property. The 0ules of 8ourt pro&ide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defendant action in court. ' real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or in.ured by the .udgment in the suit or the one entitled to the a&ails thereof. 4uch interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere e*pectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or conse1uential interest. !9. INING ET AL. VS VEGA 6acts$ Ieon 0oldan (Ieon#, married to 0afaela !ene< (0afaela#, is the owner of a 2,1/0,s1uare meter parcel of land (sub.ect property# in Jalibo, 'klan co&ered by +riginal 8ertificate of Title No. (/30G1# 0+,)20: (+8T 0+,)20#. Ieon and 0afaela died without issue. Ieon was sur&i&ed by his siblings 0omana 0oldan (0omana# and Eregoria 0oldan %ning (Eregoria#, who are now both deceased. 0omana was sur&i&ed by her daughter 'nunciacion -ega and grandson, herein respondent Ieonardo 0. -ega (Ieonardo# (also both deceased#. Ieonardo in turn is sur&i&ed by his wife Iourdes and children 0estonilo %. -ega, 8rispulo !. -ega, !ilbuena -ega,0estituto and Ienard -ega, the substituted respondents. Eregoria, on the other hand, was sur&i&ed by her si* children$ petitioners Nati&idad %ning,%bea (Nati&idad#, ;olores %ning, 0imon (;olores#, 'ntipolo, and >edro9 5ose9 and 'mando. Nati&idad is sur&i&ed by ?dilberto %bea, 5osefa %bea, !artha %bea, 8armen %bea, 'mparo %bea,6ernande<, enry 0ui< and >astor 0ui<. ;olores is sur&i&ed by 5esus 0imon, 8esaria 0imon Eon<ales and 0emedios 0imon 8ordero. 'ntipolo is sur&i&ed by !anuel -illanue&a, daughter Teodora -illanue&a,6rancisco (Teodora#, 8amilo 6rancisco (8amilo#, 'dolfo 6rancisco ('dolfo#, Iucimo 6rancisco, 5r. (Iucimo 5r.#, !ilagros 6rancisco, 8eledonio 6rancisco, and erminigildo 6rancisco ( erminigildo#. >edro is sur&i&ed by his wife, ?lisa Tan %ning and >edro %ning, 5r. 'mando died without issue. 's for 5ose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to the proceedings, or if he is ali&e at all.


%n short, herein petitioners, e*cept for 0amon Tres&alles (Tres&alles# and 0oberto Ta.onera (Ta.onera#, are EregoriaNs grandchildren or spouses thereof (EregoriaNs heirs#. %n 1==G, acting on the claim that one,half of sub.ect property belonged to him as 0omanaNs sur&i&ing heir, Ieonardo filed with the 0egional Trial 8ourt (0T8# of Jalibo, 'klan 8i&il 8ase No. :/G:) for partition, reco&ery of ownership and possession, with damages, against EregoriaNs heirs. %ssues$ 1. Whether Ieonardo is entitled to a share in IeonNs estate9 /. Whether Ieon sold the sub.ect property to Iucimo 4r.9 and 2. Whether the appellate court committed gra&e abuse of discretion in re&ersing the decision of the trial court on the ground that lucimo francisco repudiated the co,ownership only on february =, 1=G=. 0uling$ The finding that Ieon did not sell the property to Iucimo 4r. had long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of IeonNs estate. +ne issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Ieon sold the property to Iucimo 4r. The trial court, e*amining the two deeds of sale e*ecuted in fa&or of ?nri1ue< and Iucimo 4r., found them to be spurious. %t then concluded that no such sale from Ieon to Iucimo 4r. e&er took place. ;espite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. 8onse1uently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus, petitionersN insistence on Iucimo 4r.Ns 1=32 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim o&er the property must be ignored. 4ince no transfer from Ieon to Iucimo 4r. took place, the sub.ect property clearly remained part of IeonNs estate upon his passing in 1=)/. Ieon died without issue9 his heirs are his siblings 0omana and Eregoria. 4ince Ieon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, 0omana and Eregoria, who thus inherited the property in e1ual shares. %n turn, 0omanaNs and EregoriaNs heirs [ the parties herein [ became entitled to the property upon the sistersN passing. Fnder 'rticle GGG of the 8i&il 8ode, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death. EregoriaNs and 0omanaNs heirs are co, owners of the sub.ect property. Thus, ha&ing succeeded to the property as heirs of Eregoria and 0omana, petitioners and respondents became co, owners thereof. 's co,owners, they may use the property owned in common, pro&ided they do so in accordance with the purpose

for which it is intended and in such a way as not to in.ure the interest of the co,ownership or pre&ent the other co,owners from using it according to their rights.2G They ha&e the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and e&en substitute another person in their en.oyment, e*cept when personal rights are in&ol&ed.2( ?ach co,owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.2= 6inally, no prescription shall run in fa&or of one of the co,heirs against the others so long as he e*pressly or impliedly recogni<es the co, ownership. 60. IN T;E ATTER O9 (ROBATE O9 T;E L*T O9 ENRI<UE LO(EZ 6acts$ ?nri1ue 4. Iope< (?nri1ue# died lea&ing his wife, Wendy 7. Iope<, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner 0ichard 7. Iope< (0ichard# and the respondents ;iana 5eanne Iope< (;iana#, !arybeth de Ieon (!arybeth# and -ictoria I. Tua<on (-ictoria# as compulsory heirs. 7efore ?nri1ueNs death, he e*ecuted a Iast Will and Testament3 on 'ugust 10, 1==) and constituted 0ichard as his e*ecutor and administrator. 0ichard filed a petition for the probate of his fatherHs Iast Will and Testament before the 0T8 of !anila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his fa&or. !arybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not e*ecuted and attested as re1uired by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of 0ichard. The said opposition was also adopted by -ictoria. 0ichard presented the attesting witnesses and the notary public who notari<ed the will, 'tty. >erfecto Nolasco ('tty. Nolasco#. The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late ?nri1ue read and signed the will on each and e&ery page, they also read and signed the same in the latterHs presence and of one another. >hotographs of the incident were taken and presented during trial. !analo further testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and re&isions from ?nri1ue before the final copy of the will was made. +n the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness, Eregorio 7. >araon (>araon#, +fficer,in,8harge of the Notarial 4ection, +ffice of the 8lerk of 8ourt, 0T8, !anila. is testimony centered mainly on their findings that 'tty. Nolasco was not a notary public for the 8ity of !anila in 1==), which on cross e*amination was clarified after >araon disco&ered that 'tty. Nolasco was commissioned as such for the years 1==3 to 1==G.


0uling$ The pro&isions of the 8i&il 8ode on 6orms of Wills, particularly, 'rticles (0: and (0= of the 8i&il 8ode pro&ide$ '0T. (0:. ?&ery will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testatorHs name written by some other person in his presence, and by his e*press direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another,UUUUU" '0T. (0=. %n the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will in&alid if it is pro&ed that the will was in fact e*ecuted and attested in substantial compliance with all the re1uirements of 'rticle (0:." The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and pre&ent any increase or decrease in the pages. While 'rticle (0= allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, 0ichard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the 'cknowledgment portion of the sub.ect last will and testament that it Dconsists of G pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are writtenD 10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of ( pages including its aknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be e*plained by mere e*amination of the will itself but through the presentation of e&idence aliunde. 61. J.L.T. AGRO: INC VS BALANSAG ET.AL 6acts$ ;on 5ulian I. Te&es (;on 5ulian# contracted two marriages, first with 'ntonia 7aena ('ntonia#, and after her death, with !ilagros ;onio Te&es (!ilagros ;onio#. ;on 5ulian had two children with 'ntonia, namely$ 5osefa Te&es ?scaMo (5osefa# and ?milio Te&es (?milio#. e had also four (3# children with !ilagros ;onio, namely$ !aria?&elyn ;onio Te&es (!aria ?&elyn#, 5ose 8atalino ;onio Te&es (5ose 8atalino#, !ilagros 0eyes Te&es (!ilagros0eyes# and >edro 0eyes Te&es (>edro#.The present contro&ersy in&ol&es a parcel of land known as Iot No. )2 of the 7ais 8adastre, which was originally registered in the name of the con.ugal partnership of ;on 5ulian and 'ntonia. When 'ntonia died, the land was among the properties in&ol&ed in an action for partition and damages. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a 8ompromise 'greement which embodied the partition of all the properties of ;on 5ulian. The property was to remain undi&ided during the lifetime of ;on 5ulian. The 8ompromise 'greement lays down the effect of the e&entual death of ;on

5ulian that in the e&ent of death of 5ulian I. Te&es, the properties now selected and ad.udicated to ;on 5ulian shall e*clusi&ely be ad.udicated to the wife in second marriage of ;on 5ulian and his four minor children. +n 1) No&ember 1=G/, ;on 5ulian, ?milio and 5osefa e*ecuted a ;eed of 'ssignment of 'ssets with 'ssumption of Iiabilities in fa&or of 5.I.T. 'gro, %nc. Iess than a year later, ;on 5ulian, 5osefa and ?milio also e*ecuted an instrument entitled 4upplemental to the ;eed of 'ssignment of 'ssets with the 4upplemental ;eed. This instrument transferred ownership o&er Iot No. )2 in fa&or of 5.I.T. 'gro, %nc. ;on 5ulian died intestate. !eanwhile, !ilagros ;onio and her children had immediately taken possession o&er the sub.ect lot after the e*ecution of the 8ompromise 'greement. %n 1=G3, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses 'ntonio 7alansag and ilaria 8adayday. 't the 0egister of ;eeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale,respondents disco&ered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. %ssue$ Whether ;on 5ulian had &alidly transferred ownership of the sub.ect lot during his lifetimeL Kes. 0uling$ ?&idently, at the time of the e*ecution of the deed of assignment co&ering Iot No. )2 in fa&or of petitioner, ;on 5ulian remained the owner of the property since ownership o&er the sub.ect lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the sub.ect lot, ;on 5ulian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. is right cannot be challenged by !ilagros ;onio and her children on the ground that it had already been ad.udicated to them by &irtue of the compromise agreement. The ad.udication in fa&or of the heirs of ;on 5ulian from the second marriage became automatically operati&e upon the appro&al of the 8ompromise 'greement, thereby &esting on them the right to &alidly dispose of Iot No. )2 in fa&or of respondents. 'll things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the ob.ect of a contract. 'll rights which are not intransmissible may also be the ob.ect of contracts. No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance e*cept in cases e*pressly authori<ed by law. Well,entrenched is the rule that all things, e&en future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the ob.ect of a contract. The e*ception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the e*ception to the e*ception is the partition inter &i&os referred to in 'rticle 10(0. The first paragraph of 'rticle 10(0, which pro&ides the e*ception to the e*ception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads$ '0T. 10(0. 4hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter &i&os, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not pre.udice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. The partition inter &i&os of the properties of ;on 5ulian is undoubtedly &alid pursuant to 'rticle 123G. owe&er, considering that it would become legally operati&e only upon the death of ;on 5ulian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties ad.udicated to him under the


compromise agreement was but a mere e*pectancy. %t was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. 7eing the prospect of a future ac1uisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. %t had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time none*istent and might ne&er e*ist. 'dditional 8ases$ (handwritten in mamNs list# 1. O(ULENCIA VS. CA 6acts$ >0s 'ladin 4imundac and !iguel +li&en filed a complaint for specific performance again Natalia 8arpena +pulencia on the ground that the latter e*ecuted in their fa&or a Hcontract to sellH of lot /1/:.The defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. The defendant a&erred that the property sub.ect of the contract formed part of the ?state of ;emetrio 8arpena, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the 0T8 of 7inan. The court ordered the parties to submit their e&idence. >et, instead of submitting e&idence, filed a demurrer. !oreo&er, the petitioner maintained that the contract was null and &oid for want of appro&al of the probate court. !eanwhile, the court a 1uo granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. +n appeal, the appellate court set aside the trial courtHs dismissal of the complaint. %ssue$ W+N a contract to sell a real property in&ol&ed in estate proceedings &alid and binding without the appro&al of the probate court. 0uling$ Kes ereditary rights are &ested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedentHs death. >etitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of .udicial appro&al does not in&alidate the 8ontract to 4ell, because the petitioner has the substanti&e right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. >etitioner contends that DOtPo sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial distribution of the decedentHs estate pending the final termination of the testate proceedings.D >etitionerHs contention is not con&incing. The 8ontract to 4ell stipulates that petitionerHs offer to sell is contingent on the Dcomplete clearance of the court on the Iast Will Testament of her father.D 8onse1uently, although the 8ontract to 4ell was perfected between the petitioner and pri&ate respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership o&er the parcel of land to the pri&ate respondents is sub.ect to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitionerHs apprehension that the 8ontract to 4ell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. %ndeed, it is settled that Dthe sale made by an heir of his share in an

inheritance, sub.ect to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration. 2. AGLASANG VS CABATINGAN

6'8T4$ +n 6ebruary 1G, 1==/, 8onchita 8abatingan e*ecuted in fa&or of her brother, petitioner Nicolas 8abatingan, a D;eed of 8onditional of ;onation (sic# %nter -i&os for ouse and IotD co&ering one,half (X# portion of the formerHs house and lot located at 8ot,cot, Iiloan, 8ebu. 6our (3# other deeds of donation were subse1uently e*ecuted by 8onchita 8abatingan on 5anuary 13, 1==:, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, !erly 4. 8abatingan and ?stela 8. !aglasang for two parcels of land. +ne of the pro&isions in the deeds are as follows$ DThat for and in consideration of the lo&e and affection of the ;+N+0 for the ;+N??, the ;+N+0 does hereby, by these presents, transfer, con&ey, by way of donation, unto the ;+N?? the abo&e,described property, together with the buildings and all impro&ements e*isting thereon, to become effecti&e upon the death of the ;+N+09 >0+-%;?;, +W?-?0, that in the e&ent that the ;+N?? should die before the ;+N+0, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.D When 8onchita died in !ay =, 1==:, and upon learning of the e*istence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul the said four (3# deeds of donation. 0espondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking ad&antage of 8onchita 8abatinganHs fragile condition, caused the e*ecution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are &oid for failing to comply with the pro&isions of the 8i&il 8ode regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. >etitioners deny respondentsH allegations contending that 8onchita 8abatingan freely, knowingly and &oluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in fa&or of the respondents, while the %44F?$ Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter &i&os. 0FI%NE$ >etitioners insist that the donations are inter &i&os donations as these were made by the late 8onchita 8abatingan Din consideration of the lo&e and affection of the donorD for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of 8abatinganHs death. >etitionersH arguments are bereft of merit. %n determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account$ (1# %t con&eys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of


the transferor9 or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked# and control of the property while ali&e9 (/# That before his death, the transfer should be re&ocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum9 but re&ocability may be pro&ided for indirectly by means of a reser&ed power in the donor to dispose of the properties con&eyed9 (2# That the transfer should be &oid if the transferor should sur&i&e the transferee. %n the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear pro&ision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to 8abatinganHs death. The phrase Dto become effecti&e upon the death of the ;+N+0D admits of no other interpretation but that 8abatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. >etitioners themsel&es e*pressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the 'cceptance and 'ttestation clauses of the ;eed of ;onation. That the donations were made Din consideration of the lo&e and affection of the donorD does not 1ualify the donations as inter &i&os because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason. >etition denied.

stated four reasons to the matter$ (1# that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of lo&e and affection, a clear indication of a donation inter &i&os9 (/# the reser&ation of a lifetime usufruct9 (2# reser&ation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the intention to part with their si* lot9 and (3# respondentHs acceptance, contained in the deed of donation. +nce a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be re&oked, e*cept for officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to in&oke. 4. (UIG VS. (ENA9LORIDA 6'8T4$ 8armen Fbalde -da. de >arcon died in the 8ity of %loilo, without forced heirs, lea&ing certain properties in the 8ity and pro&ince of %loilo. 4he left a will and was sur&i&ed by nephews and nieces, children of her predeceased brother, 8atalino Fbalde, and sister, Iuisa Fbalde, married to 'riston !agbanua. 7esides her will, the deceased had e*ecuted two notarial deeds of donation. +ne, entitled ;+N'8%+N !+0T%4 8'F4', was e*ecuted on No&ember /3, 1=3(, in fa&or of her niece, ?stela !agbanua. The deceased e*ecuted another deed of donation, also entitled D?480%TF0' ;? ;+N'8%+N !+0T%4 8'F4'D in fa&or of the same donee, ?stela !agbanua >eMaflorida, con&eying to her three parcels of land. ;efendants,appellants ?stela !agbanua >eMaflorida, et al., insist that the reser&ation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of ;ecember /(, 1=3= indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reser&ation would be superfluous. %44F?$ %s the donation mortis causa or inter &i&osL 0FI%NE$ The 8ourt in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that the deceased e*pressly and consistently declared her con&eyance to be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death. The power, as reser&ed in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere. !. ALEJANDRO VS GERALDEZ 6'8T4$ 4ps. Ea&ino ;ia< and 4e&era !endo<a e*ecuted a ;eed of ;onation in fa&or of their children, +limpia, 'ngel and 'ndrea ;ia<. %n the deed of donation, the 4ps. ;onated ( lots, with reser&ations on certain lots, to their children and daughters,in, law and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate the same to 2rd persons while the couple are still ali&e and that they

#. GESTO(A VS CA 6'8T4$ 4pouses ;anlag own si* parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they e*ecuted a donation mortis causa in fa&or of respondent !ercedes ;anlag,>ilapil, reser&ing donorHs rights to amend, cancel, or re&oke the donation and to sell or encumber such properties. Kears later, they e*ecuted another donation, this time inter &i&os, to si* parcels of land in fa&or of respondents, reser&ing their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated. 4ubse1uently, the spouses sold / parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Eestopa, and e&entually re&oking the donation. 0espondent filed a petition to 1uiet title, stating that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial 8ourt ruled in fa&or of petitioners, but 8' re&ersed. %44F?$ Whether the (second# donation was inter &i&os or mortis causa 0FI%NE$ %t was donation inter &i&os. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations, and that they needed to e*ecute another deed of donation inter &i&os, since it has a different application to a donation mortis causa. 'lso, the court


shall continue to administer the same until their death. The donees manifested their acceptance in the same deed of donation. When Ea&ino died, 4e&era e*ecuted a deed of donation in fa&or of 'ngel and 'ndrea, gi&ing the siblings each a X portion of Iot /2GG,'. When 4e&era died, 'ndrea sued 'ngel to ha&e the lots /2GG,' and /:0/ partitioned. Teodorico 'le.andro, the sur&i&ing spouse of +limpia, mo&ed to inter&ene claiming 1@2 portion of Iot /:0/. The 86% ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donorNs lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only \upon the death of the donors. %t, howe&er, sustained the partition of Iot /:0/ since it was an e*tra.udicial partition. 7oth parties appealed to the 48, 'ndrea contending that it is a donation inter &i&os while 'le.andro contending it to be mortis causa. %44F?$ Whether or not the donation is a donation inter &i&os or mortis causa 0FI%NE$ ;onation inter &i&os The donation is a donation inter &i&os because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors as pro&ided in 'rt. G/=. %t was stipulated in the deed that out of lo&e and affection by the donors to the donees, the latter are donating wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and debt. Iikewise, it was accepted by the donees which is a re1uirement for donations inter &i&os. ;onations mortis causa are ne&er accepted during the donorNs lifetime. The reser&ation clause which pro&ides that the donees cannot sell the lots to 2rd persons while the couple is still ali&e implies that the ownership already passed. 'lthough there was a stipulation where the couple reser&ed to themsel&es the administration, ownership and rights o&er the properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean that ownership will pass only after their death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and what the donors reser&ed to themsel&es by means of that clause was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.

where he was an e&acuee. e left properties estimated at >(,000 in &alue. +n +ctober /, 1=3), 'ndres ?nri1ue<, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of the will in the 8ourt of 6irst %nstance of 8ebu. 4ome cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. ;uring the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co,witnesses, 6ather 4ancho wrote out in longhand the will in 4panish which the testator spoke and understood9 that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with 'rabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any e&idence. The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will9 that it was in the hand writing of the testator and that although at the time it was e*ecuted and at the time of the testatorHs death ,holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new 8i&il 8ode was already in force, which 8ode permitted the e*ecution of holographic wills, under a liberal &iew, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may o&erride any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate the Iast Will and Testament of 6ather 4ancho 'badia. The oppositors appealed from that decision.

%44F?$ Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was e*ecuted the ci&il code proscribes the e*ecution of such wills. 0FI%NE$ The 4upreme 8ourt held that despite the effecti&ity of the new 8i&il 8ode allowing the e*ecution of holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is because under 'rt. G=: of the 8i&il 8ode, the e*trinsic &alidity of a will should be .udged not by the law e*isting at the time of the testatorNs death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law e*isting at the time of the e*ecution of the instrument. 6or the &ery simple reason that although the will becomes operati&e only after the testatorNs death, still his wishes are gi&en e*pression at the time of e*ecution.







6'8T4$ +n 4eptember ), 1=/2, 6ather 4ancho 'badia, parish priest of Talisay, 8ebu, e*ecuted a document purporting to be his Iast Will and Testament. 0esident of the 8ity of 8ebu, he died on 5anuary 13, 1=32, in the municipality of 'loguinsan, 8ebu,


i ii iii