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Iss"e! 4hether or not the Comelec acted with #rave abuse of discretion in reversin# the lower court$s jud#ment. #e$%! &he dismissal of an appeal in an election protest case for havin# become moot and academic due to the election of new municipal officials referred only to that part of the appealed jud#ment which was affected by the election and not to that portion relatin# to the award of dama#es. 0owever, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory dama#es in the absence of a law e-pressly providin# for situations allowin# for the recovery of the same. &his, petitioner has been unable to do. &he intent of the le#islature to do away with provisions indemnifyin# the victorious party for e-penses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wron#ful act or omission clearly attributable to the losin# party cannot be #ainsaid 5 in fine, Section (+ of the /mnibus 6lection Code merely provides for the #rantin# of actual and compensatory dama#es 7in accordance with law.8 &he intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely reco#ni1es the ma-im, settled in law that a wron# without dama#e or dama#e without wron# neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obli#ation.
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Fac s! ;6milio /smena and other petitioners are candidates in the <ational 6lections. ;%.A. <o. ,,=,, the 6lectoral %eforms >aw of 1 !., prohibits mass media from sellin# or #ivin# free of char#e print space or air time for campai#n or other political purposes, e-cept to the Commission on 6lections. ;&hey contend that events after the rulin# in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections 7have called into 'uestion the validity of the very premises of that decision. ;NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of %.A. <o. ,,=, a#ainst claims that it abrid#ed freedom of speech and of the press. ?n ur#in# a ree-amination of that rulin#, petitioners claim that e-perience in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown the 7undesirable effects8 of the law because 7the ban on political advertisin# has not only failed to level the playin# field, but actually wor@ed to the #rave disadvanta#e of the poor candidateAsB8 by deprivin# them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reachin# voters li@e airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. ;0owever, no empirical data were presented by the petitioners to bac@ up their claim. &hey instead they ma@e ar#uments from which it is clear that their disa#reement is with the opinion of the Court on the constitutionality of %.A. <o. ,,=, and that what they see@ is a rear#ument on the same issue already decided in that case. Iss"e! 4/< upholdin# the validity of %A ,,=, actually wor@ed in favor of richer candidates #e$%! Petition 2?SM?SS62 Ra &o! ?t is incorrect to claim that the purpose of %A ,,=, is e'uality of the candidates when what its provisions really spea@ of is e'uality in opportunity. &he main purpose of the %A is re#ulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promotin# e'uality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertisin#. &he restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. Assumin# that rich candidates can spend for parades, rallies, motorcades, airplanes and the li@e in order to campai#n while poor candidates can only afford political ads, the #ap between the two will not necessarily be reduced by allowin# unlimited mass media advertisin# because rich candidates can spend for other propa#anda in addition to mass media advertisin#. Moreover, it is not true that C119b: has abolished the playin# field. 4hat it has done, as already stated, is merely to re#ulate its use throu#h C/M6>6C; sponsored advertisin# in place of advertisements paid for by candidates or donated by their supporters.