II MHG PROFESSIONAL READING PROGRAM

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War By Mark Bowden Synopsis. The behind-the-lines story of the U.S. Special Forces team dropped into the middle of Mogadishu, Somalia, in !!" and the intense firefight for their li#es they went through. $ true-to-life thriller that gi#es the political story of what U.S. troops were doing there in the first place and the military details of what the street fighting cost both sides. Annotation. !!! %ational Book $ward nominee for %onfiction.

From the Publisher: Black &awk 'own is Mark Bowden(s account of the longest sustained firefight in#ol#ing $merican troops since the )ietnam *ar. +n +ctober ", !!", about a hundred elite U.S. soldiers were dropped by helicopters into the teeming market in the heart of Mogadishu, Somalia. Their mission was to abduct two top lieutenants of a Somali warlord and return to base. ,t was supposed to take an hour. ,nstead they found themsel#es pinned down through a long and terrible night fighting against thousands of hea#ily armed Somalis. The following morning, eighteen $mericans were dead and more than se#enty badly in-ured. From the Editors: Mark Bowden gi#es the reader an intense ./ou $re There0 look at the +ctober !!" attempt by a U.S. Special Forces team to abduct two top lieutenants of a Somali warlord in Mogadishu, Somalia -- and shows how the mission turned into a bloodbath that would cost the li#es of 1 $merican soldiers. Ultimately, the incident would lead to the infamous #ideo footage of a soldier(s body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Bowden is careful to present both sides of the conflict, gi#ing the reader all the information they need to fully understand the day2s tragic e#ents. 3www.barnesandnoble.com4 Recommended Study/Discussion Questions for Black Hawk Down . 'o you agree with using a special operating forces 3S+F4 raid consisting of almost 56 men as the best method of taking down part of the $idid faction7 ,n this situation, could they be attrited by raids using T+* missiles and other precision weapons7 8. *as there ade9uate unity of command within the raid force7 *as unity of command ade9uate once the plan went astray7 ". ,t appears as though force protection for the airfield compound was inade9uate. There should ha#e been an effort to attrit the mortar crews that shelled the compound each night. 'escribe your actions. :. 'o you belie#e that ,talian forces communicating in code by lights to the Somalis7 ,f so, why wasn(t it stopped7 'escribe your actions.

;. From the accounts of men on the scene, the current ;.;<MM round does not ha#e the stopping power desired= multiple rounds are needed to stop an enemy soldier. &ow do you ad-ust your tactics, techni9ues and procedures 3TT>s4 to compensate7 <. Task Force ?anger set a pattern as to their modus operandi during the first si@ raids 3airAair, airA#ehicle, #ehicleA#ehicle4. This pattern was not sufficiently broken before the se#enth raid. $dditionally, the daily fly bys did not break the pattern either. *hat could ha#e been done better in the areas of operational mobility and operational security7 5. The ad#anced first aid training by all forces concerned pro#ed useful during the firefight. First aid training is time well spent in the unit training schedule. &ow well trained is your unit in first aid7 *hat can you do to make the unit more effecti#e in this area7 1. %ight #ision de#ices would ha#e been helpful once the engaged unit was forced into nighttime urban operations. *ould you ha#e left your night optics to go on a short daytime raid7 &ow well trained is your unit in night #ision de#ices7 *hat can you do to make the unit more effecti#e in this area7