VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA,complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative. The facts in this case are not disputed. Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union. In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834. Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte. The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the exparte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit. The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

DAVIDE JR., J.: In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege: 1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default. 2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993. 3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession. In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession. The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

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The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago. The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7 The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise: [I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . . And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . " In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer. We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's

full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order. Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case. Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof. We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

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WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. SO ORDERED. pangasinan electric cooperative vs ayar DECISION PER CURIAM: Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence in handling the cases assigned to him which caused unwarranted financial losses to the complainant, approximately in the total amount of sixteen million pesos (PhP 16,000,000). Records show that for several years, PANELCO I, a rural electric cooperative with principal office address at Brgy. San Jose, Bani, Pangasinan, retained the services of Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor as its counsel. In its July 22, 2002 Complaint, PANELCO I stated that while acting as counsel for the cooperative, respondent was negligent in handling its cases, alleging the following: 4. One of the cases assigned to Atty. Montemayor was Civil Case No. 17315 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68, entitled Rural Power Corporation vs. PANELCO I. After the trial court rendered a Decision adverse to PANELCO I, it was decided that the case be appealed to the Court of Appeals; 5. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the Dismissal of the appeal for the failure of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file the required number of copies within the time provided by the Rules of Court. (copy of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 1715 attached as Annex A); 6. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the Decision of the trial court became final and executory, and the judgment award in the amount of Two Million One Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Two Hundred Nine and 18/100 Pesos (P2,179,209.18) was paid by the complainant; 7. Another case assigned to Atty. Montemayor was the case of Engineering and Construction Corporation of Asia (ECCO-ASIA) vs. PANELCO I, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83 as Civil Case No. Q-89-4242. Again, the decision was appealed by PANELCO I to the Court of Appeals, through Atty. Montemayor; 8. In a Resolution dated May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals considered the appeal Abandoned due to the failure of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the two extensions of time granted. A copy of the said Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV67614 is attached as Annex B, as well as the Notice of Garnishment (Annex B-1) and Writ of Execution (Annex "B-2");

9. Thus, the funds of PANELCO I deposited in banks were garnished until the judgment award was paid to the Plaintiff ECCOASIA, in the amount of Thirteen Million Eight Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Six and 25/100 Pesos (P13,836,676.25); 10. Sometime last year, Atty. Montemayor informed the undersigned (complainant) of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and that he had filed his appeal; 11. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishments on March 11, 2002, I (complainant) confronted Atty. Montemayor on the matter, and he uttered napabayaan ko itong kaso...ano ang gagawin natin; 12. As a consequence of the negligence of Atty. Montemayor, the complainant was forced to settle with the Plaintiffs without the benefit of an approved time-table, and is presently in a dire financial situation, which has caused difficulty in meeting its monthly power bills with the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).[1]

In a Resolution dated September 4, 2002, the respondent was required to file his Comment on the administrative charges within ten (10) days from notice. He subsequently filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File his Comment; however, despite an extension of fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the original period given by the Court, respondent failed to file his Comment. Thus, the Court, in its April 12, 2004 Resolution, declared respondent to have WAIVED the filing of Comment on the Complaint. The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.[2] At the mandatory conference held before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent admitted all the allegations in the Complaint, particularly the fact that he failed to attend to the appeal of complainant's cases.[3] On November 11, 2004, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommending his disbarment from law practice. The salient portion of the Report reads: The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did not even bother to answer the complaint nor present his defense, we are now constrained to impose sanctions on his gross negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I. Considering further that the charges remain uncontroverted, it is recommended that Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor be DISBARRED from the practice of law for Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On March 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed CBD Resolution No. XVI-2005-68 adopting with modification the aforequoted Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, thus:

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RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-titled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents gross negligence, as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law.[4] The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in mishandling complainants cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to the prejudice of the complainant. After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP in its findings and conclusion that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide: CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. xxxx Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxxx Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxxx CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

The records of this case clearly show that respondent failed to live up to his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. The appeals of his client, the petitioner, were dismissed due to his improper way of filing the appeal in Civil Case No. 17315 and his nonfiling of the appellants brief in Civil Case No. Q-89-4242. Respondent did not offer a plausible explanation for not doing his level best in representing his clients cause on appeal; thus, making complainant suffer serious losses. There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to complainant, as the latters counsel of record in the civil cases, to prosecute with assiduousness said cases on appeal in order to safeguard complainant's rights, but it was respondents negli gence or omission which has caused damage to such interests. As held in Aromin v. Atty. Boncavil: Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[6] In Redentor S. Jardin v. Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr.,[7] the Court also held that: [T]he trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical. Thus, for inexcusable neglect of his professional obligations to the prejudice of his clients interests, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors, however, recommended that Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

Manifestly, respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar in relation to his client. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his clients cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and if he should do no less, then he is not true to his lawyer's oath.[5]

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It is settled that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[8] In the case of Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,[9] the Court cited several cases where lawyers were suspended for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law for their failure to file briefs or other pleadings for their respective clients.[10] The case of Atty. Montemayor is however different. He is guilty not only of his unjustified failure to file the appellants brief of his client not only once but twice. Moreover the Court notes with dismay the huge losses suffered by complainant PANELCO I in the total amount of sixteen million pesos (PhP 16,000,000). Lastly, Atty. Montemayor demonstrated an utter lack of regard for the very serious charges against him and a gross disrespect for the Court when he failed to file his comment after being required to file his response to the said charges. Respondent could have presented sufficient justification for his inability to file the appellants briefs but failed to do so. In view of the forgoing circumstances, we find that Atty. Montemayor does not deserve anymore to remain as an active member of the legal profession. The breaches of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the palpable sloth and irresponsibility he has demonstrated in handling the cases of his client undeniably reveal that he has become more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession. He cannot be entrusted anymore with the sacred duty and responsibility to protect the interests of any prospective client. If he is then allowed to resume his law practice after suspension, this will surely subvert the ends of justice, dishonor the bar, and lose the respect of society for the profession of law. The Court will not allow this affront to pass. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of law. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners. Jose M. Luison for respondents.

August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance ofManila issued a writ of possession to the properties. However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed asL-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties

CASTRO, J.: The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade. In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on

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involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs. Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. 1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ. 2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture. 3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present. 4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2 5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities. (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4 (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union. 6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to

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advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7 7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that (a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started; (b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants; (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion); (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815) We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint. Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal. It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the

amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages. Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court) The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo. Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966. This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment. The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. The Counterclaim As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess. The Supplemental Complaint Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith. The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions. The Amended Supplemental Complaint The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the

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plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation. Discussion on The of The Supplemental The Amended Supplemental Complaint Causes of Complaint Action And

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred. For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. CASTANEDA V AGO CASTRO; July 30, 1975 (glaisa po) NATURE - Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries. -1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson - 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal - Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied - 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem - 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties - 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of

preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued - 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition - Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy HELD - No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. - Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. - A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.

ANTONIO CABALLERO and CONCORDIA CABALLERO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALMA DEIPARINE, TOMAS RAGA, OLIMPIO RAGA, ADRIANO RAGA, and MAGDALENA RAGA, defendant-appellees. Porfiro D. Ellescas for plaintiff-appellants. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. for defendant-appellees.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

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This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified it to this Court by resolution of its Fifth Division, dated June 14, 1974, for the reason that it involves purely legal questions which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate. The two legal questions raised are (1) whether the written stipulation of facts entered into by the counsel for both parties without the signature of the latter is valid and binding and (2) whether a motion for new trial and to amend the complaint may be granted after a decision is rendered by the trial court on the basis of said stipulation of facts. I. Statement of the Case On March 21, 1967, plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero filed a complaint against defendants Alma Deiparine, Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga alleging, among other things: 1. That plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero are the children by the first marriage, and the defendants, Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga, are the children by second marriage of Vicenta Bucao, now deceased, who died sometime in February, 1943 in Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu; 2. That Vicenta Bucao in her lifetime and Tomas Raga acquired by joint purchase a parcel of land from the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate identified as Lot 2072 situated in Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu and now more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-2485 (T17232) of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu and further declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 15954 and at P100.00; 3. That sometime in 1932, defendant Tomas Raga and Vicenta Bucao jointly sold 1/4 of said Lot 2072 to plaintiff Antonio Caballero, which sale was evidenced by a deed of sale; and since the title to said lot at the time of the conveyance to him had not as yet been issued to them they held the subject portion in trust for said Antonio Caballero until its title could be delivered to the latter; 4. That plaintiff Antonio Caballero had been paying the yearly land tax for the subject portion thru his mother Vicenta Bucao, from the time of his acquisition thereof until Vicenta's death in 1943; 5. That long before the death of Vicenta Bucao in 1943, plaintiff Antonio Caballero had been, asking the former to deliver the title to the portion sold to him, but he was told by his mother to wait, as after all, according to her, he (plaintiff) was already in possession thereof and, besides, his mother was then still living; 6. That after the death of Vicenta Bucao in 1943, plaintiff Antonio Caballero asked defendant Tomas Raga to deliver the title to the portion sold to him from Lot 2072, but he (Tomas Raga) told him to wait until it could be segregated and that there was no hurry since he (Antonio) was already in possession thereof, and, being his brother, he would protect him (Antonio) from any claim of third persons thereto, should the occasion arise; 7. That plaintiff Antonio Caballero had been in the continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject portion and had built a house thereon way back in 1941 which is still existing up to the present and used as his dwelling;

8. That the share of Vicenta Bucao to Lot 2072 consisting of 207 square meters, more or less, in which the plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero own an undivided 1/6 share each, had not been partitioned among her heirs by the first and second marriages, respectively; 9. That sometime on May 11, 1965, plaintiff Antonio Caballero received from defendant Alma Deiparine a letter demanding that he vacate the portion of Lot 2072 which he was holding for she had bought it from defendant Tomas Raga, and as the new owner she would like to construct a house thereon and would further improve said lot; 10. That upon refusal of the plaintiff to vacate the portion in question defendant Alma Deiparine brought an action for ejectment against him in the Municipal Court of Talisay, and after trial said Court rendered judgment in favor of Antonio Caballero, the plaintiff herein; 11. That defendant Alma Deiparine appealed the decision of the Municipal Court in the ejectment case to the Court of First Instance of Cebu where she again lost but she elevated the decision of the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals where it is pending; 12. That in the light of the foregoing facts Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 is fraudulent and questionable for having deliberately included in the sale made by defendant Tomas Raga to defendant Alma Deiparine the portion previously sold to herein plaintiff Antonio Caballero as well as the plaintiffs' share inherited from their deceased mother, Vicente Bucao; 13. That the defendants Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga have willfully and falsely misrepresented themselves by declaring in the instrument of declaration of heirs and confirmation of sale they executed on March 18, 1963, that they are the sole heirs of Vicenta Bucao, thereby deliberately and willfully excluding the plaintiffs herein from succeeding to the share of their mother, Vicenta Bucao, in Lot 2072; 14. That defendant Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga have willfully and with deliberate falsehood misrepresented themselves when they stated in the instrument of declaration of heirs and confirmation of sale that Vicenta Bucao's share in Lot 2072 was sold to Tomas Raga, for there was in fact no such sale between them, the truth of the matter being that long before Vicenta Bucao's death in the early part of 1943 the said defendants had earlier evacuated from Tabunoc in the later part of 1942 and were in hiding when the Japanese forces occupied Talisay, leaving behind the herein plaintiff to minister alone to their sickly mother, Vicenta Bucao, during the last days of her life until her death in 1943 and she died without the presence of even one of her children by the second marriage; 15. That the deed of sale executed by defendant Tomas Raga over Lot 2072 in favor of defendant Alma Deiparine has been delivered to the latter but the possession of the property in question has not been delivered and still remains in the possession of the herein plaintiffs; 16. That the plaintiffs herein discovered the fraudulent conveyance of Lot 2072 to defendant Alma Deiparine only upon the receipt of the latter's letter dated May 11, 1965. Defendant Alma Deiparine answered the complaint alleging, among other things: 1. That the alleged sale between Antonio Caballero on one hand and Vicenta Bucao and defendant Tomas Raga on the other hand was only made known to her after she had already filed an action for ejectment against Antonio Caballero; at the time she purchased the lot in question on March 28, 1963, the certificate of title to the land was free of any encumbrance and she purchased it in good faith for a valuable consideration without any knowledge or information

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about the alleged sale to plaintiff Caballero of a portion thereof; the office of the register of deeds does not show that said deed of sale was registered and from the time she purchased the land on the date aforesaid until Antonio Caballero filed his answer to the ejectment case she filed, Antonio Caballero never made mention of said deed of sale although he had already received a letter of ejectment as well as oral demands to vacate; hence, the deed of sale in his favor is fictitious as confirmed by Antonio's conduct in keeping the same in secrecy for more than 30 years; 2. That the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 issued to her is valid, legal, enforceable and regular, no fraud having committed in its issuance. Defendants Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga also answered plaintiffs, complaint alleging, among other things: 1. hat it is not true that Tomas Raga and Vicente Bucao sold 1/4 of the land in question to Antonio Caballero; 2. hat before the 1/2 of the land in question was sold by Vicenta Bucao to Tomas Raga it was Vicenta and Tomas who were paying the taxes and after the sale it was Tomas alone who paid the same; 3. That Antonio Caballero never made demands because he know and still knows that he is not the owner of any portion of the land in question; while it is true that he is occupying a portion of the subject land where his house now stands, the same is by mere tolerance by Vicenta and Tomas for they took pity upon him when he needed a place where to build his house; 4. That the land in question was sold by Tomas Raga in good faith to defendant Alma Deiparine; 5. That the sale in favor of defendant Alma Deiparine is valid and did not prejudice Antonio Caballero since he has no right whatsoever in and over the land in question or in any portion thereof; 6. That the declaration of heirs and confirmation of sale speaks the truth and was not intended to prejudice any person; 7. That a sale was made by Vicenta Bucao in favor of Tomas Raga of her 1/2 participation in the land in question; 8. That it cannot be true that the sale to Alma Deiparine was only discovered by Antonio Caballero on May 11, 1965, because even before the actual sale was made, plaintiff Antonio know that there were negotiations for the sale of the land and after the sale the plaintiffs were also informed that the land has a new owner. II. Facts of the Case Before the case was called for hearing, the parties through counsel entered into a stipulation of facts on March 13, 1968, which provides as follows: STIPULATION OF FACTS

The PLAINTIFFS and the DEFENDANTS in the above-entitled case duly assisted by their respective counsels, unto this Honorable Court hereby respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts: 1. That the parties are all of legal ages and residents of Talisay, Cebu; 2. That Plaintiffs Antonio and Concordia, all surnamed Caballero, and Defendant Tomas, Olimpio, Adriano and Magdalena, all surnamed Raga, are the children of Vicenta Bucao now deceased, the first two named being the children by the first marriage and the last four named being the children by the second marriage; 3. That during the lifetime of Vicenta Bucao she with her second husband Casimero Raga and her son Tomas Raga acquired by joint purchase a parcel of land from the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate identified as Lot No. 2072 and described in TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RT-2485 (T-17232) issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on October 12, 1936, a certified true copy of which is identified as Annex "A" in the Complaint and Tomas Raga is the owner of undivided one-half thereof; 4. That in 1932 Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga before Annex "A" mentioned in the next preceding paragraph had been issued, executed jointly a notarial instrument identified as Annex "B" wherein they acknowledged that Antonio Caballero had contributed the amount therein stated for the purchase of the property and they sold 1/4 of the lot to him; when the title to said lot was issued, Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga held it in trust for their co-owner; 5. That the portion mentioned as sold to plaintiff Antonio Caballero remained unsegregated from Lot 2072 and the deed of sale, Annex "B" of the Complaint; nor had it been registered in the Register of Deeds; but he, had been in occupation of a portion of this lot peacefully until the present; 6. That the Tax Declaration of the property remained in the name of Vicenta Bucao; 7. That during the lifetime of Vicenta Bucao, she, with the conformity of her husband, sold her undivided 1/2 of the above parcel to her co-owner, Tomas Raga; 8. That on March 18, 1963 defendants Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga, Magdalena Raga and Tomas Raga executed an instrument known as "Declaration and confirmation of sale" without the participation of plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero, wherein they stated that they are the heirs of Vicenta Bucao of the 1/2 of the property to Tomas Raga, a certified true copy of which document is identified as Annex "E" in the Complaint; 9. That on March 28, 1963 Alma Deiparine acquired in good faith, with a just title and for a valuable consideration, the whole of Lot 2072 from Tomas Raga as per deed of absolute sale identified as Annex "C" in the complaint which cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-2482 (T-17232) and the issuance in her name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 on April 1,

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1963, a certified true copy of which is identified as Annex "D" in the complaint; 10. That defendant Alma Deiparine came to know only of Annex "B" when it was presented by plaintiff Antonio Caballero at the trial of an ejectment case filed by the former in the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu which was docketed as Civil Case No. 108. This case was decided in favor of Antonio Caballero but the decision was appealed by Alma Deiparine to the Court of First Instance of Cebu which affirmed the decision for Caballero. The case is now in the Court of Appeals on appeal by Alma Deiparine; 11. That based on the foregoing stipulation of facts the parties hereby jointly submit the following legal issues for the determination of this Honorable Court: a) Whether the plaintiffs could ask for the rescission of the declaration of heirs and confirmation of sale identified as Annex "E" in the complaint; b) Whether the deed of sale in favor of Alma Deiparine identified as Annex "C" in the Complaint can be annulled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 (Annex "D") be cancelled. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing Stipulation of Facts be approved and that a decision he handed down on the legal issues submitted on the basis of said Stipulation of Facts. Cebu City, March 13, 1968. (Sgd.) MELECIO C. GUBA Counsel for Plaintiffs 430 Sanciangko St., Cebu City (Sgd.) HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Counsel for Defendants Suite 307, COMTRUST Bldg., Jones Ave., Cebu City The Clerk of Court Court of First Instance of Cebu S I R: Please immediately submit the foregoing Stipulation of Facts for the approval of the Court upon your receipt hereof.(Sgd.) MELECIO C. GUBA (Sgd.) H. G. DAVIDE, JR.

The trial court on April 30, 1968, rendered a decision based on the stipulation of facts, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint insofar as the defendant Alma Deiparine is concerned, but awarding to said plaintiffs and against the other defendants Raga, jointly and severally, the amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), as moral damages, and FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees. The defendants Raga are likewise ordered to pay the costs. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and for leave of court to admit an amended complaint which the lower court in its order of August 26, 1968, denied. Hence, this appeal to the Court of Appeals by Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero, which was certified to this Court. III. Discussion of Assigned Errors Appellants assigned the following errors to have been committed by the trial court: 1. The court a quo erred in finding that the appellants submitted the stipulation of facts for its approval, the truth being that they were never made to participate in the preparation and information of said stipulation of facts; 2. The court a quo erred in finding that the stipulation of facts bear the conformity of the appellants, the truth being that they never gave their conformity to said stipulation of facts which was made the basis of the appealed decision; 3. The court a quo erred in approving the stipulation of facts which did not bear the conformity of the parties, particularly by plaintiffs-appellants; 4. The court a quo erred in rendering a decision based only on the stipulation of facts which did not state all the facts as borne by the issues brought about in the complaint as well as in the answer, nor did the stipulation of facts bear the conformity of plaintiffs-appellants; 5. The court a quo erred in denying the plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration; 6. The court a quo erred likewise in denying the admission of plaintiffs-appellants' amended complaint. Since the assigned errors are inter-related and revolve around the basic issue of the legality of the Stipulation of Facts, they will be discussed jointly for the sake of brevity. A perusal of the stipulation of facts does not disclose any assent and/or conformity to the same given by the plaintiffs-appellants. It should be noted that the complaint is verified by plaintiff Antonio Caballero who swore to the truth thereof before his counsel-notary-public, Atty. Melecio C. Guba, although under the Rules, considering the nature and subject matter of the complaint, it did not require any verification. It should also be noted that the introductory paragraph of said stipulation of facts clearly states that both parties were "duly assisted" by their counsel, which seems to connote the idea that the parties-litigants, particularly the plaintiffs-appellants, had

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actual participation in the formulation of said stipulation of facts. But the same stipulation of facts shows that plaintiffs-appellants, particularly principal plaintiff Antonio Caballero, never signed the same. As to why their counsel, particularly Atty. Melecio C. Guba for the plaintiffs, did not require his clients to affix their signatures so as to show their conformity and assent thereto, when he even required the same principal plaintiff, Antonio Caballero, to verify the complaint has not been explained and remains quite puzzling. The conduct of then counsel for plaintiffs-appellants in entering into a compromise agreement or stipulation of facts which practically confesses judgment, without the consent and conformity of his clients, is not in keeping with the sworn duty of a lawyer to protect the interest of his clients. It is a groosly reprehensible act which amounts to fraud. The stipulation of facts should not have been tolerated by the trial court by giving its seal of approval thereto. And to top it all, plaintiffs-appellants' counsel made the unauthorized admission therein that principal defendant Alma Deiparine acquired in good faith with a just title and for a valuable consideration the whole of Lot 2072. Their counsel even admitted also in said document that during the lifetime of Vicenta Bucao, she, with the conformity of her husband, sold her undivided of Lot 2072 to her co-owner Tomas Raga. No document was ever shown to him by the Ragas in support of this claim and the record do not disclose that there was such document. On the contrary it is replete with implications that no such sale was ever made. Plaintiffs-appellants maintain that if given a chance they can prove that principal defendant Alma Deiparine is a purchaser in bad faith and her registration of the deed of sale executed by the Ragas did not confer upon her any right under the law. The stipulation of facts which was made the basis of the decision appealed from was null and void as it contained serious unauthorized admissions against the interest and claims of plaintiffs-appellants who had no hand in its preparation and formulation. Hence the lower court should have set aside the decision and admit the amended complaint so as to have the issues properly ventilated. Appellees on the other hand contend that the stipulation of facts was entered into with full knowledge, consent and authority of all the parties; that the same was executed after the parties through their respective counsel had manifested at the pre-trial hearing on February 3, 1968, that they were submitting a stipulation of facts; that at the pre-trial all the parties were present and the stipulation of facts was signed by counsel for and in behalf of their clients and strictly within their authority to do so; and that it was entered into in good faith on the basis of the true facts which could be established at the trial. The stipulation of facts in question appellees further continue, is a matter of ordinary judicial Procedure as it relates to admission; that no one is in a better position than the counsel to determine what facts are to be established in a given case to support the theory of the case; that he alone knows what facts he cannot established by the evidence and what facts can be admitted without trial either because it to be true as borne out by oral or documentary evidence he himself has on hand or because he has no evidence to refute it; that it was within his authority to make the stipulation for and in behalf of his client; that in the instant cases, the complaint itself is barren of any allegation that appellee Alma Deiparine is buyer in bad faith; that the allegations in the complaint are directed only against the alleged false misrepresentations of the defendants Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga in the declaration of heirs; that the complaint was prepared by Atty. Melecio C. Guba and as a lawyer of good standing he is presumed to know the case and the nature of his evidence, and his failure to allege such a material fact simply shows lack of evidence to prove bad faith on the part of appellee Alma Deiparine that no error nor mistake, much less, bad faith, attended the admission made in the stipulation of facts that said appellee Alma Deiparine purchase the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; that it was not necessary that the parties litigant should sign the stipulation of facts which is nothing more than a pleading containing judicial admission which the lawyer himself can make.

Finally, appellees argue that the stipulation of facts clearly show that Atty. Guba acted for and in behalf of his clients; that there is no showing at all of absence of such authority, and that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and he cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently; that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer; that if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening of cases, there would never be an end to a suit for as long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligentor experienced or learned; that even granting that Atty. Guba committed a mistake, such a mistake is no ground for the reversal of the decision or re-opening of the case; that plaintiffs' remedy is to proceed against his counsel Atty. Guba, and that the lower court, therefore, did not err in rendering the decision on the basis thereof and in denying the motions for reconsideration and for amendment of the complaint. After weighing the conflicting claims of the parties, We find merit in the contention of plaintiffsappellants. Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero. A reading of the stipulation of facts convinces Us that it is a compromise agreement of the parties. The stipulation concludes with this prayer: "WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing Stipulation of Facts be approved and that a decision be handed down on the legal issues submitted on the basis of said Stipulation of Facts." Apparently it is intended to terminate the case. Rule 138, Section 23 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that: Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied) It may be true that during the pre-trial hearing held on February 3, 1968, the parties concerned agreed to execute a stipulation of facts but it does not mean that the respective counsels of the contending parties can prepare a stipulation of facts the contents of which is prejudicial to the interest of their clients and sign it themselves without the intervention of their clients. In the case at bar, the then counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, Atty. Melecio C. Guba, agreed that defendant-appellee Alma Deiparine bought the land in question in good faith and for a valuable consideration; that during the lifetime of their mother Vicenta Bucao, she, with the conformity of her husband, sold her undivided of the land in question to her co-owner and son, Tomas Raga. All these adverse facts were made the basis of the appealed decision against the plaintiffs. No further evidence was presented as there was no hearing. The attorney for the plaintiffs in making such admission went beyond the scope of his authority as counsel and practically gave away the plaintiffs' case. The admission does not refer to a matter of judicial procedure related to the enforcement of the remedy. It related to the very subject matter of the cause of action, or to a matter on which the client alone can make the admission binding on him. In Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc., L-6869, May 27, 1955; 97 Phil. 100, 104, 105, it was held that: The broad implied or apparent powers of an attorney with respect to the conduct or control of litigation are, however, limited to matters which relate only to the procedure or remedy. The employment of itself confers upon the attorney no implied or power or authority over the subject matter of the cause of action or defense; and, unless the attorney has expressly been granted authority with respect thereto, the power to deal with or surrender these matters is regarded as remaining exlusively in the client.

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The line of demarcation between the respective rights and powers of an attorney and his client is clearly defined. The cause of action, the claim or demand sued upon, and the subject matter of the litigation are all within the exclusive control of a client, and an attorney may not impair, compromise, settle, surrender, or destroy them without his client's consent. But all the proceedings in court to enforce the remedy, to bring the claim, demand, cause of action, or subject matter of the suit to hearing, trial, determination, judgment, and execution, are within the exclusive control of the attorney. (Emphasis supplied) FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and this case shall be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings in consonance with the opinion above set forth, and to admit the amended complaint submitted by the plaintiffs. Costs against appellees. 96. Caballero vs. Deiparine, 60 SCRA 136 Facts: -Plaintiffs are the children by the first marriageVicenta Bucao. Defendants (Ragas) are thechildren by Bucao's second marriage.-Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga acquired land inCebu. of this land was sold to Antonio Caballero(one of the plaintiffs). Land was never transferredthru title. Vicenta dies, but no partition of her estatewas made between her heirs-Later on, Deiparine acquired the whole lot throughpurchase from Tomas Raga. TCT was issued toDeiparine, who instituted ejectment proceedingsagainst the plaintiff -Plaintiffs assailed said sale, alleging said land waspreviously sold to him and is also forms part of theshare inherited from Vicenta-During pre-trial hearing, parties allegedly executeda stipulation of factsThe stipulation was only signed by Atty. Guba(for plaintiffs) and Atty. Hilario Davide (for respondents).-From the stipulation of facts, the CFI rendereddecision in favor of the defendants (that Deiparineowns the whole lot).-Plaintiffs filed for reconsideration saying that theywere never made to participate in the preparationand formation of the stipulation of facts Issue: WON the stipulation of facts is valid Ratio: No.-Court found it puzzling that petitioners signatureswere not affixed in the stipulation of facts even if Atty. Guba required said stipulation to be verified bythe plaintiff (despite the fact that by itsnature/subject matter the complaint did not requireverification)-said stipulation of facts entered into by partiesconstituted a compromise agreement (whichpractically confesses judgement ), without theconsent or conformity of his clients-Guba, as counsel for plaintiffs, agreed to factsadverse to his client's interest in the compromiseagreement i.e. agreeing that Deiparine was a buyer ingood faith (despite plaintiff's claim that theycan prove that Deiparine was a purchaser in bad faith) that during her lifetime, Vicenta Bucao, withconformity of her husband, sold her undivided half of said land to Tomas Raga(despite the fact that no evidence wasadduced in support of this claim)-admission of such facts prejudicial to his client'sinterests was beyond the scope of his authority ascounsel and practically gave away the case-The conduct of Atty. Guba in entering into acompromise agreement without the knowledge andconsent of his clients is not in keeping with thesworn duty of a lawyer to protect the interest of hisclients. It amounts to fraud.-The stipulation of facts which was made the basisof the decision was null and void as it containedserious unauthorized admissions against theinterest of the plaintiffs who had no hand in itspreparation.-Attorneys cannot, without special authority,compromise their clients litigation.-The case is remanded to court of origin for further proceedings and the amended complaint submittedby plaintiffs should be accepted. Note: No agency related provision was cited in thedecision, but Rule 138, Section 23 of the Rules of Court was cited providing that: Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients inany case by any agreement in relation theretomade in writing, and in taking appeals, and in allmatters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromisetheir client's litigation

, or receive anything indischarge of a client's claim but the full amount incash.Whence we can infer that the relevant provisionmay be Art. 1878 (3) which provides that: Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney arenecessary in the following cases: (3) To compromise, to submit questions toarbitration, to renounce the right to appeal froma judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription alreadyacquired;

EDUARDO vs. PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent. FERNANDO, J.:

J.

BERENGUER, complainant,

The law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the bar, as so appropriately put, is a privilege burdened with conditions. 1 A lawyer is called upon by virtue of his oath of office to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; ... [and to] conduct (himself) as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity ... to the courts ..." 2 The question, one that has an element of novelty, is whether respondent Pedro B. Carranza, duly admitted to the practice of the law, did get entangled in the complexity of the strands in the web of obligation such an oath imposes? More specifically, did he manifest the utmost fealty to the trust reposed in him as an officer of the Court by taking all necessary measures to avoid the court being misled, even if such were the result not of design but of inadvertence? A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter of fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he introduced the same in evidence. 3 Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966, to file an answer. Thereafter, on August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the matter that the aforesaid Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was introduced in evidence only to prove the fact of such transfer of the property in question to his client, respondent having "no hand in the making of said affidavit nor of the petition, both of which were prepared in Pasay City." 4 On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such investigation was had wherein both complainant and respondent were duly heard. The issue in the opinion of the then Solicitor General, the Honorable Antonio Barredo, now a member of this Court, as set forth in his report of March 18, 1968, is whether respondent "consented in violation of his oath, to the doing of any falsehood in court." It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with the preparation of the Petition or of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his participation does not appear from the evidence presented in this case. The Petition was subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City before one Atty. A. Mendoza, while the Affidavit was subscribed under oath in Pasay before Notary Public Ernesto V. Ventura. The foregoing documents were posted from Pasay to the Clerk of Court, Sorsogon...." 5

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It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not "very meticulous about the petition" because there was neither private nor government opposition thereto; that if he had intended to deceive the court by virtue of the documents, he could have told his client to answer his questions at the cadastral hearing to conform to the controverted paragraph in the Affidavit of Adjudication concerning the statement reproduced from the tax declaration that the decedent left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except the affiant...." 6 There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the evidence stands, there is no apparent causal link between the falsehood and the fact that respondent is the lawyer handling the cadastral case at the Sorsogon end."7 Nonetheless, while recognizing the absence of evidence that such falsehood in the Affidavit of Adjudication could be traced to respondent, the report would hold him liable for discretionary action as the circumstance that various estates are involved "certainly warranted a greater exercise of diligence on respondent's part." 8 Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even bother to read the entirety of the affidavit runs counter to respondent's inescapable duty to clear up doubts and inconsistencies." 9 For he could have been aware of the family litigations between his client and complainant which are rooted in successional rights...." 10 If only for the above fact then, as stated in the report, "he should precisely have taken the bother to read the entirety of the Affidavit of Adjudication when the cadastral case was heard on January 17, 1966...." 11 From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then Solicitor General Antonio Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Frine Zaballero: "If he did not, he cannot be relieved from the consequences of his acts as a lawyer, and disclaim responsibility therefor. To allow respondent relief from his duty is to ignore what is obvious from the nature of the litigations in which he entered his appearance.... Actually, respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not properly inform himself of the evidence he was going to present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for Relief...." 12 It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of his oath against respondent be instituted. Such complaint was filed by the two above officials on March 18, 1968. Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having] caused confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence therein containing a false statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the family litigations between his client and complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and that] respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of Court." 13 Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to the facts. He would allege in justification however "that while it is true that the ... respondent was the counsel who appeared for the petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record No. 869 of Sorsogon Cadastre, yet he had nothing to do with the making of the petition and the annexes thereto attached; for the same were made in Pasay City and that when (he) accepted to represent the petitioner in the Cadastral Case mentioned above, there was no opposition from anybody ... not even from the Bureau of Lands nor from the Honorable Solicitor General, making, therefore, the hearing therein a mere formality. Such being the case, the [respondent] presented the petitioner's case on January 17, 1966, without meticulously going over the documents, and the alleged Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was presented to show the fact of transfer of the land described therein from the affiant to her son. The stenographic notes in that proceeding will bear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the existence of an incorrect statement in the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It was not [wilful], for he has not consented to the

doing of the falsity therein made, since the same was prepared by petitioner's lawyer in Pasay City; nor did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing mentioned above; ..." 14 There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then Solicitor General Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to be false, in the preparation of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception obviously cannot be sustained.1awphil.t Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer must be in the negative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure to exercise greater care did result in the "confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the circumstances, it would be to err on, the side of undue leniency if he would be held blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity to his oath as attorney was less than entire. Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned. Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity. A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if courts cannot rely on the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case, even without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable. WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, through any of the district judges, is hereby directed to administer in public the reprimand thus imposed on respondent Pedro B. Carranza. The complainant, Eduardo J. Berenguer, must be duly informed of the date when such reprimand is to be administered. RCBI vs ATTY. James FLORIDO The Case This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors [1] of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation. The Facts

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On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.[2] RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (NazarenoRelampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank. In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault. Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol. Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies. The Ruling of the IBP On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty. According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe penalty.[4] On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied respondents motion.[5] The Ruling of the Court We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.[7] Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.[9] We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.[10] A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is cond emnable and unethical.[12] WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. RBCI v FLORIDOA.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010CARPIO, J.: FACTS: Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.

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RBCI allegedthat respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.A c c o r d i n g t o R B C I , r e s p o n d e n t a n d h i s c l i e n t s , N a z a r e n o R e l a m p a g o s g r o u p , t h r o u g h f o r c e a n d intimidation, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evictedCi ri l o A . G ar a y , t he ba nk m a n a ge r , de s t r o ye d t he b a n k s v a ul t, a n d i n s ta l l e d t he i r o w n st a f f t o r un t h e bank.Re s p o n de nt a d de d t h a t th e cr i m i n al c o m pl a i n t f o r m al i ci o u s mi sc hi e f filed a g ai n st him by RBCI w a sa l r e a d y d i s m i s s e d ; w h i l e t h e c o m p l a i n t f o r g r a v e c o e r c i o n w a s o r d e r e d s u s p e n d e d b e c a u s e o f t h e existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against himi n r e t al i a ti o n f o r the a d m i n i s t ra ti v e ca se s he f i l e d a g ai n st R B C I s c ou ns e l a n d th e tr i al c o u rt j u d ge s o f Bohol.M o re o v e r , re s p on de n t cl ai m e d t ha t RB C I f ai l e d t o p re se nt an y e v i de n ce t o p r o v e th e i r al l e g at i on s .R e s p on d e n t a d de d th a t t he a f fi d a vi t s a t ta c he d t o t he c o m p l a i n t w e r e ne ve r i d e n t i fi e d , a f fi r me d , o r c on f i r m e d b y t he a f f i a n ts a nd t h a t n o ne o f t he d o c u me n ta r y e x hi bi ts w e re o ri gi n al s o r c e rt i fi e d t ru e copies. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his oath and the CPR Canon 19. HELD: T h e C o u rt he l d t h at re s po n d e nt w a s g ui l t y a s ch ar g e d an d s us p e n d e d f o r a y e a r . T he fi r st a n d f o r e m o s t d u t y o f a l a w y e r i s t o m a i n t a i n a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e R e p u b l i c o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , u p h o l d t h e Constitution and obey the laws of the land. It is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legalsystem.Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of thelaw. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrainfrom doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success isw h ol l y s u b o r di na t e . H i s c o n du c t ou g h t t o a n d m us t al w a ys b e s c r u pu l ou sl y o b se r v an t o f t h e l aw a n d ethics.Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.

On August 28, 1974, the Court referred the complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On February 2, 1990, or after sixteen (16) years, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, together with the transcripts of stenographic notes taken at the investigation and folders of exhibits submitted by the parties. The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General, are the following: On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., as his counsel to commence an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been adjudicated to him under the judgment dated April 29, 1961 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of the judgment in his favor within the reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules of Court). The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following: 1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share or claim; 2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and 3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid fifty per cent (50%) of the value of the property recovered. On April 18, 1970, respondent prepared a complaint for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 but filed it only on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months later. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 9559, entitled: "Ramon S. Alisbo, Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo vs. Carlito Sales, in his own capacity and as Judicial Administrator of the deceased Pedro Sales." The complaint was signed by respondent alone. However, no sooner had he filed the complaint than he withdrew it and filed in its stead (on the same day and in the same case) a second complaint dated August 31, 1970, with Ramon S. Alisbo as the lone plaintiff, praying for the same relief. Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo were excluded as plaintiffs and were impleaded as defendants instead. Attorneys Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito Jalandoon, Sr. (herein respondent) signed as counsel. On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was filed wherein the plaintiffs were: Ramon S. Alisbo, assisted by his judicial guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and eight (8) others, namely: Pacifico S. Alisbo, Ramona Vda. de Alisbo and Ildefonso, Evangeline, Teotimo, Jr., Reynaldo, Elizabeth and Teresita, all surnamed Alisbo. The amended complaint was signed by Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo alone as counsel of the plaintiffs. On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 had already prescribed (Exh. 21). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Exh. 22). On October 3, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became final on May 30, 1961 yet, and, although a complaint for revival of said judgment was filed by Ramon Alisbo on September 12, 1970, before the ten-year prescriptive period expired, that complaint was null and void for Ramon Alisbo was insane, hence, incompetent and without legal capacity to sue when he instituted the action. The subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint on December 8,

RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and vs. ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent.

NORBERTO

S.

ALISBO, petitioners,

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and Norberto S. Alisbo against their former counsel, Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with deceit, malpractice, and professional infidelity. The complaint was referred to this Court on February 5, 1974. After the complainants had submitted the required number of copies of their complaint, the respondent was ordered to file his answer thereto which he did on June 5, 1974. On August 20, 1974, the complainants filed a reply.

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1972, after the statutory limitation period had expired, was too late to save the plaintiffs right of action. Thereafter, nothing more was done by any of the parties in the case. On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. with having deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 and with having concealed from them the material fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary in the probate proceedings. The respondent filed a general denial of the charges against him. When Ramon S. Alisbo engaged the services of Attorney Jalandoon to enforce the decision in Civil Case No. 4963, that decision was already nine (9) years old, hence, it could no longer be executed by mere motion (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court). Complainants had only about a year left within which to enforce the judgment by an independent action. Ramon Alisbo was already insane or incompetent when he hired Attorney Jalandoon to file Civil Case No. 9559 for him. Attorney Jalandoon concealed from Alisbo the fact that he (Atty. Jalandoon) had been the former counsel of Carlito Sales in the probate proceedings where Alisbo and Sales had litigated over their shares of the inheritance. However, according to Attorney Jalandoon, it was only on October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was called for pre-trial, that he discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales. At that time, the ten-year prescriptive period for revival of the judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He thereupon asked Alisbo's permission to allow him (Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He also informed the court about his untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire therefrom. His request was granted. In his report to the Court, the Solicitor General made the following observations: Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling the case for Ramon S. Alisbo which eventually led to its dismissal, respondent committed several errors, among which are: 1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo before filing the case. Otherwise, his lack of capacity to sue would not have been at issue. 2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and gave way instead to a motion to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered away precious time. 3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and impleaded them as defendants. Otherwise, the complaint would have been defective only in part. Had not respondent committed the above mistakes, Civil Case No. 9559 in all probability would not have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. (pp. 9-10, Solicitor General's Report.) While the Solicitor General does not believe that Attorney Jalandoon's mistakes in handling Alisbo's case were deliberate or made with malice aforethought because there is no "proof of

collusion or conspiracy between respondent and those who would benefit from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 . . . and that, on the other hand, respondent stood to gain substantially (50% of the amount recovered) if he had succeeded in having the judgment revived and executed" (pp. 10-11, Solicitor General's Report), still those errors are so gross and glaring that they could not have resulted from mere negligence or lack of due care. Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before the pre-trial that the Sales defendants had been his clients in the past, is unbelievable because: 1. Before he filed the complaint for revival of judgment, he had had several interviews with Ramon S. Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No. 4963. 2. He must have done some research on the court records of Civil Case No. 4963, so he could not have overlooked his own participation in that case as counsel for Carlito Sales, et al. 3. To prepare the complaint for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 9559), he had to inform himself about the personal circumstances of the defendantsCarlito Sales, et al. The fact that they had been his clients could not have eluded him. In view of his former association with the Saleses, Attorney Jalandoon, as a dutiful lawyer, should have declined the employment proffered by Alisbo on the ground of conflict of interest. Had he done that soon enough, the Alisbos (herein complainants) would have had enough time to engage the services of another lawyer and they would not have lost their case through prescription of the action. The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide: 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.) The impression we gather from the facts is that Attorney Jalandoon used his position as Alisbo's counsel precisely to favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo's action to revive the judgment in his favor and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his judgment which Attorney Jalandoon, as Sales' counsel, had vigorously opposed. Thus, although Atty. Jalandoon prepared Alisbo's complaint for revival of judgment on April 18, 1970, he delayed its filing until September 12, 1970. He postponed filing the action by asking the Court instead to resolve pending incidents in said Civil Case No. 4963. By doing that, he frittered away what little time was left before the action would prescribe. The original complaint which he filed in the names of

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Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was only partially defective because of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping the other plaintiffs, leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action, respondent made the second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the prescriptive period. After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case. While he allegedly found out about Ramon Alisbo's insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the complaint to implead Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8, 1971 only, or almost five (5) months later. By that time the prescriptive period had run out. The surrounding circumstances leave us with no other conclusion than that Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client. There is more than simple negligence resulting in the extinguishment and loss of his client's right of action; there is a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in his dealings with his client, which call for the exercise of this Court's disciplinary power. The Honorable Solicitor General who conducted the investigation of this case found respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity. Although the Solicitor General recommended the suspension of respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon Sr. from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court, after due deliberation, decided to suspend him for a period of two (2) years from the finality of this decision. IT IS SO ORDERED. Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting: I agree with the conclusion of the Court that respondent Atty. Benito Jalandoon, Sr. was guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity. I, however, believe that the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law is not commensurate with the very serious character of the misconduct and infidelity of which the Court has found him guilty. That misconduct was not an ordinary act of placing himself in a conflict of interest situation. Respondent attorney in this case not only acted where he had a clear conflict of interest but also, and worst, so acted as to in effect destroy the legal rights which pertained to the complainants. As pointed out by the Court, respondent attorney delayed the filing of the complaint for the Alisbos for revival of judgment and by doing that, he [respondent attorney] frittered away what little time was left before the action would prescribe. The original complaint which he filed in the names of Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was onlypartially defective because of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping the other plaintiffs leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action, respondent made the second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, there was here a utilization of the lawyer's craft and profession to defeat and dissolve the rights of one client for the benefit of the other client. This is infidelity to a client's cause in a particularly aggravated form, the use of the professional knowledge and technique deliberately to harm a client. Those who deal with members of the legal profession have the right to expect

not just a reasonable amount of professional learning and competence but also whole-hearted loyalty to the client's cause, of course, within the bounds of law. A client must be able to deal with his attorney free from the intolerable apprehension that such attorney may, at some other time, turn around, not just to betray the client's confidence, but also deliberately to destroy the very rights that the client went to him in the first place to defend and prosecute. I believe that the penalty justly merited by respondent in this case is suspension from the practice of law for five (5) years or outright disbarment and vote accordingly. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring. Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting : I agree with the conclusion of the Court that respondent Atty. Benito Jalandoon, Sr. was guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity. I, however, believe that the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law is not commensurate with the very serious character of the misconduct and infidelity of which the Court has found him guilty. That misconduct was not an ordinary act of placing himself in a conflict of interest situation. Respondent attorney in this case not only acted where he had a clear conflict of interest but also, and worst, so acted as to in effect destroy the legal rights which pertained to the complainants. As pointed out by the Court, respondent attorney delayed the filing of the complaint for the Alisbos for revival of judgment and by doing that, he [respondent attorney] frittered away what little time was left before the action would prescribe. The original complaint which he filed in the names of Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was onlypartially defective because of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping the other plaintiffs leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action, respondent made the second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, there was here a utilization of the lawyer's craft and profession to defeat and dissolve the rights of one client for the benefit of the other client. This is infidelity to a client's cause in a particularly aggravated form, the use of the professional knowledge and technique deliberately to harm a client. Those who deal with members of the legal profession have the right to expect not just a reasonable amount of professional learning and competence but also whole-hearted loyalty to the client's cause, of course, within the bounds of law. A client must be able to deal with his attorney free from the intolerable apprehension that such attorney may, at some other time, turn around, not just to betray the client's confidence, but also deliberately to destroy the very rights that the client went to him in the first place to defend and prosecute. I believe that the penalty justly merited by respondent in this case is suspension from the practice of law for five (5) years or outright disbarment and vote accordingly. ALFONSO VISITACION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTOR MANIT, substituted by his widow LEONARDA MANIT and daughters VIRGINIA DUNGOG, VICTORIA BATUCAN and MERLINDA MANIT, defendants-appellants. Amadeo Seno for plaintiff-appellee. Jesus P. Garcia for defendants-appellants.

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TEEHANKEE, J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court, since the issues raised on appeal are all questions of law. The Court of Appeals in its Resolution of January 17, 1967 certifying the case as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court points out that this appeal is "unique" in the sense that the appellant purports to be not the original defendant, Victor Manit, now deceased, nor his heirs, his widow and three daughters of age, substituted for him upon his death, per the title of this case above, but rather his counsel of record, Atty. Jesus P. Garcia, who on April 13, 1960, after the trial court's adverse decision, filed the Notice of Appeal and cash bond on Appeal as "Attorney for Victor Manit deceased" and on the same date filed the Record on Appeal as "Jesus P. Garcia, in his capacity as officer of the Court and as former counsel of the deceased."[[1]] The Record on Appeal and appeal bond were thereafter approved on April 25, 1960 by the trial court and the case forwarded on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and in turn certified to this Court. The case originated on January 18, 1956 when plaintiff appellee filed this case against defendant Victor Manit to hold him liable subsidiarily as employer for the death of plaintiff's son, Delano Visitacion, as a result of injuries sustained in a vehicular collision involving laid defendant's driver Rudolfo Giron, who was found insolvent after having been convicted and sentenced in a previous criminal case arising out of said death, to indemnify the victim's heirs in the amount of P3,000.00. An Answer to the complaint was filed in due course by Atty. Garcia on behalf of defendant. On June 1, 1956, the case was heard, without defendant or his counsel being present, and plaintiff presented his evidence and the case, was submitted for decision. On June 6, 1956, defendant, however, filed a motion for new trial which was granted by the trial court on June 9, 1956.[[2]] Plaintiff presented his oral and documentary evidence and was cross-examined by Atty. Garcia.[[3]] The record further shows that on March 19, 1958, Atty. Garcia commenced the presentation of evidence on behalf of defendant. He presented defendant's wife, Leonarda Manit who testified that her husband, Victor Manit "had no business of his own, because he is sickly" and that she was the one operating and managing their transportation business of three trucks.[[4]] On October 14, 1958, when the case was scheduled for continuation of the trial, Atty. Garcia manifested that the original defendant, Victor Manit had recently died, and the trial court on the same date directed him to furnish plaintiff's counsel the names of the said defendant's heirs, so that plaintiff could amend the complaint accordingly. On August 11, 1959, plaintiff's counsel submitted a Motion to Admit the Amended Complaint attached thereto, furnishing copy of said pleadings to Atty. Garcia, who acknowledged receipt thereof as "Attorney for the defendant." The only amendment in the complaint consisted in impleading the widow and heirs of the deceased original defendant in substitution for him, pursuant to Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court. At the hearing of the said motion on the same date, the trial court, after noting that there was no opposition thereto by Atty. Garcia, admitted the Amended Complaint in its Order of August 11, 1959, wherein "(A)s prayed for by counsel for the defendants, defendants are hereby given fifteen (15) days' time within which to file an answer to said amended complaint."[[5]] No answer to the amended complaint having been filed, the original answer stood as defendants' answer to the amended complaint, in accordance with Rule 11, section 3 of the Rules of Court.[[6]] The case was again set for hearing on January 28, 1960 with notice to the parties through their counsels of record. One day before the hearing, on January 27, 1960, Atty. Garcia filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel", alleging that "the heirs of Victor Manit have not hired (him) to represent them and consequently, (his) continued appearance in representation of a dead client would be illegal" and asking the trial court "that he be relieved as counsel in the above-entitled case for the reasons stated herein."[[7]] When the case was called on the next day, neither defendants nor Atty. Garcia appeared, and the trial court noting "defendants' apparent lack of interest as can be gleaned from the records" considered them to have renounced their right to appear and present evidence to contest plaintiff's claim. It did not pass upon Atty. Garcia's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and proceeded to render judgment in favor of plaintiff, the dispositive part of which provides as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court pronounces judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants; and hereby sentences the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Delano Visitacion, plus P3,000.00 in concept of moral damages, and the additional sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of this action.[[8]] Atty. Garcia's Motion for Reconsideration, based on the same grounds hereinafter discussed having been denied by the trial court, he filed the present appeal, and assigns the following errors in his "Brief for Defendant-Appellant": First Error: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONTINUING WITH THE CASE WITHOUT THE NEW DEFENDANTS BROUGHT TO ITS JURISDICTION BY SUMMONS AND WITHOUT EVEN INFORMING SAID DEFENDANTS THAT THEY HAVE BECOME PARTIES TO THE CASE. Second Error: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FILED BY A LAWYER WHO HAD LOST AUTHORITY TO RE PRESENT A DEAD CLIENT. Third Error: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A PREMATURE JUDGMENT IN AN UNFINISHED CASE WHERE THE NEW DEFENDANTS WERE NOT GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT. He prayed therein that the appellate Court render judgment: (a). Annulling the decision appealed from; (b). Remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings by serving summons on the defendants and giving them a chance to present their evidence; (c). Relieving the undersigned counsel from all responsibility in connection with this case in view of the death of his client; and (d). Granting such other and further reliefs and remedies in accordance with law and equity. (Appellants' Brief, p. 10) We hold this "unique" appeal by the counsel of record, Atty. Jesus P. Garcia, allegedly "in his capacity as officer of the Court and as former counsel of the deceased Victor Manit" to be untenable. There are two fundamental errors on which Atty. Garcia's appeal is premised. First, if he presents this appeal "in his capacity as officer of the Court and as former counsel of the deceased Victor Manit", his appeal should be thrown out, as not being a party to the case, much less a party in interest, he has no legal standing whatsoever to prosecute this appeal. Second, in filing his Notice of Appeal and Cash Appeal Bond, he represented himself as "Attorney for Victor Manit, deceased", depositing the sum of P60.00 as appeal bond "to answer or respond for the costs which the appellate court may award against the herein defendant-appellant,"[[9]] thus representing anew to the trial Court that he was duly authorized to present the appeal on behalf of the estate of the original defendant, Victor Manit deceased, who had earlier been substituted in the case by his heirs, the widow and three daughters of legal age. The trial Court was perfectly correct in relying upon this representation in accordance with Rule 138, section 21 of the Rules of Court which provides that "(A)n attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any case in which he appears ...." This appeal must accordingly be dealt with as an appeal on behalf of said heirs as defendants-appellants and not in the "unique" concept with which Atty. Garcia would circumscribe it. 1. As to the first error assigned, no error was committed by the trial court in continuing with the ease and handing down its decision against defendants-appellants. The contention that said defendants-appellants, as substituted parties-defendants by virtue of their being the heirs of the deceased original defendant pursuant to the trial court's Orders of October 24, 1958 and August 11, 1959 in accordance with Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court [[10]] , should have been brought within the Court's jurisdiction by summons is fallacious. For the record shows that Atty. Garcia at the time acknowledged receipt of the Amended Complaint substituting said defendants-heirs for the deceased original defendant as "Attorney for the defendants", presented no opposition thereto, and furthermore prayed for and was granted by the Court a period of 15 days to file an answer to the Amended Complaint. Having been duly impleaded and having submitted to the Court's jurisdiction through their counsel, Atty. Garcia, the issuance of a summons was unnecessary. The other contention that "there is oven no record showing that these defendants were at all informed that they had become parties to the above-captioned

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case" [[11]] is equally fallacious. Nowhere in appellants' brief is there an assertion by Atty. Garcia, that, he, as their attorney of record, and in compliance with his duty as such and as an officer of the Court, failed or neglected to inform them of the admission of the Amended Complaint substituting them for the deceased original defendant. 2. Appellants claim in their second assignment of error that the trial court erred in ignoring the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed by Atty. Garcia. In the face of Atty. Garcia's previous representations and appearance as counsel of record for the substituted defendants, his last hour motion to withdraw as counsel and disclaimer that said defendants have hired him to represent them which he filed one day before the date set for resumption of the hearing came too late and was properly ignored by the Court. The Court could not accept this turn-about on his mere "say-so." His motion was not verified. Aside from the fact that his said motion carried no notice, in violation of the requirement of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court, and could therefore be treated as a "mere scrap of paper", [[12]]the said motion was likewise fatally defective in that it carried no notice to his clients on record, the defendants-appellants, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, it is well settled that "(A)n attorney seeking to withdraw must make an application to the court, for the relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation." [[13]] The trial court's ignoring of the last-hour motion and its handing down of its decision on the day of the hearing, upon the failure of defendants and their counsel to appear, in spite of their having been duly notified thereof, was in effect a denial of counsel's application for withdrawal. Atty. Garcia's unexplained failure to appear was unexcusable. He had no right to presume that the Court would grant his withdrawal. If he had then appeared and insisted on his withdrawal, the trial court could then have had the opportunity to order the appearance of defendants-appellants and verify from them the truth of his assertion that they had not "hired him to represent them." 3. The trial court, therefore, did not render a "premature judgment in an unfinished case where the defendants were not given their day in court", as claimed in the last error assigned by appellants. As stated earlier, the record shows that on March 19, 1958, the original defendant's widow, Leonarda Manit was placed by Atty. Garcia on the witness stand during the deceased's lifetime and testified that her husband "has no business of his own, because he is sickly" and that she was the one operating and managing their transportation business of three trucks since as early as 1952, some years before the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1956. [[14]] In effect, the widow, Leonarda Manit had then submitted herself to the Court's jurisdiction, asserting as she did that she was the one operating the business and that her husband had no business of his own. The widow and her three children of age as heirs of the deceased cannot therefore claim ignorance of the pendency of the case, and that notwithstanding that she was the actual operator and manager of the business, that she has been kept in complete ignorance of its subsequent developments, after her husband's death over 10 years ago. Almost 10 years have elapsed since they were substituted in 1959 as defendants for the deceased, and it taxes all credibility for them to claim now in their brief that "said new defendants did not even know that they became parties in the Amended Complaint," [[15]] and that all this time not the slightest effort was made by them to find out from Atty. Garcia or from the Court for that matter what had happened to the case nor did Atty. Garcia in compliance with his duty as an officer of the Court inform them of the decision handed down by the Court Over 9 years ago. Having failed to appear on the day set for trial without any justifiable explanation to the Court nor having presented an affidavit of merits as to the existence of valid and lawful defenses, they cannot now complain of having been deprived of their day in Court. The circumstances of the case and the appeal taken all together lead to the conclusion that the last-hour withdrawal application of Atty. Garcia and his appeal "as officer of the Court and then counsel of the deceased" was but a device to prolong this case and delay in the execution of the judgment, which should have been carried out years ago. The imposition of double costs is therefore in order. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with double costs to be paid by the attorney for defendants. So ordered.

Visitacion vs. Manit27 SCRA 523, March 28, 1969J. TeehankeeFacts: Alfonso Visitacion, plaintiff-appellee, filed a case against defendant Victor Manit to holdhim liable subsidiarily as employer for the death of his son, Delano Visitacion, as a result of injuries sustained in vehicular collision involving Manits driver, Rudolfo Giron, who was found insolvent after being convicted and sentenced. The case was heard without defendant or hiscounsel being present which resulted in plaintiff presenting evidence and the case wassubmitted for decision. The defendant filed a motion for new trial which was granted and theproceeding continued with the defendants presenting their evidence. On October 14, 1958, Atty. Garcia, defendants counsel, manifested that Victor Manit had recently died and the plaintiffs counsel amended the complaint by impleading the widow and heirs of the deceased. On January 27, 1960, Atty. Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as counsel alleging that Manits heirs did not hire him to represent them and both counsel and his client failed to appear at the trial thenext day. The Court considered them having renounced their right to appear and present evidence to contest plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment in favor of plainti ff. Atty. Garcias motion to withdraw was not passed upon and his subsequent motion for reconsideration wasdenied. Thus, he filed this present appeal Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to continue the case without thedefendants brought to it by summons and without informing said defendants that theyhave become parties to the case? 2. Whether or not the lower court erred in ignoring the motion to withdraw filed byAtty. Garcia? 3. Whether or not the new defendants were not given their day in court? Held:Appealed judgment affirmed w/ double costs to be paid by attorney fordefendants. No error was committed because the record shows that Atty. Garcia had acknowledgedthe receipt of the amended complaint substituting the defendant heirs as counsel for defendants. They were impleaded and submitted to the Courts jurisdiction through theircounsels acknowledgment of the amended complaint; the issuance of a summons was unnecessary.The last-hour motion to withdraw filed one day before the hearing came too late and wasproperly ignored. The motion was not verified and also carried no notice to his clients on record which was in violation of the Rules of Court (Rule 15, Sec. 4 and Rule 138, Sec. 26,respectively). An attorney who could not get the written consent of his client must makean application to the court, for the relation does not terminate formally until there is awithdrawal of record. The decision rendered by the lower court, upon failure of defendants and counsel to appear, despite notification was in effect a denial of counsels application forwithdrawal. Atty. Garcias failur e to appear was unexcusable and he had no right to assume thatthe Court would grant his application. Counsel had no right to presume that the court would grant his withdrawal and therefore must still appear on the date of hearing. The attorneys duty to s afeguard the clients interests commences from his retainer until his defective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. The circumstances had lead the Court to believe that the last-hour application to withdraw wasmerely a device to prolong the case and delay execution of judgment.There was no premature judgment rendered because the record shows that thedefendant heirs were shown to be aware of the existence of the case. Leonarda Manit wascalled upo n as witness during the deceaseds lifetime by Atty. Garcia and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither her nor her 3 children of age can claim ignorance of thependency of the case. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee. Karingal & Badong for petitioner. A. C. Regalado & F. B. for other respondents. , J.:

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On April 4, 1961, Josefa Baluis Vda. de Jacob filed with the regional office of the Department of Labor in Naga City a claim for compensation against the A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., alleging, among others, that on October 11, 1960, at about 3:00 o'clock p.m., her deceased husband Agripino Jacob, who was then employed by said company as line inspector, was attacked by co-employee with a bolo causing his death on October 12, 1960. The company, upon being informed of Jacob's death, filed within the reglementary period the required employer's report of accident stating therein that it would oppose any claim for death compensation that may be filed by any party in interest on the ground that the death of Agripino Jacob did not arise out of or in the course of his employment but it occurred while he was on leave of absence. The hearing officer to which the case was assigned received the evidence and rendered decision dismissing the complaint on the ground advanced by the company. Not satisfied with this decision, the complainant moved to have it reconsidered, and the same having been denied, the hearing officer elevated the case to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for review. On July 3, 1962, the Commission, thru Chairman N. Baens del Rosario, reversed the decision declaring the claim compensable. Hence, it ordered the company to pay the claimant P4,000.00 as compensation, P200.00 as funeral expenses, P300.00 as attorney's fees, and P46.00 as docket fee under Section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In due time, the company filed the present petition for review. The stipulation of facts shows that the deceased Agripino Jacob was employed as a line inspector by petitioner with a salary of P165.00 a month. He was at the time of his death the encumbent president of the Bicol Transportation Employees Mutual Aid Association, BITEMAA for short, an organization which is entirely independent of the company and wherein the latter had nothing to do with its internal affairs. He was then on leave of absence thru a request duly approved by the company and when on October 11, 1960 at about 3:00 p.m. he attended a meeting of the board of directors and officers of BITEMAA he was attacked by a co-employee with a bole causing his death on the next day. Upon the foregoing facts, respondent Commission found Agripino Jacob's death compensable even if it did not actually arise out of his employment. The factors that were considered by it are: the deceased at the time of his aggression was still in the employ of the company though he was then on leave of absence. One of the purposes of the BITEMAA was to promote better understanding between the employer and its employees and anything taken up in the meeting would in the long run inure to the welfare of the company's business. The meeting was with the approval of the company. While it appears that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the lifting of the expulsion of one Simeon Vellez from its board of directors, there is nothing in the record to show any motive that could have been the cause of the hacking of the deceased. However, since Agripino Jacob had the role of working for the benefit of the employees as well as promoting good relations with the management it is possible that what precipitated his assault was a matter taken up by him which in the eyes of the members was a move in favor of the management. It is, therefore, fair to consider Jacob's death as one arising out of or in the course of his employment. Considering the philosophy behind the requirement that to be compensable the death must occur while the worker is performing some work in the course of his employment or doing something arising out of his employment, the authorities are to the effect that to come within the purview of such requirement three things must concur: the injury must be received during the period covered by the employment, the worker must be shown to have been injured at the time and place where the performance of his work requires him to be, and the worker must have been doing something in pursuance of his work.1 And so it has been held that a wound received by a worker outside the performance of his duties and in a place other than where the performance of his work requires him to be is injury not "arising out of or in the course of his employment" (Sunga v. City of Manila, 57 Phil. 869). Here these requirements are not present for admittedly the deceased when assaulted was not performing any work in pursuance of his duties and was neither in the place where his work required him to be, but was at the time presiding a meeting of a labor association the internal affairs of which are entirely independent of the company where he was then employed. It is true that at the time of his assault the deceased was still an employee of the company for he has not yet severed his employment with it, but the fact that he was then on leave of

absence is clear proof the he was not then performing his usual duties as inspector, nor doing anything in relation thereto, to come within the purview of the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment." The presumption, therefore, of the law that the claim is deemed to be valid unless the contrary is shown does not here apply, mainly for the reason that the deceased's leave of absence takes this case out of its purview. The finding of respondent Commission that since the deceased was then the president of an association whose purpose is to promote better understanding between the employer and its employees it is reasonable to suppose that what precipitated the attack is a matter taken up by him which appears in the eyes of the members as move in favor of the management, not only does not find support in the evidence, but is easily refuted by the fact that the avowed purpose of the meeting was to take up the expulsion of one Simeon Vellez from its board of directors. No other matter appears in the agenda for discussion, nor is there any inkling as to what had motivated the hacking of the deceased. While the modern trend of progressive labor legislation tends to foster harmonious relations between unions and management, - a matter which should be encouraged, - we are not prepared to relax the rule that would open the door to abuse and extreme liberalism. A happy medium should be sought which would be fair to both management and labor without doing violence to the law. The conclusion we have reached is in line with this point of view. Another factor that argues against respondent's claim is that it was filed nearly five months after the death of the deceased contrary to Section 24 of Act 3428, which requires that a claim for compensation should be filed within three months after death. This can only be offset by proof that the employer has voluntarily given some compensation to the employee in relation to the injury, a situation which does not here obtain. Verily this claim has already prescribed.2 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. No costs.

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