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Enunciation and narration: World and text

JOSE MARIA NADAL

The semiotic phenomena called here narrations (i.e., the explicit or elliptic descriptions an utterance provides of its production, of that which the utterance states explicitly or elliptically is its production) are more often called enunciations. I have made such an uncommon lexical distinction between these terms though in line for instance with studies of the importance of Barthes for reasons of clarity. By starting with the distinction between enunciation and narration, I will try to shed new light on some of the main issues in textual semiotic studies: referentiality, discursive typology, the manipulation of the implicit enunciator, and other issues which we will mention briefly toward the end of this paper. Why is it that semioticians indiscriminately use the term enunciation to describe two clearly different processes? Why consider what is actually the study of narrations to be the study of enunciations!
First part: The World

Production and its representation In order to avoid these inadequacies, I would like to consider an enunciation as the production of meaning in the natural world. If we semiotically analyze processes or transformations such as a conversation, a political meeting, the work of an artist in front of his easel, the task of a photographer with his instruments or a writer with his society, we will be dealing with enunciations. On the other hand, when we analyze how traces or sub-utterances appear in the texts resulting from these activities, traces or sub-utterances of what the texts state as their own production, we will be dealing with narrations. An enunciation is the production of a text in the natural world: it is a speech act. A narration is the explicit or elliptic uttered representation of a production, being the text its product, according to the text.
Semiotica 81-3/4, 357-384 0037-1998/90/0081-0357 $2.00

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An enunciation cannot be fictitious in itself; nor can a narration. Fiction arises when there is no credible correspondence or at least judged as such between (A) the discursive syntactic and semantic structures of the enunciation's content form and the natural world in which it is produced, and (B) the narration and the part of the utterance which does not describe the narrator's role. The natural world in which enunciation is produced is also known as non-enunciation. Enunciation the speech act and non-enunciation are creative structures of the text. The narrator is the discursive actant whose syntactic discursive values are /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/. The utterance which does not describe the role of the narrator is called the narrated or the non-narration. For the effective enunciatee, the iconicity of a text also depends on a possible intersemioticity between the text and the natural world. To obtain this intersemioticity, the actual enunciator will have to utter his text in accordance with the semantic universe of the enunciatee i.e., according to how the receiver conceives that the natural world should be enunciated with a certain type of discourse, persuading him to believe that the utterance and his natural world are analogous. We believe that what has been known as the study of enunciations has been erroneously named for over twenty-five years, for the analysis of the way in which narrator and narratee present utterances, of the circumstances surrounding a narration, of the manner in which the meaning of a text is actually connected with the narration, etc. is the study of narrations. On the other hand, we might consider that while different cultures define them to be art, enunciations are generally the object of the study of Sociology and Pragmatics. These disciplines deal with the 'artistic institution', history of arts, artists' biographies, the relationship between discourse acts and artistic genres, etc. For the last twenty-five years, narrations have been called enunciations. From the very beginning, when the first articles of this modern study were published, the authors proceeded from defining what they considered to be an enunciation to analyzing narrations, without realizing their contradiction. This is an additional reason to be precise in referring to each item by its proper name.
Jakobson and the paper enunciator

Jakobson (1957) distinguished between a speech act or enunciation process and its protagonists, and the acts narrated in the utterance and its protagonists. But his article makes obvious that what he meant by enunci-

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Enunciation and narration 3 59 ation and enunciator were in fact narration and narrator. Let us take a look at Jakobson's well-known text in order to pinpoint the oversight we have been referring to:
2.1 In order to classify the verbal categories two basic distinctions are to be observed: 1) speech itself (s), and its topic, the narrated matter (n); 2) the event itself (E), and any of its participants (P), whether 'performer' or 'undergoer'. Consequently four items are to be distinguished: a narrated event (En), a speech event (Es), a participant of the narrated event (Pn), and a participant of the speech event (Ps), whether addresser or addressee. (1957: 3).

Up to this point, we find no contradictions in the definitions. Let us take a closer look at what is meant by enunciation and by protagonist of the enunciation. For example, in the definition of the category of person:
2.21 Pn/P) PERSON characterizes the participants of the narrated event with reference to the participants of the speech event. Thus first person signals the identity of a participant of the narrated event with the performer of the speech event, and the second person, the identity with the actual or potential undergoer of the speech event. (1957: 4)

Thus, process of utterance means non-enunciative actions that is to say, those actions in the story (thus described in the utterance) which are not the actions (also described in the utterance) by which the narrator claims to tell that story. Process of enunciation means precisely those other actions (the enunciative, known as enunciated enunciation) or group of actions which, following Barthes, I have proposed to call narration. The category of person thus indicates the relationship of identity or alterity between the syntactic actor who plays the discursive actantial role of narrator and the actor about whom he is talking at a certain point in the story. Thus, the first person refers not to the enunciator a being belonging to the natural world but instead to the narrator (but note that this is only true when we are referring to a first person which implies the /Ego/-/Now/--/Here/ as syntactic discourse values of signification i.e., the first person associated to a /Now/-/Here/, and not to a /Not now/). This narrator is a discursive actant of the utterance, a being made out of paper (Nadal 1985a). It may seem that I am overly immanent that, for example, in my discourse, the second person refers to you, dear readers, and the first person to myself, J. M. Nadal. This is obviously true, but it is due to the existence of an enunciative illusion and to intersemioticity. In my text, the second person refers to the narratee, nonexistent anywhere else but

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here. This narratee is the signification of a linguistic sign. You, the reader, are unique, unrepeatable, a natural being. Tomorrow, a different reader can read this same text, somewhere else perhaps, and feel as implied in the communication as you yourself, thanks to an enunciative effect and to intersemioticity (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 312-313; 1986: 110-113, 119; Sebeok 1986: 354-384, 790-792). Furthermore: suppose we were to attend the same conference. Since you do not know who I am, I could have sent another person a friend, for instance with my text, and you would never have been aware of it. Let us suppose I had actually done it. The truth is that one may never know. Since the text claims to have been written by J. M. Nadal, who is thus narrator of the text, you, fooled by an enunciative illusion, would undoubtedly believe that the actual physical person reading the text to you is J. M. Nadal. But this would not be the case. The person reading the text to you would not be J. M. Nadal, but instead his friend, a secret substitute. Thus, either the first person of a text, its name, or its signature can designate the actor who plays the part of actant narrator. The /Ego/-/ Now/-/Here/ values or its signature exclusively designate the discursive actant narrator. Because of the enunciative effect, you interpret this actant of textual semiotics to be a simulated enunciator, actor of the referent resulting from the utterance; and because of the subsequent process of intersemioticity, the simulated enunciator is identified with the natural or physical enunciator who is actually reading the words of the narrator at the conference. This intersemiotic process could be altered by information the enunciatees (the audience at the conference) may have, or by the characteristics or doings of the enunciator: his accent, his/her sex, etc. I could not have sent a woman or a person from Japan, because my name is easily recognizable as belonging to a European male.
Jakobson and the appreciation of the non-narrator

Allow me to continue with the imaginary conference. From the speaker's platform, I say:
You will discover (and not all will approve) that I do not hold with certain of my colleagues who tell us that literature, in its most valuable and intriguing moments, is 'fundamentally non-referential'. I may come before you in my jacket and my tie, I may address you as madam and sir, but I am going to request nonetheless that you restrain yourselves from talking about 'structure', 'form', and 'symbols' at least during my speech. It seems to me that many of you have been intimidated sufficiently by your professions and should be allowed to recover

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and restore to respectability those interests and enthusiasms that more than likely drew you to reading fiction to begin with and which you oughtn't to be ashamed of now. As an experiement you might even want during the conference to try living without any classroom terminology at all, to relinquish 'utterances' and 'actors' right along with those very exalted words with which not a few of you like to solemnize your observations, such as 'process', 'paradigm', and, of course, 'semiotics' as a modifier of everything existing under the sun.

While this example may be a bit too baroque, I hope it seemed credible to you. My intention was not to fool anyone. The sentences I have just presented to you correspond to the words of David Kepesch, a young professor of Comparative Literature, the homodiegetic actor who is an /Ego/-/Now/ ('je narranf) discursive actant and an /Ego/-/Not now/ ('je narre') discursive actant as well and simulated enunciator of the novel by Philip Roth ('Philip Roth' are the graphics or substance of the expression of a series of signs whose meaning is a person from the natural world; in this case, the effective enunciator of the novel) entitled The Professor of Desire (1985: 183). As you can see, the first person indicates the actor who plays the role of the syntactic-discursive narrator actant, who simulates the enunciator and generates intersemioticity, in this way connecting textual semiotics to the natural world; however, this does not assure you that the enunciator simulated by the narrator actually corresponds to the enunciator who has written the text. In Jakobson's paper (1957), the confusion between enunciator and narrator is continuous: '2.31 EnEs) TENSE characterizes the narrated event with reference to the speech event. Thus the preterit informs us that the narrated event is anterior to the speech event' (1957: 4). But Jakobson was mistaken. Once again, the moments related by the discursive-syntactic category of time are the narrated (the non-enunciative utterance) and the narration (the enunciative utterance), which may or may not coincide with that of enunciation, a coincidence for which the time category provides no information whatsoever. After this initial mistake, Jakobson does not return to enunciations; rather, he focuses on the shifters of the utterance a certain type of linguistic sign which, contrary to the general belief, and to Jakobson in particular, refers not to the situation of enunciation, but instead to that of narration. This statement is valid in any type of semiotics: graphic verbal, oral verbal, iconographic, or of any genre; not only for fiction or for literary semiotics. We have given a different meaning to the term 'enunciated enunciation', which Jakobson coined in the above-mentioned article (1957). He understood the enunciated enunciation to be not the narration, but rather, in terms of semiotic narratology, a non-nan atonal appreciation', an apprecia-

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tion of an appreciates that, for Jakobson, was 'the alleged source of information about the narrated event' (1957: 4). This source of information is sometimes what Jakobson refers to as the protagonist of the process of enunciation (i.e., the narrator), although the narrator may be disassociated from it at times. Jakobson illustrates this disassociation: To our question, what happened to the steamer Evdokija, a Bulgarian first answered: zaminala "it is claimed to have sailed", and then added: zamina "I bear witness; it sailed'" (1957: 4-5). Jakobson claims that in 'It is claimed to have sailed' (1957: 5), the enunciated enunciation is separated from the enunciation. Actually, this is not exactly what occurs. In Jakobson's example there is only one narrator, who in the beginning of his utterance detaches himself from the appreciator, who is then an impersonal actant ('It is claimed') whose opinion is quoted in indirect speech (That the steamer Evdokija has sailed'). For further readings on the questions of mode and voice, you may refer to an article by J. M. Nadal (1985b) and to the section of this paper titled 'Utterance yielding operations'.

LanguageI speech and enunciationfutterance Benveniste was correct when he wrote in 1970 that the enunciation was not the discourse, that one should differentiate between the use of forms of language and the usage of language (1981c: 80):
Tout autre chose est l'emploi de la langue. II s'agit ici d'un mecanisme total et constant qui, d'une maniere ou d'une autre, affecte la langue entiere.... L'enonciation est cette mise en fonctionnement de la langue par un acte individuel d'utilisation.... II faut prendre garde a la condition specifique de Fenonciation: c'est Tacte meme de produire un enonce et non le texte de l'enonce qui est notre objet.

Unfortunately, the confusion Benveniste tried to avoid i.e., to confuse deictics and certain verbal morphemes with enunciation, which, as he himself claimed, is a discrete, individual, unique, unrepeatable act, etc. is widespread among his studies. Because of this, Benveniste's most famous levels of enunciation are, in fact, nothing but levels of utterance. In any case, Benveniste (1981 a, b, and c) and Jakobson (1957) were the first to approach enunciation, and their studies are evidence of unsurpassed insight and intelligence. This can be seen by the fact that this is still one of the main preoccupations in linguistics and in discourse theory, regardless of whether it is semiotic or not.

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Enunciation and narration 363 The Greimasians, or the theory smashes its object Greimas and his disciples have also devoted themselves for several years to the task of elaborating a semiotic theory of enunciation (Nadal 1986). I would argue that the Greimasian studies on this subject commit and even augment the defects in the work of the pioneers. Thus, enunciation is usually mistaken for narration, the enunciator for the narrator, enunciation for the enunciative text, and the enunciator for the signs of the narration. Another frequent confusion among Greimasians is that they confuse enunciation with elliptic narration i.e., with an objectivist narration in which no explicit enunciative indicators are meant to be left. The enunciation which is implicit in a text is also confused by Greimasians with a natural or effective enunciation, which is simply enunciation. The Paris School wrongly makes the implicit enunciator responsible for semiosis, and does not often distinguish between the subject effect created by the text and the subject who created the text. Greimasians also err when they take the implicit enunciator and its activity to be the narrator and his. They identify, in a partial, arbitrary way, the utterance with the enuncive text, and they even affirm that the enuncive does not position itself with regard to the narrative situation. In general, they tend to confuse the process considered as a discourse act and not as the syntagmatic core of the language with the product the process creates and with the system that governs it. The term or notion of enuncive linking (embrayage enoncif), necessary in order to establish a reference for the enuncive text, is restricted to the effect of 'narration homodiegetique* formally camouflaged. They limit, without justification, the enunciation, making it a theoretical instance at the most superficial level of the generative trajectory of signification, while it seems evident that to enunciate implies the actualization ofthat whole generative trajectory of signification. Due to these misunderstandings, Greimasians do not value many important contributions made by other schools to the theory of enunciation and narration. There are several reasons for these shortcomings. The first is the ambiguity of the terms 'engagement' or 'connection' and 'disengagement' or 'disconnection' (embrayage and debrayage). Sometimes these operations are understood as the breaking or reestablishment of an actantial, timely, or spatial isotopy, and sometimes as the effects of deployment over the utterance of the syntactic-discursive enuncive and enunciative values and of the simulacrum of linking with the enunciator of those same categories. The second cause of confusion is the need for a clearer definition, in

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Greimasian studies, of the subjects which participate in the different levels of communication. The enunciator, the implicit enunciator, the logically presupposed, and the narrator are actually all subjects, but not all of them have the same semiotic existence, because each of them is related to objects and functions which are semiotically different. The third reason, and undoubtedly the one behind the majority of these misunderstandings, is the confusion of the semiotic object (or object semiotics) with the semiotic theory. Enunciations in the macrosemiotics of the natural world or narrations in textual semiotics are objects of analysis on many occasions; to mistake them for it is a major error. Enunciation, as an object of study, is not at all the instance of the generative trajectory of signification which has been called enunciation. In the publications of Greimas and his disciples, the semiotic theory of enunciation is hypertrophied, and it often smashes its objective, the analysis of an enunciation and of a narration, both of which are virtually made to disappear. We cannot go into further detail. We will compromise with three short examples. As Greimas and Courtes say:
Une confusion regrettable est souvent entretenue entre Fenonciation proprement dite, dont le mode d'existence est d'etre le presuppose logique de Penonce, et enonce (ou rappoitee) qui n'esi que le simulacre imitant, a Finterieur du discours, le faire enonciatif: le 'je', F'icF ou le 'maintenant' que rencontre dans le discours enonce, ne represented aucunement le sujet, Fespace ou le temps de Tenonciation. (1979: 128)

But only a few pages earlier, Greimas and Courtes (1979: 123-124) have comitted precisely the regrettable confusion:
...Fenonce comporte souvent des elements qui renvoient a Finstance de Fenonciation: ce sont, d'une part, les pronoms personnels et possessifs, les adjectifs et adverbes appreciatifs, les deictiques spatiaux et temporeis, etc. (dont Felimination permet d'obtenir un texte enoncif, considere comme deporvu des marques de Fenonciation), et, de 'autre, les verbes performantifs (qui sont des elements descriptifs de Fenonciation, enonces et rapportes dans Fenonce, et qui peuvent etre egalement consideres comme des marques aidant concevoir et construire Finstance de Fenonciation).

This confusion between the implicit (or implied) enunciation and the narration is widely illustrated by Greimas and Courtos (1979), and it also appears in the works of some of Greimas's closest disciples. One of them, for example, referring to the same elicitation of the enunciative text, adds to the former confusion that of a natural or effective enunciation. He states (Bertrand 1984: 30):

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La semiotique, dans sa demarche initiale, s'est explicitement desinteressee de la problematique du sujet enonciateur et de sa reference obligee, la situation de communication. Elle a choisi de proceder, selon la formule de A. J. Greimas, Tobjectivation du texte' (Semantique structural, Paris, Larousse, 1966): conformement a ce choix eile a elimine les coordonnees specifiques du locuteur, c'esta-dire la categoric de la personne, celle du temps, celle de la deixis, ainsi que tous les elements phatiques.

Contrary to what Bertrand states, the 'situation de communication' he describes is simply the situation of narration formed by the /Ego/-/Now/ -/Here/ of the utterance; this 'sujet enonciateur' is not an enunciator either, or even an implicit addresser of the communication, but instead a discursive actant immersed in the utterance a narrator. This brief and harsh criticism does not mean that the Greimasian theory of enunciation is not interesting; on the contrary, we frankly believe that it is. However, in our opinion, it needs a radical revision. We will not analyze psychoanalytic theory here; nor will we analyze the theories of Culioli, Ducrot, Peirce, or the language philosophers. This will be dealt with elsewhere. Our purpose now is to outline a clear basis which will allow a simple and coherent study of enunciation and narration. To meet this purpose, we will be working with textual semiotics, analyzing the possibility of a macrosemiotics of the natural world, studying the distinction between textual semiotics and macrosemiotics of the natural world, and also between the macro-levels of text and the world. Textual semiotics Since the world is a discourse as much as any other text the real problem consists in knowing when a discourse is textual semiotics in the usual restricted sense. A semiotic object may be considered textual semiotics when it is the result of an enunciation. The defining feature of textual semiotics is its metasemiotic nature, as an utterance in another utterance, an utterance in the world. It is also the value of what is being constructed, of what does not belong to the natural world. If the system which produces the objects of textual semiotics is natural (for example, natural language), the products of such systems, textual semiotics, are characterized as being created, whether they be verbal texts, pictorial, etc. Discourses of textual semiotics are self-limited in their form. This allows us to distinguish an oral utterance, a film, a theatrical representation, a picture, or a traffic sign from the natural world to which it belongs. The self-limiting form of such objects entails discontinuity, and therefore the establishment of time or space limits for every textual semiotic dis-

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course. However, its most peculiar feature may be the guided intentionality Greimas and Courtes (1979) speak of, but guided independent of the enunciation situation in the natural world, in which textual semiotics took place, and independent of the enunciator, once the utterance has been produced. The text of any normal conversation has meaning by itself, without having to refer to the extralinguistic context in which it took place. The same thing happens with a drawing or a photograph. A drawing or a text of a harangue can create a narrative situation capable of reconstructing its signification, whatever the intentions of the effective enunciators might have been, with whom they might or might not agree, and free (in the case of the harangue) from the syncretic semiotics (gestures, movements, scents, clothing, and words) in which verbal semiotics are embedded (which will allow the catalysis of an implied enunciator of a higher rank). We must not forget that the consideration of a discourse as a case of textual semiotics is socioculturally conditioned. When changing the episteme, factors determining this textually are consequently altered. The natural world The natural world is not the real world. Man does not know too many things about the real world what we consider to be real-live beings are beings from the natural world. Greimas and Courtes affirm:
Nous entendons par monde naturel le paraitre selon lequel 1'univers se presente a rhomme comme un ensemble de qualites sensibles, dote d'une certaine organisation qui le fait parfois designer comme 'le monde du sens commun'... c'est, d'autre part, une structure 'de surface' car il se presente dans le cadre d'une relation sujet/objet, il est Tenonce' construit par le sujet humain et dechiffrable par lui.... le monde naturel est un langage figuratif, dont les figures que nous retrouvons dans le plan du contenu des langues naturelles sont faites des 'qualites sensibles' du monde et agissent directement sans mediation linguistique sur rhomme. (1979: 233-234)

Thus, the natural world is the effect of meaning originating as a consequence of the encounter between us and the real world (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 116). We might even say that we perceive ourselves as an effect of meaning derived from this encounter. Man understands the natural world as being meaningful. Its autonomous internal articulation allows us to consider the world as a semiotic object (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 339). The natural world in itself and human behavior not producing textual semiotics are also considered

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meaningful. Rain, reproduction, the outburst of Spring these facts are very meaningful to mankind. They are often far more defining than many of the articulate meanings produced by a case of textual semiotics. Greimas's semiotic theory may be perfectly transformed into the metasemiotics which analyzes the natural-world macrosemiotics. Greimas and Courtes claim they are ready to initiate this task: On voit, des lors, que les modeles narratifs constants pour rendre compte des comportements pragmatiques "en papier", peuvent etre transposes en vue d'une semiotique "pragmatique" naturelle' (1979: 166). Eric Landowski insisted upon the same idea (Greimas and Landowski 1983: 12):
il n'y a pas de fremderes du semiotique, mais tout au plus des semiotiques differentes, les unes se manifestant a travers la diversite des langues naturelles, les autres apprehensibles seulement en tant que semiotique du monde naturel.... notre formule revient simplement, on le voit, redefinir le soidisant contexte, autrement dit, le monde de reference (ou encore le 'reel'), comme un langage: un langage parmi d'autres ....

At this stage, we feel obliged to mention Kant and phenomenology, theories of knowledge to which semiotic theory owes a great deal. The question of method, the independence of a discipline in relation to its object of study, pure descriptions, antigenetism, the desire to determine what their object of knowledge actually is, the subject of knowledge, the apprehension of the object, the relationships of existence, etc., and all this without pretending to discover the nature of the object or the subject, or of any other reality previous to them or what might be their merging into one, the effort of trying not to fall into idealism or into realism, etc.
Caution as vice

In spite of its proposal, the semiotic theory has hardly started the study of the natural world. Most semioticians confuse the natural world macrosemiotics, or discourse that our conscience builds up about the real world, with the real world itself, and, fearing the substantialism that might exist if they engaged themselves with the study of the real world, which is really noncognizable, they put aside the natural world and limit themselves to textual semiotics strictly speaking. Acting accordingly, Bertrand writes (1984: 32):
la prudence du semioticien, soucieux, pour preserver la coherence de s methode, de prevenir toute incursion inopinee du 'monde exterieur' (dont le Statut releve

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368 J. M. Nadal d'une decision philosophique) dans le champ de Fanalyse du discours, veut qu'on n'accorde a Tenonciation 'veritable' que le Statut d'une pure et simple presupposition. These statements, which might be permissible if they were proposed only for the immanent study of textual semiotics, are unfortunate because they presume the arbitrary exclusion of the natural world as a semiotic object and its identification with the real world. In fact, we can choose to make the text our sole object of study; in this case, it seems reasonable to forget about enunciation and to stick to the study of implied enunciation, of the presupposed and of the narration (among many other items). But our semiotic object may be the natural world or one of its many transformations; in this case, enunciation acquires its full rights, like any other semiotic object. It is not that it is less dangerous to confuse the natural world with the real world (as inexperienced thought may do) than it is to confuse the real world with the natural world (as hypercautious semioticians do). Substantialism is impossible unless considered as ideal reasoning or as a nightmare. Eric Landowski (Greimas and Landowski 1983: 3-4, 9-17; Landowski 1983, 1989) is right when he says that the natural world is but an utterance in a nonverbal language. This utterance is not natural in the proper sense of the term. Cultural episteme imposes a distorted vision on us (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 78, 250). It is not necessary to believe that nonverbal language might be one of a kind either; it is a compound of superimposed languages (1979: 203); in this sense we speak of macrosemiotics and syncretic semiotics (1979: 166). Both semiotics, textual and natural, must be immanently studied. Natural-world semiotics embodies textual semiotics. We can distinguish in both types an implied intentionality natural in the former, artificial (oriented) in the latter. As far as the boundaries between natural world macrosemiotics and textual semiotics are concerned, Barthes said (1966: 28): au-dela du niveau narrationnel, commence le monde, c'est-a-dire d'autres systemes (sociaux, economiques, ideologiques).... analyse du discours s'arrete au discours: il faut ensuite passer une autre semiotique.

Semiotics and God: Macrolevels of signification In order to describe the relationship between natural-world macrosemiotics and textual semiotics we can imagine a script as follows: let us admit

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that in a first macrolevel there is (semiotically, beware!) a real narrator. We could address him as God by convention. This real narrator would be located in a real statement which would only consist of the real world. There would be a series of original beings in it. The perception those beings might have, as far as original enunciators, of the real world would produce an utterance (or several utterances) which would be considered original. Having reached this point, we leave hypothetical grounds and go on to semiotics of scientific vocation. This original utterance, product of the individual mind, will be understood as being deprived of psychologism that is, we put the real world in parenthesis without deciding about its nature. Each man's conscience, the utterance we have agreed to call original, is the one which constitutes nothing other than natural world macrosemiotics. We suppose that this natural world is the real world image. We could speak of a meaning effect of this macrosemiotics which would consist of the elaboration of what we might call, for example, God implied in the natural world. The term is what matters less. The idea of absurd or of the senseless would actually be valuable in shaping this instance created by natural intentionality deriving from the world to each and every one of us. As in any other utterance, we have discursive actants, narrators and non-narrators, in the consciousness understood as the original utterance, at a level which corresponds to discursive syntax of signification. The original narrator of each conscience is the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/. This original narrating subject confronts the original narrated subject, which is the /Ego-/Not Now/-/Here/ and the /Not Ego/. The /Ego in Itself/ is the original enunciator which my conscience simulates: not the original enunciator, but the one simulated by my conscience an /Ego In Itself/ to have a meaning effect from 'an external subject to my conscience and its creator whom I cannot have access to'. I only have access to my conscience. I cannot get rid of it, and come to an understanding of myself as a real being that produces this consciousness. We have the illusion that we see ourselves through that /Ego In Itself/, which is only the simulation of the original enunciator that has been built from the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/ of my conscience. The original enunciator who 'reads' my conscience, and who stands outside of it, can only 'read', can only understand itself through it, simulating itself from its original narrator. The opposition between the /Ego In Itself/ and the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/ is one of the internal /ego/, 'subjective', facing the external /Ego/, Objective', in relation with the rest of the natural world. The two non-simulated /Ego/s the ego-narrator (/Ego/-/Now//Here/) and the ego-narrated (/Ego/-/Not Now/) could be compared

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to Spitzer's dichotomy (from which we borrow the term), and also to Genette's extradiegetic/intradiegeticness. It is impossible to confuse the terminology, since Spitzer and Genette speak of textual semiotics, while we are describing what refers to the natural world. It looks as though Saint Thomas conceived an intentional species for the /Ego/, alternatively understood as subject and object. Kant referred to the unifying transcendental conscience of /Ego In Itself/, and he called the empirical conscience /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/. Transcendental conscience is, then, only conscience: an illusion of reality, of transcending my conscience, which produces the interpretation of my empirical conscience. In textual semiotics, in the discursive syntax of signification, these concepts might be expressed by the same syntactic actor made up of two discursive actants, one being the narrator and the other a non-narrator, which would be semantically co-referential. That is, a similar type of character to the one who plays the role of narrator in a homodiegetic description, according to Genette's theory. In the macrosemiotics of the natural world, which is what we are dealing with now, comparisons aside, it would be necessary to speak about a homodiegetic natural syntactic actor i.e., a homodiegetic actor instead of an imaginary actor of the real world: the simulated original enunciator. Conscience as macrosemiotics of the natural world, from which the /Ego/ takes part, was for Husserl the text of intentionality, of an intentional experience, of a movement toward an object, which would for us be nothing other than the natural narrator is in this utterance, taken as /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/. Husserl believed this intentional conscience to be the one that supplied us with time reference points as well as with spatial points to locate ourselves and inversely locate the /Non-Ego/. In every original utterance, there would be an intradiegetic part formed by the /Ego/ in the /Non-Ego/, and by the /Non-Ego/ in itself. Among the natural intradiegetic actants, some become natural or effective enunciators: we ourselves or others. Our conscience sometimes presents us with representations of natural beings, thus producing textual utterance. An enunciation consists, then, of a process of a natural enunciator which originates textual semiotics or, in other words, of an act happening in the macrosemiotics of the natural world which produces textual semiotics. This interaction enunciator-utterance is the semiotic object we call 'enunciation'. In this sense, a textual utterance is a hypo-utterance of the natural world. In textual utterances we find an articulated and oriented intentionality which creates the effect of the implicit enunciator, which is obviously neither the enunciator of the natural world nor the implicit enunciator of the natural world, but rather the idea of the enunciator which creates

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textual semiotics, an idea in agreement or disagreement with that of the actant narrator of the same text and with his discursive semantic attributes. Likewise, we can distinguish in textual semiotics, as in any other utterance, an extradiegetic level as well as an intradiegetic one. In agreement with what happens in natural-world macrosemiotics, narrators of textual semiotics are the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/ of a text; the nonnarrators are the /Ego/-/Not Now/ and the /Non-Ego/. A narration considered as a process is, in consequence, the relationship between extradiegetic and intradiegetic sub-utterances, the interactive process by which a narrator claims to produce the utterance in which he appears. This entire presentation may be illustrated by Figure 1. An effective or natural enunciatee tends, even when dealing with fiction, to produce a simulated enunciator originating from the textual narrator. This simulated enunciator is the meaning effect the textual narrator produces on the effective enunciatee due to the enunciative illusion an effect called engagement or embrayage by Greimasians. On occasion,
Real utterance: REAL WORLD (what actually exists) real narration/real rlarrated Original enunciators (each particular person in the real world) (Individual perception or conscience of the real world) Original utterance MACROSEMIOTICS OF THE NATURAL WORLD Implicit enunciator: God, the Absurd or Chance ... original / original narrat ed t];n /EGO/-/NOT NOW/ /NOW//NON-EGO/ /HERE/ effective or natural The texts enunciators Utterance: Textual S. Implicit enunciator textual narration /ego//now//here/ / textual narrated /ego//not now/ /not ego/

Figure 1. Macrolevels of signification

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372 /. M. Nadal this simulated enunciator may remit by intersemioticity to an effective natural enunciator. Let us return now to the initial distinction. To enunciate implies to narrate; narration presupposes enunciation. To enunciate implies to disconnect (debrayer) the utterance; to create it. To narrate presupposes a disconnection (debrayage) made by an effective enunciator. The effective enunciatee will consider the effective enunciator as a presupposed enunciator, as a mere logical instance. Furthermore, to narrate implies a link or connection (embrayage) with a simulated enunciator, established through the narrator. The study of enunciation is not relevant to narratology, although it is relevant to natural-world semiotics and to the study of what literature, history, painting, etc. mean to mankind. Enunciation is the basis of studies in communication. Mistaking the production with the produced, or with the representation of supposed production of the produced, constitutes a critical metalepsis which will not permit proper readings of a text or about the world. Barthes wrote (1966: 12): 'une fonction n'a de sens que pour autant qu'elle prend place dans 1'action generate d'un actant; et cette action elle-meme regoit son sens dernier du fait qu'elle est narree, confiee un discours qui a son propre code'. Behind this discourse which, as Barthes says, has its own semiotic system, one discovers what is considered to be extradiscursive the world.
Instances and signification

The analyst of discourses in the world should consider that the subject enunciator already exists semiotically as an actant to the utterance, and that what is known about this subject and its enunciation as a process, as a logical non-genetical process (the well-known logic which advances by returning) is useful; that the boundary of textual semiotics finds a legitimate barrier, but the crossing of such a barrier is as legitimate as its being respected. To distinguish clearly between what is effective and implicit enunciation, simulated enunciation and narration is beneficial for all levels of analysis. At a deeper level, an enunciation can respond to a semantic category which can differ from the one which rules the implicit enunciation and the narration. The same may be said about each of these last two categories if contrasted. The effective enunciator may separate itself, voluntarily or not, from the intentionality of its text and of its narrator; and the narrator may try to achieve his objectives or belong to a semantic microuniverse which may be different from those of the text to which he

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belongs. Nevertheless, according to the discourse, this text is his production. We could give countless examples, but we find them unnecessary at this point. At the semionarrative level, each instance independently organizes and hierarchizes its narrative programs and antiprograms. Objects of value and subjects differ. At the discursive level, the situation of enunciation may vary, not always correlating to the situation of narration, which is a stated situation of an utterance. Every instance's isotopies may be different. Iconicity and figurativization differ according to whether we are dealing with a narrator or with an effective enunciator; in the case of an implicit enunciator, they are nonexistent, because we are dealing not with a figurative actor, but with intentionality (Nadal 1986: 379; 1988b: 19). The same can be claimed about the distinction between extradiegetic and intradiegetic sub-utterances: different semantic categories, different programs, different isotopies. In reality, the proper reader of a picture or of a verbal discourse articulates the meaning of the text intuitively and unconsciously without mistaking its instances. It has taken a long time for poetics and general semiotics to separate the enunciator from the narrator (Nadal 1986). The distinction between enunciation and narration is a consequence of this differentiation. To forget these differences often means to omit or ignore signification.

Second part: The text Utterance yielding operations

Predication, appreciation, narration, and textualization are four operations on which the semiotic existence of any utterance is based. (A) To predicate involves: (a) producing narrative utterances a series of logically linked Utterances of State or Doing (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 124 n.4 and 5, 297-298); and (b) semanticizing them (in a restrictive sense, since the predication of narrative utterances is also a semantic operation, though of a syntactic type), by means of the creation of figures out of figurative and nonfigurative semes (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 328 n.8, 378-379 n.4, 5 and 6, 149 n.3, 146-148). The semiotic theory of the Paris School (Coquet 1982; Parret and Ruprecht 1985) accounts for adequate, rigorous, and coherent descriptions of this, under the following headings: (a) narrative syntax (Greimas and Courtes 1979: 381-383; 1986: 231-232), and (b) discourse semantics (1979: 328-330; 1986: 196-197).

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The production of both the narrative-syntactic and the discursivesemantic components of the theoretical model that simulates the generative trajectory of signification is only partial, being inadequate by itself to generate the structures that will be discursivized. Therefore, due to the need of discursivizing the appreciation (or 'point of view' or 'focalization'), we shall consider predication to be of a basic or narrative type namely, what the utterance 'tells' us. (B) To appreciate involves assigning the /knowing/ resulting from the narrative predication to an actant in the utterance. It means turning an actant into the support of the mentioned enunciated /knowing/, transforming it into an actant and basing the production and semanticization of the narrative utterances on this /knowing/. This very appreciation is in itself a semanticized narrative utterance which relates one actant to another narrative utterance (that of predication), which is considered as the Object of Value. In this sense, appreciation is a narratological kind of predication; it is not so closely connected to what is narrated (even though it fully determines it), since it is the way in which narration takes place. (C) Narration is the act (an act of the utterance) through which an actant discursivizes both narrative predication and narratological predication that is to say, by means of which the semantic-syntactic discursive categories of person, space, and time are added to the semanticized narrative utterances, which are the outcome of predication and appreciation. This actant (narrator) discursivizes the text, thus becoming the origin of the above categories, which are produced using the narrator as a point of reference. In other words, narration is the action of an enunciated actant (expressed morphemically or not; capable of being expressed morphemically), which tells or displays not only the 'story', but also the Opinion' or 'point of view' to which the 'story' refers. (D) Textualization decides the order in which the narrative utterances are linearized and the number of times they are textualized (including the possibility of their lack of surface manifestation or ellipsis), as well as the semantic density of the predication, which is what determines narration 'speed' and 'duration'. Ordering gives rise to analepsis, prolepsis, achrony, sylepsis, etc., and the density and frequency of textualization set up scenes, instances of ellipsis, summaries, pauses, iterations, and so on. Two excellent works by Genette (1972, 1983) analyze these questions structurally. The semanticization of narrative utterances, which is carried out by the semantic-discursive component of predication and not by textualization, is what-determines temporalization, spatialization, and actorialization strictly speaking i.e., of what does not depend on the narrator

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for temporal, spatial or personal origin, but simply on the semantic microuniverse, which is a part of the narrator's semiotic competence. Suppose a text says 'In 1919' or 'During the Renaissance' or 'In Paris' or 'Christopher Columbus'. Besides establishing a situation (Spanish: 'posicionamiento'', French: 'reperage9), those signs entail depending on their coincidence or not with the narrator's person, time, or space some semantic values which concern the narrative utterances themselves (that is, their discursive semantics) and not the relationship they bear with that which predicates them (narrator). Greimas and Courtes (1979, 1986) and many others do not distinguish the essentially different character of either category. The same thing happens in relation to the temporal and spatial relative positions of the different narrative utterances. The temporal and spatial relationships of anteriority, posteriority, concomitance, inclusion, limitation, etc. of every narrative utterance with regard to the others are the results of discourse semantics, and not of discursivization or textualization.
For instance

An example would help us to differentiate the four operations easily: 'Maria gave birth to a child, according to her sister'. The basic predication consists of a narrative Utterance of Doing by which an initial State in which the so-called Subject of State actant (Maria) is not in conjunction with the so-called Object of Value actant (her baby) is transformed into a final State, in which the State Subject (Maria) has or is in conjunction with the Object of Value (her child). The actant involved in this change in State will be called Subject of Doing (also Maria): a Subjecttype actant, whose function is also carried out in our utterance by the actor who plays the Subject of State Maria), because it is she who carries out the action (giving birth to a child). This utterance belonging to the narrative syntax of signification is semanticized, in the sense of discourse semantics, by means of the isotopies of what is /human/ and /maternal/, and by the sememes which represent the graphics or substance of the expressions 'Maria', 'give birth to', and 'child'. These figures are liable to be broken down into several classes of semes. This predication, considered to be a /knowing/, presents itself attached, as an Object of Value, to a Subject of State (syntactic-narrative) actant (Maria's sister) who is the discursive-actant-appreciator, thus forming a narrative Meta-utterance of State. Quite commonly, once the meta-utterances we call appreciation are semanticized, they tend to be of State, not

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of Doing, and, as we can see, they are a predication about the identity of the appreciator that is, about the support of the /knowing/ which predication involves. Following Greimas and Courtes (1979: 297), we shall represent the narrative or basic predication as follows:

whereby: 51 = Subject of Doing actant (Maria, the subject of 'give birth to') 52 = Subject of State actant (Maria, the subject of Doing in relation with the Object of Value the child) 01 = Object of Value actant (the child) // = Narrative Utterance of Doing () = Narrative Utterance of State => = Function of Doing (giving birth to) fl = Relation (junction) of conjunction (J = Relation (junction) of disjunction We shall represent appreciation or narratological predication as: (8302) wherein: 53 = Subject of State actant (Maria's sister) 02 = Object of Value actant (the narrative or basic predication) that is to say,

Impossibility of an indirect or free indirect discourse when the appreciator is the narrator

Appreciation is an operation which, like predication, narration, and textualization, is necessary to form an utterance, even though it may not always show on the surface of the text by means of morphemes or specific minimal signs. All narrative predications have at least one discursiveactant-appreciator.
On the left of the room you could see the door of a bedroom and on the right was the kitchen and another door which was shut. It might have been a bedroom

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or the bathroom. Shortly afterwards I discovered that the bathroom was a den you have access to through the kitchen. (Verdu 1988)

In this utterance we have three discursive-actants-appreciators, separated by a temporal hiatus. The three of them correspond to the same actor, who also plays the role of discursive-actant-narrator and nonnarrator. One of these appreciators is an ego-now and the two others are two different ego-thens. The first ego-then appreciates as far as Or the bathroom', the second one from 'the bathroom was a den' onwards. The narrator only appreciates the introductory sub-utterances of indirect discourses: 'you could see' and 'shortly afterwards I discovered that'. There is a confrontation between the appreciations of the /Ego/-/Now/ -/Here/ and those of the two /Ego/-/Then/-/There/, whose /then/s are not even co-referential, and who consequently oppose three heterodiegetical discursive actants of time. This is to say, according to the ego-now, 'you could see' and 'Shortly afterwards I discovered that'. According to the first ego-no t now or egothen, On the left of the room (was) the door of a bedroom and on the right was the kitchen and another door which was shut. It might have been a bedroom or the bathroom'. According to the second ego-then, 'the bathroom was a den you had access to through the kitchen'. The three discursive actants are the same actor (the ego), but the ego-now appreciator is the role it plays when it writes; the first ego-not now appreciator is the role played before it discovers whether the closed room is the bathroom or not; and the second ego-not now appreciator is the role played when it discovers the bathroom. The ego-now appreciator knows what the other two appreciators knew; the second ego-then appreciator knows what the first ego-then appreciator knew. Obviously, the /knowing/ of the appreciator actants of the same actor increases normally when its temporary value approaches /now/, except when any of them forgets something. In the sentence 'It might have been ...', there is only non-narratorial appreciation: that of the first ego-then. That sentence is the typical example, sometimes labeled impossible (Banfield 1982), of free indirect discourse on this occasion, free indirect psychonarrative (Cohn 1978: 'auto-recif or 'auto-narrated monologue') applied to the first person, which nevertheless is rather common (Genette 1983: 36-37). However, the fact is that a discourse which discursivizes the narrator's opinion (the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/ predicating the opinions of the /Ego//Now/-/Here/) cannot be related in free indirect discourse, because both indirect and free indirect modes of discourse are characterized by having

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non-narratorial appreciation (cf. Nadal 1985b: 535-540 on the double temporal and spatial origin in free indirect discourses). When one says think that Lekeitio is a lovely town', what follows the conjunction does not express an indirect discourse, but an ordinary one: the narrator and the appreciator are two different functions of the same discursive actant, not only of the same actor or character, as in the text by Verdu. The same thing would happen if we tried to transform that utterance into an indirect free one by deleting the first part. In the new sentence, 'Lekeitio is a lovely town', both the narrator and the appreciator are still the same discursive actant: the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/ of the utterance. Therefore, there is not a free indirect discourse, but an ordinary one instead. Narration is the operation by means of which the discursive actants of our utterance are created. In 'Maria gave birth to a child, according to her sister', there is an anonymous narrator who is not made explicit and who is identified by the /Ego/-/Now/-/Here/ values of the syntacticdiscursive categories of the utterance; we call them enunciative values (Greimas and Courtes 1979, 1986); they do an enunciative discursive actant. This narrator defines according to its origins of person, time, and space the Subject of Doing actant (Maria) and its action as enuncive i.e., as not corresponding to the person, time, and space in which narration takes place. The Subject of Doing is discursivized in this way as /She/ (Maria) and it is presented under a /Then/ (gave birth to), which are values relative to those of the narrator. That sentence allows for the understanding of the fact that the spatial category also adopts an enuncive value: /There/. The Subject of Doing presents as an enuncive actant, as being a nonnarrator and non-narratee. The Object of Value shows a non-enunciative form of person (a child), /A/, and enuncive forms of space and time /Then/-/There/. It is an enuncive type of discursive actant. The appreciator (Maria's sister) appears as being enuncive of person /She/, and of combined features that is, both enunciative and enuncive of time and space /Now and Then/, /Here and There/, due to the uncertainty of the narrator's discourse. It is a combined discursive actant, non-narrator; it is also a non-narratee. Regarding the Subject of Doing (Maria) and the Object of Value (Maria), the narrator is heterointradiegetical: his (the narrator's) person, time, and space values are not consistent with theirs. As to the narrator, the Subject and the Object are heteroextradiegetical: their values are not in accord with his. The anonymous narrator (/Ego/-/Now/-/Here/) is temporally and spatially homointradiegetical with regard to the apprecia-

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tor (Maria's sister: /She/-/Now and Then/-/Here and There/). The latter is temporall y and spatially homoextradiegetical with regard to the former, due to the (partial) agreement between the values of the above-mentioned categories. The utterance shows us a non-narratorial type of appreciation, except for the subutterance 'according to her sister', whose narrator is, at the same time, its appreciator: here we have the same discursive actant with two different functions.
The real and apparent presence of the manifestable subject of the utterance

If we made up a scale (Figure 2: Histoire/Discours, according to discourse level) with the different types of utterances according to degree of participation in them of the explicit subject of the utterance (who is the narrator, but not the implicit enunciator who always participates in the same degree as the subject implied by the entire text, thus being meaningless to differentiate the degress of an implied presence which is quantitative and qualitatively necessary and invariable), it would follow that, leaving aside secondary utterances in which a subnarrator or second narrator appears, and leaving aside the distortion it would create in the scale by the possible manifestation in the sign's level of the narrator or of its person, time, and spatial values (a sort of explicitation which affects the appearance of the text i.e., which is relevant from the point of view of textualization and of the signification apprehended by the effective enunciatee, but which is not pertinent from the point of view of discursiviHistoirejDiscours according to discourse level Discours Narrator's maximum discursivization All values are enunciative N = Appreciator, N = S. of Doing, N = S. of State N = Object of Value Histoire Narrator's minimum discursivization All values are enuncive Appreciator, S. of Doing, N ^ S. of State Object of Value
Figure 2.

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zation), we would find a type of utterance with the maximum degree of participation on the narrator's behalf. This narrator would be the appreciator, besides being both the Subject of Doing and the Subject of State of what was predicated, as well as the Object of Value ( look at my hand') We would also encounter a type of utterance with the minimum degree of participation on behalf of the narrator, in which the narrator is neither the appreciator nor any type of actant in the basic narrative utterance, and in which there are no enunciative values, except the narrator's ('She wanted him now'). Note that the morpheme represented by the graphics 'now' does not have a /Now/ value which agrees with the event of narration on the content of form level, but rather a /Then/ value which disagrees with it (Banfield 1982). This reminds us once again that in the kind of semiotics we are practicing, we do not care about signs or their form of expression, but about figures belonging to the plane of content (Nadal 1986; 1985b: 537-538; 1985c; 1988a and b). In the scale in Figure 2, the subutterance 'Maria gave birth to a child', which depends on the other subutterance where its appreciator is indicated, is situated in an intermediate place. The other subutterance, 'according to her sister', involves a greater degree of participation on behalf of the narrator. Not only does the appreciator coincide with the anonymous narrator, but the Subject of State (Maria's sister) in the Utterance of State which is the appreciation; see above has combined person and time values which are in partial agreement with those of the narrator. The whole utterance would obviously be placed on the level occupied by 'according to her sister'. The dichotomy Histoire/Discours established by Benveniste makes the present interpretation possible; it also allows an interpretation not only on the discursive level, but on the textual one as well (Figure 3). Thus, no enunciative values are textualized in our utterance, which increases, with respect to its discursive form, the degree of objectivity (or histoire,
Histoire/Discours, according to textual level Discours Maximum textualization of the narrator Maximum presence of explicit enunciative values Histoire Minimum textualization of the narrator Absence of explicit and elliptic enunciative values Figure 3.

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Enunciation and narration 381 following Benveniste's terminology). In any case, if we accept the scale which corresponds to the textual level, we have to bear in mind that it is relative to every cultural episteme. Most certainly, at the beginning of this century, a traveling used to be a trace of the explicit sender of the utterance; whereas it is no longer so, for the same European, at present. The non-narrator's appreciation (Maria sister's) is directed to what is different personally, temporally, and spatially (her sister having delivered a child); that is, it appreciates a narrative utterance to which it does not contribute, and which takes place neither in the moment nor in the place this appreciation is exerted. It appears as indirect discourse (which is usually not recognized by the theory as such 'According to X'), which makes evident the classic dissociation among the syntactic-discursive values defining the narrator and those defining the appreciator. Since our example is not part of a large discourse, it is only possible for a partial analysis of its textualization (see above): no enunciative values are made explicit in the utterance, even though we may catalyze those values. The appearance of the text disguises its discursive reality: it conceals the narrator, it conceals its introductory appreciation and the combined nature of the non-narratorial appreciation (the sister's). The implicit enunciator's and the effective enunciated s appreciation Sometimes it is useful to consider not only the opposition between the time and place of narration and the time and place of what is predicated narratively, but also the opposition between these two times and places and the moment and place of appreciation. Notice, for instance, the difference between: a. Maria gave birth to a child, according to what her sister said shortly afterwards. b. Maria gave birth to a child, according to what her sister is saying now. c. Maria was giving birth to a child, according to what her sister told us. d. Maria is giving birth to a child, according to her sister. Writers take advantage of the syntactic-discursive interplay of conformity and disconformity between the four operations which yield utterances basic predication, appreciation, narration (or discursivization), and textualization to simplify or enrich the narrative surface syntax and the discourse semantics of the form of contents in the discourses they produce; that is, they use it to simplify or enrich a story and the themes it conveys. We must also consider the fact that many textual effects such as irony, dialogism, poliphony, and so on are based on the opposition between narrative predications assigned to several actants-appreciators.

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These predications must be the same or a similar basic predication: a virtual and hypothetical predication. The contrast is sometimes very subtle, occurring not only between the predications assigned to several actors ('X thought A'/'Y thought B' or think A'/'X thought B'), but between the appreciations made by an actor's different discursive actants ( think A'/ had thought B'/'I thought C). Narratology deals with appreciation, narration, and textualization; narrativity and discourse semantics study predication that is, their object of study is the story and the themes of a discourse. Without narratological analysis, narrativity and discourse semantics are described as having a lot of deficiencies. A non-contradictory, exhaustive, and simple analysis of the form of content (Hjelmslev 1963: Chapter 3) demands a rigorous narratological description. If the structure of the different discursive actants is not reconstructed, (A) it will be very difficult to distinguish the similarities and differences among the different discursive actants /knowings/ or the views of the virtual and hypothetical story attributed to them; and (B) it will be very difficult to understand the implicit intentionality which semiotic theory attributes to the instance called implicit enunciator. On the other hand, we can speak of the hypothetical and virtual story the utterance 'tells', inasmuch as that story is the one the implicit enunciator transmits to the implicit enunciatee. That virtual and hypothetical story does not coincide exactly with any of the versions discursive actants (including the narrator) provide about it. We must not forget that the implicit enunciator is not a discursive actant. When we speak about the different versions of'the same story' supplied by the utterance, and when we say that it is a virtual and hypothetical story, we mean that it is 'implicit' in the utterance. The stories manifested in the utterance according to the different opinions of the discursive actants allow us to reconstruct the implicit story if we keep to the implicit receptive doing indicated by the text. Semiotic theory embodies this implicit receptive doing in a type of instance it calls implicit enunciatee. Free indirect discourse responds to the need to free the surface of the utterance of the farrago of the continuous and explicit indirect appreciation. This type of ellipsis affects the utterance from both the textual and the syntactic-discursive level of narration, since it eliminates the introductory narratorial appreciation (see above), but it does not modify the appreciation of the basic predication, which remains indirect. Let us remember, however, that in the vast majority of cases, the most interesting situation is the one shown by the contrast between the predications assigned to the narrators and non-narrators and what the implicit enunciator actually thinks. This is not a discursive actant, as we have

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Enunciation and narration 383 said; conseq uently, it is not likely to be invested with the values of person, time, and space categories. Or, to put it another way, it is not liable to be discursivized, to reveal itself, to be designated, or to self-designate which does not prevent the effective enunciatee (the reader, for example) from receiving the implicit enunciator's appreciations, with whom all the manifested or manifestable discursive actants' appreciations are contrasted. As we have said, it is the narrator who attributes the /knowing/ of the predications to discursive actants i.e., who says he is the appreciator. As a matter of fact, this vast network of relationships set up among the /knowing/ of the instances of the text, which is reflected by its appreciations, goes beyond utterance and is newly enriched by receptive enunciation in a decisive manner where the implicit (not manifestable) and the manifestable (or liable to be made manifested) predications of the appreciators of the utterance and those of the effective enunciatee (the reader, the spectator) meet. This encounter between the world of the text and the man of the v/orld redefines once again the individual semantic micro-universe. To account for the syntactic processes which make possible the existence of proper thematic or narrative dissonances is one of the objectives of narratology.
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Hjelmslev, Louis (1963). Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Jakobson, Roman (1957). Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb. Cambridge, MA: Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University. Landowski, Eric (1983). Simulacres en construction. Langages 70, 73-81. Nadal, Jose Maria (1985a). La narracion en 'La voluntad' de Jose Martinez Ruiz. Cahiers de l'Universite de Pau 8, 33-47. (1985b). Tipologia de los discursos narratives de Rosalia de Castro. In Adas do Congreso internacional de estudios sobre Rosalia de Castro e o seu tempo, 529-547. Santiago de Compostela: Consello da Cultura Galega y Universidad de Santiago. (1985c). 'Historia/discurso', veinticinco anos despues. Estudios Semioticos (Barcelona) 3/4, 13-25. (1986). La enunciacion narrativa. In Investigaciones Semioticas I: Adas del I Simposio Internacional de la A.E.S., Toledo, 1984, A.E.S. (ed.), 367-390. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. (1988a). Las oberturas I. Agerkaria (Bilbao) 14, 19-22. (1988b). Las oberturas II. Agerkaria (Bilbao) 15, 17-21. (forthcoming a). Semiotic narratology: The question of 'point of view'. In Hispanic Literary Theory ( = Hispanic Issues), J. Talens and D. Villanueva (eds.). Minneapolis: The Prisma Institute. (forthcoming b). Les sujets destinateurs et destinataires du discours dans les textes d'expression verbal et plastique, et le regard a la camera. In L'homme et ses signes: Proceedings of the IV Congress of A.I.S. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Parret, Herman and Ruprecht, Hans-George (eds.) (1985). Exigences et perspectives de la semiotiquejAims and Prospects of Semiotics, 2 vols. The Hague: John Benjamins. Roth, Philip (1985). The Professor of Desire. New York: Penguin Books. Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.) (1986). Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, 3 vols. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Verdu, Vicente (1988). Bautizo. El Pais Semanal 13 (567), 8.

Jose Maria Nadal (b. 1956) is Associate Professor of Audiovisual Communication at the Basque Country University in Bilbao, Spain. His principal research interests include verbal and graphic narratology of publicity and literature, theory of verbal and graphic narratology, and semiotics of persuasion. Among his publications are 'La enunciacion narrativa' (1984), 'La narracion en "La voluntad'" (1985), 'Tipologia de los discursos narratives de rosalia' (1985), 'Histoire/discours' (1988), and Innerarios de la persuasion. Analisis de spots de TV (1990, with S. Zunzunegui).

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