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Aristotle on Matter Author(s): Kit Fine Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 101, No. 401 (Jan., 1992), pp. 35-57 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254118 . Accessed: 29/04/2011 18:45
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Aristotle on Matter
KIT FINE

It is my belief thatthereis still a greatdeal to be learntfromAristotle'sviews on the natureof substance;and it is my aim in a series of papers,of which this is the first, to make clear what these views are and what it is in them that is of value.' A peculiarityof my approach,comparedto currentscholarly practice, is the attemptat rigour.I have triedto providewhat is in effect a formalizationof Aristotle's views. I have, that is to say, attemptedto make clear which of his concepts are undefinedand which of his claims underived;and I have attemptedto show how the remainingconcepts are to be defined and the remainingclaims to be derived. I can well understand a traditional scholar being suspicious of such an on the groundsthatthe variouspartsof Aristotle'sthoughtareeithertoo approach unclearto be capable of formalizationor else are clear enough not to requireit. Since the matteris not one for a prioridispute, I can only ask the scholar to put his suspicions at bay until the details of the case are examined. I then think that it will be found that the attemptat rigourprovides a most valuableguide for the study of the text. I have not tried to deal with all aspects of Aristotle's thoughton substance.I have concentratedon those which centre on the concepts of matter,form, part, and change; and I have neglected those which concern the related concepts of predication,function, priorityand power. It is to be hoped that the investigation will be rounded out at some later time to include all of the central aspects of his work. It should also be mentioned that my treatmentof the text has not been altogether scholarly.Partlythis has been a matterof competence, and partlyof inclination. I have been more concerned with the broad sweep of Aristotle's views thanwith exegetical detail;andthis has led me to conjecturethathe held a certain opinion, not because of direct textual evidence but because it is what his view most naturallyrequires.Thus the Aristotle I have presentedhere is much more consistent, definite and complete than the Aristotle of the texts.
' This paper is based upon the first two sections of my unpublishedpaper "Aristotle I shouldlike to thankthe membersof a seminarI held at UCLAin the winon Substance". ter of 1991, and FrankLewis in particular,for many helpful discussions on some of the topics of the paper.I am also gratefulto RichardSorabjifor valuableremarkson an earlier version of the paper. Mind, Vol. 101 . 401. January 1992 ? Oxford University Press 1992

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1. The concept of matter

UnderlyingAristotle's accountof the things in the world is the doctrineof hylomorphism.This doctrinedeclaresthatthings in the world are compoundsof matter and form. Thus centralto the view are three features:the two "ingredients", matterand form; and the mannerof composition, or the compound. It is quite plausible to suppose that, for Aristotle, the notion of matteris to be understoodin terms of composition: matter is what plays a certain role in the in the act of composition.2It compound;it is, as it were, the passive participant thatthe two can, in principle,be detachedand to appreciate is thereforeimportant that one can endorse the view that things have matter,or a constitution,without therebysupportingthe idea thatthere is a form in virtue of which they have that constitution. In orderto accommodatesuch a view, I have made it my aim in the present paperto discuss the concept of matteron its own; and it is only in the sequel that I have consideredits relationshipto the concepts of form and compound. If we compareAristotle's notion of matterwith the modem one, we find two striking differences. The first is that Aristotle has a hierarchicalconception of matter;what is mattermay itself have matter.Thus the matterof somethingneed not be identifiedwith thatof which it is ultimatelycomposed, the elementaryparticles or what have you. Rather,the matterof somethingexists at each level of its rangingfrom the most immediateconstituentsat one extremeto the organization, most basic constituentsat the other. In the second place, Aristotle's conception of matteris comprehensivein its scope. It applies,not merely to physical, but also to non-physicalobjects;for they Thusnot only will the token may have othernon-physicalobjects as theirmatter.3 letters constitutethe matterof a token expression, the letter types will also constitute the matterof the expression type. Indeed, as Aristotle says in connection with the objects of mathematics,"thereis some matterin everythingwhich is not an essence and a bare form but a 'this"' (Metaphysics,1037a1-2). It might be thoughtthat this issue over the natureof matteris not a real one. ForAristotle'suse of the term"hule"is somewhattechnical;and so it is conceivto a difference in the able that the apparentdifference in view is to be attributed
2 It is not so plausible to suppose that the notion of form is also to be understoodin terms of the compound,with the form being the active participantin the act of composition. For the pure forms can hardlybe understoodin termsof such a role. 3 There is the question of whethernon-physicalobjects can have physical objects as their matterand of whetherphysical objects can have non-physicalobjects as their matter. I am inclined to think that the answer is yes in both cases: for the membersof a set, which is non-physical, may be physical; and the meaning of a word is, arguably, as of the word as the underlyingtoken. However, there is no indicamuch an "ingredient" tion thatAristotle would have allowed either of these two possibilities.

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use of terms. But the dispute is not verbal,but concerns the question of whether thereis a viable conceptionof constitutionof the sortthatAristotlesupposes,one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike and which is capable of hierarchicalapplication.We may grant;if you like, the narThe question then is whetherit signifies a special row use of the term "matter". case of the more general concept, whethermatterso understoodis the ultimate matter,in the Aristoteliansense, of somethingphysical. On this furtherissue, it seems to me thatAristotle'sviews have not been given their due. His advocacy of intelligible matterhas commonly been regardedas implausiblein itself and hardlyin line with his nominalsome kind of aberration, istic leanings; and his hierarchicalconception of matter,though treatedwith a great deal more sympathy,has rarelybeen endorsed. But on both counts, it strikes me thatAristotle's views are on the right track and most in accordwith our intuitions.Of course, if one regardsthe matterof an abstract circle as some kind of abstract goo or dough, then the idea appears faintly ridiculous.But if one considersAristotle's standardexample of a definition, then it is entirelyplausible thatits defining terms (e.g. "planefigure"in the case of circle) should be constitutive of it in exactly the same general way as physical matteris constitutive of something physical; both go to make up the other and nor is there any mystery, in the case of definitions, as to what the abstractmatteris. There is also a clear sense in which somethingmay be differentlyconstituted at differentlevels. We have no difficulty, for example, in supposingthat a word is made up of lettersand the lettersof strokes.Of course, the division of the word into letters may be treated as one of the many possible decompositions of the word. But the fact is thatwe would not normallysuppose thatthe word was condecomposition. stitutedby the "funny"letters obtainedunderan arbitrary objects we arein no doubtas to theirhierIndeed,in the case of certainabstract Withthe set It archicalstructure. a, b I, tc, d }1,for example,the matterat the first level is constitutedby the sets fa, b} and {c, d}, and at the next level by the elements a, b, c and d.4 It would be absurdto regardthe set Ia, c I as a constituent of the originalset, somehow on a parwith the others;andit is unclearwhy it would not be equally absurdto regardthe funny letters as constitutiveof the word. But great as the virtues of Aristotle's concept of mattermay be, his treatment of the concept is not without its problems.The first of these is relatively minor and has to do with the distinctionbetween matteras many and one. In referring to the matterof something, one may be referringto some single thing which is the matteror to several such things. Aristotle is not always careful to heed this distinctionand so it is not always clear when he refersto the matterof something, as with the body being the matterof a man, whetherhe is making a singularor pluralreference.
4 For us, it is sets which constitutethe most naturalexample of a hierarchical structure within the abstractrealm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions,via their natural division into genus and differentia.

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In our own treatment,we shall attemptto be more sensitive to the distinction and will first give separateaccountsof matteras many and as one, and only then considerthe relationshipbetween the two. The otherdifficulty is more serious and has to do with the.way thatAristotle's conception of substanceinterfereswith his views on what constituteswhat. For he assumes thatconcrete substancesare not, strictlyspeaking,the matterof anything else; they constitute the terminusof the matter-ofrelation. But this leads one to ask: if the parts of a body, or the body itself, can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? The difficulty becomes even more acute if the family is compared,not to the man, but to a house; for it is then even less clear what the relevantdifference might be. Now it was entirelyreasonablefor Aristotle to believe thatthere was a difference in the two cases, especially if artifactsare excluded from consideration.For there is an evident difference in the unity possessed by a man and by a family; to a differencein and it is plausiblethatthis differencein unity is to be attributed the way thatthe constituentscome together.The constituentsof the one genuinely come togetherto form somethingwhich is genuinely one, while the constituents of the other come togetherin some looser way to form somethingwhich is only loosely one. But however reasonableit may have been for Aristotle to hold this view, it is not reasonablefor us. For with the advanceof science, we know that there is no special force or principlewhich binds togetherthe differentpartsof the body and yet is not operative in the universe as a whole; and in the absence of any such force or principle,it is ratherhardto see what ontological basis therecould be for distinguishingbetween the constituencyof substancesand of mere heaps. Thus the idea that there is a distinctive notion of constitution,terminatingin the concrete substances,is one that shouldbe given up. However, this is not necessarily to give up the idea thatthere is somethingdistinctiveaboutthe concrete substancesthemselves. For one can grantthat somethingis genuinely one, without therebygrantingthatwhat makes it genuinely one is some distinctiveway in which its constituentscome together. In a similarfashion, it might be supposedthat certaincomplex concepts were more of a naturalunity than others. But it would be odd to explain this unity in termsof the fact thatthe componentconcepts were put togetherin a special way, thatthe definitionalglue was in these cases somehow different.

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2. Linear constitution
The formalizationin this paper and its sequels will proceed in stages. At each stage, I presentthose principlesthat are properto a certainclusterof concepts; I provide,thatis to say, afragmentof the whole theory.In some ways this approach of one principle is unnatural,since the full justification or even understanding may requireconcepts not involved in its formulation.However, by a judicious choice of concepts, it is possible to obtain a naturalstratification of the theory in which the conceptualdisorderis reducedto a minimum. The present paper deals with a single primitive notion. This is the notion of one object being the matterof another;and for the purposes of the present section, I take this relation to obtain when the one is the matter of the other at some level, and not necessarily at the proximate level. I shall sometimes talk of one object constitutinganother(a tetm which I suspect correspondsbetterto Aristotle's "hule"), although my tendency will be to employ "matter"for the singular or linear relation and to employ "constitution"for the non-linear or pluralrelation. There is some question as to the intendeddomainof applicationof the theory. At its very broadest, the domain could be taken to consist of everything, both non-physicalandphysical;and, in this case, I shall speakof "objects"as opposed to "things".But even when the domain is restrictedto things, some uncertainty remainsas to how broadit should be. At the very minimum, the domain should contain the concrete substances (strictly speaking), their matter,the matterof their matter,and so on. The concrete substanceswill include living things, or at least those thatare fully formed. Whetherthey should also include artifactsis a matterof dispute. But important for us here. as this issue might be elsewhere, it will not be important Therearetwo respectsin which this minimaldomainmightbe extended.First, it might be taken to include "strays",i.e. matterwhich is not the matterof any substance.Examples might be the waterin my bathtubor the air in my study.5 Secondly, it might also be taken to include "mereheaps",things without any genuine unity. Now an obvious example of a heap is a pile of trash.But I think thatAristotleis also forced to recognize more organizedobjects, such as families or nations, as heaps; for otherwise, they would have people as their matterand this goes againstpeople being substances.Of course, this is not to deny thatthere might be some derivativesense in which a family or a nation could have people as its matter;but this would not be in a strictor propersense. Let us call the first of these domains the central ontology, the second the extended ontology, and the third the bloated ontology. The ontology which includes absolutely everything might, by contrast, be called universal. Sometimes the difference in the choice of ontology will matter;and sometimes it will Thatis to say:anynoncan stray. to suppose thatonly matter S It is fairlyplausible of a strict matter mustbe the(contributory) uniform thing,if notitselfa strictsubstance, substance.

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not. But in orderto avoid needless complexitiesof formulation,we may adoptthe convention that the difference will be taken not to matterunless there is some indicationto the contrary. It is supposedthateach ontology is closed underconstitution,i.e. containsthe matterof anythingwhich it contains. However, the sense of constitutionvaries accordinglyas linearor non-linearconstitutionis underconsideration.In the latmatter;but in the former ter case, the mattercan be taken to be any contributory case, it shouldbe takento be the whole matter.If, for example, we allowed a hand into the ontology, then we would have to falsely declare it a substancesince it is not the matter(i.e. the whole matter)of anythingelse. There is one complication, pertainingto the bloated ontology, which I shall ignore. Supposea quantityof earthis the sum of what, at a given time, is the earth in me and some strayearth.Then it is somewhathardto know what to say about it. We do not want to say that it is the matterof something,for partof it is not; and we do not want to say that it is the matterof nothing, for part of it is. In a notion of part,the ambiguousstatus theory which had a place for an appropriate of such things could be properlydefined. But within the presenttheory, we cannot distinguishthemboth from those things which arewholly the matterof something else and from those which are wholly not the matterof somethingelse. It might be thoughtthat such a problemdid not arise withinAristotle's ontology, properlyconceived, for there is no reason to suppose it closed under arbitrarymereologicalsums. But the problemcan arise withoutany such assumption. The earthwhich is in Callias, for example, may laterbecome distributed between me and a clod. Thus the persistenceof matteris sufficient, even in the absence of closure, to generatethe waywardcases. I suspect thattheremay be a way of removingthe difficulty, once the doctrine form.6But ratherthanprejudgethe issue, of persistenceis statedin an appropriate I shall simply presupposethatthe waywardcases have been excluded from consideration. One of the most fundamentalprinciples concerning the matter-ofrelation is the following: Axiom 1 (Foundation). There is no infinite sequence of objects xI, x2, X3,... such thatx2 is the matterof xI, X3 is the matterof x2, and so on ad infinitum. This principleis very plausibleandhas been advanced,in one form or another, by many differentthinkersthroughoutthe history of philosophy.It provides the basis for the Fundierungsaxiomin set theory, with the matter-ofrelation now being understoodas set-theoreticmembership.
6 For a related discussion on the impossibility of infinite regresses, see II.5.332b6333al5, of Generationand Corruption.

on Matter 41 Aristotle It is clear from Metaphysics994a1-5, thatAristotle held to such a principle.7 And in the ensuing passage 994alO-18, he appearsto arguefor the principleon the groundsthattheremust be a first cause ("if there is no first there is no cause at all" and, by implication,if there is an infinite regress thereis no first). This is a common fallacy. Fromthe fact thatthereis always a first cause, it does not follow that there is no infinite regress of causes; for any infinite regress might be precededby a first cause. Theremay, however, be a more charitableway of construinghis argumentor, at least, the intuitionwhich lies behind it. Aristotle seems to think that it is necessary for thereto be a first cause for thereto be any cause at all. But suppose we strengthenthis requirementto the demand that any cause must be groundedin first causes, i.e. either itself be a first cause or be (caused) by a first cause, or be caused by such causes, and so on indefinitely.Then it will follow that therecannot be an infinite regress of causes, since none of the causes in the regress could justificationfor Foundabe grounded.We thus have somethinglike the standard tion, viz. that it must be possible to generateall of the entities in question from the bottom up.8 Foundationhas an immediateconsequencefor the notion of proximatematter. Let us make the following two definitions: Definition 1. x is matterif it is the matterof something; Definition 2. x is the proximatematter of y iff x is the matterof y and there is no z such thatx is the matterof z and z is the matterof y. We may then conclude: Theorem1. Any matteris the proximatematterof something.9 of the matter-ofrelation,we may also assume that it Given our understanding is transitive: If x is the matterof y andy the matterof z thenx Axiom2 (Transitivity). is the matterof z. An explicit statementof Aristotle's willingness to use a transitiveconception of matter-ofis to be found at 1044a20-23, of Metaphysics.He therewrites, "And
7 The basic idea is to say that the matterin Callias persists not as one thing x but as severalx1, x2,.... The view thatmatterpersists can then be reconciled with the view thatit persists as somethingconnected. 8 Theremight be special reasons,in the case of concretethings, for denying the possibility of a first cause being followed by a downwardinfinite regress of causes. For let us by Aristotle,the presentmatsupposethatwe link up, in the way sometimescountenanced ter which constitutesa thing with the past matterfrom which it comes. The possibility of a sequence xi, x2, X3,... of the sort excluded by axiom 1 might then be taken to yield the is xl coming fromx2, 0C2 OC2, OC3... of comings to be, where oca possibility of a sequence OCI, is x2 coming from X3, and so on. It then seems reasonableto suppose thatthe sequence of and comings to be can be so selected that ?2 wholly precedes a,, a3 wholly precedes OC2, so on. If it is now furtherassumedto be trueof the select sequencethateach of its comings to be takes more than a fixed period of time (no matterhow small), then it follows from the standard propertiesof the temporalcontinuumthatno coming to be can precedeall of the membersof the sequence. 9 The proof is a simple exercise on relations.Otherproofs will be omitted when they are straightforward.

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therecome to be severalmattersfor the same thing, when one matteris the matter for the other;e.g. phlegm comes from the fat and from the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet". FoundationandTransitivity have consequencesfor the notion of ultimatematter. It is clear that Aristotle had a conception of "first"matter.For example, in Metaphysics 1049a24-26, he writes, "And if there is a first thing, which is no longer, in reference to something else, called 'thaten', this is prime-matter". Accordingly,let us say: Definition 3. (i) x is ultimatematteriff x is matterand nothing is the matterof x (otherwise the matterx is said to be enmattered); (ii) x is the ultimatematterof y iff x is ultimatematterand is the matter of y. I have used the expression "ultimatematter"in preferenceto the traditional term "prime matter",since the traditionalterm is commonly taken to signify somethingwith additionalproperties,such as being indeterminate, merely potential, and the matterof the elements. But whereastheremay be a genuine question as to whetherAristotlebelieved in primematteras thus characterized, thereis no real question as to whetherhe believed in ultimatematter. if The definitions of "matter" and of "enmattered" are not really appropriate straysandheaps are admittedinto the ontology. For the waterin my bathtubintuitively is matterbut is not matteraccordingto the definition, and a pile of trash intuitively is enmatteredand yet is not enmatteredaccording to the definition. The first of these difficulties might be removedby allowing anythingwith a suitable materialform to be matter,and the second difficulty could be removed by introducingan analogous relationof quasi-matter between a heap and its members and allowing an object to be enmatteredif its quasi-matter was enmattered. we lack the conceptualresourceswithin the presentframeworkto Unfortunately, make either change to the definitions. My own view is that in a properdevelopment of the theory a general relation of constitution(covering both matterand quasi-matter)would be taken as primitive.The asymmetriesin the treatmentof ordinarymatter,straysand heaps would not then arise. FromTransitivityand Foundation,it follows that: Theorem2. Any mattereither is ultimatematteror has somethingas its ultimatematter. Aristotle accepts that the converse of the matter-ofrelationis well-founded. Axiom3 (ReverseFoundation).There is no infinite sequence of objects xl, x2, x3,... such thatxl is the matterof x2,x2 is the matterof x3, and so on ad infinitum. This principleis not as reasonableas Foundationitself and has not generally been embracedby those who advocateFoundation.In the case of sets, for exam-

on Matter 43 Aristotle ple, we may have x a memberof tx}, tx} a memberof x I , and so on ad infinitum.It thereforeseems clear thatReverse Foundationshouldnot be acceptedfor objects in general. It is also plausible that the assumption should not be accepted for concrete things.Forthereseems to be no difficultyin principlein conceiving of one artifact being the matter,or partof the matter,of anotherartifact,and so on ad infinitum. from the physical limitationsof the universe,we And even withoutany departure prescribesthateach of its may imagine thatthe constitutionof some organization committeesshouldhelp constitutean oversee committeefor thatcommittee.The oversee committees would then constitutean infinite ascendingregress. beginning at Aristotle's argumentfor the principle is stated in the paragraph each term which in X3,... x,, X2, regresses considers He 994a19 of the Metaphysics. that the four intended it is and presumably predecessor xi; xi+,"comes from"its These x. from y comes in which be cases ways in which x can cause y should the from x by y comes in which those first regresses are of two sorts. There are regress the of items the that supposes destructionof x. In these cases, Aristotle must cycle. It is not clear why they must cycle. But even if they did cycle, we may note that this would at most establish that there cannot be an infinite regress of different things, with each term in the regress being distinct from any other term,'0not thattherecannotbe an infinite regress at all. Regresses of the second sort are those in which y comes from x by helping to completex. Presumablyregressesconstitutedby the matter-ofrelationare of this second sort. In these cases, Aristotle supposes that the items of the regress must have some end-point,i.e. that each thing must eventually come'to be something which does not itself come to be anythingelse. We thus have an argumentwhich is dual to the one concerningregresses in the other direction. thereforeapply.Justas a firstcause was not sufficient The same considerations to preventa backwardregress,a final cause will not be sufficientto preventa forwardregress. But it is also true,just as before, that the argumentcan be mended by adding the requirementthat each cause be grounded in one or more final causes. However, it is hardto see in this case why there should be a groundingfrom the top. For a substanceis most naturallytakento be built up from its matter,not the matterfrom the substance.And even if it is conceded that constructioncould proceed in the opposite direction,it is hardto see why it should proceed in both directions.For we only requirethat somethingbe built once. It may be thatthe two formsof groundinghave a differentsource;the one from the bottom up is requiredfor the constitutionof the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is requiredfor the essence of the thing to be intelligible. Indeed,Aristotleexplicitly remarksthatthe matterof a thing is in one sense prior to the thing and in another sense posterior. (See Metaphysics 1019a8-10, "in
10It might not even establishthis. For it may be thateach of the items x1,X2, X3,. .. reappearedafter the whole sequence.However,this is a possibility that might be ruled out in the same way as in the case of backwardregresses.

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potency the half line is priorto the whole line, and the partto the whole, and the matterto the concretesubstance,but in completerealitythese areposterior".) But if both relationsof priorityare well-founded,then infinite regresses of matterin either directionwill be blocked." A good analogy for the purposesof understanding Aristotle'sposition is with the partsof linguistic expressions. Under an unsophisticatedconception of part, one would allow a sentence S to be a partof its negation -S, -S to be a partof -S, and so on, therebycreatingan infinite regress. But undera more sophisticated conceptionof part,it would be required,in orderfor an expression e to be .a partof anotherexpressionf, thatthe linguistic role of e shouldbe understoodin termsof the linguistic role off.'2 No sentence would then ever be partof another sentence;and,in general,the simple sentences(i.e. those containingno othersentences as parts)would be the counterpart to the Aristoteliansubstancesand would provide the terminusto the role-orientedpart-wholerelation. from which ReverseFoundation Thereis anotherstandpoint mightbe justified, one which does not requireus to make sense of the idea that a thing is priorto its to theArismatter.Forlet us supposethata special class of objects,corresponding totelian substances,can somehow be picked out, whetheror not on the basis of ontological priority.Call these objects the core. Let us furthersuppose that the core is subjectto Reverse Foundationand thatno object in the core is infinite, in the sense of containingan infinite ascendingsequenceof constituents.Define the extendedcore as the closure of the core underthe matter-ofrelation.It then fol'3 lows that the extendedcore will also be subjectto Reverse Foundation. In providingsuch a justification,we do not presupposethatthe matter-ofrelation terminateswith the core. We may grant, for example, that men constitute families, that families constituteextended families, and so on. But somehow we succeed in drawinga criticalline between those things which are too high in the constitutivehierarchyand those which are not; and we then confine the matter-of relationto those things which lie at or below the criticalline. Thus our justification, or even the one in terms of priority,does not serve to undermineour previouscriticismof Aristotle.For althoughthe defined notion of constitutionterminateswith substance,the underlyingrelationdoes not. The ceiling is imposed from the outside and does not arise from within the relationitself. Reverse Foundationhas consequencesdual to those for Foundation.14
I I The restrictionof a well-founded relationis well-founded. So if the matter-ofrelation implies well-foundedpriorityand well-foundedposteriority,then both it and its converse will be well-founded. 12 It is to such a distinctionthat Dummettappealsin his elucidationof Frege's dictum thatonly in the context of a sentence does a word standfor anything(1973, pp. 192-6). 13 The proof dependsupon assumingUpwardLinearity,statedbelow. The generalconcept of the core will be discussed in more detail in a laterpaper. 14 It turnsout that a general duality theoremwill hold with respect to the replacement of the matter-ofrelationwith its converse. I shall not always botherto state the dual.

onMatter 45 Aristotle The analogueof theorem 1 is: has somethingas its proximatematter. Theorem 3. Anythingenmattered (For a statementwhich stronglysuggests thatAristotlewould endorsethis result, see Metaphysics, 1044a, 15-20.) Dual to the definitionof ultimatematter,we have: Definition4. x is a substanceiff x is enmatteredand is not the matterof anything. if straysare this definitionis not appropriate As with the definitionsof "matter", admittedinto the ontology. Thus the water in my bathtubor the air in my study would be substancesaccordingto the definitionbut would not be strictAristotelian substances.Such strayscould be excluded from substancehoodby requiring that substanceshave a suitable substantialform. But again, we lack the conceptual means to make the requiredchange to the definition. With the help of Reverse Foundation,we may deduce the analogue of theorem 2: Theorem4. Any enmatteredobject is either a substanceor is the matter of somethingwhich is a substance. Although I have postulatedthat the matter-ofrelationis transitive,I have not postulated either its asymmetry or its irreflexivity. Asymmetry follows from eitherFoundationor Reverse Foundation: Theorem5. If x is the matterof y then y is not the matterof x. For if x andy were the matterof each other,thenx, y, x, y,... would constitutean infinite sequence in both the upwardand the downwarddirection. (Direct evidence thatAristotle accepted asymmetryis to be found at 1013b8-11, where he writes "thingscan be causes of one another...not, however, in the same way".) From the above result it follows that the matter-ofrelationis irreflexive: Theorem7. x is never the matterof itself. The assumptions so far stated are compatible with branching in either the downwardor upwarddirection,i.e. with somethinghavingtwo distinctproximate mattersor with somethingbeing the proximatematterof two distinct objects. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have countenancedeither of these possibilities. presuppositionthatthe matterof Downwardbranchinggoes againsthis apparent something(at any given level of analysis)is unique.(See also the previouslycited passage at 1044a20-23.) Against upwardbranching,we may argue as follows. y and Supposex branchesoff into y andz. In the absenceof downwardbranching, z will (respectively)eitherbe identicalto or the matterof two distinct substances y' and z'; and so there would then be two (actuallyexisting) substanceswith the same ultimatematter,a possibility which Aristotle would reject. Let us, therefore,lay down the following two linearityassumptions: Axiom4 (DownwardLinearity).If x and y are both the matterof z, then eitherx = y or one of x or y is the matterof the other. AxiomS (UpwardLinearity).If z is the matterof bothx andy then either x = y or one of x or y is the matterof the other.

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From previous results and Downward Linearity, it follows that the ultimate and proximatematterof somethingenmatteredare unique: Theorem8. Anything enmatteredhas exactly one object as its ultimate matterand as its proximatematter. Of course, the ultimate and proximate matter in a given case might be the same. The dual of this result states thatfor any matter(i.e. matterof something) there is exactly one object of which it is the proximatematterand exactly one substanceof which it is the matter. Together,the various conditions imposed on the matter-ofrelationamountto the requirement that the totality of objects should constitutea set of finite linear sequences.Thus the world accordingto Aristotle would look like this:

with the dots representing the objects and with the lines going down froma object to its matter. Theremay, however, be one respectin which our account(in regardto the central or extended ontology) is incomplete. For it allows somethingto be isolated in the sense thatit is neitherthe matterof anythingnor has anythingas its matter (in the diagramit would be represented by an isolated dot). But is this a real possibility for Aristotle? The question turnson whetherthe elements constitutethe ultimatematter.If they do, then isolation is possible; for the elements will presumablybe capable of an isolated existence. If they do not, then isolation will be impossible;for the ultimatematterwill be the matterof the elements andpresumablywill be incapable of isolated existence. Grantedthatthe elements possess matter,we should thereforealso postulate: Axiom6. Anythingeither is matteror is enmattered.

3. Nonlinear constitution
In the previous section I have dealt with a linearconception of constitution,one accordingto which each object has at most one otherobject as its proximatematter. There is, however, a naturalway in which many objects can be regardedas

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the proximatematterof an object. Thus we may take the proximatematterof the set 10, 11 to be comprisedby its two members0 and 1; and we may take the proximate matterof a body to be comprisedby its various parts.It is my aim, in the presentsection, to develop an accountof the non-linearconception. Aristotle is most naturallytaken as subscribingto a linearconception of matter. But there is evidence that he was also willing to construethe matter-ofrelation in a non-linear fashion.Thus the remarks on unification in Metaphysics 1045a7-19, strongly suggest that the constituentsare many, it being the role of the form to make the many into one. Or again, he seems to think that the bodily parts are individuallymatterfor the body. Indeed, it may be surmisedthat often when he seems to take the matteras one he is really thinkingof it as many.So the elementalmatterof a mixtureis really the severaldifferentelements, andperhaps even the body is only the matterof a man throughits bodily parts. I thereforethinkthatthe ensuing theoryis very much in the spiritof whatAristotle has to say aboutconstitution.If only he had been more sensitive to the distinction between linear and non-linearconstitution,he would have been willing to subscribeto the principlesthat are here laid down for the non-linearnotion. There is some question as to what we should take as primitive in a theory of non-linearconstitution.We have the notionof severalobjectsxl, x2,... constituting anotherobjecty. But thereare various ways in which this notion might be understood. First, xI, x2,... might either immediately or mediately constitute y. For example, the set 101,( 1 11)is immediatelyconstitutedby 101 and f1 but mediately constitutedby 0 and 1. Let us agree that constitutionis to be understoodas immediate(for reasons which will laterbecome apparent). Second, thereis the questionas to whetherthe orderor multiplicityof the constituentsxl, x2,... is relevantto whetherthe constitutionrelationshipholds. Do we say thatx2,xl-as well as xl, x2-constitute the sequencexlx2;and do we say that xl-as well as xl, xl-constitute the sequencexlxl? Let us agree, for purposesof simplicity,thatorderand multiplicityare to be irrelevant,even thoughthe ability to convey certaininformationis therebylost. Finally,thereis the questionas to the sense in whichxl, x2,... aretotallyto constitutey. It is conceivable thatthere are different(immediate)analyses of y. That xl, x2,... constitutey may then be taken to mean either that xl, x2, are all of the constituentswhich belong to some given analysis of y or that they are all of the constituentswhich belong to some analysis or another.Let us agree to abide by the first sense, which after all is more naturaland "fine-tuned". it is in principle possible that xl, x2,... and yI, Y2,... Under this interpretation, should both constitute z, where the set (xl, x2,... } is distinct from the set fyI, Y2,... ). However, thereis some plausibilityin the suppositionthatthe immediate constituentsunderany two analyses of the same object are the same. This is not necessarily to deny that there cannot be two distinct analyses, but only that the differencebetween them cannotrest on a difference in the constituents. It would take us too far afield to defend this suppositionagainstall of the various objections which might be raised against it. But we may consider one such

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objection, which is to the effect that the mereological sum xl + X2 + x3 has both x1, x2 + x3 andx1 + x2,x3 as constituents.To this objection,it may be repliedthatsomethingis not a constituentof the mereologicalsum if it is itself a mereological sum; the analysisof a mereologicalsum, if it has an analysis, must be in termsof mereological atoms. Grantedthe supposition,the distinctionbetween the two forms of total constituency disappears.But also, it is then possible to define the total notion of constituency in termsof a partialnotion. Let us say thatx helps constitutey if x is among the constituentswhich totally constitutey (i.e. xl, x2,... constitutey, where one of xI, X2,... is x). Then we may say thatxl, x2,... (totally) constitutey iff each of xl, x2,... helps constitutey and nothingelse helps constitutey. There is one case in which this definitional scheme fails; and that is the case in which the polyadic constituencyrelationholds with no constituentson its left. We will want to say, for example, that... totally constitutethe null set, where... is blank;but we will not want to say of anythingwhich has no constituentsthatit is in this way degeneratelyconstituted.But with this one exception, the correctness of the definitioncan be upheld.'5 The interestof the more general polyadic notion of constituencyis not to be denied. But for the purposesof simplicity, I shall take as primitivethe immediate and partialnotion of constituency. It might be wonderedwhetheran alternativepossibility in this case is to take the mediatepartialnotion of constituencyas primitive,just as in the linear case. But thereare in fact decisive reasonsagainstso doing. We cannotdefine x immediately (helps) constitutey in the usual way as x mediatelyconstitutesy and there is no z such thatx mediately constitutesz and z mediately constitutesy. For we want to say that 0 immediately constitutes {O, 1O 11, even though it mediately constitutes IO1, which mediately constitutes {0, IOll . Indeed, it may be proved thatit is in principleimpossible to give any definitionof the immediatenotion in tertnsof the mediate notion.'6 We are thereforeobliged to adopt the immediate notion as the primitive. We have a form of Foundationfor partialconstitution:
15 In the case of concrete things, it might be arguedthat such a case cannot arise. For supposethat... constitutesx. Then grantedthatthe spatiallocation of x shouldbe included in the union of the spatiallocation of its constituents,it follows thatx has null spatiallocation, which might be ruledout as impossible. 16 More specifically, we may prove thatthe ancestralEo- of Eis not definable (even in on a set-theoreticuniverseV with urprinciple)in termsof E.For let 0 be the permutation

elements which "interchanges"

the universe. Then 0 is an automorphism on the structure<V, C?>. But it is not an automorphismon the structure<V, E>. For I Itall is the set whose sole member is { a); but This resultis of some independentinterestfor set theoryandraises the questionof what a theorywith Coo in place of C would look like.
l)= 0(I ( all) -= I al, a) is not the set whose sole member is 0(I a
( l. a

I Ia) a I and fIta l

in any set, for a a fixed urelement of

Aristotle on Matter 49 AxiomcI (Foundationc).There is no infinite sequence of objectsxl, x2, X3,... such thatx2 (helps) constitutexl, x3 (helps) constitutex2, and so on ad infinitum. This principle may be justified in the same way as its linear counterpart.'7 However, there is an objection to the principle which is peculiar to the nonlinear case. For it may be supposedthatx, + x2 + x3 +... is partiallyconstituted by x2 + X3 + ..., which is partially constituted by X3 + ..., and so on ad infinitum. But in response to this objection, it may be again maintained that the parts of a mereological sum will not be constituents if they are themselves mereological sums. Indeed, since Aristotle himself believed that mereological sums (such as quantities of uniform matter) are indefinitely divisible and since he also believed in Foundation, it would appear that he is committed to treating the relationship between a thing and its mereological parts as different from the relationshipbetween a thing and its materialor constitutiveparts.The one kind of relation holds exclusively in the horizontal dimension, as it were, without any hylomorphicdescent, while the otherrelationholds exclusively in the vertical dimension. This point is of some importancefor understanding Aristotle's views on uniform matter.For I have heard it said that flesh cannot be constitutedby water and earth, let us say, since any part of flesh is flesh; and so no matterhow far one goes in breaking up the flesh, one never comes across water or earth. But this is to presupposethatthe materialand mereologicalpartsconstitutethe flesh
in the same way. II

There are other objections to this form of Foundation:for example, from the theory of ill-founded sets as developed by Aczel and others, and from the possibility of the analysis of matterinto atoms, elementaryparticlesetc., proceeding indefinitely.I am not sure what to make of such cases and shall not discuss them any further. Of course,Aristotlewould want to adoptthe nonlinearform of Reverse Foundation as well as of Foundation: Axiomc2 (ReverseFoundation).Thereis no infinite sequenceof objects such that x, constitutes x2, x2 constitutes X3, and so on ad infinitum. Those of the previous results which did not depend upon the linearity assumptions can then be proved in the same way as before. It is not clear whether any furtherprinciples, within the completely general theoryof constitution,shouldbe laid down, eitherby Aristotleor by the neo-ArisXI, X2, X3,... 17 It should fortheprinciple be notedthatwe alsohavea spatial in applicaargument tionto concrete somewhat to theearlier Forit might things, analogous temporal argument. thata violationof the principle thatthingsget indefinitely be supposed wouldrequire small. 18 Nor,in my view, is thefactthatthewater andearth areonlypotentially present in the flesh a reasonfor denyingthatthey areconstitutive of the flesh. Indeed,I would assumethattheirpotential whatever this comesdownto, is indicative of the presence, vertical peculiar wayin whichtheyconstitute.

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totelian.'9However, it does seem reasonableto make certainother assumptions for concrete things, where these additionalassumptionsarejustified in terms of special featuresof the physical realm. These assumptionsare most aptly explained in terms of what one might call constituencytrees. For any given'object y, the constituencytree for y is defined in the obvious way. The initial node is labelled with y; its immediate descendants are then labelled with the immediateconstituentsof y; and so on. Thus a typical tree might look as follows: y x x

Given the way the constituencytree has been defined, there is nothingto prevent two distinctnodes being labelled by the same object. We may thinkof each node of the tree with label x as an occurrenceof the constituentx. Thus there is nothingto preventan object from having several constituentoccurrences. However, in the case of concretethings, it is plausibleto supposethatvarious cases of multipleoccurrenceshouldbe excluded. Let us define mediateconstitution by: Definitionc 1. x mediatelyconstitutesy if for some x1, x2,..., xn, n>1, x = xl constitutesx2,x2 constitutesx3,..., and xn-l constitutesxn = y. constitutionmay be called immediateby contrast).The first exclusion(Ordinary ary assumptionthen states: Axiomc3(i)-. No thingx both mediatelyandimmediatelyconstitutesthe same thing.y. In terms of the constituencytrees, this assumptionrules out subtreesof the following form:

19 Foundationwill be complete for the universaltheoryof constituencyas long as for any set x of objects (or of puresets, for thatmatter)thereis a properclass of objectsy with the propertythat the set of its constituentsis x. We know that there is always one such y; for we can let y be the set x itself. It is also plausible to suppose that there are other such y; we may, for example, let y be a multi-set of the objects in x. However, it is somewhat hardto know on what basis to determinethe size of the class of y's.

Aristotle onMatter 51

Thereis, of course, no questionof this axiom (or the subsequentones) holding for abstractobjects. The set ( (a }, a), for example, has a both as an immediate andas a mediateconstituent.Orto makethe comparisonmoredirect,the sentence (P&(P&Q))has P as an immediateandmediateconstituentwhen viewed as a type but,whenviewed as a token,has the firsttokenof P occurringonly as an immediate constituentand the second token of P occurringonly as a mediate constituent. It is naturalto wonder what can justify the strikingcontrastbetween the concrete andabstract cases; andone answeris in termsof the underlyingspatialproperties of concretethings and their constituents.These are defined by: (a) Subsumption. Any immediate constituent of a thing is spatially includedin it. (b) Non-inclusion. Neither of two distinct immediateconstituentsof a given thing is spatiallyincluded in the other.20 From these two assumptions,axiom 3(i) can then be derived. Given axiom 3(i)-, immediateconstitutioncan be defined in termsof mediate constitutionin the obvious way: 1. x immediatelyconstitutesy iff x mediatelyconstitutesy and Theoremc for no z does x mediatelyconstitutez and z mediatelyconstitutey.21 which renderedthe definiThus it was the possibility of "mediatereoccurrence" tion incorrectin the case of sets. The axiom does not rule out all cases of reoccurrencewithin the constituency tree of a given thing. For it allows the possibility thatx1 and x2 are constituents of somethingand thatx is a constituentof themboth. By a constituency pathfrom x to y, we mean a sequencex = x1, x., xn = y in which each xii s a constituentof within a tree xi+, for i = 1, 2,..., (n-1). Then the generalexclusion of reoccurrence amountsto the claim that:
20 The proof goes as follows. Suppose thatx is both a mediate and an immediateconstituentof y. Then for some y', y' is an immediateconstituentof y andx is a mediateconstituentof y'. Now (1) y' is distinctfromx; for otherwise,x would be a mediateconstituent of itself, which is contraryto Foundation.Furthermore, by Subsumptionand the transitivity of the relation< for spatial inclusion, it follows that (2) x<y'. But the conclusions (1) and (2) are contraryto Non-inclusion. 21 The left-to-right direction follows immediately from the axiom. The right-to-left directionfollows by definitionof mediateconstitution.

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Axiomc3(i) No two constituencypaths ever have the same originx and the same destinationy. The strengthened exclusionaryassumptioncan be derived from a strengthening of Non-inclusion: (c) Disjointness (for constituents).No two immediateconstituentsof a thing overlap; (d) Non-nullity (for constituents).Any constituenthas non-null spatial extension.22 These underlyingassumptionsarerather plausiblefor the objectsof the central ontology. One possible kind of counterexampleto ConstituentDisjointness is illustrated by the case of the neck overlappingwith the head. But we may suppose that it is indeterminate where the boundariesof the head and neck lie. Although it is possible to drawthe boundariesof eitherso thatthereis overlap,it is not possible so to drawthe boundariesof them both;the head must begin wherethe neck ends. Anotherpossible kind of counterexampleis illustratedby the case of a leg and a table top having some glue in common. But we may suppose that,properly speaking,the constituentsof the table are the leg and the top withoutthe glue and the glue itself. However, such responses are less plausible for other cases. One might maintain, for example, that two highways may both be immediate constituents of a highway system and yet overlap; and it is implausible in this case to suppose either that there is some indeterminate boundarybetween the two roads or that the areaof intersectionbelongs to neitherof them. All the same, there does seem to be some sort of presumptionin favourof the axiom and the underlyingassumptions.It does seem to be true, in a way that is hard to make precise, that any counter-example to these principles is to be regardedas an abnormalcase. A special problemover ConstituentDisjointness may arise for Aristotle from of his view, the elements his accountof uniformmatter.Foron one understanding
22Theproof goes as follows. Say that a path from x to y is accompanied if there is anotherpath from x to y. Suppose that there is an accompaniedpath. Let x=xl, x2,.. . Xn= suchpath.Thenxn I is suchpath;andlet x=x'1,X'2,... x'm=y be another y be a shortest distinct from x'm l, since otherwise xi, x2,... xn-I would be a shorteraccompaniedpath. So, by Disjointness, xn-I andx'm-1are spatiallydisjoint. By SubsumptionandTransitivity to Non-nullity. of <, x=x1 < xn-I andx=x'l <x1lm_1, contrary It is worthnoting thatthe some of the spatialassumptionsso far made can also be used to justify Foundation.We must make the additionalassumptionsthat (i) any thing with a constituenthas at least two constituentsand that(ii) thereis a non-zerolimit to the size of the spatialregion occupied by any thing. With the help of Disjointness and Subsumption, we then see that any violation of Foundationwould requirethe size of the constituentsto get indefinitely small. However, it is not clear that (i) is a justifiable assumption;and it is certainlynot justified forAristotle,who would take the sole constituentof a man to be his body or of a quantity of earthto be its ultimatematter.

Aristotle onMatter 53 and hence the spatiallocation of which constituteflesh, let us say, interpenetrate each of them will be the same as that of the flesh itself.23But even on such an it would still be possible to save the strongerform of our excluunderstanding, sionary hypothesis. For the notion of spatial location played ratheran abstract role in its proof. Supposenow thatwe substitutefor the spatiallocation of a thing its materialcontent,i.e. the mereological sum of the ultimatematterwhich constitutesit. Then the proof from the analogueof ConstituentDisjointness will still go through. Even the strongerprinciple is not sufficient to rule out all cases of multiple for it is still possible to have repeatedoccurrencesacrosstrees, rather occurrence; than within a tree. Say that: Definition 2. Two objects are unconnectedif they are not both mediate constituentsof a common object. The remainingpossibility may then be excluded by requiringthat: Axiomc 3(ii) No thing is the common constituentof two unconnected things. Let us define the notion of substancein the same way as before, but using the contributoryratherthan the holistic concept of constitution. Assume that any enmatteredobject is either a substanceor is a mediateconstituentof a substance (something which follows from Reverse Foundation).Then our assumptioncan be more simply renderedas: Axiomc3(ii)'. No two substanceshave any mediateconstituentin common. Together,the two axioms 3(i) and 3(ii) are equivalentto: Axiomc3 (UpwardLinearity).No thing is the immediateconstituentof two things. Thus this axiom serves to exclude all cases of multipleoccurrence;the difference between constituentand occurrence(between label and node) disappears.Given that Aristotle accepted the above three axioms (Foundation, Reverse Foundation, and Upward Linearity), the picture of his universe which then emerges is that of a collection of trees, ratherthan of sticks. The substancesfan out, as it were, as we move downwards,with each constituentpartoccupying its own uniqueposition. To derive axiom 3 from our spatial postulates, we need to derive the case describedunder axiom 3(ii), since the other case has alreadybeen take care of. This can be done by extending the ConstituentDisjointnessassumption: (c+) (Disjointnessfor the Unconnected)Any two unconnectedthings are spatiallydisjoint.24 Or given Reverse Foundation,we may more simply require:
23 This view is usually associatedwith the Stoics. See Chapter 6 of Sorabji(1988). But for reasons which I shall not go into, I think that the view may with some plausibilitybe attributed to Aristotle. 24 The proof proceeds in the same way as before.

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(c') (Disjointnessfor Substances).Any two substancesare spatiallydisjoint. These assumptions are not without their exceptions. Consider a sentence which is used ambiguously.Then it could be argued that two sentence tokens have been produced,each with its own meaning.Thus if neitherof the sentence tokens were a constituentof anythingelse, we would have a case in which two substances were spatially coincident. Or again, in regardto "heaps",someone may be a memberboth of a family and a gang, for example, even thoughthe two are unconnected. The assumptionsare also problematicin theirapplicationto straybits of matter; for it seems quite plausible to suppose of two straybits of matterwhich are not the matter of anything else that one may be properly included within the other.And nor does it help, in this case, to construecontentmateriallyratherthan spatially. One way out of the difficulty in this case is to deny the possibility of proper inclusion. Perhapsone only admits into the ontology those stray bits of matter which areof a piece and which arenot properlyincludedin any otherstraymatter which is of a piece. But it is interestingto note that anothersolution is open to Aristotle. For let it be assumed, compatiblywith properinclusion, that the constituents of a quantity of uniform matter interpenetrateand hence occupy the same location. Then axiomc 3(ii)' can be derived.25 But even thoughthereareexceptions to the axioms and assumptions,I am still inclined to thinkthatthere is a presumptionin favourof theirtruth,especially in applicationto the centralontology; and some account needs to be given of why this should be so. The explanation, I think, goes roughly as follows. The presumptionin favourof the principlesderives from the desirabilitythatthey should hold; and their desirability derives, in its turn, from the fact that a universe orderedin conformitywith them is more manageablethan one that is not. Thus the principlesderive from our attemptto make the universemanageable. There are two relevantaspects to our having a manageableconception of the universe,one relatingto the axioms (which merely concernconstituency)andthe other relatingto the assumptions(which also concern spatiallocation). The second of these, which is perhapsthe easier to understand, is thatthe things of inter25 Suppose thatx and are two substanceswith u as common y a (mediate)constituent. We know, from the previousreasoning,thatx andy cannotboth be substancesin the strict sense. So let us suppose thatx is a substancein the broadsense, i.e. a quantityof uniform matter.Then u must have the same location as x and hence the location of y must at least include that of x. But theny cannot be a substancein the strictsense and hence must also be a quantityof uniformmatter.So y must have the same location as x; and since they are both substances,they must be the same. On the otherhand, without interpenetration (and with the possibility of properinclusion), it hard to see how the axiom is to be defended. For suppose thatx is a substantialquantityof uniformmatterand that u is a constituentof x with a smaller spatiallocation. Let y be the partof x with the spatiallocation of u.Then presumablyy is also a substancewith x as a constituent.

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est to us shouldbe readilydiscernible.Now things are discernedin termsof their and it is in generalhardto see how the boundariesareto be discerned boundaries; if the things overlap. Thus the various disjointness assumptionscan be seen as partof a formatwhich will facilitatethe discernmentof boundaries. The special constituency axioms follow from the spatial assumptionsand so can be indirectly motivated in the same way. But they also have a more direct motivation in terms of our ability to track the consequences of change. For the purposesof predictionand control, we would like to limit the changes which are conceptually dependent upon a given change. In particular,we would like to limit those changes which are induced by the replacementof one constituentby another.Now two obvious requirementsto impose in this regard are that, in replacing an immediate constituent, one does not affect any other immediate constituentor any unconnectedthing. But it is exactly the constituency axioms is met. For example, if we had u an immewhich guaranteethatthis requirement diate constituent of y and z, and y and z immediate constituents of x, then in replacingy with the resulty' of replacingu in y with u', we would also be effecting a change in z.

4. Linearization
I want to consider the question of how, and to what extent, the two accounts of constitutionmight be reconciled. Let us call the notion of constitutionfrom the previous sectionpartial and the notion from the section before that singular. Then one possibility is to deny that there are any partial, as opposed to singular, constituents.Anything which we take to be a partialconstituentis in reality a partof a singularconstituent.Consider,for example, the sequenceof letters"cat".Then one naturallytakes its constituentsto be the letters "c", "a"and "t".But on the proposedview, the (single) constituentof the expression is in fact some collective of the three symbols. what we There are various things wrong with this view. First, it is arbitrary take the collective to be; it could be a set, a mereological sum or somethingelse in a altogether.Thus the accountof the constituentsof an object seems arbitrary way in which it should not. Second, the mannerin which a complex such as a sequence is formed from its constituents should not depend upon the internal structureof those constituents;we should not have to reach inside the constituents, as it were. Finally, there are, as we shall see, certaintechnical difficulties which arise from the possibility of constituentsthemselves having constituents. The view is also not Aristotle's. For as we have alreadynoted, there is reason to suppose thatAristotle would have been willing to countenancea pluralityof immediateconstituents. A second possibility is to treat the singular relation of constitution as the restrictionof the partialrelation to those cases in which there is no competing constituent.Thus we may say that0 is a constituentof IOI but not thatit is a con-

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stituentof 0, 11; and Aristotle might say that the body was a constituentof the man but not that anything was a constituentof the body. Certainly,such a proposal would deliver the right formal properties for linear constitution. But it would not deliverthe rightmeaning.We would be forcedto say, for example,that the body was the ultimatematterof the man, since there was no singularconstituent for the body. The final, and most plausible,possibility is to take the notion of singularconstitutionto be the resultof linearizingthe notion of partialconstitution.The tree, which is used to representthe constituencystructure of a given thing,is somehow convertedinto a branch. The topic of linearizinga structure is one which can be treatedwith mathematical precision. A linearizationmay be identified with some kind of homomorphism or partitionon the structure. Variouslinearizationprocedurescan then be consideredandplayed off againstvariousconditionsthatone might wantthem to satisfy.A very familiarlinearization,for example, is given by the notion of rank in set theory;and it can be characterized as the most coarse-grained linearization which is subjectto the condition thatxey -*f(x) <f(y). There are difficulties, in the presentcase, in understanding how the linearization is to proceed;and we may illustratewhat these difficulties are, thoughwithout any great precision, by means of a simple example. Consider the constituency structurecorrespondingto a set of the form {x, Iy I. This may be depicted as follows: a

d How then is such a structure to be linearized? One possibility is to treatb and c as one, so that a has the collective b, c as a constituent,which has d as a constituent.Anotherpossibility is to treatb and d as one, so thata has c as a constituentwhich has the collective b, d as a constituent. Yet a thirdpossibility is also to treata and c as one so that the collective a, c has the collective b, d as its constituent. It is not clear on what basis one should prefereither of these linearizationsto the others.Nor is it clear thatany of them is satisfactoryin its own right.The first suffersfrom the fact thatultimateconstituentsare not treatedas one (so thatthere

on Matter 57 Aristotle is no one thing which, properlyspeaking,is the ultimatematter).The second suffers from the fact that b in the constituency of b, d in c is left dangling; even thoughb is a constituent,it is not a constituentof any componentof thatof which b, d is a constituent.And the thirdpossibility suffers from the fact that the topmost point a (the "substanfce") is identifiedwith somethingelse. To some extent these difficulties can be mitigated if each bottom-mostpoint in the structure has at least depth 2 (i.e., is at least two steps away from the topmost point). Forwe can then treatthe bottom-mostpoints as one andthe top-most point as one. But even so, we still have a choice as to whetherto slice downwards or upwards.Thus one strategyis to treatall of the immediateconstituentsof the top-mostpoint as one, all of their immediateconstituentsas one, and so on until we reach a set of points which contains a penultimateconstituent,in which case all of the remainingpoints are also placed in the set. Or we can follow the related strategyof workingfrom the bottom up. The two strategieswill yield the same resultonly if each bottom-mostpoint in the given structurehas the same depth, i.e. only if each complete branchof the constituencytree has the same length. But there seems to be no reason (even in the context of Aristotelianmetaphysics)why this shouldbe true.Thereis nothing to prevent a mixture,for example, from being constitutedby ingredientswhich are at differentlevels in the hylomorphichierarchy. Of course, this is not to say thatin particular cases theremay be no naturalway of linearizing. Indeed, Aristotle's own division of the constituents of a living thing into the body, the non-uniformparts, the uniformparts, and the elements provides such an account. All that is being claimed is that there is no general method of linearization,one thatworks uniformlyin each case, regardlessof the natureof the subject-matter. PhilosophyDepartment Universityof Californiaat Los Angeles 405 HilgardAvenue Los Angeles CA 90024 USA REFERENCES Dummett,M. 1973: Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duckworth:London. Fine, K. 1983: "Aristotleon Substance",unpublishedpaper. 1992: "A Puzzle ConcerningMatterand Form",to appearin the Proceedings of the 1990 OxfordConferenceon Aristotle'sMetaphysics. Sorabji,R. 1983: Time,Creation and the Continuum.Ithaca,NY: Comell University Press. 1988: Matter,Space, Motion. Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity Press. KIT FINE