Ganzon v CA 200 SCRA 271 (1991) Facts: Petitioner manifested that there is still an existing preliminary injunction issued

by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil Action No. 18312. Under the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second preventive suspension has been affirmed; under the present resolution, said second preventive suspension has been served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City has been rendered moot and academic, insofar as the second preventive suspension order is concerned. Issue: When will petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as mayor of Iloilo City. Decision: As we have ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders decreed in the main decision and in the light of the finding of this Court that the fourth preventive suspension order has been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840; have also become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof. WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is hereby GRANTED. The temporary restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents are ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective immediately.

SUCALDITO VS MONTEJO (LABAD) G.R. No. 75080 PADILLA ; February 6, 1991

Facts Sucaldito spouses were grantees, by way of free patent, of 2 parcels of public agricultural land. Both lots are situated in Davao del Sur. On 14 March 1972, the spouses then sold the lots to Labad. Labad took possession of the lots, fenced the area and planted trees thereon, harrowed the soil, and cultivated the lands. However, 3 months after, on 20 June 1975, spouses Sucaldito wrote Labad informing them that they desired to repurchase the lots. Labad sent a reply on July 2 but it was not received by the spouses. Thus, on July 10 the spouses brought an action for reconveyance before the RTC of Davao del Sur The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses, declaring that it had the right to repurchase the lots within 30 days from the date the decision becomes final. CA reversed on the ground of lack of offer on the part of the spouses to repurchase. An MFR was filed. CA granted the MFR and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Labad filed a MFR which was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari, the court dismissed the petition. Their MFR were denied as well with finality. The spouses On 13 July 1983 again wrote Labad of their desire to repurchase the lands. Labad replied by saying that the spouses right to repurchase had terminated on 19 September 1982, and, at the latest, on 7 January 1983.

ISSUE: WON spouses Sucaldito had the right to repurchase the lot. HELD YES. The RTC ruled that the period to be followed for the petitioners to exercise their right of redemption is the period specified in the decision of the trial court and not the period provided in Sec. 119 of CA 141. The RTC in its 14 October 1976 decision, erred in ruling that the spouses had the right to repurchase but only within 30 days from the date the aforesaid decision became final. The right to repurchase being granted by law (Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141), no other legal restriction could be added thereto. To hold otherwise would sanction judicial legislation. Stated differently, the RTC amended what is expressly provided for in the law. And, while the law speaks of five (5) years from the date of conveyance within which to exercise the right to repurchase, the filing by spouses of the action for reconveyance on 10 July 1975 suspended the running of the redemption period and to have kept them within the protective mantle of Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Disposition WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. ABELLA V COMELEC 201 SCRA 253 GUTIERREZ; Sept 1, 1991

FACTS - Silvestre dela Cruz filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office - The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.

ISSUES 1.WON Larrazabal is disqualified from running for governor

2. WON the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified

HELD 1.Yes. The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES G.R. No. L-55960 CORTES; November 24, 1988

FACTS Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died leaving behind real and personal properties in Phils. Sy-Gonzales et al (respondents), alleged children, filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. This was opposed by (petitioners) YaoKee at al, alleging that Yao Kee is the legal wife of deceased, and the children of Yao Kee are their legitimate children. Probate court held in favor of Yao Kee et al. CA modified acknowledging respondents as natural children of Sy Kiat and held that marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat has not been legally proven. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE WON the marriage of Yao Kee with deceased was correctly proven

HELD NO.

- Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on testimonial and documentary evidence. Such evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom - A71 CC provides that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence- Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia. This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact And in this case, they were not able to prove it as under Rule 132.25of ROC DISPOSITION: CA decision affirmed.

BADUA v CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION 194 SCRA 101 J; February 14, 1991

FACTS: --The Maeng Tribe Council decided that the land was to belong to Quema and ordered Badua to vacate the land. However, Badua and wife failed to vacate such land. Spouses Badua filed a petition for specialrelief,.Respondents alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The tribal court is composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular courts, without the intervention of lawyers. -The respondents contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case since the tribal court is NOT a part of the judicial system. ISSUE: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: No. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. -Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec.1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. The decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.

LATASA V COMELEC 417 SCRA 601 AZCUNA; Dec 10, 2003

NATURE Certiorari (Rule 65) challenging resolution issued by 1st Division of COMELEC (April 27, 2001, SPA Case No. 01-059, Romeo Sunga v Arsenio Latasa) and the Resolution of COMELEC en banc denying herein petitioners MFR. The assailed Resolution denied due course to the certificate of candidacy of Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted, and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and void. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.

HELD 1. NO. As seen in these provisions, SC notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. SC also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC, he should be deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held in Labo that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the elections. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created which should be filled by succession. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

FACTS - Consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of EO 220, which created the Cordilllera Administrative region, on the ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite. Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized.

ISSUES WON the President has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras

HELD NO - EO 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. - Petitioners failed to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be overemphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220. Dispositive Petition dismissed for lack of merit

MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG v. Judge MOYA 166 SCRA 70 PARAS; September 29, 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking the reversal of the order of the then CFI of Davao denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

FACTS - From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, Pres. Carlos P. Garcia created the Municipality of Santo Tomas which now asserts jurisdiction over 8 barrios of the former. On several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of respondent, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, to the Provincial Board of Davao. However, no action was taken. - Respondent then filed a complaint with the then CFI of Davao, presided over by Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected taxes and damages. - The Municipality of Kapalong filed its Answer and later also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the lower court and lack of legal personality of the Municipality of Santo Tomas. Judge Moya denied the motion to dismiss and the 2 MFRs. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE WON the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

HELD NO. Reasoning Rule 3, Section 1 of the ROC provides that only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." As ruled in Pelaez vs Auditor General, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since the Municipality of Sto. Tomas has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, Judge Moya should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.

Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Orders of respondent Judge are SET ASIDE and the Civil Case is DISMISSED. The restraining order previously issued by this Court is made permanent.

RURAL BANK OF MAKATI V. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI 433 SCRA 362 QUISUMBING, JULY 2, 2004

FACTS: Valero, the municipal attorney of Makati, upon request of the municipal treasurer, went to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the banks payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. Bank claimed exemption under RA 720. Makati filed complaint for violation of Section 21 (a), Chapter II, Article 3 of the Metropolitan Tax Code. Also, information for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 122 and 39 for nonpayment of mayors permit fee, and Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 8203, for non-payment of annual business tax. -RTC: dismissed banks complaint. CA affirmed RTC. ISSUES: WON petitioner bank is liable to pay business taxes and mayors permit fees HELD: Bank cannot claim refund as it cannot substantiated their claim. Still liable to pay business taxes and mayors fees. Previously, the bank was exempted by RA 720 from all taxes, charges and fees. However, on December 17, 1986, EO 93 withdrew all tax duty and incentives. Therefore, bank was not exempted anymore. However, while the bank is claiming a refund of P57,854.00, they lacked evidence to support their computation of the amount to be refunded.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 17, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v CA March 31, 2000; Purisima 329 SCRA 314 NATURE Petition for review seeking to nullify the dismissal by the CA of the original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner against the City Mayor Cabili (CM) and City Legal Officer Cahanap (CLO) of Iligan and the Samahang Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOPI)- Iligan Chapter. ISSUE WON the imposition of special conditions in the business permit was a valid exercise police power by the City Mayor (Hence petitioner is estopped from questioning it) HELD No. The business permit granted by the CM to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the CA that the CM acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Petitioner assails the conditions imposed in its particular case which, it complains, amount to a confiscation of the business in which petitioner is engaged.

BINAY and MAKATI V DOMINGO and COA 201 SCRA 508 PARAS; September 11, 1991 FACTS: Makati approved Resolution No. 60 which ratified the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the mayor, extending financial assistance of P500 to a bereaved family, taken out of unappropriated available funds from the municipal treasury. Qualified beneficiaries are those whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000/mo. Makati passed Resolution No. 243, reaffirming Resolution No. 60; however, with the program stayed by the COA decision, Binay filed this special civil action for certiorari praying that Decision No. 1159 be declared null and void. ISSUE: WON the Resolutions fall under the municipalitys police power HELD: YES. Whilst police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations, the latter may exercise such power upon a valid delegation by legislature, whether express or inferred from the mere creation of the municipality. Such inference stems from the fact that the municipal corporation can only fully accomplish the object of its creation and perform its governmental functions through such powers. The police power of a municipal corporation extends to all great public needs and includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It is not limited to maintaining peace, health, security, etc. but exists so as to bring the greatest welfare to all by promoting public convenience or general prosperity and the preservation of the comfort of its inhabitants. PREMISES CONSIDERED, COA Decision No. 1159 is SET ASIDE

PEOPLE VS FAJARDO REYES; August 29, 1958

FACTS Fajardo and Babilonia was convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. ISSUE WON the Ordinance is unconstitutional HELD: YES. Under the ordinance in question the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL V JAC LINER 452 SCRA 174 CARPIO-MORALES; Feb 23, 2005

FACTS: Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances. LGCT, claiming legal interest as the grantee of the exclusive franchise for the operation of the common terminal was allowed to intervene in the petition before the trial court. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. MFR was again denied resulting to another petition for review to SC. ISSUES: WON the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances. HELD: Yes, there was improper exercise of police power. SC found that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS G.R. No. 148408 CORONA; July 14, 2006

FACTS - Parayno was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. SB recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. Parayno moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. Hence, she filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the RTC of Dagupan City. TC held that there is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Following the principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling station falls within the ambit of Section 44. The gasoline filling station endangers the lives and safety of people because once there is fire, the establishment and houses nearby will be razed to the ground. MFR denied. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: WON the legal maxim of ejusdem generis apply to the case.

HELD: NO. The zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between gasoline service station and gasoline filling station. The ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and distinct from each other. Even respondent municipalitys counsel admitted this dissimilarity during the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.